A computer-assisted proof is a mathematical proof that has been at least partially generated by computer.
Most computer-aided proofs to date have been implementations of large proofs-by-exhaustion of a mathematical theorem. The idea is to use a computer program to perform lengthy computations, and to provide a proof that the result of these computations implies the given theorem. In 1976, the four color theorem was the first major theorem to be verified using a computer program.
Attempts have also been made in the area of artificial intelligence research to create smaller, explicit, new proofs of mathematical theorems from the bottom up using automated reasoning techniques such as heuristic search. Such automated theorem provers have proved a number of new results and found new proofs for known theorems. Additionally, interactive proof assistants allow mathematicians to develop human-readable proofs which are nonetheless formally verified for correctness. Since these proofs are generally human-surveyable (albeit with difficulty, as with the proof of the Robbins conjecture) they do not share the controversial implications of computer-aided proofs-by-exhaustion.
Methods
One method for using computers in mathematical proofs is by means of so-called validated numerics or rigorous numerics. This means computing numerically yet with mathematical rigour. One uses set-valued arithmetic and inclusion principle in order to ensure that the set-valued output of a numerical program encloses the solution of the original mathematical problem. This is done by controlling, enclosing and propagating round-off and truncation errors using for example interval arithmetic. More precisely, one reduces the computation to a sequence of elementary operations, say . In a computer, the result of each elementary operation is rounded off by the computer precision. However, one can construct an interval provided by upper and lower bounds on the result of an elementary operation. Then one proceeds by replacing numbers with intervals and performing elementary operations between such intervals of representable numbers.
Computer-assisted proofs are the subject of some controversy in the mathematical world, with Thomas Tymoczko first to articulate objections. Those who adhere to Tymoczko's arguments believe that lengthy computer-assisted proofs are not, in some sense, 'real' mathematical proofs because they involve so many logical steps that they are not practically verifiable by human beings, and that mathematicians are effectively being asked to replace logical deduction from assumed axioms with trust in an empirical computational process, which is potentially affected by errors in the computer program, as well as defects in the runtime environment and hardware.
Other mathematicians believe that lengthy computer-assisted proofs should be regarded as calculations, rather than proofs: the proof algorithm itself should be proved valid, so that its use can then be regarded as a mere "verification". Arguments that computer-assisted proofs are subject to errors in their source programs, compilers, and hardware can be resolved by providing a formal proof of correctness for the computer program (an approach which was successfully applied to the four color theorem in 2005) as well as replicating the result using different programming languages, different compilers, and different computer hardware.
Another possible way of verifying computer-aided proofs is to generate their reasoning steps in a machine readable form, and then use a proof checker program to demonstrate their correctness. Since validating a given proof is much easier than finding a proof, the checker program is simpler than the original assistant program, and it is correspondingly easier to gain confidence into its correctness. However, this approach of using a computer program to prove the output of another program correct does not appeal to computer proof skeptics, who see it as adding another layer of complexity without addressing the perceived need for human understanding.
Another argument against computer-aided proofs is that they lack mathematical elegance, i.e. that they provide no insights or new and useful concepts. This is an argument which could be advanced against any lengthy proof by exhaustion whatsoever.
An additional philosophical issue raised by computer-aided proofs is whether they make mathematics into a quasi-empirical science, where the scientific method becomes more important than the application of pure reason in the area of abstract mathematical concepts. This directly relates to the argument within mathematics as to whether mathematics is based on ideas, or "merely" an exercise in formal symbol manipulation. It also raises the question whether, if according to the Platonist view, all possible mathematical objects in some sense "already exist", whether computer-aided mathematics is an observational science like astronomy, rather than an experimental one like physics or chemistry. This controversy within mathematics is occurring at the same time as questions are being asked in the physics community about whether twenty-first century theoretical physics is becoming too mathematical, and leaving behind its experimental roots.
The emerging field of experimental mathematics is confronting this debate head-on by focusing on numerical experiments as its main tool for mathematical exploration.
Critical rationalism is Karl Popper's answer to what he considered the most important problems of epistemology and philosophy of science: the problems of the growth of knowledge, notably by induction, and the demarcation of science. He adopted a fallibilist approach to these problems, especially that of induction, without falling into skepticism. His approach was to put in perspective the distinctive role of deductive logic in the development of knowledge, especially in science, in the context of a less rigorous methodology based on critical thinking. The central technical concept in the application of critical rationalism to science is falsifiability. Popper first mentioned the term "critical rationalism" in The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) and also later in Conjectures and Refutations (1963), Unended Quest (1976), and The Myth of the Framework (1994).
Fallibilism, not skepticism
Popper admitted that the truth of statements cannot be obtained using only logical definitions and deductions, as this leads to an infinite regress. For Popper, this does not prevent statements from being useful for solving problems, because they can be logically analyzed to draw logical consequences, possibly contradictions with observation statements linked to real tests. Popper wrote that the bulk of scientific activities use deductive logic to evaluate theories.
Popper accepted Hume's argument and the consequences of Duhem's thesis and insisted that there is no logical method for accessing empirical truth, no inductive rule, not even to a small extent. However, he rejected skepticism, the idea that the search for truth is futile. He admitted that, although logic alone says nothing about empirical truth, statements can be related to reality through problem solving, scientific observations and experiments. Popper always insisted on this distinction between the logical aspect and methodological aspect of science. In Realism and the Aim of Science, Popper speaks of a "preferred" theory, not of a "true" or a "false" theory, when one theory is chosen over another given experimental results.
Tarski's semantic theory of truth
Alfred Tarski inspired Popper with his semantic theory of truth.
In the early twentieth century, discussions of the truth of statements addressed different aspects, including the correspondence of statements with reality, their coherence with other statements, and their practical role in inquiry. Correspondence was an important way of conceiving truth because it made the truth of a statement depend on what was actually the case, independently of what was believed about it. However, for both Russell and Tarski, this conception encounters a fundamental difficulty: it is unclear what a relation of correspondence between a linguistic statement and reality could consist in, or how such a relation could constitute the statement's truth.
The same obstacle lay at the heart of the Vienna Circle's discussions of protocol statements, although its members differed over how it should be addressed. In his first major work in the philosophy of science, before Tarski published his work on truth, Popper had already described the same obstacle: logical justification can relate a statement only to other statements, whereas an appeal to experience or to “immediate knowledge” introduces a subjective and psychological element.In The Logic of Scientific Discovery, he observed that statements can be logically justified only by other statements, while the relation between basic statements and perceptual experiences remained obscure.
Tarski had shown how truth could be defined for certain formalized languages by means of a metalanguage in which it was possible to speak both of the expressions of the language under study and of their satisfaction in an interpretation. He nevertheless presented this conception as neutral with respect to metaphysical positions such as realism and idealism. Tarski's conception provided no general criterion for determining whether a statement corresponds to the facts.
Nevertheless, Popper wrote that Tarski's semantic theory had rehabilitated the conception of objective truth as correspondence with facts, recognizing that this truth could not be inferred from the empirical criteria used to evaluate a theory. Popper was aware that Tarski presented his semantic conception as philosophically neutral, but rejected this assessment and regarded Tarski's result as supporting a realist perspective: it made it possible to distinguish the objective truth of a theory from the always fallible reasons for preferring it. For Popper, the role of methodology was to compensate, at the practical level, for the absence of a general criterion by which correspondence with the facts could be established: guided by truth as a regulative ideal, methodology subjected theories to criticism and to tests capable of revealing their errors.
Popper also related certain distinctions in the philosophy of science to the semantic organization proposed by Tarski. In Realism and the Aim of Science, he thus distinguishes the logical versions of the problem of induction from its metaphysical versions: the latter belong, in his view, to a “meta-theory of physics”, which he compares to what Tarski calls the “semantics of physics”.
The role of methodology
Popper wrote that the bulk of scientific activity takes place in its logical part, using deductive logic to check the consistency of a theory, compare theories, check their empirical nature (i.e., falsifiability) and, most importantly, test a theory, which is possible only when it is falsifiable. He emphasized that, even when theories are tested against observations, deductive logic is largely used.
However, for Popper, this logical part of science must be integrated within an adequate methodology. Popper and the members of the Vienna Circle agreed that only statements can be used to justify statements, that is, the use of logic alone in science will not be linked to (empirical, not propositional) evidence. Logic uses accepted or provisionally accepted observation statements to determine whether a theory is logically refuted or not, but the "accepted" observation statement could be empirically false and that will not concern the logical part.
Popper wrote that any criterion, including his famous falsifiability criterion, that applies solely on the logical structure could not alone define science. In The Logic of Scientific Discovery, he wrote that "it is impossible to decide, by analysing its logical form [as do the falsifiability criterion], whether a system of statements is a conventional system of irrefutable implicit definitions, or whether it is a system which is empirical in my sense; that is, a refutable system". Popper insisted that falsifiability is a logical criterion, which must be understood in the context of a proper methodology.
Popper's methodology proposes the adoption of specific procedures and modes of behavior that align with our aim of finding the truth (not in the Nietzschean sense) or advancing knowledge.
Lakatos described the aspects of scientific methodology leading to the rejection of research programs and their theories
This methodology proposes favoring the most falsifiable theories, but Popper explains that it is not itself falsifiable. Regarding the rule favoring the most falsifiable (least probable) statements, Popper wrote: "it is a mistake to say [...] that I have ever proposed an improbability criterion for the choice of scientific hypotheses: not only do I have no general 'criterion', it happens quite often that I cannot prefer the logically 'better' and more improbable hypothesis, because somebody succeeded in refuting it experimentally". The rule is nevertheless practical, because it says that in "many cases, the more improbable hypothesis is preferable".
Lakatos’s vision of scientific methodology (akin to Popper’s) was a set of informal, implicit conventions guiding all decisions surrounding logical work—which experiments to conduct, which apparatus to build, which field to fund, and so on.
Popper's philosophy was criticized as if the logical part existed alone. For example, Putnam attributed to Popper "the fantasy of doing science using only deductive logic". Putnam further criticized Popper's description of the logical part of science by referring to methodological problems. For example, he wrote: "I claim: in a great many important cases, scientific theories do not imply predictions at all." Because Popper does not believe in inductive logic, Wesley Salmon wrote that, for Popper, "there is no ampliative form of scientific argument, and consequently, science provides no information whatever about the future". Regarding the methodological part, Feyerabend wrote that there is no method in science. He considered and rejected methodological rules, but they were those of a naive falsificationist.
In contrast, Popper emphasized both parts of science and spoke of methodology as a means of correctly using falsifiability and the usual logical work in science to make it useful in a method of conjectures and refutations to be used in usual critical discussions. Falsifiability says hypotheses should be consistent and they should logically lead to predictions, which confrontation with observations should be considered in critical thinking.
Marxism and politics
Adolf Hitler giving speech on March 15, 1938 in Heldenplatz, three days after the Anschluss.
The failure of democratic parties to prevent fascism from taking over Austrian politics in the 1920s and 1930s traumatised Popper. He suffered from the direct consequences of this failure. Events after the Anschluss (the annexation of Austria by the German Reich in 1938) prompted him to refocus his writings on social and political philosophy. His most important works in the field of social science—The Poverty of Historicism (1944) and The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945)—were inspired by his reflection on the events of his time and represented, in a sense, a reaction to the prevalent totalitarian ideologies that then dominated Central European politics. His books defended democratic liberalism as a social and political philosophy. They also represented extensive critiques of the philosophical presuppositions underpinning all forms of totalitarianism.
Earlier in his life, the death of friends in a demonstration instigated by the communists when he was about seventeen strongly contributed to Popper's position regarding the search for contradictions or criticisms and the attitude of taking them into account. He had at one point joined a socialist association, and for a few months in 1919 considered himself a communist. Although it is known that Popper worked as an office boy at the communist headquarters, whether or not he ever became a member of the Communist Party is unclear. During this time he became familiar with the Marxist view of economics, class conflict, and history. He blamed Marxism, which thesis, Popper recalls, "is that although the revolution may claim some victims, capitalism is claiming more victims than the whole socialist revolution". He asked himself "whether such a calculation could ever be supported by 'science'". He then decided that criticism was important in science. This, Popper wrote, made him "a fallibilist", and impressed on him "the value of intellectual modesty". It made him "most conscious of the differences between dogmatic and critical thinking".
Psychoanalysis
Sigmund Freud developed the theories of "Psychoanalysis". Popper considered these theories to be unscientific because they were not falsifiable.
Popper saw a contrast between the theories of Sigmund Freud and Alfred Adler, which he considered unscientific, and Albert Einstein's theory of relativity which sparked the revolution in physics in the early 20th century. Popper believed that Einstein's theory, as a theory properly grounded in scientific thought and method, was highly "risky", in the sense that it was possible to deduce consequences from it that differed considerably from those of the then-dominant Newtonian physics. One such prediction, that gravity could deflect light, was verified by Eddington'sexperiments in 1919. When he tackled the problem of demarcation in the philosophy of science, he realized that "what made a theory, or a statement, scientific was its power to rule out, or exclude, the occurrence of some possible events—to prohibit, or forbid, the occurrence of these events". He thought that, in contrast, nothing could, even in principle, falsify psychoanalytic theories. This led him to posit that "only attempted refutations which did not succeed qua refutations should count as 'verifications'".
A little later, Popper realized that theories can be "immunized" against falsification using auxiliary hypotheses. In Logik der Forschung, he introduced the notion of "(degrees of) content". He proposed that only modifications that increase the empirical content of a theory should be considered.
In a series of articles beginning in 1979, Adolf Grünbaum argued, with examples, that Freudian psychoanalytic theories are in fact falsifiable. He criticized Popper's analysis of Freud's psychoanalytic theories and, on this basis, questioned the applicability of the demarcation criterion in general.
Falsifiability, probability statement and metaphysics
Popper identified scientific statements with falsifiable statements and distinguished them from metaphysical statements. However, he considered metaphysical statements useful in science. In particular, probabilistic statements are non falsifiable and thus metaphysical in Popper's terminology. There are many other kinds of metaphysical statements that are useful in Popper's view. For examples, "all men are mortal" is metaphysical, because it is not falsifiable, but such statements suggest other hypotheses that are more precise and more useful, for example "all men die before reaching the age of 150". Similarly, probabilistic hypotheses suggest other hypotheses that are falsifiable such as the acceptance criteria for the null hypothesis in a statistical test. As another example: a statistical hypothesis like a chi-square test is not a universal statement; it concerns a specific study, but is falsifiable and thus useful in critical discussions. A probability statement like "the probability of both heads and tails are 1/2" is not falsifiable; Popper called this problem of strengthening probability statements to make them falsifiable (i.e. incompatible with some sequences) and thus not metaphysical "the problem of decidability of probability statements".
Critical thinking, not support
Popper distinguished between trusting a theory because it is true and preferring a theory because it has been more severely tested. Some have argued that, indirectly, Popper was adopting an inductive principle when he proposed to "prefer" a more severely tested theory. For Popper, the term "induction" refers to a logical method of justification, and he emphasized that this preference does not result from such a logical process whose premises would be the results of rigorous tests. For Popper, results of rigorous tests are rather used in critical discussions. He wrote:
[T]here is no "absolute reliance"; but since we have to choose, it will be "rational" to choose the best-tested theory. This will be "rational" in the most obvious sense of the word known to me: the best-tested theory is the one which, in the light of our critical discussion, appears to be the best so far, and I do not know of anything more "rational" than a well-conducted critical discussion.
—Karl Popper, Logik der Forschung (1934)
Moreover, critical discussions must consider how much the theory prohibits and thus is unlikely to survive the tests, as well as whether the theory supersedes previous theories by generalizing them as when speaking of all heavenly bodies instead of only planets. Popper regularly emphasized that criticism in critical discussions requires the use of background knowledge, but rejected the view there will always be a set of assumptions beyond rational assessment. In particular, Popper brought this point in the context of the empirical basis of science, which he compared to a swamp into which it is always possible to drive pillars deeper if a more solid foundation is needed.
The critical rationalism approach to evaluating scientific theories can be generalized to non-scientific domains. Critical rationalists hold that any claims to knowledge can and should be rationally criticized, and, if they have empirical content, can and should be subjected to tests which may falsify them. They are either falsifiable and thus empirical (in a very broad sense), or not falsifiable and thus non-empirical. The general principle of critical rationalism is the same in both cases: we critically analyze the hypotheses using our "background knowledge". In the case of scientific hypotheses, background knowledge is used while observation statements are discussed or analysed.
In mainstream epistemology, there are different types of knowledge, such as knowing someone or knowing how to drive, each associated with a type of mental and biological phenomenon. Knowledge defined as justified true belief is also a particular type of mental phenomenon. In this case, at the very least, the phenomenon is a belief in a fact identified by a proposition. The proposition in question must also be true, because it is absurd to say that we possess knowledge of something false. The proposition must also be justified.
Defining knowledge as a justified true belief is rarely a foundation accepted without discussion. On the contrary, it often constitutes a starting point for critical analysis based on counterexamples such as those presented by Gettier. For example, Meinong, at the beginning of the 20th century, cites the example of a man disturbed by ringing in his ears coming from his head. He infers that someone is ringing his doorbell when, by chance, someone is. His belief is true and justified by sensory perception, but, in a critical analysis of knowledge, he was simply lucky and doesn't really know that someone is ringing his doorbell. Long before this, similar counterexamples were raised in the Indian tradition and in ancient Greece.
These historical examples suggest that this view of knowledge has always been studied and criticized throughout the long history of philosophy. However, it was only in the mid-20th century that the analysis of knowledge as a justified mental attitude toward a true proposition emerged as a major subject of study in epistemology. According to Sander Verhaegh, prior to this period, Russell, Moore, and others had briefly analyzed knowledge as a justified true belief, but only to reject this project.
In contrast to this emphasis on justifying beliefs, Popper advanced the method of conjectures and refutations, in which beliefs can play a role in choosing a hypothesis or conjecture, but do not interfere with the use of deductive logic to test theories. Popper did not reject the role of beliefs and other subjective aspects in the development of knowledge, but in his methodology, the logical component is deductive and applies directly to conjectures and observational statements, free from psychologism.
This did not prevent authors such as Bredo Johnsen and Paul Tibbetts from criticizing Popper as if he had claimed that logic and methodology were sufficient to explain the development of knowledge. Johnsen points out that Popper explains that the method of error elimination using logical refutations requires that a finite number of theories be studied. He argues that Popper does not explain how one arrives at this finite number of theories. Tibbetts raises the question of "whether Popper’s position can take into account creative insight, discovery, and serendipity in science for these would clearly qualify as subjective phenomena [in Popper's position]".
On this subject, Popper admitted that objective knowledge develops through the individual contributions of researchers and that this depends on their biological predisposition to produce new, working theories: for Popper, “objectivity depended not on neutralizing the scientist’s subjective dispositions– which was, in any case, impossible– but on subjecting all theories to severe testing”. Popper accepted Hume’s conclusion that it is futile to attempt to provide a method to guide or validate the process of discovery. He used the terms “expectations” and “dispositions” to explain the development of knowledge and our mental capacities.
According to Suzan Haack, to support his approach, Popper has to make a problematic distinction between logic and empirical theories.
For her part, Susan Haack criticizes the separation that Popper seems to make between the rules of logic and the mathematical statements forming the empirical laws or axioms of its structures. Regarding the autonomy that Popper attributes to the world of objective knowledge, she writes:
Is not the point just this: that just as the nests, etc., that animals create are subject to natural laws which are not of the animals' creation, so the theories, etc., that we create are subject to logical laws which are not of our making? If this is the point, I think it needs to be said that it is more surprising than it perhaps looks. For it requires Popper to draw a sharp line between empirical science and mathematics, which he explicitly says that we have created, and logic, which, on this interpretation, he must hold to be entirely independent of us.
—Susan Haack, Epistemology with a Knowing Subject, 1979
On this subject, Popper defended an evolutionary view of the whole of human capacities, including our ability to use language and logic in its function of argumentation, but he also specified that this biological aspect did not fall within the field of epistemology.
He accepted that the choice of methodological rules must take into account subjective, moral, or biological aspects such as the limits of human mental capacities, but he compared the rules of scientific methodology to the rules of chess, which can be understood without having to worry about any subjective aspects, apart from the capacity for rational thought and other similar functions. He gave examples that methodology can take into account regarding the activity of a scientist S in relation to a proposition p:
"S tries to understand p."
"S tries to think of alternatives to p."
"S tries to think of criticisms of p."
"S proposes an experimental test for p."
"S tries to axiomatize p."
"S tries to derive p from q."
He added that this is very different from the use of "S knows p" or "S believes p", or even "S wrongly believes p" or "S doubts p" in an analysis of knowledge and its justification.
For Popper, this separation between logic, methodology, and psychological aspects was the concrete reality in science; that is, his methodology, which is normative, is simultaneously descriptive of what he considered to be true scientific activity. He emphasized that a large part of science relies on standard deductive reasoning, even when it comes to comparison with observations. David Miller noted that, for Popper, knowledge is neither justified nor believed, and that, generally, scientific knowledge is not true (in any logical sense). Musgrave wrote that "Popper's theory of science, and his cure for relativism, rest upon his rejection of the traditional theory of knowledge as justified true belief."
Bayesianism vs conjecture and refutation
Use of probability in a verificationist approach, "similar in some ways to that of modern pragmatists and positivists", has been traced back to Carneades. In the first half of the 20th century, Reichenbach and Carnap argued that "the only criterion of theory-confirmation ought to be agreement with observed facts; the theory would thus be the 'most probable' one... within a formal theory of inductive probability". Carnap studies have been related to Bayesianism. Theories are assigned a probability, outcomes also have a probability and, given an outcome, Bayes' theorem can be applied to revise the a priori probability of each theory. Bayes' theorem is useful when we have the background knowledge needed to establish the a priori probability of characteristic parameters of the application domain and the probability of the observed data depends on these parameters: the parameters that fit the data and therefore the domain get revised with a higher probability.
For Gelman (top) and Shalizi (bottom), the application of Bayes' theorem uses the hypothetico-deductive approach to revise models.
This view on the growth of knowledge has been criticized. Andrew Gelman and Cosma Shalizi, for example, wrote that the use of Bayes's theorem in practice is closer to the hypothetico-deductive approach, as proposed by Popper and others, than to the approach according to which the revision of probabilities is the sole consequence of the observed data. In their work, they examine the actual role played by prior distributions in Bayesian models, and the crucial aspects of model checking and model revision, which fall outside the scope of Bayesian confirmation theory.
Critical rationalism is against the use of probability to assess theories. Popper explained that the greater the informative content of a theory the lower will be its probability. The methodological rule is to aim for a bold theory that is likely to be false. He wrote that in "many cases, the more improbable (improbable in the sense of the calculus of probability) hypothesis is preferable".
Popper's break with positivism
The significance of Popper's opposition to logical positivism is disputed. The logical positivists associated empirical meaning with verification or confirmation by experience. Popper instead presented falsifiability as a criterion of empirical scientific status rather than of meaningfulness, accepted that metaphysical statements could be meaningful, and denied that successful predictions establish a theory as true or probable. Corroboration reported how a theory had performed under severe tests; it was not inductive support for believing the theory true or probable.
Historian and philosopher of physics John D. Norton considers that Popper's rejection of confirmation is a "minor" variation of the logical positivists' position.
Some philosophers consider this rejection of confirmation untenable or insufficient to distinguish Popper fundamentally from the positivists. For example, in a teaching context, John D. Norton considers Popper’s rejection of inductivist confirmation in favor of his criterion of refutability to be a “minor variation” of the logical positivists’ position, and describes the differences between the two conceptions as insignificant. In presenting his theory of material induction, Norton acknowledges that Popper "vigorously insisted" that corroboration is not confirmation; however, Norton aligns himself with the tradition holding that Popper's conception can only be reconciled with scientific practice if corroboration provides a "license for belief", a license that must be all the more solid the more robust the corroboration is.
Unlike Norton, Alain Boyer presents Popper’s break with positivism as fundamental. According to Boyer, Popper retains the empiricist requirement that scientific theories be tested against experience, but denies that successful predictions provide inductive justification for their truth or probability. This rejection of an ultimate foundation for knowledge does not mean that experience makes no positive contribution to learning or discovery. On the contrary, Boyer emphasizes that, for Popper, human beings are “seekers of regularities” who generalize and reason by analogy on the basis of fallible expectations, whether innate or acquired; the critical requirement is that the resulting generalizations be subjected to empirical testing. Boyer also contrasts the Vienna Circle's project of eliminating metaphysics through a unified scientific language with Popper's view that metaphysical questions and hypotheses may remain rationally discussable and scientifically useful.
Local induction: material induction and inductive machine
Norton discussed the Popperian rejection of confirmation in the context of his theory of material induction. Popper accepted that, when the appropriate objective conditions obtain, an inductive machine could learn from experience by discovering regularities and by formulating, testing, and eliminating hypotheses. He added that human beings, too, could successfully employ such procedures. He nevertheless denied that the machine could establish that its own objective conditions of application were fulfilled. The machine’s designers could do so, but they first had to determine what constituted the machine’s world, its events, properties, repetitions, and the kinds of questions it was to answer. According to Popper, “all the more important and difficult questions” had thus already been solved when the machine and its world were constructed. The procedure could therefore contribute positively to the discovery of local laws without providing grounds for believing them true or probable, or for believing that the presuppositions making its application possible were actually satisfied.
Boyer, following Popper, sees human beings as seekers of regularities whose projections beyond the data are structured by fallible expectations, whether innate or acquired. He interprets ordinary inductions as context-dependent generalizations that presuppose a local hypothesis concerning the representativeness of the observed sample. According to Boyer, the inductive risk belongs to this local representativeness hypothesis rather than to a universal principle of induction; experience cannot establish its own representativeness.
Norton's material theory makes inductive inferences dependent on contingent, domain-specific facts, but assigns those facts a confirmatory role: his “material postulates” justify inductions and can make them truth-conducive. Secondary accounts characterize Norton's proposal as claiming that material facts both enable and justify inductive inference. Schurz argues that attempts to justify these domain-specific generalizations inductively lead to circularity or an infinite regress.
Gelman and Shalizi describe statistical models as tools for drawing inductive inferences against a “deductive background.” They add that these inferences are deductively guaranteed by the models’ probabilistic assumptions and that their application depends on contingent material facts specific to the system under study, “exactly as Norton argues.” Brandon G. Nielsen and Daniel C. Elton, for their part, argue that any successful application of Bayesian updating must be embedded within a broader evolutionary process. According to them, constructing a useful Bayesian model itself requires a Popperian process of trial and error elimination.
Variations
Mario Bunge's scientific realism draws on Popper's critical rationalism.
The Argentine-Canadian philosopher of science Mario Bunge criticized Popper's critical rationalism, while drawing on it to formulate an account of scientific realism.
The cognitive application of free thought is known as freethinking, and adherents of freethought are known as freethinkers, which the Collins English Dictionary defines as someone "mentally free from the conventional bonds of tradition or dogma, and thinks independently." In some contemporary thought in particular, free thought is strongly tied with rejection of traditional social or religious belief systems. Freethinkers hold that knowledge should be grounded in facts, scientific inquiry, and logic. The skeptical application of science implies freedom from the intellectually limiting effects of confirmation bias, cognitive bias, conventional wisdom, popular culture, prejudice, or sectarianism.
The term first came into use in the 17th century in order to refer to people who inquired into the basis of traditional beliefs which were often accepted unquestioningly. Today, freethinking is most closely linked with agnosticism, deism, secularism, humanism, anti-clericalism, and religious critique.
Definition
Atheist author Adam Lee defines freethought as thinking which is independent of revelation, tradition, established belief, and authority, and considers it as a "broader umbrella" than atheism "that embraces a rainbow of unorthodoxy, religious dissent, skepticism, and unconventional thinking."
The basic summarizing statement of the essay The Ethics of Belief by the 19th-century British mathematician and philosopher William Kingdon Clifford is: "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." The essay became a rallying cry for freethinkers when published in the 1870s, and has been described as a point when freethinkers grabbed the moral high ground. Clifford was himself an organizer of freethought gatherings, the driving force behind the Congress of Liberal Thinkers held in 1878.
Regarding religion, freethinkers typically hold that there is insufficient evidence to support the existence of supernatural phenomena. According to the Freedom from Religion Foundation, "No one can be a freethinker who demands conformity to a bible, creed, or messiah. To the freethinker, revelation and faith are invalid, and orthodoxy is no guarantee of truth." and "Freethinkers are convinced that religious claims have not withstood the tests of reason. Not only is there nothing to be gained by believing an untruth, but there is everything to lose when we sacrifice the indispensable tool of reason on the altar of superstition. Most freethinkers consider religion to be not only untrue, but harmful."
Philosopher Bertrand Russell wrote in his 1944 essay The Value of Free Thought that someone is considered a freethinker only if their beliefs are supported by evidence rather than bias, regardless of how odd their conclusions may seem. According to Russell, a freethinker is not necessarily an atheist or an agnostic, as long as they are free from the "force of tradition" and the "tyranny of [their] own passions".
On the other hand, according to Bertrand Russell, atheists and/or agnostics are not necessarily freethinkers. As an example, he mentions Stalin, whom he compares to a "pope":
what I am concerned with is the doctrine of the modern Communistic Party, and of the Russian Government to which it owes allegiance. According to this doctrine, the world develops on the lines of a Plan called Dialectical Materialism, first discovered by Karl Marx, embodied in the practice of a great state by Lenin, and now expounded from day to day by a Church of which Stalin is the Pope. […] Free discussion is to be prevented wherever the power to do so exists; […] If this doctrine and this organization prevail, free inquiry will become as impossible as it was in the middle ages, and the world will relapse into bigotry and obscurantism.
In the 18th and 19th century, many thinkers regarded as freethinkers were deists, arguing that the nature of God can only be known from a study of nature rather than from religious revelation. In the 18th century, "deism" was as much of a 'dirty word' as "atheism", and deists were often stigmatized as either atheists or at least as freethinkers by their Christian opponents. Deists today regard themselves as freethinkers, but are now arguably less prominent in the freethought movement than atheists.
Characteristics
Tombstone detail of a freethinker, late 19th century (Cemetery of Cullera, Spain)
Among freethinkers, for a notion to be considered true it must be testable, verifiable, and logical. Many freethinkers tend to be humanists, who base morality on human needs and would find meaning in human compassion, social progress, art, personal happiness, love, and the furtherance of knowledge. Generally, freethinkers like to think for themselves, tend to be skeptical, respect critical thinking and reason, remain open to new concepts, and are sometimes proud of their own individuality. They would determine truth for themselves – based upon knowledge they gain, answers they receive, experiences they have and the balance they thus acquire. Freethinkers reject conformity for the sake of conformity, whereby they create their own beliefs by considering the way the world around them works and would possess the intellectual integrity and courage to think outside of accepted norms, which may or may not lead them to believe in some higher power.
The pansy serves as the long-established and enduring symbol of freethought; literature of the American Secular Union inaugurated its usage in the late 1800s. The reasoning behind the pansy as the symbol of freethought lies both in the flower's name and in its appearance. The pansy derives its name from the French word pensée, which means "thought". It allegedly received this name because the flower is perceived by some to bear resemblance to a human face, and in mid-to-late summer it nods forward as if deep in thought. In the 1880s, following examples set by freethinkers in France, Belgium, Spain and Sweden, it was proposed in the United States as "the symbol of religious liberty and freedom of conscience".
History
Modern freethinkers, despite their pronounced rejection of tradition, consider several historical movements, developments and individuals as pre-modern precursors, such as critical thought in Ancient Greece, repositories of knowledge and wisdom in Ireland and in the Iranian civilizations (for example in the era of Khayyam (1048–1131) and his unorthodox SufiRubaiyat poems). Later societies made advances on freedom of thought such as the Chinese (note for example the seafaring renaissance of the Southern Song dynasty of 1127–1279), on through heretical thinkers on esoteric alchemy or astrology, to the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation pioneered by Martin Luther.
French physician Rabelais (died 1553) celebrated "rabelaisian" freedom as well as good feasting and drinking (an expression and a symbol of freedom of the mind) in defiance of the hypocrisies of conformistorthodoxy in his utopianThelema Abbey (from θέλημα: free "will"), the device of which was Do What Thou Wilt:
So had Gargantua established it. In all their rule and strictest tie of their order there was but this one clause to be observed, Do What Thou Wilt; because free people ... act virtuously and avoid vice. They call this honor.
When Rabelais's hero Pantagruel journeys to the "Oracle of The Div(in)e Bottle", he learns the lesson of life in one simple word: "Trinch!", Drink! Enjoy the simple life, learn wisdom and knowledge, as a free human. Beyond puns, irony, and satire, Gargantua's prologue-metaphor instructs the reader to "break the bone and suck out the substance-full marrow" ("la substantifique moëlle"), the core of wisdom.
Prior to World War II, Australia had high rates of Protestantism and Catholicism. Post-war Australia has become a highly secularised country. Donald Horne, one of Australia's well-known public intellectuals, believed rising prosperity in post-war Australia influenced the decline in church-going and general lack of interest in religion. "Churches no longer matter very much to most Australians. If there is a happy eternal life it's for everyone ... For many Australians the pleasures of this life are sufficiently satisfying that religion offers nothing of great appeal", said Horne in his landmark work The Lucky Country (1964).
Canada
In 1873, a handful of secularists founded the earliest known secular organization in English Canada, the Toronto Freethought Association. Reorganized in 1877 and again in 1881, when it was renamed the Toronto Secular Society, the group formed the nucleus of the Canadian Secular Union, established in 1884 to bring together freethinkers from across the country.
A significant number of the early members appear to have come from the educated labour "aristocracy", including Alfred F. Jury, J. Ick Evans and J. I. Livingstone, all of whom were leading labour activists and secularists. The second president of the Toronto association, T. Phillips Thompson, became a central figure in the city's labour and social-reform movements during the 1880s and 1890s and arguably Canada's foremost late nineteenth-century labour intellectual. By the early 1880s scattered freehought organizations operated throughout southern Ontario and parts of Quebec, eliciting both urban and rural support.
The principal organ of the freethought movement in Canada was Secular Thought (Toronto, 1887–1911). Founded and edited during its first several years by English freethinker Charles Watts (1835–1906), it came under the editorship of Toronto printer and publisher James Spencer Ellis in 1891 when Watts returned to England. In 1968 the Humanist Association of Canada (HAC) formed to serve as an umbrella group for humanists, atheists, and freethinkers, and to champion social justice issues and oppose religious influence on public policy—most notably in the fight to make access to abortion free and legal in Canada.
France
Hommage aux morts de la Libre-pensée, 1881
In France, the concept first appeared in publication in 1765 when Denis Diderot, Jean le Rond d'Alembert, and Voltaire included an article on Liberté de penser in their Encyclopédie. The concept of freethought spread so widely that even places as remote as the Jotunheimen, in Norway, had well-known freethinkers such as Jo Gjende by the 19th century.
The 19th century saw the emergence of a specific notion of Libre-Pensée ("freethought"), with writer Victor Hugo as one of its major early proponents. French Freethinkers (Libre-Penseurs) associate freedom of thought, political anti-clericalism and socialist leanings. The main organisation referring to this tradition to this day is the Fédération nationale de la libre pensée, created in 1890.
Germany
Jugendweihe is a German coming of age ceremony. Photograph from early 20th century.
In Germany, during the period 1815–1848 and before the March Revolution, the resistance of citizens against the dogma of the church increased. In 1844, under the influence of Johannes Ronge and Robert Blum, belief in the rights of man, tolerance among men, and humanism grew, and by 1859 they had established the Bund Freireligiöser Gemeinden Deutschlands (literally Union of Free Religious Communities of Germany), an association of persons who consider themselves to be religious without adhering to any established and institutionalized church or sacerdotal cult. This union still exists today, and is included as a member in the umbrella organization of free humanists. In 1881 in Frankfurt am Main, Ludwig Büchner established the Deutscher Freidenkerbund (German Freethinkers League) as the first German organization for atheists and agnostics. In 1892 the Freidenker-Gesellschaft and in 1906 the Deutscher Monistenbund were formed.
Freethought organizations developed the "Jugendweihe" (literally Youth consecration), a secular "confirmation" ceremony, and atheist funeral rites. The Union of Freethinkers for Cremation was founded in 1905, and the Central Union of German Proletariat Freethinker in 1908. The two groups merged in 1927, becoming the German Freethinking Association in 1930.
More "bourgeois" organizations declined after World War I, and "proletarian" freethought groups proliferated, becoming an organization of socialist parties. European socialist freethought groups formed the International of Proletarian Freethinkers (IPF) in 1925. Activists agitated for Germans to disaffiliate from their respective Church and for secularization of elementary schools; between 1919–1921 and 1930–1932 more than 2.5 million Germans, for the most part supporters of the Social Democratic and Communist parties, gave up church membership. Conflict developed between radical forces including the Soviet League of the Militant Godless and Social Democratic forces in Western Europe led by Theodor Hartwig and Max Sievers. In 1930 the Soviet and allied delegations, following a walk-out, took over the IPF and excluded the former leaders. Following Hitler's rise to power in 1933, most freethought organizations were banned, though some right-wing groups that worked with so-called Völkische Bünde (literally "ethnic" associations with nationalist, xenophobic and very often racist ideology) were tolerated by the Nazis until the mid-1930s.
Ireland
In the 19th century, received opinion was scandalized by George Ensor (1769–1843). His Review of the Miracles, Prophecies, & Mysteries of the Old and New Testaments (1835) argued that, far from being a source of moral teaching, revealed religion and its divines regarded questions of morality as "incidental"--as a "mundane and merely philosophical" topic.
Netherlands
The Dutch magazine De Vrijdenker (The Freethinker) 2015
In the Netherlands, freethought has existed in organized form since the establishment of De Dageraad (now known as De Vrije Gedachte) in 1856. Among its most notable subscribing 19th century individuals were Johannes van Vloten, Multatuli, Adriaan Gerhard and Domela Nieuwenhuis.
In 2009, Frans van Dongen established the Atheist-Secular Party, which takes a considerably restrictive view of religion and public religious expressions.
Since the 19th century, freethought in the Netherlands has become more well known as a political phenomenon through at least three currents: liberal freethinking, conservative freethinking, and classical freethinking. In other words, parties which identify as freethinking tend to favor non-doctrinal, rational approaches to their preferred ideologies, and arose as secular alternatives to both clerically aligned parties as well as labor-aligned parties. Common themes among freethinking political parties are "freedom", "liberty", and "individualism".
With the introduction of cantonal church taxes in the 1870s, anti-clericals began to organise themselves. Around 1870, a "freethinkers club" was founded in Zürich. During the debate on the Zürich church law in 1883, professor Friedrich Salomon Vögelin and city council member Kunz proposed to separate church and state.
In the last years of the Ottoman Empire, freethought made its voice heard by the works of distinguished people such as Ahmet Rıza, Tevfik Fikret, Abdullah Cevdet, Kılıçzade Hakkı, and Celal Nuri İleri. These intellectuals affected the early period of the Turkish Republic. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk –field marshal, revolutionary statesman, author, and founder of the secular Turkish nation state, serving as its first President from 1923 until his death in 1938– was the practitioner of their ideas. He made many reforms that modernized the country. Sources point out that Atatürk was a religious skeptic and a freethinker. He was a non-doctrinaire deist or an atheist, who was antireligious and anti-Islamic in general. According to Atatürk, the Turkish people do not know what Islam really is and do not read the Quran. People are influenced by Arabic sentences that they do not understand, and because of their customs they go to mosques. When the Turks read the Quran and think about it, they will leave Islam. Atatürk described Islam as the religion of the Arabs in his own work titled Vatandaş için Medeni Bilgiler by his own critical and nationalist views.
Association of Atheism (Ateizm Derneği), the first official atheist organisation in Middle East and Caucasus, was founded in 2014. It serves to support irreligious people and freethinkers in Turkey who are discriminated against based on their views. In 2018 it was reported in some media outlets that the Ateizm Derneği would close down because of the pressure on its members and attacks by pro-government media, but the association itself issued a clarification that this was not the case and that it was still active.
United Kingdom
The term freethinker emerged towards the end of the 17th century in England to describe those who stood in opposition to the institution of the Church, and the literal belief in the Bible. The beliefs of these individuals were centered on the concept that people could understand the world through consideration of nature. Such positions were formally documented for the first time in 1697 by William Molyneux in a widely publicized letter to John Locke, and more extensively in 1713, when Anthony Collins wrote his Discourse of Free-thinking, which gained substantial popularity. This essay attacks the clergy of all churches and it is a plea for deism.
The Freethinker magazine was first published in Britain in 1881; it continued in print until 2014, and still exists as a web-based publication.
The freethought movement first organized itself in the United States as the "Free Press Association" in 1827 in defense of George Houston, publisher of The Correspondent, an early journal of Biblical criticism in an era when blasphemy convictions were still possible. Houston had helped found an Owenite community at Haverstraw, New York in 1826–27. The short-lived Correspondent was superseded by the Free Enquirer, the official organ of Robert Owen's New Harmony community in Indiana, edited by Robert Dale Owen and by Fanny Wright between 1828 and 1832 in New York. During this time Robert Dale Owen sought to introduce the philosophic skepticism of the Freethought movement into the Workingmen's Party in New York City. The Free Enquirer's annual civic celebrations of Paine's birthday after 1825 finally coalesced in 1836 in the first national freethinkers organization, the "United States Moral and Philosophical Society for the General Diffusion of Useful Knowledge". It was founded on August 1, 1836, at a national convention at the Lyceum in Saratoga Springs with Isaac S. Smith of Buffalo, New York, as president. Smith was also the 1836 Equal Rights Party's candidate for Governor of New York and had also been the Workingmen's Party candidate for Lt. Governor of New York in 1830. The Moral and Philosophical Society published The Beacon, edited by Gilbert Vale.
Driven by the revolutions of 1848 in the German states, the 19th century saw an immigration of German freethinkers and anti-clericalists to the United States (see Forty-Eighters). In the United States, they hoped to be able to live by their principles, without interference from government and church authorities.
Many Freethinkers settled in German immigrant strongholds, including St. Louis, Indianapolis, Wisconsin, and Texas, where they founded the town of Comfort, Texas, as well as others.
These groups of German Freethinkers referred to their organizations as Freie Gemeinden, or "free congregations". The first Freie Gemeinde was established in St. Louis in 1850. Others followed in Pennsylvania, California, Washington, D.C., New York, Illinois, Wisconsin, Texas, and other states.
Freethinkers tended to be liberal, espousing ideals such as racial, social, and sexual equality, and the abolition of slavery.
The "Golden Age of Freethought" in the US came in the late 1800s. The dominant organization was the National Liberal League which formed in 1876 in Philadelphia. This group re-formed itself in 1885 as the American Secular Union under the leadership of the eminent agnostic orator Robert G. Ingersoll. Following Ingersoll's death in 1899 the organization declined, in part due to lack of effective leadership.
Freethought in the United States declined in the early twentieth century. By the early twentieth century, most freethought congregations had disbanded or joined other mainstream churches. The longest continuously operating freethought congregation in America is the Free Congregation of Sauk County, Wisconsin, which was founded in 1852 and is still active as of 2020. It affiliated with the American Unitarian Association (now the Unitarian Universalist Association) in 1955. D. M. Bennett was the founder and publisher of The Truth Seeker in 1873, a radical freethought and reform American periodical.
"freethought was a basically anti-Christian, anti-clerical movement, whose purpose was to make the individual politically and spiritually free to decide for himself on religious matters. A number of contributors to Liberty were prominent figures in both freethought and anarchism. The American individualist anarchist George MacDonald [(1857–1944)] was a co-editor of Freethought and, for a time, The Truth Seeker. E. C. Walker was co-editor of the freethought/free love journal Lucifer, the Light-Bearer."
"Many of the anarchists were ardent freethinkers; reprints from freethought papers such as Lucifer, the Light-Bearer, Freethought and The Truth Seeker appeared in Liberty...The church was viewed as a common ally of the state and as a repressive force in and of itself."
European tradition
The Boletín de la Escuela Moderna, 1905, edited by Francisco Ferrer
In Europe, a similar development occurred in French and Spanish individualist anarchist circles:
"Anticlericalism, just as in the rest of the libertarian movement, in another of the frequent elements which will gain relevance related to the measure in which the (French) Republic begins to have conflicts with the church...Anti-clerical discourse, frequently called for by the French individualist André Lorulot [(1885–1963)], will have its impacts in Estudios (a Spanish individualist anarchist publication). There will be an attack on institutionalized religion for the responsibility that it had in the past on negative developments, for its irrationality which makes it a counterpoint of philosophical and scientific progress. There will be a criticism of proselytism and ideological manipulation which happens on both believers and agnostics".
These tendencies would continue in French individualist anarchism in the work and activism of Charles-Auguste Bontemps (1893–1981) and others. In the Spanish individualist anarchist magazines Ética and Iniciales
"there is a strong interest in publishing scientific news, usually linked to a certain atheist and anti-theist obsession, philosophy which will also work for pointing out the incompatibility between science and religion, faith, and reason. In this way, there will be a lot of talk on Charles Darwin's theories or on the negation of the existence of the soul".
In 1901, the Catalan anarchist and freethinker Francesc Ferrer i Guàrdia established "modern" or progressive schools in Barcelona in defiance of an educational system controlled by the Catholic Church. The schools had the stated goal to "educate the working class in a rational, secular and non-coercive setting". Fiercely anti-clerical, Ferrer believed in "freedom in education", education free from the authority of church and state. Ferrer's ideas, generally, formed the inspiration for a series of Modern Schools in the United States, Cuba, South America, and London. The first of these started in New York City in 1911. Ferrer also inspired the Italian newspaper Università popolare, founded in 1901.
In Freemasonry
Freemasonry served an important purpose in the spreading of the freethinking movement. Freemason lodges in 18th century Europe served as sites for enlightenment thinking and discussion of new ideas, helping spread freethought philosophies. The informal, secretive nature of the lodges allowed intellectuals and elites to gather and debate radical topics away from the scrutiny of church and state.
Freemasonry attracted many freethinkers and became a hub of the movement, during the Enlightenment era due to its emphasis on inclusive membership, logic, rationalism, and religious tolerance. Freemasonry's origins from stonemason guilds meant its symbolism and rituals drew on concepts from the Trivium and Quadrivium, they include the Mastery of Grammar, Rhetoric, logic then mastery of arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy as well as other arts such as the mechanical arts, reflecting Enlightenment ideals in the goal of making its members Masters of their thoughts and opinions thus making them Freethinkers. This distinguished Freemasonry from other fraternal orders focused on chivalry or Christian morality.
Due to Freemasonry utilizing extensive symbols and allegories related to mathematics, geometry, and architecture, conveying the importance of reason and science, and the central Masonic symbol of the compass and square represented logic and rigor as well references to the "Great Architect of the Universe", these concepts were interpreted as a deist scientific creator by Enlightenment freethinkers.
Influential early Speculative Masonic writings by James Anderson and Jean-Theophile Desaguliers frequently cited Isaac Newton and promoted Newtonian scientific ideas. Desaguliers was a close friend and student of Newton, further spreading Newton's theories to lodges. Geometry textbooks and lectures were common in early lodges, aligning with Enlightenment interest in mathematics and science.
Freemasonry's multi-tiered system of initiation rituals allegorically used the tools, stages, and concepts of architecture and mechanics to represent enlightenment and self-improvement through education and reason. This resonated with freethinkers' belief in perfecting society through spreading knowledge.
Religious tolerance
In 1889, a statue of Giordano Bruno was erected at the site of his execution, by freethinkers from several countries.
Unlike most contemporary fraternal orders, Freemasonry did not require its members to follow a specific religious creed. This openness allowed men of diverse faiths, including deists, to join local lodges throughout Europe and America in the Enlightenment era allowing Freethought to flourish. While utilizing religious imagery and themes, Freemasonry intentionally avoided dogmatic disputes and focused its moral lessons on shared values of virtue, charity, and righteousness thereby allowing its members to think for themselves.
This religious tolerance attracted Enlightenment thinkers, like Voltaire, who viewed organized religion as upholding oppressive traditional monarchs and hindering freethought. Benjamin Franklin praised Masonic principles of "liberality, tolerance and unity in essentials, leaving each Brother to his own opinions on non-essentials" in his writings.
Political liberalism
Many Enlightenment freethinkers perceived established dogmas as oppressing freethought. Consequently, the secrecy and hierarchical Initiatory structure of Freemasonry alarmed some authoritarian states, concerned it could encourage free and revolutionary ideas.
However, most Masonic lodges mainly aimed to promote morality, sociability, freedom and philanthropic causes rather than radical politics. Values of freethinking, liberty, equality, and opposition to tyranny were also celebrated in Masonic rituals and writings, many rituals have for motto "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity". This intellectual spirit likely contributed to many Freemasons supporting independence movements and participating as Founding Fathers of the United States.
In the 19th and 20th centuries, some authoritarian states were against Freemasonry, suspecting it of encouraging freethinking philosophies and suppressed Masonic lodges and members.
Pursuit of mastery
A core goal of Freemasonry's initiatory system is to guide people's intellectual and moral development towards mastery and self enlightenment. Masonic rituals and degrees symbolically depict the passage from an Apprentice to Fellowcraft to Master Mason as a metaphor for independent learning and self-improvement to the goal of becoming a Master of himself, thus a full freethinker.
Attaining mastery is presented as freeing someone's mind from blind reliance on authorities and dogmas so they can autonomously reason and have educated opinions. The perfectibility of human nature through education and liberty is a key theme. This aligns with freethinkers' views on thinking for oneself using logic and empiricism.
However, this does not mean that a Freemason cannot follow a dogma rather that as a freethinker, the Mason can, if they want, decide to follow a dogma on their own free will and accord, not because they are told to do so but by their own enlightened choice.