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Sunday, October 20, 2019

Ethnic conflict

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"Чеченская молитва" (Chechen's prayer) by Mikhail Evstafiev depicts a Chechen man praying during the battle of Grozny in 1995.
 
A refugee camp for displaced Tutsi in Zaire following the Rwandan Genocide of 1994.
 
Detained children and juveniles lying on matresses within a caged area in the Ursula detention facility in McAllen, Texas. The apprehension of thousands of immigrants coming mainly from Central America in detention camps as a result of the Donald Trump's administration family separation policy has been seen as a type of racial conflict by many.

An ethnic conflict is a conflict between two or more contending ethnic groups. While the source of the conflict may be political, social, economic or religious, the individuals in conflict must expressly fight for their ethnic group's position within society. This final criterion differentiates ethnic conflict from other forms of struggle.

Academic explanations of ethnic conflict generally fall into one of three schools of thought: primordialist, instrumentalist or constructivist. Recently, several political scientists have argued for either top-down or bottom-up explanations for ethnic conflict. Intellectual debate has also focused on whether ethnic conflict has become more prevalent since the end of the Cold War, and on devising ways of managing conflicts, through instruments such as consociationalism and federalisation.

Theories of causes

The causes of ethnic conflict are debated by political scientists and sociologists. Explanations generally fall into one of three schools of thought: primordialist, instrumentalist, and constructivist. More recent scholarship draws on all three schools.

Primordialist accounts

Proponents of primordialist accounts argue that "[e]thnic groups and nationalities exist because there are traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as biological features and especially territorial location". Primordialist accounts rely on strong ties of kinship among members of ethnic groups. Donald L. Horowitz argues that this kinship "makes it possible for ethnic groups to think in terms of family resemblances".

Clifford Geertz, a founding scholar of primordialism, asserts that each person has a natural connection to perceived kinsmen. In time and through repeated conflict, essential ties to one's ethnicity will coalesce and will interfere with ties to civil society. Ethnic groups will consequently always threaten the survival of civil governments but not the existence of nations formed by one ethnic group. Thus, when considered through a primordial lens, ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic society is inevitable. 

A number of political scientists argue that the root causes of ethnic conflict do not involve ethnicity per se but rather institutional, political, and economic factors. These scholars argue that the concept of ethnic war is misleading because it leads to an essentialist conclusion that certain groups are doomed to fight each other when in fact the wars between them that occur are often the result of political decisions.

Moreover, primordial accounts do not account for the spatial and temporal variations in ethnic violence. If these "ancient hatreds" are always simmering under the surface and are at the forefront of people's consciousness, then ethnic groups should constantly be ensnared in violence. However, ethnic violence occurs in sporadic outbursts. For example, Varshney points out that although Yugoslavia broke up due to ethnic violence in the 1990s, it had enjoyed a long peace of decades before the USSR collapsed. Therefore, some scholars claim that it is unlikely that primordial ethnic differences alone caused the outbreak of violence in the 1990s.

Primordialists have reformulated the "ancient hatreds" hypothesis and have focused more on the role of human nature. Peterson argues that the existence of hatred and animosity does not have to be rooted in history for it to play a role in shaping human behavior and action: "If "ancient hatred" means a hatred consuming the daily thoughts of great masses of people, then the "ancient hatreds" argument deserves to be readily dismissed. However, if hatred is conceived as a historically formed "schema" that guides action in some situations, then the conception should be taken more seriously."

Instrumentalist accounts

Anthony Smith notes that the instrumentalist account "came to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s in the United States, in the debate about (white) ethnic persistence in what was supposed to have been an effective melting pot". This new theory sought explained persistence as the result of the actions of community leaders, "who used their cultural groups as sites of mass mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources, because they found them more effective than social classes". In this account of ethnic identification, ethnicity and race are viewed as instrumental means to achieve particular ends.

Whether ethnicity is a fixed perception or not is not crucial in the instrumentalist accounts. Moreover, the scholars of this school generally do not oppose the view that ethnic difference plays a part in many conflicts. They simply claim that ethnic difference is not sufficient to explain conflicts.

Mass mobilization of ethnic groups can only be successful if there are latent ethnic differences to be exploited, otherwise politicians would not even attempt to make political appeals based on ethnicity and would focus instead on economic or ideological appeals. For these reasons, it is difficult to completely discount the role of inherent ethnic differences. Additionally, ethnic entrepreneurs, or elites, could be tempted to mobilize ethnic groups in order to gain their political support in democratizing states. Instrumentalists theorists especially emphasize this interpretation in ethnic states in which one ethnic group is promoted at the expense of other ethnicities.

Furthermore, ethnic mass mobilization is likely to be plagued by collective action problems, especially if ethnic protests are likely to lead to violence. Instrumentalist scholars have tried to respond to these shortcomings. For example, Hardin argues that ethnic mobilization faces problems of coordination and not collective action. He points out that a charismatic leader acts as a focal point around which members of an ethnic group coalesce. The existence of such an actor helps to clarify beliefs about the behavior of others within an ethnic group.

Constructivist accounts

A third, constructivist, set of accounts stress the importance of the socially constructed nature of ethnic groups, drawing on Benedict Anderson's concept of the imagined community. Proponents of this account point to Rwanda as an example because the Tutsi/Hutu distinction was codified by the Belgian colonial power in the 1930s on the basis of cattle ownership, physical measurements and church records. Identity cards were issued on this basis, and these documents played a key role in the genocide of 1994.

Some argue that constructivist narratives of historical master cleavages are unable to account for local and regional variations in ethnic violence. For example, Varshney highlights that in the 1960s "racial violence in the USA was heavily concentrated in northern cities; southern cities though intensely politically engaged, did not have riots". A constructivist master narrative is often a country level variable whereas we often have to study incidences of ethnic violence at the regional and local level.
Scholars of ethnic conflict and civil wars have introduced theories that draw insights from all three traditional schools of thought. In The Geography of Ethnic Violence, Monica Duffy Toft shows how ethnic group settlement patterns, socially constructed identities, charismatic leaders, issue indivisibility, and state concern with precedent setting can lead rational actors to escalate a dispute to violence, even when doing so is likely to leave contending groups much worse off. Such research addresses empirical puzzles that are difficult to explain using primordialist, instrumentalist, or constructivist approaches alone. As Varshney notes, "pure essentialists and pure instrumentalists do not exist anymore".

Study in the post-Cold War world

The end of the Cold War thus sparked interest in two important questions about ethnic conflict: whether ethnic conflict was on the rise and whether given that some ethnic conflicts had escalated into serious violence, what, if anything, could scholars of large-scale violence (security studies, strategic studies, interstate politics) offer by way of explanation.

One of the most debated issues relating to ethnic conflict is whether it has become more or less prevalent in the post–Cold War period. At the end of the Cold War, academics including Samuel P. Huntington and Robert D. Kaplan predicted a proliferation of conflicts fueled by civilisational clashes, Tribalism, resource scarcity and overpopulation.

The post–Cold War period has witnessed a number of ethnically-informed secessionist movements, predominantly within the former communist states. Conflicts have involved secessionist movements in the former Yugoslavia, Transnistria in Moldova, Armenians in Azerbaijan, Abkhaz and Ossetians in Georgia. Outside the former communist bloc, ethno-separatist strife in the same period has occurred in areas such as Sri Lanka, West Papua, Chiapas, East Timor, the Basque Country, Catalonia, Southern Sudan and Hazaras in Afghanistan under the Taliban.

However, some theorists contend that this does not represent a rise in the incidence of ethnic conflict, because many of the proxy wars fought during the Cold War as ethnic conflicts were actually hot spots of the Cold War. Research shows that the fall of Communism and the increase in the number of capitalist states were accompanied by a decline in total warfare, interstate wars, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, and the number of refugees and displaced persons. Indeed, some scholars have questioned whether the concept of ethnic conflict is useful at all. Others have attempted to test the "clash of civilisations" thesis, finding it to be difficult to operationalise and that civilisational conflicts have not risen in intensity in relation to other ethnic conflicts since the end of the Cold War.

A key question facing scholars who attempt to adapt their theories of interstate violence to explain or predict large-scale ethnic violence is whether ethnic groups could be considered "rational" actors. Prior to the end of the Cold War, the consensus among students of large-scale violence was that ethnic groups should be considered irrational actors, or semi-rational at best. If true, general explanations of ethnic violence would be impossible. In the years since, however, scholarly consensus has shifted to consider that ethnic groups may in fact be counted as rational actors, and the puzzle of their apparently irrational actions (for example, fighting over territory of little or no intrinsic worth) must therefore be explained in some other way. As a result, the possibility of a general explanation of ethnic violence has grown, and collaboration between comparativist and international-relations sub-fields has resulted in increasingly useful theories of ethnic conflict.

Public goods provision

A major source of ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic democracies is over the access to state patronage. Conflicts over state resources between ethnic groups can increase the likelihood of ethnic violence. In ethnically divided societies, demand for public goods decreases as each ethnic group derives more utility from benefits targeted at their ethnic group in particular. These benefits would be less valued if all other ethnic groups had access to them. Targeted benefits are more appealing because ethnic groups can solidify or heighten their social and economic status relative to other ethnic groups whereas broad programmatic policies will not improve their relative worth. Politicians and political parties in turn, have an incentive to favor co-ethnics in their distribution of material benefits. Over the long run, ethnic conflict over access to state benefits is likely to lead to the ethnification of political parties and the party system as a whole where the political salience of ethnic identity increase leading to a self-fulfilling equilibrium: If politicians only distribute benefits on an ethnic basis, voters will see themselves primarily belonging to an ethnic group and view politicians the same way. They will only vote for the politician belonging to the same ethnic group. In turn, politicians will refrain from providing public goods because it will not serve them well electorally to provide services to people not belonging to their ethnic group. In democratizing societies, this could lead to ethnic outbidding and lead to extreme politicians pushing out moderate co-ethnics. Patronage politics and ethnic politics eventually reinforce each other, leading to what Chandra terms a "patronage democracy".

The existence of patronage networks between local politicians and ethnic groups make it easier for politicians to mobilize ethnic groups and instigate ethnic violence for electoral gain since the neighborhood or city is already polarized along ethnic lines. The dependence of ethnic groups on their co-ethnic local politician for access to state resources is likely to make them more responsive to calls of violence against other ethnic groups. Therefore, the existence of these local patronage channels generates incentives for ethnic groups to engage in politically motivated violence.

While the link between ethnic heterogeneity and under provision of public goods is generally accepted, there is little consensus around the causal mechanism underlying this relationship. To identify possible causal stories, Humphreys and Habyarimana ran a series of behavioral games in Kampala, Uganda, that involved several local participants completing joint tasks and allocating money amongst them. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, they find that participants did not favor the welfare of their co-ethnics disproportionately. It was only when anonymity was removed and everyone's ethnicity was known did co-ethnics decide to favor each other. Humphreys and Habyarimana argue that cooperation among co-ethnics is primarily driven by reciprocity norms that tend to be stronger among co-ethnics. The possibility of social sanctions compelled those who would not otherwise cooperate with their co-ethnics to do so. The authors find no evidence to suggest that co-ethnics display a greater degree of altruism towards each other or have the same preferences. Ethnic cooperation takes place because co-ethnics have common social networks and therefore can monitor each other and can threaten to socially sanction any transgressors.

Institutional ethnic conflict resolution

A number of scholars have attempted to synthesize the methods available for the resolution, management or transformation of their ethnic conflict. John Coakley, for example, has developed a typology of the methods of conflict resolution that have been employed by states, which he lists as: indigenization, accommodation, assimilation, acculturation, population transfer, boundary alteration, genocide and ethnic suicide. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary have developed a taxonomy of eight macro-political ethnic conflict regulation methods, which they note are often employed by states in combination with each other. They include a number of methods that they note are clearly morally unacceptable. 

With increasing interest in the field of ethnic conflict, many policy analysts and political scientists theorized potential resolutions and tracked the results of institutional policy implementation. As such, theories often focus on which Institutions are the most appropriate for addressing ethnic conflict.

Consociationalism

Consociationalism is a power sharing agreement which coopts the leaders of ethnic groups into the central state's government. Each nation or ethnic group is represented in the government through a supposed spokesman for the group. In the power sharing agreement, each group has veto powers to varying degrees, dependent on the particular state. Moreover, the norm of proportional representation is dominant: each group is represented in the government in a percentage that reflects the ethnicity's demographic presence in the state. Another requirement for Arend Lijphart is that the government must be composed of a "grand coalition" of the ethnic group leaders which supposes a top-down approach to conflict resolution.

In theory, this leads to self governance and protection for the ethnic group. Many scholars maintain that since ethnic tension erupts into ethnic violence when the ethnic group is threatened by a state, then veto powers should allow the ethnic group to avoid legislative threats. Switzerland is often characterized as a successful consociationalist state.

A recent example of a consociational government is the post-conflict Bosnian government that was agreed upon in the Dayton Accords in 1995. A tripartite presidency was chosen and must have a Croat, a Serb, and a Bosniak. The presidents take turns acting as the forefront executive in terms of 8 months for 4 years. Many have credited this compromise of a consociational government in Bosnia for the end of the violence and the following long-lasting peace.

In contrast to Lijphart, several political scientists and policy analysts have condemned consociationalism. One of the many critiques is that consociationalism locks in ethnic tensions and identities. This assumes a primordial stance that ethnic identities are permanent and not subject to change. Furthermore, this does not allow for any "others" that might want to partake in the political process. As of 2012 a Jewish Bosnian is suing the Bosnian government from precluding him from running for presidential office since only a Croat, Serb, or Bosniak can run under the consociational government. Determining ethnic identities in advance and implementing a power sharing system on the basis of these fixed identities is inherently discriminatory against minority groups that might be not be recognized. Moreover, it discriminates against those who do not choose to define their identity on an ethnic or communal basis. In power sharing-systems that are based on pre-determined identities, there is a tendency to rigidly fix shares of representation on a permanent basis which will not reflect changing demographics over time. The categorization of individuals in particular ethnic groups might be controversial anyway and might in fact fuel ethnic tensions. 

The inherent weaknesses in using pre-determined ethnic identities to form power sharing systems has led Ljiphart to argue that adopting a constructivist approach to consociationalism can increase its likelihood of success. The self-determination of ethnic identities is more likely to be "non-discriminatory, neutral, flexible and self-adjusting". For example, in South Africa, the toxic legacy of apartheid meant that successful consociation could only be built on the basis of the self-determination of groups. Ljiphart claims that because ethnic identities are often "unclear, fluid and flexible," self-determination is likely to be more successful than pre-determination of ethnic groups. A constructivist approach to consociational theory can therefore strengthen its value as a method to resolve ethnic conflict.

Another critique points to the privileging of ethnic identity over personal political choice. Howard has deemed consociationalism as a form of ethnocracy and not a path to true pluralistic democracy. Consociationalism assumes that a politician will best represent the will of his co-ethnics above other political parties. This might lead to the polarization of ethnic groups and the loss of non-ethnic ideological parties.

Horowitz has argued that a single transferable vote system could prevent the ethnification of political parties because voters cast their ballots in order of preference. This means that a voter could cast some of his votes to parties other than his co-ethnic party. This in turn would compel political parties to broaden their manifestos to appeal to voters across the ethnic divide to hoover up second and third preference votes.

Federalism

The theory of implementing federalism in order to curtail ethnic conflict assumes that self-governance reduces "demands for sovereignty". Hechter argues that some goods such as language of education and bureaucracy must be provided as local goods, instead of statewide, in order to satisfy more people and ethnic groups. Some political scientists such as Stroschein contend that ethnofederalism, or federalism determined along ethnic lines, is "asymmetric" as opposed to the equal devolution of power found in non-ethnic federal states, such as the United States. In this sense, special privileges are granted to specific minority groups as concessions and incentives to end violence or mute conflict.

The Soviet Union divided its structure into ethno-federal sub-states termed Union Republics. The sub-state was named after a titular minority who inhabited the area as a way to Sovietize nationalist sentiments during the 1920s. Brubaker asserts that these titular republics were formed in order to absorb any potential elite led nationalist movements against the Soviet center by incentivizing elite loyalty through advancement in the Soviet political structure.

Thus, federalism provides some self-governance for local matters in order to satisfy some of the grievances which might cause ethnic conflict among the masses. Moreover, federalism brings in the elites and ethnic entrepreneurs into the central power structure; this prevents a resurgence of top-down ethnic conflict.

Nevertheless, after the fall of the USSR many critiques of federalism as an institution to resolve ethnic conflict emerged. The devolution of power away from the central state can weaken ties to the central state. Moreover, the parallel institutions created to serve a particular nation or ethnic group might provide significant resources for Secession from the central state. As most states are unwilling to give up an integral portion of their territory, secessionist movements may trigger violence.

Furthermore, some competing elite political players may not be in power; they would remain unincorporated into the central system. These competing elites can gain access through federal structures and their resources to solidify their political power in the structure. According to V.P. Gagnon this was the case in the former Yugoslavia and its violent disintegration into its ethno-federal sub-states. Ethnic entrepreneurs were able to take control of the institutionally allocated resources to wage war on other ethnic groups.

Non-territorial autonomy

A recent theory of ethnic tension resolution is non-territorial autonomy or NTA. NTA has emerged in recent years as an alternative solution to ethnic tensions and grievances in places that are likely to breed conflict. For this reason, NTA has been promoted as a more practical and state building solution than consociationalism. NTA, alternatively known as non-cultural autonomy (NCA), is based on the difference of jus solis and jus sanguinis, the principles of territory versus that of personhood. It gives rights to ethnic groups to self-rule and govern matters potentially concerning but limited to: education, language, culture, internal affairs, religion, and the internally established institutions needed to promote and reproduce these facets. In contrast to federalism, the ethnic groups are not assigned a titular sub-state, but rather the ethnic groups are dispersed throughout the state unit. Their group rights and autonomy are not constrained to a particular territory within the state. This is done in order not to weaken the center state such as in the case of ethnofederalism.

The origin of NTA can be traced back to the Marxists works of Otto Bauer and Karl Renner. NTA was employed during the interwar period, and the League of Nations sought to add protection clauses for national minorities in new states. In the 1920s, Estonia granted some cultural autonomy to the German and Jewish populations in order to ease conflicts between the groups and the newly independent state.

In Europe, most notably in Belgium, NTA laws have been enacted and created parallel institutions and political parties in the same country. In Belgium, NTA has been integrated within the federal consociational system. Some scholars of ethnic conflict resolution claim that the practice of NTA will be employed dependent on the concentration and size of the ethnic group asking for group rights.

Other scholars, such as Clarke, argue that the successful implementation of NTA rests on the acknowledgement in a state of "universal" principles: true Rule of Law, established human rights, stated guarantees to minorities and their members to use their own quotidien language, religion, and food practices, and a framework of anti-discrimination legislation in order to enforce these rights. Moreover, no individual can be forced to adhere, identify, or emphasize a particular identity (such as race, gender, sexuality, etc.) without their consent in order for NTA to function for its purpose.

Nonetheless, Clarke critiques the weaknesses of NTA in areas such as education, a balance between society wide norms and intracommunity values; policing, for criminal matters and public safety; and political representation, which limits the political choices of an individual if based solely on ethnicity. Furthermore, the challenge in evaluating the efficacy of NTA lies in the relatively few legal implementations of NTA.

Cultural rights

Emphasizing the limits of approaches that focus mainly on institutional answers to ethnic conflicts—which are essentially driven by ethnocultural dynamics of which political and/or economic factors are but elements—Gregory Paul Meyjes urges the use of intercultural communication and cultural-rights based negotiations as tools with which to effectively and sustainably address inter-ethnic strife. Meyjes argues that to fully grasp, preempt, and/or resolve such conflicts—whether with or without the aid of territorial or non-territorial institutional mechanism(s) -- a cultural rights approach grounded in intercultural knowledge and skill is essential.

Ethnic conflict resolution outside formal institutions

Informal inter-ethnic engagement

Institutionalist arguments for resolving ethnic conflict often focus on national-level institutions and do not account for regional and local variation in ethnic violence within a country. Despite similar levels of ethnic diversity in a country, some towns and cities have often found to be especially prone to ethnic violence. For example, Ashutosh Varshney, in his study of ethnic violence in India, argues that strong inter-ethnic engagement in villages often disincentivizes politicians from stoking ethnic violence for electoral gain. Informal interactions include joint participation in festivals, families from different communities eating together or allowing their children to play with one another. Every day engagement between ethnic groups at the village level can help to sustain the peace in the face of national level shocks like an ethnic riot in another part of the country. In times of ethnic tension, these communities can quell rumors, police neighborhoods and come together to resist any attempts by politicians to polarize the community. The stronger the inter-ethnic networks are, the harder it is for politicians to polarize the community even if it may be in their political interest to do so.

Formal inter-ethnic associations

However, in cities, where the population tends to be much higher, informal interactions between ethnic groups might not be sufficient to prevent violence. This is because many more links are needed to connect everyone, and therefore it is much more difficult to form and strengthen inter-ethnic ties. In cities, formal inter-ethnic associations like trade unions, business associations and professional organizations are more effective in encouraging inter-ethnic interactions that could prevent ethnic violence in the future. These organizations force ethnic groups to come together based on shared economic interests that overcomes any pre-existing ethnic differences. For example, inter-ethnic business organizations serve to connect the business interests of different ethnic groups which would increase their desire to maintain ethnic harmony. Any ethnic tension or outbreak of violence will go against their economic interests and therefore, over time, the salience of ethnic identity diminishes.

Interactions between ethnic groups in formal settings can also help countries torn apart by ethnic violence to recover and break down ethnic divisions. Paula Pickering, a political scientist, who studies peace-building efforts in Bosnia, finds that formal workplaces are often the site where inter-ethnic ties are formed. She claims that mixed workplaces lead to repeated inter-ethnic interaction where norms of professionalism compel everyone to cooperate and to treat each other with respect, making it easier for individuals belonging to the minority group to reach out and form relationships with everyone else. Nevertheless, Giuliano's research in Russia has shown that economic grievances, even in a mixed workplace, can be politicized on ethnic lines.

Examples of ethnic conflicts

United States

  • "War" or "possible war" is how the conflict between European Americans and African Americans has been thought of. Before the Civil War, many believed that it would be impossible for (free) blacks and whites to live together in the same country, what at the time was called "amalgamation". Since it was impractical to transport all the free blacks to Africa — aside from the fact that they didn't want it, there weren't enough ships even to keep up with the birthrate — they had to be kept in slavery, or exterminated. Slaves were afraid of this, while whites, even more so after Nat Turner's ferocious attack in 1831 on women and children, were also unsure of victory in a "race war".

Students for Sensible Drug Policy

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Students for Sensible Drug Policy logo.svg
Founded1998
FoundersShea Gunther, Kris Krane, Shawn Heller, Kris Lotlikar
TypeNonprofit
FocusDrug Policy, War on Drugs, Marijuana legalization, Drug checking, Psychedelics, Criminal justice reform
Area served
United States, United Kingdom, Austria, Bolivia, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Gambia, Ghana, India, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Nepal, New Zealand, Ireland, Mexico, Canada, Central and South America, Africa, Australia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Tanzania
Key people
Betty Aldworth, Anastacia Cosner, Scott Cecil, Jake Agliata, Lauren Padgett, Tyler Williams, Vilmarie Narloch, Luis Montoya, Elise Szabo, Kris Krane, Troy Dayton, Kris Lotlikar, Lauren Mendelsohn, Jesse Stout, KT Klens
Employees
9
Websitewww.ssdp.org

Students for Sensible Drug Policy (SSDP) is an international non-profit advocacy and education organization based in Washington D.C. SSDP is focused on reforming drug policy in the United States and internationally. SSDP is the only international network of students dedicated to ending the war on drugs. At its heart, SSDP is a grassroots organization, led by a student-run Board of Directors. SSDP creates change by bringing young people together and creating safe spaces for students of all political and ideological stripes to have honest conversations about drugs and drug policy. Founded in 1998, SSDP comprises thousands of members at hundreds of campuses in countries around the globe.
SSDP neither condones nor condemns drug use, and respects the right of individuals to make decisions about their own health and well-being. SSDP encourages honest conversation about the realities of the drug war, especially in light of misinformation contained in modern "anti-drug" ad campaigns or school programs. SSDP promotes youth civic engagement as a critical tool in reforming drug policy. SSDP respects the diverse experiences and identities of its constituents and encourages its members to undertake diversity training, some of which SSDP provides itself. Due to the drug war's relationship with the problem of mass incarceration, SSDP self-defines as an anti-racist organization.

History

In the fall of 1996, members of the Student Drug Reform Movement (SDRM) begin to chat over the internet using a Drug Reform Coordination Network (DRCNet) discussion page. In 1997, the Rochester Cannabis Coalition (RCC) at the Rochester Institute of Technology applied to become the first official student organization dedicated to fighting the War on Drugs; RIT denied RCC's application and ultimately expelled the lead organizer, Shea Gunther, who would go on to become an SSDP founder. In winter 1998, SDRM members at University of Massachusetts Amherst hosted a conference for about 50 students, many of whom would go on to join Shea in founding SSDP. 

That conference led to the First National Gathering in Washington, DC the following year, where attendees decided to collectively to form SSDP into a national organization and elect a board of directors composed of one representative from each of the five schools that had chapters operating under the SSDP name (Hampshire College, University of Wisconsin–Madison, George Washington University, American University, and Rochester Institute of Technology). SSDP undertook a series of actions and events which contributed to partial repeal of the Higher Education Act Aid Elimination Penalty (HEAAEP).

Chronology

January 2000 – First National Action. At and around the College Convention 2000 in New Hampshire, SSDP students protested the HEAAEP. 

Spring 2000 –First Loan Replacement Program. Hampshire College instituted the first HEAAEP loan replacement program and its president was the first to come out against the HEAAEP.

March 3, 2001 – Legislation to Repeal. A coalition of U.S. House Democrats introduced legislation that would repeal a moratorium on federal financial aid to college students with drug convictions, citing denial of aid for 8,162 students that school year.

March 15, 2001 – "Students VS. the Drug War." An article featuring SSDP appeared in Rolling Stone. HEAAEP victim Marisa Garcia '00 was profiled and the article marked SSDP's big break into public awareness.

Spring 2001 – Colleges Urge Change. Five Oregon colleges passed resolutions urging changes to the HEAAEP. Thirteen leading education associations representing admissions officers, community and state colleges, financial aid administrators and student groups sent a strongly worded letter outlining flaws in the HEAAEP to the head of the DEA.

February 2002 – Souder Confronted About HEAAEP. Members of SSDP attended an event to get long-awaited answers from Rep. Mark Souder (R-IN) about the HEAAEP legislation he authored.

2006 – Partial Repeal of the HEA. Congress, responding to pressure from SSDP and other advocates, scaled back the HEA Aid Elimination Penalty, taking away its "reachback effect" so that it would only affect students convicted for offenses that occur while they are enrolled in college and receiving aid.

SSDP has expanded from a single chapter in upstate New York created by a handful of students to a network of over 300 chapters worldwide.

Board

Students for Sensible Drug Policy is governed by a Board of Directors and a Board of Trustees, a designated body of the Board of Directors. The board of directors represents SSDP's chapters at the national level. At least two thirds of the members of SSDP's Board of Directors are students elected by SSDP's chapters each year during the organization's national Congress. Lauren Mendelsohn, University of California Irvine Law School, is the current Chair.

Members of the Board of Trustees are selected for their ability to bring expertise, experience, and resources to the organization.

Main issues

911 Good Samaritan policies

A campus Good Samaritan policy or medical amnesty policy is a policy designed to prevent students from hesitating to call for medical assistance in the event of a medical emergency related to alcohol or other drugs.

Just Say Know

Just Say Know, is a peer-to-peer drug education program, provides evidence-based drug information on campus, teaches students to recognize and address dangerous behaviors and attitudes, empowers them to reduce drug-related harm within their communities, and fosters analysis of the relationship between drug policy and drug use. Just Say Know provides a platform from which we create the values future generations will hold about drug policy and drug use culture as we move forward, valuing education over incarceration.

Global drug policy

SSDP participates in significant meetings on drug policy such as the annual Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) and the 2016 Special Session of the UN General Assembly on the World Drug Problem. The organization also coordinates youth participation in global campaigns such as Support. Don't Punish and International Overdose Awareness Day.

Marijuana policy reform

SSDP chapters provide the ground forces and the teams of volunteers for many large state and federal campaigns.

Students and chapters work on state and local marijuana policy reform by supporting legislation and ballot initiatives for decriminalization, medical marijuana, taxation and regulation, and lowest priority policies.

Pell Grants for incarcerated students

Students for Sensible Drug Policy partners with the College and Community Fellowship and The Fortune Society as part of the Education from the Inside Out Coalition to help remove barriers to higher education funding facing students in prison.

Harm reduction advocacy

Harm reduction is the act of mitigating the negative consequences associated with drug use. SSDP provides tools for its members to advocate for the implementation of harm reduction measures, as well as to engage in direct service work.

Psychedelic legalization

SSDP provides resources for its members to advocate for legalization of psychedelics.

Student drug testing

SSDP opposes student drug testing.

Campus chapters

SSDP is made up of students and community members organized on college and high school campuses across the world. In 2015–2016, SSDP chapters were on 320 campuses, included 4,312 student activists and engaged in 135 drug policy initiatives. Across the United States, there are eight regional divisions: Heartland, Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, Mountain, Northeast, Pacific, Southeast, and Southwest.

International

Several international chapters in 28 different countries across 5 continents engage in reform at community, national, and regional levels; represent the voices of youth from their countries at the United Nations; and share their experiences fighting the drug war with their fellow SSDPers all over the world. 

The SSDP international chapter network has doubled in size and international chapters.

Alumni Association

The SSDP Alumni Association is composed of individuals who determine their own activities and levels of involvement. Individuals are organized geographically into regional SSDP Alumni Associations based on where they currently reside. However, individuals may of course participate in other regional networks by joining additional regional SSDP Facebook groups (ex: if the region you attended school is different from where you currently live).

For each region, leadership boards consisting of a President, Vice President and Secretary will be responsible for coordinating alumni activities and involvement. During the pilot phase (2015), leadership board members have been appointed by staff. Leadership boards are elected in each region annually.

These boards are also responsible for managing the mentoring program by matching mentors and mentees, as well as training mentors on appropriate and effective mentorship.

DARE Committee

The Diversity, Awareness, Reflection, and Education committee (DARE) publishes a Monthly Mosaic to highlight the intersection between drug war, communities, and a broad range of issues.

Since its founding in March 2011, DARE has taken on the challenges of strengthening diversity in all its forms within SSDP. The committee endeavors to ensure that the range of perspectives & personal experiences of all communities and individuals negatively impacted in the War on Drugs are represented & integrated into SSDP & the drug policy reform movement at large. DARE does this by creating a welcoming, open, & safe space for all stakeholders.

Civil law (legal system)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Civil law, or civilian law, is a legal system originating in Europe, intellectualized within the framework of Roman law, the main feature of which is that its core principles are codified into a referable system which serves as the primary source of law. This can be contrasted with common law systems, the intellectual framework of which comes from judge-made decisional law, and gives precedential authority to prior court decisions, on the principle that it is unfair to treat similar facts differently on different occasions (doctrine of judicial precedent, or stare decisis).

Historically, a civil law is the group of legal ideas and systems ultimately derived from the Corpus Juris Civilis, but heavily overlaid by Napoleonic, Germanic, canonical, feudal, and local practices, as well as doctrinal strains such as natural law, codification, and legal positivism.

Conceptually, civil law proceeds from abstractions, formulates general principles, and distinguishes substantive rules from procedural rules. It holds case law secondary and subordinate to statutory law. Civil law is often paired with the inquisitorial system, but the terms are not synonymous.

There are key differences between a statute and a codal article. The most pronounced features of civil systems are their legal codes, with brief legal texts that typically avoid factually specific scenarios. The short articles in a civil law code deal in generalities and stand in contrast with statutory systems, which are often very long and very detailed.

Overview

The purpose of codification is to provide all citizens with manners and written collection of the laws which apply to them and which judges must follow. It is the most widespread system of law in the world, in force in various forms in about 150 countries. It draws heavily from Roman law, arguably the most intricate known legal system dating from before the modern era.

Where codes exist, the primary source of law is the law code, a systematic collection of interrelated articles, arranged by subject matter in some pre-specified order, that explain the principles of law, rights and entitlements, and how basic legal mechanisms work. Law codes are simply laws enacted by a legislature, even if they are in general much longer than other laws. Other major legal systems in the world include common law, Islamic law, Halakha, and canon law.

Legal systems of the world. Civil law based systems are in turquoise.
 
Civil law countries can be divided into:
  • those where Roman law in some form is still living law but there has been no attempt to create a civil code: Andorra and San Marino
  • those with uncodified mixed systems in which civil law is an academic source of authority but common law is also influential: Scotland and the Roman-Dutch law countries (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and Guyana)
  • those with codified mixed systems in which civil law is the background law but has its public law heavily influenced by common law: Puerto Rico, Philippines, Quebec and Louisiana
  • those with comprehensive codes that exceed a single civil code, such as France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Spain: it is this last category that is normally regarded as typical of civil law systems, and is discussed in the rest of this article.
The Scandinavian systems are of a hybrid character since their background law is a mix of civil law and Scandinavian customary law and they have been partially codified. Likewise, the laws of the Channel Islands (Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney, Sark) mix Norman customary law and French civil law.
A prominent example of a civil-law is the Napoleonic Code (1804), named after French emperor Napoleon. The code comprises three components:
  • the law of persons
  • property law
  • commercial law
Rather than a compendium of statutes or catalog of case law, the code sets out general principles as rules of law.

Unlike common law systems, civil law jurisdictions deal with case law apart from any precedent value. Civil law courts generally decide cases using codal provisions on a case-by-case basis, without reference to other (or even superior) judicial decisions. In actual practice, an increasing degree of precedent is creeping into civil law jurisprudence, and is generally seen in many nations' highest courts. While the typical French-speaking supreme court decision is short, concise and devoid of explanation or justification, in Germanic Europe, the supreme courts can and do tend to write more verbose opinions, supported by legal reasoning. A line of similar case decisions, while not precedent per se, constitute jurisprudence constante. While civil law jurisdictions place little reliance on court decisions, they tend to generate a phenomenal number of reported legal opinions. However, this tends to be uncontrolled, since there is no statutory requirement that any case be reported or published in a law report, except for the councils of state and constitutional courts. Except for the highest courts, all publication of legal opinions are unofficial or commercial.

Civil law is sometimes referred to as neo-Roman law, Romano-Germanic law or Continental law. The expression "civil law" is a translation of Latin jus civile, or "citizens' law", which was the late imperial term for its legal system, as opposed to the laws governing conquered peoples (jus gentium); hence, the Justinian Code's title Corpus Juris Civilis. Civil law practitioners, however, traditionally refer to their system in a broad sense as jus commune, literally "common law", meaning the general principles of law as opposed to laws specific to particular areas. (The use of "common law" for the Anglo-Saxon systems may or may not be influenced by this usage.)

History

Civil law takes as its major inspiration classical Roman law (c. AD 1–250), and in particular Justinian law (6th century AD), and further expanded and developed in the late Middle Ages under the influence of canon law. The Justinian Code's doctrines provided a sophisticated model for contracts, rules of procedure, family law, wills, and a strong monarchical constitutional system. Roman law was received differently in different countries. In some it went into force wholesale by legislative act, i.e., it became positive law, whereas in others it was diffused into society by increasingly influential legal experts and scholars.

Roman law continued without interruption in the Byzantine Empire until its final fall in the 15th century. However, given the multiple incursions and occupations by Western European powers in the late medieval period, its laws became widely implemented in the West. It was first received in the Holy Roman Empire partly because it was considered imperial law, and it spread in Europe mainly because its students were the only trained lawyers. It became the basis of Scots law, though partly rivaled by received feudal Norman law. In England, it was taught academically at Oxford and Cambridge, but underlay only probate and matrimonial law insofar as both were inherited from canon law, and maritime law, adapted from lex mercatoria through the Bordeaux trade.

Consequently, neither of the two waves of Roman influence completely dominated in Europe. Roman law was a secondary source that was applied only when local customs and laws were found lacking on a certain subject. However, after a time, even local law came to be interpreted and evaluated primarily on the basis of Roman law, since it was a common European legal tradition of sorts, and thereby in turn influenced the main source of law. Eventually, the work of civilian glossators and commentators led to the development of a common body of law and writing about law, a common legal language, and a common method of teaching and scholarship, all termed the jus commune, or law common to Europe, which consolidated canon law and Roman law, and to some extent, feudal law.

Codification

An important common characteristic of civil law, aside from its origins in Roman law, is the comprehensive codification of received Roman law, i.e., its inclusion in civil codes. The earliest codification known is the Code of Hammurabi, written in ancient Babylon during the 18th century BC. However, this, and many of the codes that followed, were mainly lists of civil and criminal wrongs and their punishments. The codification typical of modern civilian systems did not first appear until the Justinian Code. 

Germanic codes appeared over the 6th and 7th centuries to clearly delineate the law in force for Germanic privileged classes versus their Roman subjects and regulate those laws according to folk-right. Under feudal law, a number of private custumals were compiled, first under the Norman empire (Très ancien coutumier, 1200–1245), then elsewhere, to record the manorial – and later regional – customs, court decisions, and the legal principles underpinning them. Custumals were commissioned by lords who presided as lay judges over manorial courts in order to inform themselves about the court process. The use of custumals from influential towns soon became commonplace over large areas. In keeping with this, certain monarchs consolidated their kingdoms by attempting to compile custumals that would serve as the law of the land for their realms, as when Charles VII of France in 1454 commissioned an official custumal of Crown law. Two prominent examples include the Coutume de Paris (written 1510; revised 1580), which served as the basis for the Napoleonic Code, and the Sachsenspiegel (c. 1220) of the bishoprics of Magdeburg and Halberstadt which was used in northern Germany, Poland, and the Low Countries.

The concept of codification was further developed during the 17th and 18th centuries AD, as an expression of both natural law and the ideas of the Enlightenment. The political ideals of that era was expressed by the concepts of democracy, protection of property and the rule of law. Those ideals required certainty of law, recorded, uniform law. So, the mix of Roman law and customary and local law gave way to law codification.

Also, the notion of a nation-state implied recorded law that would be applicable to that state.

There was also a reaction to law codification. The proponents of codification regarded it as conducive to certainty, unity and systematic recording of the law; whereas its opponents claimed that codification would result in the ossification of the law. 

In the end, despite whatever resistance to codification, the codification of European private laws moved forward. Codifications were completed by Denmark (1687), Sweden (1734), Prussia (1794), France (1804), and Austria (1811). The French codes were imported into areas conquered by Napoleon and later adopted with modifications in Poland (Duchy of Warsaw/Congress Poland; Kodeks cywilny 1806/1825), Louisiana (1807), Canton of Vaud (Switzerland; 1819), the Netherlands (1838), Serbia (1844), Italy and Romania (1865), Portugal (1867) and Spain (1888). Germany (1900), and Switzerland (1912) adopted their own codifications. These codifications were in turn imported into colonies at one time or another by most of these countries. The Swiss version was adopted in Brazil (1916) and Turkey (1926).

In the United States, U.S. states began codification with New York's "Field Code" (1850), followed by California's codes (1872), and the federal revised statutes (1874) and the current United States Code (1926).

In Japan, at the beginning of the Meiji Era, European legal systems—especially the civil law of Germany and France—were the primary models for the judicial and legal systems. In China, the German Civil Code was introduced in the later years of the Qing dynasty, emulating Japan. In addition, it formed the basis of the law of the Republic of China, which remains in force in Taiwan. Furthermore, Korea, Taiwan, and Manchuria, former Japanese colonies, have been strongly influenced by the Japanese legal system.

Some authors consider civil law the foundation for socialist law used in communist countries, which in this view would basically be civil law with the addition of Marxist-Leninist ideals. Even if this is so, civil law was generally the legal system in place before the rise of socialist law, and some Eastern European countries reverted to the pre-socialist civil law following the fall of socialism, while others continued using a socialist legal systems.

Several civil-law mechanisms seem to have been borrowed from medieval Islamic Sharia and fiqh. For example, the Islamic hawala (hundi) underlies the avallo of Italian law and the aval of French and Spanish law.

Differentiation from other major legal systems

The table below contains essential disparities (and in some cases similarities) between the world's four major legal systems.


Common law Civil law Socialist law Islamic law
Other names Anglo-American, English, judge-made, legislation from the bench Continental, Romano-Germanic, European Continental Soviet Religious law, Sharia
Source of law Case law, statutes/legislation Statutes/legislation Statutes/legislation Religious documents
Lawyers Judges act as impartial referees; lawyers are responsible for presenting the case Judges dominate trials Judges dominate trials Secondary role
Judges' qualifications Career lawyers (appointed or elected) Career judges Career bureaucrats, Party members Religious as well as legal training
Degree of judicial independence High High; separate from the executive and the legislative branches of government Very limited Ranges from very limited to high
Juries Provided at trial level in some jurisdictions May adjudicate in conjunction with judges in serious criminal matters Often used at lowest level Allowed in Maliki school, not allowed in other schools
Policy-making role Courts share in balancing power Courts have equal but separate power Courts are subordinate to the legislature Courts and other government branches are theoretically subordinate to the Shari'a. In practice, courts historically made the Shari'a, while today, the religious courts are generally subordinate to the executive.
Examples Australia, United Kingdom (except Scotland), Israel, India, Cyprus, Nigeria, Republic of Ireland, Singapore, Hong Kong, United States (except Louisiana), Canada (except Quebec), New Zealand, Pakistan, Malaysia, Bangladesh All European Union states (except the UK, Ireland, and Cyprus), all of continental South and Middle America (except Guyana and Belize), Quebec, all of East Asia (except Hong Kong), all of North Africa, Francophone and Lusophone Africa, Azerbaijan, Kuwait, Iraq, Russia, Turkey, Egypt, Madagascar, Lebanon, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Louisiana Soviet Union, China (except Hong Kong and Macau) Many Muslim countries have adopted parts of Sharia Law. Examples include Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Iran, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Sudan, Malaysia, Pakistan and Yemen.

Civil law is primarily contrasted with common law, which is the legal system developed first in England, and later among English-speaking peoples of the world. Despite their differences, the two systems are quite similar from a historical point of view. Both evolved in much the same way, though at different paces. The Roman law underlying civil law developed mainly from customary law that was refined with case law and legislation. Canon law further refined court procedure. Similarly, English law developed from Anglo-Saxon customary law, Danelaw and Norman law, further refined by case law and legislation. The differences are
  • Roman law had crystallized many of its principles and mechanisms in the form of the Justinian Code, which drew from case law, scholarly commentary, and senatorial statutes
  • civilian case law has persuasive authority, not binding authority as under common law
Codification, however, is by no means a defining characteristic of a civil law system. For example, the statutes that govern the civil law systems of Sweden and other Nordic countries and the Roman-Dutch countries are not grouped into larger, expansive codes like those in French and German law.

Subgroups

The term civil law comes from English legal scholarship and is used in English-speaking countries to lump together all legal systems of the jus commune tradition. However, legal comparativists and economists promoting the legal origins theory prefer to subdivide civil law jurisdictions into four distinct groups:
  • Napoleonic: France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Chile, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal, Brazil, Mexico, other CPLP countries, Macau, former Portuguese territories in India (Goa, Daman and Diu and Dadra and Nagar Haveli), Malta, Romania, and most of the Arab world[which?] when Islamic law is not used. Former colonies include Quebec (Canada) and Louisiana (U.S.).
    • The Chilean Code is an original work of jurist and legislator Andrés Bello. Traditionally, the Napoleonic Code has been considered the main source of inspiration for the Chilean Code. However, this is true only with regard to the law of obligations and the law of things (except for the principle of abstraction), while it is not true at all in the matters of family and successions. This code was integrally adopted by Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Colombia, Panama and Venezuela (although only for one year). According to other Latin American experts of its time, like Augusto Teixeira de Freitas (author of the "Esboço de um Código Civil para o Brasil") or Dalmacio Vélez Sársfield (main author of the Argentinian Civil Code), it is the most important legal accomplishments of Latin America.
    • Cameroon, a former colony of both France and United Kingdom, is bi-juridical/mixed
  • Germanistic: Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Latvia, Estonia, Roman-Dutch, Czech Republic, Russia, Lithuania, Croatia, Hungary, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, Ukraine, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand
    • South Africa, a former colony of the United Kingdom, was heavily influenced by colonists from the Netherlands and therefore is bi-juridical/mixed.
  • Nordic: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden
  • Chinese (except Hong Kong and Macau) is a mixture of civil law and socialist law. Presently, Chinese laws absorb some features of common law system, especially those related to commercial and international transactions. Hong Kong, although part of China, uses common law. The Basic Law of Hong Kong ensures the use and status of common law in Hong Kong. Macau continues to have a Portuguese legal system of civil law.
However, some of these legal systems are often and more correctly said to be of hybrid nature: 

Napoleonic to Germanistic influence: The Italian civil code of 1942 replaced the original one of 1865, introducing germanistic elements due to the geopolitical alliances of the time. This approach has been imitated by other countries, including Portugal (1966), the Netherlands (1992), Brazil (2002) and Argentina (2014). Most of them have innovations introduced by the Italian legislation, including the unification of the civil and commercial codes.

Germanistic to Napoleonic influence: The Swiss civil code is considered mainly influenced by the German civil code and partly influenced by the French civil code. The civil code of the Republic of Turkey is a slightly modified version of the Swiss code, adopted in 1926 during Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's presidency as part of the government's progressive reforms and secularization. 

Some systems of civil law do not fit neatly into this typology, however. Polish law developed as a mixture of French and German civil law in the 19th century. After the reunification of Poland in 1918, five legal systems (French Napoleonic Code from the Duchy of Warsaw, German BGB from Western Poland, Austrian ABGB from Southern Poland, Russian law from Eastern Poland, and Hungarian law from Spisz and Orawa) were merged into one. Similarly, Dutch law, while originally codified in the Napoleonic tradition, has been heavily altered under influence from the Dutch native tradition of Roman-Dutch law (still in effect in its former colonies). Scotland's civil law tradition borrowed heavily from Roman-Dutch law. Swiss law is categorized as Germanistic, but it has been heavily influenced by the Napoleonic tradition, with some indigenous elements added in as well.

Louisiana private law is primarily a Napoleonic system. Louisiana is the only U.S. state partially based on French and Spanish codes and ultimately Roman law, as opposed to English common law. In Louisiana, private law was codified into the Louisiana Civil Code. Current Louisiana law has converged considerably with American law, especially in its public law, judicial system, and adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code (except for Article 2) and certain legal devices of American common law. In fact, any innovation, whether private or public, has been decidedly common law in origin. Quebec law, whose private law is also of French civil origin, has developed along the same lines, adapting in the same way as Louisiana to the public law and judicial system of Canadian common law. By contrast, Quebec private law has innovated mainly from civil sources. To a lesser extent, other states formerly part of the Spanish Empire, such as Texas and California, have also retained aspects of Spanish civil law into their legal system, for example community property. The legal system of Puerto Rico exhibits similarities to that of Louisiana: a civil code whose interpretations rely on both the civil and common law systems. Because Puerto Rico's Civil Code is based on the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, available jurisprudence has tended to rely on common law innovations due to the code's age and in many cases, obsolete nature.

Several Islamic countries have civil law systems that contain elements of Islamic law. As an example, the Egyptian Civil Code of 1810 that developed in the early 19th century—which remains in force in Egypt is the basis for the civil law in many countries of the Arab world where the civil law is used— is based on the Napoleonic Code, but its primary author Abd El-Razzak El-Sanhuri attempted to integrate principles and features of Islamic law in deference to the unique circumstances of Egyptian society.

Japanese Civil Code was considered as a mixture of roughly 60 percent of the German civil code and roughly 30 percent of the French civil code and 8 percent of Japanese customary law and 2 percent of the English law. The code includes the doctrine of ultra vires and a precedent of Hadley v Baxendale from English common law system.

Rejuvenation

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