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Gandhi visiting Madras (now Chennai) in 1933 on an India-wide tour for Dalit (he used Harijan) causes. His speeches during such tours and writings discussed the discriminated-against castes of India.
The
caste system in India is the paradigmatic ethnographic example of
caste. It has origins in
ancient India, and was transformed by various ruling elites in medieval, early-modern, and modern India, especially the
Mughal Empire and the
British Raj. It is today the basis of
educational and job reservations in India. It consists of two different concepts,
varna and
jati, which may be regarded as different levels of analysis of this system.
The caste system as it exists today is thought to be the result of developments during the collapse of the Mughal era and the
British colonial regime in India.
The collapse of the Mughal era saw the rise of powerful men who
associated themselves with kings, priests and ascetics, affirming the
regal and martial form of the caste ideal, and it also reshaped many
apparently casteless social groups into differentiated caste
communities. The British Raj furthered this development, making rigid caste organisation a central mechanism of administration.
Between 1860 and 1920, the British segregated Indians by caste,
granting administrative jobs and senior appointments only to the upper
castes. Social unrest during the 1920s led to a change in this policy. From then on, the colonial administration began a policy of
positive discrimination by
reserving a certain percentage of government jobs for the lower castes.
Caste-based differences have also been practised in other regions
and religions in the Indian subcontinent like Nepalese Buddhism,
Christianity,
Islam,
Judaism and
Sikhism. It has been challenged by many reformist Hindu movements, Islam, Sikhism, Christianity, and also by present-day Indian
Buddhism.
New developments took place after India achieved independence,
when the policy of caste-based reservation of jobs was formalised with
lists of
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
Since 1950, the country has enacted many laws and social initiatives to
protect and improve the socioeconomic conditions of its lower caste
population. These caste classifications for college admission quotas,
job reservations and other affirmative action initiatives, according to
the
Supreme Court of India, are based on heredity and are not changeable. Discrimination against lower castes is illegal in India under Article 15 of its
constitution, and India tracks
violence against
Dalits nationwide.
Definitions and concepts
Varna, Jāti and Caste
Varna
Varna literally means
type, order, colour or class and was a framework for grouping people into classes, first used in
Vedic Indian society. It is referred to frequently in the ancient Indian texts. The four classes were the
Brahmins (priestly people), the
Kshatriyas (also called Rajanyas, who were rulers, administrators and warriors), the
Vaishyas (artisans, merchants, tradesmen and farmers), and
Shudras (labouring classes). The
varna categorisation implicitly had a fifth element, being those people deemed to be entirely outside its scope, such as
tribal people and the
untouchables.
Jati
Jati, meaning birth, is mentioned much less often in ancient texts, where it is clearly distinguished from varna. There are four varnas but thousands of jatis. The jatis
are complex social groups that lack universally applicable definition
or characteristic, and have been more flexible and diverse than was
previously often assumed.
Some scholars of caste have considered
jati to have its
basis in religion, assuming that in India the sacred elements of life
envelop the secular aspects; for example, the anthropologist
Louis Dumont described the ritual rankings that exist within the
jati
system as being based on the concepts of religious purity and
pollution. This view has been disputed by other scholars, who believe it
to be a secular social phenomenon driven by the necessities of
economics, politics, and sometimes also geography. Jeaneane Fowler says that although some people consider
jati to be occupational segregation, in reality the
jati framework does not preclude or prevent a member of one caste from working in another occupation. A feature of
jatis has been
endogamy, in
Susan Bayly's
words, that "both in the past and for many though not all Indians in
more modern times, those born into a given caste would normally expect
to find marriage partner" within his or her
jati.
Jatis have existed in India among Hindus, Muslims, Christians and tribal people, and there is no clear linear order among them.
Caste
The term
caste is not originally an Indian word, though it is now widely used, both in English and in
Indian languages. According to the
Oxford English Dictionary, it is derived from the Portuguese
casta, meaning "race, lineage, breed" and, originally, "'pure or unmixed (stock or breed)". There is no exact translation in Indian languages, but
varna and
jati are the two most approximate terms.
Ghurye's 1932 opinion
...we
do not possess a real general definition of caste. It appears to me
that any attempt at definition is bound to fail because of the
complexity of the phenomenon. On the other hand, much literature on the
subject is marred by lack of precision about the use of the term.
Ghurye offered what he thought was a definition that could be applied
across British India, although he acknowledged that there were regional
variations on the general theme. His model definition for caste
included the following six characteristics:
- Segmentation of society into groups whose membership was determined by birth
- A hierarchical system wherein generally the Brahmins were at the
head of the hierarchy, but this hierarchy was disputed in some cases. In
various linguistic areas, hundreds of castes had a gradation generally
acknowledged by everyone
- Restrictions on feeding and social intercourse, with minute rules on
the kind of food and drink that upper castes could accept from lower
castes. There was a great diversity in these rules, and lower castes
generally accepted food from upper castes
- Segregation, where individual castes lived together, the dominant
caste living in the center and other castes living on the periphery.
There were restrictions on the use of water wells or streets by one
caste on another: an upper-caste Brahmin might not be permitted to use
the street of a lower-caste group, while a caste considered impure might
not be permitted to draw water from a well used by members of other
castes.
- Occupation, generally inherited.
Lack of unrestricted choice of profession, caste members restricted
their own members from taking up certain professions they considered
degrading. This characteristic of caste was missing from large parts of
India, stated Ghurye, and in these regions all four castes (Brahmins,
Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras) did agriculture labour or became
warriors in large numbers
- Endogamy, restrictions on marrying a person outside caste, but in some situations hypergamy allowed.
Far less rigidity on inter-marriage between different sub-castes than
between members of different castes in some regions, while in some
endogamy within a sub-caste was the principal feature of caste-society.
The above Ghurye's model of caste thereafter attracted scholarly criticism for relying on the British India census reports, the "superior, inferior" racist theories of
H. H. Risley, and for fitting his definition to then prevalent colonial orientalist perspectives on caste.
Ghurye added, in 1932, that the colonial construction of caste
led to the livening up, divisions and lobbying to the British officials
for favourable caste classification in India for economic opportunities,
and this had added new complexities to the concept of caste.
Graham Chapman and others have reiterated the complexity, and they note
that there are differences between theoretical constructs and the
practical reality.
Modern perspective on definition
Ronald Inden, the
Indologist,
agrees that there has been no universally accepted definition. For
example, for some early European documenters it was thought to
correspond with the endogamous
varnas referred to in ancient Indian scripts, and its meaning corresponds in the sense of
estates. To later Europeans of the Raj era it was endogamous
jatis, rather than
varnas, that represented
caste, such as the 2378
jatis that colonial administrators classified by occupation in the early 20th century.
Arvind Sharma, a professor of
comparative religion, notes that
caste has been used synonymously to refer to both
varna and
jati
but that "serious Indologists now observe considerable caution in this
respect" because, while related, the concepts are considered to be
distinct. In this he agrees with the Indologist
Arthur Basham, who noted that the Portuguese colonists of India used
casta to describe
... tribes,
clans or families. The name stuck and became the usual word for the
Hindu social group. In attempting to account for the remarkable
proliferation of castes in 18th- and 19th-century India, authorities
credulously accepted the traditional view that by a process of
intermarriage and subdivision the 3,000 or more castes of modern India
had evolved from the four primitive classes, and the term 'caste' was
applied indiscriminately to both varna or class, and jati
or caste proper. This is a false terminology; castes rise and fall in
the social scale, and old castes die out and new ones are formed, but
the four great classes are stable. There are never more or less than
four and for over 2,000 years their order of precedence has not
altered."
The sociologist
Andre Beteille notes that, while
varna mainly played the role of caste in classical Hindu literature, it is
jati that plays that role in present times.
Varna represents a closed collection of social orders whereas
jati is entirely open-ended, thought of as a "natural kind whose members share a common substance." Any number of new
jatis
can be added depending on need, such as tribes, sects, denominations,
religious or linguistic minorities and nationalities. Thus, "Caste" is
not an accurate representation of
jati in English. Better terms would be ethnicity, ethnic identity and ethnic group.
In normal usage of the term jati in modern India, it does refer to caste.
Flexibility
Sociologist Anne Waldrop observes that while outsiders view the term
caste as a static phenomenon of stereotypical tradition-bound India,
empirical facts suggest caste has been a radically changing feature. The
term means different things to different Indians. In the context of
politically active modern India, where job and school quotas are
reserved for affirmative action based on castes, the term has become a
sensitive and controversial subject.
Sociologists such as
M. N. Srinivas
and Damle have debated the question of rigidity in caste and believe
that there is considerable flexibility and mobility in the caste
hierarchies.
Origins
Caste system in 19th century India
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Hindu musician
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Muslim merchant
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Sikh chief
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Arab soldier
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Pages from Seventy-two Specimens of Castes in India according to Christian Missionaries in February 1837. They include Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and Arabs as castes of India.
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Perspectives
There are at least two perspectives for the origins of the caste
system in ancient and medieval India, which focus on either ideological
factors or on socio-economic factors.
- The first school focuses on the ideological factors which are
claimed to drive the caste system and holds that caste is rooted in the
four varnas. This perspective was particularly common among
scholars of the British colonial era and was articulated by Dumont, who
concluded that the system was ideologically perfected several thousand
years ago and has remained the primary social reality ever since. This
school justifies its theory primarily by citing the ancient law book Manusmriti and disregards economic, political or historical evidence.
- The second school of thought focuses on socioeconomic factors and
claims that those factors drive the caste system. It believes caste to
be rooted in the economic, political and material history of India. This school, which is common among scholars of the post-colonial era such as Berreman,
Marriott, and Dirks, describes the caste system as an ever-evolving
social reality that can only be properly understood by the study of
historical evidence of actual practice and the examination of verifiable
circumstances in the economic, political and material history of India. This school has focused on the historical evidence from ancient and medieval society in India, during the Muslim rule between the 12th and 18th centuries, and the policies of colonial British rule from 18th century to the mid-20th century.
The first school has focused on religious anthropology and
disregarded other historical evidence as secondary to or derivative of
this tradition. The second school has focused on sociological evidence and sought to understand the historical circumstances.
The latter has criticised the former for its caste origin theory,
claiming that it has dehistoricised and decontextualised Indian society.
Ritual kingship model
According to Samuel, referencing
George L. Hart,
central aspects of the later Indian caste system may originate from the
ritual kingship system prior to the arrival of Brahmanism, Buddhism and
Jainism in India. The system is seen in the South Indian Tamil
literature from the
Sangam period, dated to the third to sixth centuries CE. This theory discards the Indo-Aryan
varna
model as the basis of caste, and is centred on the ritual power of the
king, who was "supported by a group of ritual and magical specialists of
low social status," with their ritual occupations being considered
'polluted'. According to Hart, it may be this model that provided the
concerns with "pollution" of the members of low status groups. The Hart
model for caste origin, writes Samuel, envisions "the ancient Indian
society consisting of a majority without internal caste divisions and a
minority consisting of a number of small occupationally polluted
groups".
Vedic varnas
The
varnas originated in
Vedic society
(ca.1500–500 BCE). The first three groups, Brahmins, Kshatriyas and
Vaishya have parallels with other Indo-European societies, while the
addition of the Shudras is probably a Brahmanical invention from
northern India.
The
varna system is propounded in revered Hindu religious texts, and understood as idealised human callings. The
Purusha Sukta of the
Rigveda and
Manusmriti's comment on it, being the oft-cited texts.
Counter to these textual classifications, many revered Hindu texts and
doctrines question and disagree with this system of social
classification.
Scholars have questioned the varna verse in Rigveda, noting that the varna therein is mentioned only once. The Purusha Sukta verse is now generally considered to have been inserted at a later date into the Rigveda,
probably as a charter myth. Stephanie Jamison and Joel Brereton,
professors of Sanskrit and Religious studies, state, "there is no
evidence in the Rigveda for an elaborate, much-subdivided and overarching caste system", and "the varna system seems to be embryonic in the Rigveda and, both then and later, a social ideal rather than a social reality". In contrast to the lack of details about varna system in the Rigveda, the Manusmriti includes an extensive and highly schematic commentary on the varna system, but it too provides "models rather than descriptions". Susan Bayly summarises that Manusmriti and other scriptures helped elevate Brahmins in the social hierarchy and these were a factor in the making of the varna system, but the ancient texts did not in some way "create the phenomenon of caste" in India.
Jatis
Jeaneane Fowler, a professor of philosophy and religious studies, states that it is impossible to determine how and why the jatis came in existence. Susan Bayly, on the other hand, states that jati
system emerged because it offered a source of advantage in an era of
pre-Independence poverty, lack of institutional human rights, volatile
political environment, and economic insecurity.
According to social anthropologist Dipankar Gupta, guilds developed during the
Mauryan period and crystallised into
jatis in post-Mauryan times with the emergence of feudalism in India, which finally crystallised during the 7–12th centuries. However, other scholars dispute when and how
jatis
developed in Indian history. Barbara Metcalf and Thomas Metcalf, both
professors of History, write, "One of the surprising arguments of fresh
scholarship, based on inscriptional and other contemporaneous evidence,
is that until relatively recent centuries, social organisation in much
of the subcontinent was little touched by the four
varnas. Nor were
jati the building blocks of society."
According to Basham, ancient Indian literature refers often to varnas, but hardly if ever to jatis as a system of groups within the varnas.
He concludes that "If caste is defined as a system of group within the
class, which are normally endogamous, commensal and craft-exclusive, we
have no real evidence of its existence until comparatively late times."
Untouchable outcastes and the varna system
The Vedic texts neither mention the concept of untouchable people nor
any practice of untouchability. The rituals in the Vedas ask the noble
or king to eat with the commoner from the same vessel. Later Vedic texts
ridicule some professions, but the concept of untouchability is not
found in them.
The post-Vedic texts, particularly
Manusmriti
mentions outcastes and suggests that they be ostracised. Recent
scholarship states that the discussion of outcastes in post-Vedic texts
is different from the system widely discussed in colonial era Indian
literature, and in Dumont's structural theory on caste system in India.
Patrick Olivelle, a professor of Sanskrit and Indian Religions and credited with modern translations of Vedic literature, Dharma-sutras and
Dharma-sastras,
states that ancient and medieval Indian texts do not support the ritual
pollution, purity-impurity premise implicit in the Dumont theory.
According to Olivelle, purity-impurity is discussed in the Dharma-sastra
texts, but only in the context of the individual's moral, ritual and
biological pollution (eating certain kinds of food such as meat, going
to bathroom). Olivelle writes in his review of post-Vedic
Sutra and
Shastra texts, "we see no instance when a term of pure/impure is used with reference to a group of individuals or a
varna or caste". The only mention of impurity in the
Shastra texts from the 1st millennium is about people who commit grievous sins and thereby fall out of their
varna.
These, writes Olivelle, are called "fallen people" and considered
impure in the medieval Indian texts. The texts declare that these
sinful, fallen people be ostracised.
Olivelle adds that the overwhelming focus in matters relating to
purity/impurity in the Dharma-sastra texts concerns "individuals
irrespective of their
varna affiliation" and all four
varnas
could attain purity or impurity by the content of their character,
ethical intent, actions, innocence or ignorance (acts by children),
stipulations, and ritualistic behaviours.
Dumont, in his later publications, acknowledged that ancient
varna hierarchy was not based on purity-impurity ranking principle, and
that the Vedic literature is devoid of the untouchability concept.
History
Vedic period (1500–1000 BCE)
During the time of the
Rigveda, there were two
varnas:
arya varna and
dasa varna. The distinction originally arose from tribal divisions. The Vedic tribes regarded themselves as
arya (the noble ones) and the rival tribes were called
dasa,
dasyu and
pani. The
dasas
were frequent allies of the Aryan tribes, and they were probably
assimilated into the Aryan society, giving rise to a class distinction. Many
dasas were however in a servile position, giving rise to the eventual meaning of
dasa as servant or slave.
The Rigvedic society was not distinguished by occupations. Many husbandmen and artisans practised a number of crafts. The chariot-maker (rathakara) and metal worker (karmara)
enjoyed positions of importance and no stigma was attached to them.
Similar observations hold for carpenters, tanners, weavers and others.
Towards the end of the
Atharvaveda period, new class distinctions emerged. The erstwhile
dasas are renamed Shudras, probably to distinguish them from the new meaning of
dasa as slave. The
aryas are renamed
vis
or Vaishya (meaning the members of the tribe) and the new elite classes
of Brahmins (priests) and Kshatriyas (warriors) are designated as new
varnas. The Shudras were not only the erstwhile
dasas but also included the aboriginal tribes that were assimilated into the Aryan society as it expanded into Gangetic settlements. There is no evidence of restrictions regarding food and marriage during the Vedic period.
Later Vedic period (1000–600 BCE)
In an early Upanishad, Shudra is referred to as Pūşan or nourisher, suggesting that Shudras were the tillers of the soil.
But soon afterwards, Shudras are not counted among the tax-payers and
they are said to be given away along with the lands when it is gifted. The majority of the artisans were also reduced to the position of Shudras, but there is no contempt indicated for their work.
The Brahmins and the Kshatriyas are given a special position in the
rituals, distinguishing them from both the Vaishyas and the Shudras. The Vaishya is said to be "oppressed at will" and the Shudra "beaten at will."
Second urbanisation (500–200 BCE)
Our knowledge of this period is supplemented by
Pali Buddhist texts. Whereas the Brahmanical texts speak of the four-fold
varna system, the Buddhist texts present an alternative picture of the society, stratified along the lines of
jati,
kula and occupation. It is likely that the
varna system, while being a part of the Brahmanical ideology, was not practically operative in the society. In the Buddhist texts, Brahmin and Kshatriya are described as
jatis rather than
varnas. They were in fact the
jatis of high rank. The
jatis of low rank were mentioned as
chandala and occupational classes like bamboo weavers, hunters, chariot-makers and sweepers. The concept of
kulas was broadly similar. Along with Brahmins and Kshatriyas, a class called
gahapatis (literally householders, but effectively propertied classes) was also included among high
kulas. The people of high
kulas were engaged in occupations of high rank,
viz., agriculture, trade, cattle-keeping, computing, accounting and writing, and those of low
kulas were engaged in low-ranked occupations such as basket-weaving and sweeping. The
gahapatis were an economic class of land-holding agriculturists, who employed
dasa-kammakaras (slaves and hired labourers) to work on the land. The
gahapatis were the primary taxpayers of the state. This class was apparently not defined by birth, but by individual economic growth.
While there was an alignment between
kulas and occupations
at least at the high and low ends, there was no strict linkage between
class/caste and occupation, especially among those in the middle range.
Many occupations listed such as accounting and writing were not linked
to
jatis.
Peter Masefield, in his review of caste in India, states that anyone
could in principle perform any profession. The texts state that the
Brahmin took food from anyone, suggesting that strictures of
commensality were as yet unknown. The
Nikaya texts also imply that endogamy was not mandated.
The contestations of the period are evident from the texts
describing dialogues of Buddha with the Brahmins. The Brahmins maintain
their divinely ordained superiority and assert their right to draw
service from the lower orders. Buddha responds by pointing out the basic
facts of biological birth common to all men and asserts that the
ability to draw service is obtained economically, not by divine right.
Using the example of the northwest of the subcontinent, Buddha points
out that aryas could become dasas and vice versa. This form of social mobility was endorsed by Buddha.
Classical period (320–650 CE)
The Mahabharata, whose final version is estimated to have been completed by the end of the fourth century, discusses the
varna system in section 12.181, presenting two models. The first model describes
varna as a colour-based system, through a character named Bhrigu, "Brahmins
varna
was white, Kshtriyas was red, Vaishyas was yellow, and the Shudras'
black". This description is questioned by Bharadvaja who says that
colors are seen among all the
varnas, that desire, anger, fear,
greed, grief, anxiety, hunger and toil prevails over all human beings,
that bile and blood flow from all human bodies, so what distinguishes
the
varnas, he asks. The Mahabharata then declares, "There is no distinction of
varnas. This whole universe is
Brahman. It was created formerly by
Brahma, came to be classified by acts." The epic then recites a behavioural model for
varna, that those who were inclined to anger, pleasures and boldness attained the Kshtriya
varna; those who were inclined to cattle rearing and living off the plough attained the Vaishya
varna; those who were fond of violence, covetousness and impurity attained the Shudra
varna. The Brahmin class is modeled in the epic as the archetype default state of man dedicated to truth, austerity and pure conduct. In the Mahabharata and pre-medieval era Hindu texts, according to Hiltebeitel, "it is important to recognise, in theory,
varna is nongenealogical. The four
varnas are not lineages, but categories".
Adi Purana, an 8th-century text of Jainism by
Jinasena, is the first mention of
varna and
jati in
Jainism literature. Jinasena does not trace the origin of
varna system to Rigveda or to Purusha, but to the
Bharata legend. According to this legend, Bharata performed an "
ahimsa-test" (test of non-violence), and during that test all those who refused to harm any living beings were called as the priestly
varna in ancient India, and Bharata called them
dvija, twice born. Jinasena states that those who are committed to the principle of non-harming and non-violence to all living beings are
deva-Brahmaṇas, divine Brahmins. The text Adipurana also discusses the relationship between varna and jati. According to
Padmanabh Jaini, a professor of Indic studies, in Jainism and Buddhism, the Adi Purana text states "there is only one
jati called
manusyajati or the human caste, but
divisions arise on account of their different professions". The caste of Kshatriya arose, according to Jainism texts, when
Rishabha
procured weapons to serve the society and assumed the powers of a king,
while Vaishya and Shudra castes arose from different means of
livelihood they specialised in.
Late classical and early medieval period (650 to 1400 CE)
Scholars have tried to locate historical evidence for the existence and nature of varna and jati in documents and inscriptions of medieval India. Supporting evidence for the existence of varna and jati systems in medieval India has been elusive, and contradicting evidence has emerged.
Varna is rarely mentioned in the extensive medieval era records of
Andhra Pradesh, for example. This has led Cynthia Talbot, a professor of History and Asian Studies, to question whether
varna was socially significant in the daily lives of this region. The mention of
jati
is even rarer, through the 13th century. Two rare temple donor records
from warrior families of the 14th century claim to be Shudras. One
states that Shudras are the bravest, the other states that Shudras are
the purest. Richard Eaton, a professor of History, writes, "anyone could become warrior regardless of social origins, nor do the
jati
- another pillar of alleged traditional Indian society - appear as
features of people's identity. Occupations were fluid." Evidence shows,
according to Eaton, that Shudras were part of the nobility, and many
"father and sons had different professions, suggesting that social
status was earned, not inherited" in the Hindu
Kakatiya population in the
Deccan region between the 11th and 14th centuries.
In
Tamil Nadu
region of India, studied by Leslie Orr, a professor of Religion, "Chola
period inscriptions challenge our ideas about the structuring of (south
Indian) society in general. In contrast to what Brahmanical legal texts
may lead us to expect, we do not find that caste is the organising
principle of society or that boundaries between different social groups
is sharply demarcated." In Tamil Nadu the
Vellalar were during ancient and medieval period the elite caste who were major patrons of literature. They ranked higher in the social hierarchy than the Brahmins.
For northern Indian region, Susan Bayly writes, "until well into
the colonial period, much of the subcontinent was still populated by
people for whom the formal distinctions of caste were of only limited
importance; Even in parts of the so-called Hindu heartland of Gangetic
upper India, the institutions and beliefs which are now often described
as the elements of traditional caste were only just taking shape as
recently as the early eighteenth century - that is the period of
collapse of Mughal period and the expansion of western power in the
subcontinent."
For western India, Dirk Kolff, a professor of Humanities,
suggests open status social groups dominated Rajput history during the
medieval period. He states, "The omnipresence of cognatic kinship and
caste in North India is a relatively new phenomenon that only became
dominant in the early Mughal and British periods respectively.
Historically speaking, the alliance and the open status group, whether
war band or religious sect, dominated medieval and early modern Indian
history in a way descent and caste did not."
Medieval era, Islamic Sultanates and Mughal empire period (1000 to 1750)
Early and mid 20th century Muslim historians, such as Hashimi in 1927
and Qureshi in 1962, proposed that "caste system was established before
the arrival of Islam", and it and "a nomadic savage lifestyle" in the
northwest Indian subcontinent were the primary cause why
Sindhi non-Muslims "embraced Islam in flocks" when Arab Muslim armies invaded the region.
According to this hypothesis, the mass conversions occurred from the
lower caste Hindus and Mahayana Buddhists who had become "corroded from
within by the infiltration of Hindu beliefs and practices". This theory
is now widely believed to be baseless and false.
Derryl MacLein, a professor of social history and Islamic
studies, states that historical evidence does not support this theory,
whatever evidence is available suggests that Muslim institutions in
north-west India legitimised and continued any inequalities that
existed, and that neither Buddhists nor "lower caste" Hindus converted
to Islam because they viewed Islam to lack a caste system.
Conversions to Islam were rare, states MacLein, and conversions
attested by historical evidence confirms that the few who did convert
were Brahmin Hindus (theoretically, the upper caste).
MacLein states the caste and conversion theories about Indian society
during the Islamic era are not based on historical evidence or
verifiable sources, but personal assumptions of Muslim historians about
the nature of Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism in northwest Indian
subcontinent.
Richard Eaton, a professor of History, states that the
presumption of a rigid Hindu caste system and oppression of lower castes
in pre-Islamic era in India, and it being the cause of "mass conversion
to Islam" during the medieval era suffers from the problem that "no
evidence can be found in support of the theory, and it is profoundly
illogical".
Peter Jackson,
a professor of Medieval History and Muslim India, writes that the
speculative hypotheses about caste system in Hindu states during the
medieval Delhi Sultanate period (~1200 to 1500) and the existence of a
caste system as being responsible for Hindu weakness in resisting the
plunder by Islamic armies is appealing at first sight, but "they do not
withstand closer scrutiny and historical evidence".
Jackson states that, contrary to the theoretical model of caste where
Kshatriyas only could be warriors and soldiers, historical evidence
confirms that Hindu warriors and soldiers during the medieval era
included other castes such as Vaishyas and Shudras.
Further, there is no evidence, writes Jackson, that there ever was a
"widespread conversion to Islam at the turn of twelfth century" by
Hindus of lower caste.
Jamal Malik, a professor of Islamic studies, extends this observation
further, and states that "at no time in history did Hindus of low caste
convert
en masse to Islam".
Jamal Malik
states that caste as a social stratification is a well-studied Indian
system, yet evidence also suggests that hierarchical concepts, class
consciousness and social stratification had already occurred in Islam
before Islam arrived in India. The concept of caste, or '
qaum'
in Islamic literature, is mentioned by a few Islamic historians of
medieval India, states Malik, but these mentions relate to the
fragmentation of the Muslim society in India. Zia al-Din al-Barani of
Delhi Sultanate in his
Fatawa-ye Jahandari and Abu al-Fadl from Akbar's court of
Mughal Empire are the few Islamic court historians who mention caste.
Zia al-Din al-Barani's discussion, however, is not about non-Muslim castes, rather a declaration of the supremacy of
Ashraf caste over
Ardhal
caste among the Muslims, justifying it in Quranic text, with
"aristocratic birth and superior genealogy being the most important
traits of a human".
Irfan Habib, an Indian historian, states that
Abu al-Fadl's
Ain-i Akbari
provides a historical record and census of the Jat peasant caste of
Hindus in northern India, where the tax-collecting noble classes (
Zamindars),
the armed cavalry and infantry (warrior class) doubling up as the
farming peasants (working class), were all of the same Jat caste in the
16th century. These occupationally diverse members from one caste served
each other, writes Habib, either because of their reaction to taxation
pressure of Muslim rulers or because they belonged to the same caste.
Peasant social stratification and caste lineages were, states Habib,
tools for tax revenue collection in areas under the Islamic rule.
The origin of caste system of modern form, in the Bengal region of India, may be traceable to this period, states Richard Eaton. The medieval era Islamic Sultanates in India utilised social stratification to rule and collect tax revenue from non-Muslims.
Eaton states that, "Looking at Bengal's Hindu society as a whole, it
seems likely that the caste system – far from being the ancient and
unchanging essence of Indian civilisation as supposed by generations of
Orientalists – emerged into something resembling its modern form only in
the period 1200–1500".
Post-Mughal period (1700 to 1850)
Susan Bayly, an anthropologist, notes that "caste is not and never
has been a fixed fact of Indian life" and the caste system as we know it
today, as a "ritualised scheme of social stratification," developed in
two stages during the post-Mughal period, in 18th and early 19th
century. Three sets of value played an important role in this
development: priestly hierarchy, kingship, and armed ascetics.
With the Islamic Mughal empire falling apart in the 18th century,
regional post-Mughal ruling elites and new dynasties from diverse
religious, geographical and linguistic background attempted to assert
their power in different parts of India.
Bayly states that these obscure post-Mughal elites associated
themselves with kings, priests and ascetics, deploying the symbols of
caste and kinship to divide their populace and consolidate their power.
In addition, in this fluid stateless environment, some of the previously
casteless segments of society grouped themselves into caste groups.
However, in 18th century writes Bayly, India-wide networks of
merchants, armed ascetics and armed tribal people often ignored these
ideologies of caste.
Most people did not treat caste norms as given absolutes writes Bayly,
but challenged, negotiated and adapted these norms to their
circumstances. Communities teamed in different regions of India, into
"collective classing" to mold the social stratification in order to
maximise assets and protect themselves from loss.
The "caste, class, community" structure that formed became valuable in a
time when state apparatus was fragmenting, was unreliable and fluid,
when rights and life were unpredictable.
In this environment, states Rosalind O'Hanlon, a professor of
Indian history, the newly arrived colonial East India Company officials,
attempted to gain commercial interests in India by balancing Hindu and
Muslim conflicting interests, by aligning with regional rulers and large
assemblies of military monks. The British Company officials adopted
constitutional laws segregated by religion and caste.
The legal code and colonial administrative practice was largely divided
into Muslim law and Hindu law, the latter including laws for Buddhists,
Jains and Sikhs. In this transitory phase, Brahmins together with
scribes, ascetics and merchants who accepted Hindu social and spiritual
codes, became the deferred-to-authority on Hindu texts, law and
administration of Hindu matters.
While legal codes and state administration were emerging in
India, with the rising power of the colonial Europeans, Dirks states
that the late 18th-century British writings on India say little about
caste system in India, and predominantly discuss territorial conquest,
alliances, warfare and diplomacy in India.
Colin Mackenzie, a British social historian of this time, collected
vast numbers of texts on Indian religions, culture, traditions and local
histories from south India and Deccan region, but his collection and
writings have very little on caste system in 18th-century India.
During British rule (1857 to 1947)
Although the
varnas and
jatis have pre-modern origins,
the caste system as it exists today is the result of developments during
the post-Mughal period and the
British colonial regime, which made caste organisation a central mechanism of administration.
Basis
Jati were the basis of caste ethnology during the British
colonial era. In the 1881 census and thereafter, colonial ethnographers
used caste (
jati) headings, to count and classify people in what was then
British India (now India,
Pakistan,
Bangladesh and
Burma).
The 1891 census included 60 sub-groups each subdivided into six
occupational and racial categories, and the number increased in
subsequent censuses.
The British colonial era census caste tables, states Susan Bayly,
"ranked, standardised and cross-referenced jati listings for Indians on
principles similar to zoology and botanical classifications, aiming to
establish who was superior to whom by virtue of their supposed purity,
occupational origins and collective moral worth". While bureaucratic
British officials completed reports on their zoological classification
of Indian people, some British officials criticised these exercises as
being little more than a caricature of the reality of caste system in
India. The British colonial officials used the census-determined jatis
to decide which group of people were qualified for which jobs in the
colonial government, and people of which jatis were to be excluded as
unreliable.
These census caste classifications, states Gloria Raheja, a professor
of Anthropology, were also used by the British officials over the late
19th century and early 20th century, to formulate land tax rates, as
well as to frequently target some social groups as "criminal" castes and
castes prone to "rebellion".
The population then comprised about 200 million people, across
five major religions, and over 500,000 agrarian villages, each with a
population between 100 and 1,000 people of various age groups, which
were variously divided into numerous castes. This ideological scheme was
theoretically composed of around 3,000 castes, which in turn was
claimed to be composed of 90,000 local endogamous sub-groups.
The strict
British class system
may have influenced the British colonial preoccupation with the Indian
caste system as well as the British perception of pre-colonial Indian
castes. British society's own similarly rigid class system provided the
British with a template for understanding Indian society and castes. The British, coming from a society rigidly divided by class, attempted to equate India's castes with British
social classes. According to
David Cannadine, Indian castes merged with the traditional British class system during the British Raj.
Race science
Colonial administrator
Herbert Hope Risley, an exponent of
race science, used the ratio of the width of a
nose to its height to divide Indians into Aryan and Dravidian races, as well as seven castes.
Enforcement
From
the 1850s, photography was used in Indian subcontinent by the British
for anthropological purposes, helping classify the different castes,
tribes and native trades. Included in this collection were Hindu, Muslim
and Buddhist (Sinhalese) people classified by castes. Above is an 1860s photograph of Rajputs, classified as a high Hindu caste.
Jobs for upper castes
The role of the British Raj on the caste system in India is controversial. The caste system became legally rigid during the Raj, when the British started to enumerate castes during their
ten-year census and meticulously codified the system.
Between 1860 and 1920, the British segregated Indians by caste,
granting administrative jobs and senior appointments only to the upper
castes.
Targeting criminal castes and their isolation
Starting with the 19th century, the British colonial government
passed a series of laws that applied to Indians based on their religion
and caste identification.
These colonial era laws and their provisions used the term "Tribes",
which included castes within their scope. This terminology was preferred
for various reasons, including Muslim sensitivities that considered
castes by definition Hindu, and preferred Tribes, a more generic term that included Muslims.
The British colonial government, for instance, enacted the
Criminal Tribes Act of 1871. This law declared everyone belonging to certain castes to be born with criminal tendencies.
Ramnarayan Rawat, a professor of History and specialising in social
exclusion in Indian subcontinent, states that the criminal-by-birth
castes under this Act included initially
Ahirs,
Gurjars and
Jats, but its enforcement expanded by the late 19th century to include most Shudras and untouchables, such as
Chamars, as well as
Sannyasis and hill tribes. Castes suspected of rebelling against colonial laws and seeking self-rule for India, such as the previously ruling families
Kallars and the
Maravars
in south India and non-loyal castes in north India such as Ahirs,
Gurjars and Jats, were called "predatory and barbarian" and added to the
criminal castes list.
Some caste groups were targeted using the Criminal Tribes Act even when
there were no reports of any violence or criminal activity, but where
their forefathers were known to have rebelled against Mughal or British
authorities, or these castes were demanding labour rights and disrupting colonial tax collecting authorities.
The colonial government prepared a list of criminal castes, and
all members registered in these castes by caste-census were restricted
in terms of regions they could visit, move about in or people with whom
they could socialise.
In certain regions of colonial India, entire caste groups were presumed
guilty by birth, arrested, children separated from their parents, and
held in penal colonies or quarantined without conviction or due process.
This practice became controversial, did not enjoy the support of all
colonial British officials, and in a few cases this decades-long
practice was reversed at the start of the 20th century with the
proclamation that people "could not be incarcerated indefinitely on the
presumption of [inherited] bad character".
The criminal-by-birth laws against targeted castes was enforced until
the mid-20th century, with an expansion of criminal castes list in west
and south India through the 1900s to 1930s.
Hundreds of Hindu communities were brought under the Criminal Tribes
Act. By 1931, the colonial government included 237 criminal castes and
tribes under the act in the
Madras Presidency alone.
While the notion of hereditary criminals conformed to orientalist
stereotypes and the prevailing racial theories in Britain during the
colonial era, the social impact of its enforcement was profiling,
division and isolation of many communities of Hindus as
criminals-by-birth.
Religion and caste segregated human rights
Eleanor Nesbitt, a professor of History and Religions in India,
states that the colonial government hardened the caste-driven divisions
in British India not only through its caste census, but with a series of
laws in early 20th century. The British colonial officials, for instance, enacted laws such as the
Land Alienation Act
in 1900 and Punjab Pre-Emption Act in 1913, listing castes that could
legally own land and denying equivalent property rights to other
census-determined castes. These acts prohibited the inter-generational
and intra-generational transfer of land from land-owning castes to any
non-agricultural castes, thereby preventing economic mobility of
property and creating consequent caste barriers in India.
Khushwant Singh a Sikh historian, and
Tony Ballantyne
a professor of History, state that these British colonial era laws
helped create and erect barriers within land-owning and landless castes
in northwest India. Caste-based discrimination and denial of human rights by the colonial state had similar impact elsewhere in British India.
Social identity
Nicholas Dirks has argued that Indian caste as we know it today is a "modern phenomenon" , as caste was "fundamentally transformed by British colonial rule."
According to Dirks, before colonialism caste affiliation was quite
loose and fluid, but the British regime enforced caste affiliation
rigorously, and constructed a much more strict hierarchy than existed
previously, with some castes being criminalised and others being given
preferential treatment.
De Zwart notes that the caste system used to be thought of as an
ancient fact of Hindu life and that contemporary scholars argue instead
that the system was constructed by the British colonial regime. He says
that "jobs and education opportunities were allotted based on caste, and
people rallied and adopted a caste system that maximized their
opportunity". De Zwart also notes that post-colonial affirmative action
only reinforced the "British colonial project that ex hypothesi
constructed the caste system".
Sweetman notes that the European conception of caste dismissed
former political configurations and insisted upon an "essentially
religious character" of India. During the colonial period, caste was
defined as a religious system and was divorced from political powers.
This made it possible for the colonial rulers to portray India as a
society characterised by spiritual harmony in contrast to the former
Indian states which they criticised as "despotic and epiphenomenal", with the colonial powers providing the necessary "benevolent, paternalistic rule by a more 'advanced' nation".
Further development
Assumptions about the caste system in Indian society, along with its nature, evolved during British rule. Corbridge concludes that British policies of
divide and rule
of India's numerous princely sovereign states, as well as enumeration
of the population into rigid categories during the 10-year census,
particularly with the 1901 and 1911 census, contributed towards the
hardening of caste identities.
Social unrest during 1920s led to a change in this policy.
From then on, the colonial administration began a policy of positive
discrimination by reserving a certain percentage of government jobs for
the lower castes.
In the round table conference held on
August 1932, upon the request of Ambedkar, the then Prime Minister of Britain,
Ramsay MacDonald made a
Communal Award which awarded a provision for separate representation for the Muslims, Sikhs, Christians,
Anglo-Indians,
Europeans and Dalits. These depressed classes were assigned a number of
seats to be filled by election from special constituencies in which
voters belonging to the depressed classes only could vote. Gandhi went
on a hunger strike against this provision claiming that such an
arrangement would split the Hindu community into two groups. Years
later, Ambedkar wrote that Gandhi's fast was a form of coercion. This agreement, which saw Gandhi end his fast and Ambedkar drop his demand for a separate electorate, was called the
Poona Pact.
Other theories and observations
Smelser and Lipset propose in their review of Hutton's study of caste
system in colonial India the theory that individual mobility across
caste lines may have been minimal in British India because it was
ritualistic. They state that this may be because the colonial social
stratification worked with the pre-existing ritual caste system.
The emergence of a caste system in the modern form, during the
early British colonial rule in the 18th and 19th century, was not
uniform in South Asia. Claude Markovits, a French historian of colonial
India, writes that Hindu society in north and west India (Sindh), in
late 18th century and much of 19th century, lacked a proper caste
system, their religious identities were fluid (a combination of Saivism,
Vaisnavism, Sikhism), and the Brahmins were not the widespread priestly
group (but the Bawas were).
Markovits writes, "if religion was not a structuring factor, neither
was caste" among the Hindu merchants group of northwest India.
Contemporary India
Caste politics
Societal stratification, and the inequality that comes with it, still exists in India, and has been thoroughly criticised. Government policies aim at reducing this inequality by
reservation,
quota for backward classes, but paradoxically also have created an
incentive to keep this stratification alive. The Indian government
officially recognises historically discriminated communities of India
such as the untouchables under the designation of Scheduled Castes, and
certain economically backward castes as
Other Backward Class.
Loosening of caste system
Leonard and Weller have surveyed marriage and genealogical records to
study patterns of exogamous inter-caste and endogamous intra-caste
marriages in a regional population of India in 1900–1975. They report a
striking presence of exogamous marriages across caste lines over time,
particularly since the 1970s. They propose education, economic
development, mobility and more interaction between youth as possible
reasons for these exogamous marriages.
A 2003 article in
The Telegraph
claimed that inter-caste marriage and dating were common in urban
India. Indian societal and family relationships are changing because of
female literacy and education, women at work, urbanisation, the need for
two-income families, and global influences through television. Female
role models in politics, academia, journalism, business, and India's
feminist movement have accelerated the change.
Caste-related violence
Independent India has witnessed caste-related violence. According to a
2005 UN report, approximately 31,440 cases of violent acts committed
against Dalits were reported in 1996.
The UN report claimed 1.33 cases of violent acts per 10,000 Dalit
people. For context, the UN reported between 40 and 55 cases of violent
acts per 10,000 people in developed countries in 2005. One example of such violence is the
Khairlanji massacre of 2006.
Affirmative action
- The National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes was established to investigate, monitor, advise, and evaluate the
socio-economic progress of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
- A reservation system for people classified as Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes has existed for over 50 years. The presence of
privately owned free market corporations in India is limited and public
sector jobs have dominated the percentage of jobs in its economy. A 2000
report estimated that most jobs in India were in companies owned by the
government or agencies of the government.
The reservation system implemented by India over 50 years, has been
partly successful, because of all jobs, nationwide, in 1995, 17.2
percent of the jobs were held by those in the lowest castes.
- The Indian government classifies government jobs in four groups. The
Group A jobs are senior most, high paying positions in the government,
while Group D are junior most, lowest paying positions. In Group D jobs,
the percentage of positions held by lowest caste classified people is
30% greater than their demographic percentage. In all jobs classified as
Group C positions, the percentage of jobs held by lowest caste people
is about the same as their demographic population distribution. In Group
A and B jobs, the percentage of positions held by lowest caste
classified people is 30% lower than their demographic percentage.
- The presence of lowest caste people in highest paying, senior-most
position jobs in India has increased by ten-fold, from 1.18 percent of
all jobs in 1959 to 10.12 percent of all jobs in 1995.
- In 2007, India elected K. G. Balakrishnan, a Dalit, to the office of Chief Justice.
- In 2007, Uttar Pradesh, the most populous state of India, elected Mayawati
as the Chief Minister, the highest elected office of the state. BBC
claims, "Mayawati Kumari is an icon for millions of India's Dalits, or
untouchables as they used to be known."
- In 2009, the Indian parliament unanimously elected a Dalit, Meira Kumar, as the first female speaker.
Recognition
The Indian government officially recognises historically
discriminated communities of India such as the untouchables under the
designation of
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and certain economically backward Shudra castes as
Other Backward Class.
The Scheduled Castes are sometimes referred to as Dalit in contemporary
literature. In 2001, Dalits comprised 16.2 percent of India's total
population. Of the one billion Hindus in India, it is estimated that Hindu
Forward caste comprises 26%,
Other Backward Class comprises 43%, Hindu Scheduled Castes (Dalits) comprises 22% and Hindu Scheduled Tribes (Adivasis) comprises 9%.
In addition to taking affirmative action for people of schedule
castes and scheduled tribes, India has expanded its effort to include
people from poor, backward castes in its economic and social mainstream.
In 1990, the government reservation of 27% for Backward Classes on the
basis of the
Mandal Commission's
recommendations. Since then, India has reserved 27 percent of job
opportunities in government-owned enterprises and agencies for Socially
and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBCs). The 27 percent reservation
is in addition to 22.5 percent set aside for India's lowest castes for
last 50 years.
Mandal commission
The Mandal Commission was established in 1979 to "identify the
socially or educationally backward" and to consider the question of
seat reservations and quotas for people to redress caste discrimination. In 1980, the commission's report affirmed the
affirmative action
practice under Indian law, whereby additional members of lower
castes—the other backward classes—were given exclusive access to another
27 percent of government jobs and slots in public universities, in
addition to the 23 percent already reserved for the Dalits and Tribals.
When
V. P. Singh's
administration tried to implement the recommendations of the Mandal
Commission in 1989, massive protests were held in the country. Many
alleged that the politicians were trying to cash in on caste-based
reservations for purely pragmatic electoral purposes.
Many political parties in India have indulged in caste-based
votebank politics. Parties such as
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), the
Samajwadi Party and the
Janata Dal
claim that they are representing the backward castes, and rely on OBC
support, often in alliance with Dalit and Muslim support, to win
elections.
Other Backward Classes (OBC)
There is substantial debate over the exact number of OBCs in India;
it is generally estimated to be sizable, but many believe that it is
lower than the figures quoted by either the Mandal Commission or the
National Sample Survey.
In May 2011, the government approved a poverty, religion and caste census to identify poverty in different social backgrounds.
The census would also help the government to re-examine and possibly
undo some of the policies which were formed in haste such as the Mandal
Commission in order to bring more objectivity to the policies with
respect to contemporary realities.
Critics of the reservation system believe that there is actually no
social stigma at all associated with belonging to a backward caste and
that because of the huge constitutional incentives in the form of
educational and job reservations, a large number of people will falsely
identify with a backward caste to receive the benefits. This would not
only result in a marked inflation of the backward castes' numbers, but
also lead to enormous administrative and judicial resources being
devoted to social unrest and litigation when such dubious caste
declarations are challenged.
In 20th century India, the upper-class (
Ashraf) Muslims
dominated the government jobs and parliamentary representation. As a
result, there have been campaigns to include the Muslim untouchable and
lower castes among the groups eligible for
affirmative action in India under
SC and STs provision act and have been given additional reservation based on the
Sachar Committee report.
Effects of government aid
In a 2008 study, Desai et al. focussed on education attainments of
children and young adults aged 6–29, from lowest caste and tribal
populations of India. They completed a national survey of over 100,000
households for each of the four survey years between 1983 and 2000.
They found a significant increase in lower caste children in their odds
of completing primary school. The number of dalit children who
completed either middle-, high- or college-level education increased
three times faster than the national average, and the total number were
statistically same for both lower and upper castes. However, the same
study found that in 2000, the percentage of dalit males never enrolled
in a school was still more than twice the percentage of upper caste
males never enrolled in schools. Moreover, only 1.67% of dalit females
were college graduates compared to 9.09% of upper caste females. The
number of dalit girls in India who attended school doubled in the same
period, but still few percent less than national average. Other poor
caste groups as well as ethnic groups such as Muslims in India have also
made improvements over the 16-year period, but their improvement lagged
behind that of dalits and adivasis. The net percentage school
attainment for Dalits and Muslims were statistically the same in 1999.
A 2007 nationwide survey of India by the
World Bank
found that over 80 percent of children of historically discriminated
castes were attending schools. The fastest increase in school attendance
by Dalit community children occurred during the recent periods of
India's economic growth.
A study by Darshan Singh presents data on health and other
indicators of socio-economic change in India's historically
discriminated castes. He claims:
- In 2001, the literacy rates in India's lowest castes was 55 percent, compared to a national average of 63 percent.
- The childhood vaccination levels in India's lowest castes was 40 percent in 2001, compared to a national average of 44 percent.
- Access to drinking water within household or near the household in
India's lowest castes was 80 percent in 2001, compared to a national
average of 83 percent.
- The poverty level in India's lowest castes dropped from 49 percent
to 39 percent between 1995 and 2005, compared to a national average
change from 35 to 27 percent.
The life expectancy of various caste groups in modern India has been raised; but the
International Institute for Population Sciences report suggests that poverty, not caste, is the bigger differentiation in life expectancy in modern India.
Influence on other religions
While identified with Hinduism, caste systems are found in other
religions on the Indian subcontinent, including other religions such as
Buddhists, Christians and Muslims.
Christians
Social stratification is found among the Christians in India based on
caste as well as by their denomination and location. The caste
distinction is based on their caste at the time that they or their
ancestors converted to Christianity since the 16th century, they
typically do not intermarry, and sit separately during prayers in
Church.
Duncan Forrester
observes that "Nowhere else in India is there a large and ancient
Christian community which has in time immemorial been accorded a high
status in the caste hierarchy. ... Syrian Christian community operates
very much as a caste and is properly regarded as a caste or at least a
very caste-like group." Amidst the Hindu society, the
Saint Thomas Christians
of Kerala had inserted themselves within the Indian caste society by
the observance of caste rules and were regarded by the Hindus as a caste
occupying a high place within their caste hierarchy. Their traditional belief that their ancestors were high-caste Hindus such as
Nambudiris and
Nairs, who were
evangelised by
St. Thomas, has also supported their upper-caste status.
With the arrival of European missionaries and their evangelistic
mission among the lower castes in Kerala, two new groups of Christians,
called
Latin Rite
Christians and New Protestant Christians, were formed but they
continued to be considered as lower castes by higher ranked communities,
including the Saint Thomas Christians.
Muslims
Caste system has been observed among Muslims in India. They practice
endogamy,
hypergamy, hereditary occupations, avoid social mixing and have been stratified. There is some controversy if these characteristics make them social groups or castes of Islam.
Indian Muslims are a mix of
Sunni (majority),
Shia
and other sects of Islam. From the earliest days of Islam's arrival in
South Asia, the Arabic, Persian and Afghan Muslims have been part of the
upper, noble caste. Some upper caste Hindus converted to Islam and
became part of the governing group of Sultanates and
Mughal Empire, who along with Arabs, Persians and Afghans came to be known as Ashrafs (or nobles). Below them are the middle caste Muslims called
Ajlafs, and the lowest status is those of the
Arzals. Anti-caste activists like Ambedkar called the
Arzal caste among Muslims as the equivalent of Hindu untouchables, as did the controversial colonial British ethnographer Herbert Hope Risley.
In
Bengal, some Muslims refer to the social stratification within their society as
qaum (or Quoms),
a term that is found among Muslims elsewhere in India, as well as in
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Qaums have patrilineal hereditary, with ranked
occupations and endogamy. Membership in a qaum is inherited by birth. Barth identifies the origin of the stratification from the historical segregation between
pak (pure) and
paleed (impure) - - defined by the family's social or religious status, occupation and involvement in sexual crimes. Originally,
Paleed/Paleet qaum included people running or working at brothels, prostitution service providers or professional courtesan/dancers (
Tawaif)
and musicians. There is history of skin color defining Pak/Paleed, but
that does not have historical roots, and was adopted by outsiders using
analogy from Hindu Caste system.
Similarly, Christians in Pakistan are called "
Isai", meaning followers of Isa (
Jesus).
But the term originates from Hindu Caste system and refers to the
demeaning jobs performed by Christians in Pakistan out of poverty.
Efforts are being made to replace the term with "Masihi" (Messiah),
which is preferred by the Christians citizens of Pakistan.
Endogamy is very common in Muslims in the form of arranged consanguineous marriages among Muslims in India and Pakistan.
Malik states that the lack of religious sanction makes qaum a
quasi-caste, and something that is found in Islam outside South Asia.
Some assert that the Muslim castes are not as acute in their discrimination as those of the Hindus, while critics of Islam assert that the discrimination in South Asian Muslim society is worse.
Sikh
Although the
Sikh Gurus criticised the hierarchy of the caste system, one does exist in
Sikh
community. According to Sunrinder S, Jodhka, the Sikh religion does not
advocate discrimination against any caste or creed, however, in
practice, Sikhs belonging to the landowning dominant castes have not
shed all their prejudices against the Dalits. While Dalits would be
allowed entry into the village gurudwaras they would not be permitted to
cook or serve langar (the communal meal). Therefore, wherever they
could mobilise resources, the Dalits of Punjab have tried to construct
their own gurudwara and other local level institutions in order to
attain a certain degree of cultural autonomy.
In 1953, the Government of India acceded to the demands of the Sikh leader,
Tara Singh, to include Sikh castes of the converted untouchables in the list of scheduled castes. In the
Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, 20 of the 140 seats are reserved for low-caste Sikhs.
The Sikh literature from the Islamic rule and British colonial era mention Varna as Varan, and Jati as Zat or Zat-biradari. Eleanor Nesbitt, a professor of Religion and author of books on Sikhism, states that the Varan is described as a class system, while Zat has some caste system features in Sikh literature.
In theory, Nesbitt states Sikh literature does not recognise caste
hierarchy or differences. In practice, states Nesbitt, widespread
endogamy practice among Sikhs has been prevalent in modern times, and
poorer Sikhs of disadvantaged castes continue to gather in their own
places of worship. Most Sikh families, writes Nesbitt, continue to check
the caste of any prospective marriage partner for their children. She
notes that all Gurus of Sikhs married within their Zat, and they did not condemn or break with the convention of endogamous marriages for their own children or Sikhs in general.
Jains
Caste system in
Jainism
has existed for centuries, primarily in terms of endogamy, although,
per Paul Dundas, in modern times the system does not play a significant
role. This is contradicted by Carrithers and Humphreys who describe the major Jain castes in
Rajasthan with their social rank.
Table 1. Distribution of Population by Religion and Caste Categories
| Hinduism |
22.2% |
9% |
42.8% |
26%
|
| Islam |
0.8% |
0.5% |
39.2% |
59.5%
|
| Christianity |
9.0% |
32.8% |
24.8% |
33.3%
|
| Sikhism |
30.7% |
0.9% |
22.4% |
46.1%
|
| Jainism |
0.0% |
2.6% |
3.0% |
94.3%
|
| Buddhism |
89.5% |
7.4% |
0.4% |
2.7%
|
| Zoroastrianism |
0.0% |
15.9% |
13.7% |
70.4%
|
| Others |
2.6% |
82.5% |
6.25 |
8.7%
|
| Total |
19.7% |
8.5% |
41.1% |
30.8%
|
Distribution
Table 1 is the distribution of population of each Religion by Caste
Categories, obtained from merged sample of Schedule 1 and Schedule 10 of
available data from the
National Sample Survey Organisation 55th (1999–2000) and 61st Rounds (2004–05) Round Survey The
Other Backward Class (OBCs) were found to comprise 52% of the country's population by the
Mandal Commission report of 1980, a figure which had shrunk to 41% by 2006 when the National Sample Survey Organisation's survey took place.
Criticism
There has been criticism of the caste system from both within and outside of India. Since the 1980s, caste has become a major issue in the
politics of India.
Indian social reformers
The caste system has been criticised by many Indian social reformers.
Basava
Basava (1105–1167) Arguably one of the first social reformers,
Basava championed devotional worship that rejected temple worship and
rituals, and replaced it with personalised direct worship of Shiva
through practices such as individually worn icons and symbols like a
small linga. This approach brought Shiva's presence to everyone and at
all times, without gender, class or caste discrimination. His teachings
and verses such as Káyakavé Kailása (Work is the path to Kailash (bliss,
heaven), or Work is Worship) became popular.
Jyotirao Phule
Jyotirao Phule (1827–1890) vehemently criticised any explanations that the caste system was natural and ordained by the
Creator in Hindu texts. If
Brahma
wanted castes, argued Phule, he would have ordained the same for other
creatures. There are no castes in species of animals or birds, so why
should there be one among human animals. In his criticism Phule added,
"Brahmins cannot claim superior status because of caste, because they
hardly bothered with these when wining and dining with Europeans."
Professions did not make castes, and castes did not decide one's
profession. If someone does a job that is dirty, it does not make them
inferior; in the same way that no mother is inferior because she cleans
the excreta of her baby. Ritual occupation or tasks, argued Phule, do
not make any human being superior or inferior.
Vivekananda
Vivekananda
similarly criticised caste as one of the many human institutions that
bars the power of free thought and action of an individual. Caste or no
caste, creed or no creed, any man, or class, or caste, or nation, or
institution that bars the power of free thought and bars action of an
individual is devilish, and must go down. Liberty of thought and action,
asserted Vivekananda, is the only condition of life, of growth
and of well-being.
Gandhi
In his younger years,
Gandhi
disagreed with some of Ambedkar's observations, rationale and
interpretations about the caste system in India. "Caste," he claimed,
has "saved Hinduism from disintegration. But like every other
institution it has suffered from excrescences." He considered the four
divisions of Varnas to be fundamental, natural and essential. The
innumerable subcastes or Jatis he considered to be a hindrance. He
advocated to fuse all the Jatis into a more global division of Varnas.
In the 1930s, Gandhi began to advocate for the idea of heredity in caste
to be rejected, arguing that "Assumption of superiority by any person
over any other is a sin against God and man. Thus caste, in so far as it
connotes distinctions in status, is an evil."
He claimed that
Varnashrama of the
shastras is today nonexistent in practice. The present caste system is theory antithesis of
varnashrama.
Caste in its current form, claimed Gandhi, had nothing to do with
religion. The discrimination and trauma of castes, argued Gandhi, was
the result of custom, the origin of which is unknown. Gandhi said that
the customs' origin was a moot point, because one could spiritually
sense that these customs were wrong, and that any caste system is
harmful to the spiritual well-being of man and economic well-being of a
nation. The reality of colonial India was, Gandhi noted, that there was
no significant disparity between the economic condition and earnings of
members of different castes, whether it was a Brahmin or an artisan or a
farmer of low caste. India was poor, and Indians of all castes were
poor. Thus, he argued that the cause of trauma was not in the caste
system, but elsewhere. Judged by the standards being applied to India,
Gandhi claimed, every human society would fail. He acknowledged that the
caste system in India spiritually blinded some Indians, then added that
this did not mean that every Indian or even most Indians blindly
followed the caste system, or everything from ancient Indian scriptures
of doubtful authenticity and value. India, like any other society,
cannot be judged by a caricature of its worst specimens. Gandhi stated
that one must consider the best it produced as well, along with the vast
majority in impoverished Indian villages struggling to make ends meet,
with woes of which there was little knowledge.
B. R. Ambedkar
A
1922 stereograph of Hindu children of high caste, Bombay. This was part
of Underwood & Underwood stereoscope journey of colonial world.
This and related collections became controversial for staging extreme
effects and constructing identities of various colonised nations.
Christopher Pinney remarks such imaging was a part of surveillance and
imposed identities upon Indians that were resented.
B. R. Ambedkar
was born in a caste that was classified as untouchable, became a leader
of human rights campaigns in India, a prolific writer, and a key person
in drafting modern India's constitution in the 1940s. He wrote
extensively on discrimination, trauma and what he saw as the tragic
effects of the caste system in India.
He believed that the caste system originated in the practise of
endogamy and that it spread through imitation by other groups. He wrote
that initially, Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras existed as
classes whose choice of occupation was not restricted by birth and in
which exogamy was prevalent. Brahmins then began to practise endogamy
and enclosed themselves, hence Ambedkar defines caste as "enclosed
class". He believed that traditions such as sati, enforced widowhood and
child marriage developed from the need to reinforce endogamy and
Shastras were used to glorify these practices so that they are observed
without being questioned. Later, other caste groups imitated these
customs. However, although Ambedkar uses the approach of psychologist
Gabriel Tarde to indicate how the caste system spread, he also explains
that Brahmins or Manu cannot be blamed for the origin of the caste
system and he discredits theories which trace the origin of caste system
in races.
Caste politics
Economic inequality
Economic inequality seems to be related to the influence of inherited social-economic stratification.
A 1995 study notes that the caste system in India is a system of
exploitation of poor low-ranking groups by more prosperous high-ranking
groups.
A report published in 2001 note that in India 36.3% of people own no
land at all, 60.6% own about 15% of the land, with a very wealthy 3.1%
owning 15% of the land.
A study by Haque reports that India contains both the largest number of
rural poor, and the largest number of landless households on the
planet. Haque also reports that over 90 percent of both scheduled castes
(low-ranking groups) and all other castes (high-ranking groups) either
do not own land or own land area capable of producing less than $1000
per year of food and income per household. However, over 99 percent of
India's farms are less than 10 hectares, and 99.9 percent of the farms
are less than 20 hectares, regardless of the farmer or landowner's
caste. Indian government has, in addition, vigorously pursued
agricultural land ceiling laws which prohibit anyone from owning land
greater than mandated limits. India has used this law to forcibly
acquire land from some, then redistribute tens of millions of acres to
the landless and poor of the low-caste. Haque suggests that Indian
lawmakers need to reform and modernise the nation's land laws and rely
less on blind adherence to land ceilings and tenancy reform.
In a 2011 study, Aiyar too notes that such qualitative theories of
economic exploitation and consequent land redistribution within India
between 1950 and 1990 had no effect on the quality of life and poverty
reduction. Instead, economic reforms since the 1990s and resultant
opportunities for non-agricultural jobs have reduced poverty and
increased per capita income for all segments of Indian society. For specific evidence, Aiyar mentions the following
Critics
believe that the economic liberalisation has benefited just a small
elite and left behind the poor, especially the lowest Hindu caste of
dalits. But a recent authoritative survey revealed striking improvements
in living standards of dalits in the last two decades. Television
ownership was up from zero to 45 percent; cellphone ownership up from
zero to 36 percent; two-wheeler ownership (of motorcycles, scooters,
mopeds) up from zero to 12.3 percent; children eating yesterday's
leftovers down from 95.9 percent to 16.2 percent ... Dalits running
their own businesses up from 6 percent to 37 percent; and proportion
working as agricultural labourers down from 46.1 percent to 20.5
percent.
Cassan has studied the differential effect within two segments of
India's Dalit community. He finds India's overall economic growth has
produced the fastest and more significant socio-economic changes. Cassan
further concludes that legal and social program initiatives are no
longer India's primary constraint in further advancement of India's
historically discriminated castes; further advancement are likely to
come from improvements in the supply of quality schools in rural and
urban India, along with India's economic growth.
Apartheid and discrimination
The maltreatment of Dalits in India has been described by some authors as "India's hidden apartheid".
Critics of the accusations point to substantial improvements in the
position of Dalits in post-independence India, consequent to the strict
implementation of the rights and privileges enshrined in the
Constitution of India, as implemented by the Protection of Civil rights
Act, 1955. They also argue that the practise had disappeared in urban public life.
Sociologists Kevin Reilly, Stephen Kaufman and Angela Bodino,
while critical of caste system, conclude that modern India does not
practice
apartheid since there is no state-sanctioned discrimination.
They write that casteism in India is presently "not apartheid. In fact,
untouchables, as well as tribal people and members of the lowest castes
in India benefit from broad affirmative action programmes and are
enjoying greater political power."
A hypothesis that caste amounts to race has been rejected by some scholars. Ambedkar, for example, wrote that "The
Brahmin of Punjab is racially of the same stock as the
Chamar
of Punjab. The Caste system does not demarcate racial division. The
Caste system is a social division of people of the same race." Various
sociologists, anthropologists and historians have rejected the racial
origins and racial emphasis of caste and consider the idea to be one
that has purely political and economic undertones. Beteille writes that
"the Scheduled Castes of India taken together are no more a race than
are the Brahmins taken together. Every social group cannot be regarded
as a race simply because we want to protect it against prejudice and
discrimination", and that the 2001 Durban conference on racism hosted by
the U.N. is "turning its back on established scientific opinion".
In popular culture
Mulk Raj Anand's debut novel,
Untouchable (1935), is based on the theme of untouchability. The Hindi film
Achhut Kannya (Untouchable Maiden, 1936), starring
Ashok Kumar and
Devika Rani, was an early reformist film. The debut novel of
Arundhati Roy,
The God of Small Things
(1997), also has themes surrounding the caste system across religions. A
lawyer named Sabu Thomas filed a petition to have the book published
without the last chapter, which had graphic description of sexual acts
between members of different castes. Thomas claimed the alleged obscenity in the last chapter deeply hurts the Syrian Christian community, the basis of the novel.
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