The term "fear, uncertainty, and doubt" appeared as far back as the 1920s, whereas the similar formulation "doubts, fears, and uncertainties" reaches back to 1693. By 1975, the term was appearing abbreviated as FUD in marketing and sales contexts as well as in public relations:
One of the messages dealt with is
FUD—the fear, uncertainty, and doubt on the part of customer and sales
person alike that stifles the approach and greeting.
The abbreviation FUD is also alternatively rendered as "fear, uncertainty, and disinformation".
FUD was first used with its common current technology-related meaning by Gene Amdahl in 1975, after he left IBM to found his own company, Amdahl Corp.:
FUD is the fear, uncertainty, and
doubt that IBM sales people instill in the minds of potential customers
who might be considering Amdahl products.
This usage of FUD to describe disinformation in the computer hardware industry is said to have led to subsequent popularization of the term.
The idea, of course, was to
persuade buyers to go with safe IBM gear rather than with competitors'
equipment. This implicit coercion was traditionally accomplished by
promising that Good Things would happen to people who stuck with IBM, but Dark Shadows
loomed over the future of competitors' equipment or software. After
1991, the term has become generalized to refer to any kind of disinformation used as a competitive weapon.
By spreading questionable information about the drawbacks of less
well-known products, an established company can discourage
decision-makers from choosing those products over its own, regardless of
the relative technical merits. This is a recognized phenomenon,
epitomized by the traditional axiom of purchasing agents that "nobody
ever got fired for buying IBM equipment". The aim is to have IT departments buy software they know to be technically inferior because upper management is more likely to recognize the brand.
Examples
Software producers
Microsoft
From the 1990s onward, the term became most often associated with Microsoft. Roger Irwin said:
Microsoft soon picked up the art of
FUD from IBM, and throughout the '80s used FUD as a primary marketing
tool, much as IBM had in the previous decade. They ended up out FUD-ing
IBM themselves during the OS/2 vs Win3.1 years.
In 1996, Caldera, Inc. accused Microsoft of several anti-competitive practices, including issuing vaporware announcements, creating FUD, and excluding competitors from participating in beta-test programs in order to destroy competition in the DOS market.
One of the claims was related to having modified Windows 3.1 so that it would not run on DR DOS 6.0 although there were no technical reasons for it not to work. This was caused by the so-called AARD code, some encrypted piece of code, which had been found in a number of Microsoft programs. The code would fake nonsensical error messages if run on DR DOS, like:
Non-Fatal error detected: error #2726 Please contact Windows 3.1 beta support Press ENTER to exit or C to continue
If the user chose to press C,
Windows would continue to run on DR DOS without problems. While it had
been already speculated in the industry that the purpose of this code
was to create doubts about DR DOS's compatibility and thereby destroy the product's reputation, internal Microsoft memos published as part of the United States v. Microsoftantitrust case later revealed that the specific focus of these error messages was DR DOS. At one point, Microsoft CEO Bill Gates sent a memo to a number of employees, reading
You never sent me a response on the question of what things an app would do that would make it run with MS-DOS and not run with DR-DOS. Is there [a] feature they have that might get in our way?
Microsoft Senior Vice President Brad Silverberg later sent another memo, stating
What the [user] is supposed to
do is feel uncomfortable, and when he has bugs, suspect that the problem
is DR-DOS and then go out to buy MS-DOS.
In 2000, Microsoft settled the lawsuit out-of-court for an undisclosed sum, which in 2009 was revealed to be $280 million.
At around the same time, the leaked internal Microsoft "Halloween documents" stated "OSS [Open Source Software] is long-term credible… [therefore] FUD tactics cannot be used to combat it."
Open source software, and the Linux community in particular, are widely perceived as frequent targets of Microsoft's FUD:
Statements that Windows Server 2003 has lower total cost of ownership (TCO) than Linux, in Microsoft's "Get-The-Facts" campaign. It turned out that they were comparing Linux on a very expensive IBM mainframe to Windows Server 2003 on an Intel Xeon-based server.
Magistrate Judge Brooke C. Wells wrote (and Judge Dale Albert Kimball
concurred) in her order limiting SCO's claims: "The court finds SCO's
arguments unpersuasive. SCO's arguments are akin to SCO telling IBM,
'sorry, we are not going to tell you what you did wrong because you
already know...' SCO was required to disclose in detail what it feels
IBM misappropriated... the court finds it inexcusable that SCO is... not
placing all the details on the table. Certainly if an individual were
stopped and accused of shoplifting after walking out of Neiman Marcus
they would expect to be eventually told what they allegedly stole. It
would be absurd for an officer to tell the accused that 'you know what
you stole, I'm not telling.' Or, to simply hand the accused individual a
catalog of Neiman Marcus' entire inventory and say 'it's in there
somewhere, you figure it out.'"
Regarding the matter, Darl Charles McBride, President and CEO of SCO, made the following statements:
"IBM has taken our valuable trade secrets and given them away to Linux,"
"We're finding... cases where there is line-by-line code in the Linux kernel that is matching up to our UnixWare code"
"...unless more companies start licensing SCO's property... [SCO] may also sue Linus Torvalds... for patent infringement."
"Both companies [IBM and Red Hat] have shifted liability to the customer and then taunted us to sue them."
"We have the ability to go to users with lawsuits and we will if we
have to, 'It would be within SCO Group's rights to order every copy of AIX [IBM's proprietary UNIX] destroyed'"
"As of Friday, [13] June [2003], we will be done trying to talk to
IBM, and we will be talking directly to its customers and going in and
auditing them. IBM no longer has the authority to sell or distribute IBM
AIX and customers no longer have the right to use AIX software"
"If you just drag this out in a typical litigation path, where it
takes years and years to settle anything, and in the meantime you have
all this uncertainty clouding over the market..."
"Users are running systems that have basically pirated software
inside, or stolen software inside of their systems, they have
liability."
SCO stock skyrocketed from under US$3 a share to over US$20 in a matter of weeks in 2003. It later dropped to around US$1.2—then crashed to under 50 cents on 13 August 2007, in the aftermath of a ruling that Novell owns the UNIX copyrights.
FUD is widely recognized as a tactic to promote the sale or
implementation of security products and measures. It is possible to find
pages describing purely artificial problems. Such pages frequently
contain links to the demonstrating source code that does not point to
any valid location and sometimes even links that "will execute malicious
code on your machine regardless of current security software", leading
to pages without any executable code.
The drawback to the FUD tactic in this context is that, when the
stated or implied threats fail to materialize over time, the customer or
decision-maker frequently reacts by withdrawing budgeting or support
from future security initiatives.
FUD has also been utilized in technical support scams,
which may use fake error messages to scare unwitting computer users,
especially the elderly or computer-illiterate, into paying for a
supposed fix for a non-existent problem,
to avoid being framed for criminal charges such as unpaid taxes, or in
extreme cases, false accusations of illegal acts such as child pornography.
Caltex
The FUD tactic was used by Caltex
Australia in 2003. According to an internal memo, which was
subsequently leaked, they wished to use FUD to destabilize franchisee
confidence, and thus get a better deal for Caltex. This memo was used as
an example of unconscionable behaviour in a Senate inquiry. Senior management claimed that it was contrary to and did not reflect company principles.
Clorox
In 2008, Clorox was the subject of both consumer and industry criticism for advertising its Green Works line of allegedly environmentally friendly cleaning products using the slogan, "Finally, Green Works." The slogan implied both that "green"
products manufactured by other companies which had been available to
consumers prior to the introduction of Clorox's GreenWorks line had all
been ineffective, and also that the new GreenWorks line was at least as
effective as Clorox's existing product lines. The intention of this
slogan and the associated advertising campaign has been interpreted as
appealing to consumers' fears that products from companies with less brand recognition
are less trustworthy or effective. Critics also pointed out that,
despite its representation of GreenWorks products as "green" in the
sense of being less harmful to the environment and/or consumers using
them, the products contain a number of ingredients advocates of natural
products have long campaigned against the use of in household products
due to toxicity to humans or their environment.
All three implicit claims have been disputed, and some of their
elements disproven, by environmental groups, consumer-protection groups,
and the industry self-regulatory Better Business Bureau.
Emissions trading works by setting a quantitative total limit on
the emissions produced by all participating emitters. As a result, the
price automatically adjusts to this target. This is the main advantage
compared to a fixed carbon tax.
Under emission trading, a polluter having more emissions than their
quota has to purchase the right to emit more. The entity having fewer
emissions sells the right to emit carbon to other entities. As a result,
the most cost-effective carbon reduction methods would be exploited
first. ETS and carbon taxes are a common method for countries in their attempts to meet their pledges under the Paris Agreement.
Carbon ETS are in operation in China, the European Union and other countries. However, they are usually not harmonized with any defined carbon budgets, which are required to maintain global warming
below the critical thresholds of 1.5 °C or "well below" 2 °C. The
existing schemes only cover a limited scope of emissions. The EU-ETS
focuses on industry and large power generation, leaving the
introduction of additional schemes for transport and private consumption
to the member states. Though units are counted in tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent, other potent GHGs such as methane (CH4) or nitrous oxide (N2O) from agriculture
are usually not part these schemes yet. Apart from that, an oversupply
leads to low prices of allowances with almost no effect on fossil fuel
combustion. In September 2021, emission trade allowances (ETAs) covered a wide price range from €7/tCO2 in China's new national carbon market to €63/tCO2 in the EU-ETS. Latest models of the social cost of carbon calculate a damage of more than $3000 per ton CO2 as a result of economy feedbacks and falling global GDP growth rates, while policy recommendations range from about $50 to $200.
History
The international community began the long process towards building effective international and domestic measures to tackle GHG emissions (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydroflurocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulphur hexafluoride)
in response to the increasing assertions that global warming is
happening due to man-made emissions and the uncertainty over its likely
consequences. That process began in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, when 160
countries agreed the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
The necessary detail was left to be settled by the UN Conference of Parties (COP).
In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol
was the first major agreement to reduce greenhouse gases. 38 developed
countries (Annex 1 countries) committed themselves to targets and
timetables.
The resulting inflexible limitations on GHG growth could entail
substantial costs if countries have to solely rely on their own domestic
measures.
The economic problem with climate change is that the emitters of greenhouse gases (GHGs) do not face the full cost implications of their actions. These other costs are called external costs. External costs may affect the welfare
of others. In the case of climate change, GHG emissions affect the
welfare of people now and in the future, as well as affecting the
natural environment. The social cost of carbon depends on the future development of emissions. This can be addressed with the dynamic price model of emissions trading.
Distribution of allowances
Emission
allowances may be given away for free or auctioned. In the first case,
the government receives no carbon revenue and in the second it receives
(on average) the full value of the permits. In either case, permits will
be equally scarce and just as valuable to market participants. Since
the private market (for trading permits) determines the final price of
permits (at the time they must be used to cover emissions), the price
will be the same in either case (free or auctioned). This is generally
understood.
A second point about free permits (usually “grandfathered,” i.e.
given out in proportion to past emissions) has often been misunderstood.
Companies that receive free permits, treat them as if they had paid
full price for them. This is because using carbon in production has the
same cost under both arrangements. With auctioned permits, the cost is
obvious. With free permits, the cost is the cost of not selling the
permit at full value — this is termed an “opportunity cost.” Since the
cost of emissions is generally a marginal cost (increasing with output),
the cost is passed on by raising the cost of output (e.g. raising the
cost of gasoline or electricity).
Windfall profits
A
company that receives permits for free will pass on its opportunity
cost in the form of higher product prices. Hence, if it sells the same
amount of output as before that cap, with no change in production
technology, the full value (at the market price) of permits received for
free becomes windfall profits. However, since the cap reduces output
and often causes the company to incur costs to increase efficiency,
windfall profits will be less than the full value of its free permits.
Generally speaking, if permits are allocated to emitters for
free, they will profit from them. But if they must pay full price, or if
carbon is taxed, their profits will be reduced. If the carbon price
exactly equals the true social cost of carbon, then long-run profit
reduction will simply reflect the consequences of paying this new cost.
If having to pay this cost is unexpected, then there will likely be a
one-time loss that is due to the change in regulations and not simply
due to paying the real cost of carbon. However, if there is advanced
notice of this change, or if the carbon price is introduced gradually,
this one-time regulatory cost will be minimized. There has now been
enough advance notice of carbon pricing that this effect should be
negligible on average.
Carbon emission trading systems and markets
For emissions trading where greenhouse gases are regulated, one emissions permit is considered equivalent to one tonne of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Other emissions permits are carbon credits, Kyoto units, assigned amount units, and Certified Emission Reduction
units (CER). These permits can be sold privately or in the
international market at the prevailing market price. These trade and settle internationally, and hence allow permits to be transferred between countries. Each international transfer is validated by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Each transfer of ownership within the European Union is additionally validated by the European Commission.
Emissions trading programmes such as the European Union Emissions
Trading System (EU ETS) complement the country-to-country trading
stipulated in the Kyoto Protocol by allowing private trading of permits.
Under such programmes – which are generally co-ordinated with the
national emissions targets provided within the framework of the Kyoto
Protocol – a national or international authority allocates permits to
individual companies based on established criteria, with a view to
meeting national and/or regional Kyoto targets at the lowest overall
economic cost.
Other greenhouse gases can also be traded, but are quoted as standard multiples of carbon dioxide with respect to their global warming potential.
These features reduce the quota's financial impact on business, while
ensuring that the quotas are met at a national and international level.
The Chinese national carbon trading scheme is the largest in the world. It is an intensity-based trading system for carbon dioxide emissions by China, which started operating in 2021.
The initial design of the system targets a scope of 3.5 billion tons of
carbon dioxide emissions that come from 1700 installations. It has made a voluntary pledge under the UNFCCC to lower CO2 per unit of GDP by 40 to 45% in 2020 when comparing to the 2005 levels.
In November 2011, China approved pilot tests of carbon trading in
seven provinces and cities – Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, Shenzhen,
Tianjin as well as Guangdong Province and Hubei Province, with different
prices in each region.
The pilot is intended to test the waters and provide valuable lessons
for the design of a national system in the near future. Their successes
or failures will, therefore, have far-reaching implications for carbon
market development in China in terms of trust in a national carbon
trading market. Some of the pilot regions can start trading as early as
2013/2014. National trading is expected to start in 2017, latest in 2020.
The effort to start a national trading system has faced some
problems that took longer than expected to solve, mainly in the
complicated process of initial data collection to determine the base
level of pollution emission.
According to the initial design, there will be eight sectors that are
first included in the trading system: chemicals, petrochemicals, iron
and steel, non-ferrous metals, building materials, paper, power and
aviation, but many of the companies involved lacked consistent data.
Therefore, by the end of 2017, the allocation of emission quotas have
started but it has been limited to only the power sector and will
gradually expand, although the operation of the market is yet to begin.
In this system, Companies that are involved will be asked to meet
target level of reduction and the level will contract gradually.
The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (or EU-ETS) is the largest
multi-national, greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme in the world.
After voluntary trials in the UK and Denmark, Phase I began operation in January 2005 with all 15 member states of the European Union participating.
The program caps the amount of carbon dioxide that can be emitted from
large installations with a net heat supply in excess of 20 MW, such as
power plants and carbon intensive factories, and covers almost half (46%) of the EU's Carbon Dioxide emissions. Phase I permits participants to trade among themselves and in validated credits from the developing world through Kyoto's Clean Development Mechanism.
Credits are gained by investing in clean technologies and low-carbon
solutions, and by certain types of emission-saving projects around the
world to cover a proportion of their emissions.
During Phases I and II, allowances for emissions have typically
been given free to firms, which has resulted in them getting windfall
profits. Ellerman and Buchner (2008) suggested that during its first two years in operation, the EU-ETS turned an expected increase in emissions of 1%–2% per year into a small absolute decline. Grubb et al.
(2009) suggested that a reasonable estimate for the emissions cut
achieved during its first two years of operation was 50–100 MtCO2 per year, or 2.5%–5%.
A number of design flaws have limited the effectiveness of the scheme. In the initial 2005–07 period, emission caps were not tight enough to drive a significant reduction in emissions.
The total allocation of allowances turned out to exceed actual
emissions. This drove the carbon price down to zero in 2007. This
oversupply was caused because the allocation of allowances by the EU was
based on emissions data from the European Environmental Agency in
Copenhagen, which uses a horizontal activity-based emissions definition
similar to the United Nations, the EU-ETS Transaction log in Brussels,
but a vertical installation-based emissions measurement system. This
caused an oversupply of 200 million tonnes (10% of market) in the EU-ETS
in the first phase and collapsing prices.
Phase II saw some tightening, but the use of JI and CDM offsets
was allowed, with the result that no reductions in the EU will be
required to meet the Phase II cap.
For Phase II, the cap is expected to result in an emissions reduction
in 2010 of about 2.4% compared to expected emissions without the cap
(business-as-usual emissions). For Phase III (2013–20), the European Commission proposed a number of changes, including:
Setting an overall EU cap, with allowances then allocated;
Tighter limits on the use of offsets;
Unlimited banking of allowances between Phases II and III;
A move from allowances to auction.
In January 2008, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein joined the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS), according to a publication from the European Commission. The Norwegian Ministry of the Environment has also released its draft National Allocation Plan which provides a carbon cap-and-trade of 15 million tonnes of CO2, 8 million of which are set to be auctioned.
According to the OECD Economic Survey of Norway 2010, the nation "has
announced a target for 2008–12 10% below its commitment under the Kyoto
Protocol and a 30% cut compared with 1990 by 2020."
In 2012, EU-15 emissions was 15.1% below their base year level. Based
on figures for 2012 by the European Environment Agency, EU-15 emissions
averaged 11.8% below base-year levels during the 2008–2012 period. This
means the EU-15 over-achieved its first Kyoto target by a wide margin.
A 2020 study found that the European Union Emissions Trading System successfully reduced CO2 emissions even though the prices for carbon were set at low prices.
India
Trading is
set to begin in 2014 after a three-year rollout period. It is a
mandatory energy efficiency trading scheme covering eight sectors
responsible for 54 per cent of India's industrial energy consumption.
India has pledged a 20 to 25 per cent reduction in emission intensity
from 2005 levels by 2020. Under the scheme, annual efficiency targets
will be allocated to firms. Tradable energy-saving permits will be
issued depending on the amount of energy saved during a target year.
As of 2017, there is no national emissions trading scheme in the
United States. Failing to get Congressional approval for such a scheme,
President Barack Obama instead acted through the United States Environmental Protection Agency to attempt to adopt through rulemaking the Clean Power Plan,
which does not feature emissions trading. The plan was subsequently
challenged by the administration of President Donald Trump.
Concerned at the lack of federal action, several states on the
east and west coasts have created sub-national cap-and-trade programs.
President Barack Obama in his proposed 2010 United States federal budget
wanted to support clean energy development with a 10-year investment of
US$15 billion per year, generated from the sale of greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions credits. Under the proposed cap-and-trade program, all GHG
emissions credits would have been auctioned off, generating an estimated
$78.7 billion in additional revenue in FY 2012, steadily increasing to
$83 billion by FY 2019. The proposal was never made law.
The American Clean Energy and Security Act
(H.R. 2454), a greenhouse gas cap-and-trade bill, was passed on 26 June
2009, in the House of Representatives by a vote of 219–212. The bill
originated in the House Energy and Commerce Committee and was introduced
by Representatives Henry A. Waxman and Edward J. Markey. The political advocacy organizations FreedomWorks and Americans for Prosperity, funded by brothers David and Charles Koch of Koch Industries, encouraged the Tea Party movement to focus on defeating the legislation. Although cap and trade also gained a significant foothold in the Senate via the efforts of Republican Lindsey Graham, Independent and former Democrat Joe Lieberman, and Democrat John Kerry, the legislation died in the Senate.
State and regional programs
In 2003, New York State proposed and attained commitments from nine Northeast states to form a cap-and-trade carbon dioxide emissions program for power generators, called the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI). This program launched on January 1, 2009, with the aim to
reduce the carbon "budget" of each state's electricity generation sector
to 10% below their 2009 allowances by 2018.
Also in 2003, U.S. corporations were able to trade CO2 emission allowances on the Chicago Climate Exchange under a voluntary scheme. In August 2007, the Exchange announced a mechanism to create emission offsets for projects within the United States that cleanly destroy ozone-depleting substances.
In 2006, the California Legislature passed the California Global Warming Solutions Act, AB-32.
Thus far, flexible mechanisms in the form of project based offsets have
been suggested for three main project types. The project types include:
manure management,
forestry, and destruction of ozone-depleted substances. However, a
ruling from Judge Ernest H. Goldsmith of San Francisco's Superior Court
stated that the rules governing California's cap-and-trade system were
adopted without a proper analysis of alternative methods to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. The tentative ruling, issued on January 24, 2011, argued that the California Air Resources Board
violated state environmental law by failing to consider such
alternatives. If the decision is made final, the state would not be
allowed to implement its proposed cap-and-trade system until the
California Air Resources Board fully complies with the California Environmental Quality Act. However, on June 24, 2011, the Superior Court's ruling was overturned by the Court of Appeals.
By 2012, some of the emitters obtained allowances for free, which is
for the electric utilities, industrial facilities and natural gas
distributors, whereas some of the others have to go to the auction. The California cap-and-trade program came into effect in 2013.
In 2014, the Texas legislature approved a 10% reduction for the Highly Reactive Volatile Organic Compound (HRVOC) emission limit. This was followed by a 5% reduction for each subsequent year until a total of 25% percent reduction was achieved in 2017.
In February 2007, five U.S. states and four Canadian provinces joined to create the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), a regional greenhouse gas emissions trading system. In July 2010, a meeting took place to further outline the cap-and-trade system. In November 2011, Arizona, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah and Washington withdrew from the WCI. As of 2021, only the U.S. state of California and the Canadian province of Quebec participate in the WCI.
In 1997, the State of Illinois adopted a trading program for volatile organic compounds in most of the Chicago area, called the Emissions Reduction Market System. Beginning in 2000, over 100 major sources of pollution in eight Illinois counties began trading pollution credits.
In 2003 the New South Wales (NSW) state government unilaterally established the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme
to reduce emissions by requiring electricity generators and large
consumers to purchase NSW Greenhouse Abatement Certificates (NGACs).
This has prompted the rollout of free energy-efficient compact
fluorescent lightbulbs and other energy-efficiency measures, funded by
the credits. This scheme has been criticised by the Centre for Energy
and Environmental Markets (CEEM) of the UNSW
because of its lack of effectiveness in reducing emissions, its lack of
transparency and its lack of verification of the additionality of
emission reductions.
Both the incumbent HowardCoalition government and the RuddLabor opposition promised to implement an emissions trading scheme (ETS) before the 2007 federal election. Labor won the election, with the new government proceeding to implement an ETS. The government introduced the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, which the Liberals supported with Malcolm Turnbull as leader. Tony Abbott questioned an ETS, saying the best way to reduce emissions is with a "simple tax".
Shortly before the carbon vote, Abbott defeated Turnbull in a
leadership challenge, and from there on the Liberals opposed the ETS.
This left the government unable to secure passage of the bill and it was
subsequently withdrawn.
Julia Gillard
defeated Rudd in a leadership challenge and promised not to introduce a
carbon tax, but would look to legislate a price on carbon when taking the government to the 2010 election. In the first hung parliament result in 70 years, the government required the support of crossbenchers including the Greens.
One requirement for Greens support was a carbon price, which Gillard
proceeded with in forming a minority government. A fixed carbon price
would proceed to a floating-price ETS within a few years under the plan.
The fixed price lent itself to characterisation as a carbon tax and
when the government proposed the Clean Energy Bill in February 2011, the opposition claimed it to be a broken election promise.
The bill was passed by the Lower House in October 2011 and the Upper House in November 2011. The Liberal Party vowed to overturn the bill if elected.
The bill thus resulted in passage of the Clean Energy Act, which
possessed a great deal of flexibility in its design and uncertainty over
its future.
The Liberal/National coalition government elected in September 2013 has promised to reverse the climate legislation of the previous government. In July 2014, the carbon tax was repealed as well as the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) that was to start in 2015.
The Japanese city of Tokyo is like a country in its own right in
terms of its energy consumption and GDP. Tokyo consumes as much energy
as "entire countries in Northern Europe, and its production matches the
GNP of the world's 16th largest country". A scheme to limit carbon
emissions launched in April 2010 covers the top 1,400 emitters in Tokyo,
and is enforced and overseen by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government.
Phase 1, which is similar to Japan's scheme, ran until 2015. (Japan had
an ineffective voluntary emissions reductions system for years,
but no nationwide cap-and-trade program.) Emitters must cut their
emissions by 6% or 8% depending on the type of organization; from 2011,
those who exceed their limits must buy matching allowances or invest in
renewable-energy certificates or offset credits issued by smaller
businesses or branch offices. Polluters that fail to comply will be fined up to 500,000 yen plus credits for 1.3 times excess emissions. In its fourth year, emissions were reduced by 23% compared to base-year emissions.
In phase 2, (FY2015-FY2019), the target is expected to increase to
15%–17%. The aim is to cut Tokyo's carbon emissions by 25% from 2000
levels by 2020. These emission limits can be met by using technologies such as solar panels and advanced fuel-saving devices.
The NZ ETS covers forestry (a net sink), energy (43.4% of total
2010 emissions), industry (6.7% of total 2010 emissions) and waste (2.8%
of total 2010 emissions) but not pastoral agriculture (47% of 2010
total emissions).
Participants in the NZ ETS must surrender two emissions units (either
an international 'Kyoto' unit or a New Zealand-issued unit) for every
three tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions reported or they may
choose to buy NZ units from the government at a fixed price of NZ$25.
Individual sectors of the economy have different entry dates when
their obligations to report emissions and surrender emission units take
effect. Forestry, which contributed net removals of 17.5 Mts of CO2e in 2010 (19% of NZ's 2008 emissions,) entered the NZ ETS on 1 January 2008.
The stationary energy, industrial processes and liquid fossil fuel
sectors entered the NZ ETS on 1 July 2010. The waste sector (landfill
operators) entered on 1 January 2013.
Methane and nitrous oxide emissions from pastoral agriculture are not
included in the NZ ETS. (From November 2009, agriculture was to enter
the NZ ETS on 1 January 2015)
The NZ ETS is highly linked to international carbon markets as it allows the importing of most of the Kyoto Protocol
emission units. However, as of June 2015, the scheme will effectively
transition into a domestic scheme, with restricted access to
international Kyoto units (CERs, ERUs and RMUs).
The NZ ETS has a domestic unit; the 'New Zealand Unit' (NZU), which is
issued by free allocation to emitters, with no auctions intended in the
short term.
Free allocation of NZUs varies between sectors. The commercial fishery
sector (who are not participants) have a free allocation of units on a
historic basis. Owners of pre-1990 forests have received a fixed free allocation of units. Free allocation to emissions-intensive industry, is provided on an output-intensity basis. For this sector, there is no set limit on the number of units that may be allocated.
The number of units allocated to eligible emitters is based on the
average emissions per unit of output within a defined 'activity'.
Bertram and Terry (2010, p 16) state that as the NZ ETS does not 'cap'
emissions, the NZ ETS is not a cap and trade scheme as understood in
the economics literature.
The NZ ETS was reviewed in late 2011 by an independent panel, which reported to the Government and public in September 2011.
South Korea
South
Korea's national emissions trading scheme officially launched on 1
January 2015, covering 525 entities from 23 sectors. With a three-year
cap of 1.8687 billion tCO2e, it now forms the second largest
carbon market in the world following the EU ETS. This amounts to roughly
two-thirds of the country's emissions. The Korean emissions trading
scheme is part of the Republic of Korea's efforts to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions by 30% compared to the business-as-usual scenario by 2020.
Business in the UK have come out strongly in support of emissions
trading as a key tool to mitigate climate change, supported by NGOs. However, not all businesses favor a trading approach. On December 11, 2008, Rex Tillerson, the CEO of ExxonMobil, said a carbon tax
is "a more direct, more transparent and more effective approach" than a
cap-and-trade program, which he said, "inevitably introduces
unnecessary cost and complexity". He also said that he hoped that the
revenues from a carbon tax would be used to lower other taxes so as to
be revenue neutral.
Market trend
Emissions trading and carbon taxes around the world (2021)
Carbon emissions trading increased rapidly in 2021 with the start of the Chinese national carbon trading scheme. The increasing costs of permits on the EU ETS have had the effect of increasing costs of coal power.
A 2019 study by the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE) finds that efforts to put a price on greenhouse gas emissions
are growing in North America. "In addition to carbon taxes in effect
in Alberta, British Columbia and Boulder, Colorado, cap and trade
programs are in effect in California, Quebec, Nova Scotia and the nine
northeastern states that form the Regional Greenhouse gas Initiative
(RGGI). Several other states and provinces are currently considering
putting a price on emissions."
Business reaction
23 multinational corporations came together in the G8 Climate Change Roundtable, a business group formed at the January 2005 World Economic Forum. The group included Ford, Toyota, British Airways, BP and Unilever.
On June 9, 2005, the Group published a statement stating the need to
act on climate change and stressing the importance of market-based
solutions. It called on governments to establish "clear, transparent,
and consistent price signals" through "creation of a long-term policy
framework" that would include all major producers of greenhouse gases. By December 2007, this had grown to encompass 150 global businesses.
The International Air Transport Association,
whose 230 member airlines comprise 93% of all international traffic,
position is that trading should be based on "benchmarking", setting
emissions levels based on industry averages, rather than "grandfathering",
which would use individual companies' previous emissions levels to set
their future permit allowances. They argue grandfathering "would
penalise airlines that took early action to modernise their fleets,
while a benchmarking approach, if designed properly, would reward more
efficient operations".
In 2021 shipowners said they are against being included in the EU ETS.
Voluntary surrender of units
There
are examples of individuals and organisations purchasing tradable
emission permits and 'retiring' (cancelling) them so they cannot be used
by emitters to authorise their emissions. This makes the emissions
'cap' lower and therefore further reduces emissions. It is argued that
this removes the credits from the carbon market so they cannot be used
to allow the emission of carbon and that this reduces the 'cap' on
emissions by reducing the number of credits available to emitters.
Critics of carbon trading, such as Carbon Trade Watch,
argue that it places disproportionate emphasis on individual lifestyles
and carbon footprints, distracting attention from the wider, systemic
changes and collective political action that needs to be taken to tackle
climate change. Groups such as the Corner House
have argued that the market will choose the easiest means to save a
given quantity of carbon in the short term, which may be different from
the pathway required to obtain sustained and sizable reductions over a
longer period, and so a market-led approach is likely to reinforce
technological lock-in. For instance, small cuts may often be achieved
cheaply through investment in making a technology more efficient, where
larger cuts would require scrapping the technology and using a different
one. They also argue that emissions trading is undermining alternative
approaches to pollution control
with which it does not combine well, and so the overall effect it is
having is to actually stall significant change to less polluting
technologies. In September 2010, campaigning group FERN released "Trading Carbon: How it works and why it is controversial" which compiles many of the arguments against carbon trading.
The Financial Times
published an article about cap-and-trade systems which argued that
"Carbon markets create a muddle" and "...leave much room for
unverifiable manipulation". Lohmann (2009) pointed out that emissions trading schemes create new uncertainties and risks, which can be commodified by means of derivatives, thereby creating a new speculative market.
In China some companies started artificial production of
greenhouse gases with sole purpose of their recycling and gaining carbon
credits. Similar practices happened in India. Earned credit were then
sold to companies in US and Europe.
Proposals for alternative schemes to avoid the problems of cap-and-trade schemes include Cap and Share, which was considered by the Irish Parliament in 2008, and the Sky Trust schemes.
These schemes stated that cap-and-trade schemes inherently impact the
poor and those in rural areas, who have less choice in energy
consumption options.
Carbon trading has been criticised as a form of colonialism,
in which rich countries maintain their levels of consumption while
getting credit for carbon savings in inefficient industrial projects.
Nations that have fewer financial resources may find that they cannot
afford the permits necessary for developing an industrial
infrastructure, thus inhibiting these countries economic development.
Another criticism is the claimed possibility of non-existent
emission reductions being recorded under the Kyoto Protocol due to the
surplus of allowances that some countries possess. For example, Russia
had a surplus of allowances due to its economic collapse following the
end of the Soviet Union.
Other countries could have bought these allowances from Russia, but
this would not have reduced emissions. Rather, it would have been simply
be a redistribution of emissions allowances. In practice, Kyoto Parties
have as yet chosen not to buy these surplus allowances.
Flexibility, and thus complexity, inherent in cap and trade schemes has resulted in a great deal of policy uncertainty
surrounding these schemes. Such uncertainty has beset such schemes in
Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, and the US.
As a result of this uncertainty, organizations have little incentive to
innovate and comply, resulting in an ongoing battle of stakeholder
contestation for the past two decades.
Lohmann (2006b) supported conventional regulation, green taxes,
and energy policies that are "justice-based" and "community-driven."
According to Carbon Trade Watch (2009), carbon trading has had a
"disastrous track record." The effectiveness of the EU ETS was
criticized, and it was argued that the CDM had routinely favoured
"environmentally ineffective and socially unjust projects."
Annie Leonard's 2009 documentary The Story of Cap and Trade
criticized carbon emissions trading for the free permits to major
polluters giving them unjust advantages, cheating in connection with carbon offsets, and as a distraction from the search for other solutions.
Offsets
Forest campaigner Jutta Kill (2006) of European environmental group FERN
argued that offsets for emission reductions were not substitute for
actual cuts in emissions. Kill stated that "[carbon] in trees is
temporary: Trees can easily release carbon into the atmosphere through
fire, disease, climatic changes, natural decay and timber harvesting."
Permit supply level
Regulatory agencies run the risk of issuing too many emission credits, which can result in a very low price on emission permits.
This reduces the incentive that permit-liable firms have to cut back
their emissions. On the other hand, issuing too few permits can result
in an excessively high permit price.
This is an argument for a hybrid instrument having a price-floor, i.e.,
a minimum permit price, and a price-ceiling, i.e., a limit on the
permit price. However, a price-ceiling (safety value) removes the
certainty of a particular quantity limit of emissions.
Permit allocation versus auctioning
If
polluters receive emission permits for free ("grandfathering"), this
may be a reason for them not to cut their emissions because if they do
they will receive fewer permits in the future.
This perverse incentive can be alleviated if permits are auctioned, i.e., sold to polluters, rather than giving them the permits for free.
Auctioning is a method for distributing emission allowances in a
cap-and-trade system whereby allowances are sold to the highest bidder.
Revenues from auctioning go to the government and can be used for
development of sustainable technology or to cut distortionary taxes, thus improving the efficiency of the overall cap policy.
On the other hand, allocating permits can be used as a measure to
protect domestic firms who are internationally exposed to competition.
This happens when domestic firms compete against other firms that are
not subject to the same regulation. This argument in favor of allocation
of permits has been used in the EU ETS, where industries that have been
judged to be internationally exposed, e.g., cement and steel
production, have been given permits for free).
Structuring issues
Corporate and governmental carbon emission trading schemes have been modified in ways that have been attributed to permitting money laundering to take place.
The principal point here is that financial system innovations (outside
banking) open up the possibility for unregulated (non-banking)
transactions to take place in relativity unsupervised markets.
Public opinion
In
the United States, most polling shows large support for emissions
trading (often referred to as cap-and-trade). This majority support can
be seen in polls conducted by The Washington Post/ABC News, Zogby International and Yale University.
A new Washington Post-ABC poll reveals that majorities of the American
people believe in climate change, are concerned about it, are willing to
change their lifestyles and pay more to address it, and want the
federal government to regulate greenhouse gases. They are, however,
ambivalent on cap-and-trade.
More than three-quarters of respondents, 77.0%, reported they
"strongly support" (51.0%) or "somewhat support" (26.0%) the EPA's
decision to regulate carbon emissions. While 68.6% of respondents
reported being "very willing" (23.0%) or "somewhat willing" (45.6%),
another 26.8% reported being "somewhat unwilling" (8.8%) or "not at all
willing" (18.0%) to pay higher prices for "Green" energy sources to
support funding for programs that reduce the effect of global warming.
According to PolitiFact, it is a misconception that emissions trading is unpopular in the United States because of earlier polls from Zogby International and Rasmussen which misleadingly include "new taxes" in the questions (taxes aren't part of emissions trading) or high energy cost estimates.
The United States biological defense program—in recent years also called the National Biodefense Strategy—
refers to the collective effort by all levels of government, along with
private enterprise and other stakeholders, in the United States to
carry out biodefense activities.
Biodefense
is a system of planned actions to counter and reduce the risk of
biological threats and to prepare, respond to, and recover from them if
they happen. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2016
required high-level officials across the federal government to create a
national biodefense strategy together. As a result, in 2018 the National Biodefense Strategy
was released by President Donald J. Trump. In essence, the strategy
comprises the U.S. biological defense program in that it is the official
framework that provides a "single coordinated effort" to coordinate all
biodefense activities across the federal government. To execute the
strategy, the White House issued a Presidential Memorandum on the
Support for National Biodefense, which puts the specific directives and
rules in place for carrying out the plans written in the strategy. It is
worth noting that the National Biodefense Strategy elevated natural
outbreaks as a vital component of the U.S. biological defense program
for the first time, mostly because of the significant risk that natural
outbreaks pose to civilian, animal and agricultural populations across
the country.
Broadly defined, the "United States biological defense program"
now also encompasses all federal-level programs and efforts to monitor,
prevent, and contain naturally occurring infectious disease outbreaks of
widespread public health concern. These include efforts to forestall
large-scale disasters such as flu pandemics and other "emerging infections" such as novel pathogens or those imported from other countries.
Overview
Biological agents
have been used in warfare for centuries to produce death or disease in
humans, animals, or plants. The United States officially began its biological warfare
offensive program in 1941. During the next 28 years, the U.S.
initiative evolved into an effective, military-driven research and
acquisition program, shrouded in secrecy and, later, controversy. Most
research and development was done at Fort Detrick, Maryland, while production and testing of bio-weapons occurred at Pine Bluff, Arkansas, and Dugway Proving Ground (DPG), Utah.
Field testing was done secretly and successfully with simulants and
actual agents disseminated over wide areas. A small defensive effort
always paralleled the weapons development and production program. With
the presidential decision in 1969 to halt offensive biological weapons
production—and the agreement in 1972 at the international BWC never to
develop, produce, stockpile, or retain biological agents or toxins—the
program became entirely defensive, with medical and non-medical
components. The U.S. biological defense research program exists today,
conducting research to develop physical and medical countermeasures to
protect service members and civilians from the threat of modern
biological warfare.
Both the U.S. bio-weapons ban and the BWC restricted any work in
the area of biological warfare to defensive in nature. In reality, this
gives BWC member-states wide latitude to conduct biological weapons
research because the BWC contains no provisions for monitoring of
enforcement.
The treaty, essentially, is a gentlemen's agreement amongst members
backed by the long-prevailing thought that biological warfare should not
be used in battle.
In recent years certain critics have claimed the U.S. stance on
biological warfare and the use of biological agents has differed from
historical interpretations of the BWC.
For example, it is said that the U.S. now maintains that the Article I
of the BWC (which explicitly bans bio-weapons), does not apply to
"non-lethal" biological agents. Previous interpretation was stated to be in line with a definition laid out in Public Law 101-298, the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989. That law defined a biological agent as:
any micro-organism, virus, infectious substance, or
biological product that may be engineered as a result of biotechnology,
or any naturally occurring or bio-engineered component of any such
microorganism, virus, infectious substance, or biological product,
capable of causing death, disease, or other biological malfunction in a
human, an animal, a plant, or another living organism; deterioration of
food, water, equipment, supplies, or material of any kind ...
After World War II, and with the onset of Cold War
tensions, the US continued its clandestine wartime bio-weapons program.
The Korean War (1950–53) added justification for continuing the
program, when the possible entry of the Soviet Union into the war was
feared. Concerns over the Soviet Union were justified, for the Soviet
Union would pronounce in 1956 that chemical and biological weapons
would, indeed, be used for mass destruction in future wars. In October 1950, the US Secretary of Defense
approved continuation of the program, based largely on the Soviet
threat and a belief that the North Korean and Chinese communists would
use biological weapons.
With expansion of the biological warfare retaliatory program, the scope
of the defensive program was nearly doubled. Data were obtained on
personnel protection, decontamination, and immunization. Early detection
research produced prototype alarms for use on the battlefield, but
progress was slow, apparently limited by technology.
The U.S. Army Medical Unit, under the direction of The U.S. Army
Surgeon General, began formal operations in 1956. One of the Unit's
first missions was to manage all aspects of Project CD-22, the exposure
of volunteers to aerosols containing a pathogenic strain of Coxiella burnetii, the etiologic agent of Q fever. The volunteers were closely monitored and antibiotic therapy
was administered when appropriate. All volunteers recovered from Q
fever with no adverse aftereffects. One year later, the Unit submitted
to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration an Investigational New Drug application for a Q fever vaccine.
1960s
In the
following decade, the US accumulated significant data on personnel
protection, decontamination, and immunization; and, in the offensive
program, on the potential for mosquitoes to be used as biological
vectors. A new Department of Defense (DoD) Biological and Chemical Defense Planning Board
was created in 1960 to establish program priorities and objectives.
Preventive approaches toward infections of all kinds were funded under
the auspices of biological warfare. As concern increased over the
biological warfare threat during the Cold War, so did the budget for the
program: to $38 million by fiscal year 1966.
The U.S. Army Chemical Corps was given the responsibility to conduct biological warfare research for all of the services. In 1962, the responsibility for the testing of promising biological warfare agents was given to a separate Testing and Evaluation Command (TEC). Depending on the particular program, different test centers were used, such as the Deseret Test Center at Fort Douglas, Utah,
the headquarters for the new biological and chemical warfare testing
organization. In response to increasing concerns over public safety and
the environment, the TEC implemented a complex system of approval of its
research programs that included the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President of the United States.
During the last 10 years of the offensive research and
development program (1959–69), many scientific advances were made that
proved that biological warfare was clearly feasible, although dependent
on careful planning, especially with regard to meteorological
conditions. Large-scale fermentation, purification, concentration,
stabilization, drying, and weaponization of pathogenic microorganisms
could be done safely. Furthermore, modern principles of biosafety and
containment were established at the Fort Detrick laboratories which have
greatly facilitated biomedical research in general; still today, these
are followed throughout the world. Arnold G. Wedum,
M.D., Ph.D., a civilian scientist who was Director of Industrial Health
and Safety at Fort Detrick, was the leader in the development of
containment facilities.
Particular attention was directed at chemical and biological
detectors during the 1960s. The first devices were primitive field
alarms to detect chemicals. Although the development of sensitive
biological warfare agent detectors was at a standstill, two systems
were, nonetheless, investigated. The first was a monitor that detected
increases in the number of particles sized 1 to 5 µm in diameter, based
on the assumption that a biological agent attack would include airborne
particles of this size. The second system involved the selective
staining of particles collected from the air. Both systems lacked enough
specificity and sensitivity to be of any practical use.
But in 1966, a research effort directed at detecting the presence of adenosine triphosphate (a chemical found only in living organisms) was begun. By using a fluorescent material found in fireflies,
preliminary studies indicated that it was possible to detect the
presence of a biological agent in the atmosphere. The important effort
to find a satisfactory detection system continues today, for timely
detection of a biological attack would allow the attacked force to use
its protective masks effectively, and identification of the agent would
allow any pre-treatment regimens to be instituted. The US Army also
experimented with and developed highly effective barrier protective
measures against both chemical and biological agents. Special impervious
tents and personal protective equipment were developed, including
individual gas masks even for military dogs.
During the late 1960s, funding for the biological warfare program
decreased temporarily, to accommodate the accelerating costs of the Vietnam War.
The budget for fiscal year 1969 was $31 million, decreasing to $11.8
million by fiscal year 1973. Although the offensive program had been
stopped in 1969, both offensive and defensive programs continued to be
defended. John S. Foster, Jr, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, responded to a query by Congressman Richard D. McCarthy:
It is the policy of the U.S. to develop and maintain a
defensive chemical-biological (CB) capability so that our military
forces could operate for some period of time in a toxic environment, if
necessary; to develop and maintain a limited offensive capability in
order to deter all use of CB weapons by the threat of retaliation in
kind; and to continue a program of research and development in this area
to minimize the possibility of technological surprise.
On 25 November 1969, President Richard Nixon visited Fort Detrick to announce a new policy on biological warfare. In two National Security Memoranda,
the U.S. government renounced all development, production, and
stockpiling of biological weapons and declared its intent to maintain
only small research quantities of biological agents, such as are
necessary for the development of vaccines, drugs, and diagnostics.
Ground was broken in 1967 for the construction of a new, modern
laboratory building at Fort Detrick. The building would open in phases
during 1971 and 1972. With the disestablishment of the biological
warfare laboratories, the name of the U.S. Army Medical Unit, which was
to have been housed in the new laboratories, was formally changed to
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)
in 1969. The institute's new mission was stated in General Order 137, 10
November 1971 (since superseded):
Conducts studies related to medical defensive aspects of
biological agents of military importance and develops appropriate
biological protective measures, diagnostic procedures and therapeutic
methods.
The emphasis now shifted away from offensive weapons to the
development of vaccines, diagnostic systems, personal protection,
chemoprophylaxis, and rapid detection systems.
1970s
After Nixon
declared an end to the U.S. bio-weapons program, debate in the Army
centered around whether or not toxin weapons were included in the
president's declaration. Following Nixon's November 1969 order, scientists at Fort Detrick worked on one toxin, Staphylococcus enterotoxin type B (SEB), for several more months. Nixon ended the debate when he added toxins to the bio-weapons ban in February 1970.
In response to Nixon's 1969 decision, all antipersonnel
biological warfare stocks were destroyed between 10 May 1971 and 1 May
1972. The laboratory at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas, was converted to a
toxicological research laboratory, and was no longer under the
direction or control of the DoD. Biological anticrop agents were
destroyed by February 1973. Biological warfare demilitarization
continued through the 1970s, with input provided by the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare; U.S. Department of the Interior; U.S. Department of Agriculture; and the Environmental Protection Agency.
Fort Detrick and other installations involved in the biological warfare
program took on new identities, and their missions were changed to
biological defense and the development of medical countermeasures. The
necessary containment capability, Biosafety Levels 3 and 4 (BSL-3 and BSL-4) continued to be maintained at USAMRIID.
1980s
In 1984,
the DoD requested funds for the construction of another biological
aerosol test facility in Utah. The proposal submitted by the army called
for BSL-4 containment, although maintaining that the BSL-4 inclusion
was based on a possible need in the future and not on a current research
effort. The proposal was not well received in Utah, where many citizens
and government officials still recalled the secretive projects of the
military: the areas on DPG still contaminated with anthrax spores, and
the well-publicized accidental chemical poisoning of a flock of sheep in Skull Valley, Utah, in March 1968.
Questions arose over the safety of the employees and the surrounding
communities, and a suggestion was even made to shift all biological
defense research to a civilian agency, such as the National Institutes of Health. The plan for a new facility was revised to utilize a BSL-3 facility, but not before the US Congress had instituted more surveillance, reporting, and control measures on the army to ensure compliance with the BWC.
1990s
In the
1990s, the US medical biological defense research effort (part of the
U.S. Army's Biological Defense Research Program [BDRP]) was concentrated
at USAMRIID at Fort Detrick. The army maintained state-of-the-art
containment laboratory facilities there, with more than 10,000 ft2 of
BSL-4 and 50,000 ft2 of BSL-3 laboratory space. BSL-4, the highest
containment level, included laboratory suites that are isolated by
internal walls and protected by rigorous entry restrictions, air-locks,
negative-pressure air-handling systems, and filtration of all out-flow
air through high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. Workers in
BSL-4 laboratories also wore filtered positive-pressure total body suits,
which isolated the workers from the internal air of the laboratory.
BSL-3 laboratories had a similar design, but do not require that
personnel wear positive-pressure suits. Workers in BSL-3 suites were
protected immunologically by vaccines. U.S. governmental standards
provided guidance as to which organisms might be handled under various
containment levels in laboratories such as USAMRIID.
The unique facilities available at USAMRIID also included a
16-bed clinical research ward capable of BSL-3 containment, and a 2-bed
patient care isolation suite—the Medical Containment Suite (MCS), known
as "The Slammer"—where ICU-level care could be provided under BSL-4
containment. Here, healthcare personnel wore the same positive-pressure
suits as are worn in BSL-4 research laboratories. The level of patient
isolation required depended on the infecting organism and the risk to
healthcare providers. Patient care can be provided at BSL-4. There were
no patient-care category analogous to BSL-3; humans who are ill as a
result of exposure to BSL-3 agents were to be cared for in an ordinary
hospital room with barrier nursing procedures.
USAMRIID guidelines were prepared to determine which level of
containment would be employed for individual patients who required BSL-4
isolation or barrier nursing care. Staff augmentation for BSL-4
critical care expertise came from the Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC), Washington, D.C., in accordance with a memorandum of agreement
between the two institutions. Patients could be brought directly into
the BSL-4 suite from the outside through specialized ports with unique
patient-isolation equipment. (The MCS was decommissioned and
discontinued in December 2010.)
Additionally, starting in the 1970s USAMRIID maintained a unique evacuation capability known as the Aeromedical Isolation Team
(AIT). Led by a physician and a registered nurse, each of the two teams
consisted of eight volunteers who trained intensively to provide an
evacuation capability for casualties suspected of being infected with
highly transmissible, life-threatening BSL-4 infectious diseases (e.g.,
hemorrhagic fever viruses). The unit used special adult-sized Vickers
isolation units (Vickers Medical Containment Stretcher Transit
Isolator). These units were aircraft transportable and isolated a
patient placed inside from the external environment. The AIT could
transport two patients simultaneously; obviously, this was not designed
for a mass casualty situation. During the 1995 outbreak of Ebola fever in Zaire,
the AIT remained on alert to evacuate any US citizens who might have
become ill while working to control the disease in that country.
During this period, some biological defense research also continued at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, and the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research
(WRAIR), Washington, D.C. USAMRIID and these sister laboratories
conducted basic research in support of the medical component of the US
biological defense research program, which developed strategies,
products, information, procedures, and training for medical defense
against biological warfare agents. The products included diagnostic
reagents and procedures, drugs, vaccines, toxoids, and antitoxins.
Emphasis is placed on protecting personnel before any potential exposure
to the biological agent occurs.
In 1998, several DoD organizations consolidated to create the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), headquartered in Fort Belvoir, Virginia. This agency is DOD's official Combat Support Agency for countering weapons of mass destruction,
including bio-agents. DTRA's main functions are threat reduction,
threat control, combat support, and technology development. In the US
national interest, DTRA supports projects at more than 14 locations
around the world, including Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan,
Georgia, and Ukraine.
Three secret DoD projects involving countermeasures against anthrax – code named Project Bacchus, Project Clear Vision and Project Jefferson – were publicly disclosed by The New York Times in 2001. (The projects were undertaken between 1997 and 2000 and focused on the concern that the old Soviet BW program was secretly continuing and had developed a genetically modified anthrax weapon.)
Since the September 11 attacks and the 2001 anthrax attacks,
the US government has allocated nearly $50 billion to address the
threat of biological weapons. Funding for bioweapons-related activities
focuses primarily on research for and acquisition of medicines for
defense. Biodefense funding also goes toward stockpiling protective
equipment, increased surveillance and detection of bio-agents, and
improving state and hospital preparedness. Significant funding goes to
BARDA (Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority),
part of DHHS. Funding for activities aimed at prevention has more than
doubled since 2007 and is distributed among 11 federal agencies. Efforts toward cooperative international action are part of the project.
Project BioShield will transform our ability to defend
the nation in three essential ways. First, Project BioShield authorizes
$5.6 billion over 10 years for the government to purchase and stockpile
vaccines and drugs to fight anthrax, smallpox and other potential agents
of bioterror. The DHHS has already taken steps to purchase 75 million
doses of an improved anthrax vaccine for the Strategic National Stockpile.
Under Project BioShield, HHS is moving forward with plans to acquire a
safer, second generation smallpox vaccine, an antidote to botulinum
toxin, and better treatments for exposure to chemical and radiological
weapons.
This was a ten-year program to acquire medical countermeasures to
biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear agents for civilian use.
A key element of the Act was to allow stockpiling and distribution of
vaccines that had not been tested for safety or efficacy in humans,
due to ethical concerns. Efficacy of these agents cannot be directly
tested in humans without also exposing humans to the chemical,
biological, or radioactive threat being treated. In these cases
efficacy testing follows the US Food and Drug Administration Animal Rule for pivotal animal efficacy.
In December
2019, Congress moved forward with a spending package that provided
increases for several key U.S. biological defense programs, including
the Strategic National Stockpile. The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention was slated to receive $8 billion, a $636 million increase
over 2019, with a mandate written in the bill for CDC "to maintain a
strong and central role in the medical countermeasures enterprise."
Within the CDC budget, the Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund,
which prepares for "all public health emergencies" including
bioterrorism and federal efforts against infectious diseases, was funded
at $2.74 billion. Another change was a specific item in the budget for
the Strategic National Stockpile, which directed $535 million for
vaccines, medicines and diagnostic tools to fight Ebola, which has
become an emerging threat.
Current status
In August 2019, the U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) issued a report that identified specific challenges that the
United States faces in protecting the nation against biological events.
The report focused on four specific vulnerabilities: assessment of
"enterprise-wide threats", situational awareness and data integration,
biodetection technologies, and lab safety and security.
Products currently being produced or under development through military research include:
Human immune globulin preparations (passive antibody protection) against various bacteria and viruses; and
Antiviral drugs against multiple viral agents.
Some vaccines also have applicability for diseases of domestic
animals (e.g., Rift Valley fever and Venezuelan equine encephalitis). In
addition, vaccines are provided to persons who may be occupationally
exposed to such agents (e.g., laboratory workers, entomologists, and veterinary personnel) throughout government, industry, and academe.
USAMRIID also provides diagnostic and epidemiological support to
federal, state, and local agencies and foreign governments. Examples of
assistance rendered to civilian health efforts by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC) include:
The massive immunization program instituted during the Venezuelan equine encephalitis outbreak in the Americas in 1971;
The laboratory support provided to the U.S. Public Health Service
during the outbreak of Legionnaire's disease in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, in 1976;
International support during the outbreak of Rift Valley fever in Mauritania in 1989;
Assistance with the outbreak of Ebola infections among monkeys imported to Reston (Virginia) in 1990 (→ Reston virus); and
Epidemiological and diagnostic support to the World Health Organization–Centers for Disease Control and Prevention field team that studied the Ebola outbreak in Zaire in 1995 (→ Zaire ebolavirus).
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