Compatibilism

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compatibilism

Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible and that it is possible to believe in both without being logically inconsistent. The opposing belief, that the thesis of determinism is logically incompatible with the classical thesis of free will, is known as "incompatibilism".

Compatibilists often believe that freedom can be present or absent in situations for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics. In other words, that causal determinism does not exclude the truth of possible future outcomes. Because free will is often seen as a necessary prerequisite for moral responsibility, compatibilism is commonly used to support compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.

Similarly, political liberty is a non-metaphysical concept. Statements of political liberty, such as the United States Bill of Rights, assume moral liberty: the ability to choose to do otherwise than what one does.

History

Compatibilism was championed by the ancient Stoics and some medieval scholastics. More specifically, scholastics like Thomas Aquinas and later Thomists (such as Domingo Báñez) are often interpreted as holding that human action can be free, even though an agent in some strong sense could not do otherwise than what they did. Whereas Aquinas is often interpreted to maintain rational compatibilism (i.e., an action can be determined by rational cognition and yet free), later Thomists, such as Báñez, develop a sophisticated theory of theological determinism, according to which actions of free agents, despite being free, are, on a higher level, determined by infallible divine decrees manifested in the form of "physical premotion" (praemotio physica), a deterministic intervention of God into the will of a free agent required to reduce the will from potency to act. A strong incompatibilist view of freedom was, on the other hand, developed in the Franciscan tradition, especially by Duns Scotus, and later upheld and further developed by Jesuits, especially Luis de Molina and Francisco Suárez. In the early modern era, compatibilism was maintained by Age of Enlightenment philosophers such as David Hume and Thomas Hobbes.

During the 20th century, compatibilists presented novel arguments that differed from the classical arguments of Hume, Hobbes, and John Stuart Mill. Importantly, Harry Frankfurt popularized what are now known as Frankfurt counterexamples to argue for semicompatibilism, the view that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility regardless of its compatibility with free will, and developed a positive account of semicompatibilism based on higher-order volitions. Other "new compatibilists" include Gary Watson, Susan R. Wolf, P. F. Strawson, Kadri Vihvelin, and R. Jay Wallace. Contemporary compatibilists range from the philosopher and cognitive scientist Daniel Dennett, particularly in his works Elbow Room (1984) and Freedom Evolves (2003), to the existentialist philosopher Frithjof Bergmann. Perhaps the most renowned contemporary defender of semicompatibilism is John Martin Fischer. Other semicompatibilists include David P. Hunt and Alfred Mele.

A 2020 survey found that 59% of English-publishing philosophers accept or lean towards compatibilism.

Defining free will

Arthur Schopenhauer

Compatibilists often define an instance of "free will" as one in which the agent had the freedom to act according to their own motivation. That is, the agent was not coerced or restrained. Arthur Schopenhauer famously said: "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills". In other words, although an agent may often be free to act according to a motive, the nature of that motive is determined. This definition of free will does not rely on the truth or falsity of causal determinism. This view also makes free will close to autonomy, the ability to live according to one's own rules, as opposed to being submitted to external domination.

Daniel Dennett expands on this idea in his book Elbow Room, arguing that in seeking free will we must consider what exactly is desired in the concept of free will. He argues that if one becomes convinced of the need for some capacity, such as the ability to have done otherwise, it is because we have become convinced that this capacity is necessary "for the sort of free will that any responsible, dignified, moral agent must have." Dennett then says the following regarding what is requested of free will:

What we want when we want free will is the power to decide our courses of action, and to decide them wisely, in light of our expectations and desires. We want to be in control of ourselves, and not under the control of others.

(. . .)

We want, moreover, to have enough elbow room in the world so that when we exercise these powers, it is not always a matter of settling for the only desperate course of action that has a chance of fulfilling our desires.

— Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room, p. 184

Dennett argues that determinism itself does not restrict us from reaching or accomplishing any of that which we seek out of free will, and so determinism is compatible with free will, or at least any "free will worth wanting"

Alternatives as imaginary

Schrödinger's door: Saying "there may be a person behind that door" merely expresses ignorance about the one, determined reality.

Some compatibilists hold both causal determinism (all effects have causes) and logical determinism (the future is already determined) to be true. Thus statements about the future (e.g., "it will rain tomorrow") are either true or false when spoken today. This compatibilist free will should not be understood as the ability to choose differently in an identical situation. A compatibilist may believe that a person can decide between several choices, but the choice is always determined by external factors. If the compatibilist says "I may visit tomorrow, or I may not", he is saying that he does not know what he will choose—whether he will choose to follow the subconscious urge to go or not.

Non-naturalism

Not to be confused with Religious naturalism.

Alternatives to strictly naturalist physics, such as mind–body dualism positing a mind or soul existing apart from one's body while perceiving, thinking, choosing freely, and as a result acting independently on the body, include both traditional religious metaphysics and less common newer compatibilist concepts. Also consistent with both autonomy and Darwinism, they allow for free personal agency based on practical reasons within the laws of physics. While less popular among 21st-century philosophers, non-naturalist compatibilism is present in most if not almost all religions.

Dispositional account

Kadri Vihvelin offers a dispositional account of free will, which hinges on how we interpret the "can" in “We have free will only if we can choose otherwise”. To have free will is to make choices on the basis of reasons, and to possess this ability, according to Vihvelin, is to have a bundle of dispositions. Dispositions include things like being able to speak a language or run or walk. They also include dispositions required to choose, such as the capacity to form and revise beliefs in light of evidence or argument, and to form intentions in response to desires.

Someone who speaks both English and French could choose to speak English at a given moment; however, even if determinism holds, they still had the disposition to speak French at that time – the disposition didn’t vanish. Similarly, according to Vihvelin’s argument, someone who makes a particular decision also retains the bundle of disposition to have chosen otherwise – that capacity isn’t lost simply because one option was selected. This is how they could have chosen otherwise, and why they have free will.

Criticism

Compatibilism has much in common with "hard determinism", including moral systems and a belief in determinism itself.

The prominent critics of compatibilism are Peter van Inwagen and Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad.

Critics of compatibilism often focus on the definitions of free will: incompatibilists may agree that the compatibilists are showing something to be compatible with determinism, but they think that this something ought not to be called "free will". Incompatibilists might accept the "freedom to act" as a necessary criterion for free will, but doubt that it is sufficient. The incompatibilists believe that free will refers to genuine (i.e., absolute, ultimate, physical) alternate possibilities for beliefs, desires, or actions, rather than merely counterfactual ones.

Seyyed Jaaber Mousavirad argues against compatibilism by maintaining that it conflicts with two fundamental human intuitions. First, individuals intuitively apprehend that they possess not only the ability to perform an action but also the genuine ability to refrain from it. Second, moral responsibility is intelligible only if an agent has the capacity to do otherwise. Consequently, the compatibilist claim that human beings can lack the ability to refrain from acting while nevertheless remaining free and morally responsible is conceptually incoherent. Although compatibilists may redefine free will as the ability to act in accordance with one’s desires in the absence of external impediments, such a redefinition merely stipulates a new meaning rather than capturing the intuitive conception of free will that underlies moral responsibility. Furthermore, if compatibilists reject the epistemic authority of intuition, they undermine their own position, since they themselves rely on intuitive judgments in explaining freedom. Finally, their distinction between determinism arising from the laws of nature and determinism resulting from internal or external constraints lacks adequate justification, as there is no principled reason to treat these forms of determinism differently with respect to free will and moral responsibility. Compatibilism, therefore, fails to provide a coherent account of free will and moral responsibility and instead rests on an unwarranted redefinition of the concept of free will.

The direct predecessor to compatibilism was soft determinism (a term coined by William James, which he used pejoratively). Soft determinism is the view that we (ordinary humans) have free will and determinism is true. (Compatibilists, by contrast, take no stand on the truth-value of determinism.) James accused the soft determinists of creating a "quagmire of evasion" by stealing the name of freedom to mask their underlying determinism. Immanuel Kant called it a "wretched subterfuge" and "word jugglery". Kant's argument introduces the view that, while all empirical phenomena must result from determining causes, human thought introduces something seemingly not found elsewhere in nature—the ability to conceive of the world in terms of how it ought to be, or how it might otherwise be. For Kant, subjective reasoning is necessarily distinct from how the world is empirically. Because of its capacity to distinguish is from ought, reasoning can "spontaneously" originate new events without being itself determined by what already exists. It is on this basis that Kant argues against a version of compatibilism in which, for instance, the actions of the criminal are comprehended as a blend of determining forces and free choice, which Kant regards as misusing the word free. Kant proposes that taking the compatibilist view involves denying the distinctly subjective capacity to re-think an intended course of action in terms of what ought to happen.

Rayleigh–Jeans law

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rayleigh%E2%80%93Jeans_law 

Comparison of Rayleigh–Jeans law with Wien approximation and Planck's law, for a body of 5800 K temperature

In physics, the Rayleigh–Jeans law is an approximation to the spectral radiance of electromagnetic radiation as a function of wavelength from a black body at a given temperature through classical arguments. For wavelength λ, it is $${\displaystyle B_{\lambda }(T)=\frac{2c{k}_{\text{B}}T}{{\lambda }^4},}$$ where ${\displaystyle B_{\lambda }}$ is the spectral radiance (the power emitted per unit emitting area, per steradian, per unit wavelength), ${\displaystyle c}$ is the speed of light, ${\displaystyle k_{\text{B}}}$ is the Boltzmann constant, and ${\displaystyle T}$ is the temperature in kelvins. For frequency ${\displaystyle \nu }$, the expression is instead $${\displaystyle B_{\nu }(T)=\frac{2{\nu }^2{k}_{\text{B}}T}{c^2}.}$$

The Rayleigh–Jeans law agrees with experimental results at large wavelengths (low frequencies) but strongly disagrees at short wavelengths (high frequencies). This inconsistency between observations and the predictions of classical physics is commonly known as the ultraviolet catastrophe. Planck's law, which gives the correct radiation at all frequencies, has the Rayleigh–Jeans law as its low-frequency limit.

Historical development

In 1900, the British physicist Lord Rayleigh derived the λ⁻⁴ dependence of the Rayleigh–Jeans law based on classical physical arguments, relying upon the equipartition theorem. This law predicted an energy output that diverges towards infinity as wavelength approaches zero (as frequency tends to infinity). Measurements of the spectral emission of actual black bodies revealed that the emission agreed with Rayleigh's calculation at low frequencies but diverged at high frequencies, reaching a maximum and then falling with frequency, so the total energy emitted is finite. Rayleigh recognized the unphysical behavior of his formula at high frequencies and introduced an ad hoc cutoff to correct it, but experimentalists found that his cutoff did not agree with data. Hendrik Lorentz also presented a derivation of the wavelength dependence in 1903. More complete derivations, which included the proportionality constant, were presented in 1905 by Rayleigh and Sir James Jeans and independently by Albert Einstein. Rayleigh believed that this discrepancy could be resolved by the equipartition theorem failing to be valid for high-frequency vibrations, while Jeans argued that the underlying cause was matter and luminiferous aether not being in thermal equilibrium.

Rayleigh published his first derivation of the frequency dependence in June 1900. Planck discovered the curve now known as Planck's law in October of that year and presented it in December. Planck's original intent was to find a satisfactory derivation of Wien's expression for the blackbody radiation curve, which accurately described the data at high frequencies. Planck found Wien's original derivation inadequate and devised his own. Then, after learning that the most recent experimental results disagreed with his predictions for low frequencies, Planck revised his calculation, obtaining what is now called Planck's law.

Comparison to Planck's law

In 1900 Max Planck empirically obtained an expression for black-body radiation expressed in terms of wavelength λ = c/ν (Planck's law): $${\displaystyle B_{\lambda }(T)=\frac{2h{c}^2}{{\lambda }^5}\frac{1}{e^{\frac{hc}{\lambda k_{\text{B}}T}}-1},}$$ where h is the Planck constant, and k_B is the Boltzmann constant. Planck's law does not suffer from an ultraviolet catastrophe and agrees well with the experimental data, but its full significance (which ultimately led to quantum theory) was only appreciated several years later. Since $${\displaystyle e^x=1+x+\frac{x^2}{2!}+\frac{x^3}{3!}+\cdots ,}$$ then in the limit of high temperatures or long wavelengths, the term in the exponential becomes small, and the exponential is well approximated with the Taylor polynomial's first-order term: $${\displaystyle e^{\frac{hc}{\lambda k_{\text{B}}T}}\approx 1+\frac{hc}{\lambda k_{\text{B}}T}.}$$

So $${\displaystyle \frac{1}{e^{\frac{hc}{\lambda k_{\text{B}}T}}-1}\approx \frac{1}{\frac{hc}{\lambda k_{\text{B}}T}}=\frac{\lambda k_{\text{B}}T}{hc}.}$$

This results in Planck's blackbody formula reducing to $${\displaystyle B_{\lambda }(T)=\frac{2c{k}_{\text{B}}T}{{\lambda }^4},}$$ which is identical to the classically derived Rayleigh–Jeans expression.

The same argument can be applied to the blackbody radiation expressed in terms of frequency ν = c/λ. In the limit of small frequencies, that is ${\displaystyle h\nu \ll k_{\text{B}}T}$, $${\displaystyle B_{\nu }(T)=\frac{2h{\nu }^3}{c^2}\frac{1}{e^{\frac{h\nu }{k_{\text{B}}T}}-1}\approx \frac{2h{\nu }^3}{c^2}\cdot \frac{k_{\text{B}}T}{h\nu }=\frac{2{\nu }^2{k}_{\mathrm{B}}T}{c^2}.}$$

This last expression is the Rayleigh–Jeans law in the limit of small frequencies.

Consistency of frequency- and wavelength-dependent expressions

When comparing the frequency- and wavelength-dependent expressions of the Rayleigh–Jeans law, it is important to remember that $${\displaystyle \frac{dP}{d\lambda }=B_{\lambda }(T)}$$ and $${\displaystyle \frac{dP}{d\nu }=B_{\nu }(T).}$$ Note that these two expressions then have different units, as a step ${\displaystyle d\lambda }$ in wavelength is not equivalent to a step ${\displaystyle d\nu }$ in frequency. Therefore, $${\displaystyle B_{\lambda }(T)\ne B_{\nu }(T),}$$ even after substituting the value ${\displaystyle \lambda =c/\nu }$, because ${\displaystyle B_{\lambda }(T)}$ has units of energy emitted per unit time per unit area of emitting surface, per unit solid angle, per unit wavelength, whereas ${\displaystyle B_{\nu }(T)}$ has units of energy emitted per unit time per unit area of emitting surface, per unit solid angle, per unit frequency. To be consistent, we must use the equality $${\displaystyle B_{\lambda }d\lambda =dP=B_{\nu }d\nu ,}$$ where both sides now have units of power (energy emitted per unit time) per unit area of emitting surface, per unit solid angle.

Starting with the Rayleigh–Jeans law in terms of wavelength, we get $${\displaystyle B_{\lambda }(T)=B_{\nu }(T)\frac{d\nu }{d\lambda },}$$ where $${\displaystyle \frac{d\nu }{d\lambda }=\frac{d}{d\lambda }\left(\frac{c}{\lambda }\right)=-\frac{c}{{\lambda }^2}.}$$ This leads to $${\displaystyle B_{\lambda }(T)=\frac{2k_{\text{B}}T{\left(\frac{c}{\lambda }\right)}^2}{c^2}\times \frac{c}{{\lambda }^2}=\frac{2c{k}_{\text{B}}T}{{\lambda }^4}.}$$

Other forms of Rayleigh–Jeans law

Depending on the application, the Planck function can be expressed in 3 different forms. The first involves energy emitted per unit time per unit area of emitting surface, per unit solid angle, per spectral unit. In this form, the Planck function and associated Rayleigh–Jeans limits are given by $${\displaystyle B_{\lambda }(T)=\frac{2h{c}^2}{{\lambda }^5}\frac{1}{e^{\frac{hc}{\lambda k_{\text{B}}T}}-1}\approx \frac{2c{k}_{\text{B}}T}{{\lambda }^4}}$$ or $${\displaystyle B_{\nu }(T)=\frac{2h{\nu }^3}{c^2}\frac{1}{e^{\frac{h\nu }{k_{\text{B}}T}}-1}\approx \frac{2k_{\text{B}}T{\nu }^2}{c^2}.}$$

Alternatively, Planck's law can be written as an expression ${\displaystyle I(\nu ,T)=\pi B_{\nu }(T)}$ for emitted power integrated over all solid angles. In this form, the Planck function and associated Rayleigh–Jeans limits are given by $${\displaystyle I(\lambda ,T)=\frac{2\pi h{c}^2}{{\lambda }^5}\frac{1}{e^{\frac{hc}{\lambda k_{\text{B}}T}}-1}\approx \frac{2\pi c{k}_{\text{B}}T}{{\lambda }^4}}$$ or $${\displaystyle I(\nu ,T)=\frac{2\pi h{\nu }^3}{c^2}\frac{1}{e^{\frac{h\nu }{k_{\text{B}}T}}-1}\approx \frac{2\pi k_{\text{B}}T{\nu }^2}{c^2}.}$$

In other cases, Planck's law is written as $u(\nu ,T)=\frac{4\pi }{c}{B}_{\nu }(T)$ for energy per unit volume (energy density). In this form, the Planck function and associated Rayleigh–Jeans limits are given by $${\displaystyle u(\lambda ,T)=\frac{8\pi hc}{{\lambda }^5}\frac{1}{e^{\frac{hc}{\lambda k_{\text{B}}T}}-1}\approx \frac{8\pi k_{\text{B}}T}{{\lambda }^4}}$$ or $${\displaystyle u(\nu ,T)=\frac{8\pi h{\nu }^3}{c^3}\frac{1}{e^{\frac{h\nu }{k_{\text{B}}T}}-1}\approx \frac{8\pi k_{\text{B}}T{\nu }^2}{c^3}.}$$

Dysrationalia

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dysrationalia

Dysrationalia is defined as the inability to think and behave rationally despite adequate intelligence. It is a concept in educational psychology and is not a clinical disorder such as a thought disorder. Dysrationalia can be a resource to help explain why smart people fall for Ponzi schemes and other fraudulent encounters.

History

The concept of dysrationalia was first proposed by psychologist Keith Stanovich in the early 1990s. Stanovich originally classified dysrationalia as a learning disability and characterized it as a difficulty in belief formation, in assessing belief consistency, or in the determination of action to achieve one's goals. However, special education researcher Kenneth Kavale noted that dysrationalia may be more aptly categorized as a thinking disorder, rather than a learning disability, because it does not have a direct impact upon academic performance.

Psychologist Robert Sternberg argued that the construct of dysrationalia needed to be better conceptualized since it lacked a theoretical framework (explaining why people are dysrational and how they become this way) and operationalization (how dysrationalia could be measured). Sternberg also noted that the concept had the potential for misuse, as one may label another as dysrational simply because he or she does not agree with the other person's view: "I am afraid that Stanovich has fallen into a trap—that of labeling people as 'dysrational' who have beliefs that he does not accept. And therein lies frightening potential for misuse."

Stanovich then replied to both Kavale and Sternberg. In response to Sternberg's concern about the construct's potential for misuse, Stanovich said that in that respect it is no different from other constructs such as intelligence, which is a construct that Sternberg himself uses. Stanovich emphasized that use of the dysrationalia construct should be carefully based on rigorous standards of epistemic justification that do not depend solely on social agreement or disagreement and that refer to the process of justifying beliefs, not to the content of beliefs themselves. Stanovich and his colleagues further developed the theoretical framework for, and operationalization of, dysrationalia in later books.

In 2002 Sternberg edited a book, Why Smart People Can Be So Stupid, in which the dysrationalia concept was extensively discussed. In his 2009 book What Intelligence Tests Miss, Stanovich provided the detailed conceptualization that Sternberg called for in his earlier critique. In that book, Stanovich showed that variation in rational thinking skills is surprisingly independent of intelligence. One implication of this finding is that dysrationalia should not be rare.

Mindware

Stanovich proposed two concepts related to dysrationalia: mindware gap and contaminated mindware.

A mindware gap results from gaps in education and experience. This idea focuses on the lack or limitations within a person's knowledge in logic, probability theory, or scientific method when it comes to belief orientation or decision-making. Due to these gaps, intelligent people can make seemingly irrational decisions.

Contaminated mindware focuses on how intelligent people believe irrational ideologies, conspiracy theories, pseudosciences, and/or get-rich-quick schemes. A person can be led into such contaminated mindware through heuristic trust or fallacious reasoning.

Examples

One example that Stanovich related to dysrationalia centers on two former Illinois schoolteachers who pulled their children from the local public school in the area because discussions of the Holocaust are a part of the school's history curriculum. These parents, who are presumably competent due to their college education, believe that the Holocaust is a myth and should not be taught to their children. This is an example of a problem in belief formation regardless of intelligence.

A survey was given to Canadian Mensa club members on the topic of paranormal belief. Mensa members are provided membership strictly because of their high-IQ scores. The survey results showed that 44% of the members believed in astrology, 51% believed in biorhythms, and 56% believed in the existence of extraterrestrial visitors. Stanovich argued that these beliefs have no valid evidence and thus might have been an example of dysrationalia. Sternberg countered that "No one has yet conclusively proven any of these beliefs to be false", so endorsement of the beliefs should not be considered evidence of dysrationalia. Stanovich's rebuttal to Sternberg explained that the purpose of the example was to question the epistemic rationality of the process by which people arrived at their unlikely conclusions, a process of evaluating the quality of arguments and evidence for and against each conclusion, not to assume irrationality based on the content of the conclusion alone.

There are many examples of people who are famous because of their intelligence, but often display irrational behavior. Two examples cited by Stanovich were Martin Heidegger and William Crookes. Heidegger, a renowned philosopher, was also a Nazi apologist and "used the most specious of arguments to justify his beliefs". Crookes, a famous scientist who discovered the element thallium and was a Fellow of the Royal Society, "was repeatedly duped by spiritualist 'mediums' but never gave up his belief in spiritualism". Science journalist David Robson cited the example of Kary Mullis, an American biochemist and 1993 Nobel Prize winner who was also an astrology supporter and a climate change and HIV/AIDS denier.