A nuclear close call is an incident that could lead to, or could have
led to at least one unintended nuclear detonation/explosion. These
incidents typically involve a perceived imminent threat to a nuclear-armed country
which could lead to retaliatory strikes against the perceived
aggressor. The damage caused by international nuclear exchange is not
necessarily limited to the participating countries, as the hypothesized
rapid climate change associated with even small-scale regional nuclear war could threaten food production worldwide—a scenario known as nuclear famine.
Despite a reduction in global nuclear tensions and major nuclear arms reductions after the end of the Cold War (in 1989), estimated nuclear warhead stockpiles total roughly 15,000 worldwide, with the United States and Russia holding 90% of the total.
Though exact details on many nuclear close calls are hard to come
by, the analysis of particular cases has highlighted the importance of a
variety of factors in preventing accidents. At an international level,
this includes the importance of context and outside mediation; at the
national level, effectiveness in government communications, and
involvement of key decision-makers; and, at the individual level, the
decisive role of individuals in following intuition and prudent
decision-making, often in violation of protocol.
1950s and 1960s
5 November 1956
During the Suez Crisis, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) received a number of simultaneous reports, including unidentified aircraft over Turkey, Soviet MiG-15 fighters over Syria, a downed British Canberra medium bomber, and unexpected maneuvers by the Soviet Black Sea Fleet through the Dardanelles that appeared to signal a Soviet offensive. Considering previous Soviet threats to utilize conventional weapons against France and the United Kingdom, U.S. forces believed these events could trigger a NATO
nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. In fact, all reports of Soviet
action turned out to be erroneous, misinterpreted, or exaggerated. The
perceived threat was due to a coincidental combination of events,
including a wedge of swans over Turkey, a fighter escort for the Syrian president returning from Moscow, a British bomber brought down by mechanical issues, and scheduled exercises of the Soviet fleet.
5 October 1960
Radar equipment in Thule, Greenland, mistakenly interpreted a moonrise over Norway
as a large-scale Soviet missile launch. Upon receiving a report of the
supposed attack, NORAD went on high alert. However, doubts about the
authenticity of the attack arose due to the presence of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in New York City as head of the USSR's United Nations delegation.
24 January 1961
On 24 January 1961, a B-52 Stratofortress carrying two 3–4-megatonMark 39 nuclear bombs broke up in mid-air near Goldsboro, North Carolina, dropping its nuclear payload in the process. The pilot in command, Walter Scott Tulloch (grandfather of actress Bitsie Tulloch), ordered the crew to eject
at 9,000 feet (2,700 m). Five crewmen successfully ejected or bailed
out of the aircraft and landed safely, another ejected but did not
survive the landing, and two died in the crash. Information newly declassified in 2013 showed that one of the bombs came very close to detonating.
24 November 1961
Staff at the Strategic Air Command Headquarters (SAC HQ) simultaneously lost contact with NORAD and multiple Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
sites. Since these communication lines were designed to be redundant
and independent from one another, the communications failure was
interpreted as either a very unlikely coincidence or a coordinated
attack. SAC HQ prepared the entire ready force for takeoff before
already-overhead aircraft confirmed that there did not appear to be an
attack. It was later found that the failure of a single relay station in
Colorado was the sole cause of the communications problem.
27 October 1962
At the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviet patrol submarine B-59 almost launched a nuclear-tipped torpedo while under harassment by American naval forces. One of several vessels surrounded by American destroyers near Cuba, B-59 dove to avoid detection and was unable to communicate with Moscow for a number of days. USS Beale began dropping practice depth charges to signal B-59 to surface; however the captain of the Soviet submarine and its zampolit took these to be real depth charges. With low batteries affecting the submarine's life support systems and unable to make contact with Moscow, the commander of B-59 feared that war had already begun and ordered the use of a 10-kiloton nuclear torpedo against the American fleet. The zampolit agreed, but the flotilla commander Vasili Arkhipov,
realizing that the use of "toy" depth charges meant the US vessels were
only harassing them, not attacking them, refused permission to launch.
He convinced the captain to calm down, surface, and make contact with
Moscow for new orders.
On the same day, an American U-2 spy plane was shot down over Cuba, and another U-2 flown by United States Air Force
Captain Charles Maultsby strayed 300 miles (480 km) into Soviet
airspace. Despite orders to avoid Soviet airspace by at least 100 miles
(160 km), a navigational error took the U-2 over the Chukotka Peninsula, causing Soviet MiG interceptors to scramble and pursue the aircraft. American F-102A interceptors armed with GAR-11 Falcon nuclear air-to-air missiles (each with a 0.25 kiloton yield) were then scrambled to escort the U-2 into friendly airspace. Individual pilots were capable of arming and launching their missiles.
9 November 1965
The Command Center of the Office of Emergency Planning went on full alert after a massive power outage in the northeastern United States.
Several nuclear bomb detectors—used to distinguish between regular
power outages and power outages caused by a nuclear blast—near major
U.S. cities malfunctioned due to circuit errors, creating the illusion
of a nuclear attack.
23 May 1967
A powerful solar flare accompanied by a coronal mass ejection interfered with multiple NORAD radars over the Northern Hemisphere.
This interference was initially interpreted as intentional jamming of
the radars by the Soviets, thus an act of war. A nuclear bomber
counter-strike was nearly launched by the United States.
1970s and 1980s
October 1973
During the Yom Kippur War, Israeli officials panicked that the Arab invasion force would overrun Israel after the Syrian Army nearly achieved a breakout in the Golan Heights, and the U.S. government rebuffed Israel's request for an emergency airlift. According to a former CIA official, General Moshe Dayan requested and received authorization from Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir to arm 13 Jericho missiles and 8 F-4 Phantom II fighter jets with nuclear warheads. The missile launchers were located at Sdot Micha Airbase, while the fighter jets were placed on 24-hour notice at Tel Nof Airbase. The missiles were said to be aimed at the Arab military headquarters in Cairo and Damascus. The United States discovered Israel's nuclear deployment after a Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft spotted the missiles, and it began an airlift the same day. After the U.N. Security Council imposed a ceasefire, conflict resumed when the Israel Defense Force moved to encircle the Egyptian Third Army. According to former U.S. State Department officials, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev threatened to deploy the Soviet Airborne Forces against Israeli forces, and the U.S. Armed Forces were placed at DEFCON 3. Israel also redeployed its nuclear weapons. The crisis finally ended when Prime Minister Meir halted all military action.
Declassified Israeli documents have not confirmed these allegations
directly, but have confirmed that Israel was willing to use "drastic
means" to win the war.
9 November 1979
A computer error at NORAD headquarters led to alarm and full preparation for a nonexistent large-scale Soviet attack. NORAD notified national security adviserZbigniew Brzezinski that the Soviet Union had launched 250 ballistic missiles
with a trajectory for the United States, stating that a decision to
retaliate would need to be made by the president within 3 to 7 minutes.
NORAD computers then placed the number of incoming missiles at 2,200.
Strategic Air Command was notified, and nuclear bombers prepared for
takeoff. Within six to seven minutes of the initial response, satellite
and radar systems were able to confirm that the attack was a false
alarm. It was found that a training scenario was inadvertently loaded into an operational computer. Commenting on the incident, U.S. State Department adviser Marshall Shulman stated that "false alerts of this kind are not a rare occurrence. There is a complacency about handling them that disturbs me." In the months following the incident there were three more false alarms at NORAD, two of them caused by faulty computer chips.
15 March 1980
A Soviet submarine near the Kuril Islands launched four missiles as part of a training exercise.
Of these four, American early warning sensors suggested one to be aimed
towards the United States. In response, the United States convened
officials for a threat assessment conference, at which point it was
determined to not be a threat and the situation was resolved.
26 September 1983
Several weeks after the downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 over Soviet airspace, a satellite early-warning system near Moscow reported the launch of one American Minuteman ICBM.
Soon after, it reported that five missiles had been launched. Convinced
that a real American offensive would involve many more missiles,
Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov of the Air Defense Forces
refused to acknowledge the threat as legitimate and continued to
convince his superiors that it was a false alarm until this could be
confirmed by ground radar.
7 to 11 November 1983
Able Archer 83 was a command post exercise carried out by NATO military forces and political leaders between 7 and 11 November 1983.
The exercise simulated a Soviet conventional attack on European NATO
forces 3 days before the start of the exercise (D-3), transitioning to a
large scale chemical war (D-1) and on day 1 (D+1) of the exercise, NATO
forces sought political guidance on the use of nuclear weapons to stem
the Soviet advance which was approved by political leaders. NATO then
began simulating preparations for a transition to nuclear war.
These simulations included 170 radio-silent flights to air lift
19,000 US troops to Europe, regularly shifting military commands to
avoid nuclear attack, the use of new nuclear weapon release procedures,
the use of nuclear Command, Control, and Communications
(C3) networks for passing nuclear orders, the moving of NATO forces in
Europe through each of the alert phases from DEFCON 5 to DEFCON 1, and
the participation of political leaders like Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Kohl and Ronald Reagan.
The issue was worsened by leaders referring to B-52 sorties as "nuclear strikes", by the increased use of encrypted diplomatic channels between the US and UK, and by the nuclear attack false alarm in September.
In response, Soviet nuclear capable aircraft were fuelled and
armed ready to launch on the runway, and ICBMs were brought up to alert.
Soviet leaders believed the exercise was ruse to cover NATO
preparations for a nuclear first strike and frantically sent a telegram
to its residencies seeking information on NATO preparations for an
attack. The exercise closely aligned with Soviet timeline estimations
that a NATO first strike would take 7 to 10 days to execute from the
political decision being made.
Soviet forces stood down after 11 November when the exercise
ended and NATO was not aware of the complete Soviet response until
British intelligence asset Oleg Gordievsky passed on the information.
Post-Cold War
25 January 1995
Russian PresidentBoris Yeltsin became the first world leader to activate a nuclear briefcase after Russian radar systems detected the launch of what was later determined to be a Norwegian Black Brant XII research rocket being used to study the Northern Lights. Russian ballistic missile submarines were put on alert in preparation for a possible retaliatory strike.
When it became clear the rocket did not pose a threat to Russia and was
not part of a larger attack, the alarm was cancelled. Russia was in
fact one of a number of countries earlier informed of the launch;
however, the information had not reached the Russian radar operators.
The Cuban Missile Crisis, also known as the October Crisis of 1962 (Spanish: Crisis de Octubre), the Caribbean Crisis (Russian: Карибский кризис, tr.Karibsky krizis, IPA: [kɐˈrʲipskʲɪj ˈkrʲizʲɪs]), or the Missile Scare, was a 13-day (October 16–28, 1962) confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union initiated by Soviet ballistic missile deployment in Cuba. The confrontation is often considered the closest the Cold War came to escalating into a full-scale nuclear war.
When this was reported to President John F. Kennedy he then convened a meeting of the nine members of the National Security Council and five other key advisers in a group that became known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council
(EXCOMM). After consultation with them, Kennedy ordered a naval
blockade on October 22 to prevent further missiles from reaching Cuba.
The US announced it would not permit offensive weapons to be delivered
to Cuba and demanded that the weapons already in Cuba be dismantled and
returned to the Soviet Union.
After several days of tense negotiations, an agreement was
reached between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Publicly, the Soviets would
dismantle their offensive weapons in Cuba and return them to the Soviet
Union, subject to United Nations
verification, in exchange for a US public declaration and agreement to
avoid invading Cuba again. Secretly, the United States agreed that it
would dismantle all US-built Jupiter MRBMs,
which had been deployed in Turkey against the Soviet Union; there has
been debate on whether or not Italy was included in the agreement as
well.
When all offensive missiles and Ilyushin Il-28
light bombers had been withdrawn from Cuba, the blockade was formally
ended on November 21, 1962. The negotiations between the United States
and the Soviet Union pointed out the necessity of a quick, clear, and
direct communication line between the two Superpowers. As a result, the Moscow–Washington hotline
was established. A series of agreements later reduced US–Soviet
tensions for several years until both parties began to build their
nuclear arsenals even further.
Background
With the end of World War II and the start of the Cold War, the United States had grown concerned about the expansion of communism. A Latin American country openly allying with the Soviet Union was regarded by the US as unacceptable. It would, for example, defy the Monroe Doctrine, a US policy limiting US involvement in European colonies and European affairs but holding that the Western Hemisphere was in the US sphere of influence.
The Kennedy administration had been publicly embarrassed by the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961, which had been launched under President John F. Kennedy by CIA-trained forces of Cuban exiles. Afterward, former President Dwight Eisenhower told Kennedy that "the failure of the Bay of Pigs will embolden the Soviets to do something that they would otherwise not do." The half-hearted invasion left Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev
and his advisers with the impression that Kennedy was indecisive and,
as one Soviet adviser wrote, "too young, intellectual, not prepared well
for decision making in crisis situations... too intelligent and too
weak". US covert operations against Cuba continued in 1961 with the unsuccessful Operation Mongoose.
In addition, Khrushchev's impression of Kennedy's weaknesses was confirmed by the President's response during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, particularly to the building of the Berlin Wall.
Speaking to Soviet officials in the aftermath of the crisis, Khrushchev
asserted, "I know for certain that Kennedy doesn't have a strong
background, nor, generally speaking, does he have the courage to stand
up to a serious challenge." He also told his son Sergei that on Cuba, Kennedy "would make a fuss, make more of a fuss, and then agree".
A monument in the Little Havana neighborhood of Miami to the men who died at Playa Giron during the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba
In January 1962, US Army General Edward Lansdale
described plans to overthrow the Cuban government in a top-secret
report (partially declassified 1989), addressed to Kennedy and officials
involved with Operation Mongoose. CIA agents or "pathfinders" from the Special Activities Division were to be infiltrated into Cuba to carry out sabotage and organization, including radio broadcasts. In February 1962, the US launched an embargo against Cuba,
and Lansdale presented a 26-page, top-secret timetable for
implementation of the overthrow of the Cuban government, mandating
guerrilla operations to begin in August and September. "Open revolt and
overthrow of the Communist regime" would occur in the first two weeks of
October.
Balance of power
When Kennedy ran for president in 1960, one of his key election issues was an alleged "missile gap" with the Soviets leading. Actually, the US at that time led the Soviets by a wide margin that would only increase. In 1961, the Soviets had only four intercontinental ballistic missiles (R-7 Semyorka). By October 1962, they may have had a few dozen, with some intelligence estimates as high as 75.
The US, on the other hand, had 170 ICBMs and was quickly building more. It also had eight George Washington- and Ethan Allen-classballistic missile submarines, with the capability to launch 16 Polaris
missiles, each with a range of 2,500 nautical miles (4,600 km).
Khrushchev increased the perception of a missile gap when he loudly
boasted to the world that the Soviets were building missiles "like
sausages" but Soviet missiles' numbers and capabilities were nowhere
close to his assertions. The Soviet Union had medium-range ballistic missiles
in quantity, about 700 of them, but they were very unreliable and
inaccurate. The US had a considerable advantage in total number of
nuclear warheads (27,000 against 3,600) and in the technology required
for their accurate delivery. The US also led in missile defensive
capabilities, naval and air power; but the Soviets had a 2–1 advantage
in conventional ground forces, more pronounced in field guns and tanks,
particularly in the European theatre.
Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba
Justification
In May 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev
was persuaded by the idea of countering the US's growing lead in
developing and deploying strategic missiles by placing Soviet
intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba, despite the misgivings of
the Soviet Ambassador in Havana, Alexandr Ivanovich Alexeyev, who argued that Castro would not accept the deployment of the missiles. Khrushchev faced a strategic situation in which the US was perceived to have a "splendid first strike" capability that put the Soviet Union at a huge disadvantage. In 1962, the Soviets had only 20 ICBMs capable of delivering nuclear warheads to the US from inside the Soviet Union.
The poor accuracy and reliability of the missiles raised serious doubts
about their effectiveness. A newer, more reliable generation of ICBMs
would become operational only after 1965.
Therefore, Soviet nuclear capability in 1962 placed less emphasis
on ICBMs than on medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs). The missiles could hit American allies and most of Alaska from Soviet territory but not the Contiguous United States. Graham Allison, the director of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
points out, "The Soviet Union could not right the nuclear imbalance by
deploying new ICBMs on its own soil. In order to meet the threat it
faced in 1962, 1963, and 1964, it had very few options. Moving existing
nuclear weapons to locations from which they could reach American
targets was one."
A second reason that Soviet missiles were deployed to Cuba was because Khrushchev wanted to bring West Berlin, controlled by the American, British and French within Communist East Germany, into the Soviet orbit. The East Germans and Soviets considered western control over a portion of Berlin
a grave threat to East Germany. Khrushchev made West Berlin the central
battlefield of the Cold War. Khrushchev believed that if the US did
nothing over the missile deployments in Cuba, he could muscle the West
out of Berlin using said missiles as a deterrent to western
countermeasures in Berlin. If the US tried to bargain with the Soviets
after it became aware of the missiles, Khrushchev could demand trading
the missiles for West Berlin. Since Berlin was strategically more
important than Cuba, the trade would be a win for Khrushchev, as Kennedy
recognised: "The advantage is, from Khrushchev's point of view, he
takes a great chance but there are quite some rewards to it."
Thirdly, from the perspective of the Soviet Union and of Cuba, it
seemed that the United States wanted to increase its presence in Cuba.
With actions including the attempt to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States,
placing economic sanctions on the nation and conducting secret
operations on containing communism and Cuba, it was assumed that America
was trying to invade Cuba. As a result, to try and prevent this, the
USSR would place missiles in Cuba and neutralise the threat. This would
ultimately serve to secure Cuba against attack and keep the country in
the Socialist Bloc.
More than 100 US-built missiles having the capability to strike Moscow with nuclear warheads were deployed in Italy and Turkey in 1961.
Another major reason why Khrushchev planned to place missiles on Cuba
undetected was to "level the playing field" with the evident American
nuclear threat. America had the upper hand as they could launch from
Turkey and destroy the USSR before they would have a chance to react.
After the transmission of nuclear missiles, Khrushchev had finally
established mutually assured destruction,
meaning that if the U.S. decided to launch a nuclear strike against the
USSR, the latter would react by launching a retaliatory nuclear strike
against the U.S.
Additionally, placing nuclear missiles on Cuba was a way for the
USSR to show their support for Cuba and support the Cuban people who
viewed the United States as a threatening force,
as the latter had become their ally after the Cuban Revolution of 1959.
According to Khrushchev, the Soviet Union's motives were "aimed at
allowing Cuba to live peacefully and develop as its people desire".
Deployment
In
early 1962, a group of Soviet military and missile construction
specialists accompanied an agricultural delegation to Havana. They
obtained a meeting with Cuban leader Fidel Castro.
The Cuban leadership had a strong expectation that the US would invade
Cuba again and enthusiastically approved the idea of installing nuclear
missiles in Cuba. According to another source, Castro objected to the
missiles deployment that would have made him look like a Soviet puppet,
but he was persuaded that missiles in Cuba would be an irritant to the
US and help the interests of the entire socialist camp.
Also, the deployment would include short-range tactical weapons (with a
range of 40 km, usable only against naval vessels) that would provide a
"nuclear umbrella" for attacks upon the island.
By May, Khrushchev and Castro agreed to place strategic nuclear
missiles secretly in Cuba. Like Castro, Khrushchev felt that a US
invasion of Cuba was imminent and that to lose Cuba would do great harm
to the communists, especially in Latin America. He said he wanted to
confront the Americans "with more than words.... the logical answer was
missiles". The Soviets maintained their tight secrecy, writing their plans longhand, which were approved by Marshal of the Soviet UnionRodion Malinovsky on July 4 and Khrushchev on July 7.
From the very beginning, the Soviets' operation entailed elaborate denial and deception, known as "maskirovka".
All the planning and preparation for transporting and deploying the
missiles were carried out in the utmost secrecy, with only a very few
told the exact nature of the mission. Even the troops detailed for the
mission were given misdirection by being told that they were headed for a
cold region and being outfitted with ski boots, fleece-lined parkas,
and other winter equipment. The Soviet code-name was Operation Anadyr. The Anadyr River flows into the Bering Sea, and Anadyr is also the capital of Chukotsky District
and a bomber base in the far eastern region. All the measures were
meant to conceal the program from both internal and external audiences.
Specialists in missile construction under the guise of "machine
operators," "irrigation specialists," and "agricultural specialists"
arrived in July. A total of 43,000 foreign troops would ultimately be brought in.
Chief Marshal of Artillery Sergei Biryuzov, Head of the Soviet Rocket
Forces, led a survey team that visited Cuba. He told Khrushchev that the
missiles would be concealed and camouflaged by palm trees.
The Cuban leadership was further upset when in September, the US Congress
approved Joint Resolution 230, which expressed Congress's resolve to
prevent the creation of an externally-supported military establishment. On the same day, the US announced a major military exercise in the Caribbean, PHIBRIGLEX-62, which Cuba denounced as a deliberate provocation and proof that the US planned to invade Cuba.
The Soviet leadership believed, based on its perception of
Kennedy's lack of confidence during the Bay of Pigs Invasion, that he
would avoid confrontation and accept the missiles as a fait accompli.
On September 11, the Soviet Union publicly warned that a US attack on
Cuba or on Soviet ships that were carrying supplies to the island would
mean war. The Soviets continued the Maskirovka
program to conceal their actions in Cuba. They repeatedly denied that
the weapons being brought into Cuba were offensive in nature. On
September 7, Soviet Ambassador to the United StatesAnatoly Dobrynin assured United States Ambassador to the United NationsAdlai Stevenson that the Soviet Union was supplying only defensive weapons to Cuba. On September 11, the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS: Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza)
announced that the Soviet Union had no need or intention to introduce
offensive nuclear missiles into Cuba. On October 13, Dobrynin was
questioned by former Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles about whether the Soviets planned to put offensive weapons in Cuba. He denied any such plans.
On October 17, Soviet embassy official Georgy Bolshakov brought
President Kennedy a personal message from Khrushchev reassuring him that
"under no circumstances would surface-to-surface missiles be sent to
Cuba."
As early as August 1962, the US suspected the Soviets of building
missile facilities in Cuba. During that month, its intelligence
services gathered information about sightings by ground observers of
Russian-built MiG-21 fighters and Il-28 light bombers. U-2 spy planes found S-75 Dvina (NATO designation SA-2) surface-to-air missile sites at eight different locations. CIA director John A. McCone
was suspicious. Sending antiaircraft missiles into Cuba, he reasoned,
"made sense only if Moscow intended to use them to shield a base for
ballistic missiles aimed at the United States".
On August 10, he wrote a memo to Kennedy in which he guessed that the
Soviets were preparing to introduce ballistic missiles into Cuba.
With important Congressional elections scheduled for November,
the crisis became enmeshed in American politics. On August 31, Senator Kenneth Keating
(R-New York) warned on the Senate floor that the Soviet Union was "in
all probability" constructing a missile base in Cuba. He charged the
Kennedy administration with covering up a major threat to the US,
thereby starting the crisis. He may have received this initial "remarkably accurate" information from his friend, former congresswoman and ambassador Clare Booth Luce, who in turn received it from Cuban exiles.
A later confirming source for Keating's information possibly was the
West German ambassador to Cuba, who had received information from
dissidents inside Cuba that Soviet troops had arrived in Cuba in early
August and were seen working "in all probability on or near a missile
base" and who passed this information to Keating on a trip to Washington
in early October. Air Force General Curtis LeMay presented a pre-invasion bombing plan to Kennedy in September, and spy flights and minor military harassment from US forces at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base were the subject of continual Cuban diplomatic complaints to the US government.
Map created by American intelligence showing Surface-to-Air Missile activity in Cuba, September 5, 1962
The first consignment of R-12
missiles arrived on the night of September 8, followed by a second on
September 16. The R-12 was a medium-range ballistic missile, capable of
carrying a thermonuclear warhead. It was a single-stage, road-transportable, surface-launched, storable liquid propellant fuelled missile that could deliver a megaton-class nuclear weapon. The Soviets were building nine sites—six for R-12 medium-range missiles (NATO designation SS-4 Sandal) with an effective range of 2,000 kilometres (1,200 mi) and three for R-14 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (NATO designation SS-5 Skean) with a maximum range of 4,500 kilometres (2,800 mi).
On October 7, Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado spoke at the UN General Assembly:
"If... we are attacked, we will defend ourselves. I repeat, we have
sufficient means with which to defend ourselves; we have indeed our
inevitable weapons, the weapons, which we would have preferred not to
acquire, and which we do not wish to employ."
On October 10 in another Senate speech Sen. Keating reaffirmed his
earlier warning of August 31 and stated that, "Construction has begun on
at least a half dozen launching sites for intermediate range tactical
missiles."
Missiles reported
The
missiles in Cuba allowed the Soviets to effectively target most of the
Continental US. The planned arsenal was forty launchers. The Cuban
populace readily noticed the arrival and deployment of the missiles and
hundreds of reports reached Miami. US intelligence received countless
reports, many of dubious quality or even laughable, most of which could
be dismissed as describing defensive missiles.
Only five reports bothered the analysts. They described large
trucks passing through towns at night that were carrying very long
canvas-covered cylindrical objects that could not make turns through
towns without backing up and manoeuvring. Defensive missiles could turn.
The reports could not be satisfactorily dismissed.
A
U-2 reconnaissance photograph of Cuba, showing Soviet nuclear missiles,
their transports and tents for fueling and maintenance.
Aerial confirmation
The United States had been sending U-2 surveillance over Cuba since the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion.
The first issue that led to a pause in reconnaissance flights took
place on August 30, when a U-2 operated by the US Air Force's Strategic Air Command flew over Sakhalin Island in the Soviet Far East by mistake. The Soviets lodged a protest and the US apologised. Nine days later, a Taiwanese-operated U-2 was lost over western China to an SA-2 surface-to-air missile. US officials were worried that one of the Cuban or Soviet SAMs
in Cuba might shoot down a CIA U-2, initiating another international
incident. In a meeting with members of the Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance (COMOR) on September 10, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy
heavily restricted further U-2 flights over Cuban airspace. The
resulting lack of coverage over the island for the next five weeks
became known to historians as the "Photo Gap". No significant U-2 coverage was achieved over the interior of the island. US officials attempted to use a Corona
photo-reconnaissance satellite to obtain coverage over reported Soviet
military deployments, but imagery acquired over western Cuba by a Corona
KH-4 mission on October 1 was heavily covered by clouds and haze and
failed to provide any usable intelligence. At the end of September, Navy reconnaissance aircraft photographed the Soviet ship Kasimov, with large crates on its deck the size and shape of Il-28 jet bomber fuselages.
In September 1962, analysts from the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) noticed that Cuban surface-to-air missile sites were arranged in a
pattern similar to those used by the Soviet Union to protect its ICBM
bases, leading DIA to lobby for the resumption of U-2 flights over the
island.
Although in the past the flights had been conducted by the CIA,
pressure from the Defense Department led to that authority being
transferred to the Air Force. Following the loss of a CIA U-2 over the Soviet Union in May 1960,
it was thought that if another U-2 were shot down, an Air Force
aircraft arguably being used for a legitimate military purpose would be
easier to explain than a CIA flight.
When the reconnaissance missions were reauthorized on October 9,
poor weather kept the planes from flying. The US first obtained U-2
photographic evidence of the missiles on October 14, when a U-2 flight
piloted by Major Richard Heyser took 928 pictures on a path selected by DIA analysts, capturing images of what turned out to be an SS-4 construction site at San Cristóbal, Pinar del Río Province (now in Artemisa Province), in western Cuba.
One
of the first U-2 reconnaissance images of missile bases under
construction shown to President Kennedy on the morning of October 16,
1962
President notified
On October 15, the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center
(NPIC) reviewed the U-2 photographs and identified objects that they
interpreted as medium range ballistic missiles. This identification was
made, in part, on the strength of reporting provided by Oleg Penkovsky, a double agent in the GRU working for CIA and MI6.
Although he provided no direct reports of the Soviet missile
deployments to Cuba, technical and doctrinal details of Soviet missile
regiments that had been provided by Penkovsky in the months and years
prior to the Crisis helped NPIC analysts correctly identify the missiles
on U-2 imagery.
That evening, the CIA notified the Department of State and at 8:30 pm EDT,
Bundy chose to wait until the next morning to tell the President.
McNamara was briefed at midnight. The next morning, Bundy met with
Kennedy and showed him the U-2 photographs and briefed him on the CIA's
analysis of the images. At 6:30 pm EDT, Kennedy convened a meeting of the nine members of the National Security Council and five other key advisers, in a group he formally named the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM) after the fact on October 22 by the National Security Action Memorandum 196.
Without informing the members of EXCOMM, President Kennedy tape
recorded all of their proceedings, and Sheldon M. Stern, head of the
Kennedy library transcribed some of them.
Responses considered
President Kennedy meets in the Oval Office with General Curtis LeMay and the reconnaissance pilots who found the missile sites in Cuba.
The US had no plan in place because its intelligence had been
convinced that the Soviets would never install nuclear missiles in Cuba.
EXCOMM, of which Vice PresidentLyndon B. Johnson was a member, quickly discussed several possible courses of action:
Do nothing: American vulnerability to Soviet missiles was not new.
Diplomacy: Use diplomatic pressure to get the Soviet Union to remove the missiles.
Secret approach: Offer Castro the choice of splitting with the Russians or being invaded.
Invasion: Full force invasion of Cuba and overthrow of Castro.
Air strike: Use the US Air Force to attack all known missile sites.
Blockade: Use the US Navy to block any missiles from arriving in Cuba.
As
the article describes, both the US and the Soviet Union considered many
possible outcomes of their actions and threats during the crisis
(Allison, Graham T.; Zelikow, Philip D.). This game tree models how both actors would have considered their decisions. It is broken down into a simple form for basic understanding.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
unanimously agreed that a full-scale attack and invasion was the only
solution. They believed that the Soviets would not attempt to stop the
US from conquering Cuba. Kennedy was sceptical:
They, no more than we, can let
these things go by without doing something. They can't, after all their
statements, permit us to take out their missiles, kill a lot of
Russians, and then do nothing. If they don't take action in Cuba, they
certainly will in Berlin.
Kennedy concluded that attacking Cuba by air would signal the Soviets
to presume "a clear line" to conquer Berlin. Kennedy also believed that
US allies would think of the country as "trigger-happy cowboys" who
lost Berlin because they could not peacefully resolve the Cuban
situation.
President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara in an EXCOMM meeting
The EXCOMM then discussed the effect on the strategic balance of
power, both political and military. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed
that the missiles would seriously alter the military balance, but
McNamara disagreed. An extra 40, he reasoned, would make little
difference to the overall strategic balance. The US already had
approximately 5,000 strategic warheads,
but the Soviet Union had only 300. McNamara concluded that the Soviets
having 340 would not therefore substantially alter the strategic
balance. In 1990, he reiterated that "it made no difference.... The military balance wasn't changed. I didn't believe it then, and I don't believe it now."
The EXCOMM agreed that the missiles would affect the political
balance. Kennedy had explicitly promised the American people less than a
month before the crisis that "if Cuba should possess a capacity to
carry out offensive actions against the United States... the United
States would act."
Also, credibility among US allies and people would be damaged if the
Soviet Union appeared to redress the strategic balance by placing
missiles in Cuba. Kennedy explained after the crisis that "it would have
politically changed the balance of power. It would have appeared to,
and appearances contribute to reality."
President Kennedy meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in the Oval Office (October 18, 1962)
On October 18, Kennedy met with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko,
who claimed the weapons were for defensive purposes only. Not wanting
to expose what he already knew and to avoid panicking the American
public, Kennedy did not reveal that he was already aware of the missile buildup. By October 19, frequent U-2 spy flights showed four operational sites.
Operational plans
Two
Operational Plans (OPLAN) were considered. OPLAN 316 envisioned a full
invasion of Cuba by Army and Marine units, supported by the Navy
following Air Force and naval airstrikes. Army units in the US would
have had trouble fielding mechanised and logistical assets, and the US
Navy could not supply enough amphibious shipping to transport even a
modest armoured contingent from the Army.
OPLAN 312, primarily an Air Force and Navy carrier operation, was
designed with enough flexibility to do anything from engaging
individual missile sites to providing air support for OPLAN 316's ground
forces.
Blockade
A US Navy P-2H Neptune of VP-18 flying over a Soviet cargo ship with crated Il-28s on deck during the Cuban Crisis.
Kennedy met with members of EXCOMM and other top advisers throughout
October 21, considering two remaining options: an air strike primarily
against the Cuban missile bases or a naval blockade of Cuba. A full-scale invasion was not the administration's first option. McNamara supported the naval blockade as a strong but limited military action that left the US in control. The term "blockade" was problematic. According to international law, a blockade is an act of war, but the Kennedy administration did not think that the Soviets would be provoked to attack by a mere blockade. Additionally, legal experts at the State Department and Justice Department concluded that a declaration of war could be avoided if another legal justification, based on the Rio Treaty for defence of the Western Hemisphere, was obtained from a resolution by a two-thirds vote from the members of the Organization of American States (OAS).
AdmiralAnderson, Chief of Naval Operations wrote a position paper that helped Kennedy to differentiate between what they termed a "quarantine"
of offensive weapons and a blockade of all materials, claiming that a
classic blockade was not the original intention. Since it would take
place in international waters, Kennedy obtained the approval of the OAS
for military action under the hemispheric defence provisions of the Rio
Treaty:
Latin American participation in the
quarantine now involved two Argentine destroyers which were to report
to the US Commander South Atlantic [COMSOLANT] at Trinidad on November
9. An Argentine submarine and a Marine battalion with lift were
available if required. In addition, two Venezuelan destroyers
(Destroyers ARV D-11 Nueva Esparta" and "ARV D-21 Zulia") and one
submarine (Caribe) had reported to COMSOLANT, ready for sea by November
2. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago offered the use of Chaguaramas
Naval Base to warships of any OAS nation for the duration of the
"quarantine". The Dominican Republic had made available one escort ship.
Colombia was reported ready to furnish units and had sent military
officers to the US to discuss this assistance. The Argentine Air Force
informally offered three SA-16 aircraft in addition to forces already committed to the "quarantine" operation.
This initially was to involve a naval blockade against offensive weapons within the framework of the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty.
Such a blockade might be expanded to cover all types of goods and air
transport. The action was to be backed up by surveillance of Cuba. The
CNO's scenario was followed closely in later implementing the
"quarantine."
On October 19, the EXCOMM formed separate working groups to examine
the air strike and blockade options, and by the afternoon most support
in the EXCOMM shifted to the blockade option. Reservations about the
plan continued to be voiced as late as the October 21, the paramount
concern being that once the blockade was put into effect, the Soviets
would rush to complete some of the missiles. Consequently, the US could
find itself bombing operational missiles if the blockade failed to force
Khrushchev to remove the missiles already on the island.
Speech to the nation
President Kennedy signs the Proclamation for Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba at the Oval Office on October 23, 1962.
At 3:00 pm EDT on October 22, President Kennedy formally established
the Executive Committee (EXCOMM) with National Security Action
Memorandum (NSAM) 196. At 5:00 pm, he met with Congressional leaders who
contentiously opposed a blockade and demanded a stronger response. In Moscow, Ambassador Foy D. Kohler briefed Khrushchev on the pending blockade and Kennedy's speech to the nation. Ambassadors around the world gave notice to non-Eastern Bloc leaders. Before the speech, US delegations met with Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, West GermanChancellorKonrad Adenauer, French President Charles de Gaulle and Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, José Antonio Mora
to brief them on the US intelligence and their proposed response. All
were supportive of the US position, except Macmillan who advocated
appeasement.
Shortly before his speech, Kennedy called former President Dwight Eisenhower. Kennedy's conversation with the former president also revealed that the two were consulting during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The two also anticipated that Khrushchev would respond to the Western
world in a manner that was similar to his response during the Suez Crisis and would possibly wind up trading off Berlin.
On October 22 at 7:00 pm EDT, Kennedy delivered a nationwide
televised address on all of the major networks announcing the discovery
of the missiles. He noted:
It shall be the policy of this
nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any
nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the
United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet
Union.
Kennedy described the administration's plan:
To halt this offensive buildup, a
strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to
Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba, from
whatever nation or port, will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive
weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to
other types of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however,
denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their
Berlin blockade of 1948.
Soviet Premier Khrushchev's October 24, 1962 letter to Kennedy stating that the blockade of Cuba "constitute[s] an act of aggression..."
On October 23, at 11:24 am EDT, a cable, drafted by George Wildman Ball to the US Ambassador in Turkey and NATO,
notified them that they were considering making an offer to withdraw
what the US knew to be nearly-obsolete missiles from Italy and Turkey,
in exchange for the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba. Turkish officials
replied that they would "deeply resent" any trade involving the US
missile presence in their country. Two days later, on the morning of October 25, American journalist Walter Lippmann
proposed the same thing in his syndicated column. Castro reaffirmed
Cuba's right to self-defense and said that all of its weapons were
defensive and Cuba would not allow an inspection.
International response
Three days after Kennedy's speech, the Chinese People's Daily announced that "650,000,000 Chinese men and women were standing by the Cuban people."
In West Germany, newspapers supported the US response by contrasting it
with the weak American actions in the region during the preceding
months. They also expressed some fear that the Soviets might retaliate
in Berlin. In France on October 23, the crisis made the front page of
all the daily newspapers. The next day, an editorial in Le Monde
expressed doubt about the authenticity of the CIA's photographic
evidence. Two days later, after a visit by a high-ranking CIA agent, the
newspaper accepted the validity of the photographs. Also in France, in
the October 29 issue of Le Figaro, Raymond Aron wrote in support of the American response. On October 24, Pope John XXIII sent a message to the Soviet embassy in Rome to be transmitted to the Kremlin
in which he voiced his concern for peace. In this message he stated,
"We beg all governments not to remain deaf to this cry of humanity. That
they do all that is in their power to save peace."
Soviet broadcast and communications
The
crisis was continuing unabated, and in the evening of October 24, the
Soviet news agency TASS broadcast a telegram from Khrushchev to Kennedy
in which Khrushchev warned that the United States's "outright piracy"
would lead to war.
That was followed at 9:24 pm by a telegram from Khrushchev to Kennedy,
which was received at 10:52 pm EDT. Khrushchev stated, "if you weigh the
present situation with a cool head without giving way to passion, you
will understand that the Soviet Union cannot afford not to decline the
despotic demands of the USA" and that the Soviet Union views the
blockade as "an act of aggression" and their ships will be instructed to
ignore it.
After October 23, Soviet communications with the USA increasingly
showed indications of having being rushed. Undoubtedly a product of
pressure, it was not uncommon for Khrushchev to repeat himself and send
messages lacking simple editing.
With President Kennedy making his aggressive intentions of a possible
air-strike followed by an invasion on Cuba known, Khrushchev rapidly
sought after a diplomatic compromise. Communications between the two
super-powers had entered into a unique and revolutionary period; with
the newly developed threat of mutual destruction through the deployment
of nuclear weapons, diplomacy now demonstrated how power and coercion
could dominate negotiations.
US alert level raised
Adlai Stevenson shows aerial photos of Cuban missiles to the United Nations, October 25, 1962.
The US requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council on October 25. US Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin
in an emergency meeting of the Security Council, challenging him to
admit the existence of the missiles. Ambassador Zorin refused to answer.
The next day at 10:00 pm EDT, the US raised the readiness level of SAC
forces to DEFCON 2. For the only confirmed time in US history, B-52 bombers went on continuous airborne alert, and B-47
medium bombers were dispersed to various military and civilian
airfields and made ready to take off, fully equipped, on 15 minutes'
notice.
One eighth of SAC's 1,436 bombers were on airborne alert, and some 145
intercontinental ballistic missiles stood on ready alert, some of which
targeted Cuba, and Air Defense Command
(ADC) redeployed 161 nuclear-armed interceptors to 16 dispersal fields
within nine hours, with one third maintaining 15-minute alert status.
Twenty-three nuclear-armed B-52s were sent to orbit points within
striking distance of the Soviet Union so that it would believe that the
US was serious. Jack J. Catton later estimated that about 80 percent of SAC's planes were ready for launch during the crisis; David A. Burchinal recalled that, by contrast:
the Russians were so thoroughly
stood down, and we knew it. They didn't make any move. They did not
increase their alert; they did not increase any flights, or their air
defense posture. They didn't do a thing, they froze in place. We were
never further from nuclear war than at the time of Cuba, never further.
By October 22, Tactical Air Command
(TAC) had 511 fighters plus supporting tankers and reconnaissance
aircraft deployed to face Cuba on one-hour alert status. TAC and the Military Air Transport Service
had problems. The concentration of aircraft in Florida strained command
and support echelons, which faced critical undermanning in security,
armaments, and communications; the absence of initial authorization for
war-reserve stocks of conventional munitions forced TAC to scrounge; and
the lack of airlift assets to support a major airborne drop
necessitated the call-up of 24 Reserve squadrons.
On October 25 at 1:45 am EDT, Kennedy responded to Khrushchev's
telegram by stating that the US was forced into action after receiving
repeated assurances that no offensive missiles were being placed in
Cuba, and when the assurances proved to be false, the deployment
"required the responses I have announced.... I hope that your government
will take necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier
situation."
A
declassified map used by the US Navy's Atlantic Fleet showing the
position of American and Soviet ships at the height of the crisis.
Blockade challenged
At 7:15 am EDT on October 25, USS Essex and USS Gearing attempted to intercept Bucharest but failed to do so. Fairly certain that the tanker
did not contain any military material, the US allowed it through the
blockade. Later that day, at 5:43 pm, the commander of the blockade
effort ordered the destroyer USS Joseph P. Kennedy Jr. to intercept and board the Lebanese freighter Marucla. That took place the next day, and Marucla was cleared through the blockade after its cargo was checked.
At 5:00 pm EDT on October 25, William Clements announced that the
missiles in Cuba were still actively being worked on. That report was
later verified by a CIA report that suggested there had been no slowdown
at all. In response, Kennedy issued Security Action Memorandum 199,
authorizing the loading of nuclear weapons onto aircraft under the
command of SACEUR,
which had the duty of carrying out first air strikes on the Soviet
Union. During the day, the Soviets responded to the blockade by turning
back 14 ships that were presumably carrying offensive weapons. The first indication of this came from a report from the British GCHQ sent to the White House Situation Room containing intercepted communications from Soviet ships reporting their positions. On October 24, Kislovodsk,
a Soviet cargo ship, reported a position north-east of where it had
been 24 hours earlier indicating it had "discontinued" its voyage and
turned back towards the Baltic. The next day, reports showed more ships
originally bound for Cuba had altered their course.
Raising the stakes
The
next morning, October 26, Kennedy informed the EXCOMM that he believed
only an invasion would remove the missiles from Cuba. He was persuaded
to give the matter time and continue with both military and diplomatic
pressure. He agreed and ordered the low-level flights over the island to
be increased from two per day to once every two hours. He also ordered a
crash program to institute a new civil government in Cuba if an
invasion went ahead.
At this point, the crisis was ostensibly at a stalemate. The
Soviets had shown no indication that they would back down and had made
several comments to the contrary. The US had no reason to believe
otherwise and was in the early stages of preparing for an invasion,
along with a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union if it responded
militarily, which was assumed.
Kennedy had no intention of keeping these plans a secret; with an array
of Cuban and Soviet spies forever present, Khrushchev was quickly made
aware of this looming danger.
Pressure continues to show
The sword of Damocles
looming over the USSR in the form of an air strike followed by invasion
allowed the United States to exert pressure in future talks. It was
precisely this sword that played such an influential role in
accelerating Khrushchev's proposal for a compromise.
Throughout the closing stages of October, Soviet telegrams were
typically rushed and showed signs of immense pressure. Khrushchev's
tendency to use platitudinous and ambiguous language assisted the United
States in exerting linguistic dominance throughout the compromise
negotiations. Leading Soviet figures consistently failed to mention that
only Cuban government could agree to inspections of the territory and
continually made arrangements relating to Cuba without the knowledge of
Fidel Castro himself. According to Dean Rusk, Khrushchev "blinked", he
began to panic from the consequences of his own plan and it became clear
that his nervousness led to communicative failures that allowed the US
to largely dominate negotiations in late October.
Secret negotiations
At 1:00 pm EDT on October 26, John A. Scali of ABC News had lunch with Aleksandr Fomin, the cover name of Alexander Feklisov, the KGBstation chief in Washington, at Fomin's request. Following the instructions of the Politburo of the CPSU,
Fomin noted, "War seems about to break out." He asked Scali to use his
contacts to talk to his "high-level friends" at the State Department to
see if the US would be interested in a diplomatic solution. He suggested
that the language of the deal would contain an assurance from the
Soviet Union to remove the weapons under UN supervision and that Castro
would publicly announce that he would not accept such weapons again in
exchange for a public statement by the US that it would avoid invading
Cuba. The US responded by asking the Brazilian government to pass a message to Castro that the US would be "unlikely to invade" if the missiles were removed.
Mr. President, we and
you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied
the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that
knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so
tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it,
and then it will be necessary to cut that knot, and what that would mean
is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand
perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.
Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby
to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us
not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take
measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.
— Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 26, 1962
On October 26 at 6:00 pm EDT, the State Department started receiving a
message that appeared to be written personally by Khrushchev. It was
Saturday at 2:00 am in Moscow. The long letter took several minutes to
arrive, and it took translators additional time to translate and
transcribe it.
Robert F. Kennedy
described the letter as "very long and emotional". Khrushchev
reiterated the basic outline that had been stated to Scali earlier in
the day: "I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships bound
for Cuba are not carrying any armaments. You will declare that the
United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support
any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Then the necessity
of the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will disappear." At
6:45 pm EDT, news of Fomin's offer to Scali was finally heard and was
interpreted as a "set up" for the arrival of Khrushchev's letter. The
letter was then considered official and accurate although it was later
learned that Fomin was almost certainly operating of his own accord
without official backing. Additional study of the letter was ordered and
continued into the night.
Crisis continues
Direct
aggression against Cuba would mean nuclear war. The Americans speak
about such aggression as if they did not know or did not want to accept
this fact. I have no doubt they would lose such a war.
S-75 Dvina
with V-750V 1D missile (NATO SA-2 Guideline) on a launcher. An
installation similar to this one shot down Major Anderson's U-2 over
Cuba.
Castro, on the other hand, was convinced that an invasion of Cuba was
soon at hand, and on October 26, he sent a telegram to Khrushchev that
appeared to call for a pre-emptive nuclear strike on the US in case of attack. In a 2010 interview, Castro expressed regret about his earlier stance on first use: "After I've seen what I've seen, and knowing what I know now, it wasn't worth it at all." Castro also ordered all anti-aircraft weapons in Cuba to fire on any US aircraft:
the orders had been to fire only on groups of two or more. At 6:00 am
EDT on October 27, the CIA delivered a memo reporting that three of the
four missile sites at San Cristobal and the two sites at Sagua la Grande
appeared to be fully operational. It also noted that the Cuban military
continued to organise for action but was under order not to initiate
action unless attacked.
At 9:00 am EDT on October 27, Radio Moscow
began broadcasting a message from Khrushchev. Contrary to the letter of
the night before, the message offered a new trade: the missiles on Cuba
would be removed in exchange for the removal of the Jupiter missiles
from Italy and Turkey. At 10:00 am EDT, the executive committee met
again to discuss the situation and came to the conclusion that the
change in the message was because of internal debate between Khrushchev
and other party officials in the Kremlin.
Kennedy realised that he would be in an "insupportable position if this
becomes Khrushchev's proposal" because the missiles in Turkey were not
militarily useful and were being removed anyway and "It's gonna – to any
man at the United Nations or any other rational man, it will look like a
very fair trade." Bundy explained why Khrushchev's public acquiescence
could not be considered: "The current threat to peace is not in Turkey,
it is in Cuba."
McNamara noted that another tanker, the Grozny, was about
600 miles (970 km) out and should be intercepted. He also noted that
they had not made the Soviets aware of the blockade line and suggested
relaying that information to them via U Thant at the United Nations.
A Lockheed U-2F, the high altitude reconnaissance type shot down over Cuba, being refueled by a BoeingKC-135Q. The aircraft in 1962 was painted overall gray and carried USAF military markings and national insignia.
While the meeting progressed, at 11:03 am EDT a new message began to arrive from Khrushchev. The message stated, in part:
"You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you
because it is ninety-nine miles by sea from the coast of the United
States of America. But... you have placed destructive missile weapons,
which you call offensive, in Italy and Turkey, literally next to us.... I
therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the
means which you regard as offensive.... Your representatives will make a
declaration to the effect that the United States... will remove its
analogous means from Turkey... and after that, persons entrusted by the
United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the
fulfillment of the pledges made."
The executive committee continued to meet through the day.
Throughout the crisis, Turkey had repeatedly stated that it would be upset if the Jupiter missiles were removed. Italy's Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, who was also Foreign Minister ad interim, offered to allow withdrawal of the missiles deployed in Apulia as a bargaining chip. He gave the message to one of his most trusted friends, Ettore Bernabei, the general manager of RAI-TV, to convey to Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.
Bernabei was in New York to attend an international conference on
satellite TV broadcasting. Unknown to the Soviets, the US regarded the
Jupiter missiles as obsolescent and already supplanted by the Polaris
nuclear ballistic submarine missiles.
On the morning of October 27, a U-2F (the third CIA U-2A, modified for air-to-air refuelling) piloted by USAF Major Rudolf Anderson, departed its forward operating location at McCoy AFB,
Florida. At approximately 12:00 pm EDT, the aircraft was struck by an
SA-2 surface-to-air missile launched from Cuba. The aircraft was shot
down, and Anderson was killed. The stress in negotiations between the
Soviets and the US intensified; it was only later believed that the
decision to fire the missile was made locally by an undetermined Soviet
commander, acting on his own authority. Later that day, at about 3:41 pm
EDT, several US Navy RF-8A Crusader aircraft, on low-level photo-reconnaissance missions, were fired upon.
On October 28, 1962, Khrushchev told his son Sergei that the
shooting down of Anderson's U-2 was by the "Cuban military at the
direction of Raul Castro".
At 4:00 pm EDT, Kennedy recalled members of EXCOMM to the White House
and ordered that a message should immediately be sent to U Thant asking
the Soviets to suspend work on the missiles while negotiations were
carried out. During the meeting, General Maxwell Taylor
delivered the news that the U-2 had been shot down. Kennedy had earlier
claimed he would order an attack on such sites if fired upon, but he
decided to not act unless another attack was made. Forty years later,
McNamara said:
We had to send a U-2 over to gain
reconnaissance information on whether the Soviet missiles were becoming
operational. We believed that if the U-2 was shot down that—the Cubans
didn't have capabilities to shoot it down, the Soviets did—we believed
if it was shot down, it would be shot down by a Soviet
surface-to-air-missile unit, and that it would represent a decision by
the Soviets to escalate the conflict. And therefore, before we sent the
U-2 out, we agreed that if it was shot down we wouldn't meet, we'd
simply attack. It was shot down on Friday.... Fortunately, we changed
our mind, we thought "Well, it might have been an accident, we won't
attack." Later we learned that Khrushchev had reasoned just as we did:
we send over the U-2, if it was shot down, he reasoned we would believe
it was an intentional escalation. And therefore, he issued orders to
Pliyev, the Soviet commander in Cuba, to instruct all of his batteries
not to shoot down the U-2.
Ellsberg said that Robert Kennedy (RFK) told him in 1964 that after the U-2 was shot down and the pilot killed, he (RFK) told Soviet ambassador Dobrynin,
"You have drawn first blood ... . [T]he president had decided against
advice ... not to respond militarily to that attack, but he [Dobrynin]
should know that if another plane was shot at, ... we would take out all
the SAMs and antiaircraft ... . And that would almost surely be
followed by an invasion."
Drafting response
Emissaries sent by both Kennedy and Khrushchev agreed to meet at the Yenching Palace Chinese restaurant in the Cleveland Park neighbourhood of Washington, DC, on Saturday evening, October 27.
Kennedy suggested to take Khrushchev's offer to trade away the
missiles. Unknown to most members of the EXCOMM, but with the support of
his brother the president, Robert Kennedy had been meeting with the
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington to discover whether the
intentions were genuine.
The EXCOMM was generally against the proposal because it would
undermine NATO's authority, and the Turkish government had repeatedly
stated it was against any such trade.
As the meeting progressed, a new plan emerged, and Kennedy was
slowly persuaded. The new plan called for him to ignore the latest
message and instead to return to Khrushchev's earlier one. Kennedy was
initially hesitant, feeling that Khrushchev would no longer accept the
deal because a new one had been offered, but Llewellyn Thompson argued that it was still possible. White House Special Counsel and Adviser Ted Sorensen
and Robert Kennedy left the meeting and returned 45 minutes later, with
a draft letter to that effect. The President made several changes, had
it typed, and sent it.
After the EXCOMM meeting, a smaller meeting continued in the Oval Office.
The group argued that the letter should be underscored with an oral
message to Dobrynin that stated that if the missiles were not withdrawn,
military action would be used to remove them. Rusk added one proviso
that no part of the language of the deal would mention Turkey, but there
would be an understanding that the missiles would be removed
"voluntarily" in the immediate aftermath. The president agreed, and the
message was sent.
At Rusk's request, Fomin and Scali met again. Scali asked why the two
letters from Khrushchev were so different, and Fomin claimed it was
because of "poor communications". Scali replied that the claim was not
credible and shouted that he thought it was a "stinking double cross".
He went on to claim that an invasion was only hours away, and Fomin
stated that a response to the US message was expected from Khrushchev
shortly and urged Scali to tell the State Department that no treachery
was intended. Scali said that he did not think anyone would believe him,
but he agreed to deliver the message. The two went their separate ways,
and Scali immediately typed out a memo for the EXCOMM.
Within the US establishment, it was well understood that ignoring
the second offer and returning to the first put Khrushchev in a
terrible position. Military preparations continued, and all active duty
Air Force personnel were recalled to their bases for possible action.
Robert Kennedy later recalled the mood: "We had not abandoned all hope,
but what hope there was now rested with Khrushchev's revising his course
within the next few hours. It was a hope, not an expectation. The
expectation was military confrontation by Tuesday (October 30), and
possibly tomorrow (October 29) ...."
At 8:05 pm EDT, the letter drafted earlier in the day was
delivered. The message read, "As I read your letter, the key elements of
your proposals—which seem generally acceptable as I understand them—are
as follows: 1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from
Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and
undertake, with suitable safe-guards, to halt the further introduction
of such weapon systems into Cuba. 2) We, on our part, would agree—upon
the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations,
to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments (a) to
remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give
assurances against the invasion of Cuba." The letter was also released
directly to the press to ensure it could not be "delayed".
With the letter delivered, a deal was on the table. As Robert Kennedy
noted, there was little expectation it would be accepted. At 9:00 pm
EDT, the EXCOMM met again to review the actions for the following day.
Plans were drawn up for air strikes on the missile sites as well as
other economic targets, notably petroleum storage. McNamara stated that
they had to "have two things ready: a government for Cuba, because we're
going to need one; and secondly, plans for how to respond to the Soviet
Union in Europe, because sure as hell they're going to do something
there".
At 12:12 am EDT, on October 27, the US informed its NATO allies that
"the situation is growing shorter.... the United States may find it
necessary within a very short time in its interest and that of its
fellow nations in the Western Hemisphere to take whatever military
action may be necessary." To add to the concern, at 6:00 am, the CIA
reported that all missiles in Cuba were ready for action.
A US Navy HSS-1 Seabat helicopter hovers over Soviet submarine B-59, forced to the surface by US Naval forces in the Caribbean near Cuba (October 28–29, 1962)
On October 27, Khrushchev also received a letter from Castro, what is
now known as the Armageddon Letter (dated the day before), which was
interpreted as urging the use of nuclear force in the event of an attack
on Cuba:
"I believe the imperialists' aggressiveness is extremely dangerous and
if they actually carry out the brutal act of invading Cuba in violation
of international law and morality, that would be the moment to eliminate
such danger forever through an act of clear legitimate defense, however
harsh and terrible the solution would be," Castro wrote.
Averted nuclear launch
Later that same day, what the White House later called "Black Saturday," the US Navy dropped a series of "signalling" depth charges (practice depth charges the size of hand grenades) on a Soviet submarine (B-59) at the blockade line, unaware that it was armed with a nuclear-tipped torpedo with orders that allowed it to be used if the submarine was damaged by depth charges or surface fire. As the submarine was too deep to monitor any radio traffic, the captain of the B-59, Valentin Grigorievitch Savitsky, decided that a war might already have started and wanted to launch a nuclear torpedo. The decision to launch these required agreement from all three officers on board, but one of them, Vasily Arkhipov, objected and so the nuclear launch was narrowly averted.
On the same day a U-2 spy plane made an accidental, unauthorised
ninety-minute overflight of the Soviet Union's far eastern coast. The Soviets responded by scrambling MiG fighters from Wrangel Island; in turn, the Americans launched F-102 fighters armed with nuclear air-to-air missiles over the Bering Sea.
Crisis ends
On
Saturday, October 27, after much deliberation between the Soviet Union
and Kennedy's cabinet, Kennedy secretly agreed to remove all missiles
set in Turkey and possibly southern Italy, the former on the border of
the Soviet Union, in exchange for Khrushchev removing all missiles in
Cuba.
There is some dispute as to whether removing the missiles from Italy
was part of the secret agreement. Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs that
it was, and when the crisis had ended McNamara gave the order to
dismantle the missiles in both Italy and Turkey.
At this point, Khrushchev knew things the US did not: First,
that the shooting down of the U-2 by a Soviet missile violated direct
orders from Moscow, and Cuban antiaircraft fire against other US
reconnaissance aircraft also violated direct orders from Khrushchev to
Castro. Second, the Soviets already had 162 nuclear warheads on Cuba that the US did not then believe were there.
Third, the Soviets and Cubans on the island would almost certainly have
responded to an invasion by using those nuclear weapons, even though
Castro believed that every human in Cuba would likely die as a result.
Khrushchev also knew but may not have considered the fact that he had
submarines armed with nuclear weapons that the US Navy may not have
known about.
Khrushchev knew he was losing control. President Kennedy had
been told in early 1961 that a nuclear war would likely kill a third of
humanity, with most or all of those deaths concentrated in the US, the
USSR, Europe and China; Khrushchev may well have received similar reports from his military.
With this background, when Khrushchev heard Kennedy's threats
relayed by Robert Kennedy to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, he immediately
drafted his acceptance of Kennedy's latest terms from his dacha without
involving the Politburo, as he had previously, and had them immediately
broadcast over Radio Moscow, which he believed the US would hear. In
that broadcast at 9:00 am EST, on October 28, Khrushchev stated that
"the Soviet government, in addition to previously issued instructions on
the cessation of further work at the building sites for the weapons,
has issued a new order on the dismantling of the weapons which you
describe as 'offensive' and their crating and return to the Soviet
Union."
At 10:00 am, October 28, Kennedy first learned of Khrushchev's solution
to the crisis with the US removing the 15 Jupiters in Turkey and the
Soviets would remove the rockets from Cuba. Khrushchev had made the
offer in a public statement for the world to hear. Despite almost solid
opposition from his senior advisers, Kennedy quickly embraced the Soviet
offer. "This is a pretty good play of his," Kennedy said, according to a
tape recording that he made secretly of the Cabinet Room meeting.
Kennedy had deployed the Jupiters in March of the year, causing a stream
of angry outbursts from Khrushchev. "Most people will think this is a
rather even trade and we ought to take advantage of it," Kennedy said.
Vice President Lyndon Johnson was the first to endorse the missile swap
but others continued to oppose the offer. Finally, Kennedy ended the
debate. "We can't very well invade Cuba with all its toil and blood,"
Kennedy said, "when we could have gotten them out by making a deal on
the same missiles on Turkey. If that's part of the record, then you
don't have a very good war."
Kennedy immediately responded to Khrushchev's letter, issuing a
statement calling it "an important and constructive contribution to
peace". He continued this with a formal letter:
I consider my letter to you of
October twenty-seventh and your reply of today as firm undertakings on
the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried
out.... The US will make a statement in the framework of the Security
Council in reference to Cuba as follows: it will declare that the United
States of America will respect the inviolability of Cuban borders, its
sovereignty, that it take the pledge not to interfere in internal
affairs, not to intrude themselves and not to permit our territory to be
used as a bridgehead for the invasion of Cuba, and will restrain those
who would plan to carry an aggression against Cuba, either from US
territory or from the territory of other countries neighboring to Cuba.
Kennedy's planned statement would also contain suggestions he had
received from his adviser Schlesinger Jr. in a "Memorandum for the
President" describing the "Post Mortem on Cuba".
Kennedy's Oval Office telephone conversation with Eisenhower soon
after Khrushchev's message arrived revealed that the President was
planning to use the Cuban Missile Crisis to escalate tensions with
Khrushchev and in the long run, Cuba as well.
The President also claimed that he thought the crisis would result in
direct military confrontations in Berlin by the end of the next month.
He also claimed in his conversation with Eisenhower that the Soviet
leader had offered to withdraw from Cuba in exchange for the withdrawal
of missiles from Turkey and that while the Kennedy Administration had
agreed not to invade Cuba, they were only in process of determining Khrushchev's offer to withdraw from Turkey.
When former US President Harry Truman
called President Kennedy the day of Khrushchev's offer, the President
informed him that his Administration had rejected the Soviet leader's
offer to withdraw missiles from Turkey and was planning on using the
Soviet setback in Cuba to escalate tensions in Berlin.
Removal of Missiles in Cuba November 11, 1962 – NARA – 193868
The US continued the blockade; in the following days, aerial
reconnaissance proved that the Soviets were making progress in removing
the missile systems. The 42 missiles and their support equipment were
loaded onto eight Soviet ships. On November 2, 1962, Kennedy addressed
the US via radio and television broadcasts regarding the dismantlement
process of the Soviet R-12 missile bases located in the Caribbean
region.
The ships left Cuba on November 5 to 9. The US made a final visual
check as each of the ships passed the blockade line. Further diplomatic
efforts were required to remove the Soviet Il-28 bombers, and they were
loaded on three Soviet ships on December 5 and 6. Concurrent with the
Soviet commitment on the Il-28s, the US government announced the end of
the blockade from 6:45 pm EST on November 20, 1962.
At the time when the Kennedy administration thought that the
Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved, nuclear tactical rockets stayed in
Cuba since they were not part of the Kennedy-Khrushchev understandings
and the Americans did not know about them. The Soviets changed their
minds, fearing possible future Cuban militant steps, and on November 22,
1962, Deputy Premier of the Soviet UnionAnastas Mikoyan told Castro that the rockets with the nuclear warheads were being removed as well.
In his negotiations with the Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin,
Robert Kennedy informally proposed that the Jupiter missiles in Turkey
would be removed "within a short time after this crisis was over". The last US missiles were disassembled by April 24, 1963, and were flown out of Turkey soon afterward.
The practical effect of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Pact was that the
US would remove their rockets from Italy and Turkey and that the Soviets
had no intention of resorting to nuclear war if they were out-gunned by
the US.
Because the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles from NATO bases in Italy
and Turkey was not made public at the time, Khrushchev appeared to have
lost the conflict and become weakened. The perception was that Kennedy
had won the contest between the superpowers and that Khrushchev had been
humiliated. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev took every step to avoid full
conflict despite pressures from their respective governments. Khrushchev
held power for another two years.
Nuclear forces
By
the time of the crisis in October 1962, the total amount of nuclear
weapons in the stockpiles of each country numbered approximately 26,400
for the United States and 3,300 for the Soviet Union. At the peak of the
crisis, the U.S. had some 3,500 nuclear weapons ready to be used on
command with a combined yield of approximately 6,300 megatons. The
Soviets had considerably less strategic firepower at their disposal
(some 300-320 bombs and warheads), lacking submarine-based weapons in a
position to threaten the U.S. mainland and having most of their
intercontinental delivery systems based on bombers that would have
difficulty penetrating North American air defence systems. The U.S. had
approximately 4,375 nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, most of which
were tactical weapons such as nuclear artillery,
with around 450 of them for ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and
aircraft; the Soviets had more than 550 similar weapons in Europe.
Regional (mostly targeting Europe, and others targeting U.S. bases in east Asia):
MRBM: 528 SS-4/R-12,
492 at soft launch sites and 36 at hard launch sites (approximately six
to eight R-12s were operational in Cuba, capable of striking the U.S.
mainland at any moment until the crisis was resolved)
The nuclear-armed Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missile. The US secretly agreed to withdraw the missiles from Italy and Turkey.
Soviet leadership
The
enormity of how close the world came to thermonuclear war impelled
Khrushchev to propose a far-reaching easing of tensions with the US.
In a letter to President Kennedy dated October 30, 1962, Khrushchev
outlined a range of bold initiatives to forestall the possibility of a
further nuclear crisis, including proposing a non-aggression treaty
between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact
or even disbanding these military blocs, a treaty to cease all nuclear
weapons testing and even the elimination of all nuclear weapons,
resolution of the hot-button issue of Germany by both East and West
formally accepting the existence of West Germany and East Germany,
and US recognition of the government of mainland China. The letter
invited counter-proposals and further exploration of these and other
issues through peaceful negotiations. Khrushchev invited Norman Cousins,
the editor of a major US periodical and an anti-nuclear weapons
activist, to serve as liaison with President Kennedy, and Cousins met
with Khrushchev for four hours in December 1962.
Kennedy's response to Khrushchev's proposals was lukewarm but
Kennedy expressed to Cousins that he felt constrained in exploring these
issues due to pressure from hardliners in the US national security
apparatus. The US and the USSR did shortly thereafter agree on a treaty
banning atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, known as the "Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty".
Further after the crisis, the US and the Soviet Union created the Moscow–Washington hotline,
a direct communications link between Moscow and Washington. The purpose
was to have a way that the leaders of the two Cold War countries could
communicate directly to solve such a crisis.
The compromise embarrassed Khrushchev and the Soviet Union because the withdrawal of US missiles from Italy and Turkey
was a secret deal between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Khrushchev went to
Kennedy as he thought that the crisis was getting out of hand, but the
Soviets were seen as retreating from circumstances that they had
started.
Khrushchev's fall from power two years later was in part because of the Soviet Politburo's
embarrassment at both Khrushchev's eventual concessions to the US and
this ineptitude in precipitating the crisis in the first place.
According to Dobrynin, the top Soviet leadership took the Cuban outcome
as "a blow to its prestige bordering on humiliation".
Cuban leadership
Cuba
perceived the outcome as a betrayal by the Soviets, as decisions on how
to resolve the crisis had been made exclusively by Kennedy and
Khrushchev. Castro was especially upset that certain issues of interest
to Cuba, such as the status of the US Naval Base in Guantánamo, were not
addressed. That caused Cuban–Soviet relations to deteriorate for years
to come. On the other hand, Cuba continued to be protected from invasion.
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