Anti anti-communism

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Anti anti-communism is opposition to anti-communism as applied in the Cold War. The term was first coined by Clifford Geertz, an American anthropologist at the Institute for Advanced Study, who defined it as being applied in "the cold war days" by "those who ... regarded the [Red] Menace as the primary fact of contemporary political life" to "[t]hose of us who strenuously opposed [that] obsession, as we saw it ... with the insinuation – wildly incorrect in the vast majority of cases – that, by the law of the double negative, we had some secret affection for the Soviet Union." Stated more simply by Kristen Ghodsee and Scott Sehon, "the anthropologist Clifford Geertz wrote that you could be 'anti anti-communism' without being in favour of communism."

Analysis

Some academics and journalists argue that anti-communist narratives have exaggerated the extent of political repression and censorship in states under communist rule or have drawn comparisons with what they see as atrocities that were perpetrated by capitalist countries, particularly during the Cold War. Among them are Mark Aarons, Vincent Bevins, Noam Chomsky, Jodi Dean, Kristen Ghodsee, Seumas Milne, and Michael Parenti. Academic Albert Szymanski drew a comparison between the treatment of anti-communist dissidents in the Soviet Union after Joseph Stalin's death and the treatment of dissidents in the United States during the period of McCarthyism, claiming that "on the whole, it appears that the level of repression in the Soviet Union in the 1955 to 1980 period was at approximately the same level as in the United States during the McCarthy years (1947–1956)."

In 1964, socialist historian Theodore Draper used the term "anti-anti-communism" to refer to Fidel Castro's consolidation of power in 1959, which preceded the Cuban-Soviet economic agreement of 1960.

John Earl Haynes, who studied the Venona decryptions extensively, argued that Joseph McCarthy's attempts to "make anti-communism a partisan weapon" actually "threatened [the post-War] anti-Communist consensus", thereby ultimately harming anti-communist efforts more than helping them. President Harry Truman called Joseph McCarthy "the greatest asset the Kremlin has". Liberal anti-communists like Edward Shils and Daniel Moynihan had a contempt for McCarthyism. Sociologist Edward Shils criticized an excessive policy of secrecy during the Cold War, leading to the misdirection of McCarthyism, which was addressed during the 1994-1997 Moynihan Commission. As Moynihan put it, "reaction to McCarthy took the form of a modish anti-anti-Communism that considered impolite any discussion of the very real threat Communism posed to Western values and security." After revelations of Soviet spy networks from the declassified Venona project, Moynihan wondered: "Might less secrecy have prevented the liberal overreaction to McCarthyism as well as McCarthyism itself?" In 1998, Geoffrey Wheatcroft criticised certain aspects of anti-anti-communism. He suggested that "one mark of the true anti-anti-communist is an evasive use of language" such as downplaying historical Soviet espionage.

Linguist Noam Chomsky noted double standards in his criticism of The Black Book of Communism. In outlining economist Amartya Sen's research on hunger that while India's democratic institutions prevented famines, its excess of mortality over Communist China, potentially attributable to the latter's more equal distribution of medical and other resources, was nonetheless close to four million per year for non-famine years. Chomsky argued that if the same methodology of The Black Book of Communism was applied to India, then "the democratic capitalist 'experiment' has caused more deaths than in the entire history of ... Communism everywhere since 1917: over 100 million deaths by 1979, and tens of millions more since, in India alone." At a April 2017 conference at the University of Bern called "Anti-communist persecutions in the 20th Century", American historian Ronald Grigor Suny suggested that the panel write "The Black Book of Anti-communism", referencing the controversial The Black Book of Communism.

In her 2012 book The Communist Horizon, political philosopher Jodi Dean argued that there is a double standard among all sides of the political spectrum, including conservatives, liberals, and social democrats, in how communism and capitalism are perceived nearly two decades after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Dean stated that the worst excesses of capitalism are often minimized, while communism is often equated only with the Soviet Union, and experiments in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia are often ignored, with an emphasis placed on the Stalin era and its violent excesses including gulags, purges, droughts and famines, and almost no consideration for the industrialization and modernization of the Soviet economy, the successes of Soviet science (such as the Soviet space program), or the rise in the standard of living for the once predominantly agrarian society. The dissolution of the Soviet Union is therefore seen as the proof that communism cannot work, allowing for all left-wing criticism of the excesses of neoliberal capitalism to be silenced, for the alternatives would supposedly inevitably result in economic inefficiency and violent authoritarianism.

Other academics and journalists such as Kristen Ghodsee and Seumas Milne asserted that in the post–Cold War era any narratives which include Communist states' achievements are often ignored, while those which focus exclusively on the crimes of Joseph Stalin and other Communist party leaders are amplified. Both allege this is done in part to silence any criticism of global capitalism. Political scientist Michael Parenti holds that communist regimes, as flawed as they were, nevertheless played a role in "tempering the worst impulses of Western capitalism and imperialism", and criticized left-wing anti-communists in particular for failing to understand that in the post–Cold War era Western business interests are "no longer restrained by a competing system" and are now "rolling back the many gains that working people in the West have won over the years." Parenti added that "some of them still don't get it." Vincent Bevins argues that anti-communist mass killings backed by the United States during the Cold War have been far more impactful on shaping the contemporary world than communist mass killings have.

In a critique of Stephen F. Cohen, Jonathan Chait used a fully hyphenated form of the term in 2014, calling Cohen "an old-school leftist who has carried on the mental habits of decades of anti-anti-communism seamlessly into a new career of anti-anti-Putinism", referring to the use of whataboutism or what Chait calls "defense-by-implication" as a rhetorical strategy by RT commentators.

Victims of Communism Memorial

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victims_of_Communism_Memorial

 

Victims of Communism Memorial

Goddess of Democracy replica

Website	victimsofcommunism.org/memorial

The Victims of Communism Memorial is a memorial in Washington, D.C. located at the intersection of Massachusetts and New Jersey Avenues and G Street, NW, two blocks from Union Station and within view of the U.S. Capitol. The memorial is dedicated "to the more than one hundred million victims of communism". The Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation says the purpose of the memorial is to ensure "that the history of communist tyranny will be taught to future generations." The Memorial was opened by President George W. Bush on June 12, 2007. It was dedicated on the 20th anniversary of President Ronald Reagan's "tear down this wall" speech in front of the Berlin Wall.

The Memorial features a ten-foot (3 m) bronze replica from photographs, of the Goddess of Democracy, erected by students during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre. The monument's design and the statue are works of sculptor Thomas Marsh. He led a project in 1994, to re-create the Goddess of Democracy in Chinatown, San Francisco. The inscription reads: (front) "To the more than one hundred million victims of communism and to those who love liberty", and (rear) "To the freedom and independence of all captive nations and peoples"

Background

A bill, H.R. 3000, sponsored by Representatives Dana Rohrabacher and Tom Lantos and Senators Claiborne Pell and Jesse Helms, to authorize the memorial passed unanimously on December 17, 1993 and was signed into law by President Bill Clinton, becoming Public Law 103-199 Section 905. It was backed by prominent conservatives including Lev E. Dobriansky, Grover Norquist, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Lee Edwards. Because of delays in establishing the memorial, the authorization was subsequently extended through Section 326 of Public Law 105–277, approved October 21, 1998, until December 17, 2007. The Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation had the duty of funding and directing the first stages of planning the memorial.

In November 2005, the National Capital Planning Commission gave approval to the monument's design. After raising over US$825,000 for construction and maintenance costs, the groundbreaking ceremony was held September 27, 2006.

Dedication ceremony

George W. Bush speaking at the memorial's dedication ceremony

On June 12, 2007, the memorial was officially dedicated. Among the hundreds of invited guests were people from many countries who suffered hardships under Communist regimes, such as Vietnamese poet Nguyen Chi Thien, Chinese political prisoner Harry Wu, Lithuanian anti-communist journalist Nijolė Sadūnaitė and others. During the opening ceremony, President George W. Bush referenced millions of those unnamed who suffered under Communism:

They include innocent Ukrainians starved to death in Stalin's Great Famine; or Russians killed in Stalin's purges; Lithuanians and Latvians and Estonians loaded onto cattle cars and deported to Arctic death camps of Soviet Communism. They include Chinese killed in the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution; Cambodians slain in Pol Pot's Killing Fields; East Germans shot attempting to scale the Berlin Wall in order to make it to freedom; Poles massacred in the Katyn Forest; and Ethiopians slaughtered in the "Red Terror"; Miskito Indians murdered by Nicaragua's Sandinista dictatorship; and Cuban balseros who drowned escaping tyranny.

President Bush also said, "We'll never know the names of all who perished, but at this sacred place, communism's unknown victims will be consecrated to history and remembered forever. We dedicate this memorial because we have an obligation to those who died, to acknowledge their lives and honor their memory." Bush equated communism to the threat of terrorism then facing the U.S.: "Like the Communists, the terrorists and radicals who have attacked our nation are followers of a murderous ideology that despises freedom, crushes all dissent, has expansionist ambitions and pursues totalitarian aims."

On the first anniversary, there was another ceremony by the International Committee for Crimea. On June 9, 2011, a second commemoration ceremony was held with representatives of ethnic and religious groups who suffered under communist regimes.

Criticism

Statue by Thomas Marsh

Andrei Tsygankov of San Francisco State University criticized the statue as an expression of the anti-Russia lobby in Washington. He depicted it as a revival of Cold War symbolism. Russian politician Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, also criticized the memorial, attacking the U.S. and referencing "the blood of civilians in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Serbs in Kosovo, Guantanamo Bay, as well as CIA prisons in Eastern Europe [that] are part of the black list of crimes of the globalists."

The statue drew criticism from the Chinese embassy in Washington because the memorial evokes the Tiananmen Square protests. A Chinese foreign ministry speaker accused the US of pushing a "Cold War" thought and meddling in China's internal affairs, and issued a formal protest. The embassy called its construction an "attempt to defame China." The chairman of the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, Lee Edwards, said he was not aware of any official complaint.

Democracy in China

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamophobia_in_China

Ideological debate over democracy in China has existed in Chinese politics since the 19th century. Chinese scholars, thinkers, and policy-makers have debated about democracy, an idea which was first imported by Western colonial powers but which some argue also has connections to classic Chinese thinking. Starting in the mid-eighteenth century, many Chinese argued about how to deal with Western culture. Though Chinese Confucians were initially opposed to Western modes of thinking, it became clear that aspects of the West were appealing. Industrialization gave the West an economic and military advantage. The Qing dynasty's defeats in the First and Second Opium Wars compelled a segment of Chinese politicians and intellectuals to rethink their notion of cultural and political superiority.

Democracy entered the Chinese consciousness because it was the form of government used in the West, potentially responsible for its industrial, economic and military advancements. A segment of Chinese scholars and politicians became persuaded that democratization and industrialization were imperative for a competitive China. In response, a number of scholars resisted the idea, saying democracy and Westernization had no place in traditional Chinese culture. Liang Shuming's opinion was most popular, holding that democracy and traditional Chinese society were completely incompatible, hence China's only choice was either wholesale Westernization or complete rejection of the West. The debate centered on the philosophical compatibility of traditional Chinese Confucian beliefs and the technologies of the West.

China is not a liberal or representative democracy. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese government state that China is a socialist democracy and a people's democratic dictatorship. Under Xi Jinping, China is also termed a whole-process people's democracy. Many foreign and some domestic observers categorize China as an authoritarian one-party state, with some saying it has shifted to neoauthoritarianism. Some characterize it as a dictatorship.

The constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the CCP constitution state that its form of government is "people's democratic dictatorship". The state constitution also holds that China is a one-party state that is governed by the CCP. This gives the CCP a total monopoly of political power. All political opposition is illegal. Currently, there are eight minor political parties in China other than the CCP that are legal, but all have to accept CCP primacy to exist. Freedom of speech and freedom of assembly are severely restricted by the government. Censorship is widespread and dissent is harshly punished in the country.

Qing dynasty

Introducing the concept of modern democracy is credited to Liang Qichao, a prominent writer and political thinker. In 1898, along with his mentor Kang Youwei, he submitted reform proposals to the young emperor, leading to the Hundred Days' Reforms. These proposed popular participation and elections, but provoked a crackdown from court conservatives and the beheading of several reform advocates. After escaping to Japan, Liang Qichao translated and commented on the works of Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, Hume, Bentham and many other western political philosophers. He published his essays in a series of journals that found a warm audience among Chinese intelligentsia hungering for an explanation of why China, once a formidable empire, was now on the verge of being dismembered by foreign powers. In interpreting Western democracy through the prism of his strongly Confucian background, Liang shaped the ideas of democracy that would be used throughout the next century. Liang favored gradual reform to turn China into a constitutional monarchy with democracy.

Liang's great rival was Sun Yat-sen who argued that democracy would be impossible as long as the Qing monarchy still existed. Sun proposed the Three Principles of the People (三民主義) – typically translated into English as "Nationalism, Democracy, and People's Livelihood". This framing of democracy (minquanzhuyi) differs from the typical Western view, being based in Liang's interpretation of General will, which prioritizes the power of the group over individual freedoms. Sun viewed traditional Chinese society as too individualistic and stated that individual liberty must be broken down so that the Chinese people could pressed together, using the metaphor of adding cement to sand. Like Liang, Sun agreed that democracy, or at least universal suffrage, could not happen overnight in a country with high illiteracy rates and a lack of political consciousness. Sun's program called for a period of "political tutelage [zh]" in which the people would be educated, then allowed to participate in elections.

The Boxer Uprising and the Allied invasion exposed the need for basic changes. The Qing Imperial Court responded by organizing elections. China's first modern elections were organized by Yuan Shikai for Tianjin's county council in 1907. In 1909, 21 of 22 provinces, with the exception being Xinjiang, held elections for provincial assemblies and municipal councils. Requirements were strict; only those that passed the imperial exams, worked in government or military, or owned 5000 yuan of property may vote or run for office. This essentially limited the electorate to the gentry class. Hundreds of thousands voted and the winners were overwhelmingly constitutional monarchists, followers of Liang Qichao. The provincial assemblies elected half of the 200 member national assembly, the other half was selected by regent Prince Chun. All of these assemblies became hotbeds of dissent against the Qing as they were protected by freedom of speech. In 1909, the Qing government held parliamentary elections.

Republic of China

Main article: Politics of the Republic of China

 

After the 1911 Revolution provincial assemblies provided legitimacy to the rebels by declaring their independence from the Qing Empire. The national assembly issued an ultimatum to the Qing court and delegates from the provincial assemblies were sent to Nanjing to legitimize the provisional government of the Republic of China. In late 1912, national elections were held with an enlarged electorate, albeit still small proportionally to the national population. Sun's Nationalist Party dominated both houses of the National Assembly. Song Jiaoren, the incoming Nationalist prime minister, was assassinated in March 1913 before the assembly could meet. The military leader Yuan Shikai forced the National Assembly to elect him president for a five-year term then purged it of Nationalists. After Yuan's death in 1916, a succession of governments failed to unify the country or gain international support. President Xu Shichang organized elections for a third assembly in 1921, but with only 11 provinces voting it never had a quorum and never convened. That was the last attempt to hold national elections until 1947. All assemblies were dissolved after the Nationalists' Northern Expedition.

The formation of the Nationalist one-party state in 1927 implemented Sun Yat-sen's three-stage program, in which the party provided "political tutelage", with elections only after the people were properly educated. All other parties were kept out of government until 1937 when the impending Second Sino-Japanese War led to the United Front and the formation of the People's Political Council which included the smaller parties.

In 1932, Chiang Kai-shek created the Blue Shirts Society, the core of which were Nationalist military officers who had been exposed to the politics of fascism through Chiang's Nazi advisors. Blue Shirts rhetoric emphasized contempt for liberal democracy.

After the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Nationalist government promulgated the Constitution of the Republic of China. The 1947 National Assembly and 1948 legislative elections were boycotted by the Communists which held most of northern China. As a result, the Nationalists and their junior coalition partners, the Chinese Youth Party and China Democratic Socialist Party, won the election.

People's Republic of China

See also: Democracy in Marxism

The People's Republic of China (PRC) officially refers to itself as a "socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics", but explicitly distinguishing itself from the liberal democratic system, which the CCP calls "unfit" for China's "unique conditions". In the PRC definition, democracy has meant the Marxist–Leninist concepts of people's democratic dictatorship and democratic centralism. In this viewpoint, CCP acts as the representative of the Chinese public.

New Democracy

Main article: New Democracy

Mao Zedong put forward the concept of New Democracy in his early 1940 text On New Democracy, written while the Yan'an Soviet was developing and expanding during the Second Sino-Japanese War. During this period, Mao was concerned about bureaucratization and sought to develop a culture of mass politics. In his view, mass democracy was crucial, but could be guaranteed only to the revolutionary classes. In the concept of New Democracy, the working class and the communist party are the dominant part of a coalition which includes progressive intellectuals and bourgeois patriotic democrats. This coalition of classes is symbolized by the four smaller stars on the flag of China: workers, peasants, intellectuals, and the national bourgeoisie. Led by a communist party, a New Democracy allows for limited development of national capitalism as part of the effort to replace foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism.

The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) was the primary government body through which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sought to incorporate non-CCP elements into the political system pursuant to principles of New Democracy. On September 29, 1949, the CPPCC unanimously adopted the Common Program as the basic political program for the country following the success of the Chinese Communist Revolution. The Common Program defined China as a new democratic country which would practice a people's democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat and based on an alliance of workers and peasants which would unite all of China's democratic classes (defined as those opposing imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism and favoring an independent China).

Later Mao era

The Cultural Revolution promoted political empowerment of ordinary Chinese people, according to academic Dongping Han. Prior to the Cultural Revolution, rural production team leaders were appointed by village leaders (who had themselves been appointed by commune leaders). In his fieldwork in Jimo, academic Dongping Han found that production team leaders during the Cultural Revolution were elected by team members to one year terms as part of what Han describes as a rising democratic consciousness among ordinary people.

Late 1970s to 1980s

See also: Democracy movements of China

In the Democracy Wall movement of 1978 to 1979, movement participants argued that "democracy" was the means to resolve conflict between the bureaucratic class and the people, although the nature of the proposed democratic institutions was a major source of disagreement among participants. A majority viewed the movement as part of a struggle between correct and incorrect notions of Marxism. Many participants advocated classical Marxist views that drew on the Paris Commune for inspiration. The Democracy Wall movement also included non-Marxists and anti-Marxists, although these participants were a minority.

Leaders of the post-Mao reforms in the 1980s argued that the Party's record under Mao was bad, but that the Party reformed without being forced. The American political scientist Andrew Nathan concluded that "the reforms aimed to change China from a terror-based, totalitarian dictatorship to a 'mature,' administered dictatorship of the Post-Stalinist Soviet or Eastern European type." "Democracy" would not involve elections or participation in decision making but "the rule of law", which was based on procedural regularity in the exercise of power.

21st century

The party operates on the Leninist principle of democratic centralism. From 2007 to 2009, Hu Jintao promoted intra-party party democracy (dangnei minzhu, 党内民主) in an effort to decrease the party's focus on top-down decision-making.

In December 2008, more than 350 intellectual and cultural leaders, including Liu Xiaobo, issued Charter 08. The Charter said China remains the only large world power to still retain an authoritarian system that so infringes on human rights, and "This situation must change! Political democratic reforms cannot be delayed any longer!"

Chinese premier Wen Jiabao called for more democracy in 2011, having generally been regarded as a political reformer during his career. However, Wu Bangguo, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, said in 2011 that "we have made a solemn declaration that we will not employ a system of multiple parties holding office in rotation", having said similar remarks during his career.

The core socialist values campaign introduced during the 18th National Congress in 2012 promotes democracy as one of its four national values.

After Xi Jinping became CCP general secretary in 2012, Amnesty International said that human rights in China have become worse. In 2013, a CCP memo called "Document Number 9" was leaked, which warned against "Western constitutional democracy" along with other Western ideas. Human rights abuses are rejected by the government, which insists the country is run according to law. During a visit to Europe in 2014, CCP general secretary Xi Jinping said that a multi-party system would not work for China. He said China had experimented in the past with various political systems, including multi-party democracy, warning that copying foreign political or development models could be catastrophic because of its unique historical and social conditions. Xi has strengthened the CCP's control over the government and in 2018 amended the party and state constitutions to include Xi Jinping Thought, described as the next stage of socialism with Chinese characteristics. In that same year, the Chinese government also abolished term limits for the presidency, allowing Xi to rule for life.

Whole-process people's democracy

Main article: Whole-process people's democracy

CCP general secretary Xi Jinping has additionally coined the term whole-process people's democracy (全过程人民民主), also called "whole-process democracy" (全过程民主, 全过程的民主) which he said "put the people as masters" and that in it "all major legislative decisions are made only after democratic deliberations and thorough procedures to ensure sound and democratic decision-making". He said that "whole-process democracy" had four pillars:

1. process democracy (过程民主) and achievement democracy (成果民主)
2. procedural democracy (程序民主) and substantive democracy (实质民主)
3. direct democracy (直接民主) and indirect democracy (间接民主)
4. people's democracy (人民民主) and will of the state (国家意志)

In 2021, in response to the Summit for Democracy held by US president Joe Biden, the State Council of China released a white paper called China: Democracy That Works which praised China's "whole-process democracy", said that "there are many ways to achieve democracy" and disparaged American democracy as "performative." The white paper describes China's position that "There is no single road to democracy. The true barrier to democracy lies not in different models of democracy, but in arrogance, prejudice and hostility towards other countries’ attempts to explore their own paths to democracy, and in assumed superiority and the determination to impose one's own model of democracy on others."

Under the concept of whole-process people's democracy, whether a country is democratic should not be measured by the electoral process but instead by the results it delivers to the people. By using the improvement of living standards and development as the measure of democratic success, this framing favors China, which has undergone major advances in development and living standards during the last four decades.

Consultative democracy

The Xi Jinping administration promotes a view of consultative democracy (xieshang minzhu 协商民主) rather than intra-party democracy. This view of socialist democracy emphasizes consulting more often with society at large while strengthening the leading role of the party. Through consultative democracy, Chinese policymakers seek to balance conflicting interests and stakeholders as long as they do not challenge the CCP priorities, with the main channel for this being the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The CPPCC is an institutional component of the CCP's people's democracy and united front strategy, which provides a "seat" for the eight small legally-permitted parties and independent nonparty "friends." These eight parties were founded before the proclamation of the PRC, and they must accept the "leading role" of the CCP as a condition of their continued existence.

Such institutional mechanisms for addressing the interests of new elites while also taking into account disadvantaged groups have been described by academics as "administrative absorption of society" or "democracy in governance."

Elections in China

Main article: Elections in China

China conducts direct and indirect elections for its people's congresses, a practice that began in the communist areas during the Chinese Civil War. The operation of people's congresses were set out in the Electoral Law of 1953 and have been subsequently revised. Currently there are five levels of people's congresses. From more to less local, they are: (1) people's congresses in villages, minority nationality townships, and towns; (2) people's congresses of cities that are not sub-divided, municipal districts, counties, and autonomous counties; (3) people's congresses in sub-districts of larger cities and in autonomous prefectures; (4) people's congresses in provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly administered by China's central government; and (5) the National People's Congress. Direct elections occur at the two most local levels, while the members at the higher levels are indirectly elected, i.e., elected by those elected in the lower levels. The National People's Congress is officially China's highest organ of state power. However, nominations at all levels are controlled by the CCP, and CCP's leading position is enshrined in the state constitution, meaning that the elections have little way of influencing politics. Additionally, elections are not pluralistic as no opposition is allowed.

Starting in the 1980s, in the period of Opening and Reform, the government organized village elections in which several candidates would run, changing the position of the village chairman from appointed by the Communist Party to being elected by villagers. In mid-2000s the autonomy of elected village officials gradually eroded.

Special Administrative Regions, 1997–present

Main articles: Politics of Hong Kong, Elections in Hong Kong, Politics of Macau, and Elections in Macau

As European colonies, Hong Kong and Macau were denied democratic governments until very late in the colonial period. Official memos from CCP leaders, threatening the British government if they were to hold elections in Hong Kong, were repeatedly sent from the 1950s onwards. Hong Kong got its first elections in the 1980s, and Macau in the 1990s.

Both Hong Kong and Macau have legislatures; 35 of Hong Kong's 70 legislators are directly elected, as are 14 of Macau's 33. Also, like grassroots elections in China, Hong Kong does hold elections for the district councils, which act as consultants to the government. Following electoral reforms implemented by the Mainland government, the legislature of Hong Kong following the 2021 general election will only have 20 out of 90 members directly elected.

Hong Kong

Main article: Democratic development in Hong Kong

The first Chief Executive election saw the Chief Executive elected by a 400-member Selection Committee in 1996, then by 800-member Election Committee in 2002, 2005, 2007, and then 1200-member Election Committee in 2012 and 2017.

The Legislative Council of Hong Kong from 1997 to 2004 had 60 seats with 24 were directly elected, six elected from an 800-member electoral college known as the Election Committee of Hong Kong, and 30 elected from FCs. Elections in 2004 and 2008, had 30 members were directly elected by universal suffrage from geographical constituencies (GCs) and 30 were elected from functional constituencies (FCs). From 2012 onwards, The Legislative Council consists of 70 elected members, 35 members were directly elected by universal suffrage from geographical constituencies and 35 were elected from functional constituencies.

There have been many attempts with many different ideas to introduce universal suffrage since the handover. Electoral reform in Hong Kong was seen as an avenue for political liberalization in China; the universal suffrage reform package which would allow Hongkongers to vote for the chief executive but the chief executive first needed to be approved by a committee. The law failed to pass Hong Kong's legislative council when pan-democrats voted against the package and most of the pro-Beijing members walked out.

In 2014, Hong Kong experienced massive protests against the Chinese government's universal suffrage reform package, as the candidates would have to "love the country, and love Hong Kong" and would "protect the broad stability of Hong Kong now and in the future" to be able to stand for election. The universal suffrage reform package failed to pass Hong Kong's legislative council when the majority voted against the package.

On December 20, 2021, China's central government issued a white paper on its view of democracy in Hong Kong, which it framed as an executive-led governance arrangement designed to ensure Hong Kong's capacity and efficacy. According to this view, there is no single set of criteria for democracy and no single democratic model that is universally acceptable. The white paper states that Hong Kong's democracy should not be a replica of some other democratic model and that in the central government's view, principles of national sovereignty and security require that central authorities have the final say in determining Hong Kong's method of democracy.

Macau

The first Macao Legislative Council in 1996 had 23 members: eight of whom were directly elected (GC), eight indirectly (FC), and seven nominated by the Chief Executive. Its second Legislative Council (2001) had four more members: two more directly elected and two more indirectly. Its third and fourth (2005 and 2009) legislative councils had 29 members, and the fifth (2013) and sixth (2017) have 33.

The first Chief Executive of Macau was elected by the 200-member Chief Executive Selection Committee in 1999, 2004 and 2009 saw the Chief Executive elected by 300-member Election Committee, and 400-member Election Committee in 2014 and 2019.

Influence of international events

Chinese policymakers generally view democratic political systems as hampered in their ability to pursue long-term development targets and long-term programs because of their focus on election campaigns and the frequent changes of government in such systems. In this view, policy under democratic systems as largely restricted to ad hoc interventions which leaves social development vulnerable to blind market forces and the short-term policy interventions available under democratic systems are not equipped to address long-term issues such as environmental degradation, dysfunction in capital markets, or population change.

Chinese policymakers view the experience of the post-Soviet states as an example of the harm caused by rapid democratization. According to this view, these states' adoption of democracy resulted in the collapse of their communist governments and a decade of political instability and economic instability.

The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States reinforced Chinese views that liberal democracy is dysfunctional. The United States' response to the COVID-19 pandemic compounded the situation, increasing views among the Chinese public that the United States political system and economy were not world benchmarks.

Influence of traditions

Confucianism

Social harmony

A primary motivation within traditional Chinese philosophy is to preserve social harmony. It looks unfavorably upon anyone who attempts to disrupt this placidity. The election process that takes place in modern liberal democracy directly opposes this ideal. During election campaigns, the issues most frequently discussed are the ones that are highly charged emotionally and politically. In contemporary U.S. elections, controversial issues like abortion, gay marriage, military engagement in the Middle East are at the forefront of campaigns. Chinese Confucians consider these controversial issues to be cleavages within the fabric of social harmony. Western politicians rely on utilizing these social cleavages to garner support from voters. In Chinese culture it would be an impropriety for a politician to exploit these social cleavages to achieve the personal goal of getting elected. Consequently, many of the more traditionalist Chinese people consider the election process of the West and western-influenced democracies to be quite arguably inappropriate as per Chinese culture.

Serve the common good, not the majority

Another motivation in Chinese culture is to benefit the common good. Modern liberal democracy is based upon the self-interest of each voter. Voters are encouraged to choose an official that benefits them and promotes their interests. Elected representatives serve the interests of their individual constituents. If they do not adequately represent the beliefs of their constituency they will not be re-elected. Consequently, people of a traditionalist Chinese perspective tend to believe that the collective good of the people is under-represented in a democracy, which instead reflects majoritarianism.

The weight of the Confucian family

Another frequently cited argument against democracy in China relates to the importance of the family. Familial relationships form the backbone of China's social structure. People are more concerned with their family than with politics. Based on this aspect of Chinese culture, many traditionalist Chinese viewpoints emphasize that in the absence of a strong authoritarian government, Chinese society would disintegrate. Thus in the eyes of many, a democracy would be too weak for Chinese society.

Christian influences

As per some points of view, there is arguably a correlation between Christianity and democracy, perhaps, as per some Chinese perspectives, liberal democracy has its historical basis in Christian culture. As a result, most current forms contain philosophical remnants of those probable origins. One such trace of Christianity is the empowerment of the individual. Christian concepts consider each individual to be sacred in the eyes of God. The concept of liberal democracy rests on all this sense that the individual has inherent worth regardless of his place within social hierarchies.

Traditional Chinese culture makes no such claim. In fact, the philosophical significance of the individual is often identified as an area of incompatibility between democracy and Chinese culture. Confucian societies are centered on familial relationships; an individual had no authority to revolt against these societal ties. An individual disconnected from the family is widely considered an outcast and relegated to the bottom of the social ladder. Confucianism lacks a universal reverence for the individual; personal status in Confucian communities is inexorably linked to one's position within the social hierarchy. In this context, many individual rights cannot exist in the same way they do in the West. Naturally the right of the individual to partake in the direct appointment of a ruling official is an ideological inconsistency with traditional Confucian society.

Chinese pragmatism

Disassociation of democracy and well-being

A counterpoint to these examples is that as time has progressed, anti-democratic rhetoric has moved away from the philosophical and into the pragmatic. The boom of the Four Tigers and other growing Asian economies has severed the links between Western culture and material wealth in the eyes of many Chinese. In the early 1900s, scholars like Liang Qichao conflated democracy and power. For some Chinese, the economic success of Confucian and authoritarian societies challenges the idea that wholesale adoption of Western beliefs such as Democracy are requisite for economic success.

Optimism versus pessimism

At a fundamental philosophical level, Confucian tradition is contingent upon an idea articulated by Thomas Metzger as epistemological optimism. This expresses the belief that it is possible to understand the essence of high morality and design policies and laws that reflect that knowledge. Confucian society seeks to carry out all daily tasks and rituals in pursuit of fulfilling that universal morality. The modern conception of liberal democracy is grounded in the opposing principle of ideological pessimism. This denies that such knowledge is possible, thus the theory and practice of liberal democracy does not make rules in the pursuit of high morality.

Citizen surveys

A 1990 survey from Andrew Nathan and Tianjian Shi reported that 55% of people surveyed agree that "China needs more democracy now", but 76% agreed that Chinese democracy depends on the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. They also reported that a sizeable proportion feared the negative aspects of democracy, 36% agreed that too many parties would "cause political chaos."

Surveys done with the World Values Survey and the East Asia Barometer in 2001 and 2002 shows high explicit support for democracy. In the survey, 96% answered either "fairly good" or "very good" to the question "Do you think having a democratic political system is....". Moreover, 81% of respondents agreed with the statement "democracy may have problems but it is better than any form government." When asked to compare authoritarianism or democracy, only 5% of respondents said that an authoritarian government can be preferable, with 20% saying it does not matter. When chosen to rate out of 10 how suitable democracy is for China, only 2% gave a rating lower than 5, 96% gave a 6 or higher, 76% giving an 8, 9 or 10. Nevertheless, 60 to 70% of respondents feared some democratic practices may cause negative effects. 26% agreed or strongly agreed with the statements "in democracy the economic systems runs badly." 35% agreed with that statement "democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling." 18% agreed with the statement "democracies aren't good at maintaining order."

An Asian Barometer survey from 2014 to 2016 had 76% of Chinese respondents agreeing that democracy was capable of solving the problems in their society. However, when asked to rate the level of democracy in their own government on a 10-point scale, they gave an overall rating of 6.5 (the 7th highest percentage out of 14 different regions surveyed).

Zhengxu Wang of Fudan University in Shanghai wrote in a report in 2007: "It is clear that public support for democracy is high in China. Public opinion surveys show that more than 90% of Chinese citizens believe that having a democracy is good. But the majority is not yet ready for a major effort towards democratization because they still see economic growth and social stability as more important than freedom of speech, political participation, and other democratic rights."

A report of two Stanford professors, Jennifer Pan and Yiqing Xu, done between 2018 and 2019 showed that a majority of Chinese people believed that the government had no right to interfere in how many children people had, and that the government should allow public expression of negative views of government policies. The poll also showed that Chinese people with higher income or Chinese students studying in the US being more politically and economically liberal.

A 2020 Harvard University study conducted yearly since 2003 found that Chinese citizens' trust in their government has increased each year, "virtually across the board."

In 2022, a poll by the Alliance of Democracies Foundation found that 91% of Chinese say democracy is important to them, with an 81% saying that China is a democracy.

According to Chinese economist David Daokui Li, the general trend is that age cohorts born in the 1970s and later take a more critical view of United States-style democracy than other age cohorts.

Democracy dimensions

The general Chinese public has virtually no say on how the top leaders of the country are elected, which violates the right to be a candidate as a democratic dimension for the conduct free and fair elections.

International rankings

China is considered internationally to be amongst the least democratic countries in the world. It has consistently been ranked amongst the lowest as an "authoritarian regime" by the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index, ranking at 156th out of 167 countries in 2022. According to 2023 V-Dem Democracy indices China is the third least electoral democratic country in the world and ranked second least electoral democratic country in Asia according to V-Dem Democracy indices in 2023. Hong Kong was ranked 14th least electoral democracy in Asia according to V-Dem Democracy indices in 2023. According to Civicus, China's civic space is rated as "closed."

Islamophobia in China

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamophobia_in_China

A Han Chinese man holding a self-defense weapon during the July 2009 Ürümqi riots

Islamophobia in China refers to the set of discourses, behaviors and structures which express feelings of anxiety, fear, hostility and rejection towards Islam and/or Muslims in China.

Negative views and attitudes towards Muslims in China are widespread, and some Muslim communities in China face legal restrictions on their ability to practice. Muslim prisoners in detention centers and internment camps have faced practices such as being force-fed pork. Prohibitions on fasting during Ramadan are couched in terms of protecting residents' free will.

In the 21st century, coverage of Muslims in Chinese media has generally been negative, and Islamophobic content is widespread on Chinese social media. Anti-Muslim attitudes in China have been tied to both narratives regarding historical conflicts between China and Muslim polities as well as contemporary rhetoric related to terrorism in China and abroad.

History

See also: Antireligious campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party, Persecution of Uyghurs in China, and History of Islam in China

Recent scholars contend that historical conflicts between the Han Chinese and Muslims like the Northwest Hui Rebellion have been used by some Han Chinese to legitimize and fuel anti-Muslim beliefs and bias in contemporary China. Scholars and researchers have also argued that Western Islamophobia and the "War on Terror" have contributed to the mainstreaming of anti-Muslim sentiments and practices in China.

Middle Easterners in China interviewed by the Middle East Institute in 2018 generally did not report discrimination. However, a Yemeni student said that he received unfavorable reactions from some Chinese when he stated he was a Muslim.

It has been reported that Muslims were being forced to eat pork in detention centers and in the Xinjiang internment camps. Since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, campaigns against Islam have extended to the Hui people and Utsul community in Hainan. In 2023, NPR reported on ways that the Chinese government is actively preventing Chinese Muslim from going on the Hajj such as confiscation of passports.

News coverage

Mosque with dome removed due to Sinicization policy

Traditional media in China were used to be very cautious on the coverage of ethnic issues—particularly Muslim issues, to foster a positive environment both for solidarity among China's different ethnic groups and religions and China's diplomatic relations with Muslim countries. Starting in 2015, hostility towards Muslims and Islam surged after series of terrorist attacks and the emergence of the European refugee crisis. Some observers contend that although negative stereotypes about Muslims have long existed in China, a global rise of Islamophobia, the influence of fake news, and the actions of the Chinese government towards their Muslim minorities have exacerbated Islamophobia in the country.

US-based researchers Rose Luqiu and Fan Yang contend in The Washington Post that anti-Muslim sentiment has been spurred by Chinese news reports, which tend to portray Muslims as prone to terrorism, or as recipients of disproportionate aid from the government. A 2018 study by the two researchers found that Chinese news coverage of Muslims and Islam was generally negative. The study found that non-Muslim Chinese hold negative views towards Islam and Muslims, and that some Chinese Muslims report discrimination and awareness of negative portrayals of themselves in the media.

Online

The same two researchers analyzed over 10,000 posts on Weibo in 2019 relating to Islam and found that anti-Muslim sentiment was a common frame. Chinese Muslims users on the site reported that they faced challenges in attempting to have others understand their faith, due to the prevailing Han-centric discourse and government censorship.

In 2017, Gerry Shih of the Associated Press described Islamophobic rhetoric in online social media posts as due to perceived injustices regarding the Muslim minority advantages in college admissions and exemptions from family-size limits. In 2018, a South China Morning Post article similarly described online Islamophobia in China as "becoming increasingly widespread" particularly due to news of institutional preferential treatment for Muslim minorities and news of terrorist attacks in Xinjiang. A 2018 UCSD study of 77,642 posts from Tencent QQ suggested that online Islamophobia was especially concentrated in provinces with higher Muslim populations. An online movement against the spread of halal products in the country has also been reported.

According to Tony Lin of the Columbia Journalism Review, many users utilize popular sites like Weibo and WeChat to spread anti-Muslim fake news taken from western far-right media. He wrote that after the 2019 Christchurch mosque shootings, the most liked comments under Chinese social media posts and various mainstream media sites covering the incident were explicitly anti-Muslim or in support of the shooter. However, he also wrote that the comments were not representative of the Chinese population. Other articles have reported on the more varied netizen responses to the mosque shootings.

Russian entry into World War I

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_entry_into_World_War_I

Russian troops in the trenches at the East Prussian frontier.

European diplomatic alignments shortly before the war.

The Russian Empire's entry into World War I unfolded gradually in the days leading up to July 28, 1914. The sequence of events began with Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Serbia, a Russian ally. In response, Russia issued an ultimatum to Vienna via Saint Petersburg, warning Austria-Hungary against attacking Serbia. As the conflict escalated with the invasion of Serbia, Russia commenced mobilizing its reserve army along the border of Austria-Hungary. Consequently, on July 31, Germany demanded that Russia demobilize. When Russia did not comply, Germany declared war on Russia on August 1, 1914. According to its war plan, Germany prioritized its offensive against France, declaring war on August 3. Germany deployed its main armies through Belgium with the aim of encircling Paris. The imminent threat to Belgium prompted Britain to declare war on Germany on August 4. The Ottoman Empire subsequently joined the Central Powers and engaged in warfare against Russia along their shared border.

Historians studying the causes of World War I have often highlighted the roles of Germany and Austria-Hungary, while downplaying Russia's contribution to the outbreak of this global conflict. The prevailing scholarly view has focused on Russia's defense of Orthodox Serbia, its pan-Slavic aspirations, its treaty commitments with France, and its efforts to maintain its status as a major world power. However, historian Sean McMeekin emphasizes Russia's ambitions to expand its empire southward and to capture Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul) as a gateway to the Mediterranean Sea.

Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austria-Hungarian throne, was assassinated by Bosnian Serbs on June 28, 1914, in response to Austria-Hungary's annexation of the predominantly Slavic province. Although Austria-Hungary could not conclusively prove that the Serbian state had sponsored the assassination, it issued an ultimatum to Serbia during the July Crisis one month later, expecting it to be rejected and thus leading to war. Austria-Hungary considered Serbia deserving of punishment for the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.

While Russia had no formal treaty obligation to Serbia, it emphasized its interest in controlling the Balkans, viewing it as a long-term strategic goal to gain a military advantage over Germany and Austria-Hungary. Russia was initially inclined to delay militarization, and most Russian leaders sought to avoid war. However, Russia had secured French support and feared that a failure to defend Serbia would damage its credibility, constituting a significant political setback in its Balkan ambitions. Tsar Nicholas II ordered the mobilization of Russian forces on July 30, 1914, to deter Austria-Hungary from invading Serbia. Historian Christopher Clark views the "Russian general mobilization [of July 30] as one of the most critical decisions of the July Crisis." The first general mobilization occurred before the German government declared a state of imminent war.

Russia's warnings to Germany led to military action by German forces, which carried out their mobilization and declared war on August 1, 1914. At the start of the conflict, Russian forces launched offensives against Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Background

A Russian recruiting poster. Caption reads: "World on Fire; Second Patriotic War."

Between 1873 and 1887, Russia was allied with Germany and Austria-Hungary in the League of the Three Emperors, and later with Germany in the 1887–1890 Reinsurance Treaty. Both alliances collapsed due to the conflicting interests of Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans. France capitalized on this situation by forming the 1894 Franco-Russian Alliance, while Britain viewed Russia with suspicion because of the Great Game. In 1800, there was over 3,000 kilometers (1,900 mi) separating Russia and British India, but by 1902, this distance had decreased to 30 kilometers (19 mi) due to Russian advances into Central Asia. The proximity raised the risk of conflict between the two powers, compounded by Russia's longstanding goal of gaining control of the Bosporus Straits, which would provide access to the Mediterranean Sea dominated by Britain.

Britain's isolation during the 1899–1902 Second Boer War and Russia's defeat in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War prompted both countries to seek allies. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 resolved disputes in Asia and paved the way for the establishment of the Triple Entente with France, although this alliance was largely informal. In 1908, Austria-Hungary annexed the former Ottoman province of Bosnia and Herzegovina, leading to the Russian-backed formation of the Balkan League aimed at preventing further Austrian expansion.

During the 1912–1913 First Balkan War, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece seized most of the remaining Ottoman territories in Europe. Disagreements over their partition led to the Second Balkan War, where Bulgaria suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of its former allies. This defeat transformed Bulgaria into a resentful regional power, setting the stage for renewed attempts to achieve its national goals. As a result, Serbia emerged as the primary Russian ally in the region.

Russia's industrial base and railway network had significantly improved since 1905, albeit from a relatively low starting point. In 1913, Nicholas II expanded the Russian army to over 500,000 men. Although there was no formal alliance between Russia and Serbia, their close bilateral ties provided Russia with a pathway into the weakening Ottoman Empire, where Germany also had significant interests. Coupled with the increase in Russian military capabilities, Austria-Hungary and Germany perceived Serbia's expansion as a threat. When Austria-Hungary invaded Serbia on July 28, 1914, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov interpreted it as part of an Austro-German plot to diminish Russian influence in the Balkans.

On July 30, Russia announced a general mobilization in support of Serbia. The following day, on August 1, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia, followed by Austria-Hungary on August 6. Russia and the Entente declared war on the Ottoman Empire in November 1914, prompted by Ottoman warships bombarding the Black Sea port of Odesa in late October.

Major players

Many historians agree that Russia's top military leadership was generally regarded as incompetent. Tsar Nicholas II made all final decisions but often received conflicting advice from his advisors, leading to flawed decision-making throughout his reign. He established an organizational structure that proved inadequate for the high pressures and immediate demands of wartime. British historian David Stevenson, for instance, highlights the "disastrous consequences of deficient civil-military liaison," where civilians and generals lacked communication. The government was unaware of its fatal weaknesses and remained disconnected from public opinion. The Foreign Minister had to warn Nicholas that "unless he yielded to the popular demand and took up arms in support of Serbia, he would risk facing revolution and losing his throne." Nicholas yielded but ultimately lost his throne. Stevenson concludes:

Russian decision-making in July 1914 was more truly a tragedy of miscalculation... a policy of deterrence that failed to deter. Yet, like Germany, it too rested on the assumption that war was possible without domestic breakdown and that it could be waged with a reasonable prospect of success. Russia was more vulnerable to social upheaval than any other power. Its socialists were more estranged from the existing order than those elsewhere in Europe, and a strike wave among the industrial workforce reached a crescendo with the general stoppage in St. Petersburg in July 1914.

French ambassador Maurice Paléologue quickly gained influence by repeatedly pledging that France would go to war alongside Russia, aligning with President Raymond Poincaré's position.

Serious planning for a future war was practically unattainable due to the intricate rivalries and preferences afforded to royalty. The primary criteria for high command were ties to royalty rather than expertise. While the General Staff possessed expertise, it was often overshadowed by the elite Imperial Guards, a favored stronghold of the aristocracy that prioritized ceremonial parades over strategic military planning. Consequently, the grand dukes inevitably ascended to high command positions.

French alliance

Russia relied heavily on the French alliance, as Germany would face greater challenges in a two-front war compared to a conflict with Russia alone. French ambassador Maurice Paléologue harbored deep antipathy toward Germany and believed that when war broke out, France and Russia had to be staunch allies against Germany. His stance aligned with that of French President Raymond Poincaré. France pledged unconditional support to Russia in the unfolding crisis with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Historians debate whether Paléologue exceeded his instructions, but there is consensus that he failed to provide Paris with precise information, neglecting to warn that Russian mobilization could precipitate a world war.

Beginning of the war

On June 28, 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria was assassinated in Sarajevo, triggering a period of indecision for Tsar Nicholas II regarding Russia's course of action. A relatively new factor influencing Russian policy was the rise of Pan-Slavism, which emphasized Russia's responsibility to all Slavs, particularly those threatened by Austria-Hungary. This shift in focus redirected attention from the Ottoman Empire to the perceived threat posed by Austria-Hungary against Slavic peoples. Serbia positioned itself as the champion of the Pan-Slavic ideal, while Austria-Hungary aimed to crush Serbia for this reason. Nicholas was inclined to defend Serbia but was reluctant to engage in war with Germany. In a series of letters exchanged with Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany (the so-called "Willy–Nicky correspondence"), both cousins expressed their desire for peace and attempted to persuade the other to relent. Nicholas sought to limit Russia's mobilization to confront only Austria-Hungary in order to avoid a conflict with Germany. However, the Kaiser had pledged to support Austria-Hungary.

Nicky (Tsar Nicholas II) (right) with Willy (Kaiser Wilhelm) in 1905. Nicholas is wearing a German Army uniform, and Wilhelm is wearing that of a Russian hussar regiment.

On July 25, 1914, Nicholas decided to intervene in the Austro-Serbian conflict, a move that escalated the situation towards a general war. He placed the Russian army on "alert" on July 25, although it was not a full-scale mobilization. This action raised concerns along the German and Austro-Hungarian borders, appearing as military preparations for war. However, the Russian Army had few viable plans and no contingency plans for a partial mobilization. On July 30, 1914, Nicholas took the momentous step of confirming the order for a general mobilization, despite his strong reluctance.

On July 28, Austria-Hungary officially declared war on Serbia. Count Witte conveyed to the French Ambassador Maurice Palaeologus that the Russian perspective viewed the war as madness, dismissed Slavic solidarity as mere nonsense, and saw no potential benefits from engaging in war.

Russian prisoners at the Battle of Tannenberg where German forces annihilated the Russian Second Army.

On July 30, Russia ordered a general mobilization but stated that it would not initiate an attack if peace negotiations commenced. In response to the discovery of Russian partial mobilization, which had been ordered on July 25, Germany announced a state of pre-mobilization, citing the imminent threat of war. Germany demanded that Russia demobilize within twelve hours. When the German ultimatum to Russia expired at 7 p.m. in St. Petersburg, the German ambassador to Russia met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov. Despite being asked three times if Russia would reconsider, the ambassador delivered a note accepting Russia's challenge to war, leading to Germany declaring war on Russia on August 1. On August 6, Franz Joseph I of Austria signed the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war against Russia.

At the onset of the war, each European power started releasing curated, and at times misleading, collections of diplomatic correspondence. These publications aimed to justify their own entry into the war while attributing blame to other parties. The first of these compilations was the German White Book, released on August 4, 1914, the same day as Britain's declaration of war. The British Blue Book was published two days later, followed by the Russian Orange Book in mid-August.

Military weaknesses

The outbreak of war on August 1, 1914, caught Russia severely unprepared. The Allies relied heavily on the Russian army, which had a pre-war regular strength of 1,400,000 and added 3,100,000 reserves through mobilization. However, Russia was ill-equipped in other aspects for the war effort. Germany had ten times as much railway track per square kilometer, resulting in Russian soldiers traveling an average of 1,290 kilometers (800 mi) to reach the front, while German soldiers traveled less than a quarter of that distance. Russia's heavy industry was insufficient to equip the massive armies that the Tsar could mobilize, and its munitions reserves were limited. While the German army in 1914 was better equipped than any other on a per-person basis, the Russian army lacked sufficient artillery pieces, shells, motorized transports, and boots.

Before the war, Russian planners overlooked the critical logistical challenge of how the Allies could transport supplies and munitions to Russia. With the Baltic Sea blocked by German U-boats and surface ships, and the Dardanelles obstructed by the guns of Germany's ally, the Ottoman Empire, Russia initially could only receive assistance through Arkhangelsk, which was frozen solid in winter, or Vladivostok, over 6,400 kilometers (4,000 mi) from the front line. In 1915, construction of a new rail line began, eventually providing access to the ice-free port of Murmansk by 1917.

Illustration of the second Siege of Przemyśl, from the Illustrated War News.

The Russian High Command suffered from internal strife due to the mutual animosity between War Minister Vladimir Sukhomlinov and Grand Duke Nicholas, who commanded the armies in the field. Despite this, an immediate attack was launched against the German province of East Prussia. The Germans swiftly mobilized and defeated the two invading Russian armies. The Battle of Tannenberg, in which the entire Russian Second Army was annihilated, cast a dark shadow over the empire's future. The loyal officers who perished were precisely those needed to safeguard the dynasty. While the Russian armies achieved some success against both the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman forces, they faced steady retreats against the German Army. In September 1914, to alleviate pressure on France, the Russians were compelled to halt a successful offensive against Austria-Hungary in Galicia and instead attack German-held Silesia.

The primary Russian objective was focused on the Balkans, particularly the capture of Constantinople (Istanbul). The Ottoman Empire's entry into the war presented new opportunities, but Russia was too strained to capitalize on them. Instead, the government encouraged Britain and France to undertake the ill-fated Gallipoli campaign. Subsequently, Russia supported an Armenian rebellion, resulting in the Armenian genocide, one of the war's great atrocities. The combination of inadequate preparation and planning undermined the morale of Russian troops and laid the groundwork for the regime's collapse in early 1917.

Russian war poster 1915

Gradually, a war of attrition took hold on the expansive Eastern Front, with the Russians confronting the combined forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary, leading to staggering losses. General Anton Denikin, retreating from Galicia, wrote:

The German heavy artillery swept away whole lines of trenches and their defenders with them. We hardly replied. There was nothing with which we could reply. Our regiments, although completely exhausted, were beating off one attack after another by bayonet... Blood flowed unendingly, the ranks became thinner and thinner and thinner. The number of graves multiplied.

Legacy

Historians examining the origins of the First World War have primarily focused on the roles of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The scholarly consensus minimizes the mention of Russia, with only brief references to its defense of Serbia, its Pan-Slavic activities, its treaty commitments with France, and its efforts to maintain its status as a major power.

However, historian Sean McMeekin has emphasized Russia's aggressive expansionist aspirations to the south. He contends that for Russia, the war was primarily about the Ottoman Empire, asserting that the Foreign Ministry and Army had been planning a war of aggression since at least 1908, and possibly as early as 1895. McMeekin highlights that the immediate objective was to capture Constantinople and control the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits to gain access to the Mediterranean. Reviewers have generally been critical of McMeekin's revisionist interpretation.