An international team of scientists has developed an algorithm that
represents a major step toward simulating neural connections in the
entire human brain.
The new algorithm, described in an open-access paper published inFrontiers in Neuroinformatics,
is intended to allow simulation of the human brain’s 100 billion
interconnected neurons on supercomputers. The work involves researchers
at the Jülich Research Centre, Norwegian University of Life Sciences,
Aachen University, RIKEN, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, and KTH
Royal Institute of Technology.
An open-source neural simulation tool. The algorithm was developed using NEST*
(“neural simulation tool”) — open-source simulation software in
widespread use by the neuroscientific community and a core simulator of
the European Human Brain Project.
With NEST, the behavior of each neuron in the network is represented by
a small number of mathematical equations, the researchers explain in an
announcement.
Since 2014, large-scale simulations of neural networks using NEST have been running on the petascale** K supercomputer at RIKEN and JUQUEEN
supercomputer at the Jülich Supercomputing Centre in Germany to
simulate the connections of about one percent of the neurons in the
human brain, according to Markus Diesmann, PhD, Director at the Jülich Institute of Neuroscience and Medicine. Those simulations have used a previous version of the NEST algorithm.
Why supercomputers can’t model the entire brain (yet). “Before
a neuronal network simulation can take place, neurons and their
connections need to be created virtually,” explains senior author Susanne Kunkel of KTH Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm.
During the simulation, a neuron’s action potentials (short electric
pulses) first need to be sent to all 100,000 or so small computers,
called nodes, each equipped with a number of processors doing the actual
calculations. Each node then checks which of all these pulses are
relevant for the virtual neurons that exist on this node.
That process requires one bit of information per processor for every
neuron in the whole network. For a network of one billion neurons, a
large part of the memory in each node is consumed by this single bit of
information per neuron. Of course, the amount of computer memory
required per processor for these extra bits per neuron increases with
the size of the neuronal network. To go beyond the 1 percent and
simulate the entire human brain would require the memory available to
each processor to be 100 times larger than in today’s supercomputers.
In future exascale** computers, such as the post-K computer planned
in Kobe and JUWELS at Jülich*** in Germany, the number of processors per
compute node will increase, but the memory per processor and the number
of compute nodes will stay the same.
Achieving whole-brain simulation on future exascale supercomputers. That’s
where the next-generation NEST algorithm comes in. At the beginning of
the simulation, the new NEST algorithm will allow the nodes to exchange
information about what data on neuronal activity needs to sent and to
where. Once this knowledge is available, the exchange of data between
nodes can be organized such that a given node only receives the
information it actually requires. That will eliminate the need for the
additional bit for each neuron in the network.
Brain-simulation
software, running on a current petascale supercomputer, can only
represent about 1 percent of neuron connections in the cortex of a human
brain (dark red area of brain on left). Only about 10 percent of neuron
connections (center) would be possible on the next generation of
exascale supercomputers, which will exceed the performance of today’s
high-end supercomputers by 10- to 100-fold. However, a new algorithm
could allow for 100 percent (whole-brain-scale simulation) on exascale
supercomputers, using the same amount of computer memory as current
supercomputers. (credit: Forschungszentrum Jülich, adapted by
KurzweilAI)
With memory consumption under control, simulation speed will then
become the main focus. For example, a large simulation of 0.52 billion
neurons connected by 5.8 trillion synapses running on the supercomputer
JUQUEEN in Jülich previously required 28.5 minutes to compute one second
of biological time. With the improved algorithm, the time will be
reduced to just 5.2 minutes, the researchers calculate.
“The combination of exascale hardware and [forthcoming NEST] software
brings investigations of fundamental aspects of brain function, like
plasticity and learning, unfolding over minutes of biological time,
within our reach,” says Diesmann.
The new algorithm will also make simulations faster on presently available petascale supercomputers, the researchers found.
NEST simulation software update. In one of the next releases of the simulation software by the Neural Simulation Technology Initiative, the researchers will make the new open-source code freely available to the community.
For the first time, researchers will have the computer power
available to simulate neuronal networks on the scale of the entire human
brain.
Kenji Doya of
Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology (OIST) may be among the
first to try it. “We have been using NEST for simulating the complex
dynamics of the basal ganglia circuits in health and Parkinson’s disease on
the K computer. We are excited to hear the news about the new
generation of NEST, which will allow us to run whole-brain-scale
simulations on the post-K computer to clarify the neural mechanisms of
motor control and mental functions,” he says .
* NEST is a simulator for spiking neural network models that
focuses on the dynamics, size and structure of neural systems, rather
than on the exact morphology of individual neurons. NEST is ideal for
networks of spiking neurons of any size, such as models of information
processing, e.g., in the visual or auditory cortex of mammals, models of
network activity dynamics, e.g., laminar cortical networks or balanced
random networks, and models of learning and plasticity.
** Petascale supercomputers operate at petaflop/s (quadrillions or 1015 floating point operations per second). Future exascale supercomputers will operate at exaflop/s (1018 flop/s). The fastest supercomputer at this time is the Sunway TaihuLight at the National Supercomputing Center in Wuxi, China, operating at 93 petaflops/sec.
*** At Jülich, the work is supported by the Simulation Laboratory
Neuroscience, a facility of the Bernstein Network Computational
Neuroscience at Jülich Supercomputing Centre. Partial funding comes from
the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (Human Brain Project,
HBP) and the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation
programme, and the Exploratory Challenge on Post-K Computer
(Understanding the neural mechanisms of thoughts and its applications to
AI) of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology (MEXT) Japan. With their joint project between Japan and
Europe, the researchers hope to contribute to the formation of an
International Brain Initiative (IBI).
Abstract of Extremely Scalable Spiking Neuronal Network Simulation Code: From Laptops to Exascale Computers
State-of-the-art software tools for neuronal network simulations
scale to the largest computing systems available today and enable
investigations of large-scale networks of up to 10 % of the human cortex
at a resolution of individual neurons and synapses. Due to an upper
limit on the number of incoming connections of a single neuron, network
connectivity becomes extremely sparse at this scale. To manage
computational costs, simulation software ultimately targeting the brain
scale needs to fully exploit this sparsity. Here we present a two-tier
connection infrastructure and a framework for directed communication
among compute nodes accounting for the sparsity of brain-scale networks. We demonstrate the feasibility of this approach by implementing the
technology in the NEST simulation code and we investigate its
performance in different scaling scenarios of typical network
simulations. Our results show that the new data structures and
communication scheme prepare the simulation kernel for post-petascale
high-performance computing facilities without sacrificing performance in
smaller systems.
Wahhabism (Arabic: الوهابية, al-Wahhābiya(h)) is an Islamic doctrine and religious movement founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. It has been variously described as "ultraconservative", "austere",
"fundamentalist",
or "puritan(ical)"; as an Islamic "reform movement" to restore "pure monotheistic worship" (tawhid) by devotees; and as a "deviant sectarian movement", "vile sect" and a distortion of Islam by its opponents.
The term Wahhabi(ism) is often used polemically and adherents commonly reject its use, preferring to be called Salafi or muwahhid. claiming to emphasize the principle of tawhid (the "uniqueness" and "unity" of God), for exclusivity on monotheism, dismissing other Muslims as practising shirk, (idolatry). It follows the theology of Ibn Taymiyyah and the Hanbali school of jurisprudence, although Hanbali leaders renounced Abd al-Wahhab's views.
Wahhabism is named after an eighteenth-century preacher and activist, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792).[16] He started a reform movement in the remote, sparsely populated region of Najd,[17] advocating a purging of such widespread Sunni practices as the veneration of saints and the visiting of their tombs and shrines,
all of which were practiced all over the Islamic world, but which he
considered idolatrous impurities and innovations in Islam (Bid'ah).[18][14] Eventually he formed a pact with a local leader, Muhammad bin Saud,
offering political obedience and promising that protection and
propagation of the Wahhabi movement meant "power and glory" and rule of
"lands and men".[19]
The alliance between followers of ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad bin Saud's successors (the House of Saud)
proved to be a durable one. The House of Saud continued to maintain its
politico-religious alliance with the Wahhabi sect through the waxing
and waning of its own political fortunes over the next 150 years,
through to its eventual proclamation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
in 1932, and then afterwards, on into modern times. Today Ibn Abd
Al-Wahhab's teachings are the official, state-sponsored form of Sunni
Islam[3][20] in Saudi Arabia.[21] With the help of funding from Saudi petroleum exports[22] (and other factors[23]), the movement underwent "explosive growth" beginning in the 1970s and now has worldwide influence.[3] The US State Department has estimated that over the past four decades the capital Riyadh has invested more than $10bn (£6bn) into charitable foundations in an attempt to replace mainstream Sunni Islam with the harsher, intolerant Wahhabism.[24] (as of 2017 changes to Saudi religious policy by Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman
have led some to suggest that "Islamists throughout the world will
have to follow suit or risk winding up on the wrong side of orthodoxy".[25])
The "boundaries" of Wahhabism have been called "difficult to pinpoint",[26] but in contemporary usage, the terms Wahhabi and Salafi are often used interchangeably, and they are considered to be movements with different roots that have merged since the 1960s.[27][28][29] However, Wahhabism has also been called "a particular orientation within Salafism",[30] or an ultra-conservative, Saudi brand of Salafism.[31][32] Estimates of the number of adherents to Wahhabism vary, with one source (Mehrdad Izady)
giving a figure of fewer than 5 million Wahhabis in the Persian Gulf
region (compared to 28.5 million Sunnis and 89 million Shia).[21][33]
The majority of Sunni and Shia Muslims worldwide disagree with
the interpretation of Wahhabism, and many Muslims denounce them as a
faction or a "vile sect".[8]Islamic scholars, including those from the Al-Azhar University, regularly denounce Wahhabism with terms such as "Satanic faith".[34] Wahhabism has been accused of being "a source of global terrorism",[35][36] inspiring the ideology of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),[37] and for causing disunity in Muslim communities by labelling Muslims who disagreed with the Wahhabi definition of monotheism as apostates[38] (takfir) and justifying their killing.[39][40][41] It has also been criticized for the destruction of historic shrines of saints, mausoleums, and other Muslim and non-Muslim buildings and artifacts.[42][43][44]
Definitions and etymology
Definitions
Some definitions or uses of the term Wahhabi Islam include:
"a corpus of doctrines", and "a set of attitudes and behavior,
derived from the teachings of a particularly severe religious reformist
who lived in central Arabia in the mid-eighteenth century" (Gilles Kepel)[45]
"pure Islam" (David Commins, paraphrasing supporters' definition),[9] that does not deviate from Sharia law in any way and should be called Islam and not Wahhabism. (King Salman bin Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia)[46]
"a misguided creed that fosters intolerance, promotes simplistic
theology, and restricts Islam's capacity for adaption to diverse and
shifting circumstances" (David Commins, paraphrasing opponents'
definition)[9]
"a conservative reform movement ... the creed upon which the kingdom
of Saudi Arabia was founded, and [which] has influenced Islamic
movements worldwide" (Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim world)[47]
"a sect dominant in Saudi Arabia and Qatar" with footholds in
"India, Africa, and elsewhere", with a "steadfastly fundamentalist
interpretation of Islam in the tradition of Ibn Hanbal" (Cyril Glasse)[13]
an "eighteenth-century reformist/revivalist movement for sociomoral
reconstruction of society", "founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab"
(Oxford Dictionary of Islam).[48]
originally a "literal revivification" of Islamic principles that
ignored the spiritual side of Islam, that "rose on the wings of
enthusiasm and longing and then sank down into the lowlands of pharisaic
self-righteousness" after gaining power and losing its "longing and
humility" (Muhammad Asad)[49]
"a political trend" within Islam that "has been adopted for
power-sharing purposes", but cannot be called a sect because "It has no
special practices, nor special rites, and no special interpretation of
religion that differ from the main body of Sunni Islam" (Abdallah Al
Obeid, the former dean of the Islamic University of Medina and member of
the Saudi Consultative Council)[26]
"the true salafist movement". Starting out as a theological reform
movement, it had "the goal of calling (da'wa) people to restore the
'real' meaning of tawhid (oneness of God or monotheism) and to disregard
and deconstruct 'traditional' disciplines and practices that evolved in
Islamic history such as theology and jurisprudence and the traditions
of visiting tombs and shrines of venerated individuals." (Ahmad
Moussalli)[50]
a term used by opponents of Salafism in hopes of besmirching that
movement by suggesting foreign influence and "conjuring up images of
Saudi Arabia". The term is "most frequently used in countries where
Salafis are a small minority" of the Muslim community but "have made
recent inroads" in "converting" the local population to Salafism.
(Quintan Wiktorowicz)[10]
a blanket term used inaccurately to refer to "any Islamic movement
that has an apparent tendency toward misogyny, militantism, extremism,
or strict and literal interpretation of the Quran and hadith" (Natana J.
DeLong-Bas)[51]
Etymology
According to Saudi writer Abdul Aziz Qassim and others, it was the Ottomans who "first labelled Abdul Wahhab's school of Islam in Saudi Arabia as Wahhabism". The British also adopted it and expanded its use in the Middle East.[52]
Naming controversy: Wahhabis, Muwahhidun, and Salafis
Wahhabis
do not like – or at least did not like – the term. Ibn Abd-Al-Wahhab
was averse to the elevation of scholars and other individuals, including
using a person's name to label an Islamic school.
According to Robert Lacey "the Wahhabis have always disliked the name customarily given to them" and preferred to be called Muwahhidun (Unitarians).[54] Another preferred term was simply "Muslims" since their creed is "pure Islam".[55] However, critics complain these terms imply non-Wahhabis are not monotheists or Muslims.[55][56] Additionally, the terms Muwahhidun and Unitarians are associated with other sects, both extant and extinct.[57]
Other terms Wahhabis have been said to use and/or prefer include ahl al-hadith ("people of hadith"), Salafi Da'wa or al-da'wa ila al-tawhid[58]
("Salafi preaching" or "preaching of monotheism", for the school rather than the adherents) or Ahl ul-Sunna wal Jama'a ("people of the tradition of Muhammad and the consensus of the Ummah"),[30]
Ahl al-Sunnah ("People of the Sunna"),[59] or "the reform or Salafi movement of the Sheikh" (the sheikh being ibn Abdul-Wahhab).[60] Early Salafis referred to themselves simply as "Muslims", believing the neighboring Ottoman Caliphate was al-dawlah al-kufriyya (a heretical nation) and its self-professed Muslim inhabitants actually non-Muslim. The prominent 20th-century Muslim scholar Nasiruddin Albani, who considered himself "of the Salaf", referred to Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's activities as "Najdi da'wah".[63]
Many, such as writer Quinton Wiktorowicz, urge use of the term
Salafi, maintaining that "one would be hard pressed to find individuals
who refer to themselves as Wahhabis or organizations that use 'Wahhabi'
in their title, or refer to their ideology in this manner (unless they
are speaking to a Western audience that is unfamiliar with Islamic
terminology, and even then usage is limited and often appears as
'Salafi/Wahhabi')".[10] A New York Times
journalist writes that Saudis "abhor" the term Wahhabism, "feeling it
sets them apart and contradicts the notion that Islam is a monolithic
faith".[64] Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud
for example has attacked the term as "a doctrine that doesn't exist
here (Saudi Arabia)" and challenged users of the term to locate any
"deviance of the form of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia from the
teachings of the Quran and Prophetic Hadiths".[65][66]Ingrid Mattson argues that "'Wahhbism'
is not a sect. It is a social movement that began 200 years ago to rid
Islam of rigid cultural practices that had (been) acquired over the
centuries."[67]
On the other hand, according to authors at Global Security and Library of Congress the term is now commonplace and used even by Wahhabi scholars in the Najd,[18][68] a region often called the "heartland" of Wahhabism.[69] Journalist Karen House calls 'Salafi' "a more politically correct term" for 'Wahhabi'.[70]
In any case, according to Lacey, none of the other terms have caught on, and so like the Christian Quakers, Wahhabis have "remained known by the name first assigned to them by their detractors".[54]
Wahhabis and Salafis
Many scholars and critics distinguish between Wahhabi and Salafi. According to American scholar Christopher M. Blanchard,[71] Wahhabism refers to "a conservative Islamic creed centered in and emanating from Saudi Arabia", while Salafiyya
is "a more general puritanical Islamic movement that has developed
independently at various times and in various places in the Islamic
world".[39]
However, many call Wahhabism a more strict, Saudi form of Salafi.[72][73]
Wahhabism is the Saudi version of Salafism, according to Mark Durie, who
states Saudi leaders "are active and diligent" in using their
considerable financial resources "in funding and promoting Salafism all
around the world".[74]
Ahmad Moussalli tends to agree Wahhabism is a subset of Salafism,
saying "As a rule, all Wahhabis are salafists, but not all salafists are
Wahhabis."[50]
Hamid Algar lists three "elements" Wahhabism and Salafism had in common.
above all disdain for all developments subsequent to al-Salaf al-Salih (the first two or three generations of Islam),
the abandonment of consistent adherence to one of the four or five Sunni Madhhabs (schools of fiqh).
And "two important and interrelated features" that distinguished Salafis from the Wahhabis:
a reliance on attempts at persuasion rather than coercion in order to rally other Muslims to their cause; and
an informed awareness of the political and socio-economic crises confronting the Muslim world.[75]
Hamid Algar and another critic, Khaled Abou El Fadl,
argue Saudi oil-export funding "co-opted" the "symbolism and language
of Salafism", during the 1960s and 70s, making them practically
indistinguishable by the 1970s,[76]
and now the two ideologies have "melded". Abou El Fadl believes
Wahhabism rebranded itself as Salafism knowing it could not "spread in
the modern Muslim world" as Wahhabism.[27]
History
The Wahhabi mission started as a revivalist movement in the remote, arid region of Najd. With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the Al Saud dynasty, and with it Wahhabism, spread to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. After the discovery of petroleum near the Persian Gulf
in 1939, it had access to oil export revenues, revenue that grew to
billions of dollars. This money – spent on books, media, schools,
universities, mosques, scholarships, fellowships, lucrative jobs for
journalists, academics and Islamic scholars – gave Wahhabism a
"preeminent position of strength" in Islam around the world.[77]
In the country of Wahhabism's founding – and by far the largest
and most powerful country where it is the state religion – Wahhabi ulama
gained control over education, law, public morality and religious
institutions in the 20th century, while permitting as a "trade-off"
doctrinally objectionable actions such as the import of modern
technology and communications, and dealings with non-Muslims, for the
sake of the consolidation of the power of its political guardian, the Al
Saud dynasty.[78]
However, in the last couple of decades of the twentieth century
several crises worked to erode Wahhabi "credibility" in Saudi Arabia and
the rest of the Muslim world – the November 1979 seizure of the Grand
Mosque by militants; the deployment of US troops in Saudi Arabia during
the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq; and the 9/11 2001al-Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington.[79]
In each case the Wahhabi establishment was called on to support
the dynasty's efforts to suppress religious dissent – and in each case
it did[79] – exposing its dependence on the Saudi dynasty and its often unpopular policies.[80][81]
In the West, the end of the Cold War and the anti-communist alliance with conservative, religious Saudi Arabia, and the 9/11 attacks created enormous distrust towards the kingdom and especially its official religion.[82]
Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab
The founder of Wahhabism, Mohammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, was born around 1702–03 in the small oasis town of 'Uyayna in the Najd region, in what is now central Saudi Arabia.[83] He studied in Basra,[84] in what is now Iraq, and possibly Mecca and Medina while there to perform Hajj, before returning to his home town of 'Uyayna in 1740. There he worked to spread the call (da'wa) for what he believed was a restoration of true monotheistic worship (Tawhid).[85]
The "pivotal idea" of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teaching was that
people who called themselves Muslims but who participated in alleged
innovations were not just misguided or committing a sin, but were
"outside the pale of Islam altogether", as were Muslims who disagreed
with his definition.
[86]
This included not just lax, unlettered, nomadic Bedu, but also Shias and Sunnis such as the Ottomans.[87]
Such infidels were not to be killed outright, but to be given a chance to repent first.[88]
With the support of the ruler of the town – Uthman ibn Mu'ammar – he
carried out some of his religious reforms in 'Uyayna, including the
demolition of the tomb of Zayd ibn al-Khattab, one of the Sahaba (companions) of the prophet Muhammad,
and the stoning to death of an adulterous woman. However, a more
powerful chief (Sulaiman ibn Muhammad ibn Ghurayr) pressured Uthman ibn
Mu'ammar to expel him from 'Uyayna.[citation needed]
The ruler of a nearby town, Muhammad ibn Saud, invited ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab to join him, and in 1744 a pact was made between the two.
[89]
Ibn Saud would protect and propagate the doctrines of the Wahhabi
mission, while ibn Abdul Wahhab "would support the ruler, supplying him
with 'glory and power'". Whoever championed his message, ibn Abdul Wahhab promised, "will, by means of it, rule the lands and men".
[19]
Ibn Saud would abandon un-Sharia taxation of local harvests, and in
return God might compensate him with booty from conquest and sharia
compliant taxes that would exceed what he gave up.[90]
The alliance between the Wahhabi mission and Al Saud family has "endured
for more than two and half centuries", surviving defeat and collapse.[89][91]
The two families have intermarried multiple times over the years and in
today's Saudi Arabia, the minister of religion is always a member of
the Al ash-Sheikh family, i.e., a descendent of Ibn Abdul Wahhab.[92]
According to most sources, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab declared jihad against neighboring tribes, whose practices of asking saints for their intercession, making pilgrimages to tombs and special mosques, he believed to be the work of idolaters/unbelievers.[40][56][88][93]
One academic disputes this. According to Natana DeLong-Bas, Ibn
Abd al-Wahhab was restrained in urging fighting with perceived
unbelievers, preferring to preach and persuade rather than attack.[94][95][96] It was only after the death of Muhammad bin Saud in 1765 that, according to DeLong-Bas, Muhammad bin Saud's son and successor, Abdul-Aziz bin Muhammad, used a "convert or die" approach to expand his domain,[97] and when Wahhabis adopted the takfir ideas of Ibn Taymiyya.[98]
However, various scholars, including Simon Ross Valentine, have
strongly rejected such a view of Wahhab, arguing that "the image of
Abd’al-Wahhab presented by DeLong-Bas is to be seen for what it is,
namely a re-writing of history that flies in the face of historical
fact".[99] Conquest expanded through the Arabian Peninsula until it conquered Mecca and Medina in the early 19th century.[100][101] It was at this time, according to DeLong-Bas, that Wahhabis embraced the ideas of Ibn Taymiyya,
which allow self-professed Muslims who do not follow Islamic law to be
declared non-Muslims – to justify their warring and conquering the
Muslim Sharifs of Hijaz.[98]
One of their most noteworthy and controversial attacks was on Karbala
in 1802. There, according to a Wahhabi chronicler `Uthman b. `Abdullah
b. Bishr: "The Muslims" – as the Wahhabis referred to themselves, not
feeling the need to distinguish themselves from other Muslims, since
they did not believe them to be Muslims –
scaled the walls, entered the city
... and killed the majority of its people in the markets and in their
homes. [They] destroyed the dome placed over the grave of al-Husayn [and
took] whatever they found inside the dome and its surroundings ... the
grille surrounding the tomb which was encrusted with emeralds, rubies,
and other jewels ... different types of property, weapons, clothing,
carpets, gold, silver, precious copies of the Qur'an.[102][103]
After this, the Wahhabis also massacred the male
population and enslaved the women and children of the predominantly
Sunni city of Ta'if in Hejaz in 1803.[104]
Saud bin Abdul-Aziz bin Muhammad bin Saud managed to establish his rule over southeastern Syria between 1803 and 1812. However, Egyptian forces acting under the Ottoman Empire and led by Ibrahim Pasha, were eventually successful in counterattacking in a campaign starting from 1811.[105] In 1818 they defeated Al-Saud, leveling the capital Diriyah, executing the Al-Saud emir and exiling the emirate's political and religious leadership,[91][106] and otherwise unsuccessfully attempted to stamp out not just the House of Saud but the Wahhabi mission as well.[107]
A second, smaller Saudi state (Emirate of Nejd)
lasted from 1819–1891. Its borders being within Najd, Wahhabism was
protected from further Ottoman or Egyptian campaigns by the Najd's
isolation, lack of valuable resources, and that era's limited
communication and transportation.[108]
By the 1880s, at least among townsmen if not Bedouin, Wahhabi
strict monotheistic doctrine had become the native religious culture of
the Najd.[109]
In 1901, Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud, a fifth generation descendant of Muhammad ibn Saud,[110] began a military campaign that led to the conquest of much of the Arabian peninsula and the founding of present-day Saudi Arabia, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.[111] The result that safeguarded the vision of Islam-based on the tenets of Islam as preached by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab
was not bloodless, as 40,000 public executions and 350,000 amputations
were carried out during its course, according to some estimates.[112][113][114][115]
Under the reign of Abdul-Aziz, "political considerations trumped
religious idealism" favored by pious Wahhabis. His political and
military success gave the Wahhabi ulama control over religious
institutions with jurisdiction over considerable territory, and in later
years Wahhabi ideas formed the basis of the rules and laws concerning
social affairs, and shaped the kingdom's judicial and educational
policies.[116]
But protests from Wahhabi ulama were overridden when it came to
consolidating power in Hijaz and al-Hasa, avoiding clashes with the
great power of the region (Britain), adopting modern technology,
establishing a simple governmental administrative framework, or signing
an oil concession with the U.S.
[117]
The Wahhabi ulama also issued a fatwa affirming that "only the ruler could declare a jihad"[118] (a violation of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teaching, according to DeLong-Bas[95]),
As the realm of Wahhabism expanded under Ibn Saud into areas of Shiite (Al-Hasa, conquered in 1913) and pluralistic Muslim tradition (Hejaz,
conquered in 1924–25), Wahhabis pressed for forced conversion of Shia
and an eradication of (what they saw as) idolatry. Ibn Saud sought "a
more relaxed approach".[119]
In al-Hasa, efforts to stop the observance of Shia religious
holidays and replace teaching and preaching duties of Shia clerics with
Wahhabi, lasted only a year.[120]
In Mecca and Jeddah (in Hejaz) prohibition of tobacco, alcohol,
playing cards and listening to music on the phonograph was looser than
in Najd. Over the objections of Wahhabi ulama, Ibn Saud permitted both
the driving of automobiles and the attendance of Shia at hajj.[121]
Enforcement of the commanding right and forbidding wrong, such as
enforcing prayer observance and separation of the sexes, developed a
prominent place during the second Saudi emirate, and in 1926 a formal committee for enforcement was founded in Mecca.[13][122][123]
While Wahhabi warriors swore loyalty to monarchs of Al Saud, there was one major rebellion. King Abdul-Aziz put down rebelling Ikhwan
– nomadic tribesmen turned Wahhabi warriors who opposed his
"introducing such innovations as telephones, automobiles, and the
telegraph" and his "sending his son to a country of unbelievers
(Egypt)".
[124]
Britain had aided Abdul-Aziz, and when the Ikhwan attacked the British protectorates of Transjordan, Iraq and Kuwait, as a continuation of jihad to expand the Wahhabist realm, Abdul-Aziz struck, killing hundreds before the rebels surrendered in 1929.[125]
Connection with the outside
Before
Abdul-Aziz, during most of the second half of the 19th century, there
was a strong aversion in Wahhabi lands to mixing with "idolaters" (which
included most of the Muslim world). Voluntary contact was considered by
Wahhabi clerics to be at least a sin, and if one enjoyed the company of
idolaters, and "approved of their religion", an act of unbelief.[126] Travel outside the pale of Najd to the Ottoman lands "was tightly controlled, if not prohibited altogether".[127]
Over the course of its history, however, Wahhabism has become more accommodating towards the outside world.[128] In the late 1800s, Wahhabis found Muslims with at least similar beliefs – first with Ahl-i Hadith in India,[129] and later with Islamic revivalists in Arab states (one being Mahmud Sahiri al-Alusi in Baghdad).[130] The revivalists and Wahhabis shared a common interest in Ibn Taymiyya's thought, the permissibility of ijtihad, and the need to purify worship practices of innovation.[131] In the 1920s, Rashid Rida, a pioneer Salafist whose periodical al-Manar
was widely read in the Muslim world, published an "anthology of Wahhabi
treatises", and a work praising the Ibn Saud as "the savior of the
Haramayn [the two holy cities] and a practitioner of authentic Islamic
rule".
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia after unification in 1932
In
a bid "to join the Muslim mainstream and to erase the reputation of
extreme sectarianism associated with the Ikhwan", in 1926 Ibn Saud
convened a Muslim congress of representatives of Muslim governments and
popular associations.[134]
By the early 1950s, the "pressures" on Ibn Saud of controlling the
regions of Hejaz and al-Hasa – "outside the Wahhabi heartland" – and of
"navigating the currents of regional politics" "punctured the seal"
between the Wahhabi heartland and the "land of idolatry" outside.[135][136]
A major current in regional politics at that time was secularnationalism, which, with Gamal Abdul Nasser,
was sweeping the Arab world. To combat it, Wahhabi missionary outreach
worked closely with Saudi foreign policy initiatives. In May 1962, a
conference in Mecca organized by Saudis discussed ways to combat
secularism and socialism. In its wake, the World Muslim League was established.[137] To propagate Islam and "repel inimical trends and dogmas", the League opened branch offices around the globe.[138] It developed closer association between Wahhabis and leading Salafis, and made common cause with the Islamic revivalist Muslim Brotherhood, Ahl-i Hadith and the Jamaat-i Islami, combating Sufism and "innovative" popular religious practices[137] and rejecting the West and Western "ways which were so deleterious of Muslim piety and values".[139] Missionaries were sent to West Africa, where the League funded schools,
distributed religious literature, and gave scholarships to attend Saudi
religious universities. One result was the Izala Society which fought Sufism in Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon.[140]
An event that had a great effect on Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia[141] was the "infiltration of the transnationalist revival movement" in the form of thousands of pious, Islamist Arab Muslim Brotherhood refugees from Egypt following Nasser's clampdown on the Brotherhood[142] (and also from similar nationalist clampdowns in Iraq[143] and Syria[144]), to help staff the new school system of the (largely illiterate) Kingdom.[145]
The Brotherhood's Islamist ideology differed from the more conservative Wahhabism which preached loyal obedience to the king.
The Brotherhood dealt in what one author (Robert Lacey) called
"change-promoting concepts" like social justice and anticolonialism, and
gave "a radical, but still apparently safe, religious twist" to the
Wahhabi values Saudi students "had absorbed in childhood". With the
Brotherhood's "hands-on, radical Islam", jihad became a "practical
possibility today", not just part of history.[146]
The Brethren were ordered by the Saudi clergy and government not
to attempt to proselytize or otherwise get involved in religious
doctrinal matters within the Kingdom, but nonetheless "took control" of
Saudi Arabia's intellectual life" by publishing books and participating
in discussion circles and salons held by princes.[147]
In time they took leading roles in key governmental ministries,[148] and had influence on education curriculum.[149] An Islamic university in Medina created in 1961 to train – mostly non-Saudi – proselytizers to Wahhabism[150] became "a haven" for Muslim Brother refugees from Egypt.[151]
The Brothers' ideas eventually spread throughout the kingdom and had
great effect on Wahhabism – although observers differ as to whether this
was by "undermining" it[141][152]
or "blending" with it.[153][154]
Growth
In the 1950s and 60s within Saudi Arabia, the Wahhabi ulama
maintained their hold on religious law courts, and presided over the
creation of Islamic universities and a public school system which gave
students "a heavy dose of religious instruction".[155]
Outside of Saudi the Wahhabi ulama became "less combative" toward the
rest of the Muslim world.
In confronting the challenge of the West, Wahhabi doctrine "served well"
for many Muslims as a "platform" and "gained converts beyond the
peninsula".[155][156]
A number of reasons have been given for this success: the growth in popularity and strength of both Arab nationalism
(although Wahhabis opposed any form of nationalism as an ideology,
Saudis were Arabs, and their enemy the Ottoman caliphate was ethnically
Turkish),[23] and Islamic reform (specifically reform by following the example of those first three generations of Muslims known as the Salaf);[23] the destruction of the Ottoman Empire which sponsored their most effective critics;[157] the destruction of another rival, the Khilafa in Hejaz, in 1925.[23]
Not least in importance was the money Saudi Arabia earned from exporting oil.[77]
Petroleum export era
The pumping and export of oil from Saudi Arabia started during World
War II, and its earnings helped fund religious activities in the 1950s
and 60s. But it was the 1973 oil crisis
and quadrupling in the price of oil that both increased the kingdom's
wealth astronomically and enhanced its prestige by demonstrating its
international power as a leader of OPEC. By 1980, Saudi Arabia was
earning every three days the income from oil it had taken a year to earn
before the embargo.[158]
Tens of billions of US dollars of this money were spent on books,
media, schools, scholarships for students (from primary to
post-graduate), fellowships and subsidies to reward journalists,
academics and Islamic scholars, the building of hundreds of Islamic
centers and universities, and over one thousand schools and one thousand
mosques.[159][160][161]
During this time, Wahhabism attained what Gilles Kepel called a
"preeminent position of strength in the global expression of Islam".[77]
Afghanistan jihad
The "apex of cooperation" between Wahhabis and Muslim revivalist groups was the Afghan jihad.[162]
In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Shortly thereafter, Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, a Muslim Brother cleric with ties to Saudi religious institutions,[163] issued a fatwa[164] declaring defensive jihad in Afghanistan against the atheist Soviet Union, "fard
ayn", a personal (or individual) obligation for all Muslims. The edict
was supported by Saudi Arabia's Grand Mufti (highest religious scholar),
Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz, among others.[165][166]
Between 1982 and 1992 an estimated 35,000 individual Muslim
volunteers went to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets and their Afghan
regime.
Thousands more attended frontier schools teeming with former and future
fighters. Somewhere between 12,000 and 25,000 of these volunteers came
from Saudi Arabia.[167]
Saudi Arabia and the other conservative Gulf monarchies also provided
considerable financial support to the jihad – $600 million a year by
1982.[168]
By 1989, Soviet troops had withdrawn and within a few years the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul had collapsed.[citation needed]
This Saudi/Wahhabi religious triumph further stood out in the
Muslim world because many Muslim-majority states (and the PLO) were
allied with the Soviet Union and did not support the Afghan jihad.[169] But many jihad volunteers (most famously Osama bin Laden)
returning home to Saudi Arabia and elsewhere were often radicalized by
Islamic militants who were "much more extreme than their Saudi
sponsors".[169]
"Erosion" of Wahhabism
Islamic Revolution in Iran
The February 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran
challenged Saudi Wahhabism in a number of ways on a number of fronts.
It was a revolution of Shia, not Sunni, Islam and Wahhabism held that
Shia were not truly Muslims. Nonetheless, its massive popularity in
Iran and its overthrow of a pro-American secular monarchy generated
enormous enthusiasm among pious Sunni, not just Shia Muslims around the
world.[170] Its leader (Ruhollah Khomeini)
preached that monarchy was against Islam and America was Islam's enemy,
and called for the overthrow of al-Saud family. (In 1987 public address
Khomeini declared that "these vile and ungodly Wahhabis are like daggers which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back", and announced that Mecca was in the hands of "a band of heretics".[171] )[172]
All this spurred Saudi Arabia – a kingdom allied with America – to
"redouble their efforts to counter Iran and spread Wahhabism around the
world", and reversed any moves by Saudi leaders to distance itself from
Wahhabism or "soften" its ideology.[173]
Grand Mosque seizure
In 1979, 400–500 Islamist insurgents, using smuggled weapons and supplies, took over the Grand mosque
in Mecca, called for an overthrow of the monarchy, denounced the
Wahhabi ulama as royal puppets, and announced the arrival of the Mahdi of "end time".
The insurgents deviated from Wahhabi doctrine in significant details,[174] but were also associated with leading Wahhabi ulama (Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz knew the insurgent's leader, Juhayman al-Otaybi).[175]
Their seizure of Islam's
holiest site, the taking hostage of hundreds of hajj pilgrims, and the
deaths of hundreds of militants, security forces and hostages caught in
crossfire during the two-week-long retaking of the mosque, all shocked
the Islamic world[176] and did not enhance the prestige of Al Saud as "custodians" of the mosque.
The incident also damaged the prestige of the Wahhabi
establishment. Saudi leadership sought and received Wahhabi fatawa to
approve the military removal of the insurgents and after that to execute
them,[177] but Wahhabi clerics also fell under suspicion for involvement with the insurgents.[178]
In part as a consequence, Sahwa clerics influenced by Brethren's ideas
were given freer rein. Their ideology was also thought more likely to
compete with the recent Islamic revolutionism/third-worldism of the Iranian Revolution.[178]
Although the insurgents were motivated by religious puritanism,
the incident was not followed by a crackdown on other religious purists,
but by giving greater power to the ulama and religious conservatives to
more strictly enforce Islamic codes in myriad ways[179]
– from the banning of women's images in the media to adding even more
hours of Islamic studies in school and giving more power and money to
the religious police to enforce conservative rules of behaviour.
1990 Gulf War
In August 1990 Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait. Concerned that Saddam Hussein
might push south and seize its own oil fields, Saudis requested
military support from the US and allowed tens of thousands of US troops
to be based in the Kingdom to fight Iraq.[183]
But what "amounted to seeking infidels' assistance against a Muslim
power" was difficult to justify in terms of Wahhabi doctrine.
Again Saudi authorities sought and received a fatwa from leading
Wahhabi ulama supporting their action. The fatwa failed to persuade many
conservative Muslims and ulama who strongly opposed US presence,
including the Muslim Brotherhood-supported Sahwah "Awakening" movement
that began pushing for political change in the kingdom.[186]
Outside the kingdom, Islamist revival groups that had long received
aid from Saudi and had ties with Wahhabis (Arab jihadists, Pakistani and
Afghan Islamists) supported Iraq, not Saudi.[187]
During this time and later, many in the Wahhabi/Salafi movement
(such as Osama bin Laden) not only no longer looked to the Saudi monarch
as an emir of Islam, but supported his overthrow, focusing on jihad against the US and (what they believe are) other enemies of Islam.[188][189] (This movement is sometimes called neo-Wahhabi or neo-salafi.[50][190])
After 9/11
The 2001 9/11 attacks
on Saudi's putative ally, the US, that killed almost 3,000 people and
caused at least $10 billion in property and infrastructure damage,[191] were assumed by many, at least outside the kingdom, to be "an expression of Wahhabism" since the al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and most of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudi nationals.[192]
A backlash in the formerly hospitable US against the kingdom focused on
its official religion that came to be considered by some "a doctrine of
terrorism and hate".[82]
Inside the kingdom, Crown Prince Abdullah addressed the country's
religious, tribal, business and media leadership following the attacks
in a series of televised gatherings calling for a strategy to correct
what had gone wrong. According to Robert Lacey, the gatherings and later articles and replies by a top cleric, Abdullah Turki, and two top Al Saud princes, Prince Turki Al-Faisal and Prince Talal bin Abdul Aziz,
served as an occasion to sort out who had the ultimate power in the
kingdom: not the ulama, but rather the Al Saud dynasty. They declared
that Muslim rulers were meant to exercise power, while religious
scholars were meant to advise.[193]
In 2003–04, Saudi Arabia saw a wave of al-Qaeda-related suicide bombings, attacks on Non-Muslim foreigners (about 80% of those employed in the Saudi private sector are foreign workers[194] and constitute about 30% of the country's population[195]),
and gun battles between Saudi security forces and militants. One
reaction to the attacks was a trimming back of the Wahhabi
establishment's domination of religion and society. "National Dialogues"
were held that included "Shiites, Sufis, liberal reformers, and
professional women".[196] In 2009, as part of what some called an effort to "take on the ulama and reform the clerical establishment", King Abdullah
issued a decree that only "officially approved" religious scholars
would be allowed to issue fatwas in Saudi Arabia. The king also expanded
the Council of Senior Scholars (containing officially approved religious scholars) to include scholars from Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence other than the Hanbalimadhab—Shafi'i, Hanafi and Maliki schools.[197]
Relations with the Muslim Brotherhood have deteriorated steadily. After 9/11, the then interior minister Prince Nayef blamed the Brotherhood for extremism in the kingdom,[198]
and he declared it guilty of "betrayal of pledges and ingratitude" and
"the source of all problems in the Islamic world", after it was elected
to power in Egypt.[199] In March 2014 the Saudi government declared the Brotherhood a "terrorist organization".[183]
In April 2016, Saudi Arabia stripped its religious police, who enforce Islamic law on the society and are known as the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice,
from their power to follow, chase, stop, question, verify
identification, or arrest any suspected persons when carrying out
duties. They were told to report suspicious behaviour to regular police
and anti-drug units, who would decide whether to take the matter
further.[200][201]
Muhammad bin Salman
Bold reformist actions on religious policy taken by Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MbS) in 2017 have led some to question the future of Wahhabi conservatism. In an October 2017 interview with The Guardian newspaper, MbS stated
What happened in the last 30 years is not Saudi Arabia.
What happened in the region in the last 30 years is not the Middle East.
After the Iranian revolution in 1979, people wanted to copy this model
in different countries, one of them is Saudi Arabia. We didn't know how
to deal with it. And the problem spread all over the world. Now is the
time to get rid of it.[202]
MbS has ruled in favor of allowing women to drive and enter sport
stadiums, eventually reopening cinemas. According to Kamel Daoud, MbS is
"above all ... putting pressure on the clergy and announcing the review
and certification of the great canons of Muslim orthodoxy, including
the hadiths, the collection of the Prophet Muhammad's sayings".[25]
MbS pronouncements, as well as an international conference on Sunni Islam in Grozny (funded by the government of the United Arab Emirates) where "200 Muslim scholars from Egypt, Russia, Syria, Sudan, Jordan, and Europe reject[ed] Saudi Arabia's doctrine",[203]
have been called a "frontal assault on Wahhabism" (as well as an
assault on other conservative "interpretations of Islam, such as Salafism and Deobandism").[204][205]
Memoirs of Mr. Hempher
A widely circulated but discredited apocryphal description of the founding of Wahhabism[206][207]
known as Memoirs of Mr. Hempher, The British Spy to the Middle East (other titles have been used)[208]
alleges that a British agent named Hempher was responsible for the creation of Wahhabism. In the "memoir", Hempher corrupts Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, manipulating him[209]
to preach his new interpretation of Islam for the purpose of sowing
dissension and disunity among Muslims so that "We, the English people
... may live in welfare and luxury."[208]
Practices
As a
religious revivalist movement that works to bring Muslims back from
what it believes are foreign accretions that have corrupted Islam,[210]
and believes that Islam is a complete way of life and so has
prescriptions for all aspects of life, Wahhabism is quite strict in what
it considers Islamic behavior. As a result, it has been described as
the "strictest form of Sunni Islam".[211] On the other hand critics argue, Wahhabism is not strict, but a distorted version of Islam and not based on traditional Shari'a law, nor is their practise typical or mired in the roots of Islam.[212][213]
This does not mean however, that all adherents agree on what is
required or forbidden, or that rules have not varied by area or changed
over time. In Saudi Arabia the strict religious atmosphere of Wahhabi
doctrine is visible in the conformity in dress, public deportment, and
public prayer,[214] and makes its presence felt by the wide freedom of action of the "religious police", clerics in mosques, teachers in schools, and judges (who are religious legal scholars) in Saudi courts.[215]
Commanding right and forbidding wrong
Wahhabism
is noted for its policy of "compelling its own followers and other
Muslims strictly to observe the religious duties of Islam, such as the
five prayers", and for "enforcement of public morals to a degree not
found elsewhere".[216]
While other Muslims might urge abstention from alcohol, modest dress, and salat
prayer, for Wahhabis prayer "that is punctual, ritually correct, and
communally performed not only is urged but publicly required of men."
Not only is wine forbidden, but so are "all intoxicating drinks and
other stimulants, including tobacco." Not only is modest dress
prescribed, but the type of clothing that should be worn, especially by
women (a black abaya, covering all but the eyes and hands) is specified.[68]
Following the preaching and practice of Abdul Wahhab that coercion should be used to enforce following of sharia, an official committee has been empowered to "Command the Good and Forbid the Evil" (the so-called "religious police")[216][217]
in Saudi Arabia – the one country founded with the help of Wahhabi
warriors and whose scholars and pious citizens dominate many aspects of
the Kingdom's life. Committee "field officers" enforce strict closing of
shops at prayer time, segregation of the sexes, prohibition of the sale
and consumption of alcohol, driving of motor vehicles by women, and
other social restrictions.[218]
A large number of practices have been reported forbidden by Saudi
Wahhabi officials, preachers or religious police. Practices that have
been forbidden as Bida'a (innovation) or shirk
and sometimes "punished by flogging" during Wahhabi history include
performing or listening to music, dancing, fortune telling, amulets,
television programs (unless religious), smoking, playing backgammon,
chess, or cards, drawing human or animal figures, acting in a play or
writing fiction (both are considered forms of lying), dissecting
cadavers (even in criminal investigations and for the purposes of
medical research), recorded music played over telephones on hold or the
sending of flowers to friends or relatives who are in the hospital.[114][219][220][221][222][223]
Common Muslim practices Wahhabis believe are contrary to Islam include
listening to music in praise of Muhammad, praying to God while visiting
tombs (including the tomb of Muhammad), celebrating mawlid (birthday of the Prophet),[224]
the use of ornamentation on or in mosques.[225]
The driving of motor vehicles by women is allowed in every country but Wahhabi-dominated Saudi Arabia[226] and dream interpretation, practiced by the famously strict Taliban, is discouraged by Wahhabis.[227]
Wahhabism emphasizes "Thaqafah Islamiyyah" or Islamic culture and
the importance of avoiding non-Islamic cultural practices and
non-Muslim friendship no matter how innocent these may appear,[228][229] on the grounds that the Sunna forbids imitating non-Muslims.[230]
Foreign practices sometimes punished and sometimes simply condemned by
Wahhabi preachers as unIslamic, include celebrating foreign days (such
as Valentine's Day[231] or Mothers Day[228][230]) shaving, cutting or trimming of beards,[232] giving of flowers,[233] standing up in honor of someone, celebrating birthdays (including the Prophet's), keeping or petting dogs.[222] Wahhabi scholars have warned against taking non-Muslims as friends, smiling at or wishing them well on their holidays.[64]
Wahhabis are not in unanimous agreement on what is forbidden as
sin. Some Wahhabi preachers or activists go further than the official
Saudi Arabian Council of Senior Scholars in forbidding (what they believe to be) sin. Several wahhabis have declared football
forbidden for a variety of reasons including it is a non-Muslim,
foreign practice, because of the revealing uniforms and because of the
foreign non-Muslim language used in matches.[234][235]
The Saudi Grand Mufti, on the other hand has declared football permissible (halal).
[236]
Senior Wahhabi leaders in Saudi Arabia have determined that Islam
forbids the traveling or working outside the home by a woman without
their husband's permission – permission which may be revoked at any time
– on the grounds that the different physiological structures and
biological functions of the two sexes mean that each is assigned a
distinctive role to play in the family.[237]
As mentioned before, Wahhabism also forbids the driving of motor
vehicles by women. Sexual intercourse out of wedlock may be punished
with beheading[238] although sex out of wedlock was permissible with a female slave until the practice of slavery was banned in 1962 (Prince Bandar bin Sultan was the product of "a brief encounter" between his father Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz – the Saudi defense minister for many years – and "his slave, a black servingwoman").[239][240]
Despite this strictness, senior Wahhabi scholars of Islam in the Saudi kingdom have made exceptions in ruling on what is haram.
Foreign non-Muslim troops are forbidden in Arabia, except when the king
needed them to confront Saddam Hussein in 1990; gender mixing of men
and women is forbidden, and fraternization with non-Muslims is
discouraged, but not at King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST). Movie theaters and driving by women are forbidden, except at the ARAMCO
compound in eastern Saudi, populated by workers for the company that
provides almost all the government's revenue. The exceptions made at
KAUST are also in effect at ARAMCO.[241]
More general rules of what is permissible have changed over time.
Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud imposed Wahhabi doctrines and practices "in a
progressively gentler form" as his early 20th-century conquests expanded
his state into urban areas, especially the Hejab.[242]
After vigorous debate Wahhabi religious authorities in Saudi Arabia
allowed the use of paper money (in 1951), the abolition of slavery (in
1962), education of females (1964), and use of television (1965).[240] Music, the sound of which once might have led to summary execution, is now commonly heard on Saudi radios.
[242]
Minarets for mosques and use of funeral markers, which were once
forbidden, are now allowed. Prayer attendance which was once enforced by
flogging, is no longer.[243]
Appearance
The
uniformity of dress among men and women in Saudi Arabia (compared to
other Muslim countries in the Middle East) has been called a "striking
example of Wahhabism's outward influence on Saudi society", and an
example of the Wahhabi belief that "outward appearances and expressions
are directly connected to one's inward state."[225]
The "long, white flowing thobe" worn by men of Saudi Arabia has been called the "Wahhabi national dress".[244] Red-and-white checkered or white head scarves known as Ghutrah are worn. In public women are required to wear a black abaya or other black clothing that covers every part of their body other than hands and eyes.
A "badge" of a particularly pious Salafi or Wahhabi man is a robe too short to cover the ankle, an untrimmed beard,[245] and no cord (Agal) to hold the head scarf in place.[246] The warriors of the Ikhwan Wahhabi religious militia wore a white turban in place of an agal.[247]
Wahhabiyya mission
Wahhabi mission, or Dawah Wahhabiyya, is the idea of spreading Wahhabism throughout the world.
[248]
Tens of billions of dollars have been spent by the Saudi government
and charities on mosques, schools, education materials, scholarships,
throughout the world to promote Islam and the Wahhabi interpretation of
it. Tens of thousands of volunteers[167] and several billion dollars also went in support of the jihad against the atheist communist regime governing Afghanistan.[168]
Regions
Wahhabism
originated in the Najd region, and its conservative practices have
stronger support there than in regions in the kingdom to the east or
west of it.[249][250][251]
Glasse credits the softening of some Wahhabi doctrines and practices on
the conquest of the Hejaz region "with its more cosmopolitan traditions
and the traffic of pilgrims which the new rulers could not afford to
alienate".[242]
The only other country "whose native population is Wahhabi and
that adheres to the Wahhabi creed", is the small gulf monarchy of Qatar,[252][253]
whose version of Wahhabism is notably less strict. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Qatar made significant changes in the 1990s. Women
are now allowed to drive and travel independently; non-Muslims are
permitted to consume alcohol and pork. The country sponsors a film
festival, has "world-class art museums", hosts Al Jazeera news service, will hold the 2022 football World Cup,
and has no religious force that polices public morality. Qataris
attribute its different interpretation of Islam to the absence of an
indigenous clerical class and autonomous bureaucracy (religious affairs
authority, endowments, Grand Mufti), the fact that Qatari rulers do not
derive their legitimacy from such a class.[253][254]
Views
Adherents to the Wahhabi movement identify as Sunni Muslims.[255] The primary Wahhabi doctrine is affirmation of the uniqueness and unity of God (Tawhid),[14][256] and opposition to shirk (violation of tawhid – "the one unforgivable sin", according to Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab).[257] They call for adherence to the beliefs and practices of the salaf
(exemplary early Muslims). They strongly oppose what they consider to
be heterodox doctrines, particularly those held by the vast majority of Sunnis and Shiites,[258]
and practices such as the veneration of Prophets and saints in the
Islamic tradition. They emphasize reliance on the literal meaning of the
Quran and hadith, rejecting rationalistic theology (kalam). Wahhabism has been associated with the practice of takfir
(labeling Muslims who disagree with their doctrines as apostates).
Adherents of Wahhabism are favourable to derivation of new legal rulings
(ijtihad) so long as it is true to the essence of the Quran, Sunnah and understanding of the salaf.[259]
Theology
In theology Wahhabism is closely aligned with the Athari (traditionalist) school, which represents the prevalent theological position of the Hanbali school of law.[260][261] Athari theology is characterized by reliance on the zahir
(apparent or literal) meaning of the Quran and hadith, and opposition
to the rational argumentation in matters of belief favored by Ash'ari and Maturidi theology.[262][263] However, Wahhabism diverges in some points of theology from other Athari movements.[264] These include a zealous tendency toward takfir, which bears a resemblance to the Kharijites.[264][265] Another distinctive feature is a strong opposition to mysticism.[264]
Although it is typically attributed to the influence of Ibn Taymiyyah,
Jeffry Halverson argues that Ibn Taymiyyah only opposed what he saw as
Sufi excesses and never mysticism in itself, being himself a member of
the Qadiriyyah Sufi order.[264]
DeLong-Bas writes that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not denounce Sufism or
Sufis as a group, but rather attacked specific practices which he saw as
inconsistent with the Quran and hadith.[266]
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab considered some beliefs and practices of the Shia to violate the doctrine of monotheism.[267] According to DeLong-Bas, in his polemic against the "extremist Rafidah
sect of Shiis", he criticized them for assigning greater authority to
their current leaders than to Muhammad in interpreting the Quran and
sharia, and for denying the validity of the consensus of the early
Muslim community.[267] He also believed that the Shia doctrine of infallibility of the imams constituted associationism with God.[267]
David Commins describes the "pivotal idea" in Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's
teaching as being that "Muslims who disagreed with his definition of
monotheism were not ... misguided Muslims, but outside the pale of Islam
altogether." This put Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teaching at odds with that of
most Muslims through history who believed that the "shahada" profession
of faith ("There is no god but God, Muhammad is his messenger") made
one a Muslim, and that shortcomings in that person's behavior and
performance of other obligatory rituals rendered them "a sinner", but
"not an unbeliever."
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not accept that view. He
argued that the criterion for one's standing as either a Muslim or an
unbeliever was correct worship as an expression of belief in one God ...
any act or statement that indicates devotion to a being other than God
is to associate another creature with God's power, and that is
tantamount to idolatry (shirk). Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab
included in the category of such acts popular religious practices that
made holy men into intercessors with God. That was the core of the
controversy between him and his adversaries, including his own brother.[268]
In Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's major work, a small book called Kitab al-Tawhid, he states that worship in Islam is limited to conventional acts of worship such as the five daily prayers (salat); fasting for Ramadan (Sawm); Dua (supplication); Istia'dha (seeking protection or refuge); Ist'ana (seeking help), and Istigatha to Allah (seeking benefits and calling upon Allah alone). Worship beyond this – making du'a or tawassul – are acts of shirk and in violation of the tenets of Tawhid (montheism).
Ibn Abd al-Wahahb's justification for considering the majority of
Muslims of Arabia to be unbelievers, and for waging war on them, can be
summed up as his belief that the original pagans the prophet Muhammad
fought "affirmed that God is the creator, the sustainer and the master
of all affairs; they gave alms, they performed pilgrimage and they
avoided forbidden things from fear of God". What made them pagans whose
blood could be shed and wealth plundered was that "they sacrificed
animals to other beings; they sought the help of other beings; they
swore vows by other beings." Someone who does such things even if their
lives are otherwise exemplary is not a Muslim but an unbeliever (as Ibn
Abd al-Wahahb believed). Once such people have received the call to
"true Islam", understood it and then rejected it, their blood and
treasure are forfeit.[271][272]
This disagreement between Wahhabis and non-Wahhabi Muslims over
the definition of worship and monotheism has remained much the same
since 1740, according to David Commins,[268]
although, according to Saudi writer and religious television show host
Abdul Aziz Qassim, as of 2014, "there are changes happening within the
[Wahhabi] doctrine and among its followers."[46]
According to another source, defining aspects of Wahhabism
include a very literal interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah and a
tendency to reinforce local practices of the Najd.[273]
Whether the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab included the
need for social renewal and "plans for socio-religious reform of
society" in the Arabian Peninsula, rather than simply a return to
"ritual correctness and moral purity", is disputed.[274][275]
Jurisprudence (fiqh)
Of the four major sources in Sunni fiqh – the Quran, the Sunna, consensus (ijma), and analogical reasoning (qiyas) – Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's writings emphasized the Quran and Sunna. He used ijma only "in conjunction with its corroboration of the Quran and hadith"[276] (and giving preference to the ijma of Muhammad's companions rather than the ijma of legal specialists after his time), and qiyas only in cases of extreme necessity.[277] He rejected deference to past juridical opinion (taqlid) in favor of independent reasoning (ijtihad), and opposed using local customs.[278]
He urged his followers to "return to the primary sources" of Islam in
order "to determine how the Quran and Muhammad dealt with specific
situations",[279] when using ijtihad.
According to Edward Mortimer, it was imitation of past juridical opinion
in the face of clear contradictory evidence from hadith or Qur'anic
text that Ibn Abd al-Wahhab condemned.[280]
Natana DeLong-Bas writes that the Wahhabi tendency to consider failure
to abide by Islamic law as equivalent to apostasy was based on the
ideology of Ibn Taymiyya rather than Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's preaching and emerged after the latter's death.[281]
According to an expert on law in Saudi Arabia (Frank Vogel), Ibn
Abd al-Wahhab himself "produced no unprecedented opinions". The
"Wahhabis' bitter differences with other Muslims were not over fiqh
rules at all, but over aqida, or theological positions".[282]
Scholar David Cummings also states that early disputes with other
Muslims did not center on fiqh, and that the belief that the distinctive
character of Wahhabism stems from Hanbali legal thought is a "myth".[283]
Some scholars are ambivalent as to whether Wahhabis belong to the Hanbali legal school. The Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World
maintains Wahhabis "rejected all jurisprudence that in their opinion
did not adhere strictly to the letter of the Qur'an and the hadith".[284]
Cyril Glasse's New Encyclopedia of Islam states that "strictly speaking", Wahhabis "do not see themselves as belonging to any school,"[285]
and that in doing so they correspond to the ideal aimed at by Ibn Hanbal, and thus they can be said to be of his 'school'.[286][287]
According to DeLong-Bas, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab never directly claimed to
be a Hanbali jurist, warned his followers about the dangers of adhering
unquestionably to fiqh, and did not consider "the opinion of any law
school to be binding."[288]
He did, however, follow the Hanbali methodology of judging everything
not explicitly forbidden to be permissible, avoiding the use of analogical reasoning, and taking public interest and justice into consideration.[288]
Loyalty and disassociation
According to various sources—scholars,
former Saudi students,
[294] Arabic-speaking/reading teachers who have had access to Saudi text books,
[295]
and journalists[296]
– Ibn `Abd al Wahhab and his successors preach that theirs is the one true form of Islam.
According to a doctrine known as al-wala` wa al-bara` (literally,
"loyalty and disassociation"), Abd al-Wahhab argued that it was
"imperative for Muslims not to befriend, ally themselves with, or
imitate non-Muslims or heretical Muslims", and that this "enmity and
hostility of Muslims toward non-Muslims and heretical had to be visible
and unequivocal."[297][298]
Even as late as 2003, entire pages in Saudi textbooks were devoted to
explaining to undergraduates that all forms of Islam except Wahhabism
were deviation,[295]
although, according to one source (Hamid Algar) Wahhabis have
"discreetly concealed" this view from other Muslims outside Saudi Arabia
"over the years."[290][299]
In reply, the Saudi Arabian government "has strenuously denied
the above allegations", including that "their government exports
religious or cultural extremism or supports extremist religious
education."[300]
Politics
According
to ibn Abdal-Wahhab there are three objectives for Islamic government
and society: "to believe in Allah, enjoin good behavior, and forbid
wrongdoing." This doctrine has been sustained in missionary literature,
sermons, fatwa rulings, and explications of religious doctrine by
Wahhabis since the death of ibn Abdal-Wahhab.[68] Ibn Abd al-Wahhab saw a role for the imam, "responsible for religious matters", and the amir, "in charge of political and military issues".[301] (In Saudi history the imam has not been a religious preacher or scholar, but Muhammad ibn Saud[302] and subsequent Saudi rulers.[58][303])
He also taught that the Muslim ruler is owed unquestioned
allegiance as a religious obligation from his people so long as he leads
the community according to the laws of God. A Muslim must present a bayah, or oath of allegiance, to a Muslim ruler during his lifetime to ensure his redemption after death.[68][304]
Any counsel given to a ruler from community leaders or ulama should be
private, not through public acts such as petitions, demonstrations,
etc.
[305][306]
(This strict obedience can become problematic if a dynastic dispute
arises and someone rebelling against the ruler succeeds and becomes the
ruler, as happened in the late 19th century at the end of the second
al-Saud state.[307] Is the successful rebel a ruler to be obeyed, or a usurper?[308])
While this gives the king wide power, respecting shari'a does impose limits, such as giving qadi
(Islamic judges) independence. This means not interfering in their
deliberations, but also not codifying laws, following precedents or
establishing a uniform system of law courts – both of which violate the
qadi's independence.[309]
Wahhabis have traditionally given their allegiance to the House of Saud, but a movement of "Salafi jihadis" has developed among those who believe Al Saud has abandoned the laws of God.[188][189]
According to Zubair Qamar, while the "standard view" is that "Wahhabis
are apolitical and do not oppose the State", there is/was another
"strain" of Wahhabism that "found prominence among a group of Wahhabis
after the fall of the second Saudi State in the 1800s", and post 9/11 is associated with Jordanian/Palestinian scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and "Wahhabi scholars of the 'Shu’aybi' school".[310]
Wahhabis share the belief of Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Islamic dominion over politics and government and the importance of dawah
(proselytizing or preaching of Islam) not just towards non-Muslims but
towards erroring Muslims. However Wahhabi preachers are conservative
and do not deal with concepts such as social justice, anticolonialism, or economic equality, expounded upon by Islamist Muslims.[311] Ibn Abdul Wahhab's original pact promised whoever championed his message, 'will, by means of it, rule and lands and men.'"[19]
Population
One of the more detailed estimates of religious population in the Persian Gulf is by Mehrdad Izady
who estimates, "using cultural and not confessional criteria",
approximately 4.56 million Wahhabis in the Persian Gulf region, about 4
million from Saudi Arabia, (mostly the Najd), and the rest coming overwhelmingly from the Emirates and Qatar.[21] Most Sunni Qataris are Wahhabis (46.9% of all Qataris)[21] and 44.8% of Emiratis are Wahhabis,[21] 5.7% of Bahrainis are Wahhabis, and 2.2% of Kuwaitis are Wahhabis.[21]
Notable leaders
There has traditionally been a recognized head of the Wahhabi "religious estate", often a member of Al ash-Sheikh (a descendant of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab) or related to another religious head. For example, Abd al-Latif was the son of Abd al-Rahman ibn Hasan.
Abd Allah ibn Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1752–1826)
was the head of Wahhabism after his father retired from public life in
1773. After the fall of the first Saudi emirate, Abd Allah went into exile in Cairo where he died.[312]
Sulayman ibn Abd Allah (1780–1818) was a grandson of Muhammad ibn
Abd al-Wahhab and author of an influential treatise that restricted
travel to and residing in land of idolaters (i.e. land outside of the
Wahhabi area).[312]
Abd al-Rahman ibn Hasan (1780–1869) was head of the religious estate in the second Saudi emirate.[312]
Abd al-Latif ibn Abd al-Rahman (1810–1876) Head of religious estate in 1860 and early 1870s.[312]
Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Al ash-Sheikh
(1893–1969) was the head of Wahhabism in mid twentieth century. He has
been said to have "dominated the Wahhabi religious estate and enjoyed
unrivaled religious authority."[314]
In more recent times, two Wahhabi clerics have risen to prominence with no relation to ibn Abd al-Wahhab.
Abdul Aziz Bin Baz (1910–1999) has been called "the most prominent proponent" of Wahhabism during his time.[315]
Muhammad ibn al-Uthaymeen
(1925–2001) is another "giant". According to David Dean Commins, no
one "has emerged" with the same "degree of authority in the Saudi
religious establishment" since their deaths.[315]
International influence and propagation
Explanation for influence
Khaled Abou El Fadl attributed the appeal of Wahhabism to some Muslims as stemming from
Arab nationalism, which followed the Wahhabi attack on the Ottoman Empire
Reformism, which followed a return to Salaf (as-Salaf aṣ-Ṣāliḥ);
Control of Mecca and Medina, which gave Wahhabis great influence on Muslim culture and thinking;
Oil, which after 1975 allowed Wahhabis to promote their interpretations of Islam using billions from oil export revenue.[316]
Scholar Gilles Kepel, agrees that the tripling in the price of oil in the mid-1970s and the progressive takeover of Saudi Aramco in the 1974–1980 period, provided the source of much influence of Wahhabism in the Islamic World.
... the financial clout of Saudi Arabia had been amply
demonstrated during the oil embargo against the United States, following
the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. This show of international power, along
with the nation's astronomical increase in wealth, allowed Saudi
Arabia's puritanical, conservative Wahhabite faction to attain a
preeminent position of strength in the global expression of Islam. Saudi
Arabia's impact on Muslims throughout the world was less visible than
that of Khomeini]s Iran, but the effect was deeper and more enduring...
it reorganized the religious landscape by promoting those associations
and ulamas who followed its lead, and then, by injecting substantial
amounts of money into Islamic interests of all sorts, it won over many
more converts. Above all, the Saudis raised a new standard – the
virtuous Islamic civilization – as foil for the corrupting influence of
the West.[77]
Funding factor
Estimates of Saudi spending on religious causes abroad include "upward of $100 billion";[317] between $2 and 3 billion per year since 1975 (compared to the annual Soviet propaganda budget of $1 billion/year);[318]
and "at least $87 billion" from 1987–2007.[319]
Its largesse funded an estimated "90% of the expenses of the
entire faith", throughout the Muslim World, according to journalist
Dawood al-Shirian.[320] It extended to young and old, from children's madrasas to high-level scholarship.[321]
"Books, scholarships, fellowships, mosques" (for example, "more than
1,500 mosques were built from Saudi public funds over the last 50
years") were paid for.[322] It rewarded journalists and academics, who followed it and built satellite campuses around Egypt for Al Azhar, the oldest and most influential Islamic university.[160] Yahya Birt counts spending on "1,500 mosques, 210 Islamic centres and dozens of Muslim academies and schools".
This financial aid has done much to overwhelm less strict local
interpretations of Islam, according to observers like Dawood al-Shirian
and Lee Kuan Yew,[320] and has caused the Saudi interpretation (sometimes called "petro-Islam"[324]) to be perceived as the correct interpretation—or the "gold standard" of Islam—in many Muslims' minds.[325][326]
Militant and political Islam
According
to counter-terrorism scholar Thomas F. Lynch III, Sunni extremists
perpetrated about 700 terror attacks killing roughly 7,000 people from
1981–2006.[327] What connection, if any, there is between Wahhabism and the Jihadi Salafis such as Al-Qaeda who carried out these attacks, is disputed.
The militant Islam of Osama bin
Laden did not have its origins in the teachings of Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab and
was not representative of Wahhabi Islam as it is practiced in
contemporary Saudi Arabia, yet for the media it came to define Wahhabi
Islam during the later years of bin Laden's lifetime. However
"unrepresentative" bin Laden's global jihad was of Islam in general and
Wahhabi Islam in particular, its prominence in headline news took
Wahhabi Islam across the spectrum from revival and reform to global
jihad.[328]
Noah Feldman
distinguishes between what he calls the "deeply conservative" Wahhabis
and what he calls the "followers of political Islam in the 1980s and
1990s," such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad and later Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. While Saudi Wahhabis were "the largest funders of local Muslim Brotherhood chapters and other hard-line Islamists"
during this time, they opposed jihadi resistance to Muslim governments
and assassination of Muslim leaders because of their belief that "the
decision to wage jihad lay with the ruler, not the individual believer".[329]
Karen Armstrong states that Osama bin Laden, like most extremists, followed the ideology of Sayyid Qutb, not "Wahhabism".[330]
More recently the self-declared "Islamic State" in Iraq and Syria headed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has been described as both more violent than al-Qaeda and more closely aligned with Wahhabism.
For their guiding principles, the leaders of the Islamic
State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, are open and clear about their almost
exclusive commitment to the Wahhabi movement of Sunni Islam. The group
circulates images of Wahhabi religious textbooks from Saudi Arabia in
the schools it controls. Videos from the group's territory have shown
Wahhabi texts plastered on the sides of an official missionary van.[331]
According to scholar Bernard Haykel,
"for Al Qaeda, violence is a means to an ends; for ISIS, it is an end
in itself." Wahhabism is the Islamic State's "closest religious
cognate."[331]
The Sunni militant groups worldwide that are associated with the Wahhabi ideology include: Al-Shabaab, Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, and ISIS.[citation needed]
Criticism and controversy
Criticism by other Muslims
Among the criticism, or comments made by critics, of the Wahhabi movement are:
That it is not so much strict and uncompromising as aberrant,[332] going beyond the bounds of Islam in its restricted definition of tawhid (monotheism), and much too willing to commit takfir (declare non-Muslim and subject to execution) Muslims it found in violation of the doctrines of Wahhabism.[333]
(in the second Wahhabi-Saudi jihad/conquest of the Arabian peninsula,
an estimated 400,000 were killed or wounded according to some estimates[112][113][114][115]);
That bin Saud's agreement to wage jihad to spread Ibn Abdul
Wahhab's teachings had more to do with traditional Najd practice of
raiding – "instinctive fight for survival and appetite for lucre" – than
with religion;[334]
That it has no connection to other Islamic revival movements;[335]
That unlike other revivalists, its founder Abd ul-Wahhab showed
little scholarship – writing little and making even less commentary;[336]
That its rejection of the "orthodox" belief in saints, which had become a cardinal doctrine in Sunni Islam very early on,[337][338][339] represents a departure from something which has been an "integral part of Islam ... for over a millennium."[340][341]
In this connection, mainstream Sunni scholars also critique the Wahhabi
citing of Ibn Taymiyyah as an authority when Ibn Taymiyyah himself
adhered to the belief in the existence of saints;[342]
That its use of Ibn Hanbal, Ibn al-Qayyim, and even Ibn Taymiyyah's name to support its stance is inappropriate, as it is historically known that all three of these men revered many aspects of Sufism,
save that the latter two critiqued certain practices among the Sufis of
their time. Those who criticize this aspect of Wahhabism often refer to
the group's use of Ibn Hanbal's name to be a particularly egregious
error, arguing that the jurist's love for the relics of Muhammad, for the intercession of the Prophet, and for the Sufis of his time is well established in Islamic tradition;[343]
That historically Wahhabis have had a suspicious willingness to ally
itself with non-Muslim powers (specifically America and Britain), and
in particular to ignore the encroachments into Muslim territory of a
non-Muslim imperial power (the British) while waging jihad and weakening
the Muslim Caliphate of the Ottomans[344][345]
Initial opposition
The
first people to oppose Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab were his father Abd
al-Wahhab and his brother Salman Ibn Abd al-Wahhab who was an Islamic
scholar and qadi.
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's brother wrote a book in refutation of his brother's
new teachings, called: "The Final Word from the Qur'an, the Hadith, and
the Sayings of the Scholars Concerning the School of Ibn `Abd
al-Wahhab", also known as:
"Al-Sawa`iq al-Ilahiyya fi Madhhab al-Wahhabiyya" ("The Divine
Thunderbolts Concerning the Wahhabi School").[346]
In "The Refutation of Wahhabism in Arabic Sources, 1745–1932",[346] Hamadi Redissi provides original references to the description of Wahhabis as a divisive sect (firqa) and outliers (Kharijites) in communications between Ottomans and Egyptian Khedive Muhammad Ali. Redissi details refutations of Wahhabis by scholars (muftis); among them Ahmed Barakat Tandatawin, who in 1743 describes Wahhabism as ignorance (Jahala).
Shi'a opposition
Al-Baqi' mausoleum reportedly contained the bodies of Hasan ibn Ali (a grandson of Muhammad) and Fatimah (the daughter of Muhammad).
In 1801 and 1802, the Saudi Wahhabis under Abdul Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn Saud attacked and captured the holy Shia cities of Karbala and Najaf in Iraq and destroyed the tombs of Husayn ibn Ali, who is the grandson of Muhammad, and Ali (Ali bin Abu Talib), the son-in-law of Muhammad (see: Saudi sponsorship mentioned previously). In 1803 and 1804 the Saudis captured Mecca and Madinah and demolished various tombs of Ahl al-Bayt and Sahabah,
ancient monuments, ruins according to Wahhabis, they "removed a number
of what were seen as sources or possible gateways to polytheism or shirk" – such as the tomb of Fatimah, the daughter of Muhammad. In 1998 the Saudis bulldozed and poured gasoline over the grave of Aminah bint Wahb, the mother of Muhammad, causing resentment throughout the Muslim World.
Shi'a Muslims complain that Wahhabis and their teachings are a
driving force behind sectarian violence and anti-Shia targeted killings
in many countries such as Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Yemen.
Worldwide, Saudis run sponsored mosques and Islamic schools teaching the
Wahhabi version of Sunni Islam that labels Shia Muslims, Sufis,
Christians, Jews and others as either apostates or infidels, thus paving
a way for armed jihad against them by any means necessary till their
death or submission to the Wahhabi doctrine. Wahhabis consider Shi'ites
to be the archenemies of Islam.
Wahhabism
has been vehemently criticized by many mainstream Sunni Muslims and
continues to be condemned by many prominent traditional Sunni scholars
for being a "heretical and violent" innovation within Sunni Islam.[8] Among traditional Sunni organizations worldwide that oppose the Wahhabi ideology is the Al-Azhar in Cairo, the faculty of which regularly denounces Wahhabism with terms such as "Satanic faith."[8] Regarding Wahhabism, the renowned Azharite Sunni scholar and intellectual Muhammad Abu Zahra
said: "The Wahhabis exaggerated [and bowdlerized] Ibn Taymiyya's
positions ... The Wahhabis did not restrain themselves to proselytism
only, but resorted to warmongering against whoever disagreed with them
on the grounds that they were fighting innovation (bid`a), and
innovations are an evil that must be fought ... Whenever they were able
to seize a town or city they would come to the tombs and turn them into
ruins and destruction ... and they would destroy whatever mosques were
with the tombs also ... Their brutality did not stop there but they also
came to whatever graves were visible and destroyed them also. And when
the ruler of the Hijaz regions caved in to them they destroyed all the
graves of the Companions and razed them to the ground ... In fact, it
has been noticed that the Ulama of the Wahhabis consider their own
opinions correct and not possibly wrong, while they consider the
opinions of others wrong and not possibly correct. More than that, they
consider what others than themselves do in the way of erecting tombs and
circumambulating them, as near to idolatry ... In this respect they are
near the Khawarij who used to declare those who dissented with them
apostate and fight them as we already mentioned."[352]
The Sunni conventional scholars for centuries rejected Ibn
Taymiyah's ideas however Wahhabism has made this controversial scholar
its central figure.[353]
In the 18th century, the Hanafi scholar Ibn Abidin declared the Wahhabi movement of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab to be a modern-day manifestation of the Kharijites.[354][355]
Another important early rebuttal of Wahhabism came from the Sunni
jurist Ibn Jirjis, who argued that supplicating the saints is permitted
to "Whoever declares that there is no god but God and prays toward
Mecca," for, according to him, supplicating the saints is not a form of
worship but merely calling out to them, and that worship at graves is
not idolatry unless the supplicant believes that buried saints have the
power to determine the course of events. These arguments were
specifically rejected as heretical by the Wahhabi leader at the time.
[356]
Morocco
The influential Sunni jurist and son of the renowned Moroccan scholar Abdullah al-Ghumari,
Abu'l-Fayd Ahmad, staunchly condemned Wahhabism and attacked it for
straying away from classical tradition, stating: "And nothing has
emerged ... to bring about earthquakes and discord in the religion like Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab,
who was astray and led others astray. Hence he was the Devil's Horn
foretold by the Messenger (upon him be blessings and peace), and he
abstained from offering prayer for Najd because of him, and because of
the dissensions which would flow from his demonic preaching."[357]
Kuwait
The prominent Kuwaiti Sunni Shafi'i
jurist Yusuf ibn al-Sayyid Hashim al-Rifa`i (1932-1999) remained a
severe critic of Wahhabism throughout his scholarly life, and penned a
famous fifty-seven point critique of the movement, titled Advice to the Scholars of Najd.
He criticized the followers of the movement for causing discord among
the Sunni community by their labeling all other Sunnis as "pagans,"
"innovators," and "deviants."[358]
Turkey
The Transnational Turkish Gülen movement disagrees with Wahhabism furthermore blames it directly for the rise of Islamophobia in the world.[359] The leader of the movement Fethullah Gülen denounces Arabs for conspiring against the Ottoman state as well as interpreting Islam strictly by their Arabian culture and Wahhabism.[360]
The largest Sunni organization in the world, Indonesia's Nahdlatul Ulama, opposes Wahhabism,[362] referring to as a fanatical and innovative movement within the tradition of Sunnism.[362] Subsequently, Nahdlatul Ulama promotes Islam Nusantara,
as an alternative movement against the growing austerity, intolerance,
radicalization and violence brought by Wahhabi movement within modern
Indonesian society. Islam Nusantara was developed in Nusantara
(Indonesian archipelago) at least since the 16th century, defined as an
interpretation of Islam that takes into account local Indonesian
customs in forming its fiqh.[363]
Malaysia
Malaysia's largest Islamic body, the National Fatwa Council, has described Wahhabism as being against Sunni
teachings, Dr Abdul Shukor Husin, chairman of the National Fatwa
Council, said Wahhabi followers were fond of declaring Muslims of other
schools as apostates merely on the grounds that they did not conform to
Wahhabi teachings.[364]
India
South Asia's Barelvi movement rejects Wahhabi beliefs.[365]
According to Barelvi scholars, Wahhabis preach violence as opposed to
Barelvis who promote peace. In 2016 Barelvis banned Wahhabis from their
mosques nationwide.[366] The founder of the movement Ahmed Raza Khan said Wahhabis aren't Muslims, and any Muslim who has difficulty understanding this, has also left Islam.[367]
Somalia
The Somalia based paramilitary group Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a actively battles Wahhabi militants to prevent imposition of Wahhabi ideology.[368]
Lebanon
The transnational Lebanon Al-Ahbash movement uses takfir against Wahhabi and Salafi leaders.[369][370] The head of Al-Ahbash, Abdullah al-Harari says Wahhabis offer anthropomorphic descriptions of God thereby imitate polytheists.[371]
United States
The SufiIslamic Supreme Council of America founded by the Naqshbandi Sufi Shaykh Hisham Kabbani
classify Wahhabism as being extremist and heretical based on
Wahhabism's role as a terrorist ideology and labelling of other Muslims,
especially Sufis as polytheists, a practice known as Takfir.
In general, mainstream Sunni Muslims condemn Wahhabism for being a major factor behind the rise of such groups as al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Boko Haram, while also inspiring movements such as the Taliban.
Non-religious motivations
According
to at least one critic, the 1744–1745 alliance between Ibn Abdul Wahhab
and the tribal chief Muhammad bin Saud to wage jihad on neighboring
allegedly false Muslims, was a "consecration" by Ibn Abdul Wahhab of bin
Saud tribe's long-standing raids on neighboring oases by "renaming
those raids jihad." Part of the Najd's "Hobbesian
state of perpetual war pitted Bedouin tribes against one another for
control of the scarce resources that could stave off starvation." And a
case of substituting fath, "the 'opening' or conquest of a vast
territory through religious zeal", for the "instinctive fight for
survival and appetite for lucre."
[334]
Wahhabism in the United States
A study conducted by the NGOFreedom House found Wahhabi publications in mosques
in the United States. These publications included statements that
Muslims should not only "always oppose" infidels "in every way", but
"hate them for their religion . . . for Allah's sake", that democracy
"is responsible for all the horrible wars ... [and] the number of wars
it started in the 20th century alone is more than 130 wars", and that Shia and certain Sunni Muslims were infidels.[379][380]
A review of the study by the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated[381]
Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) complained that
the study cited documents from only a few mosques, arguing that most
mosques in the U.S. are not under Wahhabi influence.[382] ISPU comments on the study were not entirely negative:
American-Muslim leaders must
thoroughly scrutinize this study. Despite its limitations, the study
highlights an ugly undercurrent in modern Islamic discourse that
American Muslims must openly confront. However, in the vigor to expose
strains of extremism, we must not forget that open discussion is the
best tool to debunk the extremist literature rather than a suppression
of First Amendment rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.[382]
Concern has been expressed over the fact that U.S. university branches, like the Georgetown School of Foreign Service and the Northwestern
school of Journalism, housed in the Wahhabi country of Qatar, are
exposed to the extremist propaganda espoused by Wahhabist imams who
preach at the Qatar Foundation's mosque in Education City. Education City,
a large campus where U.S. and European universities reside, hosted a
series of religious prayers and lectures as part of a month-long annual
Ramadan program in 2015. The prayers and lectures were held at Education City's new lavish mosque in Doha. Education City also affords campus space to other American universities such as Texas A&M and Carnegie Mellon.
Among those who have attended Education City lectures is a Saudi preacher who described the Charlie Hebdo
massacre in Paris as "the sequel to the comedy film of 9/11", and
another cleric who wrote, "Jews and their helpers must be destroyed."[383] The mosque in Education City
has hosted extremist Anti-Semitic Wahhabi preachers speaking against
"Zionist aggressors" in their sermons, and calling upon Allah "to count
them in number and kill them completely, do not spare a [single] one of
them."[383] Qatar has reportedly sent Jewish professors back to America,[384] and students attending American universities in Qatar are reportedly required to dress in a manner respectful to Wahhabism.[385]
European expansion
There
has been much concern, expressed in both American and European media
and scholarship, over the fact that Wahhabi countries like Saudi Arabia
and Qatar have been financing mosques and buying up land all over
Europe. Belgium, Ireland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy
have all noted the growing influence that these Wahhabi countries have over territory and religion in Europe.[386]
The concern resonates at a local level in Europe as well. In
2016, the citizens of Brussels, Belgium overturned a 2015 decision to
build a 600-person mosque next to the Qatari embassy. Fear largely
emanates from the fact that Belgian citizens see the mosque as an
opportunity for a Wahhabi country to exert control over Muslims in
Europe, thus spreading the more extreme sect of Islam.[386]
Several articles have been written that list the Cork Islamic Cultural Center
as an example of one of many properties throughout Europe, paid for by
the Qatari government, in an effort to spread an extreme and intolerant
form of Islam known as Wahhabism.[citation needed]
The Assalam Mosque
is located in Nantes, France was also a source on some controversy.
Construction on the mosque began in 2009 and was completed in 2012. It
is the largest mosque in its region in France. The mosque is frequently
listed among examples of Qatar’s efforts to export Wahhabism, their
extreme and often intolerant version of Islam, throughout Europe.
Some of the initiatives of the Cultural Islamic Center Sesto San Giovanni in Italy, funded by Qatar Charity, have also raised concerns due to its ties to Wahhabbism. The Consortium Against Terrorist Finance (CATF) said that the mosque has a history of affiliation and cooperation with extremists and terrorists.[388]
CATF notes that Qatar Charity "was named as a major financial conduit
for al-Qaeda in judicial proceedings following the attacks on the U.S.
Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania", supported al-Qaeda operatives in
Northern Mali, and was "heavily involved in Syria."[388]
Munich
Forum for Islam (MFI), also known as the Center for Islam in
Europe-Munich (ZIEM), was another controversial initiative largely
financed by the Wahhabi Gulf country of Qatar.[386]
In 2013 German activists filed a lawsuit in opposition to the
construction of the mosque. These activists expressed fear that the
Qatari government aimed to build Mosques all over Europe to spread
Wahhabism. But the government quashed the lawsuit. In addition to this
2014 ruling, another court ordered an anti-mosque protester to pay a
fine for defaming Islam when the protester claimed that Wahhabi Islam is
incompatible with democracy.[389]
The Islamic Cultural Center in Luxembourg was also funded by
Qatar in what some note is an attempt by Qatar to spread Wahhabism in
Europe.[390]
Destruction of Islam's early historical sites
The Wahhabi teachings disapprove of "veneration of the historical
sites associated with early Islam", on the grounds that "only God should
be worshipped" and "that veneration of sites associated with mortals
leads to idolatry".[391] However, critics point out that no Muslims venerate buildings or tombs as it is a shirk. Muslims visiting the resting places of Ahl al-Bayt or Sahabah
still pray to Allah alone while remembering the Prophet's companions
and family members. Many buildings associated with early Islam,
including mazaar, mausoleums and other artifacts have been destroyed in Saudi Arabia by Wahhabis from the early 19th century through the present day.[42][43]
This practice has proved controversial and has received considerable
criticism from Sufi and Shia Muslims and in the non-Muslim world.
Ironically, despite Wahhabi destruction of many Islamic,
non-Islamic, and historical sites associated with the first Muslims; the
Prophet's family and companions) and the strict prohibition of visiting such sites (including mosques), the Saudi government renovated the tomb of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab
turning his birthplace into a major tourist attraction and an important
place of visitation within the kingdom's modern borders.[392]