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Sunday, September 6, 2020

Opposition to the English Poor Laws

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Mr. Canning was once asked by Mr. Tierney why he did not touch the Poor Law? To which question Mr. Canning replied:— "Why do not Governments decide offhand a question growing out of the usages of centuries—interwoven with the habits, and deeply rooted in the prejudices of the people? Of all subjects of legislation on which Governments ought not harshly or prematurely to interfere, without ascertaining, and, if possible, carrying with them the prevailing sentiments of the country, this of the Poor Law appears to me the one on which it would be most undesirable to take a precipitate course."
From the reign of Elizabeth I until the passage of the Poor Law Amendment Act in 1834 relief of the poor in England was administered on the basis of a Poor Law enacted in 1601. From the start of the nineteenth century the basic concept of providing poor relief was criticised as misguided by leading political economists and in southern agricultural counties the burden of poor-rates was felt to be excessive (especially where poor-rates were used to supplement low wages (the 'allowance' or Speenhamland system)). Opposition to the Elizabethan Poor Law led to a Royal Commission on poor relief, which recommended that poor relief could not in the short term be abolished; however it should be curtailed, and administered on such terms that none but the desperate would claim it. Relief should only be administered in workhouses, whose inhabitants were to be confined, 'classified' (men, women, boys, girls) and segregated. The Poor Law Amendment Act allowed these changes to be implemented by a Poor Law Commission largely unaccountable to Parliament. The Act was passed by large majorities in Parliament, but the regime it was intended to bring about was denounced by its critics as (variously) un-Christian, un-English, unconstitutional, and impracticable for the great manufacturing districts of Northern England. The Act itself did not introduce the regime, but introduced a framework by which it might easily be brought in.

Opposition to the New Poor Law strictly speaking was resistance to the introduction of the New Poor Law administrative framework; this was chiefly encountered in the industrial North in 1837–9 and overcome after a few riots by a judicious mixture of legal threats and deployment of the military. Opposition to the New Poor Law in the looser sense of resistance to (and criticism of) key features of the regime recommended by the Royal Commission persisted and eventually became orthodoxy: for example outdoor relief was never abolished in much of the industrial North. When a prominent West Riding opponent of the New Poor Law died in 1858, the Huddersfield Chronicle wrote "..the controversy closed and English common sense has settled down on the poor-law question somewhat nearer to the views of Oastler and Pitkethly than those of their opponents."

Criticism of the Elizabethan Poor Law

Criticism of the Poor Law grew in the early nineteenth century after the Napoleonic Wars with France, especially among political economists

Malthus thought the Old Poor Law encouraged population growth.
 
Ricardo argued that poor-rates reduced wages
 
Thomas Malthus thought any benevolence to the poor was self-defeating; the only check on the numbers of the poor was poverty. Furthermore, the Poor Law gave a right to relief only in the parish where the claimant had a right of settlement, obtained by birth or by prolonged residence: it undesirably limited the mobility of labour. Without the Poor Law there would be "a few more instances of severe distress," but "the aggregate mass of happiness among the common people would have been much greater than it is at present." However, he was one of the first to advocate so called 'indoor relief' in workhouses for the poor as opposed to outdoor relief (handouts in money or in kind, with recipients not under the control of poor-law authorities). 

David Ricardo supported the abolition of the Poor Law in his book 'Principles of Political Economy and Taxation' published in 1817. Any tax raised to pay for welfare such as poor rates reduced the money available to pay wages. He also argued that it rewarded laziness, discouraged people from saving for old age or illness, and encouraged irresponsibly large families.

Edwin Chadwick, a member of the Royal Commission, and subsequently Secretary of the Poor Law Commission, was a follower of Jeremy Bentham (who believed that wages would find their true levels in a free-market system where there was state control to maintain common agreed standards). Chadwick therefore criticized the Old Poor Law because its decentralised administration meant significant variation in the treatment of paupers. Chadwick held that the able-bodied poor should be put to work in workhouses which met the condition of less eligibility: they could not claim outdoor relief as they did under the existing Poor Law. Conditions had to be worse than those for the poorest labourer outside the workhouse, so that people would not want to claim relief. This would decrease the poor rate, allow wages to rise to their true levels, and promote honest toil.
"Every penny bestowed, that tends to render the condition of the pauper more eligible than that of the independent labourer, is a bounty on indolence and vice." -1832 Royal Commission

Opposition to introduction of the New Poor Law

The 1832 Royal Commission

Alarmed at the cost of poor relief in the southern agricultural districts of England (where in many areas it had become a semi-permanent top-up of labourers' wages - the 'allowance system','Roundsman system', or 'Speenhamland system' ) Parliament had set up a Royal Commission into the operation of the Poor Laws. Its report had recommended sweeping changes unsurprisingly similar to those favoured by Chadwick: 

1835 model design of a workhouse to hold 300 paupers segregated into four classes
  • Out-relief of the able-bodied poor should cease - relief should be given only in workhouses, and upon such terms that only the truly indigent would accept it. "Into such a house none will enter voluntarily; work, confinement, and discipline, will deter the indolent and vicious; and nothing but extreme necessity will induce any to accept the comfort which must be obtained by the surrender of their free agency, and the sacrifice of their accustomed habits and gratifications."
Whilst this recommendation was a solution to existing problems consistent with 'political economy', there was little consideration in the report of what new problems it might give rise to . There was little practical experience to support it - only four of the parishes reporting had entirely abolished out-relief; their problem cases could well have simply been displaced to neighbouring parishes
  • Different classes of paupers should be segregated ; to this end parishes should pool together in unions, with each of their poorhouses dedicated to a single class of paupers and serving the whole of the union. "the separation of man and wife was necessary, in order to ensure the proper regulation of workhouses"
In practice, most existing workhouses were ill-suited to the new system (characterised by opponents as locking up the poor in 'Poor Law bastiles'), and many poor law unions soon found they needed a new purpose-built union workhouse. Their purpose being to securely confine large numbers of the lower classes at low cost, they not unnaturally looked much like prisons; this was not unwelcome to the New Poor Law authorities:"At present their prison-like appearance, and the notion that they are intended to torment the poor inspires a salutary dread of them."
  • The new system would be undermined if different unions treated their paupers differently; there should therefore be a central board with powers to specify standards and to enforce those standards; this could not be done directly by Parliament because of the legislative workload that would ensue.
This arrangement was simultaneously justified as required to give absolute uniformity country-wide and as allowing regulations to be tailored to local circumstances without taking up Parliament's time.
  • Mothers of illegitimate children should receive much less support; poor-law authorities should no longer attempt to identify the fathers of illegitimate children and recover the costs of child support from them
It was argued that penalising fathers of illegitimate children reinforced pressures for the parents of children conceived out of wedlock to marry, and generous payments for illegitimate children indemnified the mother against failure to marry. "The effect has been to promote bastardy; to make want of chastity on the woman's part the shortest road to obtaining either a husband or a competent maintenance; and to encourage extortion and perjury"

1834 Poor Law Amendment Act

Acting on the recommendations of the Royal Commission, Parliament passed the Poor Law Amendment Act 1834, which however did not directly enact the recommendations. On illegitimacy it did not follow the recommendations of the Commission; under the New Poor Law fathers of illegitimate children could still be pursued; with however the crucial difference that under the old poor law the mother's sworn testimony was sufficient to establish paternity; under the New Poor Law the mother's word alone was insufficient; there had to be corroborative evidence. To implement the other recommendations the Act set up a three-man Poor Law Commission, an 'at arms' length' quango to which Parliament delegated the power to make appropriate regulations, without making any provision for effective oversight of the Commission's doings. Local poor-rates payers still elected their local Board of Poor Law Guardians and still paid for local poor law provisions, but those provisions could be specified to the Board of Guardians by the Poor Law Commission; where they were the views of the local rate-payers were irrelevant.

Opposition to the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act

The radical MP William Cobbett voted against the Act, asserting that the poor had an automatic right to relief and that the Act aimed to "enrich the landowner" at the expense of the poor. The 'Tory Radical' Richard Oastler personally lobbied Tory leaders (including the Duke of Wellington) to oppose the Act. Oastler's objections were that the Act pursued aims dictated by political economy by un-Christian treatment of the poor (and particularly of the married poor: "whom God hath joined together let no man part asunder"), and to ensure this was done with consistent heartlessness was setting up an unconstitutional body. Oastler told the Duke "if that Bill passes, the man who can produce the greatest confusion in the country will be the greatest patriot, and I will try to be that man".  However the Duke was unconvinced; Tory landowners were as keen on reducing poor rates as were the Whigs, and the Bill received little opposition from either the House of Commons or the House of Lords before gaining Royal Assent. John Fielden, an industrialist and owner of textile mills at Todmorden and MP for Oldham (where he had secured Cobbett's election) was like Cobbett a strong opponent of the New Poor Law, and after Cobbett's death was part of a small group of MPs who called for review of the working of the Act - Fielden further called for its repeal: all that was achieved was a Select Committee which took most of its evidence from the Poor Law Commission and other Poor Law functionaries and consequently found much to praise and little to blame.

Resistance to the New Poor Law structures

One of the 'Somerset House Despots': Sir Thomas Frankland Lewis, (Chairman of Poor Law Commission 1834–39)

South of England

The new dispensation was implemented progressively, starting with the southern counties of England, whose problems it was designed to address. There it achieved a considerable reduction in the poor rates with only minor disturbances (In Buckinghamshire when paupers were transported 3 miles from Chalfont St. Giles to Amersham, the Riot Act had to be read. In East Anglia new workhouses were attacked.) "Partial riots have occurred in different counties; but, by the aid of small parties of the Metropolitan Police ... occasionally aided by the support of military force, these disturbances have been put down, without any considerable injury to property."

North of England

There had been no great dissatisfaction with the existing Poor Law in the North, the burden of poor relief being lower (in 1832 under the old Poor Law Lancashire, with a population about 280% that of Kent, had poor relief costs only about 80% those of Kent). The rate of increase in the cost of poor-relief was no of concern either: in Sheffield the cost of poor-relief in 1833 was half what it had been ten years before. Correspondingly there had been no urgent need to implement the New Poor Law. Not until January 1837 were the first steps taken to introduce the system into the textile districts of Lancashire and the West Riding of Yorkshire by setting up 'poor law unions' and electing Boards of Guardians for them. The Poor Law Boards were then to appoint a clerk to administer whatever system of relief was specified for that Union by the central Commission.

Inquiries in the West Riding of Yorkshire by an assistant to the Royal Commission had led him to note that out-door relief was an important (and relatively cheap) way of coping with the trade cycle. When trade was slack manufacturers could lay off 500 hands at once - this was a scale for which it would be impracticable to provide workhouse accommodation; where unemployment was likely to be temporary (e.g. caused by the trade cycle or sickness) the eventual cost (and inconvenience) of re-establishing a household on leaving the workhouse had to be borne in mind and could well suggest the wisdom of out-door relief. Furthermore, where the head of a household containing child wage-earners became unemployed, it would be more sensible (and cheaper) to supplement the household income by a judicious amount of out-door relief than to move the family to the poorhouse. Hand-loom weavers, a group of workers now habitually in great distress, had very low earnings; not because their wages were supplemented by out-door relief, but because they were competing with power-looms; nothing would be gained by forcing them into the workhouse or to turn to some occupation for which they would not have the required physical strength. The Assistant Commissioner also noted that diet of West-Riding poorhouse inmates was not a deterrent; there seemed to be a deliberate policy of 'the best of everything, and plenty of it'.

Richard Oastler: "a gross and wicked law .. if it was truth, the Bible was a lie"
 
The Poor Law Commission intended (or said they intended) to allow the new Poor Law Boards in manufacturing areas to continue out-door relief, but opponents of the New Poor Law held that the safest way to defend out-door relief and the rest of the status quo was to prevent the New Poor Law administrative framework becoming established. Hence they strove to prevent new Poor Law Boards being established (or to elect Guardians hostile to the New Poor Law who would obstruct or delay clerks to Poor Law Boards being appointed), since their existence would allow the Poor Law Commission to specify changes in the regime of existing poorhouses and greatly facilitate the cessation of out-door relief should the Commission change its mind (or not be telling the truth). 

The Poor Law Commission intended (or said they intended) to allow the new Poor Law Boards in manufacturing areas to continue out-door relief, but opponents of the New Poor Law held that the safest way to defend out-door relief and the rest of the status quo was to prevent the New Poor Law administrative framework becoming established. Hence they strove to prevent new Poor Law Boards being established (or to elect Guardians hostile to the New Poor Law who would obstruct or delay clerks to Poor Law Boards being appointed), since their existence would allow the Poor Law Commission to specify changes in the regime of existing poorhouses and greatly facilitate the cessation of out-door relief should the Commission change its mind (or not be telling the truth). 

In the Northern industrial towns, a variety of organisations (trade unions, Short Time Committees, Radical associations )were already in existence whose (often overlapping) memberships were generally opposed to the New Poor Law. Local Anti-Poor Law Associations sprang up able to readily mobilise large numbers for protest meetings against the Act, and against its local implementation. Many of the leaders of the anti-poor law movement had previously been prominent in the Ten Hours Movement.
 
Richard Oastler wrote letters to Yorkshire newspapers like the Leeds Intelligencer and to the national Radical press denouncing the Poor Law Amendment Act as being cruel and unchristian. He spoke in similar vein at anti-New Poor Law meetings; his first speech (to a mass meeting in Huddersfield) was subsequently published under the (representative) title of Damnation! Eternal damnation to the fiend-begotten 'coarser-food', new Poor Law !). Huddersfield was notably slow to set up an effective New Poor Law administration, large crowds/mobs gathering outside (or breaking up) meetings of the Guardians, but never with enough violence to lead local Tory magistrates to ask for military assistance to preserve order. (When Whig magistrates were appointed and the military deployed, the Guardians meeting was subject to a large peaceful picket which terminated with the crowd giving a cheer for the troops for having had to turn out on a miserable January night and a whip-round to give them a shilling each to buy something warm and comfortable).

John Fielden attempted to prevent the Act from being implemented in his area, threatening to close the family firm down unless the Guardians of the Todmorden Poor Law Union resigned. When they didn't the Fielden mills duly closed, throwing nearly 3,000 out of work. The Guardians stood firm, troops were moved into the area, and after a week Fieldens re-opened (paying their employees as normal for the week not worked) However, some townships refused to recognise the authority of the Guardians. and instructed (or intimidated) their 'overseer of the poor' to ignore the Guardians' instructions. The overseer of Langfield was fined £5 for disobeying the Guardians and two constables sent from Halifax to distrain goods to that value. The constables were surrounded by a mob summoned from two of Fielden's mills (supplemented by navvies building the Manchester & Leeds Railway), roughly treated and made to promise never to return. The following week a mob again gathered in the belief that another attempt at distraint was to be made; when this did not happen, they attacked the houses of various guardians and supporters of the New Poor Law, causing damage put at over £1000.

Extra-Parliamentary opposition to the New Poor Law regime

While there were protests in towns such as Oldham, Huddersfield, and Bradford (where the Poor Law Guardians had to be protected by troops after riots against the Act), in other areas the New Poor Law administrative framework was set in place with much less difficulty. Even in Huddersfield the new administrative framework was in place within two years. However, opposition to the New Poor Law did not cease once its structures were in place. Outside Parliament, agitation and mass meetings continued. Horror stories of (mis)-treatment of paupers under the New Poor Law not only featured in the speeches of its opponents; they also circulated in Chartist newspapers such as Augustus Beaumont's Northern Liberator and Feargus O'Connor's Northern Star and were collected in George R. Wythen Baxter's The Book of the Bastilles. Not all the stories were entirely accurate, and some propaganda was very black; a document recommending infanticide and alleged to be the work of the Poor Law Commission was published as the Book of Murder.

Relationship to Chartism

The ease with which the Reform Parliament had passed the Poor Law Act of 1834, its refusal to pass a Ten-Hour Bill and the contrast between the zeal with which the New Poor Law was brought in and the failure to enforce the Factory Act of 1833 were powerful arguments that only the fundamental political changes sought by Chartism would produce a Parliament which paid more than lip-service to the interests of the working classes. Consequently, the anti-poor law movement became almost inextricably linked with Chartism. The leaders of the Anti-Poor Law movement differed in their response to Chartism. Oastler would have nothing to do with it, and continued to speak only on the Poor Law and on Factory Reform (but to audiences of largely Chartist tendencies). He called upon his hearers to exercise their right to bear arms (but not to bring them to meetings); he also warned (but was careful not to threaten) that a social cataclysm would result if the government were to further oppress the poor. J R Stephens, a Methodist minister who had been prominent in both the Factory Reform and Anti-Poor Law movements addressed Chartist meetings, giving much the same advice as Oastler, and was a delegate to the National Convention, but later said "I would rather walk to London on my bare knees, on sharp flint stones to attend an Anti-poor Law meeting, than be carried to London in a coach and six, pillowed with down to present that petition - the "national petition" to the House of Commons" Stephens was less prudent than Oastler in his speeches and failed to persuade those coming to his meetings to leave their guns at home. Consequently, when the Government cracked down on Chartist activity after the Todmorden Riots (in which - despite the insinuations of the Manchester Guardian - Fielden could not be implicated), Stephens was imprisoned for eighteen months for unlawful assembly. Fielden deprecated the use of force, or any hint of the use of force, and hence advised against the acquisition of arms. Initially, he had striven to prevent Anti-Poor Law meetings alienating non-Chartist sympathisers by discussing other Chartist demands, but at the height of the Chartist agitation of 1838 he abandoned this position. Instead, thinking that the poor law would never be reformed until parliament had been remodelled along the lines called for by the Chartists' National Petition, he spoke at Chartist meetings and urged Chartists to concentrate on the fundamental reforms they sought and not allow themselves to be bought off with concessions on the Poor Law and Factory Reform. With the failure of the National Petition, and the consequent drift of Chartism away from 'moral force' to 'physical force', (which Fielden could not support) he reverted to his original position; that (once again) the Anti-Poor Law movement had a better chance of success if it remained distinct from more general Chartist agitation.

Even after the crack-down, the Commissioners admitted that they were influenced by the agitation: "The depressed condition of the manufacturing population, to which we have already adverted, and the disquietude of the public mind occasioned by the chartist riot at Newport, in Monmouthshire, rendered us extremely unwilling to take any step in the manufacturing districts of Lancashire which might have even a remote tendency to produce a disturbance, or which might be used by designing persons as a pretext for agitation"

Attacks on workhouses

On two occasions in the 1840s, newly built workhouses were sacked by rioters, but on neither occasion was the riot clearly single-issue:
  • In 1842, during the Plug Plot Riots, the Stockport Union Workhouse at Shaw Heath was attacked and sacked by rioters, being eventually dispersed by the Cheshire Yeomanry
  • In 1843, during the Rebecca Riots of 1842–43 a force of several thousand Rebeccaites, including 300 farmers on horseback entered Carmarthen demanding not only the removal of toll-gates, but also the abolition of tithes and church rates, fairer rents and 'the alteration of the present poor-law to which they expressed the most bitter hostility'. They then proceeded to attack the workhouse, entered it and were sacking it when the military (a troop of the 4th Dragoons) arrived and restored order.

Mounting opposition in Parliament

John Fielden: MP for Oldham and determined Parliamentary opponent of the New Poor Law
 
Criticism slowly mounted: when the Whigs introduced a Poor Law Amendment Bill in 1841 to extend the Commission's life, MPs complained of the pettiness of some of the rules called for by the Poor Law Commission (e.g. workhouse inmates to take their meals in silence), of the refusal of the Commissioners to allow Boards of Guardians much discretion, and of the way the Commission had evaded Parliamentary scrutiny. A general election occurred before the Bill was passed, and the Conservatives came to power, with some of their MPs stating that they owed their seats to the opposition they had professed to the New Poor-law; the government, however, came forward with a Bill to extend the Commission to 1847, and to make minor amendments to the Poor Law. Whilst there continued to be cross-party Front Bench support for the New Poor Law (in 1844 in Coningsby, Benjamin Disraeli mocked Peel's 'sound Conservative government' as 'Tory men and Whig measures') Conservative malcontents such as Disraeli were alive to the consequent opportunity to undermine Peel by allying themselves with the opposition to unpopular Whig measures. The Bill made very slow progress (opponents made lengthy speeches; Fielden repeatedly moved adjournment of the debate), and many clauses were dropped in order to secure its passage before the existing authorisation of the Commission lapsed. The previous proceedings of the Poor Law Commission were not endorsed unequivocably : ("My Lords, I don't mean to say that I approve of every act that has been done in carrying this bill into operation. I think that in many cases those who had charge of the working of the bill have gone too far") it was now stressed that the virtue of the Commission was that it supported diversity, rather than that it was necessary to achieve uniformity; administratively 'special rules' were to be as far as possible consolidated into general rules laid before Parliament. A further Poor Law Amendment Act was passed in 1844; its main effect was to again revise the treatment of unmarried mothers: in Committee stage many amendments seeking to relax the poor law regime were rebuffed by the Home Secretary on the argument that - correctly understood - the existing rules and regulations of the Poor Law Commission already permitted the relaxation sought.

Scottish Poor Law Commission critical of 'workhouse test'

A Commission of Enquiry into the Scottish poor laws (which, in principle, unlike the English did not give relief to the able-bodied poor), set up in 1843 and reporting in May 1844 came to conclusions which differed significantly from its English predecessor, being critical of the effect of the 'workhouse test' on those subjected to it:
" It did not promote the development of any intellectual energy, neither did it foster feelings of manliness and independence. Its influence dries up the last impulses of social life. It destroys all feelings of self-respect and alienates the inmates from almost every sympathy which either in equals or superiors is inherent in rightly constituted natures. Repulsion and discomfort being the sole means by which this workhouse test works—that repulsion and discomfort must be carefully kept up for its operation.
and of the argument that as a 'self-acting test' it had the great virtue of removing any need for moral judgement on applicants:
"We hold that no just system of Poor Laws can exist, excluding, in the distribution of relief, the consideration of character—which should be a fundamental consideration. The man who has conducted himself with activity and industry for the bettering of his condition, and has only fallen through misfortune, not by fault, has a just title to the sympathy of his fellow-men. And not only that the necessary relief be cheerfully accorded, but full scope given for all the ministrations of charity to his comfort."

Andover workhouse scandal and subsequent inquiries

Andover workhouse
 
In 1845, it was alleged that paupers at the Andover Union workhouse employed in crushing bones were (regardless of age or state of decay) eating marrow from the bones and gnawing off any shreds of meat still adherent. When reported to the guardians, they had neither intervened, nor informed the Poor Law Commissioners.  The Assistant Poor Law Commissioner for the area (a Mr Parker) was sent to investigate, and found the allegations to be largely true, if slightly over-stated. This had been going on for some time without being detected by the Poor Law Commission's supervisory regime (in the first instance Mr Parker). The Home Secretary had on a number of occasions told the House of Commons that grinding bone was work of too penal a nature to be carried out by workhouse inmates, and the Poor Law Commission would see that his wish that it should cease was acted upon. The crushed bones were mostly sold to the guardians(for use as fertiliser) at a price which did not represent good value for the rate-payer.

Public hearings by Assistant Poor Law Commissioner

Sir James Graham - Home Secretary at the time
 
On the instructions of the Commission Parker then heard in public (poorly specified) charges against the master of the workhouse of diverting some of the paupers' rations for his own use, improper behaviour towards pauper girls, sleeping with inmates, conducting prayers when drunk, etc., but nothing relating to the bone-crushing. Parker was critical (many papers thought over-critical) of the prosecution witnesses, even criticising the workhouse medical officer for not keeping his books in the form prescribed by the Poor Law Commission, when the books were in the form directed by the Andover Guardians, and Parker was more demonstrably at fault since his routine duties included inspecting workhouse books to ensure that they met the Poor Law Commission's requirements. The hearings were adjourned to give the master of the workhouse time to prepare his defence and witnesses, but before the time allowed was up the Commissioners stopped the enquiry, recommended suspension of the master and (on the assumption that that recommendation would be acted upon) suggested complainants prosecute him on specimen charges at Quarter Sessions. The complainants declined; seeing this not as an escalation of proceedings, but an attempt to evade a verdict against the master, pointing out that whilst the charges against the master (if true) showed him unfit to hold his post, they were unlikely to support a conviction. The Times, saying the behaviour of the Somerset House set was like that of a cheat at cards, held open hearings of witnesses to the bone-crushing and -gnawing. The guardians voted not to suspend the master; his wife was however suspended, having physically attacked witnesses against her husband. The Commission then ordered the immediate resumption of the inquiry, allowing no further time for the master to prepare his defence: the resumed enquiry was now attended by a shorthand writer taking an accurate record and reporting it to the Home Secretary (no accurate record of proceedings had previously been taken, leading to arguments about what previous witnesses had said). No sooner had the enquiry resumed than it was terminated by the master's resignation.

Assistant Poor Law Commissioner 'resigns' and retaliates

Edwin Chadwick (Secretary to the Poor Law Commission) in later life

The guardians asked the master to stay on until a permanent replacement was chosen; Parker insisted this was unacceptable and recommended a former master of the Oxford Union workhouse (a Mr C Price) as a locum. The Times promptly revealed that Price had resigned from the Oxford post when serious allegations had been made against him. Price had resigned his post at Oxford whilst complaints against him were being investigated by an Assistant Poor Law Commissioner; The Poor Law Commission originally claimed that a report had been submitted to them, but gone unread because of Price's resignation; they then admitted than once Price had resigned the investigation was abandoned without their knowledge by the Assistant Commissioner, and no record of it (or indication that it had been undertaken) kept by the Commission. The Poor Law Commission insisted on Price resigning and instructed Parker to resign. He did, but then published a pamphlet (Letters to the Right Hon. Sir James Graham, Bart,; on the Subject of Recent Proceedings connected with the Andover Union By H. W. Parker, Esq. Barrister at Law.) justifying himself and detailing conversations with the Commission and with the Home Secretary which alleged that
  • although the Home Secretary had communicated his views on bone-crushing to the Commission in 1842, and Edwin Chadwick (Secretary to the Commission) had circulated a paper reaching the same conclusion, the Commission had issued no rule or direction on the matter, because there was disagreement within the Commission as to whether they had powers to do so
  • the Home Secretary had met Parker and a Poor Law Commissioner so they could construct an agreed narrative reflecting as little discredit upon themselves as possible

Select Committee on the Andover Union

It was separately alleged that the Commission had attempted to discredit a Yorkshire MP critical of it by sending an Assistant Poor Law Commissioner (Charles Mott) to inspect and unfavourably report upon the conditions in and management of a workhouse of which the MP was a guardian; that report had then been quoted (in good faith) by the Home Secretary in the Commons. Against the advice of the Home Secretary (who dismissed the affair as a "workhouse squabble") the House of Commons voted for a Committee to enquire into the management of the Andover workhouse, and into the conduct of the Poor Law Commissioners and Mr Parker.  Further questions arose as to the dismissal of the Assistant Commissioner for Wales (the reasons given by the Commissioners and the Home Secretary being markedly different) and to the propriety of the Haydock Lodge Lunatic Asylum for lunatic paupers being owned by a serving assistant secretary to the Commission and Mr Mott (no longer an Assistant Commissioner, but a poor law auditor). The Andover Committee revealed an underlying split between the Commissioners and Chadwick, each party feeling that they should have had more power and the other less. As a consequence of this split both parties were happy to share with the Committee the shortcomings of the other. Sir Frankland Lewis, the first Chairman of the Commission gave evidence that Chadwick had written an order that bells should not be tolled at the funeral of a pauper, and - having waited until Lewis (who Chadwick knew was opposed to any such ban) was absent - induced the Commissioners to issue the order. It became apparent that the important business of the Commissioners had not been conducted (as the Act establishing them required) by minuted meetings as a Board, nor had adequate records been kept of their decisions and the reasons for them. Chadwick's evidence to the Committee confirmed what had previously generally been taken to be a wild allegation by the wilder opponents of the New Poor Law: that in 1834 the Commission had indicated in a secret briefing paper for ministers that they intended to completely taper-out out-door relief for all classes of paupers (not just the able-bodied), to coarsen the diet of paupers, reduce its quantity, and enforce strict regulations. Ministers had repeatedly denied the existence of any such paper or any such plan. The findings of the committee (quoted verbatim in) characterised the Commissioners' conduct on matters within the committee's terms of reference as "irregular and arbitrary, not in accordance with the statute under which they exercise their functions, and such as to shake public confidence in their administration of the law", going on to note that the committee had in passing heard worrying evidence on matters outside its terms of reference on which it would be improper to base findings.

Poor Law Commission replaced by Poor Law Board

The Peel administration fell in the aftermath of the repeal of the Corn Laws, and the new (Whig) Home Secretary denied that the Andover Committee had demonstrated malice, recklessness or illegality in the proceedings of the Commission but promised that it would be replaced. The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1847 replaced the Poor Law Commission with a Poor Law Board, the President of which sat in the Commons. The Annual Report of the Board would be laid before Parliament (the Commission's Annual Report had been to the Home Secretary); the nine Assistant Commissioners remained in post but were re-titled Inspectors, and three further Inspectors were recruited. The Poor Law Board took up its duties in December 1847; in preparation for this a Consolidated General Order detailing the 'general rules' which it intended to apply to poor relief were issued in July 1847 by the outgoing Commission. The powers of the Board were not materially different to those of the Commission, but they were applied in a different spirit: for example, whereas the Commission had to be applied to for (and had repeatedly refused) authorisation of any deviation from the normal workhouse diet on Christmas Day, the new general rules explicitly noted that this was permitted. The 'New Poor Law' remained, but its underlying intent had been largely defeated. At the end of 1849, the Chartist paper the Northern Star was hopeful of achieving an extension of the franchise, drawing encouragement from the fate of the other great agitations going on when the Star had been founded twelve years before: ..now, when the Ten Hours"Bill" has become an ACT; now, when the Poor Law Commission has become a Poor Law BOARD; and the ultra-Malthusianism of the one has been replaced by a policy more in accordance with humanity and reason".

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Rail Passengers in Great Britain from 1829-2019
 
Class 87 electric locomotive and Mark 3 coaches franchised by Virgin Trains.
 
The railway system of Great Britain started with the building of local isolated wooden wagonways starting in the 1560s. A patchwork of local rail links operated by small private railway companies developed in the late 18th century. These isolated links expanded during the railway boom of the 1840s into a national network, although still run by dozens of competing companies. Over the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries, these amalgamated or were bought by competitors until only a handful of larger companies remained (see railway mania). The entire network was brought under government control during the First World War and a number of advantages of amalgamation and planning were demonstrated. However, the government resisted calls for the nationalisation of the network. In 1923, almost all the remaining companies were grouped into the "Big Four": the Great Western Railway, the London and North Eastern Railway, the London, Midland and Scottish Railway and the Southern Railway. The "Big Four" were joint-stock public companies and they continued to run the railway system until 31 December 1947.

From the start of 1948, the "Big Four" were nationalised to form British Railways. Though there were few initial changes to the service, usage increased and the network became profitable. Declining passenger numbers and financial losses in the late 1950s and early 1960s prompted the closure of many branch and main lines, and small stations, under the Beeching Axe. High-speed inter-city trains were introduced in the 1970s. The 1980s saw severe cuts in rail subsidies and above-inflation increases in fares and losses decreased. Railway operations were privatised during 1994–1997. Ownership of the track and infrastructure passed to Railtrack, whilst passenger operations were franchised to individual private sector operators (originally there were 25 franchises) and the freight services sold outright. Since privatisation, passenger volumes have increased to their highest ever level, but whether this is due to privatisation is disputed. The Hatfield accident set in motion the series of events that resulted in the ultimate collapse of Railtrack and its replacement with Network Rail, a state-owned, not-for-dividend company.

Before 1830: The pioneers

A wagonway, essentially a railway powered by animals drawing the cars or wagons, was used by German miners at Caldbeck, Cumbria, England, perhaps from the 1560s. A wagonway was built at Prescot, near Liverpool, sometime around 1600, possibly as early as 1594. Owned by Philip Layton, the line carried coal from a pit near Prescot Hall to a terminus about half a mile away.

Another wagonway was Sir Francis Willoughby's Wollaton Wagonway in Nottinghamshire built between 1603 and 1604 to carry coal.

As early as 1671 railed roads were in use in Durham to ease the conveyance of coal; the first of these was the Tanfield Wagonway. Many of these tramroads or wagon ways were built in the 17th and 18th centuries. They used simply straight and parallel rails of timber on which carts with simple flanged iron wheels were drawn by horses, enabling several wagons to be moved simultaneously. The first public railway in the world was the Lake Lock Rail Road, a narrow gauge railway built near Wakefield, West Yorkshire, England.

Although the idea of wooden-railed wagonways originated in Germany in the 16th century, the first use of steam locomotives was in Britain. Its earliest "railways" were straight and were constructed from parallel rails of timber on which ran horse-drawn carts. These were succeeded in 1793 when Benjamin Outram constructed a mile-long tramway with L-shaped cast iron rails. These rails became obsolete when William Jessop began to manufacture cast iron rails without guiding ledges - the wheels of the carts had flanges instead. Cast iron is brittle and so the rails tended to break easily. Consequently, in 1820, John Birkenshaw introduced a method of rolling wrought iron rails, which were used from then onwards.

The first passenger service was at Oystermouth in 1807, photograph from 1870
 
The first passenger-carrying public railway was opened by the Swansea and Mumbles Railway at Oystermouth in 1807, using horse-drawn carriages on an existing tramline.


In 1802, Richard Trevithick designed and built the first (unnamed) steam locomotive to run on smooth rails.


Salamanca of 1812

The first commercially successful steam locomotive was Salamanca, built in 1812 by John Blenkinsop and Matthew Murray for the 4 ft (1,219 mm) gauge Middleton Railway. Salamanca was a rack and pinion locomotive, with cog wheels driven by two cylinders embedded into the top of the centre-flue boiler. 

In 1813, William Hedley and Timothy Hackworth designed a locomotive (Puffing Billy) for use on the tramway between Stockton and Darlington. Puffing Billy featured piston rods extending upwards to pivoting beams, connected in turn by rods to a crankshaft beneath the frames which, in turn, drove the gears attached to the wheels. This meant that the wheels were coupled, allowing better traction. A year later, George Stephenson improved on that design with his first locomotive Blücher, which was the first locomotive to use single-flanged wheels. 

That design persuaded the backers of the proposed Stockton and Darlington Railway to appoint Stephenson as Engineer for the line in 1821. While traffic was originally intended to be horse-drawn, Stephenson carried out a fresh survey of the route to allow steam haulage. The Act was subsequently amended to allow the usage of steam locomotives and also to allow passengers to be carried on the railway. The 25-mile (40 km) long route opened on 27 September 1825 and, with the aid of Stephenson's Locomotion No 1, was the first locomotive-hauled public railway in the world.

1830 – 1922: Early development

In 1830 the Liverpool and Manchester Railway opened. This set the pattern for modern railways. It was the world's first inter-city passenger railway and the first to have 'scheduled' services, terminal stations and services as we know them today. The railways carried freight and passengers with also the world's first goods terminal station at the Park Lane railway goods station at Liverpool's south docks, accessed by the 1.26-mile Wapping Tunnel. In 1836, at the Liverpool end the line was extended to Lime Street station in Liverpool's city centre via a 1.1 mile long tunnel. 

Many of the first public railways were built as local rail links operated by small private railway companies. With increasing rapidity, more and more lines were built, often with scant regard for their potential for traffic. The 1840s were by far the biggest decade for railway growth. In 1840, when the decade began, railway lines in Britain were few and scattered but, within ten years, a virtually complete network had been laid down and the vast majority of towns and villages had a rail connection and sometimes two or three. Over the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries, most of the pioneering independent railway companies aremained malgamated or were bought by competitors, until only a handful of larger companies.




The period also saw a steady increase in government involvement, especially in safety matters. The 1840 "Act for Regulating Railways" empowered the Board of Trade to appoint railway inspectors. The Railway Inspectorate was established in 1840, to enquire into the causes of accidents and recommend ways of avoiding them. As early as 1844, a bill had been put before Parliament suggesting the state purchase of the railways; this was not adopted. It did, however, lead to the introduction of minimum standards for the construction of carriages and the compulsory provision of 3rd class accommodation for passengers - so-called "Parliamentary trains". 


The railway companies ceased to be profitable after the mid-1870s. Nationalisation of the railways was first proposed by William Ewart Gladstone as early as the 1840s, and calls for nationalisation continued throughout that century, with F. Keddell writing in 1890 that "The only valid ground for maintaining the monopoly would be the proof that the Railway Companies have made a fair and proper use of their great powers, and have conduced to the prosperity of the people. But the exact contrary is the case." The entire network was brought under government control during the First World War, and a number of advantages of amalgamation and planning were revealed. However, the Conservative members of the wartime coalition government resisted calls for the formal nationalisation of the railways in 1921.

1923 – 1947: The Big Four

On 1 January 1923, almost all the railway companies were grouped into the Big Four: the Great Western Railway, the London and North Eastern Railway, the London, Midland and Scottish Railway and the Southern Railway companies. A number of other lines, already operating as joint railways, remained separate from the Big Four; these included the Somerset and Dorset Joint Railway and the Midland and Great Northern Joint Railway. The "Big Four" were joint-stock public companies and they continued to run the railway system until 31 December 1947.

The LNER Class A4 streamlined loco hauled express trains of the 1930s offered a high-speed alternative to road transport
 
The competition from road transport during the 1920s and 1930s greatly reduced the revenue available to the railways, even though the needs for maintenance on the network had never been higher, as investment had been deferred over the past decade. Rail companies accused the government of favouring road haulage through the construction of roads subsidised by the taxpayer, while restricting the rail industry's ability to use flexible pricing because it was held to nationally agreed rate cards. The government response was to commission several inconclusive reports; the Salter Report of 1933 finally recommended that road transport should be taxed directly to fund the roads and increased Vehicle Excise Duty and fuel duties were introduced. It also noted that many small lines would never be likely to compete with road haulage. Although these road pricing changes helped their survival, the railways entered a period of slow decline, owing to a lack of investment and changes in transport policy and lifestyles.

During the Second World War, the companies' managements joined together, effectively operating as one company. Assisting the country's 'war effort' put a severe strain on the railways' resources and a substantial maintenance backlog developed. After 1945, for both practical and ideological reasons, the government decided to bring the rail service into the public sector.

1948 – 1994: British Rail

British Rail filmstrip showing how the railways were unified under BR.

From the start of 1948, the railways were nationalised to form British Railways (latterly "British Rail") under the control of the British Transport Commission. Though there were few initial changes to the service, usage increased and the network became profitable. Regeneration of track and stations was completed by 1954. Rail revenue fell and, in 1955, the network again ceased to be profitable. The mid-1950s saw the hasty introduction of diesel and electric rolling stock to replace steam in a modernisation plan costing many millions of pounds but the expected transfer back from road to rail did not occur and losses began to mount. This failure to make the railways more profitable through investment led governments of all political persuasions to restrict rail investment to a drip feed and seek economies through cutbacks.

The desire for profitability led to a major reduction in the network during the mid-1960s. Dr. Richard Beeching was given the task by the government of re-organising the railways ("the Beeching Axe"). This policy resulted in many branch lines and secondary routes being closed because they were deemed uneconomic. The closure of stations serving rural communities removed much feeder traffic from main line passenger services. The closure of many freight depots that had been used by larger industries such as coal and iron led to much freight transferring to road haulage. The closures were extremely unpopular with the general public at that time and remain so today.

Passenger levels decreased steadily from the late fifties to late seventies. Passenger services then experienced a renaissance with the introduction of the high-speed InterCity 125 trains in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The 1980s saw severe cuts in government funding and above-inflation increases in fares, but the service became more cost-effective. Following sectorisation of British Rail, InterCity became profitable. InterCity became one of Britain's top 150 companies operating city centre to city centre travel across the nation from Aberdeen and Inverness in the north to Poole and Penzance in the south.

Between 1994 and 1997, British Rail was privatised. Ownership of the track and infrastructure passed to Railtrack, passenger operations were franchised to individual private sector operators (originally there were 25 franchises) and the freight services sold outright (six companies were set up, but five of these were sold to the same buyer). The Conservative government under John Major said that privatisation would see an improvement in passenger services. Passenger levels have since increased strongly.

1995 onwards: Post-privatisation

The Great Western Railway's London terminus at Paddington
 
Rail modal share 1952-2017
 
GB rail subsidy 1985–2019 in 2018 prices, showing a short decline after privatisation, followed by a steep rise following the Hatfield crash in 2000 then a further increase to fund Crossrail and HS2
 
Since privatisation, numbers of passengers have grown rapidly; by 2010 the railways were carrying more passengers than at any time since the 1920s, and by 2014 passenger numbers had expanded to their highest level ever, more than doubling in the 20 years since privatisation. Train fares cost more than under British Rail.

The railways have become significantly safer since privatisation and are now the safest in Europe. However, the public image of rail travel was damaged by some prominent accidents shortly after privatisation. These included the Southall rail crash (where a train with its faulty Automatic Warning System disconnected passed a stop signal), the Ladbroke Grove rail crash (also caused by a train passing a stop signal) and the Hatfield accident (caused by a rail fragmenting due to the development of microscopic cracks).

Following the Hatfield accident, the rail infrastructure company Railtrack imposed over 1,200 emergency speed restrictions across its network and instigated an extremely costly nationwide track replacement programme. The consequential severe operational disruption to the national network and the company's spiralling costs set in motion the series of events which resulted in the ultimate collapse of the company and its replacement with Network Rail, a state-owned, not-for-dividend company.

Since April 2016, the British railway network has been severely disrupted on many occasions by wide-reaching rail strikes, affecting rail franchises across the country. The industrial action began on Southern services as a dispute over the planned introduction of driver-only operation, and has since expanded to cover many different issues affecting the rail industry; as of February 2018, the majority of the industrial action remains unresolved, with further strikes planned. The scale, impact and bitterness of the nationwide rail strikes have been compared to the 1984–85 miners' strike by the media.

As of 2018, government subsidies to the rail industry in real terms were roughly three times that of the late 1980s.

Railway Mania

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Railway Mania was an instance of a stock market bubble in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in the 1840s. It followed a common pattern: as the price of railway shares increased, speculators invested more money, which further increased the price of railway shares, until the share price collapsed. The mania reached its zenith in 1846, when 272 Acts of Parliament setting up new railway companies were passed, with the proposed routes totaling 9,500 miles (15,300 km). About a third of the railways authorised were never built—the companies either collapsed due to poor financial planning, were bought out by larger competitors before they could build their line, or turned out to be fraudulent enterprises to channel investors' money into other businesses.

Causes

A painting of the inaugural journey of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, by A.B. Clayton
 
The world's first recognizably modern inter-city railway, the Liverpool and Manchester Railway (the L&M), opened its railway in 1830 and proved to be successful for transporting both passengers and freight. In the late 1830s and early 1840s, the British economy slowed. Interest rates rose, making it more attractive to invest money in government bonds—the main source of investment at the time, and political and social unrest deterred banks and businesses from investing the huge sums of money required to build railways; the L&M cost £637,000 (£55,210,000 adjusted for 2015).

By the mid-1840s, the economy was improving and the manufacturing industries were once again growing. The Bank of England cut interest rates, making government bonds less attractive investments, and existing railway companies' shares began to boom as they moved ever-increasing amounts of cargo and people, making people willing to invest in new railways. 

Crucially, there were more investors in British business. The Industrial Revolution was creating a new, increasingly affluent middle class. While earlier business ventures had relied on a small number of banks, businessmen and wealthy aristocrats for investment, a prospective railway company also had a large, literate section of population with savings to invest. In 1825 the government had repealed the Bubble Act, brought in after the near-disastrous South Sea Bubble of 1720, which had put close limits on the formation of new business ventures and, importantly, had limited joint stock companies to a maximum of five separate investors. With these limits removed anyone could invest money (and hopefully earn a return) on a new company and railways were heavily promoted as a foolproof venture. New media such as newspapers and the emergence of the modern stock market made it easy for companies to promote themselves and provide the means for the general public to invest. Shares could be purchased for a 10% deposit with the railway company holding the right to call in the remainder at any time. The railways were so heavily promoted as a foolproof venture that thousands of investors on modest incomes bought large numbers of shares whilst only being able to afford the deposit. Many families invested their entire savings in prospective railway companies—and many of those lost everything when the bubble collapsed and the companies called in the remainder of their due payments.

The British government promoted an almost totally 'laissez-faire' system of non-regulation in the railways. Companies had to submit a bill to Parliament to gain the right to acquire land for the line, which required the route of the proposed railway to be approved, but there were no limits on the number of companies and no real checks on the financial viability of a line. Anyone could form a company, gain investment and submit a bill to Parliament. Since many MPs were heavy investors in such schemes, it was rare for a bill to not pass during the peak of the mania in 1846, although Parliament did reject schemes that were blatantly misleading or impossible to construct—at the mania's peak there were several schemes floated for 'direct' railways which ran in vast, straight lines across swathes of countryside that would have been difficult to construct and nearly impossible for the locomotives of the day to work on. 

Magnates like George Hudson developed routes in the North and Midlands by amalgamating small railway companies and rationalising routes. He was also an MP, but ultimately failed owing to his fraudulent practices of, for example, paying dividends from capital.

The end of the mania

As with other bubbles, the Railway Mania became a self-promoting cycle based purely on over-optimistic speculation. As the dozens of companies formed began to operate and the simple unviability of many of them became clear, investors began to realise that railways were not all as lucrative and as easy to build as they had been led to believe. Coupled to this, in late 1845 the Bank of England put up interest rates. As banks began to re-invest in bonds, the money began to flow out of railways, under-cutting the boom. 

The share prices of railways slowed in their rise, then leveled out. As they began to fall, investment stopped virtually overnight, leaving numerous companies without funding and numerous investors with no prospect of any return on their investment. The larger railway companies such as the Great Western Railway and the nascent Midland began to buy up strategic failed lines to expand their network. These lines could be purchased at a fraction of their real value as given a choice between a below-value offer for their shares or the total loss of their investment, shareholders naturally chose the former. Many middle class families on modest incomes had sunk their entire savings into new companies during the mania, and they lost everything when the speculation collapsed. 

The boom-and-bust cycle of early-industrial Britain was still in effect, and the boom that had created the conditions for Railway Mania began to cool and then a decline set in. The number of new railway companies fell away to almost nothing in the late 1840s and early 1850s, with the only new lines constructed being by the large companies. Economic upturns in the 1850s and 1860s saw smaller booms in railway construction, but these never reached anywhere near the scale of the mania—partly due to more thoughtful (if still very limited) government control, partly due to more cautious investors and partly because the UK railway network was approaching maturity, with none of the 'blank canvas' available to numerous companies as in the 1840s.

Results

Unlike some stock market bubbles, there was a net tangible result from all the investment: a vast expansion of the British railway system, though perhaps at an inflated cost. Amongst the high number of impractical, overambitious and downright fraudulent schemes promoted during the mania were a good number of practical trunk routes (most notably the initial part of the Great Northern Railway and the trans-Pennine Woodhead route) and important freight lines (such as large parts of what would become the North Eastern Railway). These projects all required vast amounts of capital all of which had to be raised from private enterprise. The speculative frenzy of the mania made people much more willing to invest the large sums required for railway construction than they had been previously or would be in later years. Even many of the routes that failed when the mania collapsed became viable (if not lucrative) when each was in the hands of the larger company that had purchased it. A total of 6,220 miles (10,010 km) of railway line were built as a result of projects authorised between 1844 and 1846—by comparison, the total route mileage of the modern UK railway network is around 11,000 miles (18,000 km).

Comparisons

Railway and Canal Mania can be compared with a similar mania in the 1990s in the stock of telecom companies. The telecom mania resulted in the installation and deployment of a vast amount of fibre-optic telecommunications infrastructure, spurred on from the realisation that the same railway rights-of-way could make affordable conduits for fibre optics. Yet another boom occurred in the period 1995–2000, during the development of the Internet, when many companies were established to promote new services on the growing network. The dot-com bubble soon collapsed, although some companies such as Google grew and prospered.

Narcissism

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