In philosophy, ethical dilemmas, also called ethical paradoxes or moral dilemmas, are situations in which an agent stands under two (or more) conflicting moral requirements, none of which overrides
the other. A closely related definition characterizes ethical dilemmas
as situations in which every available choice is wrong. The term is also
used in a wider sense in everyday language to refer to ethical
conflicts that may be resolvable, to psychologically difficult choices
or to other types of difficult ethical problems. This article is about
ethical dilemmas in the strict philosophical sense, often referred to as genuine ethical dilemmas. Various examples have been proposed but there is disagreement as to whether these constitute genuine or merely apparent
ethical dilemmas. The central debate around ethical dilemmas concerns
the question of whether there are any. Defenders often point to apparent
examples while their opponents usually aim to show their existence
contradicts very fundamental ethical principles. Ethical dilemmas come
in various types. An important distinction concerns the difference
between epistemic dilemmas, which give a possibly false impression to the agent of an unresolvable conflict, and actual or ontological dilemmas.
There is broad agreement that there are epistemic dilemmas but the main
interest in ethical dilemmas takes place on the ontological level.
Traditionally, philosophers held that it is a requirement for good moral
theories to be free from ethical dilemmas. But this assumption has been
questioned in contemporary philosophy.
Definition
A
person is in an ethical dilemma if they stand under several conflicting
moral obligations and no obligation overrides the others. Two ethical
requirements are conflicting if the agent can do one or the other
but not both: the agent has to choose one over the other. Two
conflicting ethical requirements do not override each other if they have the same strength or if there is no sufficient ethical reason to choose one over the other. Only this type of situation constitutes an ethical dilemma in the strict philosophical sense, often referred to as a genuine ethical dilemma.
Other cases of ethical conflicts are resolvable and are therefore not
ethical dilemmas strictly speaking. This applies to many instances of conflict of interest as well.
For example, a businessman hurrying along the shore of a lake to a
meeting is in an ethical conflict when he spots a drowning child close
to the shore. But this conflict is not a genuine ethical dilemma since
it has a clear resolution: jumping into the water to save the child
significantly outweighs the importance of making it to the meeting on
time. Also excluded from this definition are cases in which it is merely
psychologically difficult for the agent to make a choice, for example,
because of personal attachments or because the knowledge of the
consequences of the different alternatives is lacking.
Ethical dilemmas are sometimes defined not in terms of
conflicting obligations but in terms of not having a right course of
action, of all alternatives being wrong.
The two definitions are equivalent for many but not all purposes. For
example, it is possible to hold that in cases of ethical dilemmas, the
agent is free to choose either course of action, that either alternative
is right. Such a situation still constitutes an ethical dilemma
according to the first definition, since the conflicting requirements
are unresolved, but not according to the second definition, since there
is a right course of action.
Examples
Various
examples of ethical dilemmas have been proposed but there is
disagreement as to whether these constitute genuine or merely apparent
ethical dilemmas. One of the oldest examples is due to Plato,
who sketches a situation in which the agent has promised to return a
weapon to a friend, who is likely to use it to harm someone since he is
not in his right mind.
In this example, the duty to keep a promise stands in conflict with the
duty to prevent that others are harmed. It is questionable whether this
case constitutes a genuine ethical dilemma since the duty to prevent
harms seems to clearly outweigh the promise. Another well-known example comes from Jean-Paul Sartre,
who describes the situation of one of his students during the German
occupation of France. This student faced the choice of either fighting
to liberate his country from the Germans or staying with and caring for
his mother, for whom he was the only consolation left after the death of
her other son. The conflict, in this case, is between a personal duty
to his mother and the duty to his country. The novel Sophie's Choice by William Styron presents one more widely discussed example.
In it, a Nazi guard forces Sophie to choose one of her children to be
executed, adding that both will be executed if she refuses to choose.
This case is different from the other examples in which the conflicting
duties are of different types. This type of case has been labeled symmetrical since the two duties have the same type.
Types
Ethical
dilemmas come in different types. The distinctions between these types
are often important for disagreements about whether there are ethical
dilemmas or not. Certain arguments for or against their existence may
apply only to some types but not to other types. And only some types, if
any, may constitute genuine ethical dilemmas.
Epistemic vs ontological
In epistemic ethical dilemmas,
it is not clear to the agent what should be done because the agent is
unable to discern which moral requirement takes precedence.
Many decisions in everyday life, from a trivial choice between
differently packaged cans of beans in the supermarket to life-altering
career-choices, involve this form of uncertainty. But unresolvable
conflicts on the epistemic level can exist without there actually being
unresolvable conflicts and vice versa.
The main interest in ethical dilemmas is concerned with on the ontological level:
whether there actually are genuine dilemmas in the form of unresolvable
conflicts between moral requirements, not just whether the agent
believes so.
The ontological level is also where most of the theoretical
disagreements happen since both proponents and opponents of ethical
dilemmas usually agree that there are epistemic ethical dilemmas.
This distinction is sometimes used to argue against the existence of
ethical dilemmas by claiming that all apparent examples are in truth
epistemic in nature. In some cases, this can be shown by how the
conflict is resolved once the relevant information is obtained. But
there may be other cases in which the agent is unable to acquire
information that would settle the issue, sometimes referred to as stable epistemic ethical dilemmas.
Self-imposed vs world-imposed
The difference between self-imposed and world-imposed
ethical dilemmas concerns the source of the conflicting requirements.
In the self-imposed case, the agent is responsible for the conflict. A common example in this category is making two incompatible promises,
for example, to attend two events happening at distant places at the
same time. In the world-imposed case, on the other hand, the agent is
thrown into the dilemma without being responsible for it occurring.
The difference between these two types is relevant for moral theories.
Traditionally, most philosophers held that ethical theories should be
free from ethical dilemmas, that moral theories that allow or entail the
existence of ethical dilemmas are flawed.
In the weak sense, this prohibition is only directed at the
world-imposed dilemmas. This means that all dilemmas are avoided by
agents who strictly follow the moral theory in question. Only agents who
diverge from the theory's recommendations may find themselves in
ethical dilemmas. But some philosophers have argued that this
requirement is too weak, that the moral theory should be able to provide
guidance in any situation. This line of thought follows the intuition that it is not relevant how the situation came about for how to respond to it.
So e.g. if the agent finds themselves in the self-imposed ethical
dilemma of having to choose which promise to break, there should be some
considerations why it is right to break one promise rather than the
other. Utilitarians, for example, could argue that this depends on which broken promise results in the least harm to all concerned.
Obligation vs prohibition
An obligation is an ethical requirement to act in a certain way while a prohibition
is an ethical requirement to not act in a certain way. Most discussions
of ethical dilemmas focus on obligation dilemmas: they involve two
conflicting actions that the agent is ethically required to perform.
Prohibition dilemmas, on the other hand, are situations in which no
course of action is allowed. It has been argued that many arguments
against ethical dilemmas are only successful in regard to obligation
dilemmas but not against prohibition dilemmas.
Single-agent vs multi-agent
Ethical
dilemmas involve two courses of action that are both obligatory but
stand in conflict with each other: it is not possible to perform both
actions. In regular single-agent cases, a single agent has both conflicting obligations. In multi-agent cases, the actions are still incompatible but the obligations concern different people.
For example, two contestants engaged in a competition may have both the
duty to win if that is what they promised to their families. These two
obligations belonging to different people are conflicting since there
can be only one winner.
Other types
Ethical
dilemmas can be divided according to the types of obligations that are
in conflict with each other. For example, Rushworth Kidder suggests that
four patterns of conflict can be discerned: "truth versus loyalty,
individual versus community, short term versus long term, and justice
versus virtue".
These cases of conflicts between different types of duties can be
contrasted with conflicts in which one type of duty conflicts with
itself, for example, if there is a conflict between two long-term
obligations. Such cases are often called symmetric cases. The term "problem of dirty hands"
refers to another form of ethical dilemmas, which specifically concerns
political leaders who find themselves faced with the choice of
violating commonly accepted morality in order to bring about some
greater overall good.
Existence of ethical dilemmas
The problem of the existence of ethical dilemmas concerns the question of whether there are any genuine ethical dilemmas, as opposed to, for example, merely apparent epistemic dilemmas or resolvable conflicts.
The traditional position denies their existence but there are various
defenders of their existence in contemporary philosophy. There are
various arguments for and against both sides. Defenders of ethical
dilemmas often point to apparent examples of dilemmas while their
opponents usually aim to show their existence contradicts very
fundamental ethical principles. Both sides face the challenge of
reconciling these contradictory intuitions.
Arguments in favor
A
common way to argue in favor of ethical dilemmas is to cite concrete
examples. Such examples are quite common and can include cases from
everyday life, stories, or thought experiments, like Sartre's student or
Sophie's Choice discussed in the section on examples.
The strength of arguments based on examples rests on the intuition that
these cases actually are examples of genuine ethical dilemmas.
Opponents of ethical dilemmas often reject this argument based on the
claim that the initial intuitions in such cases are misleading. For
example, it may turn out that the proposed situation is impossible, that
one choice is objectively better than the other or that there is an
additional choice that was not mentioned in the description of the
example. But for the argument of the defenders to succeed, it is
sufficient to have at least one genuine case.
This constitutes a considerable difficulty for the opponents since they
would have to show that our intuitions are mistaken not just about some
of these cases but about all of them. Some opponents have responded to
this difficulty by arguing that all these cases merely constitute epistemic but not genuine dilemmas, i.e. that the conflict merely seems unresolvable because of the agent's lack of knowledge. This position is often defended by utilitarians.
Support for it comes from the fact that the consequence of even simple
actions are often too vast for us to properly anticipate. According to
this interpretation, we mistake our uncertainty about which course of
action outweighs the other for the idea that this conflict is not
resolvable on the ontological level.
Defenders of ethical dilemmas usually agree that there are many cases
of epistemic dilemmas that are resolvable but seem unresolvable.
However, they reject that this claim can be generalized to apply to all
examples.
The argument from moral residue is another argument in favor of ethical dilemmas. Moral residue, in this context, refers to backward-looking emotions like guilt or remorse. These emotions are due to the impression of having done something wrong, of having failed to live up to one's obligations.
In some cases of moral residue, the agent is responsible herself
because she made a bad choice which she regrets afterward. But in the
case of an ethical dilemma, this is forced on the agent no matter how
she decides. Going through the experience of moral residue is not just
something that happens to the agent but it even seems to be the
appropriate emotional response. The argument from moral residue uses
this line of thought to argue in favor of ethical dilemmas by holding
that the existence of ethical dilemmas is the best explanation for why
moral residue in these cases is the appropriate response.
Opponents can respond by arguing that the appropriate response is not
guilt but regret, the difference being that regret is not dependent on
the agent's previous choices. By cutting the link to the possibly
dilemmatic choice, the initial argument loses its force.
Another counter-argument allows that guilt is the appropriate emotional
response but denies that this indicates the existence of an underlying
ethical dilemma. This line of argument can be made plausible by pointing
to other examples, e.g. cases in which guilt is appropriate even though
no choice whatsoever was involved.
Arguments against
Some
of the strongest arguments against ethical dilemmas start from very
general ethical principles and try to show that these principles are
incompatible with the existence of ethical dilemmas, that their
existence would therefore involve a contradiction.
One such argument proceeds from the agglomeration principle and the principle that ought implies can. According to the agglomeration principle, if an agent ought to do one thing and ought to do another thing then this agent ought to do both things. According to ought implies can,
if an agent ought to do both things then the agent can do both things.
But if the agent can do both things, there is no conflict between the
two courses of action and therefore no dilemma. It may be necessary for
defenders to deny either the agglomeration principle or the principle that ought implies can. Either choice is problematic since these principles are quite fundamental.
Another line of argumentation denies that there are unresolvable ethical conflicts.
Such a view may accept that we have various duties, which may conflict
with each other at times. But this is not problematic as long as there
is always one duty that outweighs the others. It has been proposed that
the different types of duties can be ordered into a hierarchy.
So in cases of conflict, the higher duty would always take precedent
over the lower one, for example, that telling the truth is always more
important than keeping a promise. One problem with this approach is that
it fails to solve symmetric cases: when two duties of the same type stand in conflict with each other.
Another problem for such a position is that the weight of the different
types of duties seems to be situation-specific: in some cases of
conflict we should tell the truth rather than keep a promise, but in
other cases the reverse is true. This is, for example, W. D. Ross's
position, according to which we stand under a number of different
duties and have to decide on their relative weight based on the specific
situation.
But without a further argument, this line of thought just begs the
question against the defender of ethical dilemmas, who may simply deny
the claim that all conflicts can be resolved this way.
A different type of argument proceeds from the nature of moral
theories. According to various authors, it is a requirement for good
moral theories that they should be action-guiding by being able to
recommend what should be done in any situation.
But this is not possible when ethical dilemmas are involved. So these
intuitions about the nature of good moral theories indirectly support
the claim that there are no ethical dilemmas.
Morality (from Latinmoralitas 'manner, character, proper behavior') is the differentiation of intentions, decisions and actions between those that are distinguished as proper (right) and those that are improper (wrong). Morality can be a body of standards or principles derived from a code of conduct from a particular philosophy, religion or culture, or it can derive from a standard that a person believes should be universal. Morality may also be specifically synonymous with "goodness" or "rightness".
Immorality is the active opposition to morality (i.e. opposition to that which is good or right), while amorality
is variously defined as an unawareness of, indifference toward, or
disbelief in any particular set of moral standards and/or principles.
Ethics (also known as moral philosophy) is the branch of philosophy which addresses questions of morality. The word "ethics" is "commonly used interchangeably with 'morality'... and sometimes it is used more narrowly to mean the moral principles of a particular tradition, group, or individual." Likewise, certain types of ethical theories, especially deontological ethics, sometimes distinguish between ethics and morality.
Immanuel Kant introduced the categorical imperative: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law."
Philosopher Simon Blackburn
writes that "Although the morality of people and their ethics amounts
to the same thing, there is a usage that restricts morality to systems
such as that of Immanuel Kant, based on notions such as duty, obligation, and principles of conduct, reserving ethics for the more Aristotelian approach to practical reasoning, based on the notion of a virtue, and generally avoiding the separation of 'moral' considerations from other practical considerations."
Descriptive and normative
In its descriptive sense, "morality" refers to personal or cultural values, codes of conduct or social mores
from a society that provides these codes of conduct in which it applies
and is accepted by an individual. It does not connote objective claims
of right or wrong, but only refers to that which is considered right or
wrong. Descriptive ethics is the branch of philosophy which studies morality in this sense.
In its normative sense, "morality" refers to whatever (if anything) is actually right or wrong, which may be independent of the values or mores held by any particular peoples or cultures. Normative ethics is the branch of philosophy which studies morality in this sense.
Realism and anti-realism
Philosophical theories on the nature and origins of morality (that is, theories of meta-ethics) are broadly divided into two classes:
Moral realism
is the class of theories which hold that there are true moral
statements that report objective moral facts. For example, while they
might concede that forces of social conformity significantly shape individuals' "moral" decisions, they deny that those cultural norms and customs define morally right behavior. This may be the philosophical view propounded by ethical naturalists, but not all moral realists accept that position (e.g. ethical non-naturalists).
Moral anti-realism,
on the other hand, holds that moral statements either fail or do not
even attempt to report objective moral facts. Instead, they hold that
moral sentences are either categorically false claims of objective moral
facts (error theory); claims about subjective attitudes rather than objective facts (ethical subjectivism);
or else do not attempt to describe the world at all but rather
something else, like an expression of an emotion or the issuance of a
command (non-cognitivism).
Some forms of non-cognitivism and ethical subjectivism, while considered anti-realist in the robust sense used here, are considered realist in the sense synonymous with moral universalism. For example, universal prescriptivism is a universalist form of non-cognitivism which claims that morality is derived from reasoning about implied imperatives, and divine command theory and ideal observer theory
are universalist forms of ethical subjectivism which claim that
morality is derived from the edicts of a god or the hypothetical decrees
of a perfectly rational being, respectively.
Anthropology
Morality with practical reasoning
Practical reason is necessary for the moral agency but it is not a sufficient condition for moral agency.
Real life issues that need solutions do need both rationality and
emotion to be sufficiently moral. One uses rationality as a pathway to
the ultimate decision, but the environment and emotions towards the
environment at the moment must be a factor for the result to be truly
moral, as morality is subject to culture. Something can only be morally
acceptable if the culture as a whole has accepted this to be true. Both
practical reason and relevant emotional factors are acknowledged as
significant in determining the morality of a decision.
Tribal and territorial
Celia Green made a distinction between tribal and territorial morality.
She characterizes the latter as predominantly negative and
proscriptive: it defines a person's territory, including his or her
property and dependents, which is not to be damaged or interfered with.
Apart from these proscriptions, territorial morality is permissive,
allowing the individual whatever behaviour does not interfere with the
territory of another. By contrast, tribal morality is prescriptive,
imposing the norms of the collective on the individual. These norms will
be arbitrary, culturally dependent and 'flexible', whereas territorial
morality aims at rules which are universal and absolute, such as Kant's 'categorical imperative' and Geisler's graded absolutism.
Green relates the development of territorial morality to the rise of
the concept of private property, and the ascendancy of contract over
status.
Some observers hold that individuals apply distinct sets of moral rules to people depending on their membership of an "in-group"
(the individual and those they believe to be of the same group) or an
"out-group" (people not entitled to be treated according to the same
rules). Some biologists, anthropologists and evolutionary psychologists
believe this in-group/out-group discrimination has evolved because it
enhances group survival. This belief has been confirmed by simple
computational models of evolution.
In simulations this discrimination can result in both unexpected
cooperation towards the in-group and irrational hostility towards the
out-group. Gary R. Johnson and V.S. Falger have argued that nationalism and patriotism are forms of this in-group/out-group boundary. Jonathan Haidt has noted that experimental observation indicating an in-group criterion provides one moral foundation substantially used by conservatives, but far less so by liberals.
In-group preference is also helpful at the individual level for
the passing on of one's genes. For example, a mother who favors her own
children more highly than the children of other people will give greater
resources to her children than she will to strangers', thus heightening
her children's chances of survival and her own gene's chances of being
perpetuated. Due to this, within a population, there is substantial selection pressure
exerted toward this kind of self-interest, such that eventually, all
parents wind up favoring their own children (the in-group) over other
children (the out-group).
Comparing cultures
Peterson and Seligman
approach the anthropological view looking across cultures, geo-cultural
areas and across millennia. They conclude that certain virtues have
prevailed in all cultures they examined. The major virtues they
identified include wisdom / knowledge; courage; humanity; justice; temperance; and transcendence. Each of these include several divisions. For instance humanity includes love, kindness, and social intelligence.
Still, others theorize that morality is not always absolute,
contending that moral issues often differ along cultural lines. A 2014
PEW research study among several nations illuminates significant
cultural differences among issues commonly related to morality,
including divorce, extramarital affairs, homosexuality, gambling,
abortion, alcohol use, contraceptive use, and premarital sex. Each of
the 40 countries in this study has a range of percentages according to
what percentage of each country believes the common moral issues are
acceptable, unacceptable, or not moral issues at all. Each percentage
regarding the significance of the moral issue varies greatly on the
culture in which the moral issue is presented.
Advocates of a theory known as moral relativism subscribe to the
notion that moral virtues are right or wrong only within the context of a
certain standpoint (e.g., cultural community). In other words, what is
morally acceptable in one culture may be taboo in another. They
further contend that no moral virtue can objectively be proven right or
wrong.
Critics of moral relativism point to historical atrocities such as
infanticide, slavery, or genocide as counter arguments, noting the
difficulty in accepting these actions simply through cultural lenses.
Fons Trompenaars, author of Did the Pedestrian Die?, tested members of different cultures with various moral dilemmas.
One of these was whether the driver of a car would have his friend, a
passenger riding in the car, lie in order to protect the driver from the
consequences of driving too fast and hitting a pedestrian. Trompenaars
found that different cultures had quite different expectations, from
none to definite.
Anthropologists from Oxford's Institute of Cognitive &
Evolutionary Anthropology (part of the School of Anthropology &
Museum Ethnography) analysed ethnographic accounts of ethics from 60
societies, comprising over 600,000 words from over 600 sources and
discovered what they believe to be seven universal moral rules: help
your family, help your group, return favours, be brave, defer to
superiors, divide resources fairly, and respect others' property.
The development of modern morality is a process closely tied to sociocultural evolution. Some evolutionary biologists, particularly sociobiologists, believe that morality is a product of evolutionary forces acting at an individual level and also at the group level through group selection
(although to what degree this actually occurs is a controversial topic
in evolutionary theory). Some sociobiologists contend that the set of
behaviors that constitute morality evolved largely because they provided
possible survival or reproductive benefits (i.e. increased evolutionary
success). Humans consequently evolved "pro-social" emotions, such as
feelings of empathy or guilt, in response to these moral behaviors.
On this understanding, moralities are sets of self-perpetuating and biologically driven behaviors which encourage human cooperation. Biologists contend that all social animals, from ants to elephants, have modified their behaviors, by restraining immediate selfishness
in order to improve their evolutionary fitness. Human morality,
although sophisticated and complex relative to the moralities of other
animals, is essentially a natural phenomenon that evolved to restrict
excessive individualism that could undermine a group's cohesion and
thereby reducing the individuals' fitness.
On this view, moral codes are ultimately founded on emotional
instincts and intuitions that were selected for in the past because they
aided survival and reproduction (inclusive fitness). Examples: the maternal bond is selected for because it improves the survival of offspring; the Westermarck effect, where close proximity during early years reduces mutual sexual attraction, underpins taboos against incest because it decreases the likelihood of genetically risky behaviour such as inbreeding.
The phenomenon of reciprocity
in nature is seen by evolutionary biologists as one way to begin to
understand human morality. Its function is typically to ensure a
reliable supply of essential resources, especially for animals living in
a habitat where food quantity or quality fluctuates unpredictably. For
example, some vampire bats
fail to feed on prey some nights while others manage to consume a
surplus. Bats that did eat will then regurgitate part of their blood
meal to save a conspecific
from starvation. Since these animals live in close-knit groups over
many years, an individual can count on other group members to return the
favor on nights when it goes hungry (Wilkinson, 1984)
Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce (2009) have argued that morality
is a suite of behavioral capacities likely shared by all mammals living
in complex social groups (e.g., wolves, coyotes, elephants, dolphins,
rats, chimpanzees). They define morality as "a suite of interrelated
other-regarding behaviors that cultivate and regulate complex
interactions within social groups." This suite of behaviors includes
empathy, reciprocity, altruism, cooperation, and a sense of fairness. In related work, it has been convincingly demonstrated that chimpanzees show empathy for each other in a wide variety of contexts. They also possess the ability to engage in deception, and a level of social politics prototypical of our own tendencies for gossip and reputation management.
Christopher Boehm (1982) has hypothesized that the incremental development of moral complexity throughout hominid
evolution was due to the increasing need to avoid disputes and injuries
in moving to open savanna and developing stone weapons. Other theories
are that increasing complexity was simply a correlate of increasing
group size and brain size, and in particular the development of theory of mind abilities.
In modern moral psychology,
morality is sometimes considered to change through personal
development. Several psychologists have produced theories on the
development of morals, usually going through stages of different morals.
Lawrence Kohlberg, Jean Piaget, and Elliot Turiel have cognitive-developmental approaches to moral development; to these theorists morality forms in a series of constructive stages or domains. In the Ethics of care approach established by Carol Gilligan, moral development occurs in the context of caring, mutually responsive relationships which are based on interdependence, particularly in parenting but also in social relationships generally. Social psychologists such as Martin Hoffman and Jonathan Haidt emphasize social and emotional development based on biology, such as empathy. Moral identity theorists, such as William Damon and Mordechai Nisan,
see moral commitment as arising from the development of a self-identity
that is defined by moral purposes: this moral self-identity leads to a
sense of responsibility to pursue such purposes. Of historical interest
in psychology are the theories of psychoanalysts such as Sigmund Freud, who believe that moral development is the product of aspects of the super-ego
as guilt-shame avoidance. Theories of moral development therefore tend
to regard it as positive moral development: the higher stages are
morally higher, though this, naturally, involves a circular argument.
The higher stages are better because they are higher, but the better
higher because they are better.
As an alternative to viewing morality as an individual trait,
some sociologists as well as social- and discursive psychologists have
taken upon themselves to study the in-vivo aspects of morality by examining how persons conduct themselves in social interaction.
A new study analyses the common perception of a decline in
morality in societies worldwide and throughout history. Adam M.
Mastroianni and Daniel T. Gilbert present a series of studies indicating
that the perception of moral decline is an illusion and easily
produced, with implications for misallocation of resources, underuse of
social support, and social influence. To begin with, the authors
demonstrate that people in no less than 60 nations hold the belief that
morality is deteriorating continuously, and this conviction has been
present for the last 70 years. Subsequently, they indicate that people
ascribe this decay to the declining morality of individuals as they age
and the succeeding generations. Thirdly, the authors demonstrate that
people's evaluations of the morality of their peers have not decreased
over time, indicating that the belief in moral decline is an illusion.
Lastly, the authors explain a basic psychological mechanism that uses
two well-established phenomena (distorted exposure to information and
distorted memory of information) to cause the illusion of moral decline.
The authors present studies that validate some of the predictions about
the circumstances in which the perception of moral decline is
attenuated, eliminated, or reversed (e.g., when participants are asked
about the morality of people closest to them or people who lived before
they were born).
Moral cognition
Moral
cognition refers to cognitive processes implicated in moral judgment
and decision making, and moral action. It consists of several
domain-general cognitive processes, ranging from perception of a morally
salient stimulus to reasoning when faced with a moral dilemma. While it
is important to mention that there is not a single cognitive faculty
dedicated exclusively to moral cognition, characterizing the contributions of domain-general processes to moral
behavior is a critical scientific endeavor to understand how morality
works and how it can be improved.
Cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists investigate the
inputs to these cognitive processes and their interactions, as well as
how these contribute to moral behavior by running controlled
experiments.
In these experiments putatively moral versus nonmoral stimuli are
compared to each other, while controlling for other variables such as
content or working memory load. Often, the differential neural response
to specifically moral statements or scenes, are examined using
functional neuroimaging experiments.
Critically, the specific cognitive processes that are involved depend on the prototypical situation that a person encounters.
For instance, while situations that require an active decision on a
moral dilemma may require active reasoning, an immediate reaction to a
shocking moral violation may involve quick, affect-laden processes.
Nonetheless, certain cognitive skills such as being able to attribute
mental states—beliefs, intents, desires, emotions to oneself, and others
is a common feature of a broad range of prototypical situations. In
line with this, a meta-analysis found overlapping activity between moral emotion and moral reasoning tasks, suggesting a shared neural network for both tasks. The results of this meta-analysis, however, also demonstrated that the processing of moral input is affected by task demands.
Regarding the issues of morality in video games, some scholars
believe that because players appear in video games as actors, they
maintain a distance between their sense of self and the role of the game
in terms of imagination. Therefore, the decision-making and moral
behavior of players in the game are not representing player's Moral
dogma.
It has been recently found that moral judgment consists in
concurrent evaluations of three different components that align with
precepts from three dominant moral theories (virtue ethics, deontology,
and consequentialism): the character of a person (Agent-component, A);
their actions (Deed-component, D); and the consequences brought about in
the situation (Consequences-component, C). This, implies that various inputs of the situation a person encounters affect moral cognition.
Jonathan Haidt
distinguishes between two types of moral cognition: moral intuition and
moral reasoning. Moral intuition involves the fast, automatic, and affective processes that result in an evaluative feeling of good-bad or like-dislike, without
awareness of going through any steps. Conversely, moral reasoning does
involve conscious mental activity to reach a moral judgment. Moral
reasoning is controlled and less affective than moral intuition. When
making moral judgments, humans perform moral reasoning to support their
initial intuitive feeling. However, there are three ways humans can
override their immediate intuitive response. The first way is conscious
verbal reasoning (for example, examining costs and benefits). The second
way is reframing a situation to see a new perspective or consequence,
which triggers a different intuition. Finally, one can talk to other
people which illuminates new arguments. In fact, interacting with other
people is the cause of most moral change.
The brain areas that are consistently involved when humans reason
about moral issues have been investigated by multiple quantitative
large-scale meta-analyses of the brain activity changes reported in the
moral neuroscience literature. The neural network underlying moral decisions overlaps with the network
pertaining to representing others' intentions (i.e., theory of mind)
and the network pertaining to representing others' (vicariously
experienced) emotional states (i.e., empathy). This supports the notion
that moral reasoning is related to both seeing things from other
persons' points of view and to grasping others' feelings. These results
provide evidence that the neural network underlying moral decisions is
probably domain-global (i.e., there might be no such things as a "moral
module" in the human brain) and might be dissociable into cognitive and
affective sub-systems.
Cognitive neuroscientist Jean Decety
thinks that the ability to recognize and vicariously experience what
another individual is undergoing was a key step forward in the evolution
of social behavior, and ultimately, morality. The inability to feel empathy is one of the defining characteristics of psychopathy, and this would appear to lend support to Decety's view. Recently, drawing on empirical research in evolutionary theory, developmental psychology, social neuroscience,
and psychopathy, Jean Decety argued that empathy and morality are
neither systematically opposed to one another, nor inevitably
complementary.
Brain areas
An
essential, shared component of moral judgment involves the capacity to
detect morally salient content within a given social context. Recent
research implicated the salience network in this initial detection of moral content. The salience network responds to behaviorally salient events and may be critical to modulate downstream default and frontal control
network interactions in the service of complex moral reasoning and
decision-making processes.
The explicit making of moral right and wrong judgments coincides with activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), a region involved in valuation, while intuitive reactions to situations containing implicit moral issues activates the temporoparietal junction area, a region that plays a key role in understanding intentions and beliefs.
Stimulation of the VMPC by transcranial magnetic stimulation,
or neurological lesion, has been shown to inhibit the ability of human
subjects to take into account intent when forming a moral judgment.
According to such investigations, TMS did not disrupt participants'
ability to make any moral judgment. On the contrary, moral judgments of
intentional harms and non-harms were unaffected by TMS to either the
RTPJ or the control site; presumably, however, people typically make
moral judgments of intentional harms by considering not only the
action's harmful outcome but the agent's intentions and beliefs. So why
were moral judgments of intentional harms not affected by TMS to the
RTPJ? One possibility is that moral judgments typically reflect a
weighted function of any morally relevant information that is available
at the time. Based on this view, when information concerning the agent's
belief is unavailable or degraded, the resulting moral judgment simply
reflects a higher weighting of other morally relevant factors (e.g.,
outcome). Alternatively, following TMS to the RTPJ, moral judgments
might be made via an abnormal processing route that does not take belief
into account. On either account, when belief information is degraded or
unavailable, moral judgments are shifted toward other morally relevant
factors (e.g., outcome). For intentional harms and non-harms, however,
the outcome suggests the same moral judgment as to the intention. Thus,
the researchers suggest that TMS to the RTPJ disrupted the processing of
negative beliefs for both intentional harms and attempted harms, but
the current design allowed the investigators to detect this effect only
in the case of attempted harms, in which the neutral outcomes did not
afford harsh moral judgments on their own.
Similarly, individuals with a lesion of the VMPC judge an action
purely on its outcome and are unable to take into account the intent of
that action.
Genetics
Moral intuitions may have genetic bases. A 2022 study conducted by scholars Michael Zakharin and Timothy C. Bates, and published by the European Journal of Personality, found that moral foundations have significant genetic bases.
Another study, conducted by Smith and Hatemi, similarly found
significant evidence in support of moral heritability by looking at and
comparing the answers of moral dilemmas between twins.
Genetics play a role in influencing prosocial behaviors and moral
decision-making. Genetics contribute to the development and expression
of certain traits and behaviors, including those related to morality.
However, it is important to note that while genetics play a role in
shaping certain aspects of moral behavior, morality itself is a
multifaceted concept that encompasses cultural, societal, and personal
influences as well.
Politics
If morality is the answer to the question 'how ought we to live' at the individual level, politics
can be seen as addressing the same question at the social level, though
the political sphere raises additional problems and challenges. It is therefore unsurprising that evidence has been found of a relationship between attitudes in morality and politics. Moral foundations theory, authored by Jonathan Haidt and colleagues, has been used to study the differences between liberals and conservatives, in this regard.Haidt found that Americans who identified as liberals tended to value
care and fairness higher than loyalty, respect and purity.
Self-identified conservative Americans valued care and fairness less and
the remaining three values more. Both groups gave care the highest
over-all weighting, but conservatives valued fairness the lowest,
whereas liberals valued purity the lowest. Haidt also hypothesizes that
the origin of this division in the United States can be traced to
geo-historical factors, with conservatism strongest in closely knit,
ethnically homogeneous communities, in contrast to port-cities, where the cultural mix is greater, thus requiring more liberalism.
Group morality develops from shared concepts and beliefs and is often codified to regulate behavior within a culture
or community. Various defined actions come to be called moral or
immoral. Individuals who choose moral action are popularly held to
possess "moral fiber", whereas those who indulge in immoral behavior may
be labeled as socially degenerate. The continued existence of a group
may depend on widespread conformity to codes of morality; an inability
to adjust moral codes in response to new challenges is sometimes
credited with the demise of a community (a positive example would be the
function of Cistercian reform in reviving monasticism; a negative example would be the role of the Dowager Empress in the subjugation of China to European interests). Within nationalist
movements, there has been some tendency to feel that a nation will not
survive or prosper without acknowledging one common morality, regardless
of its content.
Political morality is also relevant to the behavior
internationally of national governments, and to the support they receive
from their host population. The Sentience Institute, co-founded by Jacy Reese Anthis, analyzes the trajectory of moral progress in society via the framework of an expanding moral circle. Noam Chomsky states that
... if we adopt the principle of universality: if an
action is right (or wrong) for others, it is right (or wrong) for us.
Those who do not rise to the minimal moral level of applying to
themselves the standards they apply to others—more stringent ones, in
fact—plainly cannot be taken seriously when they speak of
appropriateness of response; or of right and wrong, good and evil.
In fact, one of them, maybe the most, elementary of moral principles is
that of universality, that is, If something's right for me, it's right
for you; if it's wrong for you, it's wrong for me. Any moral code that
is even worth looking at has that at its core somehow.
Religion and morality are not synonymous. Morality does not depend
upon religion although for some this is "an almost automatic
assumption". According to The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics,
religion and morality "are to be defined differently and have no
definitional connections with each other. Conceptually and in principle,
morality and a religious value system are two distinct kinds of value
systems or action guides."
Positions
Within the wide range of moral traditions, religious value systems co-exist with contemporary secular frameworks such as consequentialism, freethought, humanism, utilitarianism, and others. There are many types of religious value systems. Modern monotheistic religions, such as Islam, Judaism, Christianity, and to a certain degree others such as Sikhism and Zoroastrianism,
define right and wrong by the laws and rules set forth by their
respective scriptures and as interpreted by religious leaders within the
respective faith. Other religions spanning pantheistic to nontheistic tend to be less absolute. For example, within Buddhism, the intention of the individual and the circumstances should be accounted for in the form of Merit, to determine if an action is right or wrong termed. A further disparity between the values of religious traditions is pointed out by Barbara Stoler Miller,
who states that, in Hinduism, "practically, right and wrong are decided
according to the categories of social rank, kinship, and stages of
life. For modern Westerners, who have been raised on ideals of
universality and egalitarianism, this relativity of values and obligations is the aspect of Hinduism most difficult to understand".
Religions provide different ways of dealing with moral dilemmas. For example, there is no absolute prohibition on killing in Hinduism, which recognizes that it "may be inevitable and indeed necessary" in certain circumstances. In monotheistic traditions, certain acts are viewed in more absolute terms, such as abortion or divorce. Religion is not always positively associated with morality. Philosopher David Hume stated that, "the greatest crimes have been found, in many instances, to be compatible with a superstitious piety
and devotion; Hence it is justly regarded as unsafe to draw any
inference in favor of a man's morals, from the fervor or strictness of
his religious exercises, even though he himself believe them sincere."
Religious value systems can also be used to justify acts that are contrary to contemporary morality, such as massacres, misogyny and slavery. For example, Simon Blackburn
states that "apologists for Hinduism defend or explain away its
involvement with the caste system, and apologists for Islam defend or
explain away its harsh penal code or its attitude to women and
infidels". In regard to Christianity, he states that the "Bible
can be read as giving us a carte blanche for harsh attitudes to
children, the mentally handicapped, animals, the environment, the
divorced, unbelievers, people with various sexual habits, and elderly
women", and notes morally suspect themes in the Bible's New Testament as well. Elizabeth Anderson likewise holds that "the Bible contains both good and evil teachings", and it is "morally inconsistent". Christian apologists address Blackburn's viewpoints and construe that Jewish laws in the Hebrew Bible
showed the evolution of moral standards towards protecting the
vulnerable, imposing a death penalty on those pursuing slavery and
treating slaves as persons and not property.
Humanists like Paul Kurtz believe that we can identify moral values
across cultures, even if we do not appeal to a supernatural or
universalist understanding of principles – values including integrity,
trustworthiness, benevolence, and fairness. These values can be
resources for finding common ground between believers and nonbelievers.
Empirical analyses
Several
studies have been conducted on the empirics of morality in various
countries, and the overall relationship between faith and crime is unclear.
A 2001 review of studies on this topic found "The existing evidence
surrounding the effect of religion on crime is varied, contested, and
inconclusive, and currently, no persuasive answer exists as to the
empirical relationship between religion and crime." Phil Zuckerman's 2008 book, Society without God, based on studies conducted during 14 months in Scandinavia in 2005–2006, notes that Denmark and Sweden,
"which are probably the least religious countries in the world, and
possibly in the history of the world", enjoy "among the lowest violent
crime rates in the world [and] the lowest levels of corruption in the
world".
Dozens of studies have been conducted on this topic since the twentieth century. A 2005 study by Gregory S. Paul published in the Journal of Religion and Society
stated that, "In general, higher rates of belief in and worship of a
creator correlate with higher rates of homicide, juvenile and early
adult mortality, STD infection rates, teen pregnancy, and abortion in
the prosperous democracies," and "In all secular developing democracies a
centuries long-term trend has seen homicide rates drop to historical
lows" with the exceptions being the United States (with a high
religiosity level) and "theistic" Portugal. In a response, Gary Jensen builds on and refines Paul's study,
he concludes that a "complex relationship" exists between religiosity
and homicide "with some dimensions of religiosity encouraging homicide
and other dimensions discouraging it". In April 2012, the results of a
study which tested their subjects' pro-social sentiments were published in the Social Psychological and Personality Science
journal in which non-religious people had higher scores showing that
they were more motivated by their own compassion to perform pro-social
behaviors. Religious people were found to be less motivated by
compassion to be charitable than by an inner sense of moral obligation.
Forgetting or disremembering is the apparent loss or modification of information already encoded and stored in an individual's short or long-term memory. It is a spontaneous or gradual process in which old memories
are unable to be recalled from memory storage. Problems with
remembering, learning and retaining new information are a few of the
most common complaints of older adults.
Studies show that retention improves with increased rehearsal. This
improvement occurs because rehearsal helps to transfer information into
long-term memory.
Forgetting curves
(amount remembered as a function of time since an event was first
experienced) have been extensively analyzed. The most recent evidence
suggests that a power function provides the closest mathematical fit to the forgetting function.
Overview
Failing
to retrieve an event does not mean that this specific event has been
forever forgotten. Research has shown that there are a few health
behaviors that to some extent can prevent forgetting from happening so
often.
One of the simplest ways to keep the brain healthy and prevent
forgetting is to stay active and exercise. Staying active is important
because overall it keeps the body healthy. When the body is healthy the
brain is healthy and less inflamed as well.
Older adults who were more active were found to have had less episodes
of forgetting compared to those older adults who were less active. A
healthy diet can also contribute to a healthier brain and aging process
which in turn results in less frequent forgetting.
History
One of the first to study the mechanisms of forgetting was the German psychologist Hermann Ebbinghaus
(1885). Using himself as the sole subject in his experiment, he
memorized lists of three letter nonsense syllable words—two consonants
and one vowel in the middle. He then measured his own capacity to
relearn a given list of words after a variety of given time period. He
found that forgetting occurs in a systematic manner, beginning rapidly
and then leveling off.
Although his methods were primitive, his basic premises have held true
today and have been reaffirmed by more methodologically sound methods. The Ebbinghaus forgetting curve
is the name of his results which he plotted out and made 2 conclusions.
The first being that much of what we forget is lost soon after it is
originally learned. The second being that the amount of forgetting
eventually levels off.
Around the same time Ebbinghaus developed the forgetting curve,
psychologist Sigmund Freud theorized that people intentionally forgot
things in order to push bad thoughts and feelings deep into their
unconscious, a process he called "repression".
There is debate as to whether (or how often) memory repression really occurs and mainstream psychology holds that true memory repression occurs only very rarely.
One process model for memory was proposed by Richard Atkinson and
Richard Shiffrin in the 1960s as a way to explain the operation of
memory. This modal model of memory, also known as the Atkinson-Shiffrin model of memory, suggests there are three types of memory: sensory memory, short-term memory, and long-term memory.
Each type of memory is separate in its capacity and duration. In the
modal model, how quickly information is forgotten is related to the type
of memory where that information is stored. Information in the first
stage, sensory memory, is forgotten after only a few seconds. In the
second stage, short-term memory, information is forgotten after about 20
years. While information in long-term memory can be remembered for
minutes or even decades, it may be forgotten when the retrieval
processes for that information fail.
Concerning unwanted memories, modern terminology divides motivated forgetting into unconscious repression (which is disputed) and conscious thought suppression.
Measurements
Forgetting can be measured in different ways all of which are based on recall:
For this type of measurement, a participant has to identify material that was previously learned.
The participant is asked to remember a list of material. Later on they
are shown the same list of material with additional information and they
are asked to identify the material that was on the original list. The
more they recognize, the less information is forgotten.
Free recall and variants
Free
recall is a basic paradigm used to study human memory. In a free recall
task, a subject is presented a list of to-be-remembered items, one at a
time. For example, an experimenter might read a list of 20 words aloud,
presenting a new word to the subject every 4 seconds. At the end of the
presentation of the list, the subject is asked to recall the items
(e.g., by writing down as many items from the list as possible). It is
called a free recall task because the subject is free to recall the
items in any order that he or she desires.
Prompted (cued) recall
Prompted
recall is a slight variation of free recall that consists of presenting
hints or prompts to increase the likelihood that the behavior will be
produced. Usually these prompts are stimuli that were not there during
the training period. Thus in order to measure the degree of forgetting,
one can see how many prompts the subject misses or the number of prompts
required to produce the behavior.
Relearning method
This
method measures forgetting by the amount of training required to reach
the previous level of performance. German psychologist Hermann
Ebbinghaus (1885) used this method on himself. He memorized lists of
nonsensical syllables until he could repeat the list two times without
error. After a certain interval, he relearned the list and saw how long
it would take him to do this task. If it took fewer times, then there
had been less forgetting. His experiment was one of the first to study
forgetting.
Recognition
Participants
are given a list of words and that they have to remember. Then they are
shown the same list of material with additional information and they
are asked to identify the material that was on the original list. The
more they recognize, the less information is forgotten.
Theories
The four main theories of forgetting apparent in the study of psychology are as follows:
Cue-dependent forgetting
Cue-dependent forgetting (also, context-dependent forgetting) or retrieval failure, is the failure to recall a memory due to missing stimuli or cues that were present at the time the memory was encoded.
Encoding is the first step in creating and remembering a memory. How
well something has been encoded in the memory can be measured by
completing specific tests of retrieval. Examples of these tests would be
explicit ones like cued recall or implicit tests like word fragment
completion. Cue-dependent forgetting is one of five cognitive psychology
theories of forgetting. This theory states that a memory is sometimes
temporarily forgotten purely because it cannot be retrieved, but the
proper cue can bring it to mind. A good metaphor for this is searching for a book in a library without the reference number,
title, author or even subject. The information still exists, but
without these cues retrieval is unlikely. Furthermore, a good retrieval cue must be consistent with the original encoding of the information. If the sound of the word is emphasized during the encoding process, the cue that should be used should also put emphasis on the phonetic
quality of the word. Information is available however, just not readily
available without these cues. Depending on the age of a person,
retrieval cues and skills may not work as well. This is usually common
in older adults but that is not always the case. When information is
encoded into the memory and retrieved with a technique called spaced retrieval, this helps older adults retrieve the events stored in the memory better. There is also evidence from different studies that show age related changes in memory. These specific studies have shown that episodic memory
performance does in fact decline with age and have made known that
older adults produce vivid rates of forgetting when two items are
combined and not encoded.
Organic causes
Forgetting
that occurs through physiological damage or dilapidation to the brain
are referred to as organic causes of forgetting. These theories
encompass the loss of information already retained in long-term memory or the inability to encode new information again. Examples include Alzheimer's, amnesia, dementia, consolidation theory and the gradual slowing down of the central nervous system due to aging.
Interference theories
Interference theory
refers to the idea that when the learning of something new causes
forgetting of older material on the basis of competition between the
two. This essentially states that memory's information may become
confused or combined with other information during encoding, resulting
in the distortion or disruption of memories.
In nature, the interfering items are said to originate from an
overstimulating environment. Interference theory exists in three
branches: Proactive, Retroactive and Output. Retroactive and
Proactive inhibition each referring in contrast to the other.
Retroactive interference is when new information (memories) interferes
with older information. On the other hand, proactive interference is
when old information interferes with the retrieval of new information.
This is sometimes thought to occur especially when memories are
similar. Output Interference occurs when the initial act of recalling
specific information interferes with the retrieval of the original
information. Another reason why retrieval failure occurs is due to
encoding failure. The information never made it to long-term memory
storage. According to the level of processing theory, how well
information is encoded depends on the level of processing a piece of
information receives. Certain parts of information are better encoded
than others; for example, information this visual imagery or that has a
survival value is more easily transferred to the long-term memory
storage.
This theory shows a contradiction: an extremely intelligent individual
is expected to forget more hastily than one who has a slow mentality.
For this reason, an intelligent individual has stored up more memory in
his mind which will cause interferences and impair their ability to
recall specific information.
Based on current research, testing interference has only been carried
out by recalling from a list of words rather than using situation from
daily lives, thus it is hard to generalize the findings for this theory.
It has been found that interference related tasks decreased memory
performance by up to 20%, with negative effects at all interference time
points and large variability between participants concerning both the
time point and the size of maximal interference. Furthermore, fast
learners seem to be more affected by interference than slow learners.
People are also less likely to recall items when intervening stimuli
are presented within the first ten minutes after learning. Recall
performance is better without interference.
Peripheral processes such as encoding time, recognition memory and
motor execution decline with age. However proactive interference is
similar. Suggesting contrary to earlier reports that the inhibitory
processes observed with this paradigm remain intact in older adults.
Trace decay theory
Decay theory
states that when something new is learned, a neurochemical, physical
"memory trace" is formed in the brain and over time this trace tends to
disintegrate, unless it is occasionally used. Decay theory states the
reason we eventually forget something or an event is because the memory
of it fades with time. If we do not attempt to look back at an event,
the greater the interval time between the time when the event from
happening and the time when we try to remember, the memory will start to
fade. Time is the greatest impact in remembering an event.
Trace decay theory explains memories that are stored in both
short-term and long-term memory system, and assumes that the memories
leave a trace in the brain.
According to this theory, short-term memory (STM) can only retain
information for a limited amount of time, around 15 to 30 seconds unless
it is rehearsed. If it is not rehearsed, the information will start to
gradually fade away and decay. Donald Hebb proposed that incoming
information causes a series of neurons to create a neurological memory
trace in the brain which would result in change in the morphological
and/or chemical changes in the brain and would fade with time. Repeated
firing causes a structural change in the synapses. Rehearsal of repeated
firing maintains the memory in STM until a structural change is made.
Therefore, forgetting happens as a result of automatic decay of the
memory trace in brain. This theory states that the events between
learning and recall have no effects on recall; the important factor that
affects is the duration that the information has been retained. Hence,
as longer time passes more of traces are subject to decay and as a
result the information is forgotten.
One major problem about this theory is that in real-life
situation, the time between encoding a piece of information and
recalling it, is going to be filled with all different kinds of events
that might happen to the individual. Therefore, it is difficult to
conclude that forgetting is a result of only the time duration. It is
also important to consider the effectiveness of this theory. Although it
seems very plausible, it is about impossible to test. It is difficult
to create a situation where there is a blank period of time between
presenting the material and recalling it later.
This theory is supposedly contradicted by the fact that one is able to ride a bike even after not having done so for decades. "Flashbulb memories" are another piece of seemingly contradicting evidence. It is believed that certain memories "trace decay" while others do not. Sleep is believed to play a key role in halting trace decay, although the exact mechanism of this is unknown.
Physical and chemical changes in our brain lead to a memory
trace, and this is based on the idea of the trace theory of memory.
Information that gets into our short-term memory lasts a few seconds
(15–20 seconds), and it fades away if it is not rehearsed or practiced
as the neurochemical memory trace disappears rapidly. According to the
trace decay theory of forgetting, what occurs between the creation of
new memories and the recall of these memories is not influenced by the
recall. However, the time between these events (memory formation and
recalling) decides whether the information can be kept or forgotten. As
there is an inverse correlation that if the time is short, more
information can be recalled. On the other hand, if the time is long less
information can be recalled or more information will be forgotten. This
theory can be criticized for not sharing ideas on how some memories can
stay and others can fade, though there was a long time between the
formation and recall. Newness to something plays a crucial role in this
situation. For instance, people are more likely to recall their very
first day abroad than all of the intervening days between it and living
there. Emotions also play a crucial role in this situation.
Forgetting can have very different causes than simply removal of
stored content. Forgetting can mean access problems, availability
problems, or can have other reasons such as amnesia caused by an accident.
Psychologists have called attention to "social aspects of forgetting". Though often loosely defined, social amnesia is generally considered to be the opposite of collective memory. "Social amnesia" was first discussed by Russell Jacoby,
yet his use of the term was restricted to a narrow approach, which was
limited to what he perceived to be a relative neglect of
psychoanalytical theory in psychology. The cultural historian Peter Burke
suggested that "it may be worth investigating the social organization
of forgetting, the rules of exclusion, suppression or repression, and
the question of who wants whom to forget what". In an in-depth historical study spanning two centuries, Guy Beiner
proposed the term "social forgetting", which he distinguished from
crude notions of "collective amnesia" and "total oblivion", arguing that
"social forgetting is to be found in the interface of public silence
and more private remembrance". The philosopher Walter Benjamin
sees social forgetting closely linked to the question of present-day
interests, arguing that "every image of the past that is not recognized
by the present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear
irretrievably". Building on this, the sociologist David Leupold
argued in the context of competing national narratives that what is
suppressed and forgotten in one national narrative "might appear at the
core of past narrations by the other" - thus often leading to
diametrically opposed, mutually exclusive accounts on the past.
