Animal euthanasia (euthanasia from Greek: εὐθανασία;
"good death") is the act of killing an animal humanely, most commonly
with injectable drugs. Reasons for euthanasia include incurable (and
especially painful) conditions or diseases,
lack of resources to continue supporting the animal, or laboratory test
procedures. Euthanasia methods are designed to cause minimal pain and
distress. Euthanasia is distinct from animal slaughter and pest control.
In domesticated animals, this process is commonly referred to by euphemisms such as "put down" or "put to sleep".
Methods
The
methods of euthanasia can be divided into pharmacological and physical
methods. Acceptable pharmacological methods include injected drugs and
gases that first depress the central nervous system and then
cardiovascular activity. Acceptable physical methods must first cause
rapid loss of consciousness by disrupting the central nervous system. The most common methods are discussed here, but there are other acceptable methods used in different situations.
Intravenous anesthetic
Upon administration of intravenous anesthetic, unconsciousness, respiratory then cardiac arrest follow rapidly, usually within 30 seconds.
Some veterinarians perform a two-stage process: an initial
injection that simply renders the pet unconscious and a second shot that
causes death.
This allows the owner the chance to say goodbye to a live pet without
their emotions stressing the animal. It also greatly mitigates any
tendency toward spasm and other involuntary movement which tends to
increase the emotional upset that the pet's owner experiences.
For large animals, the volumes of barbiturates required are considered by some to be impractical, although this is standard practice in the United States.
For horses and cattle, other drugs may be available. Some specially
formulated combination products are available, such as Somulose (secobarbital/cinchocaine) and Tributame (embutramide/chloroquine/lidocaine),
which cause deep unconsciousness and cardiac arrest independently with a
lower volume of injection, thus making the process faster, safer, and
more effective.
Occasionally, a horse injected with these mixtures may display apparent seizure activity before death. This may be due to premature cardiac arrest. However, if normal precautions (e.g., sedation with detomidine) are taken, this is rarely a problem. Anecdotal reports that long-term use of phenylbutazone increases the risk of this reaction are unverified.
After the animal has died, it is not uncommon for the body to
have posthumous body jerks or a sudden bladder or bowel outburst. This
is caused by the muscles of the deceased animal's body relaxing.
Gas anesthetics such as isoflurane and sevoflurane can be used for euthanasia of very small animals. The animals are placed in sealed chambers where high levels of anesthetic gas are introduced. Death may also be caused using carbon dioxide once unconsciousness has been achieved by inhaled anaesthetic. Carbon dioxide is often used on its own for euthanasia of wild animals.
There are mixed opinions on whether it causes distress when used on its
own, with human experiments lending support to the evidence that it can
cause distress and equivocal results in non-humans.
In 2013, the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) issued new
guidelines for carbon dioxide induction, stating that a flow rate of 10%
to 30% volume/min is optimal for the humane euthanasia of small
rodents.
Carbon monoxide is often used, but some states in the US have banned its use in animal shelters: although carbon monoxide poisoning is not particularly painful, the conditions in the gas chamber are often not humane. Nitrogen has been shown to be effective, although some young animals are more resistant to the effects, and it currently is not widely used.
Cervical dislocation
Cervical dislocation,
or displacement (breaking or fracturing) of the neck, is an older and
less common method of killing small animals such as mice. Performed
properly it is intended to cause as painless a death as possible and has
no cost or equipment involved. The handler must know the proper method
of executing the movement which will cause the cervical displacement and
without proper training and method education there is a risk of not
causing death and can cause severe pain and suffering. It is unknown how
long an animal remains conscious, or the level of suffering it goes
through after a correct snapping of the neck, which is why it has become
less common and often substituted with inhalants.
Intracardiac or intraperitoneal injection
When intravenous injection is not possible, euthanasia drugs such as pentobarbital can be injected directly into a heart chamber or body cavity.
While intraperitoneal injection is fully acceptable (although it may take up to 15 minutes to take effect in dogs and cats), an intracardiac (IC) injection
may only be performed on an unconscious or deeply sedated animal.
Performing IC injections on a fully conscious animal in places with
humane laws for animal handling is often a criminal offense.
Shooting
1912 press advertisement for "The Greener Killer", a firearm for euthanising ponies and horsesCaptive bolt gun
This can be a means of euthanasia for large animals—such as horses, cattle, and deer—if performed properly.
This may be performed by means of:
Traditionally used in the field for euthanizing horses, deer or other large game animals. The animal is shot in the forehead with the bullet directed down the spine through the medulla oblongata, resulting in instant death. The risks are minimal if carried out by skilled personnel in a suitable location.
Commonly used by the meat packing industry to slaughter cattle and other livestock. The bolt is fired through the forehead causing massive disruption of the cerebral cortex. In cattle, this stuns the animal, though if left for a prolonged period it will die from cerebral oedema. Death should therefore be rapidly brought about by pithing or exsanguination. Horses are killed outright by the captive bolt, making pithing and exsanguination unnecessary.
Reasons
The reasons for euthanasia of pets and other animals include:
Lethal chamber in the Royal London Institute and Home for Lost and Starving Cats
Illness or accident that is not terminal but would cause suffering
for the animal to live with, or when the owner cannot afford, or when
the owner has a moral objection to the treatment
Behavioural problems (usually ones that cannot be corrected) e.g. aggression – Canines that have usually caused grievous bodily harm
(severe injuries or death) to either humans or other animals through
mauling are usually seized and euthanised ('destroyed' in British legal
terms)
Old age and deterioration leading to loss of major bodily functions, resulting in severe impairment of the quality of life
Dementia in pets leading to loss of cognitive function and normal
daily behaviour and interactions with owner. Dementia resulting in
unsocial and repetitive behaviour causing prolonged stress for both pets
and their owners.
Lack of home or caretaker or resources for feeding
Research and testing – In the course of scientific research or testing, animals may be euthanized in order to be dissected, to prevent suffering after testing, to prevent the spread of disease, or other reasons
Small animal euthanasia is typically performed in a veterinary clinic or hospital, at animal shelter, or at the pet owner's home and is usually carried out by a veterinarian or a veterinary technician
working under the veterinarian's supervision. Often animal shelter
workers are trained to perform euthanasia as well. A licensed
veterinarian can help an owner determine when in the course of an
illness or behavioral problem euthanasia is appropriate.
In the case of large animals which have sustained injuries, this
will also occur at the site of the accident, for example, on a
racecourse.
Some animal rights organizations support animal euthanasia in certain circumstances and practice euthanasia at shelters that they operate.
Legal status
In the U.S., for companion animals euthanized in animal shelters, most states prescribe intravenous injection as the required method. These laws date to 1990, when Georgia's Humane Euthanasia Act became the first state law to mandate this method. Before that, gas chambers and other means were commonly employed. The Georgia law was resisted by the Georgia Commissioner of Agriculture, Tommy Irvin, who was charged with enforcing the act. In March 2007, he was sued by former State Representative Chesley V. Morton, who wrote the law, and subsequently ordered by the court to enforce all provisions of the Act.
Many pet owners choose to have their pets cremated or buried after the pet is euthanized, and there are pet funeral homes that specialize in animal burial or cremation. Otherwise, the animal facility will often freeze the body and subsequently send it to the local landfill.
In some instances, animals euthanized at shelters or animal control agencies have been sent to meat rendering facilities to be processed for use in cosmetics, fertilizer, gelatin, poultry feed, pharmaceuticals and pet food. It was proposed that the presence of pentobarbital in dog food may have caused dogs to become less responsive to the drug when being euthanized.
However, a 2002 FDA study found no dog or cat DNA in the foods they
tested, so it was theorized that the drug found in dog food came from
euthanized cattle and horses. Furthermore, the level of the drug found
in pet food was safe.
Euthanasia (from Greek: εὐθανασία, lit. 'good death': εὖ, eu, 'well, good' + θάνατος, thanatos, 'death') is the practise of intentionally ending life to eliminate pain and suffering.
Different countries have different euthanasia laws. The British House of Lordsselect committee on medical ethics
defines euthanasia as "a deliberate intervention undertaken with the
express intention of ending a life to relieve intractable suffering". In the Netherlands and Belgium, euthanasia is understood as "termination of life by a doctor at the request of a patient".
The Dutch law, however, does not use the term 'euthanasia' but includes
the concept under the broader definition of "assisted suicide and
termination of life on request".
Euthanasia is categorised in different ways, which include voluntary, non-voluntary, and involuntary.
Voluntary euthanasia is when a person wishes to have their life ended
and is legal in a growing number of countries. Non-voluntary euthanasia
occurs when a patient's consent is unavailable and is legal in some
countries under certain limited conditions, in both active and passive
forms. Involuntary euthanasia, which is done without asking for consent
or against the patient's will, is illegal in all countries and is
usually considered murder.
As of 2006, euthanasia had become the most active area of research in bioethics.
In some countries, divisive public controversy occurs over the moral,
ethical, and legal issues associated with euthanasia. Passive euthanasia
(known as "pulling the plug") is legal under some circumstances in many
countries. Active euthanasia, however, is legal or de facto
legal in only a handful of countries (for example, Belgium, Canada, and
Switzerland), which limit it to specific circumstances and require the
approval of counsellors,
doctors, or other specialists. In some countries—such as Nigeria, Saudi
Arabia, and Pakistan—support for active euthanasia is almost
nonexistent.
Definition
Like other terms borrowed from history, "euthanasia" has had
different meanings depending on usage. The first apparent usage of the
term "euthanasia" belongs to the historian Suetonius, who described how the Emperor Augustus, "dying quickly and without suffering in the arms of his wife, Livia, experienced the 'euthanasia' he had wished for." The word "euthanasia" was first used in a medical context by Francis Bacon
in the 17th century to refer to an easy, painless, happy death, during
which it was a "physician's responsibility to alleviate the 'physical
sufferings' of the body." Bacon referred to an "outward euthanasia"—the
term "outward" he used to distinguish from a spiritual concept—the
euthanasia "which regards the preparation of the soul."
In current usage, euthanasia has been defined as the "painless inducement of a quick death".
However, it is argued that this approach fails to properly define
euthanasia, as it leaves open a number of possible actions that would
meet the requirements of the definition but would not be seen as
euthanasia. In particular, these include situations where a person kills
another, painlessly, but for no reason beyond that of personal gain, or
accidental deaths that are quick and painless but not intentional.
Another approach incorporates the notion of suffering into the definition. The definition offered by the Oxford English Dictionary
incorporates suffering as a necessary condition with "the painless
killing of a patient suffering from an incurable and painful disease or
in an irreversible coma",
This approach is included in Marvin Khol and Paul Kurtz's definition of
it as "a mode or act of inducing or permitting death painlessly as a
relief from suffering".
Counterexamples can be given: such definitions may encompass killing a
person suffering from an incurable disease for personal gain (such as to
claim an inheritance), and commentators such as Tom Beauchamp and Arnold Davidson have argued that doing so would constitute "murder simpliciter" rather than euthanasia.
The third element incorporated into many definitions is that of
intentionality: the death must be intended rather than accidental, and
the intent of the action must be a "merciful death".
Michael Wreen argued that "the principal thing that distinguishes
euthanasia from intentional killing simpliciter is the agent's motive:
it must be a good motive insofar as the good of the person killed is
concerned."
Similarly, Heather Draper speaks to the importance of motive, arguing
that "the motive forms a crucial part of arguments for euthanasia,
because it must be in the best interests of the person on the receiving
end." Definitions such as those offered by the House of LordsSelect committee on Medical Ethics
take this path, where euthanasia is defined as "a deliberate
intervention undertaken with the express intention of ending a life, to
relieve intractable suffering." Beauchamp and Davidson also highlight Baruch Brody's
"an act of euthanasia is one in which one person ... (A) kills another
person (B) for the benefit of the second person, who actually does
benefit from being killed".
Draper argued that any definition of euthanasia must incorporate
four elements: an agent and a subject; an intention; causal proximity,
such that the actions of the agent lead to the outcome; and an outcome.
Based on this, she offered a definition incorporating those elements,
stating that euthanasia "must be defined as death that results from the
intention of one person to kill another person, using the most gentle
and painless means possible, that is motivated solely by the best
interests of the person who dies."
Prior to Draper, Beauchamp and Davidson had also offered a definition
that included these elements. Their definition specifically discounts fetuses to distinguish between abortions and euthanasia:
In summary, we have argued ... that
the death of a human being, A, is an instance of euthanasia if and only
if (1) A's death is intended by at least one other human being, B,
where B is either the cause of death or a causally relevant feature of
the event resulting in death (whether by action or by omission); (2)
there is either sufficient current evidence for B to believe that A is
acutely suffering or irreversibly comatose, or there is sufficient
current evidence related to A's present condition such that one or more
known causal laws supports B's belief that A will be in a condition of
acute suffering or irreversible comatoseness; (3) (a) B's primary reason
for intending A's death is cessation of A's (actual or predicted
future) suffering or irreversible comatoseness, where B does not intend
A's death for a different primary reason, though there may be other
relevant reasons, and (b) there is sufficient current evidence for
either A or B that causal means to A's death will not produce any more
suffering than would be produced for A if B were not to intervene; (4)
the causal means to the event of A's death are chosen by A or B to be as
painless as possible, unless either A or B has an overriding reason for
a more painful causal means, where the reason for choosing the latter
causal means does not conflict with the evidence in 3b; (5) A is a
nonfetal organism.
Wreen, in part responding to Beauchamp and Davidson, offered a six-part definition:
Person A committed an act of
euthanasia if and only if (1) A killed B or let her die; (2) A intended
to kill B; (3) the intention specified in (2) was at least partial cause
of the action specified in (1); (4) the causal journey from the
intention specified in (2) to the action specified in (1) is more or
less in accordance with A's plan of action; (5) A's killing of B is a
voluntary action; (6) the motive for the action specified in (1), the
motive standing behind the intention specified in (2), is the good of
the person killed.
Wreen also considered a seventh requirement: "(7) The good specified
in (6) is, or at least includes, the avoidance of evil", although, as
Wreen noted in the paper, he was not convinced that the restriction was
required.
In discussing his definition, Wreen noted the difficulty of justifying euthanasia when faced with the notion of the subject's "right to life". In response, Wreen argued that euthanasia has to be voluntary and that "involuntary euthanasia is, as such, a great wrong".
Other commentators incorporate consent more directly into their
definitions. For example, in a discussion of euthanasia presented in
2003 by the European Association of Palliative Care (EPAC) Ethics Task
Force, the authors offered: "Medicalized killing of a person without the
person's consent, whether nonvoluntary (where the person is unable to
consent) or involuntary (against the person's will), is not euthanasia:
it is murder. Hence, euthanasia can be voluntary only." Although the EPAC Ethics Task Force argued that both non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia
could not be included in the definition of euthanasia, there is
discussion in the literature about excluding one but not the other.
Classification
Euthanasia may be classified into three types, according to whether a person gives informed consent: voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary.
There is a debate within the medical and bioethics literature
about whether or not the non-voluntary (and by extension, involuntary)
killing of patients can be regarded as euthanasia, irrespective of
intent or the patient's circumstances. In the definitions offered by
Beauchamp and Davidson and, later, by Wreen, consent on the part of the
patient was not considered one of their criteria, although it may have
been required to justify euthanasia. However, others see consent as essential.
Voluntary euthanasia
is conducted with the consent of the patient. Active voluntary
euthanasia is legal in Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Passive
voluntary euthanasia is legal throughout the US per Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. When the patient brings about their own death with the assistance of a physician, the term assisted suicide
is often used instead. Assisted suicide is legal in Switzerland and the
U.S. states of California, Oregon, Washington, Montana and Vermont.
Non-voluntary euthanasia
Non-voluntary euthanasia is conducted when the consent of the patient is unavailable. Examples include child euthanasia, which is illegal worldwide but decriminalised under certain specific circumstances in the Netherlands under the Groningen Protocol.
Passive forms of non-voluntary euthanasia (i.e. withholding treatment)
are legal in a number of countries under specified conditions.
Voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary types can be further divided into passive or active variants. Passive euthanasia entails the withholding treatment necessary for the continuance of life. Active euthanasia entails the use of lethal substances or forces (such as administering a lethal injection),
and is more controversial. While some authors consider these terms to
be misleading and unhelpful, they are nonetheless commonly used. In some
cases, such as the administration of increasingly necessary, but toxic
doses of painkillers, there is a debate whether or not to regard the practice as active or passive.
Euthanasia was practiced in Ancient Greece and Rome: for example, hemlock was employed as a means of hastening death on the island of Kea, a technique also employed in Massalia. Euthanasia, in the sense of the deliberate hastening of a person's death, was supported by Socrates, Plato and Seneca the Elder in the ancient world, although Hippocrates appears to have spoken against the practice,
writing "I will not prescribe a deadly drug to please someone, nor give
advice that may cause his death" (noting there is some debate in the
literature about whether or not this was intended to encompass
euthanasia).
Early modern period
The term euthanasia, in the earlier sense of supporting someone as they died, was used for the first time by Francis Bacon. In his work, Euthanasia medica, he chose this ancient Greek word and, in doing so, distinguished between euthanasia interior, the preparation of the soul for death, and euthanasia exterior,
which was intended to make the end of life easier and painless, in
exceptional circumstances by shortening life. That the ancient meaning
of an easy death came to the fore again in the early modern period can be seen from its definition in the 18th century Zedlers Universallexikon:
Euthanasia: a very gentle and quiet death, which happens without painful convulsions. The word comes from ευ, bene, well, and θανατος, mors, death.
The concept of euthanasia in the sense of alleviating the process of death goes back to the medical historian Karl Friedrich Heinrich Marx,
who drew on Bacon's philosophical ideas. According to Marx, a doctor
had a moral duty to ease the suffering of death through encouragement,
support and mitigation using medication. Such an "alleviation of death"
reflected the contemporary zeitgeist,
but was brought into the medical canon of responsibility for the first
time by Marx. Marx also stressed the distinction of the theological care
of the soul of sick people from the physical care and medical treatment
by doctors.
Euthanasia in its modern sense has always been strongly opposed in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Thomas Aquinas opposed both and argued that the practice of euthanasia contradicted our natural human instincts of survival,
as did Francois Ranchin (1565–1641), a French physician and professor
of medicine, and Michael Boudewijns (1601–1681), a physician and
teacher. Other voices argued for euthanasia, such as John Donne in 1624, and euthanasia continued to be practised. In 1678, the publication of Caspar Questel's De pulvinari morientibus non-subtrahend, ("On the pillow of which the dying should not be deprived"),
initiated debate on the topic. Questel described various customs which
were employed at the time to hasten the death of the dying, (including
the sudden removal of a pillow, which was believed to accelerate death),
and argued against their use, as doing so was "against the laws of God
and Nature". This view was shared by others who followed, including Philipp Jakob Spener, Veit Riedlin and Johann Georg Krünitz.
Despite opposition, euthanasia continued to be practised, involving
techniques such as bleeding, suffocation, and removing people from their
beds to be placed on the cold ground.
Suicide and euthanasia became more accepted during the Age of Enlightenment. Thomas More wrote of euthanasia in Utopia, although it is not clear if More was intending to endorse the practice.
Other cultures have taken different approaches: for example, in Japan
suicide has not traditionally been viewed as a sin, as it is used in
cases of honor, and accordingly, the perceptions of euthanasia are
different from those in other parts of the world.
Beginnings of the contemporary euthanasia debate
In the mid-1800s, the use of morphine to treat "the pains of death" emerged, with John Warren recommending its use in 1848. A similar use of chloroform
was revealed by Joseph Bullar in 1866. However, in neither case was it
recommended that the use should be to hasten death. In 1870 Samuel
Williams, a schoolteacher, initiated the contemporary euthanasia debate
through a speech given at the Birmingham Speculative Club in England,
which was subsequently published in a one-off publication entitled Essays of the Birmingham Speculative Club, the collected works of a number of members of an amateur philosophical society. Williams' proposal was to use chloroform to deliberately hasten the death of terminally ill patients:
That in all cases of hopeless and
painful illness, it should be the recognized duty of the medical
attendant, whenever so desired by the patient, to administer chloroform
or such other anaesthetic as may by-and-bye supersede chloroform – so as
to destroy consciousness at once, and put the sufferer to a quick and
painless death; all needful precautions being adopted to prevent any
possible abuse of such duty; and means being taken to establish, beyond
the possibility of doubt or question, that the remedy was applied at the
express wish of the patient.
— Samuel Williams (1872), Euthanasia Williams and Northgate: London.
The essay was favourably reviewed in The Saturday Review, but an editorial against the essay appeared in The Spectator.
From there it proved to be influential, and other writers came out in
support of such views: Lionel Tollemache wrote in favour of euthanasia,
as did Annie Besant, the essayist and reformer who later became involved with the National Secular Society, considering it a duty to society to "die voluntarily and painlessly" when one reaches the point of becoming a 'burden. Popular Science analyzed the issue in May 1873, assessing both sides of the argument.
Kemp notes that at the time, medical doctors did not participate in the
discussion; it was "essentially a philosophical enterprise ... tied
inextricably to a number of objections to the Christian doctrine of the
sanctity of human life".
Felix Adler, c. 1913, the first prominent American to argue for permitting suicide in cases of chronic illness
The rise of the euthanasia movement in the United States coincided with the so-called Gilded Age,
a time of social and technological change that encompassed an
"individualistic conservatism that praised laissez-faire economics, scientific method, and rationalism", along with major depressions, industrialisation and conflict between corporations and labour unions.
It was also the period in which the modern hospital system was
developed, which has been seen as a factor in the emergence of the
euthanasia debate.
Robert Ingersoll
argued for euthanasia, stating in 1894 that where someone is suffering
from a terminal illness, such as terminal cancer, they should have a
right to end their pain through suicide. Felix Adler offered a similar approach, although, unlike Ingersoll, Adler did not reject religion. In fact, he argued from an Ethical Culture
framework. In 1891, Adler argued that those suffering from overwhelming
pain should have the right to commit suicide, and, furthermore, that it
should be permissible for a doctor to assist – thus making Adler the
first "prominent American" to argue for suicide in cases where people
were suffering from chronic illness. Both Ingersoll and Adler argued for voluntary euthanasia of adults suffering from terminal ailments.
Dowbiggin argues that by breaking down prior moral objections to
euthanasia and suicide, Ingersoll and Adler enabled others to stretch
the definition of euthanasia.
The first attempt to legalise euthanasia took place in the United States, when Henry Hunt introduced legislation into the General Assembly of Ohio in 1906. Hunt did so at the behest of Anna Sophina Hall,
a wealthy heiress who was a major figure in the euthanasia movement
during the early 20th century in the United States. Hall had watched her
mother die after an extended battle with liver cancer,
and had dedicated herself to ensuring that others would not have to
endure the same suffering. Towards this end she engaged in an extensive
letter writing campaign, recruited Lurana Sheldon and Maud Ballington Booth, and organised a debate on euthanasia at the annual meeting of the American Humane Association in 1905 – described by Jacob Appel as the first significant public debate on the topic in the 20th century.
Hunt's bill called for the administration of an anesthetic
to bring about a patient's death, so long as the person is of lawful
age and sound mind, and was suffering from a fatal injury, an
irrevocable illness, or great physical pain. It also required that the
case be heard by a physician, required informed consent in front of
three witnesses, and required the attendance of three physicians who had
to agree that the patient's recovery was impossible. A motion to reject
the bill outright was voted down, but the bill failed to pass, 79 to
23.
Along with the Ohio euthanasia proposal, in 1906 Assemblyman Ross Gregory introduced a proposal to permit euthanasia to the Iowa legislature.
However, the Iowa legislation was broader in scope than that offered in
Ohio. It allowed for the death of any person of at least ten years of
age who suffered from an ailment that would prove fatal and cause
extreme pain, should they be of sound mind and express a desire to
artificially hasten their death. In addition, it allowed for infants to
be euthanised if they were sufficiently deformed, and permitted
guardians to request euthanasia on behalf of their wards. The proposed
legislation also imposed penalties on physicians who refused to perform
euthanasia when requested: a 6–12-month prison term and a fine of
between $200 and $1,000. The proposal proved to be controversial.
It engendered considerable debate and failed to pass, having been
withdrawn from consideration after being passed to the Committee on
Public Health.
After 1906 the euthanasia debate reduced in intensity,
resurfacing periodically, but not returning to the same level of debate
until the 1930s in the United Kingdom.
Euthanasia opponent Ian Dowbiggin argues that the early membership of the Euthanasia Society of America
(ESA) reflected how many perceived euthanasia at the time, often seeing
it as a eugenics matter rather than an issue concerning individual
rights.
Dowbiggin argues that not every eugenist joined the ESA "solely for
eugenic reasons", but he postulates that there were clear ideological
connections between the eugenics and euthanasia movements.
In January 1936, King George V was given a fatal dose of morphine and cocaine
to hasten his death. At the time he was suffering from
cardio-respiratory failure, and the decision to end his life was made by
his physician, Lord Dawson. Although this event was kept a secret for over 50 years, the death of George V coincided with proposed legislation in the House of Lords to legalise euthanasia.
A 24 July 1939 killing of a severely disabled infant in Nazi Germany was described in a BBC "Genocide Under the Nazis Timeline" as the first "state-sponsored euthanasia".
Parties that consented to the killing included Hitler's office, the
parents, and the Reich Committee for the Scientific Registration of
Serious and Congenitally Based Illnesses. The Telegraph noted that the killing of the disabled infant—whose name was Gerhard Kretschmar,
born blind, with missing limbs, subject to convulsions, and reportedly
"an idiot"— provided "the rationale for a secret Nazi decree that led to
'mercy killings' of almost 300,000 mentally and physically handicapped
people".
While Kretchmar's killing received parental consent, most of the 5,000
to 8,000 children killed afterwards were forcibly taken from their
parents.
The "euthanasia campaign" of mass murder gathered momentum on 14
January 1940 when the "handicapped" were killed with gas vans and at
killing centres, eventually leading to the deaths of 70,000 adult
Germans. Professor Robert Jay Lifton, author of The Nazi Doctors
and a leading authority on the T4 program, contrasts this program with
what he considers to be a genuine euthanasia. He explains that the Nazi
version of "euthanasia" was based on the work of Adolf Jost, who published The Right to Death (Das Recht auf den Tod) in 1895. Lifton writes:
Jost argued that control over the death of the individual
must ultimately belong to the social organism, the state. This concept
is in direct opposition to the Anglo-American concept of euthanasia,
which emphasizes the individual's 'right to die' or 'right to
death' or 'right to his or her own death,' as the ultimate human claim.
In contrast, Jost was pointing to the state's right to kill. ...
Ultimately the argument was biological: 'The rights to death [are] the
key to the fitness of life.' The state must own death—must kill—in order
to keep the social organism alive and healthy.
In modern terms, the use of "euthanasia" in the context of Action T4 is seen to be a euphemism to disguise a program of genocide, in which people were killed on the grounds of "disabilities, religious beliefs, and discordant individual values".
Compared to the discussions of euthanasia that emerged post-war, the
Nazi program may have been worded in terms that appear similar to the
modern use of "euthanasia", but there was no "mercy" and the patients
were not necessarily terminally ill. Despite these differences, historian and euthanasia opponent Ian Dowbiggin
writes that "the origins of Nazi euthanasia, like those of the American
euthanasia movement, predate the Third Reich and were intertwined with
the history of eugenics and Social Darwinism, and with efforts to
discredit traditional morality and ethics."
1949 New York State Petition for Euthanasia and Catholic opposition
On 6 January 1949, the Euthanasia Society of America presented to the New York State Legislature
a petition to legalize euthanasia, signed by 379 leading Protestant and
Jewish ministers, the largest group of religious leaders ever to have
taken this stance. A similar petition had been sent to the New York
Legislature in 1947, signed by approximately 1,000 New York physicians. Roman Catholic
religious leaders criticized the petition, saying that such a bill
would "legalize a suicide-murder pact" and a "rationalization of the
fifth commandment of God, 'Thou Shalt Not Kill.'" The Right Reverend Robert E. McCormick stated that:
The ultimate object of the
Euthanasia Society is based on the Totalitarian principle that the state
is supreme and that the individual does not have the right to live if
his continuance in life is a burden or hindrance to the state. The Nazis
followed this principle and compulsory Euthanasia was practiced as a
part of their program during the recent war. We American citizens of New
York State must ask ourselves this question: "Are we going to finish
Hitler's job?"
The petition brought tensions between the American Euthanasia Society
and the Catholic Church to a head that contributed to a climate of
anti-Catholic sentiment generally, regarding issues such as birth
control, eugenics, and population control. However, the petition did not
result in any legal changes.
Debate
Historically, the euthanasia debate has tended to focus on a number of key concerns. According to euthanasia opponent Ezekiel Emanuel, proponents of euthanasia have presented four main arguments: a) that people have a right to self-determination,
and thus should be allowed to choose their own fate; b) assisting a
subject to die might be a better choice than requiring that they
continue to suffer; c) the distinction between passive euthanasia, which
is often permitted, and active euthanasia, which is not substantive (or
that the underlying principle–the doctrine of double effect–is
unreasonable or unsound); and d) permitting euthanasia will not
necessarily lead to unacceptable consequences. Pro-euthanasia activists
often point to countries like the Netherlands and Belgium, and states like Oregon, where euthanasia has been legalized, to argue that it is mostly unproblematic.
Similarly, Emanuel argues that there are four major arguments
presented by opponents of euthanasia: a) not all deaths are painful; b)
alternatives, such as cessation of active treatment, combined with the
use of effective pain relief, are available; c) the distinction between
active and passive euthanasia is morally significant; and d) legalising
euthanasia will place society on a slippery slope, which will lead to unacceptable consequences. In fact, in Oregon,
in 2013, pain was not one of the top five reasons people sought
euthanasia. Top reasons were a loss of dignity, and a fear of burdening
others.
In the United States in 2013, 47% nationwide supported
doctor-assisted suicide. This included 32% of Latinos, 29% of
African-Americans. Some U.S. disability rights organizations have also opposed bills legalizing assisted suicide.
A 2015 Populus
poll in the United Kingdom found broad public support for assisted
dying. 82% of people supported the introduction of assisted dying laws,
including 86% of people with disabilities.
An alternative approach to the question is seen in the hospice movement which promotes palliative care
for the dying and terminally ill. This has pioneered the use of
pain-relieving drugs in a holistic atmosphere in which the patient's
spiritual care ranks alongside physical care. It 'intends neither to
hasten nor postpone death'.
Passive euthanasia legal (refusal of treatment / withdrawal of life support)
Active euthanasia illegal, passive euthanasia not legislated or regulated
All forms of euthanasia illegal
West's Encyclopedia of American Law states that "a 'mercy
killing' or euthanasia is generally considered to be a criminal
homicide" and is normally used as a synonym of homicide committed at a
request made by the patient.
The judicial sense of the term "homicide" includes any intervention undertaken with the express intention of ending a life, even to relieve intractable suffering.Not all homicide is unlawful. Two designations of homicide that carry no criminal punishment are justifiable and excusable homicide.
In most countries this is not the status of euthanasia. The term
"euthanasia" is usually confined to the active variety; the University
of Washington website states that "euthanasia generally means that the
physician would act directly, for instance by giving a lethal injection,
to end the patient's life". Physician-assisted suicide is thus not classified as euthanasia by the US State of Oregon, where it is legal under the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, and despite its name, it is not legally classified as suicide either.
Unlike physician-assisted suicide, withholding or withdrawing
life-sustaining treatments with patient consent (voluntary) is almost
unanimously considered, at least in the United States, to be legal. The use of pain medication to relieve suffering, even if it hastens death, has been held as legal in several court decisions.
Some governments around the world have legalized voluntary
euthanasia but most commonly it is still considered to be criminal
homicide. In the Netherlands and Belgium, where euthanasia has been
legalized, it still remains homicide although it is not prosecuted and
not punishable if the perpetrator (the doctor) meets certain legal
conditions.
In a historic judgment, the Supreme court of India legalized
passive euthanasia. The apex court remarked in the judgment that the
Constitution of India values liberty, dignity, autonomy, and privacy. A
bench headed by Chief Justice Dipak Misra delivered a unanimous
judgment.[71]
Health professionals' sentiment
A 2010 survey in the United States of more than 10,000 physicians
found that 16.3% of physicians would consider halting life-sustaining
therapy because the family demanded it, even if they believed that it
was premature. Approximately 54.5% would not, and the remaining 29.2%
responded "it depends".
The study also found that 45.8% of physicians agreed that
physician-assisted suicide should be allowed in some cases; 40.7% did
not, and the remaining 13.5% felt it depended.
In the United Kingdom, the assisted dying campaign group Dignity in Dying cites research in which 54% of general practitioners support or are neutral towards a law change on assisted dying. Similarly, a 2017 Doctors.net.uk poll reported in the British Medical Journal stated that 55% of doctors believe assisted dying, in defined circumstances, should be legalised in the UK.
The Roman Catholic Church condemns euthanasia and assisted suicide as
morally wrong. As paragraph 2324 of the Catechism of the Catholic
Church states, "Intentional euthanasia, whatever its forms or motives,
is murder. It is gravely contrary to the dignity of the human person and
to the respect due to the living God, his Creator". Because of this,
per the Declaration on Euthanasia, the practice is unacceptable within the Church. The Orthodox Church in America,
along with other Eastern Orthodox Churches, also opposes euthanasia
stating that "euthanasia is the deliberate cessation of human life, and,
as such, must be condemned as murder."
Many non-Catholic churches in the United States take a stance
against euthanasia. Among Protestant denominations, the Episcopal Church
passed a resolution in 1991 opposing euthanasia and assisted suicide
stating that it is "morally wrong and unacceptable to take a human life
to relieve the suffering caused by incurable illnesses." Protestant and other non-Catholic churches which oppose euthanasia include:
The Church of England
accepts passive euthanasia under some circumstances, but is strongly
against active euthanasia, and has led opposition against recent
attempts to legalise it. The United Church of Canada
accepts passive euthanasia under some circumstances, but is in general
against active euthanasia, with growing acceptance now that active
euthanasia has been partly legalised in Canada. The Waldensians take a liberal stance on Euthanasia and allow the decision to lie with individuals.
Islam
Euthanasia is a complex issue in Islamic theology; however, in general it is considered contrary to Islamic law and holy texts. Among interpretations of the Qur'an and Hadith,
the early termination of life is a crime, be it by suicide or helping
one commit suicide. The various positions on the cessation of medical
treatment are mixed and considered a different class of action than
direct termination of life, especially if the patient is suffering.
Suicide and euthanasia are both crimes in almost all Muslim majority countries.
Judaism
There is much debate on the topic of euthanasia in Judaic theology,
ethics, and general opinion (especially in Israel and the United
States). Passive euthanasia was declared legal by Israel's highest court
under certain conditions and has reached some level of acceptance.
Active euthanasia remains illegal; however, the topic is actively under
debate with no clear consensus through legal, ethical, theological and
spiritual perspectives.
Melancholy by Domenico Fetti (1612). Death, suffering and meaninglessness are the main themes of philosophical pessimism.
Philosophical pessimism is a family of philosophical views
that assign a negative value to life or existence. Philosophical
pessimists commonly argue that the world contains an empirical prevalence of pains over pleasures, that existence is ontologically or metaphysically adverse to living beings, and that life is fundamentally meaningless or without purpose.
Philosophical pessimism is not a single coherent movement, but rather a
loosely associated group of thinkers with similar ideas and a
resemblance to each other. Their responses to the condition of life are widely varied. Philosophical pessimists usually do not advocate for suicide as a solution to the human predicament; though many favour the adoption of antinatalism, that is, non-procreation.
Definitions
The word pessimism comes from Latin pessimus, meaning "the worst".
Philosophers define the position in a variety of ways. In Pessimism: A History and a Criticism, James Sully describes the essence of philosophical pessimism as "the denial of happiness or the affirmation of life's inherent misery". Byron Simmons writes, "[p]essimism is, roughly, the view that life is not worth living". Frederick C. Beiser
writes, "pessimism is the thesis that life is not worth living, that
nothingness is better than being, or that it is worse to be than not
be". According to Paul Prescott, it is the view that "the bad prevails over the good".
Olga Plümacher
identifies two fundamental claims of philosophical pessimism: "The sum
of displeasure outweighs the sum of pleasure" and "Consequently the
non-being of the world would be better than its being".
Ignacio L. Moya defines pessimism as a position that holds that the
essence of existence can be known (at least partially); that life is
essentially characterized by needs, wants, and pain, and hence suffering
is inescapable; that there are no ultimate reasons for, no cosmic plan
or purpose to suffering; and that, ultimately, non-existence is
preferable to existence.
Themes
Reaching a
pessimistic conclusion can be approached in various ways, with numerous
arguments reinforcing this perspective. However, certain recurring
themes consistently emerge:
Life is not worth living — one of the most common
arguments of pessimists is that life is not worth living. In short,
pessimists view existence, overall, as having a deleterious effect on
living beings: to be alive is to be put in a bad position.
The bad prevails over the good — generally, the bad wins over the good.
This can be understood in two ways. Firstly, one can make a case that —
irrespective of the quantities of goods and evils — the suffering
cannot be compensated for by the good. Secondly, one can make a case that there is a predominance of bad things over good things.
Non-existence is preferable to existence — since existence is
bad, it would have been better had it not have been. This point can be
understood in one of the two following ways. Firstly, one can argue
that, for any individual being, it would have been better had they never
existed. Secondly, various pessimists have argued that the non-existence of the whole world would be better than its existence.
Pessimistic sentiments can be found throughout religions and in the
works of various philosophers. The major developments in the tradition
started with the works of German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, who was the first to provide an explanation for why there is so much misery in the world and construct a complete philosophical system in which pessimism played a major role.
Ancient times
One of the central points of Buddhism, which originated in ancient India, is the claim that life is full of suffering and unsatisfactoriness. This is known as dukkha from the Four Noble Truths.
In the Ecclesiastes from the Abrahamic religions, which originated in the Middle East, the author laments the meaninglessness of human life, views life as worse than death and expresses antinatalistic sentiments towards coming into existence. These views are made central in Gnosticism, a religious movement stemming from Christianity, where the body is seen as a type of a "prison" for the soul, and the world as a type of hell.
Hegesias of Cyrene, who lived in ancient Greece,
argued that lasting happiness cannot be realized because of constant
bodily ills and the impossibility of achieving all our goals.
19th century Germany
Arthur Schopenhauer
was the first philosopher who constructed an entire philosophical
system, where he presented an explanation of the world through metaphysics, aesthetics, epistemology, and ethics — all connected with a pessimistic view of the world. Schopenhauer viewed the world as having two sides — Will and representation. Will is pure striving, aimless, incessant, with no end; it is the inner essence of all things. Representation
is how we view the world with our particular perceptual and cognitive
endowment; it is how we build objects from our perceptions.
In living creatures, the Will takes the form of the will to life — self-preservation or the survival instinct appearing as striving to satisfy desires.
And since this will to life is our inner nature, we are doomed to be
always dissatisfied, as one satisfied desire makes room for striving for
yet another thing. There is, however, something we can do with that ceaseless willing. We
can take temporary respite during aesthetic contemplation or through
cultivating a moral attitude. We can also defeat the will to life more
permanently through asceticism, achieving equanimity.
Main arguments
The most common arguments for the tenets of philosophical pessimism are briefly presented here.
Duḥkha as the mark of existence
Constant dissatisfaction — duḥkha
— is an intrinsic mark of all sentient existence. All living creatures
have to undergo the sufferings of birth, aging, sickness and death; want
what they do not have, avoid what they do not like, and feel loss for
the positive things they have lost. All of these types of striving (taṇhā)
are sources of suffering, and they are not external but are rather
inherent vices (such as greed, lust, envy, self-indulgence) of all
living creatures.
Since in Buddhism one of the central concepts is that of liberation or nirvana,
this highlights the miserable character of existence, as there would be
no need to make such a great effort to free oneself from a mere "less
than ideal state". Since enlightenment is the goal of Buddhist practices
through the Noble Eightfold Path, the value of life itself, under this perspective, appears as doubtful.
Pleasure doesn't add anything positive to our experience
A number of philosophers have put forward criticisms of pleasure, essentially denying that it adds anything positive to our well-being above the neutral state.
Pleasure as the mere removal of pain
A particular strand of criticism of pleasure goes as far back as to Plato,
who said that most of the pleasures we experience are forms of relief
from pain, and that the unwise confuse the neutral painless state with
happiness.Epicurus
pushed this idea to its limit and claimed that, "[t]he limit of the
greatness of the pleasures is the removal of everything which can give
pain".As such, according to Epicureans,
one can not be better off than being free from pain, anxiety, distress,
fear, irritation, regret, worry, etc. — in the state of tranquillity.
According to Knutsson, there are a couple of reasons why we might
think that. Firstly, we can say that one experience is better than
another by recognizing that the first one lacks a particular discomfort.
And we can do that with any number of experiences, thus explaining what
it means to feel better, all that just with relying on taking away
disturbances. Secondly, it's difficult to find a particular quality of
experience that would make it better than a completely undisturbed
state. Thirdly, we can explain behavior without invoking positive
pleasures. Fourthly, it's easy to understand what it means for an
experience to have certain imperfections (aversive qualities), while
it's not clear what it would mean for an experience to be genuinely
better than neutral. And lastly, a model with only negative and neutral
states is theoretically simpler than one containing an additional class
of positive experiences.
No genuine positive states
A
stronger version of this view is that there may be no states that are
undisturbed or neutral. It's at least plausible that in every state we could
notice some dissatisfactory quality such as tiredness, irritation,
boredom, worry, feeling uncomfortable, etc. Instead of neutral states,
there may simply be "default" states — states with recurrent but minor
frustrations and discomforts that, over time, we got used to and learned
not to do anything about. Pleasure as the mere relief from striving.
Schopenhauer
maintained that only pain is positive. That is, only pain is directly
felt — it's experienced as something which is immediately added to our
consciousness. On the other hand, pleasure is only ever negative, which
means it only takes away something already present in our experience —
and thus is only experienced in an indirect or mediate way. He put forward his negativity thesis — that pleasure is only ever a relief from pain. Later German pessimists — Julius Bahnsen, Eduard von Hartmann, and Philipp Mainländer — held very similar views.
Pain can be removed in one of two ways. One way is to satisfy a
desire. Since to strive is to suffer, once a desire is satisfied,
suffering momentarily stops. The second way is through distraction. When
we're not paying attention to what we lack — and hence, desire — we are
temporarily at peace. This happens in cases of intellectual and
aesthetic experiences.
A craving may arise when we direct our attention towards some
external object, or when we notice something unwanted about our current
situation. This is experienced as a visceral need to change something about the current state. When we do not feel any such cravings, we are content or tranquil — we feel no urgency or need to change anything about our experience.
No genuine counterpart to suffering
Alternatively,
it can be argued that, for any purported pleasant state, we never find —
under closer inspection — anything that would make it a positive or
genuine counterpart to suffering. For an experience to be genuinely
positive it would have to be an experiential opposite to suffering.
However, it's difficult to understand what it would take for an
experience to be an opposite of another experience — there just seem to
be separate axes of experiences (hot and cold, loud and silent), which
are noticed as contrasting. And even if we granted that the idea of an
experiential opposite makes sense, it's difficult — if not impossible —
to actually find a clear example of such an experience that would
survive scrutiny.
There is some neuroscientific evidence that positive and negative
experiences are not laid on the same axis, but rather comprise two
distinct — albeit interacting — systems.
Life contains uncompensated evils
One
argument for the negative view on life is the recognition that evils
are unconditionally unacceptable. A good life is not possible with evils
in it. This line of thinking is based on Schopenhauer's
statement that "the ill and evil in the world... even if they stood in
the most just relation to each other, indeed even if they were far
outweighed by the good, are nevertheless things that should absolutely
never exist in any way, shape or form" in The World as Will and Representation. The idea here is that no good can ever erase the experienced evils,
because they are of a different quality or kind of importance.
Schopenhauer elaborates on the vital difference between the good
and the bad, saying that, "it is fundamentally beside the point to argue
whether there is more good or evil in the world: for the very existence
of evil already decides the matter since it can never be cancelled out
by any good that might exist alongside or after it, and cannot therefore
be counterbalanced", and adding that, "even if thousands had lived in
happiness and delight, this would never annul the anxiety and tortured
death of a single person; and my present wellbeing does just as little
to undo my earlier suffering."
One way of interpreting the argument is by focusing on how one
thing could compensate another. The goods can only compensate the evils,
when they a) happen to the same subject, and b) happen at the same
time. The reason why the good has to happen to the same subject is
because the miserable cannot feel the happiness of the joyful, and hence
it has no effect on him. The reason why the good has to happen at the
same time is because the future joy does not act backwards in time, and
so it has no effect on the present state of the suffering individual.
But these conditions are not being met, and hence life is not worth
living. Here, it doesn't matter whether there are any genuine positive
pleasures, because since pleasures and pains are experientially
separated, the evils are left unrepaid.
Another interpretation of the negativity thesis — that goods are
merely negative in character — uses metaphors of debt and repayment, and
crime and punishment. Here, merely ceasing an evil does not count as
paying it off, just like stopping committing a crime does not amount to
making amends for it. The bad can only be compensated by something
positively good, just like a crime has to be answered for by some
punishment, or a debt has to be paid off by something valuable. If the
good is merely taking away an evil, then it cannot compensate for the
bad since it's not of the appropriate kind — it's not a positive thing
that could "repay the debt" of the bad.
Suffering is essential to life because of perpetual striving
Arthur Schopenhauer introduces an a priori
argument for pessimism. The basis of the argument is the recognition
that sentient organisms—animals—are embodied and inhabit specific niches
in the environment. They struggle for their self-preservation. Striving to satisfy wants is the essence of all organic life.
Schopenhauer posits that striving is the essence of life. All
striving, he argues, involves suffering. Thus, he concludes that
suffering is unavoidable and inherent to existence. Given this, he says
that the balance of good and bad is on the whole negative.
There are a couple of reasons why suffering is a fundamental aspect of life:
Satisfaction is elusive: organisms strive towards various
things all the time. Whenever they satisfy one desire, they want
something else and the striving begins anew.
Happiness is negative: while needs come to us seemingly out
of themselves, we have to exert ourselves in order to experience some
degree of joy. Moreover, pleasure is only ever a satisfaction—or
elimination—of a particular desire. Therefore, it is only a negative
experience as it temporarily takes away a striving or need.
Striving is suffering: as long as striving is not satisfied, it's being experienced as suffering.
Boredom is suffering: the lack of an object of desire is experienced as a discomforting state.
The terminality of human life
According to Julio Cabrera's ontology,
human life has a structurally negative value. Under this view, human
life does not provoke discomfort in humans due to the particular events
that happen in the lives of each individual, but due to the very being
or nature of human existence as such. The following characteristics
constitute what Cabrera calls the "terminality of being" — in other
words, its structurally negative value:
The being acquired by a
human at birth is decreasing (or "decaying"), in the sense of a being
that begins to end since its very emergence, following a single and
irreversible direction of deterioration and decline, of which complete
consummation can occur at any moment between some minutes and around one
hundred years.
From the moment they come into being, humans are
affected by three kinds of frictions: physical pain (in the form of
illnesses, accidents, and natural catastrophes to which they are always
exposed); discouragement (in the form of "lacking the will", or the
"mood" or the "spirit", to continue to act, from mild taedium vitae
to serious forms of depression), and finally, exposure to the
aggressions of other humans (from gossip and slander to various forms of
discrimination, persecution, and injustice); aggressions that we too
can inflict on others (who are also submitted, like us, to the three
kinds of friction).
To defend themselves against (a) and (b), human beings are equipped with mechanisms of creation of positive values (ethical, aesthetic, religious, entertaining, recreational,
as well as values contained in human realizations of all kinds), which
humans must keep constantly active. All positive values that appear
within human life are reactive and palliative; they do not arise from
the structure of life itself, but are introduced by the permanent and
anxious struggle against the decaying life and its three kinds of
friction, with such struggle however doomed to be defeated, at any
moment, by any of the mentioned frictions or by the progressive decline
of one's being.
For Cabrera, this situation is further worsened by a phenomenon he
calls "moral impediment", that is, the structural impossibility of
acting in the world without harming or manipulating someone at some
given moment.
According to him, moral impediment happens not necessarily because of a
moral fault in us, but due to the structural situation in which we have
been placed. The positive values that are created in human life come
into being within a narrow and anxious environment.
Human beings are cornered by the presence of their decaying
bodies as well as pain and discouragement, in a complicated and holistic
web of actions, in which we are forced to quickly understand
diversified social situations and take relevant decisions. It is
difficult for our urgent need to build our own positive values, not to
end up harming the projects of other humans who are also anxiously
trying to do the same, that is, build their own positive values. The asymmetry between harms and benefits
David Benatar
argues that there is a significant difference between lack/presence of
harms and benefits when comparing a situation when a person exists with a
situation when said person never exists. The starting point of the
argument is the following noncontroversial observation:
1. The presence of pain is bad.
2. The presence of pleasure is good.
However, the symmetry breaks when we consider the absence of pain and pleasure:
3. The absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone.
4. The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.
Based on the above, Benatar infers the following:
the absence of pain is better in the case where a person never exists than the presence of pain where a person does exist,
the absence of pleasure is not worse in the case where a person
never exists than the presence of pleasure where a person does exists.
In short, the absence of pain is good, while the absence of pleasure
is not bad. From this it follows that not coming into existence has
advantages over coming into existence for the one who would be affected
by coming into the world. This is the cornerstone of his argument for antinatalism — the view that coming into existence is bad.
Empirical differences between the pleasures and pains in life
To
support his case for pessimism, Benatar mentions a series of empirical
differences between the pleasures and pains in life. In a strictly
temporal aspect, the most intense pleasures that can be experienced are
short-lived (e.g. orgasms), whereas the most severe pains can be much more enduring, lasting for days, months, and even years.
The worst pains that can be experienced are also worse in quality or
magnitude than the best pleasures are good, offering as an example the thought experiment of whether one would accept "an hour of the most delightful pleasures in exchange for an hour of the worst tortures".
In addition to citing Schopenhauer, who made a similar argument,
when asking his readers to "compare the feelings of an animal that is
devouring another with those of that other"; the amount of time it may take for one's desires to be fulfilled, with some of our desires never being satisfied;
the quickness with which one's body can be injured, damaged, or fall
ill, and the comparative slowness of recovery, with full recovery
sometimes never being attained the existence of chronic pain, but the comparative non-existence of chronic pleasure; the gradual and inevitable physical and mental decline to which every life is subjected through the process of ageing;
the effortless way in which the bad things in life naturally come to
us, and the efforts one needs to muster in order to ward them off and
obtain the good things; the lack of a cosmic or transcendent meaning to human life as a whole, borrowing a term from Spinoza, according to Benatar our lives lack meaning from the perspective of the universe, that is, sub specie aeternitatis
Benatar concludes that, even if one argues that the bad things in
life are in some sense necessary for human beings to appreciate the
good things in life, or at least to appreciate them fully, he asserts
that it is not clear that this appreciation requires as much bad as
there is, and that our lives are worse than they would be if the bad
things were not in such sense necessary.
Human life would be vastly better if pain were fleeting
and pleasure protracted; if the pleasures were much better than the
pains were bad; if it were really difficult to be injured or get sick;
if recovery were swift when injury or illness did befall us; and if our
desires were fulfilled instantly and if they did not give way to new
desires. Human life would also be immensely better if we lived for many
thousands of years in good health and if we were much wiser, cleverer,
and morally better than we are.
Responses to the evils of existence
Pessimistic philosophers came up with a variety of ways of dealing with the suffering and misery of life.
Schopenhauer's renunciation of the will to life
Arthur Schopenhauer
regarded his philosophy not only as a condemnation of existence, but
also as a doctrine of salvation that allows one to counteract the
suffering that comes from the will to life and attain tranquillity.
According to Schopenhauer, suffering comes from willing (striving,
desiring). One's willing is proportional to one's focus on oneself,
one's needs, fears, individuality, etc. So, Schopenhauer reasons, to
interrupt suffering, one has to interrupt willing. And to diminish
willing, one has to diminish the focus on oneself. This can be
accomplished in a couple of ways.
Aesthetic contemplation
Aesthetic
contemplation is the focused appreciation of a piece of art, music, or
even an idea. It is disinterested and impersonal. It is disinterested —
one's interests give way to a devotion to the object; it's being
considered as an end in itself. It is impersonal — not constrained by
one's own likes and dislikes. Aesthetic appreciation evokes a universal
idea of an object, rather than the perception of the object as unique.
During that time, one "loses oneself" in the object of
contemplation, and the sense of individuation temporarily dissolves.
This is because the universality of the object of contemplation passes
onto the subject. One's consciousness becomes will-less. One becomes — if only for a brief moment — a neutral spectator or a "pure subject", unencumbered by one's own self, needs, and suffering.
Compassionate moral outlook
For
Schopenhauer, a proper moral attitude towards others comes from the
recognition that the separation between living beings occurs only in the
realm of representation, originating from the principium individuationis. Underneath the representational realm, we are all one. Each person is, in fact, the same Will — only manifested through different objectifications. The suffering of another being is thus our own suffering.
The recognition of this metaphysical truth allows one to attain a more
universal, rather than individualistic, consciousness. In such a
universal consciousness, one relinquishes one's exclusive focus on one's
own well-being and woe towards that of all other beings.
Asceticism
Schopenhauer
explains that one may go through a transformative experience in which
one recognizes that the perception of the world as being constituted of
separate things, that are impermanent and constantly striving, is
illusory. This can come about through knowledge of the workings of the
world or through an experience of extreme suffering. One sees through the veil of Maya.
This means that one no longer identifies oneself as a separate
individual. Rather, one recognizes himself as all things. One sees the
source of all misery — the Will as the thing-in-itself, which is the kernel of all reality. One can then change one’s attitude to life towards that of the renunciation of the will to life and practice self-denial (not giving in to desires).
The person who attains this state of mind lives his life in complete peace and equanimity. He is not bothered by desires or lack. He accepts everything as it is.
This path of redemption, Schopenhauer argues, is more permanent,
since it's grounded in a profound recognition that changes one's
attitude. It's not merely a fleeting moment as in the case of an
aesthetic experience.
The ascetic
way of life, however, is not available for everyone — only a few rare
and heroic individuals may be able to live as ascetics and attain such a
state. More importantly, Schopenhauer explains, asceticism requires
virtue; and virtue can be cultivated but not taught.
Defence mechanisms
Peter Wessel Zapffe
viewed humans as animals with an overly developed consciousness who
yearn for justice and meaning in a fundamentally meaningless and unjust
universe — constantly struggling against feelings of existential dread
as well as the knowledge of their own mortality. He identified four defence mechanisms that allow people to cope with disturbing thoughts about the nature of human existence:
Isolation: the troublesome facts of existence are simply
repressed — they are not spoken about in public, and are not even
thought about in private.
Anchoring: one fixates (anchors) oneself on cultural
projects, religious beliefs, ideologies, etc.; and pursue goals
appropriate to the objects of one's fixation. By dedicating oneself to a
cause, one focuses one's attention on a specific value or ideal, thus
achieving a communal or cultural sense of stability and safety from
unsettling existential musings.
Distraction: through entertainment, career, status, etc.,
one distracts oneself from existentially disturbing thoughts. By
constantly chasing for new pleasures, new goals, and new things to do,
one is able to evade a direct confrontation against mankind's vulnerable
and ill-fated situation in the cosmos.
Sublimation: artistic expression may act as a temporary
means of respite from feelings of existential angst by transforming them
into works of art that can be aesthetically appreciated from a
distance.
Concern for those who will be coming into this world has been present throughout the history of pessimism. Notably, Arthur Schopenhauer asked: One should try to imagine that the act of procreation
were neither a need, nor accompanied by sexual pleasure, but instead a
matter of pure, rational reflection; could the human race even continue
to exist? Would not everyone, on the contrary, have so much compassion
for the coming generation that he would rather spare it the burden of
existence, or at least refuse to take it upon himself to cold-bloodedly
impose it on them?
Schopenhauer also compares life to a debt that's being collected
through urgent needs and torturing wants. We live by paying off the
interests on this debt by constantly satisfying the desires of life; and
the entirety of such debt is contracted in procreation: when we come
into the world.
Anthropocentric antinatalism
Some pessimists, most notably Peter Wessel Zapffe and David Benatar,
prescribe abstention from procreation as the best response to the ills
of life. A person can only do so much to secure oneself from suffering
or help others in need. The best course of action, they argue, is to not
bring others into a world where discomfort is guaranteed.
They also suggest a scenario where humanity decides not to
continue to exist, but instead chooses to go down the route of phased
extinction. The resulting extinction of the human species would not be
regrettable but a good thing. They go as far as to prescribe non-procreation as the morally right — or even obligatory — course of action. Zapffe conveys this position through the words of the titular Last Messiah: "Know yourselves – be infertile and let the earth be silent after ye".
Wildlife antinatalism
Antinatalism
can be extended to animals. Benatar clearly notes that his "argument
applies not only to humans but also to all other sentient beings" and
that "coming into existence harms all sentient beings". He reinforces his view when discussing extinction by saying "it would
be better, all things considered, if there were no more people (and
indeed no more conscious life)."
It can be argued that since we have a prima facie
obligation to help humans in need, and preventing future humans from
coming into existence is helping them, and there is no justification for
treating animals worse,
we have a similar obligation to animals living in the wild. That is, we
should also help alleviate their suffering and introduce certain
interventions to prevent them from coming into the world — a position
which would be called "wildlife anti-natalism".
Suicide
Some pessimists, including David Benatar and Julio Cabrera,
argue that in some extreme situations, such as intense pain, terror,
and slavery, people are morally justified to end their own lives.
Although this will not resolve the human predicament, it may at the very
least stop further suffering or moral degradation of the person in
question. Cabrera says that dying is usually not pleasant nor dignified, so
suicide is the only way to choose the way one dies. He writes, "If you
want to die well, you must be the artist of your own death; nobody can
replace you in that."
Arthur Schopenhauer
rejects various objections to suicide stemming from religion, as well
as those based on accusations of cowardice or insanity regarding the
person who decides to end their own life. In this perspective, we should
be compassionate towards the suicide — we should understand that
someone may not be able to bear the sufferings present in their own
life, and that one's own life is something that one has an indisputable
right to.
Schopenhauer does not see suicide as a kind of solution to the
sufferings of existence. His opposition to suicide is rooted in his
metaphysical system. Schopenhauer focuses on human nature — which is
governed by the Will. This means that we are in a never ending
cycle of striving to achieve our ends, feeling dissatisfied, feeling
bored, and once again desiring something else. Yet because the Will is the inner essence of existence, the source of our suffering is not exactly in us, but in the world itself.
Taking one's life is a mistake, for one still would like to live,
but simply in better conditions. The suicidal person still desires
goods in life — a "person who commits suicide stops living precisely
because he cannot stop willing". It is not one's own individual life that is the source of one's suffering, but the Will, the ceaselessly striving nature of existence. The mistake is in annihilating an individual life, and not the Will itself. The Will cannot be negated by ending one's life, so it's not a solution to the sufferings embedded in existence itself.
David Benatar considers many objections against suicide, such as
it being a violation of the sanctity of human life, a violation of the
person's right to life, being unnatural, or being a cowardly act, to be
unconvincing. The only relevant considerations that should be taken into
account in the matter of suicide are those regarding people to whom we
hold some special obligations. Such as, for example, our family members.
In general, for Benatar the question of suicide is more a question of
dealing with the particular miseries of one's life, rather than a moral
problem per se. Consequently, he argues that, in certain
situations, suicide is not only morally justified but is also a rational
course of action.
Benatar's arguments regarding the poor quality of human life do
not lead him to the conclusion that death is generally preferable to the
continuation of life. But they do serve to clarify as to why there are
cases in which one's continued existence would be worse than death, as
they make it explicit that suicide is justified in a greater variety of
situations than we would normally grant. Every person's situation is
different, and the question of the rationality of suicide must be
considered from the perspective of each particular individual — based on
their own hardships and prospects regarding the future.
Jiwoon Hwang argued that the hedonistic interpretation of David
Benatar's axiological asymmetry of harms and benefits entails
promortalism — the view that it is always preferable to cease to exist
than to continue to live. Hwang argues that the absence of pleasure is
not bad in the following cases: for the one who never exists, for the
one who exists, and for the one who ceased to exist. By "bad" we mean
that it's not worse than the presence of pleasure for the one who
exists. This is consistent with Benatar's statement that the presence of
pleasure for the existing person is not an advantage over the absence
of pleasure for the never existing and vice versa.
Collective ending of all life
Eduard von Hartmann was against all individualistic forms of abolition of suffering, prominent in Buddhism
and in Schopenhauer's philosophy, since they leave the problem of
suffering still going on for others. Instead, he opted for a collective
solution: he believed that life progresses towards greater
rationality—culminating in humankind—and that as humans became more
educated and more intelligent, they would see through various illusions
regarding the abolishion of suffering, eventually realizing that the
problem lies ultimately in existence itself.
Thus, humanity as a whole would recognize that the only way to
end the suffering present in life is to end life itself. This would
happen in the future, where people would have advanced technologically
to a point where they could destroy the whole of nature. That, for von
Hartmann, would be the ultimate negation of the Will by Reason.
Henri Rousseau's The Hungry Lion Throws Itself on the Antelope (1905). Suffering seems to be inseparable from the life of wild animals. "The
lion, being hungry, throws itself on the antelope, [and] devours it.
The panther anxiously awaits the moment when it too can claim its share.
Birds of prey have each torn a piece of flesh from the top of the poor
animal which sheds a tear. The sun sets."
What are we to make of a creation in which the routine
activity is for organisms to be tearing others apart with teeth of all
types—biting, grinding flesh, plant stalks, bones between molars,
pushing the pulp greedily down the gullet with delight, incorporating
its essence into one's own organization, and then excreting with foul
stench and gasses the residue. Everyone reaching out to incorporate
others who are edible to him. The mosquitoes bloating themselves on
blood, the maggots, the killer-bees attacking with a fury and a
demonism, sharks continuing to tear and swallow while their own innards
are being torn out—not to mention the daily dismemberment and slaughter
in "natural" accidents of all types (...) Creation is a nightmare
spectacular taking place on a planet that has been soaked for hundreds
of millions of years in the blood of all its creatures. The soberest
conclusion that we could make about what has actually been taking place
on the planet for about three billion years is that it is being turned
into a vast pit of fertilizer. But the sun distracts our attention,
always baking the blood dry, making things grow over it, and with its
warmth giving the hope that comes with the organism's comfort and
expansiveness.
The theory of evolution by natural selection
can be said to justify a form of philosophical pessimism based on a
negative evaluation of the lives of animals in the wild. In 1887, Charles Darwin
expressed a feeling of revolt at the notion that God's benevolence is
limited, stating: "for what advantage can there be in the sufferings of
millions of the lower animals throughout almost endless time?" The animal activist and moral philosopher Oscar Horta
argues that because of evolutionary processes, not only is suffering in
nature inevitable, but that it actually prevails over happiness.
For evolutionary biologistRichard Dawkins,
nature is in no way benevolent. He argues that what is at stake in
biological processes is nothing more than the survival of DNA sequences
of genes.
Dawkins also asserts that as long as the DNA is transmitted, it does
not matter how much suffering such transmission entails and that genes
do not care about the amount of suffering they cause because nothing
affects them emotionally. In other words, nature is indifferent to
unhappiness, unless it has an impact on the survival of the DNA.
Although Dawkins does not explicitly establish the prevalence of
suffering over well-being, he considers unhappiness to be the "natural
state" of wild animals:
The total amount of suffering per year in the natural
world is beyond all decent contemplation. During the minute it takes me
to compose this sentence, thousands of animals are being eaten alive;
others are running for their lives, whimpering with fear; others are
being slowly devoured from within by rasping parasites; thousands of all
kinds are dying of starvation, thirst and disease. It must be so. If
there is ever a time of plenty, this very fact will automatically lead
to an increase in population until the natural state of starvation and
misery is restored.... In a universe of
blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to
get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won't find any
rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe we observe has
precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no
design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind, pitiless
indifference.
Even though pessimists agree on the judgment that life is bad and some pessimistic antinatalists criticise procreation, their views on abortion differ.
Pro-death view
David
Benatar holds a "pro-death" stance on abortion. He argues that in the
earlier stages of pregnancy, when the fetus has not yet developed
consciousness and has no morally relevant interests, we should adopt a
presumption against carrying the fetus to term. What demands
justification is not the act of abortion, but the failure to abort the
fetus (in the early stages of pregnancy). Benatar does not argue that
such early abortions should be mandatory, but only that it would be
preferable to perform the abortion.
Anti-abortion view
Julio Cabrera
notices that abortion requires consideration of and action upon
something that is already there. He argues that we must take it into our
moral deliberations, regardless of the nature of that thing. He gives the following argument against abortion:
P1. From the perspective of negative ethics, it is wrong to eliminate another human being only for our benefit, hence treating him as an obstacle to be removed.
P2. It’s morally good to act in favor of those who cannot defend themselves.
P3. A fetus is something that begins to terminate from the very beginning, and it terminates as a human being.
P4. A human fetus is, within the context of gestation, pregnancy and birth, the most helpless being involved.
Conclusion: Therefore, from the perspective of negative ethics, it is morally wrong to eliminate (abort) a human being.
Cabrera further elaborates on the argument with a couple of
points. Since we are all valueless, the victimizer has no greater value
than the victim to justify the killing. It's better to err on the side
of caution and not abort because it's difficult to say when a fetus
becomes a human. A fetus has a potential to become a rational agent with
consciousness, feelings, preferences, thoughts, etc. We can think of
humans as beings who are always in self-construction; and a fetus is
such a type of being. Furthermore, a fetus is — like any other human
being — in a process of "decay". Finally, we should also debate the
status of those who perform abortions and the women who undergo
abortions; not just the status of the fetus.
For Arthur Schopenhauer,
every action (eating, sleeping, breathing, etc.) was a struggle against
death, although one which always ends with death's triumph over the
individual.
Since other animals also fear death, the fear of death is not rational,
but more akin to an instinct or a drive, which he called the will to life.
In the end, however, death dissolves the individual and, with it, all
fears, pains, and desires. Schopenhauer views death as a "great
opportunity not to be I any longer". Our inner essence is not destroyed though — since we are a manifestation of the universal Will.
David Benatar
has not only a negative view on coming into existence, but also on
ceasing to exist. Even though it is a harm for us to come into
existence, once we do exist we have an interest in continuing to exist.
We have plans for the future; we want to achieve our goals; there may be
some future goods we could benefit from, if we continue to exist. But
death annihilates us; in this way robbing us from our future and the
possibility of us realizing our plans.
Olga Plümacher criticizes Schopenhauer's system on a variety of points. According to Schopenhauer, an individual person is itself a manifestation of the Will. But if that is the case, then the negation of the Will
is also an illusion, since if it were genuine, it would bring about the
end of the world. Furthermore, she notices that for Schopenhauer, the
non-existence of the world is preferable to its existence. However, this
is not an absolute statement (that is, it says that the world is the
worst), but a comparative statement (that is, it says that its worse
than something else).
Against the claim that pleasures are only ever negative
A
claim pessimists often make is that pleasures are negative in nature —
they are mere satisfactions of desires or removals of pains. Some object
to this by providing intuitive counterexamples, where we are engaged in
something pleasurable which seems to be adding some genuine pleasure
above the neutral state of undisturbness. This objection can be presented like this:
Imagine that I am enjoying the state of being hydrated,
full and warm. Then somebody offers me a small chocolate bon-bon, and I
greatly enjoy the delicious taste of the dark chocolate. Why am I not
experiencing more pleasure now than I was before (...)?
The objection here is that we can clearly introspect that we feel
something added to our experience, not that we merely no longer feel
some pain, boredom, or desire. Such experiences include pleasant
surprises, waking up in a good mood, savoring delicious meals,
anticipating something good that will likely happen to us, and others.
The response to these objections from counterexamples can run as
follows. Usually, we do not focus enough on our present state to notice
all disturbances (discontentment). It's likely we could notice some
disturbances had we paid enough attention — even in situations where we
think we experience genuine pleasure. Thus, it's at least plausible that
these seemingly positive states have various imperfections, and we are
not, in fact, undisturbed; and, therefore, we are below the hedonic
neutral state.
