Science for the People (SftP) is a left-wing organization that emerged from the antiwar culture of the United States in the late 1960s. Since 2014 it has experienced a revival focusing primarily on the dual nature of science. The organization advocates for a scientific establishment that is not isolated from society, rather one that uses scientific discoveries to advocate for and advance social justice and critically approach science as a social endeavor.
History
The original group was composed of professors, students, workers, and other concerned citizens who sought to end potential oppression brought on by pseudoscience, or by what it considered the misuse of science. SftP generated much controversy in the 1970s for the radical tactics of some of its members. Over the initial few years there was an emergence of multiple differing opinions about the nature and mission of SftP should be. A faction wanted SftP to pay special attention to scientific issues that support class struggle. Another wanted to develop "a science for the people." The majority, however, wanted to be the scientific community's critical conscience and expose, from within, the dangers of the misuse of science. After a bitter internal struggle and departure of many, the group that remained focused its efforts, primarily through its magazine, on criticism of scientific misuse. During this time it became identified with prominent academic scientists such as Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin.
Relationship with the scientific establishment
In the first five years SftP became known in the US scientific community for its attempts at disrupting the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). SftP members considered the AAAS, the world’s largest association of scientists, aligned with the government and the ruling elite. SftP particularly decried what it considered AAAS' complicity in war, sexism, racism and capitalism. A specific focus of the activists was the scientific community's involvement in the Vietnam war. Some of the tactics use to disrupt the AAAS meetings were picketing, demonstrations, impromptu speeches and confrontational interruptions. These actions led to the arrest of several SftP activists in the early 1970s.
Prior to the formation of SftP and its radical activism against the scientific establishment similar attempts had taken place with other organizations. One notable example is University of California, Berkeley nuclear physicist Charles Schwartz's 1967 attempt to amend the American Physical Society's (APS) constitution to allow 1% of members to call for a vote on any social or scientific issue. His motion was defeated because APS members did not think the society should take a stance on social issues. Another instance is the petition physicists began to the APS not to hold its 1970 meeting in Chicago because of the police brutality at the Democratic National Convention in 1968. The APS Council polled members and upheld its decision to keep the meeting in Chicago.
In 1971 a proposed amendment to change the APS's mission statement to include the phrase "The Society...shall shun those activities which are judged to contribute harmfully to the welfare of mankind." was defeated.
In following years, thanks to the actions of dedicated activists such as Schwartz and Martin Perl and others, APS took certain steps towards social responsibility. These included the 1972 creation of the Committee on the Status of Women in Physics the 1979 boycott of states that had not ratified the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and the 1983 Arms Control Resolution. The latter was strongly criticized by George Keyworth, science advisor to president Ronald Reagan.
Positions and views
Science for the People has positions in multiple different areas. It states on its website that it identifies as part of the "broader left."
Anti-militarism
Statement by MIT scientists about the anti-war protest walkout on March 4, 1969
From its inception in January 1969 SftP opposed the involvement of scientists in the military. SftP also challenged the established notion that organizations such as the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and the American Physical Society (APS) can stay neutral vis-à-vis the Vietnam war. Early on, a number of SftP scientists mobilized against US Congress' Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Program, arguing that the ABM was not feasible and the funds would be better spent on basic scientific research. On March 4, 1969 MIT scientists staged a mass walkout in protest of the ABM.
In April 1969, Scientists and Engineers for Social and Political Action (SESPA), SftP's predecessor, held an orderly march of 250 physicists to the White House to protest the ABM.
This type of activism among scientists in the US led to the anti-ABM treaty of 1972 with the Soviet Union. In the 1980s SftP opposed president Reagan's attempt to revive the arms race with the Soviet Union as well as the US involvement in Nicaragua.
Position on nuclear energy
In the mid-70s SftP cautioned against the ways that nuclear power was being promoted as a safe and environmentally clean alternative to coal. In May 1976 the organization published a pamphlet arguing that the push for nuclear energy in the US over solar and other cleaner, cheaper alternatives benefitted the Atomic-Industrial complex and not the general public. In the 1980s, especially in the wake of such disasters as Three Mile Island, SftP questioned the environmental safety of nuclear energy and the toxic waste it produces.
Views on technology
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s SftP considered technology an important outcome of scientific advancement. The organization favored the more concrete nature of technological developments over purely intellectual exercise of theoretical science. Key to the group’s support for technology was the conviction that it should neither replace humans in the workplace nor harm the environment. SftP members advocated for research and development programs to be chosen based on equity and social need and not to meet the government's needs of economic and military security.
Position on science education
One of the core tenets of the SftP was that science and particularly biology and medicine cannot remain neutral. The organization not only believed that these disciplines should focus on correcting societal ills they also actively participated in educating people on work place hazards such as asbestos and other chemical and environmental exposures.
In the early 1970s a Boston several SftP members known as the Boston Science Teaching Group, published and distributed series of pamphlets on topics such as genetics and ecology. Other members who were professional educators volunteered to teach biology in Boston’s underserved school districts. In 1971 two university professors, Rita Arditti and Tom Strunk, in an attempt to reform college biology curriculum, created a socially conscious first year college course called "Objecting to Objectivity: A Course in Biology". The course covered genetic engineering, physical and social limitations and implications of human gene maps, polygenic inheritance and prenatal diagnosis. It also discussed reproduction, birth control and abortion including the contemporary research and public policies about reproductive health. Other topics included population growth and Malthusian and Marxist theories and ethics of human research.
Positions on race and gender
Advocating for racial and gender equality in science and medicine was one of the core tenets of SftP. The organization included multiple feminist members who were pioneering women in science. These included Arditti and other biologists such as Anne Fausto-Sterling, Freda Friedman Salzman, Ruth Hubbard, and author and activist Barbara Beckwith. Hubbard, for instance, was the first woman to attain tenure in biology at Harvard University. SftP also embraced the cause of gender equality in the society at large and advocated for reproductive rights, gender equality at the workplace and addressed issues surrounding sexuality. It also fought against domestic violence and traditional gender roles in family structure. While focusing on the world of science, feminist members of SftP faced an uphill battle in introducing gender parity for women in science at the universities. They also sought to change the discriminatory gender dynamics in academia and in laboratories.
SftP's efforts at promoting gender equality were paralleled with its efforts to promote racial and ethnic equality. Although made up primarily of white Americans, some SftP members maintained relations with the Black Panther Party. The two organizations urged the scientific community to create a free science program for black communities to enhance their scientific knowledge. The organization also criticized attacks on affirmative action and featured pieces by black and other minority scientists in its publication. It also uncovered occupational health hazards among black and ethnic minority workers both in the US and abroad and fought to improve workplace conditions to eliminate these risks. SftP's antiracist ideology put it at odds with the concepts of sociobiology and genetic determinism.
SftP condemned the 1969 arguments that genetic differences were the underlying reason for differences in educational achievements between blacks and whites. SftP also took issue with the Harvard XYY study in 1975. The goal of the XYY study was to assess the risk of criminality the extra Y chromosome supposedly conferred. The SftP scientists pointed out the ethical and methodological failures of the above study, including open ended consents, stigmatization of individuals with XYY, lack of controls and absence of double blinding.
Positions on healthcare and medicine
Health care providers who were SftP members worked to strengthen healthcare infrastructure in underserved communities. They partnered with both the Black Panthers and Young Lords Organization to bring medical services to minorities, who often could not access the medical establishment both as practitioners and as patients. SftP joined with other New Left Health organizations such as Health Policy Advisory Center and Medical Committee for Human Rights, fought for a fair and just healthcare system and advocated for women’s reproductive rights.
SftP members, such as cancer researcher John Valentine at Wayne State University, exposed the capitalist interests that drove biomedical research. He argued that the 1971 National Cancer Act, signed by president Richard Nixon, failed to fund research into cancer causes such as poor preventative healthcare, occupational hazards and environmental exposures. He also criticized the use of public funds only to develop new chemotherapeutic agents instead of using some of it to minimize cancer risk due to workplace exposures and cancer-causing consumer products.
SftP biologists also opposed recombinant DNA (rDNA) research before its public health and environmental impact can be thoroughly elucidated. They also expressed concerns and, accurately, predicted that rDNA can commercialize biomedical research and make it a market commodity. They urged the scientific community and the general public to consider who decides what research gets done and who benefits from these decisions.
Views on agriculture and ecology
SftP argued that the existing contemporary agricultural models were neither benefitting the consumer, as food prices were rising astronomically, nor the farmer because their increasing debt without a raise in income. The primary benefiters were input and output capital enterprises such has fertilizer companies, insecticide and herbicide manufacturers and farm machinery companies. Members of the SftP formed the New World Agriculture Group (NWAG) that attempted to discover and develop ecologically rational alternative agricultural methods. Methods that protected the environment and preserved long-term productive capacity. NWAG also proposed partnering with farm labor organizations to help bring an end to worker exploitation and the unequal wealth distribution.
International relations
From its inception SftP condemned the use of technology and science to oppress and colonize other countries. The organization gave the examples of both Vietnam and Cuba where, it stated, the US technological and scientific superiority was being used to both militarily and economically repress the smaller nations. In response to the US policy, in 1971, a group of SftP members in Cambridge, Massachusetts collected and shipped large amounts of scientific books and journals to Vietnam and Cuba to aid in science education there. The same year, molecular biologist Dr. Mark Ptashne and zoologist Dr. Bert Pfeiffer went to Hanoi and lectured to Vietnamese scientists and physicians. There were also successful efforts of networking with scientists in China, and, in the 1980s, with the scientific and technological community in Nicaragua.
2014 revitalization
Since the fall of 2014, an effort to revive and reorganize SftP has been underway. The SftP revitalization efforts emerged from the convention held April 11–13, 2014, at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. At the 2014 conference various topics including the history of the SftP, health care, climate change, social justice, science education, gender and racial bias and militarization of science were discussed. Since then, inspired by the original 1970s-1980s group, this new formation has dedicated itself to building a social movement around progressive and radical perspectives on science and society.
Several local chapters of the SftP participated in the first annual March for Science on April 22, 2017. The revived SftP also published a statement titled "Which Way for Science?". The statement hailed the March for Science as "an exciting first step," but it also criticized the "apolitical" nature of the event and for their lack of attention to the experiences of scientists from historically marginalized groups such as women, people of color and others. "Which Way for Science" called attention to science's historic ties to U.S. capitalism and militarism, and called for a radical shift in its practice.
2018 National Convention
The national convention, held at the University of Michigan's Ann Arbor campus in February 2018, brought together close to one hundred scientists and activists to formalize the group's bylaws and structure. During the three days the attendees discussed the history and future of SftP, heard from local chapters that included representatives from Atlanta, Mexico City, New York and seven other North American locations. The organizational structure of SftP was explored and these discussions served as a guide to developing an inclusive, radical and democratic political movement for scientists and STEM workers. There were a dozen presentations on variety of topics related to SftP's mission.
In addition to the call to organize more local chapters a number of working groups was also developed during the meeting. These included groups dealing with Climate Change, Reproductive Justice, Science education and others. Plans to participate in the second annual March for Science on April 14, 2018, were also initiated at the convention.
René Descartes, in De homine (1662), claimed that non-human animals could be explained reductively as automata; meaning essentially as more mechanically complex versions of this Digesting Duck.
Reductionism is any of several related philosophical ideas regarding the associations between phenomena which can be described in terms of simpler or more fundamental phenomena. It is also described as an intellectual and philosophical position that interprets a complex system as the sum of its parts, contrary to holism. Reductionism tends to focus on the small, predictable details of a system and is often associated with various philosophies like emergence, materialism, and determinism.
Definitions
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy suggests that reductionism is "one of the most used and abused terms in the philosophical lexicon" and suggests a three-part division:
Ontological reductionism: a belief that the whole of reality consists of a minimal number of entities or substances, often meant in the metaphysical sense that "there is but one substance"
Methodological reductionism: the view that the best scientific strategy is to always attempt to provide explanation in terms of ever-smaller entities.
Theory reductionism: the suggestion that a newer theory does not replace or absorb an older one, but reduces it to more basic terms. Theory reduction itself is divisible into three parts: translation, derivation, and explanation.
For the sciences, application of methodological reductionism attempts explanation of entire systems in terms of their individual, constituent parts and their interactions. For example, the temperature of a gas is reduced to nothing beyond the average kinetic energy of its molecules in motion. Thomas Nagel and others speak of 'psychophysical reductionism' (the attempted reduction of psychological phenomena to physics and chemistry), and 'physico-chemical reductionism' (the attempted reduction of biology to physics and chemistry). In a very simplified and sometimes contested form, reductionism is said to imply that a system is nothing but the sum of its parts.
However, a more nuanced opinion is that a system is composed entirely of its parts, but the system will have features that none of the parts have (which, in essence is the basis of emergentism). "The point of mechanistic explanations is usually showing how the higher level features arise from the parts."
Other definitions are used by other authors. For example, what John Polkinghorne terms 'conceptual' or 'epistemological' reductionism is the definition provided by Simon Blackburn and by Jaegwon Kim: that form of reductionism which concerns a program of replacing the facts or entities involved in one type of discourse with other facts or entities from another type, thereby providing a relationship between them. Richard Jones distinguishes ontological and epistemological reductionism, arguing that many ontological and epistemological reductionists affirm the need for different concepts for different degrees of complexity while affirming a reduction of theories.
The idea of reductionism can be expressed by "levels" of explanation, with higher levels reducible if need be to lower levels. This use of levels of understanding in part expresses our human limitations in remembering detail. However, "most philosophers would insist that our role in conceptualizing reality [our need for a hierarchy of "levels" of understanding] does not change the fact that different levels of organization in reality do have different 'properties'."
Reductionism does not preclude the existence of what might be termed emergent phenomena, but it does imply the ability to understand those phenomena completely in terms of the processes from which they are composed. This reductionist understanding is very different from ontological or strong emergentism, which intends that what emerges in "emergence" is more than the sum of the processes from which it emerges, respectively either in the ontological sense or in the epistemological sense.
Ontological reductionism
Richard Jones divides ontological reductionism into two: the reductionism of substances (e.g., the reduction of mind to matter) and the reduction of the number of structures operating in nature (e.g., the reduction of one physical force to another). This permits scientists and philosophers to affirm the former while being anti-reductionists regarding the latter.
Nancey Murphy has claimed that there are two species of ontological reductionism: one that claims that wholes are nothing more than their parts; and atomist reductionism, claiming that wholes are not "really real". She admits that the phrase "really real" is apparently senseless but she has tried to explicate the supposed difference between the two.
Ontological reductionism denies the idea of ontological emergence, and claims that emergence is an epistemological phenomenon that only exists through analysis or description of a system, and does not exist fundamentally.
In some scientific disciplines, ontological reductionism takes two forms: token-identity theory and type-identity theory. In this case, "token" refers to a biological process.
Token ontological reductionism is the idea that every item that exists is a sum item. For perceivable items, it affirms that every perceivable item is a sum of items with a lesser degree of complexity. Token ontological reduction of biological things to chemical things is generally accepted.
Type ontological reductionism is the idea that every type of item is a sum type of item, and that every perceivable type of item is a sum of types of items with a lesser degree of complexity. Type ontological reduction of biological things to chemical things is often rejected.
Michael Ruse has criticized ontological reductionism as an improper argument against vitalism.
Methodological reductionism
In a biological context, methodological reductionism means attempting to explain all biological phenomena in terms of their underlying biochemical and molecular processes.
Theory reduction is the process by which a more general theory absorbs a special theory. It can be further divided into translation, derivation, and explanation. For example, both Kepler's laws of the motion of the planets and Galileo's theories of motion formulated for terrestrial objects are reducible to Newtonian theories of mechanics because all the explanatory power of the former are contained within the latter. Furthermore, the reduction is considered beneficial because Newtonian mechanics is a more general theory—that is, it explains more events than Galileo's or Kepler's. Besides scientific theories, theory reduction more generally can be the process by which one explanation subsumes another.
In mathematics
In mathematics, reductionism can be interpreted as the philosophy that all mathematics can (or ought to) be based on a common foundation, which for modern mathematics is usually axiomatic set theory. Ernst Zermelo was one of the major advocates of such an opinion; he also developed much of axiomatic set theory. It has been argued that the generally accepted method of justifying mathematical axioms by their usefulness in common practice can potentially weaken Zermelo's reductionist claim.
Jouko Väänänen has argued for second-order logic as a foundation for mathematics instead of set theory, whereas others have argued for category theory as a foundation for certain aspects of mathematics.
The incompleteness theorems of Kurt Gödel, published in 1931, caused doubt about the attainability of an axiomatic foundation for all of mathematics. Any such foundation would have to include axioms powerful enough to describe the arithmetic of the natural numbers (a subset of all mathematics). Yet Gödel proved that, for any consistent recursively enumerable axiomatic system powerful enough to describe the arithmetic of the natural numbers, there are (model-theoretically) true propositions about the natural numbers that cannot be proved from the axioms. Such propositions are known as formally undecidable propositions. For example, the continuum hypothesis is undecidable in the Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory as shown by Cohen.
In science
Reductionist thinking and methods form the basis for many of the well-developed topics of modern science, including much of physics, chemistry and molecular biology. Classical mechanics in particular is seen as a reductionist framework. For instance, the Solar System is understood in terms of its components (the Sun and the planets) and their interactions. Statistical mechanics can be considered as a reconciliation of macroscopicthermodynamic laws with the reductionist method of explaining macroscopic properties in terms of microscopic components, although it has been argued that reduction in physics 'never goes all the way in practice'.
In computer science
The role of reduction in computer science can be thought as a precise and unambiguous mathematical formalization of the philosophical idea of "theory reductionism". In a general sense, a problem (or set) is said to be reducible to another problem (or set), if there is a computable/feasible method to translate the questions of the former into the latter, so that, if one knows how to computably/feasibly solve the latter problem, then one can computably/feasibly solve the former. Thus, the latter can only be at least as "hard" to solve as the former.
Reduction in theoretical computer science is pervasive in both: the mathematical abstract foundations of computation; and in real-world performance or capability analysis of algorithms. More specifically, reduction is a foundational and central concept, not only in the realm of mathematical logic and abstract computation in computability (or recursive) theory, where it assumes the form of e.g. Turing reduction, but also in the realm of real-world computation in time (or space) complexity analysis of algorithms, where it assumes the form of e.g. polynomial-time reduction. Further, in the even more practical domain of software development, reduction can be seen as the inverse of composition and the conceptual process a programmer applies to a problem in order to produce an algorithm which solves the problem using a composition of existing algorithms (encoded as subroutines, or subclasses).
Philosophers of the Enlightenment worked to insulate human free will from reductionism. Descartes separated the material world of mechanical necessity from the world of mental free will. German philosophers introduced the concept of the "noumenal" realm that is not governed by the deterministic laws of "phenomenal" nature, where every event is completely determined by chains of causality. The most influential formulation was by Immanuel Kant, who distinguished between the causal deterministic framework the mind imposes on the world—the phenomenal realm—and the world as it exists for itself, the noumenal realm, which, as he believed, included free will. To insulate theology from reductionism, 19th century post-Enlightenment German theologians, especially Friedrich Schleiermacher and Albrecht Ritschl, used the Romantic method of basing religion on the human spirit, so that it is a person's feeling or sensibility about spiritual matters that comprises religion.
Causation
Most common philosophical understandings of causation involve reducing it to some collection of non-causal facts. Opponents of these reductionist views have given arguments that the non-causal facts in question are insufficient to determine the causal facts.
An alternative term for ontological reductionism is fragmentalism, often used in a pejorative sense. In cognitive psychology, George Kelly developed "constructive alternativism" as a form of personal construct psychology and an alternative to what he considered "accumulative fragmentalism". For this theory, knowledge is seen as the construction of successful mental models of the exterior world, rather than the accumulation of independent "nuggets of truth". Others argue that inappropriate use of reductionism limits our understanding of complex systems. In particular, ecologist Robert Ulanowicz says that science must develop techniques to study ways in which larger scales of organization influence smaller ones, and also ways in which feedback loops create structure at a given level, independently of details at a lower level of organization. He advocates and uses information theory as a framework to study propensities in natural systems. The limits of the application of reductionism are claimed to be especially evident at levels of organization with greater complexity, including living cells, neural networks (biology), ecosystems, society, and other systems formed from assemblies of large numbers of diverse components linked by multiple feedback loops.
In philosophy, Occam's razor (also spelled Ockham's razor or Ocham's razor; Latin: novacula Occami) is the problem-solving principle that recommends searching for explanations constructed with the smallest possible set of elements. It is also known as the principle of parsimony or the law of parsimony (Latin: lex parsimoniae). Attributed to William of Ockham, a 14th-century English philosopher and theologian, it is frequently cited as Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem, which translates as "Entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity", although Occam never used those words. Popularly, the principle is sometimes paraphrased as "of two competing theories, the simpler explanation of an entity is to be preferred".
The philosophical razor advocates that when presented with competing hypotheses about the same prediction and both hypotheses have equal explanatory power, one should prefer the hypothesis that requires the fewest assumptions, and that this is not meant to be a way of choosing between hypotheses that make different predictions. Similarly, in science, Occam's razor is used as an abductiveheuristic in the development of theoretical models rather than as a rigorous arbiter between candidate models.
History
The phrase Occam's razor did not appear until a few centuries after William of Ockham's death in 1347. Libert Froidmont, in his 1649 Philosophia Christiana de Anima (On Christian Philosophy of the Soul) claimed to have coined the phrase novacula occami when he described Gregory of Rimini, one of Ockham's critics. Ockham did not invent this principle, but its fame – and its association with him – may be due to the frequency and effectiveness with which he used it. Ockham stated the principle in various ways, but the most popular version – "Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity" (Non sunt multiplicanda entia sine necessitate) – was formulated by the Irish Franciscan philosopher John Punch in his 1639 commentary on the works of Duns Scotus.
Formulations before William of Ockham
Part of a page from John Duns Scotus's book Commentaria oxoniensia ad IV libros magistri Sententiarum, showing the words: "Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate", i.e., "Plurality is not to be posited without necessity"
The origins of what has come to be known as Occam's razor are traceable to the works of earlier philosophers such as John Duns Scotus (1265–1308), Robert Grosseteste (1175–1253), Maimonides (Moses ben-Maimon, 1138–1204), and even Aristotle (384–322BC). Aristotle writes in his Posterior Analytics, "We may assume the superiority ceteris paribus [all other things being equal] of the demonstration which derives from fewer postulates or hypotheses." Ptolemy (c.AD 90– c.168) stated, "We consider it a good principle to explain the phenomena by the simplest hypothesis possible."
Phrases such as "It is vain to do with more what can be done with fewer" and "A plurality is not to be posited without necessity" were commonplace in 13th-century scholastic writing. Robert Grosseteste, in Commentary on [Aristotle's] the Posterior Analytics Books (Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros) (c.1217–1220), declares:
"That is better and more valuable which requires fewer, other circumstances being equal ... For if one thing were demonstrated from many and another thing from fewer equally known premises, clearly that is better which is from fewer because it makes us know quickly, just as a universal demonstration is better than particular because it produces knowledge from fewer premises. Similarly in natural science, in moral science, and in metaphysics the best is that which needs no premises and the better that which needs the fewer, other circumstances being equal."
The Summa Theologica of Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) states that "it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many". Aquinas uses this principle to construct an objection to God's existence, an objection that he in turn answers and refutes generally (cf. quinque viae), and specifically, through an argument based on causality. Hence, Aquinas acknowledges the principle that today is known as Occam's razor, but prefers causal explanations to other simple explanations (cf. also Correlation does not imply causation).
William of Ockham (c.1287–1347) was an English Franciscan friar and theologian, an influential medieval philosopher and a nominalist. His popular fame as a great logician rests chiefly on the maxim attributed to him and known as Occam's razor. The term razor refers to distinguishing between two hypotheses either by "shaving away" unnecessary assumptions or cutting apart two similar conclusions.
While it has been claimed that Occam's razor is not found in any of William's writings, one can cite statements such as Numquam ponenda est pluralitas sine necessitate ("Plurality must never be posited without necessity"), which occurs in his theological work on the Sentences of Peter Lombard (Quaestiones et decisiones in quattuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi; ed. Lugd., 1495, i, dist. 27, qu. 2, K).
Nevertheless, the precise words sometimes attributed to William of Ockham, Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem (Entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity), are absent in his extant works; this particular phrasing comes from John Punch, who described the principle as a "common axiom" (axioma vulgare) of the Scholastics. William of Ockham himself seems to restrict the operation of this principle in matters pertaining to miracles and God's power, considering a plurality of miracles possible in the Eucharist simply because it pleases God.
This principle is sometimes phrased as Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate ("Plurality should not be posited without necessity"). In his Summa Totius Logicae, i. 12, William of Ockham cites the principle of economy, Frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora ("It is futile to do with more things that which can be done with fewer"; Thorburn, 1918, pp.352–53; Kneale and Kneale, 1962, p.243.)
Later formulations
To quote Isaac Newton, "We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. Therefore, to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes." In the sentence hypotheses non fingo ("I contrive no hypotheses"), Newton affirms the success of this approach.
Bertrand Russell offers a particular version of Occam's razor: "Whenever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities."
Around 1960, Ray Solomonoff founded the theory of universal inductive inference, the theory of prediction based on observations– for example, predicting the next symbol based upon a given series of symbols. The only assumption is that the environment follows some unknown but computable probability distribution. This theory is a mathematical formalization of Occam's razor.
Another technical approach to Occam's razor is ontological parsimony. Parsimony means spareness and is also referred to as the Rule of Simplicity. This is considered a strong version of Occam's razor. A variation used in medicine is called the "Zebra": a physician should reject an exotic medical diagnosis when a more commonplace explanation is more likely, derived from Theodore Woodward's dictum "When you hear hoofbeats, think of horses not zebras".
Ernst Mach formulated the stronger version of Occam's razor into physics, which he called the Principle of Economy stating: "Scientists must use the simplest means of arriving at their results and exclude everything not perceived by the senses."
Justifications
Aesthetic
Prior to the 20th century, it was a commonly held belief that nature itself was simple and that simpler hypotheses about nature were thus more likely to be true. This notion was deeply rooted in the aesthetic value that simplicity holds for human thought and the justifications presented for it often drew from theology.Thomas Aquinas made this argument in the 13th century, writing, "If a thing can be done adequately by means of one, it is superfluous to do it by means of several; for we observe that nature does not employ two instruments [if] one suffices."
The razor's statement that "other things being equal, simpler explanations are generally better than more complex ones" is amenable to empirical testing. Another interpretation of the razor's statement would be that "simpler hypotheses are generally better than the complex ones". The procedure to test the former interpretation would compare the track records of simple and comparatively complex explanations. If one accepts the first interpretation, the validity of Occam's razor as a tool would then have to be rejected if the more complex explanations were more often correct than the less complex ones (while the converse would lend support to its use). If the latter interpretation is accepted, the validity of Occam's razor as a tool could possibly be accepted if the simpler hypotheses led to correct conclusions more often than not.
Even if some increases in complexity are sometimes necessary, there still remains a justified general bias toward the simpler of two competing explanations. To understand why, consider that for each accepted explanation of a phenomenon, there is always an infinite number of possible, more complex, and ultimately incorrect, alternatives. This is so because one can always burden a failing explanation with an ad hoc hypothesis. Ad hoc hypotheses are justifications that prevent theories from being falsified.
Possible explanations can become needlessly complex. It might be coherent, for instance, to add the involvement of leprechauns to any explanation, but Occam's razor would prevent such additions unless they were necessary.
For example, if a person, accused of breaking a vase, makes supernatural claims that leprechauns were responsible for the breakage, a simple explanation might be that the person did it, but ongoing ad hoc justifications (e.g., "... and that's not me breaking it on the film; they tampered with that, too") could successfully prevent complete disproof. This endless supply of elaborate competing explanations, called saving hypotheses, cannot be technically ruled out – except by using Occam's razor.
Any more complex theory might still possibly be true. A study of the predictive validity of Occam's razor found 32 published papers that included 97 comparisons of economic forecasts from simple and complex forecasting methods. None of the papers provided a balance of evidence that complexity of method improved forecast accuracy. In the 25 papers with quantitative comparisons, complexity increased forecast errors by an average of 27 percent.
One justification of Occam's razor is a direct result of basic probability theory. By definition, all assumptions introduce possibilities for error; if an assumption does not improve the accuracy of a theory, its only effect is to increase the probability that the overall theory is wrong.
There have also been other attempts to derive Occam's razor from probability theory, including notable attempts made by Harold Jeffreys and E. T. Jaynes. The probabilistic (Bayesian) basis for Occam's razor is elaborated by David J. C. MacKay in chapter 28 of his book Information Theory, Inference, and Learning Algorithms, where he emphasizes that a prior bias in favor of simpler models is not required.
William H. Jefferys and James O. Berger (1991) generalize and quantify the original formulation's "assumptions" concept as the degree to which a proposition is unnecessarily accommodating to possible observable data. They state, "A hypothesis with fewer adjustable parameters will automatically have an enhanced posterior probability, due to the fact that the predictions it makes are sharp." The use of "sharp" here is not only a tongue-in-cheek reference to the idea of a razor, but also indicates that such predictions are more accurate than competing predictions. The model they propose balances the precision of a theory's predictions against their sharpness, preferring theories that sharply make correct predictions over theories that accommodate a wide range of other possible results. This, again, reflects the mathematical relationship between key concepts in Bayesian inference (namely marginal probability, conditional probability, and posterior probability).
The bias–variance tradeoff is a framework that incorporates the Occam's razor principle in its balance between overfitting (associated with lower bias but higher variance) and underfitting (associated with lower variance but higher bias).
Other philosophers
Karl Popper
Karl Popper argues that a preference for simple theories need not appeal to practical or aesthetic considerations. Our preference for simplicity may be justified by the falsifiability criterion: we prefer simpler theories to more complex ones "because their empirical content is greater; and because they are better testable". The idea here is that a simple theory applies to more cases than a more complex one, and is thus more easily falsifiable. This is again comparing a simple theory to a more complex theory where both explain the data equally well.
Elliott Sober
The philosopher of science Elliott Sober once argued along the same lines as Popper, tying simplicity with "informativeness": The simplest theory is the more informative, in the sense that it requires less information to a question. He has since rejected this account of simplicity, purportedly because it fails to provide an epistemic justification for simplicity. He now believes that simplicity considerations (and considerations of parsimony in particular) do not count unless they reflect something more fundamental. Philosophers, he suggests, may have made the error of hypostatizing simplicity (i.e., endowed it with a sui generis existence), when it has meaning only when embedded in a specific context (Sober 1992). If we fail to justify simplicity considerations on the basis of the context in which we use them, we may have no non-circular justification: "Just as the question 'why be rational?' may have no non-circular answer, the same may be true of the question 'why should simplicity be considered in evaluating the plausibility of hypotheses?'"
... the simplest hypothesis proposed as an explanation of phenomena is more likely to be the true one than is any other available hypothesis, that its predictions are more likely to be true than those of any other available hypothesis, and that it is an ultimate a priori epistemic principle that simplicity is evidence for truth.
—Swinburne 1997
According to Swinburne, since our choice of theory cannot be determined by data (see Underdetermination and Duhem–Quine thesis), we must rely on some criterion to determine which theory to use. Since it is absurd to have no logical method for settling on one hypothesis amongst an infinite number of equally data-compliant hypotheses, we should choose the simplest theory: "Either science is irrational [in the way it judges theories and predictions probable] or the principle of simplicity is a fundamental synthetic a priori truth."
3.328 "If a sign is not necessary then it is meaningless. That is the meaning of Occam's Razor."
(If everything in the symbolism works as though a sign had meaning, then it has meaning.)
4.04 "In the proposition, there must be exactly as many things distinguishable as there are in the state of affairs, which it represents. They must both possess the same logical (mathematical) multiplicity (cf. Hertz's Mechanics, on Dynamic Models)."
5.47321 "Occam's Razor is, of course, not an arbitrary rule nor one justified by its practical success. It simply says that unnecessary elements in a symbolism mean nothing. Signs which serve one purpose are logically equivalent; signs which serve no purpose are logically meaningless."
and on the related concept of "simplicity":
6.363 "The procedure of induction consists in accepting as true the simplest law that can be reconciled with our experiences."
Uses
Science and the scientific method
Andreas Cellarius's illustration of the Copernican system, from the Harmonia Macrocosmica (1660). Future positions of the sun, moon and other solar system bodies can be calculated using a geocentric model (the earth is at the centre) or using a heliocentric model (the sun is at the centre). Both work, but the geocentric model requires a much more complex system of calculations than the heliocentric model. This was pointed out in a preface to Copernicus's first edition of De revolutionibus orbium coelestium.
In chemistry, Occam's razor is often an important heuristic when developing a model of a reaction mechanism. Although it is useful as a heuristic in developing models of reaction mechanisms, it has been shown to fail as a criterion for selecting among some selected published models. In this context, Einstein himself expressed caution when he formulated Einstein's Constraint: "It can scarcely be denied that the supreme goal of all theory is to make the irreducible basic elements as simple and as few as possible without having to surrender the adequate representation of a single datum of experience." An often-quoted version of this constraint (which cannot be verified as posited by Einstein himself) reduces this to "Everything should be kept as simple as possible, but not simpler."
In the scientific method, Occam's razor is not considered an irrefutable principle of logic or a scientific result; the preference for simplicity in the scientific method is based on the falsifiability criterion. For each accepted explanation of a phenomenon, there may be an extremely large, perhaps even incomprehensible, number of possible and more complex alternatives. Since failing explanations can always be burdened with ad hoc hypotheses to prevent them from being falsified, simpler theories are preferable to more complex ones because they tend to be more testable. As a logical principle, Occam's razor would demand that scientists accept the simplest possible theoretical explanation for existing data. However, science has shown repeatedly that future data often support more complex theories than do existing data. Science prefers the simplest explanation that is consistent with the data available at a given time, but the simplest explanation may be ruled out as new data become available. That is, science is open to the possibility that future experiments might support more complex theories than demanded by current data and is more interested in designing experiments to discriminate between competing theories than favoring one theory over another based merely on philosophical principles.
When scientists use the idea of parsimony, it has meaning only in a very specific context of inquiry. Several background assumptions are required for parsimony to connect with plausibility in a particular research problem. The reasonableness of parsimony in one research context may have nothing to do with its reasonableness in another. It is a mistake to think that there is a single global principle that spans diverse subject matter.
It has been suggested that Occam's razor is a widely accepted example of extraevidential consideration, even though it is entirely a metaphysical assumption. Most of the time, however, Occam's razor is a conservative tool, cutting out "crazy, complicated constructions" and assuring "that hypotheses are grounded in the science of the day", thus yielding "normal" science: models of explanation and prediction. There are, however, notable exceptions where Occam's razor turns a conservative scientist into a reluctant revolutionary. For example, Max Planck interpolated between the Wien and Jeans radiation laws and then used Occam's razor logic to formulate the quantum hypothesis, though he resisted accepting that hypothesis even as it became obvious it was correct.
Appeals to simplicity were used to argue against the phenomena of meteorites, ball lightning, continental drift, and reverse transcriptase. One can argue for atomic building blocks for matter, because it provides a simpler explanation for the observed reversibility of both mixing and chemical reactions as simple separation and rearrangements of atomic building blocks. At the time, however, the atomic theory was considered more complex because it implied the existence of invisible particles that had not been directly detected. Ernst Mach and the logical positivists rejected John Dalton's atomic theory until the reality of atoms was more evident in Brownian motion, as shown by Albert Einstein.
In the same way, postulating the aether is more complex than transmission of light through a vacuum. At the time, however, all known waves propagated through a physical medium, and it seemed simpler to postulate the existence of a medium than to theorize about wave propagation without a medium. Likewise, Isaac Newton's idea of light particles seemed simpler than Christiaan Huygens's idea of waves, so many favored it. In this case, as it turned out, neither the wave – nor the particle – explanation alone suffices, as light behaves like waves and like particles.
Three axioms presupposed by the scientific method are realism (the existence of objective reality), the existence of natural laws, and the constancy of natural law. Rather than depend on provability of these axioms, science depends on the fact that they have not been objectively falsified. Occam's razor and parsimony support, but do not prove, these axioms of science. The general principle of science is that theories (or models) of natural law must be consistent with repeatable experimental observations. This ultimate arbiter (selection criterion) rests upon the axioms mentioned above.
If multiple models of natural law make exactly the same testable predictions, they are equivalent and there is no need for parsimony to choose a preferred one. For example, Newtonian, Hamiltonian and Lagrangian classical mechanics are equivalent. Physicists have no interest in using Occam's razor to say the other two are wrong. Likewise, there is no demand for simplicity principles to arbitrate between wave and matrix formulations of quantum mechanics. Science often does not demand arbitration or selection criteria between models that make the same testable predictions.
Biology
Biologists or philosophers of biology use Occam's razor in either of two contexts both in evolutionary biology: the units of selection controversy and systematics. George C. Williams in his book Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966) argues that the best way to explain altruism among animals is based on low-level (i.e., individual) selection as opposed to high-level group selection. Altruism is defined by some evolutionary biologists (e.g., R. Alexander, 1987; W. D. Hamilton, 1964) as behavior that is beneficial to others (or to the group) at a cost to the individual, and many posit individual selection as the mechanism that explains altruism solely in terms of the behaviors of individual organisms acting in their own self-interest (or in the interest of their genes, via kin selection). Williams was arguing against the perspective of others who propose selection at the level of the group as an evolutionary mechanism that selects for altruistic traits (e.g., D. S. Wilson & E. O. Wilson, 2007). The basis for Williams's contention is that of the two, individual selection is the more parsimonious theory. In doing so he is invoking a variant of Occam's razor known as Morgan's Canon: "In no case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms of higher psychological processes, if it can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes which stand lower in the scale of psychological evolution and development." (Morgan 1903).
However, more recent biological analyses, such as Richard Dawkins's The Selfish Gene, have contended that Morgan's Canon is not the simplest and most basic explanation. Dawkins argues the way evolution works is that the genes propagated in most copies end up determining the development of that particular species, i.e., natural selection turns out to select specific genes, and this is really the fundamental underlying principle that automatically gives individual and group selection as emergent features of evolution.
Zoology provides an example. Muskoxen, when threatened by wolves, form a circle with the males on the outside and the females and young on the inside. This is an example of a behavior by the males that seems to be altruistic. The behavior is disadvantageous to them individually but beneficial to the group as a whole; thus, it was seen by some to support the group selection theory. Another interpretation is kin selection: if the males are protecting their offspring, they are protecting copies of their own alleles. Engaging in this behavior would be favored by individual selection if the cost to the male musk ox is less than half of the benefit received by his calf – which could easily be the case if wolves have an easier time killing calves than adult males. It could also be the case that male musk oxen would be individually less likely to be killed by wolves if they stood in a circle with their horns pointing out, regardless of whether they were protecting the females and offspring. That would be an example of regular natural selection – a phenomenon called "the selfish herd".
Systematics is the branch of biology that attempts to establish patterns of relationship among biological taxa, today generally thought to reflect evolutionary history. It is also concerned with their classification. There are three primary camps in systematics: cladists, pheneticists, and evolutionary taxonomists. Cladists hold that classification should be based on synapomorphies (shared, derived character states), pheneticists contend that overall similarity (synapomorphies and complementary symplesiomorphies) is the determining criterion, while evolutionary taxonomists say that both genealogy and similarity count in classification (in a manner determined by the evolutionary taxonomist).
It is among the cladists that Occam's razor is applied, through the method of cladistic parsimony. Cladistic parsimony (or maximum parsimony) is a method of phylogenetic inference that yields phylogenetic trees (more specifically, cladograms). Cladograms are branching, diagrams used to represent hypotheses of relative degree of relationship, based on synapomorphies. Cladistic parsimony is used to select as the preferred hypothesis of relationships the cladogram that requires the fewest implied character state transformations (or smallest weight, if characters are differentially weighted). Critics of the cladistic approach often observe that for some types of data, parsimony could produce the wrong results, regardless of how much data is collected (this is called statistical inconsistency, or long branch attraction). However, this criticism is also potentially true for any type of phylogenetic inference, unless the model used to estimate the tree reflects the way that evolution actually happened. Because this information is not empirically accessible, the criticism of statistical inconsistency against parsimony holds no force. For a book-length treatment of cladistic parsimony, see Elliott Sober's Reconstructing the Past: Parsimony, Evolution, and Inference (1988). For a discussion of both uses of Occam's razor in biology, see Sober's article "Let's Razor Ockham's Razor" (1990).
Other methods for inferring evolutionary relationships use parsimony in a more general way. Likelihood methods for phylogeny use parsimony as they do for all likelihood tests, with hypotheses requiring fewer differing parameters (i.e., numbers or different rates of character change or different frequencies of character state transitions) being treated as null hypotheses relative to hypotheses requiring more differing parameters. Thus, complex hypotheses must predict data much better than do simple hypotheses before researchers reject the simple hypotheses. Recent advances employ information theory, a close cousin of likelihood, which uses Occam's razor in the same way. The choice of the "shortest tree" relative to a not-so-short tree under any optimality criterion (smallest distance, fewest steps, or maximum likelihood) is always based on parsimony.
Francis Crick has commented on potential limitations of Occam's razor in biology. He advances the argument that because biological systems are the products of (an ongoing) natural selection, the mechanisms are not necessarily optimal in an obvious sense. He cautions: "While Ockham's razor is a useful tool in the physical sciences, it can be a very dangerous implement in biology. It is thus very rash to use simplicity and elegance as a guide in biological research." This is an ontological critique of parsimony.
In biogeography, parsimony is used to infer ancient vicariant events or migrations of species or populations by observing the geographic distribution and relationships of existing organisms. Given the phylogenetic tree, ancestral population subdivisions are inferred to be those that require the minimum amount of change.
In the philosophy of religion, Occam's razor is sometimes applied to the existence of God. William of Ockham himself was a Christian. He believed in God, and in the authority of Christian scripture; he writes that "nothing ought to be posited without a reason given, unless it is self-evident (literally, known through itself) or known by experience or proved by the authority of Sacred Scripture." Ockham believed that an explanation has no sufficient basis in reality when it does not harmonize with reason, experience, or the Bible. Unlike many theologians of his time, though, Ockham did not believe God could be logically proven with arguments. To Ockham, science was a matter of discovery; theology was a matter of revelation and faith. He states: "Only faith gives us access to theological truths. The ways of God are not open to reason, for God has freely chosen to create a world and establish a way of salvation within it apart from any necessary laws that human logic or rationality can uncover."
Thomas Aquinas, in the Summa Theologica, uses a formulation of Occam's razor to construct an objection to the idea that God exists, which he refutes directly with a counterargument:
Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence.
In turn, Aquinas answers this with the quinque viae, and addresses the particular objection above with the following answer:
Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the Article.
PRIEST: Who can comprehend the vast and infinite purpose which God has for man? Where is even the man who understands all things visible?
DYING MAN: Anyone who sees things simply, and especially the man who does not go looking for a multiplicity of causes with which to obscure the effects. Why do you need a second difficulty when you cannot explain the first? If we admit it is possible that Nature alone is responsible for creating what you attribute to your God, why do you insist on looking for a master hand? The cause of what you do not comprehend may be the simplest thing there is. Study physics and you will understand Nature better; learn to think clearly, cast out your preconceived ideas and you will have no need of this God of yours.
Rather than argue for the necessity of a god, some theists base their belief upon grounds independent of, or prior to, reason, making Occam's razor irrelevant. This was the stance of Søren Kierkegaard, who viewed belief in God as a leap of faith that sometimes directly opposed reason. This is also the doctrine of Gordon Clark's presuppositional apologetics, with the exception that Clark never thought the leap of faith was contrary to reason (see also Fideism).
Various arguments in favor of God establish God as a useful or even necessary assumption. Contrastingly some anti-theists hold firmly to the belief that assuming the existence of God introduces unnecessary complexity (e.g., the Ultimate Boeing 747 gambit from Dawkins's The God Delusion).
Another application of the principle is to be found in the work of George Berkeley (1685–1753). Berkeley was an idealist who believed that all of reality could be explained in terms of the mind alone. He invoked Occam's razor against materialism, stating that matter was not required by his metaphysics and was thus eliminable. One potential problem with this belief is that it's possible, given Berkeley's position, to find solipsism itself more in line with the razor than a God-mediated world beyond a single thinker.
Occam's razor may also be recognized in the apocryphal story about an exchange between Pierre-Simon Laplace and Napoleon. It is said that in praising Laplace for one of his recent publications, the emperor asked how it was that the name of God, which featured so frequently in the writings of Lagrange, appeared nowhere in Laplace's. At that, he is said to have replied, "It's because I had no need of that hypothesis." Though some points of this story illustrate Laplace's atheism, more careful consideration suggests that he may instead have intended merely to illustrate the power of methodological naturalism, or even simply that the fewer logical premises one assumes, the stronger is one's conclusion.
Philosophy of mind
In his article "Sensations and Brain Processes" (1959), J. J. C. Smart invoked Occam's razor with the aim to justify his preference of the mind–brain identity theory over spirit–body dualism. Dualists state that there are two kinds of substances in the universe: physical (including the body) and spiritual, which is non-physical. In contrast, identity theorists state that everything is physical, including consciousness, and that there is nothing nonphysical. Though it is impossible to appreciate the spiritual when limiting oneself to the physical, Smart maintained that identity theory explains all phenomena by assuming only a physical reality. Subsequently, Smart has been severely criticized for his use (or misuse) of Occam's razor and ultimately retracted his advocacy of it in this context. Paul Churchland (1984) states that by itself Occam's razor is inconclusive regarding duality. In a similar way, Dale Jacquette (1994) stated that Occam's razor has been used in attempts to justify eliminativism and reductionism in the philosophy of mind. Eliminativism is the thesis that the ontology of folk psychology including such entities as "pain", "joy", "desire", "fear", etc., are eliminable in favor of an ontology of a completed neuroscience.
Penal ethics
In penal theory and the philosophy of punishment, parsimony refers specifically to taking care in the distribution of punishment in order to avoid excessive punishment. In the utilitarian approach to the philosophy of punishment, Jeremy Bentham's "parsimony principle" states that any punishment greater than is required to achieve its end is unjust. The concept is related but not identical to the legal concept of proportionality. Parsimony is a key consideration of the modern restorative justice, and is a component of utilitarian approaches to punishment, as well as the prison abolition movement. Bentham believed that true parsimony would require punishment to be individualised to take account of the sensibility of the individual – an individual more sensitive to punishment should be given a proportionately lesser one, since otherwise needless pain would be inflicted. Later utilitarian writers have tended to abandon this idea, in large part due to the impracticality of determining each alleged criminal's relative sensitivity to specific punishments.
There are various papers in scholarly journals deriving formal versions of Occam's razor from probability theory, applying it in statistical inference, and using it to come up with criteria for penalizing complexity in statistical inference. Papershave suggested a connection between Occam's razor and Kolmogorov complexity.
One of the problems with the original formulation of the razor is that it only applies to models with the same explanatory power (i.e., it only tells us to prefer the simplest of equally good models). A more general form of the razor can be derived from Bayesian model comparison, which is based on Bayes factors and can be used to compare models that do not fit the observations equally well. These methods can sometimes optimally balance the complexity and power of a model. Generally, the exact Occam factor is intractable, but approximations such as Akaike information criterion, Bayesian information criterion, Variational Bayesian methods, false discovery rate, and Laplace's method are used. Many artificial intelligence researchers are now employing such techniques, for instance through work on Occam Learning or more generally on the Free energy principle.
Statistical versions of Occam's razor have a more rigorous formulation than what philosophical discussions produce. In particular, they must have a specific definition of the term simplicity, and that definition can vary. For example, in the Kolmogorov–Chaitinminimum description length approach, the subject must pick a Turing machine whose operations describe the basic operations believed to represent "simplicity" by the subject. However, one could always choose a Turing machine with a simple operation that happened to construct one's entire theory and would hence score highly under the razor. This has led to two opposing camps: one that believes Occam's razor is objective, and one that believes it is subjective.
Objective razor
The minimum instruction set of a universal Turing machine requires approximately the same length description across different formulations, and is small compared to the Kolmogorov complexity of most practical theories. Marcus Hutter has used this consistency to define a "natural" Turing machine of small size as the proper basis for excluding arbitrarily complex instruction sets in the formulation of razors. Describing the program for the universal program as the "hypothesis", and the representation of the evidence as program data, it has been formally proven under Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory that "the sum of the log universal probability of the model plus the log of the probability of the data given the model should be minimized." Interpreting this as minimising the total length of a two-part message encoding model followed by data given model gives us the minimum message length (MML) principle.
One possible conclusion from mixing the concepts of Kolmogorov complexity and Occam's razor is that an ideal data compressor would also be a scientific explanation/formulation generator. Some attempts have been made to re-derive known laws from considerations of simplicity or compressibility.
According to Jürgen Schmidhuber, the appropriate mathematical theory of Occam's razor already exists, namely, Solomonoff'stheory of optimal inductive inference and its extensions. See discussions in David L. Dowe's "Foreword re C. S. Wallace" for the subtle distinctions between the algorithmic probability work of Solomonoff and the MML work of Chris Wallace, and see Dowe's "MML, hybrid Bayesian network graphical models, statistical consistency, invariance and uniqueness" both for such discussions and for (in section 4) discussions of MML and Occam's razor. For a specific example of MML as Occam's razor in the problem of decision tree induction, see Dowe and Needham's "Message Length as an Effective Ockham's Razor in Decision Tree Induction".
Mathematical arguments against Occam's razor
The no free lunch (NFL) theorems for inductive inference prove that Occam's razor must rely on ultimately arbitrary assumptions concerning the prior probability distribution found in our world. Specifically, suppose one is given two inductive inference algorithms, A and B, where A is a Bayesian procedure based on the choice of some prior distribution motivated by Occam's razor (e.g., the prior might favor hypotheses with smaller Kolmogorov complexity). Suppose that B is the anti-Bayes procedure, which calculates what the Bayesian algorithm A based on Occam's razor will predict – and then predicts the exact opposite. Then there are just as many actual priors (including those different from the Occam's razor prior assumed by A) in which algorithm B outperforms A as priors in which the procedure A based on Occam's razor comes out on top. In particular, the NFL theorems show that the "Occam factors" Bayesian argument for Occam's razor must make ultimately arbitrary modeling assumptions.
Software development
In software development, the rule of least power argues the correct programming language to use is the one that is simplest while also solving the targeted software problem. In that form the rule is often credited to Tim Berners-Lee since it appeared in his design guidelines for the original Hypertext Transfer Protocol. Complexity in this context is measured either by placing a language into the Chomsky hierarchy or by listing idiomatic features of the language and comparing according to some agreed to scale of difficulties between idioms. Many languages once thought to be of lower complexity have evolved or later been discovered to be more complex than originally intended; so, in practice this rule is applied to the relative ease of a programmer to obtain the power of the language, rather than the precise theoretical limits of the language.
Artificial intelligence
Scientists have discovered that deep neural networks (DNN) prefer simpler mathematical functions while learning. This simplicity bias enables DNNs to overcome overfitting – a scenario where the model gets overwhelmed with noise due to the presence of too many parameters.
Controversial aspects
Occam's razor is not an embargo against the positing of any kind of entity, or a recommendation of the simplest theory come what may. Occam's razor is used to adjudicate between theories that have already passed "theoretical scrutiny" tests and are equally well-supported by evidence. Furthermore, it may be used to prioritize empirical testing between two equally plausible but unequally testable hypotheses; thereby minimizing costs and wastes while increasing chances of falsification of the simpler-to-test hypothesis.
Another contentious aspect of the razor is that a theory can become more complex in terms of its structure (or syntax), while its ontology (or semantics) becomes simpler, or vice versa. Quine, in a discussion on definition, referred to these two perspectives as "economy of practical expression" and "economy in grammar and vocabulary", respectively.
Galileo Galilei lampooned the misuse of Occam's razor in his Dialogue. The principle is represented in the dialogue by Simplicio. The telling point that Galileo presented ironically was that if one really wanted to start from a small number of entities, one could always consider the letters of the alphabet as the fundamental entities, since one could construct the whole of human knowledge out of them.
Instances of using Occam's razor to justify belief in less complex and more simple theories have been criticized as using the razor inappropriately. For instance Francis Crick stated that "While Occam's razor is a useful tool in the physical sciences, it can be a very dangerous implement in biology. It is thus very rash to use simplicity and elegance as a guide in biological research."
Similarly, Lewis White Beck discerned that the principle of sufficient reason enjoys a degree of metaphysical importance in the logic of science which is at least equivalent to the status attained by the use of parsimony in Occam's razor. Beck observed that while the latter principle dictates a search for the simplest causes in the formulation of an explanation, the former principle cautions against the excessive use of simplification, which may result in an explanation which is inadequate to the task of explaining the facts themselves. Stated more simply, "Parsimony is not itself a simple criterion of a good methodology; we cannot simply count the factors of explanation and say that the theory containing the smallest number is the best. The ideal of parsimony cannot be expressed without the proviso that the conditions for which it is a norm shall themselves be adequate."
Anti-razors
Occam's razor has met some opposition from people who consider it too extreme or rash. Walter Chatton (c.1290–1343) was a contemporary of William of Ockham who took exception to Occam's razor and Ockham's use of it. In response he devised his own anti-razor: "If three things are not enough to verify an affirmative proposition about things, a fourth must be added and so on." Although there have been several philosophers who have formulated similar anti-razors since Chatton's time, no one anti-razor has perpetuated as notably as Chatton's anti-razor, although this could be the case of the Late Renaissance Italian motto of unknown attribution Se non è vero, è ben trovato ("Even if it is not true, it is well conceived") when referred to a particularly artful explanation.
Anti-razors have also been created by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), and Karl Menger (1902–1985). Leibniz's version took the form of a principle of plenitude, as Arthur Lovejoy has called it: the idea being that God created the most varied and populous of possible worlds. Kant felt a need to moderate the effects of Occam's razor and thus created his own counter-razor: "The variety of beings should not rashly be diminished."
Karl Menger found mathematicians to be too parsimonious with regard to variables so he formulated his Law Against Miserliness, which took one of two forms: "Entities must not be reduced to the point of inadequacy" and "It is vain to do with fewer what requires more." A less serious but even more extremist anti-razor is 'Pataphysics, the "science of imaginary solutions" developed by Alfred Jarry (1873–1907). Perhaps the ultimate in anti-reductionism, "'Pataphysics seeks no less than to view each event in the universe as completely unique, subject to no laws but its own." Variations on this theme were subsequently explored by the Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges in his story/mock-essay "Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius". Physicist R. V. Jones contrived Crabtree's Bludgeon, which states that "[n]o set of mutually inconsistent observations can exist for which some human intellect cannot conceive a coherent explanation, however complicated."
Recently, American physicist Igor Mazin argued that because high-profile physics journals prefer publications offering exotic and unusual interpretations, the Occam's razor principle is being replaced by an "Inverse Occam's razor", implying that the simplest possible explanation is usually rejected.
Other
Since 2012, The Skeptic magazine annually awards the Ockham Awards, or simply the Ockhams, named after Occam's razor, at QED. The Ockhams were introduced by editor-in-chief Deborah Hyde to "recognise the effort and time that have gone into the community's favourite skeptical blogs, skeptical podcasts, skeptical campaigns and outstanding contributors to the skeptical cause." The trophies, designed by Neil Davies and Karl Derrick, carry the upper text "Ockham's" and the lower text "The Skeptic. Shaving away unnecessary assumptions since 1285." Between the texts, there is an image of a double-edged safety razorblade, and both lower corners feature an image of William of Ockham's face.