Logical consequence (also entailment) is a fundamental concept in logic which describes the relationship between statements that hold true when one statement logically follows from one or more statements. A valid logical argument is one in which the conclusion is entailed by the premises, because the conclusion is the consequence of the premises. The philosophical analysis
of logical consequence involves the questions: In what sense does a
conclusion follow from its premises? and What does it mean for a
conclusion to be a consequence of premises? All of philosophical logic is meant to provide accounts of the nature of logical consequence and the nature of logical truth.
Logical consequence is necessary and formal, by way of examples that explain with formal proof and models of interpretation. A sentence is said to be a logical consequence of a set of sentences, for a given language, if and only if, using only logic (i.e., without regard to any personal interpretations of the sentences) the sentence must be true if every sentence in the set is true.
Logicians make precise accounts of logical consequence regarding a given language, either by constructing a deductive system for or by formal intended semantics for language . The Polish logician Alfred Tarski identified three features of an adequate characterization of entailment: (1) The logical consequence relation relies on the logical form of the sentences: (2) The relation is a priori, i.e., it can be determined with or without regard to empirical evidence (sense experience); and (3) The logical consequence relation has a modal component.
Formal accounts
The
most widely prevailing view on how best to account for logical
consequence is to appeal to formality. This is to say that whether
statements follow from one another logically depends on the structure or
logical form of the statements without regard to the contents of that form.
Syntactic accounts of logical consequence rely on schemes using inference rules. For instance, we can express the logical form of a valid argument as:
All X are Y
All Y are Z
Therefore, all X are Z.
This argument is formally valid, because every instance of arguments constructed using this scheme is valid.
This is in contrast to an argument like "Fred is Mike's brother's
son. Therefore Fred is Mike's nephew." Since this argument depends on
the meanings of the words "brother", "son", and "nephew", the statement
"Fred is Mike's nephew" is a so-called material consequence of "Fred is Mike's brother's son", not a formal consequence. A formal consequence must be true in all cases, however this is an incomplete definition of formal consequence, since even the argument "P is Q's brother's son, therefore P is Q's nephew" is valid in all cases, but is not a formal argument.
A priori property of logical consequence
If it is known that follows logically from , then no information about the possible interpretations of or will affect that knowledge. Our knowledge that is a logical consequence of cannot be influenced by empirical knowledge. Deductively valid arguments can be known to be so without recourse to experience, so they must be knowable a priori.
However, formality alone does not guarantee that logical consequence is
not influenced by empirical knowledge. So the a priori property of
logical consequence is considered to be independent of formality.
Proofs and models
The two prevailing techniques for providing accounts of logical consequence involve expressing the concept in terms of proofs and via models. The study of the syntactic consequence (of a logic) is called (its) proof theory whereas the study of (its) semantic consequence is called (its) model theory.
A formula is a syntactic consequence within some formal system of a set of formulas if there is a formal proof in of from the set . This is denoted . The turnstile symbol was originally introduced by Frege in 1879, but its current use only dates back to Rosser and Kleene (1934–1935).
Syntactic consequence does not depend on any interpretation of the formal system.
A formula is a semantic consequence within some formal system of a set of statements if and only if there is no model in which all members of are true and is false. This is denoted . Or, in other words, the set of the interpretations that make all members of true is a subset of the set of the interpretations that make true.
Modal accounts
Modal accounts of logical consequence are variations on the following basic idea:
is true if and only if it is necessary that if all of the elements of are true, then is true.
Alternatively (and, most would say, equivalently):
is true if and only if it is impossible for all of the elements of to be true and false.
is true if and only if there is no possible world at which all of the elements of are true and is false (untrue).
Consider the modal account in terms of the argument given as an example above:
All frogs are green.
Kermit is a frog.
Therefore, Kermit is green.
The conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises because we
can not imagine a possible world where (a) all frogs are green; (b)
Kermit is a frog; and (c) Kermit is not green.
Modal-formal accounts
Modal-formal
accounts of logical consequence combine the modal and formal accounts
above, yielding variations on the following basic idea:
if and only if it is impossible for an argument with the same logical form as / to have true premises and a false conclusion.
Warrant-based accounts
The
accounts considered above are all "truth-preservational", in that they
all assume that the characteristic feature of a good inference is that
it never allows one to move from true premises to an untrue conclusion.
As an alternative, some have proposed "warrant-preservational"
accounts, according to which the characteristic feature of a good
inference is that it never allows one to move from justifiably
assertible premises to a conclusion that is not justifiably assertible.
This is (roughly) the account favored by intuitionists such as Michael Dummett.
The accounts discussed above all yield monotonic consequence relations, i.e. ones such that if is a consequence of , then is a consequence of any superset of .
It is also possible to specify non-monotonic consequence relations to
capture the idea that, e.g., 'Tweety can fly' is a logical consequence
of
{Birds can typically fly, Tweety is a bird}
but not of
{Birds can typically fly, Tweety is a bird, Tweety is a penguin}.
Objectivism is a philosophical system developed by Russian-American writer and philosopher Ayn Rand.
She described it as "the concept of man as a heroic being, with his own
happiness as the moral purpose of his life, with productive achievement
as his noblest activity, and reason as his only absolute".
Rand first expressed Objectivism in her fiction, most notably The Fountainhead (1943) and Atlas Shrugged (1957), and later in non-fiction essays and books. Leonard Peikoff, a professional philosopher and Rand's designated intellectual heir,
later gave it a more formal structure. Peikoff characterizes
Objectivism as a "closed system" insofar as its "fundamental principles"
were set out by Rand and are not subject to change. However, he stated
that "new implications, applications and integrations can always be
discovered".
Objectivism's main tenets are that reality exists independently of consciousness, that human beings have direct contact with reality through sense perception (see direct and indirect realism), that one can attain objective knowledge from perception through the process of concept formation and inductive logic, that the proper moral purpose of one's life is the pursuit of one's own happiness (see rational egoism), that the only social system consistent with this morality is one that displays full respect for individual rights embodied in laissez-fairecapitalism, and that the role of art in human life is to transform humans' metaphysical
ideas by selective reproduction of reality into a physical form—a work
of art—that one can comprehend and to which one can respond emotionally.
Academic philosophers have generally paid little attention to or dismissed Rand's philosophy, although a smaller number of academics do support it. Nonetheless, Objectivism has been a persistent influence among right-libertarians and American conservatives. The Objectivist movement, which Rand founded, attempts to spread her ideas to the public and in academic settings.
The name "Objectivism" derives from the idea that human knowledge and values are objective:
they exist and are determined by the nature of reality, to be
discovered by one's mind, and are not created by the thoughts one has. Rand stated that she chose the name because her preferred term for a philosophy based on the primacy of existence—"existentialism"—had already been taken.
Rand characterized Objectivism as "a philosophy for living on
earth", based on reality, and intended as a method of defining human
nature and the nature of the world in which we live.
My philosophy, in essence, is the
concept of man as a heroic being, with his own happiness as the moral
purpose of his life, with productive achievement as his noblest
activity, and reason as his only absolute.
Rand's philosophy begins with three axioms: existence, consciousness, and identity.
Rand defined an axiom as "a statement that identifies the base of
knowledge and of any further statement pertaining to that knowledge, a
statement necessarily contained in all others whether any particular
speaker chooses to identify it or not. An axiom is a proposition that
defeats its opponents by the fact that they have to accept it and use it
in the process of any attempt to deny it." As Objectivist philosopher Leonard Peikoff
argued, Rand's argument for axioms "is not a proof that the axioms of
existence, consciousness, and identity are true. It is proof that they
are axioms, that they are at the base of knowledge and thus inescapable."
Rand said that existence is the perceptually self-evident
fact at the base of all other knowledge, i.e., that "existence exists".
She further said that to be is to be something, that "existence is identity". That is, to be is to be "an entity of a specific nature made of specific attributes".
That which has no nature or attributes does not and cannot exist. The
axiom of existence is conceptualized as differentiating something from
nothing, while the law of identity is conceptualized as differentiating
one thing from another, i.e., one's first awareness of the law of
non-contradiction, another crucial base for the rest of knowledge. As
Rand wrote, "A leaf ... cannot be all red and green at the same time, it
cannot freeze and burn at the same time... A is A." Objectivism rejects belief in anything alleged to transcend existence.
Rand argued that consciousness is "the faculty of perceiving that
which exists". As she put it, "to be conscious is to be conscious of something", that is consciousness itself cannot be distinguished or conceptualized except in relation to an independent reality. "It cannot be aware only of itself—there is no 'itself' until it is aware of something." Thus, Objectivism posits that the mind does not create reality, but rather, it is a means of discovering reality.
Expressed differently, existence has "primacy" over consciousness,
which must conform to it. Any other type of argument Rand termed "the
primacy of consciousness", including any variant of metaphysical
subjectivism or theism.
Objectivist philosophy derives its explanations of action and causation from the axiom of identity, referring to causation as "the law of identity applied to action".
According to Rand, it is entities that act, and every action is the
action of an entity. The way entities act is caused by the specific
nature (or "identity") of those entities; if they were different, they
would act differently. As with the other axioms, an implicit
understanding of causation is derived from one's primary observations of
causal connections among entities even before it is verbally identified
and serves as the basis of further knowledge.
Epistemology: reason
According to Rand, attaining knowledge beyond what is given by perception requires both volition (or the exercise of free will) and performing a specific method of validation by observation, concept-formation, and the application of inductive and deductive reasoning.
For example, a belief in dragons, however sincere, does not mean that
reality includes dragons. A process of proof identifying the basis in
reality of a claimed item of knowledge is necessary to establish its
truth.
Objectivist epistemology
begins with the principle that "consciousness is identification". This
is understood to be a direct consequence of the metaphysical principle
that "existence is identity". Rand defined "reason" as "the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man's senses". Rand wrote "The fundamental concept of method, the one on which all the others depend, is logic.
The distinguishing characteristic of logic (the art of
non-contradictory identification) indicates the nature of the actions
(actions of consciousness required to achieve a correct identification)
and their goal (knowledge)—while omitting the length, complexity or
specific steps of the process of logical inference, as well as the
nature of the particular cognitive problem involved in any given
instance of using logic."
According to Rand, consciousness
possesses a specific and finite identity, just like everything else
that exists; therefore, it must operate by a specific method of
validation. An item of knowledge cannot be "disqualified" by being
arrived at by a specific process in a particular form. Thus, for Rand,
the fact that consciousness must itself possess identity implies the
rejection of both universal skepticism based on the "limits" of
consciousness, as well as any claim to revelation, emotion or
faith-based belief.
Objectivist epistemology maintains that all knowledge is
ultimately based on perception. "Percepts, not sensations, are the
given, the self-evident."
Rand considered the validity of the senses to be axiomatic and said
that purported arguments to the contrary all commit the fallacy of the
"stolen concept" by presupposing the validity of concepts that, in turn, presuppose the validity of the senses. She said that perception, being determined physiologically, is incapable of error. For example, optical illusions are errors in the conceptual identification of what is seen, not errors of sight itself.
The validity of sense perception, therefore, is not susceptible to
proof (because it is presupposed by all proof as proof is only a matter
of adducing sensory evidence) nor should its validity be denied (since
the conceptual tools one would have to use to do this are derived from
sensory data). Perceptual error, therefore, is not possible. Rand
consequently rejected epistemological skepticism, as she said that the skeptics' claim to knowledge "distorted" by the form or the means of perception is impossible.
The Objectivist theory of perception distinguishes between the form and object.
The form in which an organism perceives is determined by the physiology
of its sensory systems. Whatever form the organism perceives it in,
what it perceives—the object of perception—is reality. Rand consequently rejected the Kantian dichotomy between "things as we perceive them" and "things as they are in themselves". Rand wrote:
The attack on man's consciousness
and particularly on his conceptual faculty has rested on the
unchallenged premise that any knowledge acquired by a process of consciousness is necessarily subjective and cannot correspond to the facts of reality, since it is processed knowledge … [but] all knowledge is
processed knowledge—whether on the sensory, perceptual or conceptual
level. An "unprocessed" knowledge would be a knowledge acquired without
means of cognition.
The aspect of epistemology given the most elaboration by Rand is the theory of concept-formation, which she presented in Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. She argued that concepts are formed by a process of measurement omission. Peikoff described this as follows:
To form a concept, one mentally isolates
a group of concretes (of distinct perceptual units), on the basis of
observed similarities which distinguish them from all other known
concretes (similarity is 'the relationship between two or more existents
which possess the same characteristic(s), but in different measure or
degree'); then, by a process of omitting the particular measurements of
these concretes, one integrates them into a single new mental
unit: the concept, which subsumes all concretes of this kind (a
potentially unlimited number). The integration is completed and retained
by the selection of a perceptual symbol (a word) to designate it.
"A concept is a mental integration of two or more units possessing the
same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular
measurements omitted."
According to Rand, "the term 'measurements omitted' does not mean, in
this context, that measurements are regarded as non-existent; it means
that measurements exist, but are not specified. That measurements must exist is an essential part of the process. The principle is: the relevant measurements must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity."
Rand argued that concepts are organized hierarchically. Concepts
such as 'dog,' which bring together "concretes" available in perception,
can be differentiated (into the concepts of 'dachshund,' 'poodle,'
etc.) or integrated (along with 'cat,' etc., into the concept of
'animal'). Abstract concepts such as 'animal' can be further integrated,
via "abstraction from abstractions", into such concepts as 'living
thing.' Concepts are formed in the context of knowledge available. A
young child differentiates dogs from cats and chickens but need not
explicitly differentiate them from deep-sea tube worms, or from other
types of animals not yet known to him, to form a concept 'dog'.
Because of its characterization of concepts as "open-ended"
classifications that go well beyond the characteristics included in
their past or current definitions, Objectivist epistemology rejects the analytic-synthetic distinction as a false dichotomy and denies the possibility of a priori knowledge.
Rand rejected "feeling" as sources of knowledge. Rand
acknowledged the importance of emotion for human beings, but she
maintained that emotions are a consequence of the conscious or
subconscious ideas that a person already accepts, not a means of
achieving awareness of reality. "Emotions are not tools of cognition." Rand also rejected all forms of faith
or mysticism, terms that she used synonymously. She defined faith as
"the acceptance of allegations without evidence or proof, either apart
from or against the evidence of one's senses and reason...
Mysticism is the claim to some non-sensory, non-rational, non-definable,
non-identifiable means of knowledge, such as 'instinct,' 'intuition,'
'revelation,' or any form of 'just knowing.'" Reliance on revelation is like reliance on a Ouija board;
it bypasses the need to show how it connects its results to reality.
Faith, for Rand, is not a "short-cut" to knowledge, but a
"short-circuit" destroying it.
Objectivism acknowledges the facts that human beings have limited
knowledge, are vulnerable to error, and do not instantly understand all
of the implications of their knowledge.
According to Peikoff, one can be certain of a proposition if all of the
available evidence verifies it, i.e., it can be logically integrated
with the rest of one's knowledge; one is then certain within the context
of the evidence.
Rand rejected the traditional rationalist/empiricist
dichotomy, arguing that it embodies a false alternative: conceptually
based knowledge independent of perception (rationalism) versus
perceptually based knowledge independent of concepts (empiricism). Rand
argued that neither is possible because the senses provide the material
of knowledge while conceptual processing is also needed to establish
knowable propositions.
Criticism on epistemology
The philosopher John Hospers, who was influenced by Rand and shared her moral and political opinions, disagreed with her concerning issues of epistemology. Some philosophers, such as Tibor Machan, have argued that the Objectivist epistemology is incomplete.
Psychology professor Robert L. Campbell
writes that the relationship between Objectivist epistemology and
cognitive science remains unclear because Rand made claims about human
cognition and its development which belong to psychology, yet Rand also
argued that philosophy is logically prior to psychology and in no way
dependent on it.
The philosophers Randall Dipert
and Roderick T. Long have argued that Objectivist epistemology
conflates the perceptual process by which judgments are formed with the
way in which they are to be justified, thereby leaving it unclear how
sensory data can validate judgments structured propositionally.
Ethics: self-interest
Objectivism includes an extensive treatment of ethical concerns. Rand wrote on morality in her works We the Living (1936), Atlas Shrugged (1957) and The Virtue of Selfishness
(1964). Rand defines morality as "a code of values to guide man's
choices and actions—the choices and actions that determine the purpose
and the course of his life".
Rand maintained that the first question is not what should the code of
values be, the first question is "Does man need values at all—and why?"
According to Rand, "it is only the concept of 'Life' that makes the
concept of 'Value' possible", and "the fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do".
Rand writes: "there is only one fundamental alternative in the
universe: existence or non-existence—and it pertains to a single class
of entities: to living organisms. The existence of inanimate matter is
unconditional, the existence of life is not: it depends on a specific
course of action. [...] It is only a living organism that faces a
constant alternative: the issue of life or death".
Rand argued that the primary emphasis of man's free will
is the choice: 'to think or not to think'. "Thinking is not an
automatic function. In any hour and issue of his life, man is free to
think or to evade that effort. Thinking requires a state of full,
focused awareness. The act of focusing one's consciousness is
volitional. Man can focus his mind to a full, active, purposefully
directed awareness of reality—or he can unfocus it and let himself drift
in a semiconscious daze, merely reacting to any chance stimulus of the
immediate moment, at the mercy of his undirected sensory-perceptual
mechanism and of any random, associational connections it might happen
to make." According to Rand, therefore, possessing free will, human beings must choose their values: one does not automatically
have one's own life as his ultimate value. Whether in fact a person's
actions promote and fulfill his own life or not is a question of fact,
as it is with all other organisms, but whether a person will act to
promote his well-being is up to him, not hard-wired into his physiology.
"Man has the power to act as his own destroyer—and that is the way he
has acted through most of his history."
In Atlas Shrugged, Rand wrote "Man's mind is his basic
tool of survival. Life is given to him, survival is not. His body is
given to him, its sustenance is not. His mind is given to him, its
content is not. To remain alive he must act and before he can act he
must know the nature and purpose of his action. He cannot obtain his
food without knowledge of food and of the way to obtain it. He cannot
dig a ditch—or build a cyclotron—without a knowledge of his aim and the
means to achieve it. To remain alive, he must think." In her novels, The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged,
she also emphasizes the importance of productive work, romantic love
and art to human happiness, and dramatizes the ethical character of
their pursuit. The primary virtue in Objectivist ethics is rationality,
as Rand meant it "the recognition and acceptance of reason as one's
only source of knowledge, one's only judge of values and one's only
guide to action".
The purpose of a moral code, Rand said, is to provide the
principles by reference to which man can achieve the values his survival
requires. Rand summarizes:
If [man] chooses to live, a
rational ethics will tell him what principles of action are required to
implement his choice. If he does not choose to live, nature will take
its course. Reality confronts a man with a great many "must's", but all
of them are conditional: the formula of realistic necessity is: "you
must, if –" and the if stands for man's choice: "if you want to achieve a
certain goal".
Rand's explanation of values presents the proposition that an
individual's primary moral obligation is to achieve his own
well-being—it is for his life and his self-interest that an individual
ought to obey a moral code. Ethical egoism is a corollary of setting man's life as the moral standard. Rand believed that rational egoism is the logical consequence
of humans following evidence to its logical conclusion. The only
alternative would be that they live without orientation to reality.
A corollary to Rand's endorsement of self-interest is her rejection of the ethical doctrine of altruism—which she defined in the sense of Auguste Comte's altruism (he popularized the term),
as a moral obligation to live for the sake of others. Rand also
rejected subjectivism. A "whim-worshiper" or "hedonist", according to
Rand, is not motivated by a desire to live his own human life, but by a
wish to live on a sub-human level. Instead of using "that which promotes
my (human) life" as his standard of value, he mistakes "that which I
(mindlessly happen to) value" for a standard of value, in contradiction
of the fact that, existentially, he is a human and therefore rational
organism. The "I value" in whim-worship or hedonism can be replaced with
"we value", "he values", "they value", or "God values", and still, it
would remain dissociated from reality. Rand repudiated the equation of
rational selfishness with hedonistic or whim-worshiping
"selfishness-without-a-self". She said that the former is good, and the
latter bad, and that there is a fundamental difference between them.
For Rand, all of the principal virtues
are applications of the role of reason as man's basic tool of survival:
rationality, honesty, justice, independence, integrity, productiveness,
and pride—each of which she explains in some detail in "The Objectivist
Ethics". The essence of Objectivist ethics is summarized by the oath her Atlas Shrugged
character John Galt adhered to: "I swear—by my life and my love of
it—that I will never live for the sake of another man, nor ask another
man to live for mine."
Criticism on ethics
Some philosophers have criticized Objectivist ethics. The philosopher Robert Nozick
argues that Rand's foundational argument in ethics is unsound because
it does not explain why someone could not rationally prefer dying and
having no values, in order to further some particular value. He argues
that her attempt to defend the morality of selfishness is, therefore, an
instance of begging the question. Nozick also argues that Rand's solution to David Hume's famous is-ought problem is unsatisfactory. In response, the philosophers Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl have argued that Nozick misstated Rand's case.
Charles King criticized Rand's example of an indestructible robot to demonstrate the value of life as incorrect and confusing.
In response, Paul St. F. Blair defended Rand's ethical conclusions,
while maintaining that his arguments might not have been approved by
Rand.
Politics: individual rights and capitalism
Rand's defense of individual liberty integrates elements from her entire philosophy.
Since reason is the means of human knowledge, it is therefore each
person's most fundamental means of survival and is necessary to the
achievement of values. The use or threat of force
neutralizes the practical effect of an individual's reason, whether the
force originates from the state or from a criminal. According to Rand,
"man's mind will not function at the point of a gun".
Therefore, the only type of organized human behavior consistent with
the operation of reason is that of voluntary cooperation. Persuasion is
the method of reason. By its nature, the overtly irrational cannot rely
on the use of persuasion and must ultimately resort to force to prevail. Thus, Rand argued that reason and freedom are correlates, just as she argued that mysticism and force are corollaries.
Based on this understanding of the role of reason, Objectivists claim
that the initiation of physical force against the will of another is
immoral, as are indirect initiations of force through threats, fraud, or breach of contract. The use of defensive or retaliatory force, on the other hand, is appropriate.
Objectivism claims that because the opportunity to use reason
without the initiation of force is necessary to achieve moral values,
each individual has an inalienable moral right
to act as his own judgment directs and to keep the product of his
effort. Peikoff, explaining the basis of rights, stated, "In content, as
the founding fathers recognized, there is one fundamental right, which
has several major derivatives. The fundamental right is the right to
life. Its major derivatives are the right to liberty, property, and the
pursuit of happiness." "A 'right' is a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context."
These rights are specifically understood to be rights to action, not to
specific results or objects, and the obligations created by rights are
negative in nature: each individual must refrain from violating the
rights of others. Objectivists reject alternative notions of rights, such as positive rights, collective rights, or animal rights. Objectivism claims that the only social system which fully recognizes individual rights is capitalism, specifically what Rand described as "full, pure, uncontrolled, unregulated laissez-faire capitalism".
Objectivism regards capitalism as the social system which is most
beneficial to the poor, but does not consider this its primary
justification.
Rather, it is the only moral social system. Objectivism maintains that
only societies seeking to establish freedom (or free nations) have a
right to self-determination.
Objectivism describes government as "the means of placing the
retaliatory use of physical force under objective control—i.e., under
objectively defined laws"; thus, government is both legitimate and
critically important in order to protect individual rights. Rand opposed anarchism because she considered that putting police and courts on the market is an inherent miscarriage of justice. Objectivism claims that the proper functions of a government are "the police, to protect men from criminals—the armed services, to protect men from foreign invaders—the law courts, to settle disputes among men according to objective laws", the executive, and legislatures.
Furthermore, in protecting individual rights, the government is acting
as an agent of its citizens and "has no rights except the rights delegated to it by the citizens" and it must act in an impartial manner according to specific, objectively defined laws.
Rand argued that limited intellectual property
monopolies being granted to certain inventors and artists on a
first-to-file basis are moral because she considered all property as
fundamentally intellectual. Furthermore, the value of a commercial
product derives in part from the necessary work of its inventors.
However, Rand considered limits on patents and copyrights as important
and said that if they were granted in perpetuity, it would necessarily
result in de facto collectivism.
Rand opposed racism and any legal application of racism. She considered affirmative action to be an example of legal racism. Rand advocated the right to legal abortion. Rand believed capital punishment
is morally justified as retribution against a murderer, but dangerous
due to the risk of mistakenly executing innocent people and facilitating
state murder. She therefore said she opposed capital punishment "on
epistemological, not moral, grounds". She opposed involuntary military conscription. She opposed any form of censorship, including legal restrictions on pornography, opinion or worship,
famously quipping; "In the transition to statism, every infringement of
human rights has begun with a given right's least attractive
practitioners".
Objectivists have also opposed a number of government activities
commonly endorsed by both liberals and conservatives, including antitrust laws, the minimum wage, public education, and existing child labor laws. Objectivists have argued against faith-based initiatives, displaying religious symbols in government facilities, and the teaching of "intelligent design" in public schools. Rand opposed involuntary taxation
and believed government could be financed voluntarily, although she
thought this could only happen after other reforms of government were
implemented.
The Objectivist theory of art
derives from its epistemology, by way of "psycho-epistemology" (Rand's
term for an individual's characteristic mode of functioning in acquiring
knowledge). Art, according to Objectivism, serves a human cognitive
need: it allows human beings to understand concepts as though they were percepts.
Objectivism defines "art" as a "selective re-creation of reality
according to an artist's metaphysical value-judgments"—that is,
according to what the artist believes to be ultimately true and
important about the nature of reality and humanity. In this respect
Objectivism regards art as a way of presenting abstractions concretely,
in perceptual form.
The human need for art, according to this idea, derives from the
need for cognitive economy. A concept is already a sort of mental
shorthand standing for a large number of concretes, allowing a human
being to think indirectly or implicitly of many more such concretes than
can be kept explicitly in mind. But a human being cannot keep
indefinitely many concepts explicitly in mind either—and yet, according
to Objectivism, they need a comprehensive conceptual framework to
provide guidance in life. Art offers a way out of this dilemma by
providing a perceptual, easily grasped means of communicating and
thinking about a wide range of abstractions, including one's
metaphysical value-judgments. Objectivism regards art as an effective
way to communicate a moral or ethical ideal.
Objectivism does not, however, regard art as propagandistic: even
though art involves moral values and ideals, its purpose is not to
educate, only to show or project. Moreover, art need not be, and usually
is not, the outcome of a full-blown, explicit philosophy. Usually, it
stems from an artist's sense of life (which is preconceptual and largely emotional).
The end goal of Rand's own artistic endeavors was to portray the ideal man. The Fountainhead is the best example of this effort.
Rand uses the character of Roark to embody the concept of the higher
man which she believes is what great art should do—embody the
characteristics of the best of humanity. This symbolism should be
represented in all art; artistic expression should be an extension of
the greatness in humanity.
Rand said that Romanticism
was the highest school of literary art, noting that Romanticism was
"based on the recognition of the principle that man possesses the
faculty of volition", absent which, Rand believed, literature is robbed
of dramatic power, adding:
What the Romanticists brought to art was the primacy of values...
Values are the source of emotions: a great deal of emotional intensity
was projected in the work of the Romanticists and in the reactions of
their audiences, as well as a great deal of color, imagination,
originality, excitement, and all the other consequences of a
value-oriented view of life.
The term "romanticism", however, is often affiliated with
emotionalism, to which Objectivism is completely opposed. Historically,
many romantic artists were philosophically subjectivist. Most Objectivists who are also artists subscribe to what they term romantic realism, which is how Rand described her own work.
Some scholars have emphasized applying Objectivism to more
specific areas. Machan has developed Rand's contextual conception of
human knowledge (while also drawing on the insights of J. L. Austin and Gilbert Harman) in works such as Objectivity (2004), and David Kelley has explicated Rand's epistemological ideas in works such as The Evidence of the Senses (1986) and A Theory of Abstraction (2001). Regarding the topic of ethics, Kelley has argued in works such as Unrugged Individualism (1996) and The Contested Legacy of Ayn Rand
(2000) that Objectivists should pay more attention to the virtue of
benevolence and place less emphasis on issues of moral sanction.
Kelley's claims have been controversial, and critics Peikoff and Peter Schwartz have argued that he contradicts important principles of Objectivism.
Kelley has used the term "Open Objectivism" for a version of
Objectivism that involves "a commitment to reasoned, non-dogmatic
discussion and debate", "the recognition that Objectivism is open to
expansion, refinement, and revision", and "a policy of benevolence
toward others, including fellow-travelers and critics". Arguing against Kelley, Peikoff characterized Objectivism as a "closed system" that is not subject to change.
An author who emphasizes Rand's ethics, Tara Smith, retains more of Rand's original ideas in such works as Moral Rights and Political Freedom (1995), Viable Values (2000), and Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics (2006). In collaboration with Peikoff, David Harriman has developed a theory of scientificinduction based upon Rand's theory of concepts in The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics (2010).
The political aspects of Rand's philosophy are discussed by Bernstein in The Capitalist Manifesto (2005). In Capitalism: A Treatise on Economics (1996), George Reisman attempts to integrate Objectivist methodology and insights with both Classical and Austrian economics. In psychology, Professor Edwin A. Locke and Ellen Kenner have explored Rand's ideas in the publication The Selfish Path to Romance: How to Love with Passion & Reason. Other writers have explored the application of Objectivism to fields ranging from art, as in What Art Is (2000) by Louis Torres and Michelle Marder Kamhi, to teleology, as in The Biological Basis of Teleological Concepts (1990) by Harry Binswanger.
Impact
One Rand biographer says most people who read Rand's works for the first time do it in their "formative years". Rand's former protégé Nathaniel Branden referred to Rand's "especially powerful appeal to the young", while Onkar Ghate of the Ayn Rand Institute said Rand "appeals to the idealism of youth". This appeal has alarmed a number of critics of the philosophy. Many of these young people later abandon their positive opinion of Rand and are often said to have "outgrown" her ideas.
Endorsers of Rand's work recognize the phenomenon, but attribute it to
the loss of youthful idealism and inability to resist social pressures
for intellectual conformity. In contrast, historian Jennifer Burns, writing in Goddess of the Market
(2009), writes some critics "dismiss Rand as a shallow thinker
appealing only to adolescents", although she thinks the critics "miss
her significance" as a "gateway drug" to right-wing politics.
Academic philosophers have generally dismissed Objectivism since Rand first presented it. Objectivism has been termed "fiercely anti-academic" because of Rand's criticism of contemporary intellectuals. David Sidorsky,
a professor of moral and political philosophy at Columbia University,
writes that Rand's work is "outside the mainstream" and is more of an ideology than a comprehensive philosophy. British philosopher Ted Honderich notes that he deliberately excluded an article on Rand from The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Rand is, however, mentioned in the article on popular philosophy by Anthony Quinton). Rand is the subject of entries in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers, the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Routledge Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Political Thinkers, and The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy. Chandran Kukathas writes in an entry about Rand in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
"The influence of Rand's ideas was strongest among college students in
the USA but attracted little attention from academic philosophers."
Kukathas also writes that her defenses of capitalism and selfishness
"kept her out of the intellectual mainstream".
During the 1990s, Rand's works were more likely to be encountered in American classrooms. The Ayn Rand Society, dedicated to fostering the scholarly study of Objectivism, is affiliated with the American Philosophical Association's Eastern Division. Aristotle scholar and Objectivist Allan Gotthelf,
late chairman of the Society, and his colleagues argued for more
academic study of Objectivism, considering the philosophy as a unique
and intellectually interesting defense of classical liberalism that is worth debating. In 1999, a refereed Journal of Ayn Rand Studies began. Programs and fellowships for the study of Objectivism have been supported at the University of Pittsburgh, University of Texas at Austin and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.