Impeachment is the process by which a legislative body
levels charges against a government official. Impeachment does not in
itself remove the official definitively from office; it is similar to an
indictment in criminal law,
and thus it is essentially the statement of charges against the
official. Whereas in some countries the individual is provisionally
removed, in others they can remain in office during the trial. Once an
individual is impeached, they must then face the possibility of
conviction on the charges by a legislative vote, which is separate from
the impeachment, but flows from it, and a judgment which convicts the
official on the articles of impeachment entails the official's
definitive removal from office.
Because impeachment and conviction of officials involve an
overturning of the normal constitutional procedures by which individuals
achieve high office (election, ratification, or appointment) and
because it generally requires a supermajority,
they are usually reserved for those deemed to have committed serious
abuses of their office. In the United States, for example, impeachment
at the federal level is limited to those who may have committed "Treason, Bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors".
Impeachment exists under constitutional law in many countries
around the world, including Brazil, France, India, Ireland, the
Philippines, Russia, South Korea, and the United States.
Etymology and history
The word "impeachment" derives from Old French empeechier from Latin word impedīre expressing the idea of catching or ensnaring by the 'foot' (pes, pedis), and has analogues in the modern French verb empêcher (to prevent) and the modern Englishimpede. Medieval popular etymology also associated it (wrongly) with derivations from the Latin impetere (to attack).
Beyond ancient Greek and Roman political systems, impeachment was first used in England.[citation needed] Specifically, the process was first used by the English "Good Parliament" against Baron Latimer
in the second half of the 14th century. Following the British example,
the constitutions of Virginia (1776), Massachusetts (1780) and other
states thereafter adopted the impeachment mechanism, but they restricted
the punishment to removal of the official from office.
In various jurisdictions
Austria
The Austrian Federal President can be impeached by the Federal Assembly (Bundesversammlung) before the Constitutional Court. The constitution also provides for the recall of the president by a referendum.
Neither of these courses has ever been taken. This is likely because
while the President is vested with considerable powers on paper, they
act as a largely ceremonial figurehead in practice, and are thus hardly
in a position to abuse their powers.
Brazil
The President of the Federative Republic of Brazil may be impeached by the Chamber of Deputies and tried and removed from office by the Federal Senate. The Brazilian Constitution
requires that two-thirds of the Deputies vote in favor of the
impeachment of the President and two-thirds of the Senators vote for
conviction in the subsequent trial for removal from office. State
governors and municipal mayors can also be impeached, tried and removed
by the respective legislative bodies. Upon conviction, the officeholder
has their political rights revoked for eight years — which bars them
from running for any office during that time.
Fernando Collor de Mello,
the 32nd President of Brazil, resigned in 1992 amidst impeachment
proceedings. Despite his resignation, the Senate nonetheless voted to
convict him and bar him from holding any office for eight years, due to
evidence of bribery and misappropriation.
In 2016, the Chamber of Deputies initiated an impeachment case against President Dilma Rousseff on allegations of budgetary mismanagement.
Following her impeachment by the Chamber of Deputies and her conviction
by trial in the Senate, she was definitively replaced by Vice President
Michel Temer, who had served as acting president while Rousseff's case was pending in the Senate.
Bulgaria
The President of Bulgaria can be removed only for high treason or violation of the constitution. The process is started by a two-thirds majority vote of the Parliament
to impeach the President, whereupon the Constitutional Court decides
whether the President is guilty of the crime of which he is charged. If
he is found guilty, he is removed from power. No Bulgarian President has
ever been impeached. The same procedure can be used to remove the Vice President of Bulgaria, which has also never happened.
Croatia
The process of impeaching the President of Croatia can be initiated by a two-thirds majority vote in favor in the Sabor and is thereafter referred to the Constitutional Court,
which must accept such a proposal with a two-thirds majority vote in
favor in order for the president to be removed from office. This has
never occurred in the history of the Republic of Croatia.
In case of a successful impeachment motion a president's constitutional
term of five years would be terminated and an election called within 60
days of the vacancy occurring. During the period of vacancy the
presidential powers and duties would be carried out by the Speaker of the Croatian Parliament in his/her capacity as Acting President of the Republic.
Czech Republic
Prior to 2013 the President of the Czech Republic could be impeached only for an act of high treason (which is not defined in the Constitution of the Czech Republic itself). The process has to start in the Senate of the Czech Republic which only has the right to impeach the president, this passes the case to the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic
which has to decide whether the President is guilty or not. If the
Court decides that the President is guilty then the President loses his
office and the ability to be elected President of the Czech Republic
ever again. No Czech president has ever been impeached, though members of the Senate sought to impeach President Vaclav Klaus in 2013. This case was dismissed by the court reasoning that his mandate has expired.
In 2013 the constitution changed; now the process can be started
by at least three-fifths of present senators and must be approved by at
least
three-fifths of all members of Parliament. Also, the President can be
impeached not only for high treason (newly defined in the Constitution) but also for a serious infringement of the Constitution.
France
The President of France can be impeached by the French Parliament
for willfully violating the Constitution or the national laws. The
process of impeachment is written in the 68th article of the French Constitution. A group of senators or a group of members of the National Assembly can begin the process. Then, Both the French National Assembly and the French Senate
have to acknowledge the impeachment. After the upper house and the
lower house's agreement, both the two houses unite to form the High Court. Finally, the High Court must decide to declare the impeachment of the President of France or not.
Germany
The Federal President of Germany can be impeached both by the Bundestag and by the Bundesrat for willfully violating federal law. Once the Bundestag or the Bundesrat impeaches the president, the Federal Constitutional Court
decides whether the President is guilty as charged and, if this is the
case, whether to remove him or her from office. The Federal
Constitutional Court also has the power to remove federal judges from
office for willfully violating core principles of the federal constitution or a state constitution. The impeachment procedure is regulated in Article 61 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.
There is no formal impeachment process for the Chancellor of Germany, however the Bundestag can replace the chancellor at any time by voting for a new chancellor (constructive vote of no confidence, Article 67 of the Basic Law).
There has never been an impeachment against the President so far.
Constructive votes of no confidence against the Chancellor occurred in
1972 and 1982, with only the second one being successful.
Hong Kong
The Chief Executive of Hong Kong can be impeached by the Legislative Council.
A motion for investigation, initiated jointly by at least one-fourth of
all the legislators charging the Chief Executive with "serious breach
of law or dereliction of duty" and refusing to resign, shall first be
passed by the Council. An independent investigation committee, chaired
by the Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal,
will then carry out the investigation and report back to the Council.
If the Council find the evidence sufficient to substantiate the charges,
it may pass a motion of impeachment by a two-thirds majority.
However, the Legislative Council does not have the power actually
to remove the Chief Executive from office, as the Chief Executive is
appointed by the Central People's Government (State Council of China). The Council can only report the result to the Central People's Government for its decision.
Hungary
Article 13 of Hungary's Fundamental Law (constitution) provides for the process of impeaching and removing the President.
The President enjoys immunity from criminal prosecution while in
office, but may be charged with crimes committed during his term
afterwards. Should the President violate the constitution while
discharging his duties or commit a willful criminal offense, he may be
removed from office. Removal proceedings may be proposed by the
concurring recommendation of one-fifth of the 199 members of the
country's unicameral Parliament. Parliament votes on the proposal by
secret ballot, and if two-thirds of all representatives agree, the
President is impeached. Once impeached, the President's powers are
suspended, and the Constitutional Court decides whether or not the
President should be removed from office.
Iceland
The constitution of Iceland does not provide a process to impeach the President of Iceland. The President can be removed from office by a three-fourths majority in Parliament
and a subsequent majority in a referendum. Cabinet ministers can be
impeached by Parliament and their cases are adjudicated by the National Court.
Since cabinet ministers can only be relieved of duty by the President, a
guilty verdict can only result in a fine or imprisonment.
India
The president and judges, including the chief justice of the supreme court and high courts, can be impeached by the parliament
before the expiry of the term for violation of the Constitution. Other
than impeachment, no other penalty can be given to a president in
position for the violation of the Constitution under Article 361 of the constitution. However a president after his term/removal can be punished for his already proven unlawful activity under disrespecting the constitution, etc.
No president has faced impeachment proceedings. Hence, the provisions
for impeachment have never been tested. The sitting president cannot be
charged and needs to step down in order for that to happen.
Cabinet ministers can be impeached by the members of the Assembly. Presidential appointment of a new minister is subject to a parliamentary vote of confidence.
Impeachment of ministers has been a fairly commonly used tactic in the
power struggle between the president and the assembly during the last
several governments.
Ireland
In the Republic of Ireland formal impeachment only applies to the Irish president. Article 12 of the Irish Constitution provides that, unless judged to be "permanently incapacitated" by the Supreme Court, the president can only be removed from office by the houses of the Oireachtas
(parliament) and only for the commission of "stated misbehaviour".
Either house of the Oireachtas may impeach the president, but only by a
resolution approved by a majority of at least two-thirds of its total
number of members; and a house may not consider a proposal for
impeachment unless requested to do so by at least thirty of its number.
Where one house impeaches the president, the remaining house
either investigates the charge or commissions another body or committee
to do so. The investigating house can remove the president if it
decides, by at least a two-thirds majority of its members, both that the
president is guilty of the charge, and that the charge is sufficiently
serious as to warrant the president's removal. To date no impeachment of
an Irish president has ever taken place. The president holds a largely
ceremonial office, the dignity of which is considered important, so it
is likely that a president would resign from office long before
undergoing formal conviction or impeachment.
The Republic's Constitution and law also provide that only a
joint resolution of both houses of the Oireachtas may remove a judge.
Although often referred to as the "impeachment" of a judge, this
procedure does not technically involve impeachment.
Italy
In
Italy, according to Article 90 of the Constitution, the President of
the Republic can be impeached through a majority vote of the Parliament
in joint session for high treason and for attempting to overthrow the
Constitution. If impeached, the President of the Republic is then tried
by the Constitutional Court integrated with sixteen citizens older than
forty chosen by lot from a list compiled by the Parliament every nine
years.
Italian press and political forces made use of the term
"impeachment" for the attempt by some members of parliamentary
opposition to initiate the procedure provided for in Article 90 against
Presidents Francesco Cossiga (1991), Giorgio Napolitano (2014) and Sergio Mattarella (2018).
Liechtenstein
Members
of the Liechtenstein Government can be impeached before the State Court
for breaches of the Constitution or of other laws. As a hereditary monarchy the Sovereign Prince can not be impeached as he "is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts and does not have legal responsibility". The same is true of any member of the Princely House who exercises the function of head of state should the Prince be temporarily prevented or in preparation for the Succession.
Lithuania
In the Republic of Lithuania, the President may be impeached by a three-fifths majority in the Seimas. President Rolandas Paksas was removed from office by impeachment on April 6, 2004 after the Constitutional Court of Lithuania found him guilty of having violated his oath and the constitution. He was the first European head of state to have been impeached.
Norway
Members of government, representatives of the national assembly
(Stortinget) and Supreme Court judges can be impeached for criminal
offenses tied to their duties and committed in office, according to the
Constitution of 1814, §§ 86 and 87. The procedural rules were modeled
after the US rules and are quite similar to them. Impeachment has been
used eight times since 1814, last in 1927. Many argue that impeachment
has fallen into desuetude. In cases of impeachment, an appointed court (Riksrett) takes effect.
Pakistan
The country's ruling coalition said on August 7, 2008, that it would seek the impeachment of PresidentPervez Musharraf,
alleging the U.S.-backed former general had "eroded the trust of the
nation" and increasing pressure on him to resign. He resigned on August
18, 2008. Another kind of impeachment in Pakistan is known as the vote
of less-confidence or vote of mis-understanding and has been practiced
by provincial assemblies to weaken the national assembly.
Impeaching a president requires a two-thirds majority support of lawmakers in a joint session of both houses of Parliament.
A main difference from US proceedings however is that only one
third of House members are required to approve the motion to impeach the
President (as opposed to a simple majority of those present and voting
in their US counterpart). In the Senate, selected members of the House
of Representatives act as the prosecutors and the Senators act as judges
with the Senate President presiding over the proceedings (the Chief
Justice jointly presides with the Senate President if the President is
on trial). Like the United States, to convict the official in question
requires that a minimum of two thirds (i.e. 16 of 24 members) of all the
Members of the Senate vote in favor of conviction. If an impeachment
attempt is unsuccessful or the official is acquitted, no new cases can
be filed against that impeachable official for at least one full year.
Impeachable offenses and officials
The 1987 Philippine Constitution says the grounds for impeachment include culpable violation of the Constitution, bribery, graft
and corruption, and betrayal of public trust. These offenses are
considered "high crimes and misdemeanors" under the Philippine
Constitution.
The President, Vice President, Supreme Court justices, and
members of the Constitutional Commission and Ombudsman are all
considered impeachable officials under the Constitution.
Impeachment proceedings and attempts
President Joseph Estrada was the first official impeached
by the House in 2000, but the trial ended prematurely due to outrage
over a vote to open an envelope where that motion was narrowly defeated
by his allies. Estrada was deposed days later during the 2001 EDSA Revolution.
In 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008, impeachment complaints were filed against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, but none of the cases reached the required endorsement of 1⁄3 of the members for transmittal to, and trial by, the Senate.
In March 2011, the House of Representatives impeachedOmbudsmanMerceditas Gutierrez,
becoming the second person to be impeached. In April, Gutierrez
resigned prior to the Senate's convening as an impeachment court.
To date, three officials had been successfully impeached by the
House of Representatives, and two were not convicted. The latter, Chief Justice Renato C. Corona,
was convicted on May 29, 2012 by the Senate under Article II of the
Articles of Impeachment (for betraying public trust), with 20–3 votes
from the Senator Judges.
In
Polish law there is no impeachment procedure defined, as it is present
in the other countries. Infringements of the law can be investigated
only by special Parliament's Committee or (if accusations involve people
holding the highest offices of state) by the State Tribunal. The State Tribunal is empowered to rule for the removal of individuals from public office but it is not a common practice.
Romania
The President can be impeached by Parliament
and is then suspended. A referendum then follows to determine whether
the suspended President should be removed from office. President Traian Băsescu was impeached twice by the Parliament: in 2007 and more recently in July 2012. A referendum was held
on May 19, 2007 and a large majority of the electorate voted against
removing the president from office. For the most recent suspension a referendum was held on July 29, 2012; the results were heavily against the president, but the referendum was invalidated due to low turnout.
Russia
The President of Russia can be impeached if both the State Duma (which initiates the impeachment process through the formation of a special investigation committee) and the Federation Council of Russia vote by a two-thirds majority in favor of impeachment and, additionally, the Supreme Court finds the President guilty of treason or a similarly heavy crime against the nation and the Constitutional Court
confirms that the constitutional procedure of the impeachment process
was correctly observed. In 1995–1999, the Duma made several attempts to
impeach then-President Boris Yeltsin, but they never had a sufficient number of votes for the process to reach the Federation Council.
Singapore
The Constitution of Singapore allows the impeachment of a sitting President
on charges of treason, violation of the Constitution, corruption, or
attempting to mislead the Presidential Elections Committee for the
purpose of demonstrating eligibility to be elected as President. The Prime Minister or at least one-quarter of all Members of Parliament
(MPs) can pass an impeachment motion, which can only succeed if at
least half of all MPs (excluding nominated Members) vote in favor,
whereupon the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
will appoint a tribunal to investigate allegations against the
President. If the tribunal finds the President guilty, or otherwise
declares that the President is "permanently incapable of discharging the
functions of his office by reason of mental or physical infirmity",
Parliament will hold a vote on a resolution to remove the President from
office, which requires a three-quarters majority to succeed. No President has ever been removed from office in this fashion.
South Korea (Republic of Korea)
According to the Article 65 Clause 1 of Constitution of South Korea,
if President, Prime Minister, or other state council members including
Supreme Court and Constitutional court members, violate the Constitution
or other laws of official duty, the National Assembly can impeach them.
Clause 2 states the impeachment bill may be proposed by one third or
more of the total members of the National Assembly, and shall require
majority voting and approved by two thirds or more of the total members
of the National Assembly. This article also states that any person
against whom a motion for impeachment has been passed shall be suspended
from exercising his power until the impeachment has been adjudicated
and shall not extend further than removal from public office. Provided,
That it shall not exempt the person impeached from civil or criminal
liability.
Two presidents have been impeached since the foundation of the Sixth Republic of Korea and adoption of the new Constitution of South Korea in 1987. Roh Moo-hyun in 2004 was impeached by the National Assembly but was overturned by the Constitutional Court. Park Geun-hye
in 2016 was impeached by the National Assembly, and the impeachment was
confirmed by the Constitutional Court on March 10, 2017.
Taiwan
In Taiwan, according to the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China, impeachment of the president or the vice president by the Legislative Yuan
shall be initiated upon the proposal of more than one-half of the total
members of the Legislative Yuan and passed by more than two-thirds of
the total members of the Legislative Yuan, whereupon it shall be
presented to the grand justices of the Judicial Yuan for adjudication.
Turkey
In Turkey, according to the Constitution, the Grand National Assembly may initiate an investigation of the President, the Vice President or any member of the Cabinet
upon the proposal of simple majority of its total members, and within a
period less than a month, the approval of three-fifth of the total
members. The investigation would be carried out by a commission of fifteen members of the Assembly,
each nominated by the political parties in proportion to their
representation therein. The Commission would submit its report
indicating the outcome of the investigation to the Speaker
within two months. If the investigation is not completed within this
period, the Commission's time renewed for another month. Within ten days
of its submission to the Speaker, the report would be distributed to
all members of the Assembly,
and ten days after its distribution, the report would be discussed on
the floor. Upon the approval of two thirds of the total number of the Assembly by secret vote, the person or persons, about whom the investigation was conducted, may be tried before the Constitutional Court. The trial would be finalized within three months, and if not, a one-time additional period of three months shall be granted.
The President, about whom an investigation has been initiated, may not call for an election. The President, who is convicted by the Court, would be removed from office.
The provision of this article shall also apply to the offenses
for which the President allegedly worked during his term of office.
Ukraine
During
the crisis which started in November 2013, the increasing political
stress of the face-down between the protestors occupying Independence
Square in Kiev and the State Security forces under the control of President Yanukovych
led to deadly armed force being used on the protestors. Following the
negotiated return of Kiev's City Hall on February 16, 2014, occupied by
the protesters since November 2013, the security forces thought they
could also retake "Maidan", Independence Square. The ensuing fighting
from 17 through 21 February 2014 resulted in a considerable number of
deaths and a more generalised alienation of the population, and the
withdrawal of President Yanukovych to his support area in the East of
Ukraine.
In the wake of the President's departure, Parliament convened on
February 22; it reinstated the 2004 Constitution, which reduced
Presidential authority, and voted impeachment of President Yanukovych as
de facto
recognition of his departure from office as President of an integrated
Ukraine. The President riposted that Parliament's acts were illegal as
they could pass into law only by Presidential signature.
United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, in principle anybody may be prosecuted and tried by the two Houses of Parliament for any crime. The first recorded impeachment is that of William Latimer, 4th Baron Latimer during the Good Parliament of 1376. The last was that of Henry Dundas, 1st Viscount Melville in 1806. Over the centuries, the procedure has been supplemented by other forms of oversight including select committees, confidence motions, and judicial review, while the privilege of peers to trial only in the House of Lords was abolished in 1948,
and thus impeachment, which has not kept up with modern norms of
democracy or procedural fairness, is generally considered obsolete.
Article One of the United States Constitution gives the House of Representatives the sole power of impeachment and the Senate the sole power to try impeachments of officers of the U.S. federal government. (Various state
constitutions include similar measures, allowing the state legislature
to impeach the governor or other officials of the state government.) In
contrast to the British system, in the United States impeachment is only
the first of two stages, and conviction during the second stage
requires "the concurrence of two thirds of the members present". Impeachment does not necessarily result in removal from office; it is only a legal statement of charges, parallel to an indictment in criminal law.
An official who is impeached faces a second legislative vote (whether
by the same body or another), which determines conviction, or failure to
convict, on the charges embodied by the impeachment. Most constitutions
require a supermajority
to convict. Although the subject of the charge is criminal action, it
does not constitute a criminal trial; the only question under
consideration is the removal of the individual from office, and the
possibilities of a subsequent vote preventing the removed official from
ever again holding political office in the jurisdiction where he or she
was removed.
Impeachment with respect to political office should not be confused with witness impeachment.
The House of Representatives
has initiated impeachment proceedings only 64 times since 1789, only 19
of these proceedings actually resulting in the House's passing Articles
of Impeachment, and of those, only eight resulted in removal from
office (all federal judges).
Two United States Presidents have been impeached: Andrew Johnson in 1868 and Bill Clinton in 1998; neither was convicted by the Senate. Additionally, there were efforts to impeach John Tyler and Richard Nixon (Nixon resigned before proceedings began).
Deep sea mining is a mineral retrieval process that takes place on the ocean floor. Ocean mining sites are usually around large areas of polymetallic nodules or active and extinct hydrothermal vents at 1,400 to 3,700 metres (4,600 to 12,100 ft) below the ocean’s surface. The vents create globular or massive sulfide deposits, which contain valuable metals such as silver, gold, copper, manganese, cobalt, and zinc.
The deposits are mined using either hydraulic pumps or bucket systems
that take ore to the surface to be processed. As with all mining
operations, deep sea mining raises questions about its potential
environmental impact. Environmental advocacy groups such as Greenpeace
and the Deep sea Mining Campaign
have argued that seabed mining should not be permitted in most of the
world's oceans because of the potential for damage to deepsea ecosystems
and pollution by heavy metal laden plumes.
Brief history
In the 1960s the prospect of deep-sea mining was brought up by the publication of J. L. Mero's Mineral Resources of the Sea. The book claimed that nearly limitless supplies of cobalt, nickel and other
metals could be found throughout the planet's oceans. Mero stated that these metals occurred in deposits of manganese nodules, which appear as lumps of compressed flowers on the seafloor at
depths of about 5,000 m. Some nations including France, Germany and the United States sent out research vessels in search of nodule deposits. One such vessel was the Glomar Explorer.
Initial estimates of deep sea mining viability turned out to be much
exaggerated. This overestimate, coupled with depressed metal prices, led
to the near abandonment of nodule mining by 1982. From the 1960s to
1984 an estimated US $650 million had
been spent on the venture, with little to no return.
Over the past decade a new phase of deep-sea mining has begun. Rising demand for precious metals in Japan, China, Korea and India
has pushed these countries in search of new sources. Interest has
recently shifted toward hydrothermal vents as the source of metals
instead of scattered nodules. The trend of transition towards an
electricity-based information and transportation infrastructure
currently seen in western societies further pushes demands for precious
metals. The current revived interest in phosphorus nodule mining at the
seafloor stems from phosphor-based artificial fertilizers being of
significant importance for world food production. Growing world
population pushes the need for artificial fertilizers or greater
incorporation of organic systems within agricultural infrastructure.
Currently, the best potential deep sea site, the Solwara 1 Project, has been found in the waters off Papua New Guinea, a high grade copper-gold resource and the world's first Seafloor Massive Sulphide (SMS) resource. The Solwara 1 Project is located at 1600 metres water depth in the Bismarck Sea, New Ireland Province. Using ROV (remotely operated underwater vehicles)
technology developed by UK-based Soil Machine Dynamics, Nautilus
Minerals Inc. is first company of its kind to announce plans to begin
full-scale undersea excavation of mineral deposits.
However a dispute with the government of Papua-New Guinea delayed
production and its now scheduled to commence commercial operations in
early 2018.
The world's first "large-scale" mining of hydrothermal vent
mineral deposits was carried out by Japan in August - September, 2017. Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) carried out this operation using the Research Vessel Hakurei. This mining was carried out at the 'Izena hole/cauldron' vent field
within the hydrothermally active back-arc basin known as the Okinawa Trough which contains 15 confirmed vent fields according to the InterRidge Vents Database.
Laws and regulations
The international law–based regulations on deep sea mining are contained in the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea from 1973 to 1982, which came into force in 1994. The convention set up the International Seabed Authority (ISA), which regulates nations’ deep sea mining ventures outside each nations’ Exclusive Economic Zone
(a 200-nautical-mile (370 km) area surrounding coastal nations). The
ISA requires nations interested in mining to explore two equal mining
sites and turn one over to the ISA, along with a transfer of mining
technology over a 10- to 20-year period. This seemed reasonable at the
time because it was widely believed that nodule mining would be
extremely profitable. However, these strict requirements led some
industrialized countries to refuse to sign the initial treaty in 1982.
The US abides by the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act,
which was originally written in 1980. This legislations is largely
recognized as one of the main concerns the US has with ratifying UNCLOS.
Within the EEZ of nation states seabed mining comes under the
jurisdiction of national laws. Despite extensive exploration both
within and outside of EEZs, only a few countries, notably New Zealand,
have established legal and institutional frameworks for the future
development of deep seabed mining.
Papua New Guinea was the first country to approve a permit for
the exploration of minerals in the deep seabed. Solwara 1 was awarded
its licence and environmental permits despite three independent reviews
of the environmental impact statement mine finding significant gaps and
flaws in the underlying science ( see http://www.deepseaminingoutofourdepth.org/report/).
The ISA has recently arranged a workshop in Australia where
scientific experts, industry representatives, legal specialists and
academics worked towards improving existing regulations and ensuring
that development of seabed minerals does not cause serious and permanent
damage to the marine environment.
Resources mined
The
deep sea contains many different resources available for extraction,
including silver, gold, copper, manganese, cobalt, and zinc. These raw
materials are found in various forms on the sea floor.
Minerals and related depths
Type of mineral deposit
Average Depth
Resources found
Polymetallic nodules
4,000 – 6,000 m
Nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese
Manganese crusts
800 – 2,400 m
Mainly cobalt, some vanadium, molybdenum and platinum
Sulfide deposits
1,400 – 3,700 m
Copper, lead and zinc some gold and silver
Diamonds are also mined from the seabed by De Beers and others.
Nautilus Minerals Inc and Neptune Minerals are planning to mine the
offshore waters of Papua New Guinea and New Zealand.
Extraction methods
Recent technological advancements have given rise to the use remotely operated vehicles
(ROVs) to collect mineral samples from prospective mine sites. Using
drills and other cutting tools, the ROVs obtain samples to be analyzed
for precious materials. Once a site has been located, a mining ship or
station is set up to mine the area.
There are two predominant forms of mineral extraction being
considered for full-scale operations: continuous-line bucket system
(CLB) and the hydraulic suction system. The CLB system is the preferred
method of nodule collection. It operates much like a conveyor-belt,
running from the sea floor to the surface of the ocean where a ship or
mining platform extracts the desired minerals, and returns the tailings to the ocean.
Hydraulic suction mining lowers a pipe to the seafloor which transfers
nodules up to the mining ship. Another pipe from the ship to the
seafloor returns the tailings to the area of the mining site.
In recent years, the most promising mining areas have been the
Central and Eastern Manus Basin around Papua New Guinea and the crater
of Conical Seamount to the east. These locations have shown promising
amounts of gold in the area's sulfide deposits (an average of 26 parts per million).
The relatively shallow water depth of 1050 m, along with the close
proximity of a gold processing plant makes for an excellent mining site.
Deep sea mining project value chain can be differentiated using
the criteria of the type of activities where the value is actually
added. During prospecting, exploration and resource assessment phases
the value is added to intangible assets, for the extraction, processing
and distribution phases the value increases with relation to product
processing. There is an intermediate phase – the pilot mining test which
could be considered to be an inevitable step in the shift from
“resources” to “reserves” classification, where the actual value starts.
Exploration phase involves such operations as locating, sea
bottom scanning and sampling using technologies such as echo-sounders,
side scan sonars, deep-towed photography, ROVs, AUVs. The resource
valuation incorporates the examination of data in the context of
potential mining feasibility.
Value chain based on product processing involves such operations
as actual mining (or extraction), vertical transport, storing,
offloading, transport, metallurgical processing for final products.
Unlike the exploration phase, the value increases after each operation
on processed material eventually delivered to the metal market.
Logistics involves technologies analogous to those applied in land
mines. This is also the case for the metallurgical processing, although
rich and polymetallic mineral composition which distinguishes marine
minerals from its land analogs requires special treatment of the
deposit. Environmental monitoring and impact assessment analysis relate
to the temporal and spatial discharges of the mining system if they
occur, sediment plumes, disturbance to the benthic environment and the
analysis of the regions affected by seafloor machines. The step involves
an examination of disturbances near the seafloor, as well as
disturbances near the surface. Observations include baseline comparisons
for the sake of quantitative impact assessments for ensuring the
sustainability of the mining process.
Environmental impacts
Research shows that polymetallic nodule fields are hotspots of abundance and diversity for a highly vulnerable abyssal fauna.
Because deep sea mining is a relatively new field, the complete
consequences of full-scale mining operations on this ecosystem are
unknown. However, some researchers have said they believe that removal
of parts of the sea floor will result in disturbances to the benthic layer, increased toxicity of the water column and sediment plumes from tailings. Removing parts of the sea floor could disturb the habitat of benthic organisms, with unknown long-term effects.
Aside from the direct impact of mining the area, some researchers and
environmental activists have raised concerns about leakage, spills and corrosion that could alter the mining area’s chemical makeup.
Among the impacts of deep sea mining, sediment plumes could have
the greatest impact. Plumes are caused when the tailings from mining
(usually fine particles) are dumped back into the ocean, creating a
cloud of particles floating in the water. Two types of plumes occur:
near bottom plumes and surface plumes. Near bottom plumes occur when the tailings are pumped back down to the mining site. The floating particles increase the turbidity, or cloudiness, of the water, clogging filter-feeding apparatuses used by benthic organisms.
Surface plumes cause a more serious problem. Depending on the size of
the particles and water currents the plumes could spread over vast
areas. The plumes could impact zooplankton and light penetration, in turn affecting the food web of the area.
Controversy
An article in the Harvard Environmental Law Review
in April 2018 argued that "the 'new global gold rush' of deep sea
mining shares many features with past resource scrambles – including a
general disregard for environmental and social impacts, and the
marginalisation of indigenous peoples and their rights".
The Foreshore and Seabed Act (2004) ignited fierce indigenous
opposition in New Zealand, as its claiming of the seabed for the Crown
in order to open it up to mining conflicted with Māori claims to their
customary lands, who protested the Act as a "sea grab." Later, this act
was repealed after an investigation from the UN Commission on Human
Rights upheld charges of discrimination. The Act was subsequently
repealed and replaced with the Marine and Coastal Area Bill (2011). However, conflicts between indigenous sovereignty and seabed mining continue. Organizations like the Deep Sea Mining Campaign
and Alliance of Solwara Warriors, comprising 20 communities in the
Bismarck and Solomon Sea, are examples of organizations that are seeking
to ban seabed mining in Papua New Guinea, where the Solwara 1 project
is set to occur, and in the Pacific. They argue primarily that
decision-making about deep sea mining has not adequately addressed Free
Prior and Informed Consent from affected communities and have not
adhered to the Precautionary Principle,
a rule proposed by the 1982 UN World Charter for Nature which informs
the ISA regulatory framework for mineral exploitation of the deep sea.
Dutch United Nations soldiers, part of United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, monitoring the Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary.
Peacekeeping comprises activities intended to create conditions that favour lasting peace. Research generally finds that peacekeeping reduces civilian and battlefield deaths and reduces the risk of renewed warfare.
Within the United Nations
(UN) group of nation-state governments and organisations, there is a
general understanding that at the international level, peacekeepers
monitor and observe peace processes in post-conflict areas, and may assist ex-combatants in implementing peace agreement
commitments that they have undertaken. Such assistance may come in many
forms, including confidence-building measures, power-sharing
arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law, and economic and social development. Accordingly, the UN peacekeepers (often referred to as Blue Berets or Blue Helmets because of their light blue berets or helmets) can include soldiers, police officers, and civilian personnel.
Under international law, peacekeepers are non-combatants due to their neutral stance in the conflict between two or more belligerent
parties (to the same extent as neutral personnel and properties outside
of peacekeeping duties) and are to be protected from attacks at all
times.
Definitions and types of peacekeeping operations
United Nations peacekeeping missions
Chapter VI and Chapter VII mission types
There are a range of various types of operations encompassed in peacekeeping. In Page Fortna's book Does Peacekeeping Work?, for instance, she distinguishes four different types of peacekeeping operations.
Importantly, these types of missions and how they are conducted are
heavily influenced by the mandate in which they are authorized. Three of
Fortna's four types are consent-based missions, i.e. so-called "Chapter VI" missions, with the fourth being a "Chapter VII"
Mission.
Chapter VI missions are consent based, therefore they require the
consent of the belligerent factions involved in order to operate. Should
they lose that consent, Peacekeepers would be compelled to withdraw.
Chapter VII missions, by contrast, do not require consent, though they
may have it. If consent is lost at any point, Chapter VII missions would
not be required to withdraw.
Observation Missions which consist of small contingents
of military or civilian observers tasked with monitoring cease-fires,
troop withdrawals, or other conditions outlined in a ceasefire
agreement. They are typically unarmed and are primarily tasked with
observing and reporting on what is taking place. Thus, they do not
possess the capability or mandate to intervene should either side renege
on the agreement. Examples of observation missions include UNAVEM II in Angola in 1991 and MINURSO in the Western Sahara.
Interpositional Missions, also known as traditional
peacekeeping, are larger contingents of lightly armed troops meant to
serve as a buffer between belligerent factions in the aftermath of a
conflict. Thus, they serve as a buffer zone between the two sides and
can monitor and report on the compliance of either side with regard to
parameters established in a given ceasefire agreement. Examples include UNAVEM III in Angola in 1994, and MINUGUA in Guatemala in 1996.
Multidimensional missions are carried out by military and police
personnel in which they attempt to implement robust and comprehensive
settlements. Not only do they act as observers, or in an interpositional
role, but they also participate in more multidimensional tasks—such as
electoral supervision, police and security forces reform, institution
building, economic development and more. Examples include UNTAG in Namibia, ONUSAL in El Salvador, and ONUMOZ in Mozambique.
Peace enforcement Missions are Chapter VII missions and
unlike the previous Chapter VI missions, they do not require the consent
of the belligerent parties. These are multidimensional operations
comprising both civilian and military personnel. The military force is
substantial in size and fairly well-equipped by UN Peacekeeping
standards. They are mandated to use force for purposes beyond just
self-defence. Examples include ECOMOG and UNAMSIL in West Africa and Sierra Leone in 1999, as well as the NATO operations in Bosnia—IFOR and SFOR.
UN missions during and after the Cold War
During the Cold War,
peacekeeping was primarily interpositional in nature—thus being
referred to as traditional peacekeeping. UN Peacekeepers were deployed
in the aftermath of interstate conflict in order to serve as a buffer
between belligerent factions and ensure compliance with the terms of an
established peace agreement. Missions were consent-based, and more often
than not observers were unarmed—such was the case with UNTSO in the Middle East and UNCIP in India and Pakistan. Others were armed—such as UNEF-I, established during the Suez Crisis. They were largely successful in this role.
In the post-Cold War
era, the United Nations has taken on a more nuanced, multidimensional
approach to Peacekeeping. In 1992, in the aftermath of the Cold War,
then Secretary-GeneralBoutros Boutros-Ghali put together a report detailing his ambitious concepts for the United Nations and Peacekeeping at large. The report, titled An Agenda for Peace,
described a multi-faceted and interconnected set of measures he hoped
would lead to effective use of the UN in its role in post-Cold War
international politics. This included the use of preventative diplomacy,
peace-enforcement, peace-making, peace-keeping and post-conflict
reconstruction.
Broader aims of UN missions
In The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations, Michael Doyle
and Nicolas Sambanis summarise Boutros Boutros’ report as preventative
diplomacy, confidence-building measures such as fact-finding missions,
observer mandates, and the potential deployment of UN mandated forces as
a preventative measure in order to diminish the potential for violence
or the danger of violence occurring and thus increasing the prospect for
lasting peace. Their definitions are as follows:
Peace-enforcement, meant to act with or without the
consent of the belligerents in order to ensure any treaty or cease-fire
mandated by the United Nations Security Council is maintained. This is
done primarily under the auspices of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and
the forces are generally heavily armed as opposed to the unarmed, or
lightly-armed personnel frequently deployed as observers.
Peace-making, meant to compel belligerents to seek a peaceful
settlement for their differences via mediation and other forms of
negotiation provided by the UN under the auspices of Chapter VI of the UN Charter.
Peace-keeping, deployment of a lightly-armed United Nations
presence in the field with the consent of the belligerents involved in
order to build confidence and monitor any agreements between concerned
parties. Additionally, diplomats would continue to work toward
comprehensive and lasting peace, or for the implementation of an agreed
upon peace.
Post-Conflict Reconstruction, intended to develop economic
and social cooperation meant to mend relations between the belligerents.
Social, political, and economic infrastructure would ideally prevent
potential violence and conflict in the future and help to contribute to a
lasting and robust peace.
Not all international peacekeeping forces have been directly
controlled by the United Nations. In 1981, an agreement between Israel
and Egypt formed the Multinational Force and Observers which continues to monitor the Sinai Peninsula.
The African Union
(AU) is working on building an African Peace and Security Architecture
that fulfils the mandate to enforce peace and security on the continent.
In cases of genocide
or other serious human-rights violations, an AU-mission could be
launched even against the wishes of the government of the country
concerned, as long as it is approved by the AU General Assembly. The
establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)
which includes the African Standby Force (ASF) is planned earliest for
2015.
Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping (UCP) are civilian personnel that
carry out non-violent, non-interventionist and impartial set of tactics
in order to protect civilians in conflict zones from violence in
addition to supporting additional efforts to build a lasting peace.
While the term UCP is not entirely ubiquitous among non-governmental
agencies (NGOs) in the field: many utilize similar techniques and desire
shared outcomes for peace; such as accompaniment, presence, rumour
control, community security meetings, the securing of safe passage, and
monitoring.
Brief history
Creation and early years
United Nations Peacekeeping started in 1948 when the United Nations Security Council
authorised the deployment of UN unarmed military observers to the
Middle East in order to monitor the armistice agreement that was signed
between Israel and its Arab neighbours in the wake of the Arab-Israeli War. This operation was called the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and is still in operation today.
With the passage of resolution 73 (1949) by the Security Council in
August 1949, UNTSO was given the task of fulfilling four Armistice
Agreements between the state of Israel and the Arab states which had
participated in the war. Thus, UNTSO's operations were spread through
five states in the region—Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian
Arab Republic.
Cold War peacekeeping
In
the wake of independence in India and Pakistan in August 1947 and the
subsequent bloodshed that followed the Security Council adopted
resolution 39 (1948) in January 1948 in order to create the United
Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), with the purpose of
mediating the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and the
fighting related to it. This operation was non-interventionist in nature
and was additionally tasked with supervision of a ceasefire signed by
Pakistan and India in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. With the passage of the Karachi agreement
in July 1949, UNCIP would supervise a ceasefire line that would be
mutually overseen by UN unarmed military observers and local commanders
from each side in the dispute. UNCIP's mission in the region continues
to this day, now under the operational title of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).
Since then, sixty-nine peacekeeping operations have been authorised and have deployed to various countries all over the world.
The great majority of these operations have begun in the post-Cold War
world. Between 1988 and 1998 thirty-five UN operations had been
established and deployed. This signified a substantial increase when
compared with the periods between 1948 and 1978; which saw the creation
and deployment of only thirteen UN Peacekeeping operations and zero
between 1978 and 1988.
Armed intervention first came in the form of UN involvement in the wake of the Suez Crisis in 1956. United Nations Emergency Force
(UNEF-1), which existed from November 1956 to June 1967 was essentially
the first ever United Nations peacekeeping force. It was given the
mandate of ensuring the cessation of hostilities between Egypt, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel
in addition to overseeing the withdrawal of French, Israeli and British
troops from Egyptian territory. Upon completion of said withdrawal,
UNEF would serve as a buffer force between Egyptian and Israeli forces
in order to supervise conditions of the ceasefire and contribute to a
lasting peace.
Shortly thereafter, the United Nations Operation in the Congo
(ONUC), was deployed in 1960. This operation involved upwards of 20,000
military personnel at its peak, and resulted in the death of 250 UN
personnel, including then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. ONUC was meant to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces in the Congo, who had reinserted themselves after Congolese independence in the wake of a revolt carried out by the Force Publique
(FP), in order to protect Belgian citizens and economic interests. ONUC
was also tasked with establishing and maintaining law and order
(helping to end the FP revolt and ethnic violence) as well as provide
technical assistance and training to Congolese security forces. An
additional function was added to ONUC's mission, in which the force was
tasked with maintaining the territorial integrity and political
independence of the Congo—resulting from the secession of the mineral-rich provinces of Katanga and South Kasai.
The UN forces there, somewhat controversially, more or less became an
arm of the Congolese government at the time and helped to forcefully end
the secession of both provinces.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the UN created multiple short-term
missions all over the world including the Mission of the Representative
of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP), the UN
Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF), the UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), in conjunction with more long-term operations such as the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II), the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
Experiences of peacekeeping during the Yugoslav Wars, especially failures such as the Srebrenica Massacre, led, in part, to the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission,
which works to implement stable peace through some of the same civic
functions that peacekeepers also work on, such as elections. The
Commission currently works with six countries, all in Africa. In 2013 the U.N. Security Council
unanimously passed Resolution 2122, which among other things calls for
stronger measures regarding women's participation in conflict and
post-conflict processes such as peace talks, gender expertise in
peacekeeping missions, improved information about the impact of armed
conflict on women, and more direct briefing to the Council on progress
in these areas. Also in 2013, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW), a UN women's rights committee, said in a general
recommendation that states that have ratified the UN Women's Rights
Convention are obliged to uphold women's rights before, during, and
after conflict when they are directly involved in fighting, and/or are
providing peacekeeping troops or donor assistance for conflict
prevention, humanitarian aid or post-conflict reconstruction.
The Committee also stated that ratifying states should exercise due diligence in ensuring that non-state actors, such as armed groups and private security contractors, be held accountable for crimes against women.
One of the findings of Page Fortna about where peacekeepers go is
that “peacekeeping is a matter of supply and demand” From the supply
side, she observes that there is unlikely a Peacekeeping mission in
civil wars on countries close to one of the members of the Security
Council. From the demand side, there is diverse evidence that
peacekeeping missions are deployed in the countries who need it the
most, this is where the risk of a recurring war is high.
Composition of peacekeeping forces
Nations that participate in peacekeeping missions
Irish UNMIL troops on patrol in Liberia, July 2006.
The United Nations Charter
stipulates that to assist in maintaining peace and security around the
world, all member states of the UN should make available to the Security
Council necessary armed forces and facilities. Since 1948, about 130
nations have contributed military and civilian police personnel to peace
operations. While detailed records of all personnel who have served in
peacekeeping missions since 1948 are not available, it is estimated that
up to one million soldiers, police officers and civilians have served
under the UN flag in the last 56 years. As of March 2008, 113 countries
were contributing a total 88,862 military observers, police, and troops.
Despite the large number of contributors, the greatest burden
continues to be borne by a core group of developing countries. The ten
largest troop (including police and military experts) contributing
countries to UN peacekeeping operations as of May, 2017 were Ethiopia (8229), India (7665), Pakistan (7135), Bangladesh (6958), Rwanda (6256), Nepal (5158), Burkina Faso (2969), Senegal (2847), Ghana (2751), Indonesia (2719).
As of March 2008, in addition to military and police personnel,
5,187 international civilian personnel, 2,031 UN Volunteers, and 12,036
local civilian personnel worked in UN peacekeeping missions.
As of 30 June 2014, 3,243 people from over 100 countries have been killed while serving on peacekeeping missions. Many of those came from India (157), Nigeria (142), Pakistan (136), Ghana (132), Canada (121), France (110) and the United Kingdom (103). Thirty percent of the fatalities in the first 55 years of UN peacekeeping occurred between 1993 and 1995.
Developing nations
tend to participate in peacekeeping more than developed countries.
This may be due in part because forces from smaller countries avoid
evoking thoughts of imperialism. The rate of reimbursement by the UN for
troop contributing countries per peacekeeper per month include: $1,028
for pay and allowances; $303 supplementary pay for specialists; $68 for
personal clothing, gear and equipment; and $5 for personal weaponry.
This can be a significant source of revenue for a developing country.
By providing important training and equipment for the soldiers as well
as salaries, UN peacekeeping missions allow them to maintain larger
armies than they otherwise could. About 4.5% of the troops and civilian
police deployed in UN peacekeeping missions come from the European Union and less than one percent from the United States.
Women's participation in peacekeeping
Security
Council Resolution 1325 was the first major step taken by the UN to
include women as active and equal actors in “the prevention and
resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building,
peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction
and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full
involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace
and security”.
A critique of this resolution is that UNSCR 1325 proposes the
implementing gender mainstreaming, however the progress that has been
accomplished in this area has focused on women, rather than on assessing
the impacts of planned action on both men and women. In 2010, a
comprehensive 10-year impact study was conducted to assess the success
of this resolution and found that there was limited success with the
implementation, particularly in the increasing women's participation in
peace negotiations and peace agreements, and sexual and gender-based
violence has continued to be prevalent, despite efforts to reduce it.
Ghanaian women serve in UN Peacekeeping
In 2013 the U.N. Security Council
unanimously passed Resolution 2122, which among other things calls for
stronger measures regarding women's participation in conflict and
post-conflict processes such as peace talks, gender expertise in
peacekeeping missions, improved information about the impact of armed
conflict on women, and more direct briefing to the Council on progress
in these areas. Also in 2013, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW), a UN women's rights committee, said in a general
recommendation that states that have ratified the UN Women's Rights
Convention are obliged to uphold women's rights before, during, and
after conflict when they are directly involved in fighting, and/or are
providing peacekeeping troops or donor assistance for conflict
prevention, humanitarian aid or post-conflict reconstruction. The Committee also stated that ratifying states should exercise due
diligence in ensuring that non-state actors, such as armed groups and
private security contractors, be held accountable for crimes against
women.
As of July 2016, women serve in every UN peacekeeping mission either as troops, police, or civilian staff.
In 1993, women made up 1% of deployed uniformed personnel. In 2014,
out of approximately 125,000 peacekeepers, women constitute 3% of
military personnel and 10% of police personnel in UN Peacekeeping
missions, as well as 29% of international and 17% of national staff in
peacekeeping and special political missions. In 2016, five women were leading peacekeeping missions as Special Representatives of the Secretary-General.
Theoretical basis for why peacekeeping missions should keep and preserve peace
While
much has been written about Peacekeeping and what Peacekeepers do, very
little empirical research has taken place in order to identify the
manner in which Peacekeepers can have an impact in a post-conflict
environment. Columbia University
Professor, Virginia Page Fortna attempts to lay out four causal
mechanisms through which peacekeepers have the opportunity to lay the
groundwork for a lasting peace. Fortna's four mechanisms are as follows:
Change the incentives of recent belligerents, making peace more desirable or war more costly.
Reduce the uncertainty and fear that drives security dilemma spirals.
Prevent or control accidents or the actions of rogue groups that might otherwise escalate back to war.
Prevent political abuse by one side (generally the government) that might cause actors losing the peace to take up arms anew.
Fortna argues that peacekeepers have a positive impact on the peace
process, despite often being sent to places where peace is most
difficult to achieve. Peacekeeping is often looked at by detractors as
ineffective, or unnecessary. Peace prevails when belligerents already
have a vested interest in sustaining peace and therefore it could be
argued that Peacekeepers play only a minor role in creating a strong
foundation for enduring peace. Yet these causal reasons illustrate the
important roles that Peacekeepers play in ensuring that peace lasts,
especially when contrasted against situations in which belligerents are
left to their own devices. These causal reasons thus illustrate the need
for Peacekeeping and lay a foundation for the manner in which
Peacekeeping operations can have a substantive impact on the
post-conflict environment.
In order to change the incentives for war and make peace more
appealing the UN can provide a military force by way of an enforcement
mandate which provides deterrence to would-be spoilers. They can monitor
the situation making the potential for surprise attack by one of the
belligerents less likely to occur or by making it more difficult to
carry out such an attack. A lightly-armed observer mission can also
serve as an early-warning force or “tripwire” for the aforementioned
enforcement mission. Aid and recognition provided to the belligerents by
the international community should be made conditional and based on
compliance with objectives laid out in the negotiating process. And
lastly, peace dividends should be provided in the forms of jobs, public
works and other benefits.
To reduce uncertainty and fear the UN Peacekeeping force can
monitor the aforementioned compliance, facilitate communication between
belligerents in order to ease security dilemma concerns thus reassuring
belligerents that the other side will not renege, and allow for
belligerents to signal their legitimate intentions for peace to the
other side. That is to say, provide a meaningful pathway for
communication between both sides to make their intentions known and
credible.
Prevention and control of potential accidents that may derail the
peace process can be achieved by the peacekeeping force by deterring
rogue groups. Belligerent forces are often undisciplined without a
strong central source of command and control,
therefore while a peace is being negotiated there is potential for a
rogue group on one side to renege and spoil the peace process. UN forces
can serve to prevent this. Additionally, the UN force can serve as a
moderator and make communication easy between both parties and bring in
political moderates from either side. By providing law and order UN
peacekeeping forces can temporarily replace a state's security forces
and prevent a bias overreaction to an alleged violation by one side
which could in turn result in escalation and a renewal in the violence.
Prevention of political abuse can be achieved through the
reformation of institutions associated with the government. Training and
monitoring the security forces (e.g. army or police) help to make them
an unbiased protector of the people rather than a weapon of suppression
for the ruling government. Hopefully this training can bring trust by
the people for the security establishment. UN forces can also run and
monitor elections in order to ensure a fair process. In other cases, the
UN may provide a neutral interim government to administer the country
during a transitional period wherein the associated government
institutions are being retrained, reformed or better developed. Lastly,
military groups such as armed rebels can be encouraged to put down their
weapons and transformed into political organisations using appropriate
non-violent means to mete out their grievances and compete in the
election cycle. This is especially important as many of these groups
serve as the chief opposition to a given government, but lack the means
or know-how to operate effectively as political organisations.
Different peacekeeping missions take place as a result of
different causal mechanisms. More military deterrence and enforcement
are meant for those missions operating under the auspices of Chapter
VII, while Chapter VI missions are meant to serve more as monitoring
forces and interpositional operations are meant to target and prevent
potential political abuse—these are primarily multidimensional missions
and are heavily involved in the post-conflict political situation.
Effectiveness of peacekeeping missions
According
to a 2014 survey of the academic literature, "there is considerable
evidence that [United Nations peacekeeping operations] are effective in
maintaining peace."
According to Fortna, there is strong evidence that the presence of
peacekeepers significantly reduces the risk of renewed warfare; more
peacekeeping troops contribute to fewer battlefield deaths; and more
peacekeeping troops contribute to fewer civilian deaths. A study by political scientists at Uppsala University and Peace Research Institute Oslo
estimates that an ambitious UN peacekeeping policy with a doubled
peacekeeping operation and strong mandates would "reduce the global
incidence of armed conflict by two thirds relative to a no-PKO
scenario."
According to Fordham University political scientist Anjali Dayal,
"Scholars have found that peacekeeping keeps wars from bleeding across
borders. Having more peacekeepers on the ground also seems to correspond
with fewer civilians targeted with violence. And peace operations at
times have successfully served as transitional authorities, handing
power back to local authorities, although this is decreasingly true."
A 2018 study found that peacekeeping reduces the severity of civil war
on its own, but when it is coupled with mediation, the impact is
greater.
There is also evidence that the promise to deploy peacekeepers can help
international organizations bring combatants to the negotiation table
and increase the likelihood that they will agree to a cease-fire.
By controlling for specific factors that affect where
peacekeepers are deployed and what the potential chances for peace are,
Page Fortna's statistical research shows that there is a statistically
significant impact on lasting peace when peacekeepers are deployed.
Despite the fact that peacekeepers are sent to locations where peace is
least likely to succeed, Fortna finds that conservative estimates
suggest that the presence of UN peacekeepers diminishes the risk for
renewed violence by at least 55%-60%; with less conservatives estimates
upwards of 75%-85%.
Additionally, her analysis concludes that there is little difference in
the effectiveness between Chapter VI consent-based missions and Chapter
VII enforcement missions. Indeed, enforcement missions only remain
effective if the UN peacekeeping force can prove and sustain their
credibility in the use of force.
This stresses the importance of a UN mission maintaining the consent of
the peacekept. Ultimately, Fortna finds that peacekeeping is an
effective tool for ensuring a lasting peace; especially compared to
situations in which belligerents' are left to their own devices.
Utilising the previously mentioned causal mechanisms for peacekeeping, a
UN peacekeeping force can have a substantial and substantive impact on
sustaining a lasting peace. Having a relative consensus of the positive
impact of peacekeeping for ensuring a lasting peace, Fortna and Howard
suggest that the literature is moving towards the study of i) the
effectiveness of the types of peace-keepers, ii) the transitional
administrations, iii) the links between peacekeeping and
democratisation, and iv) the perspectives of the “peacekept".
Doyle and Sambanis' analysis finds that lasting peace is more
likely after non-ethnic wars in countries with a relatively high level
of development in addition to whether or not UN peacekeeping forces and
financial assistance are available. They conclude that in the short run
lasting peace is more dependent on a robust UN deployment coupled with
low levels of hostility between belligerents. They note that increased
economic capacity can provide an incentive not to renew hostilities. In
the long run, however, economic capacity matters far more whereas the
degree of hostility between belligerents is less important. As
successful as UN deployments can be, they have inadequately spurred
independent economic development within the countries where they have
intervened. Thus, the UN plays a strong, but indirect role and success
in lasting peace is predicated on the development of institutions that
support peace, rather than serving as a deterrent for renewed war.
Other scholarly analyses show varying success rates for
peacekeeping missions, with estimate ranging from 31 percent to 85
percent.
Factors that Impact Lasting Peace
There
are many factors that can have a negative impact on lasting peace such
as hidden information about the relative strength possessed by the
belligerents; a rebel group's involvement in illicit financing through
means such as through the export of diamonds and other minerals;
participation in the trafficking of drugs, weapons and human beings;
whether or not military victory was achieved by one side; the length of
the war as well as how costly it was; commitment problems and security
dilemma spirals experienced by both sides; whether a cease-fire or
treaty signed by the belligerents; lack of transparency in the motives
and actions carried out by belligerents in the immediate aftermath of
the conflict; extremist spoilers; participants in the conflict that may
benefit from its continuation; indivisibility and more.
Perhaps one of the most statistically significant contributors to
a lasting peace is whether or not military victory was achieved by one
side. According to Fortna's research, civil wars in which one side wins,
resulting in a cease-fire or truce, have an approximately 85%-90% lower
chance of renewed war. Moreover, peace treaties further reduce the risk
by 60%-70%.
If a group is funded by drugs, diamonds or other illicit trade
then there is a substantial increase in the chance of renewed
violence—100%-250%-- which is to say that in such circumstances war is
two to three-and-a-half times more likely to begin again. While Fortna finds that wars which involve many factions are less likely to resume, Doyle and Sambanis find the opposite.
Costly wars and wars fought along identity lines both provide
varied chances of the renewal of violence. While longer wars and peace
established by treaty (especially those attained by military victory)
can reduce the chances of another war.
Impacts of peacekeeping on participating forces
Military normalisation
Some
commentators have highlighted the potential to leverage peacekeeping
operations as a mechanism for advancing military normalisation. Michael
Edward Walsh and Jeremy Taylor have argued that Japan's peacekeeping operations in South Sudan
provide those promoting Japan's military normalisation with "a unique
opportunity to further erode the country’s pacifist constitution."
"Unable to accept the full weight of modern peacekeeping operations
without fundamental political, legal, and social changes," they conclude
that "Japan’s peacekeepers remain ill-prepared to tackle many serious
contingencies requiring use of deadly force."
For this reason, they suggest that Japan's continued participation in
UN peacekeeping operations might force policy changes that ultimately
push the country toward "a tipping point from which the normalisation of
Japan’s military (will be) the only outcome."
Political impact on sending countries
Diana Muir Appelbaum, has expressed concern that the creation of a military in Fiji
for the purpose of serving in international peacekeeping missions, has
produced a military powerful enough to stage four coups d’état (1987,
1999–2000, 2006, and 2009) and to rule Fiji as a military dictatorship
for over two decades.
However, a 2018 study published in the Journal of Peace Research, found
that countries where militaries are highly dependent on the funds they
receive from UN peacekeeping were less likely to experience coups
d’états than comparable countries less dependent on such funds.
Impacts on individual peacekeepers
Memorial in Kigali, Rwanda to ten Belgian peacekeepers of UNAMIR who were massacred by Hutu paramilitaries in 1994
Studies of peacekeeping soldiers show both positive and negative
effects. A study of 951 US Army soldiers assigned to Bosnia revealed
that 77% reported some positive consequences, 63% reported a negative
consequence, and 47% reported both.
The peacekeepers are exposed to danger caused by the warring parties
and often in an unfamiliar climate. This gives rise to different mental
health problems, suicide, and substance abuse as shown by the percentage
of former peacekeepers with those problems. Having a parent in a
mission abroad for an extended period is also stressful to the
peacekeepers' families.
Another viewpoint raises the problem that the peacekeeping may
soften the troops and erode their combat ability, as the mission profile
of a peacekeeping contingent is totally different from the profile of a
unit fighting an all-out war.
Criticism
Peacekeeping, human trafficking, and forced prostitution
Since the 1990s, UN Peacekeepers have been the subject of numerous accusations of abuse ranging from rape and sexual assault, to pedophilia and human trafficking. Complaints have arisen from Cambodia, East Timor and West Africa. In Bosnia-Herzegovina
prostitution associated with trafficked women skyrocketed and often
operated just beyond the gates of U.N. compounds. David Lamb, a regional
human rights officer in Bosnia from 2000 to 2001 claimed “The sex slave
trade in Bosnia largely exists because of the U.N. peacekeeping
operation. Without the peacekeeping presence, there would have been
little or no forced prostitution in Bosnia.” In addition, hearing held
by the U.S. House of Representatives
in 2002 found that members of SFOR were frequenting Bosnian brothels
and engaging in sex with trafficked women and underage girls.
Reporters witnessed a rapid increase in prostitution in Cambodia, Mozambique, Bosnia, and Kosovo
after UN and, in the case of the latter two, NATO peacekeeping forces
moved in. In the 1996 UN study called "The Impact of Armed Conflict on
Children", former first lady of Mozambique Graça Machel
documented: "In 6 out of 12 country studies on sexual exploitation of
children in situations of armed conflict prepared for the present
report, the arrival of peacekeeping troops has been associated with a
rapid rise in child prostitution".
Gita Sahgal spoke out in 2004 with regard to the fact that prostitution and sex abuse crops up wherever humanitarian intervention efforts are set up. She observed that the "issue with the UN is that peacekeeping operations unfortunately seem to be doing the same thing that other militaries do. Even the guardians have to be guarded".
An investigation by Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, then Permanent Representative of Jordan
to the United Nations, in 2006 resulted in a comprehensive report which
detailed some of this abuse in detail— particularly that which occurred
in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Sexual exploitation frequently came in the form of prostitution,
wherein some money (an average of $1-$3 per encounter) was exchanged for
sex. In other instances food, or jobs were utilized to ply women for
sex. Other young women reported of “rape disguised as prostitution”,
whereabouts Peacekeepers would rape them and were then given some money
or food in order to make the act seem consensual.
Between May and September 2004, there were seventy-two allegations of
sexual exploitation—68 against military and 4 against civilian
personnel. By the end of 2004 there would be a total of 105 allegations.
The majority of these allegations were in regards to sex with person
under the age of 18 years (45 percent) and sex with adult prostitutes
(31 percent). Rape and sexual assault made up approximately 13 and 5
percent respectively, with the remaining 6 percent of allegations
relating to other forms of sexual exploitation. Most of the allegations were against peacekeepers from Pakistan, Uruguay, Morocco, Tunisia, South Africa, and Nepal.
Uruguayan President Jose Mujica apologized to Haitian President Michel Martelly
over the alleged rape of an 18-year-old Haitian man by Uruguayan UN
peacekeeping troops. Martelly said "a collective rape carried out
against a young Haitian" would not go unpunished. Four soldiers
suspected of being involved in the rape have been detained.
In July 2007 the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) confined an entire contingent of 734 Moroccans in the Ivory Coast
in the wake of allegations that some had sexually abused underage
girls. In the following years, there were 80 investigations carried out
by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). In 2013, allegations were levelled on personnel from France, Gabon, and Burundi operating in the Central African Republic. These include accusations of sexual abuse and exploitation of at least 108 from Kemo Prefecture and that the vast majority of the cases involved minors.
In 2016, more allegations of abuse were levelled on Peacekeepers
operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo's eastern province of North Kivu. Tanzania
and the UN opened a joint inquiry into the alleged abuse, which
involved Tanzanian troops. There have been 18 reports of sexual abuse,
eight of which involved minors. Sixteen Tanzanian soldiers, a Malawian
and a South African are implicated in the accusations. The UN reported
in March 2016 that there was a large increase in allegations; which
involved troops from twenty one countries. Most of the allegations
involved troops from African countries including: Cameroon, Congo, Tanzania, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ghana, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal and Togo.
Peacekeepers and the Haiti cholera crisis
Significant scientific evidence, first reported by the Associated Press, and later the New York Times, Al Jazeera, and ABC News has shown that Nepalese Peacekeeping troops stationed at a remote base in Mirebalais, Haiti, triggered a deadly cholera epidemic that has ravaged the country since October 2010. Cholera
is a waterborne disease that causes diarrhoea and vomiting, and it can
kill in a matter of hours if patients do not receive rehydration
intervention. As of July 2012, Haiti's cholera epidemic was the worst in
the world: about 7,500 had died and about 585,000 Haitians (about 1 in every 20 Haitians) had become ill with the disease.
According to the UN-appointed Independent Panel of Experts on the
Cholera Outbreak in Haiti, the conditions at the Peacekeeping base were
unsafe, and allowed contamination of Haiti's river systems in at least
two ways: "The construction of the water pipes in the main
toilet/showering area [was] haphazard, with significant potential for
cross-contamination...especially from pipes that run over an open
drainage ditch that runs throughout the camp and flows directly into the
Meye Tributary System".
Additionally, the Independent Panel reported that on a regular basis
black water waste from the Mirebalais base and two other bases was
deposited in an open, unfenced septic pit that was susceptible to
flooding and would overflow into the Meye Tributary during rainfall.
In November 2011, over 5,000 victims of the cholera epidemic
filed a claim with the UN's internal claims mechanism seeking redress in
the form of clean water and sanitation infrastructure necessary to
control the epidemic, compensation for individual losses, and an
apology. In July 2012, 104 Members of the United States Congress
signed a letter affirming that the "actions of the UN" had brought
cholera to Haiti and that the UN should "confront and ultimately
eliminate cholera". In 2013 the UN rejected the claim and the victims' lawyers have pledged to sue the UN in court.
Cultural Concerns Related to Contemporary Peacekeeping
There
is a notable intermingling of varied cultures when it comes to
peacekeeping. From the vast number of troops, police and personnel that
are brought together from various contributing countries to the
oftentimes challenging ethnic regions which peacekeeping forces are
often deployed. Because of these varied cultures, complicated cultural
interactions take place which not only affect mission effectiveness, but
can also lead to friction with the population the peacekeepers are
meant to be assisting.
In most cases prior to 1988, specific countries often provided
peacekeepers. At that point, only twenty six countries had sent
personnel to participate in peacekeeping deployments. Today, that number
has risen to more than eighty.
This results in an extremely heterogeneous group. Thus, UN Peacekeeping
deployments must not only contend with language complications, but also
myriad cultural and social differences that can create operational
difficulties that are hard to overcome. These difference can create
problems with regard to interactions (whether personal or between
institutions/units), misunderstandings, inadvertent offensive behaviour
and prejudices that may be associated with a particular contingent from a
given country.
In terms of operations, effectiveness can be hindered by the
varying tactics, techniques and procedures employed by the military or
police personnel that are a part of a given deployment. Because UN
forces are cobbled together from so many different sources, there is a
discrepancy in capabilities, training, equipment, standards and
procedures. Moreover, substantial differences exist in the form of
command and control between contributing members personnel. In addition,
some nations may not wish to be subordinated to another, complicating unity of command.
This can lead to deep-seated divisions between contingents within the
UN force that results in a lack of mutual support between units in the
field. This can be demonstrated in the experiences of UN peacekeeping
forces deployed to East Timor, where the Australians
engaged in a robust operation that maximised force protection in
contrast to a pro-active heart and minds approach utilised by Great
Britain's Ghurka personnel.
Maintaining the consent of the peacekept is an important facet of modern peacekeeping. Notably in Bosnia, Somalia
and Rwanda, fundamental principles of retaining that consent was
ignored on the grounds of a humanitarian intervention—reflecting the
nature of an Article VII intervention. Yet in order to stress and
maintain the legitimacy of an intervention it is important that the UN's
forces continue to enjoy the consent of the population and government
of the country to which they were deployed. This means making the
peacekept feel a part of the process in addition to important cultural
knowledge of the area in which peacekeepers are operating, in order to
reduce friction and provide for a successful operation.
There has been little study on the interaction of cultures that
exist within a peacekeeping force and the population within which they
operate. However, in 1976 Galtun and Hveem studied Norwegian
personnel who participated in UNEF-1 (in Gaza) and ONUC (Congo). They
posited that knowledge of the culture and an understanding of the
inhabitants in a given country were not only necessary, but crucial for
the success of the mission. They found that personnel from the Norwegian
contingent wanted greater insight into the conflict and the culture in
which they operated. They also wanted more robust training with regard
to working with people from other countries. Yet the study revealed the
troops received very little from briefings and that the majority of the
information regarding the conflict was gained through the news, reading
books or speaking with other UN personnel—rather than any established UN
training program.
Similarly, a study conducted on the relations between members of UNIFIL
and local population in Lebanon, carried out by Heiberg and Holst, all
but confirmed the findings. In their example, they found that the
countries that were able to integrate more fully with the population and
show a depth of knowledge about the local culture were more successful,
while those that were ambitious, but less integrated into the local
scene found themselves far removed from the individuals with which they
were supposed to be engaged with, and their success, or lack thereof,
illustrated this.
Only the Italian contingent of some
2,200 people operated as part of the local environment and became an
active element in restoring normal living conditions. Its soldiers were
provided with the training required to acquaint them with the cultural,
political and social situation of the people among whom they worked.
Operating in a sector that contained approximately 600,000 inhabitants,
mostly Shi'ites, the Italians carefully nurtured contact with the
ordinary citizens and the political leaders in their area... While the
Americans thought they were becoming involved in Lebanese politics, they
entered into Lebanese culture and history with little or no
understanding of the way things worked-- or didn't work... Most
Americans did not understand the subtleties of short-term alliances, the
length of memories and blood feuds, the strength of aln [kin] in Arab culture nor the nuances of religious differences.
This
illustrates the importance of understanding the significance that
culture plays in the conduct of successful peacekeeping operations.
However, despite the existence of a UN training manual that attempts to
advise peacekeepers on necessary techniques, there is no unifying
doctrine, or standardised procedure among peacekeeping contingents,
which will ultimately hinder the potential for success.
Limitations on Contemporary Intervention and Conflict Resolution
Throughout
the duration of the Cold War external intervention and mediation in
civil conflicts took on a state-centric mechanism in which sovereignty
was inviolable. Rarely did the international community intervene in
internal conflicts involving a state's government and domestic
belligerents that opposed it. Since the end of the Cold War, however,
that has changed. Today, mediation by international actors in civil
conflict rest on a standardised resolution mechanism that accords
broadly equal standing to all factions within a conflict, and attempts
to reach a settlement accepted by all.
The end of the Cold War presented an opportunity to reshape the
international system. This opportunity was afforded to the Cold War's
victor's-- that is to say—the United States and other western capitalist states governed by liberal-democratic values that put a premium on basic human rights and democratization.
In the preceding decades the state was the only entity to receive
special status. While there were exceptions, such as groups struggling
against colonial powers, the state possessed the ultimate degree of
legitimacy. As a result, the international community rarely meddled with
the internal machinations of a given country. Sovereignty was not to be
violated and this was a system which benefited both superpowers, their
allies, as well as third world governments.
Now, however, with legitimacy being extended to non-state actors,
as well as the opportunity for a minority to secede from a given state
and form a new country there has been a dramatic shift in the
international status quo. Moreover, the international community's model
for conflict resolution is heavily influenced by academic thought
developed in western countries. This model encourages intervening in
civil wars in order to stop political violence and come to a negotiated
settlement which often involves democratising efforts. Critics such as Christopher Clapham and David Shearer,
argue that this intervention can provide mechanisms for continued
conflict to the detriment of the civilian population. Clapham's argument
is principally in relation to the situation in Rwanda leading up to the genocide, whereas Shearer focuses on the negative aspects of intervention, primarily regarding Sierra Leone,
which prevents total victory by one side and results in the creation of
asymmetries between belligerents which opens the door for continued
bloodshed.
In Rwanda, third-party attempts at a negotiated settlement between the Hutu and Tutsi
afforded an opportunity for Hutu extremists to prepare for the killing
of Hutu moderates and the genocide of the Tutsi. The international
community, led by regional states from the Organisation of African Unity,
sought to negotiate a settlement and find a solution for the ongoing
ethnic violence between Hutu and Tutsi via the Arusha Peace Process.
This process lasted just over a year, included substantial international
involvement, and incorporated many regional actors such as Tanzania (host of the process), Burundi, Uganda and Zaire.
While the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was a major beneficiary of the Arusha accords
and was able to redress many of its grievances, many of the gains that
it made could have been achieved through military action. Arusha,
according to Clapham, affected the relative power of the participants in
the two following ways: a ceasefire which froze the distribution of
territorial control at a particular point and secondly the importance it
ascribed to the participants of the negotiations.
Meaning that it froze the conflict and prevented continued territorial
gains being made by the RPF, in addition to designating the degree of
importance with regard to the factions within the negotiations. A
faction's importance was weighted not on their relative popularity or
military strength, but on artificial weight assigned by the mediators.
Thus, the entire process served to undermine the RPF's position while
stalling their hitherto successful military campaign, while allowing
Hutu extremists to prepare for a genocide.
Shearer argues that modern strategies that rely solely on
consent-based negotiations are severely limited and that victory by
military means should not be ignored. He states that a shift in
battlefield fortunes can often bring one belligerent to the negotiation
table and will likewise moderate their demands.
Consent is of great importance when it comes to negotiation and
mediation. The current international system and the conflict resolution
model which the international community has utilised most since the end
of the Cold War puts a premium on consent. But Shearer asks that if a
belligerent uses negotiations and cease-fires as a method of delay in
order to allow them to reposition military forces and continue fighting,
then should consent-based strategies still be pursued, regardless of
the potential for lengthening a conflict and the associated human cost?
According to the empirical analysis cited by Shearer, past civil wars
with negotiated settlements have had little success. He cites a study
from John Stedman that notes between 1900 and 1980 85% of civil wars
were solved by one side winning outright (this excludes colonial wars).
15% percent ended as a result of negotiation. Additionally, Roy Licklider's study supports these conclusions by noting the following:
"From
1945 to 1989, 58 out of a total of 93 civil conflicts, as he
categorised them, were settled in some form, while the remainder
continued. However, only 14 (or 24 percent) of those settled were solved
by negotiation. The others (76 percent) ended with military victories.
Additionally, fighting resumed in seven of the 14 conflict which were
initially ended by negotiation. The overall success rate of negotiated
settlements, therefore, was around 12 percent out of the internal wars
that ended."
In Sierra Leone the Revolutionary United Front, led by Foday Sankoh,
fought an ongoing and bloody civil war with the government from 1991 to
1996. The conflict attracted little international attention, but
managed to devastate the country and destroy its economy. Neither
belligerent was willing to concede or compromise on their demands,
despite multiple attempts at a negotiated settlement. Sankoh would come
to the table after the intervention of the private military corporationExecutive Outcomes and a reversal in the RUF's battlefield fortunes.
In the aftermath the RUF was a depleted threat, civilians were
able to return from refugee camps and begin rebuilding their lives. But
the peace was fragile and negotiations were ongoing. The RUF was
reluctant to put down their arms, concerned over potential retribution
at the hands of army units and civilian militias alike. There was a
planned deployment of UN peacekeepers meant to ease these concerns and
help with the transition to peace, but things began to unravel.
International contributors began to shy away from further peacekeeping
initiatives; such as an expensive and open-ended mission in a
strategically unimportant country. As a result, the UN's intervention
force was slow to come to fruition and then came to a halt completely
when Sankoh argued the size of the contingent of 740 UN peacekeepers was
too large.
The UN refused to engage without total consent from both parties,
thus preventing the deployment of a peacekeeping force. This
consent-based approach, Shearer argues, illustrates the limits the UN
can play in the volatile and fragile state of affairs that exist during
and after civil wars. "In Sierra Leone, it meant that an important
component needed to shore up the peace-building process was absent. It
also meant that Sankoh was dictating terms." This consent-based approach effectively allowed the leadership of a brutal rebel group to hinder the potential for peace.
The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the newly elected President of Sierra Leone terminated the Executive Outcomes contract undermining his hard power advantage. Things were further inflamed when disaffected officers of the army overthrew the government in 1997. The war quickly renewed. A small UN force of monitors was deployed to observe the security situation. UNOMSIL,
as it was called, was deployed between July 1998 and October 1999, but
was forced to withdraw from the country when the RUF took the country's capitol.
UNAMSIL
was eventually formed and deployed in 1999, authorised under a Chapter
VII mandate, it was meant to enforce the Lome agreements. However,
violence would continue. From the outset the RUF was beyond
uncooperative and once the ECOMOG contingent withdrew, the RUF attacked UN forces, eventually taking hundreds hostage.
This led to an unexpected backlash from the international community
that the RUF did not anticipate. Its leadership had expected the
international community to cut and run, as it had done in Somalia and
earlier when UNOMSIL fled Freetown. Instead, with British support, an
aggressive campaign
was waged against the RUF. UNAMSIL's mandate was expanded and its
manpower enlarged. By late 2000 and early 2001 the RUF's military
strength had been severely depleted. Thus the Abuja agreements were signed and UNAMSIL fulfilled its mandate in December 2005.
While Sierra Leone is at peace today and the UN's mission can be deemed
a success, the way in which the situation developed illustrates
Shearer's point: that a consent-based approach focused on negotiation
that encompasses all belligerents' interest may not necessarily lead to
success. As we see, fighting continued despite the presence of UNOMSIL.
Indeed, even after UNOMSIL was replaced by a more robust force under a
Chapter VII mandate in the form of UNAMSIL the violence continued. When
the British intervened militarily and substantially degraded the RUF's
capability to sustain the conflict, as Executive Outcomes had done years
prior, the RUF finally come to the negotiating table and allowed for
the establishment of peace.
Some authors question the idea of international interventions at
all. In a 2005 working paper for the Center for Global Development, Jeremy Weinstein of Stanford University
provides a theory of “autonomous recovery,” in which states can achieve
sustainable peace without international intervention. Using case
studies of Uganda, Eritrea, and Somalia,
Weinstein demonstrates how states can develop effective institutions
out of warfare. This method has cost and benefits that must be weighed
against the potential outcome of international intervention. External
intervention can stop mass atrocities, but also stop institutional
change. Autonomous recovery elevates the strongest leader, but also
rewards the strongest fighters who may be less inclined to share power.
Furthermore, intervention depends on external influence while autonomous
recovery is based on internal factors. The conclusions of his argument
could suggest intervention is not ideal policy, but Weinstein argues the
international community's “responsibility to protect”
doctrine has moral importance for intervention and the conditions for
“autonomous recovery” are very rare. Weinstein argues the fundamental
challenge is how to incentivise good governance and assistance to rebel
groups without disrupting the connection of citizens to rulers in terms
of revenue collection that enables accountability.
Mission Creep
Although
acknowledging a number of practical and moral reasons for peacekeeping
operations, James Fearon and David Laitin assert that they have a
tendency under some circumstances to become tangled with state-building
efforts. In weak states facing successful guerrilla campaigns,
peacekeepers face pressures to build state institutional and
administrative capacity in order to achieve lasting peace. These
pressures can lead to mission creep beyond the original purview of the
peacekeeping operation; without engaging in state-building, the
peacekeepers risk allowing the peacekept country to revert to violence
following their exit. Thus, Fearon and Laitin advocate for the greater
integration of state-building in peacekeeping efforts through a new
framework of "neotrusteeship," which would see foreign powers exercising
a great deal of control over a weak state's domestic affairs in order
to ensure the prevention of future violence.
Lack of Engagement with the Populace
A growing critique of peacekeeping is the lack of engagement between the peacekeeping officials and the local populace. As Séverine Autesserre outlines in a 2015 Foreign Policy article,
this creates an environment where the peacekeeping officials develop
plans to ‘keep’ the peace, but they are disconnected from reality,
having the opposite effect on the ground. Additionally, it creates a
reinforcement mechanism for the peacekeeping officials, because the
officials on the ground report that their plan was successfully
implemented, but, in reality, it had adverse effects. If the situation
on the ground turns into another outbreak of violence, the local
populace will be blamed.
This criticism is similar to the critic levelled at development in developing countries by authors such as James C. Scott, James Ferguson, and L. Lohman.
Although peacekeeping and development are two different things, the
logic behind the criticism is the same. The third-party
officials-whether they are peacekeepers or agents of development-are
isolated from the general populace, believing they know what is best,
and refusing to gather information from a ground level. This is not out
of maliciousness or imperialism, but out of a legitimate belief that
they, as educated officials with access to other experts and who are
well versed in development and peacekeeping literature, know what is
best.
Proposed reform
Brahimi analysis
In
response to criticism, particularly of the cases of sexual abuse by
peacekeepers, the UN has taken steps toward reforming its operations.
The Brahimi Report
was the first of many steps to recap former peacekeeping missions,
isolate flaws, and take steps to patch these mistakes to ensure the
efficiency of future peacekeeping missions. The UN has vowed to continue
to put these practices into effect when performing peacekeeping
operations in the future. The technocratic aspects of the reform process
have been continued and revitalised by the DPKO in its "Peace
Operations 2010" reform agenda. This included an increase in personnel,
the harmonisation of the conditions of service of field and headquarters
staff, the development of guidelines and standard operating procedures,
and improving the partnership arrangement between the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), African Union, and European Union. A 2008 capstone doctrine entitled "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines" incorporates and builds on the Brahimi analysis.
One of the main issues that the Brahimi report identifies is the
lack of coordination and planning of the Peacekeeping Operations. Also,
the difference between the objectives of the Peacekeeping Operations and
the resources destined to fund the missions. Therefore, the report asks
the Security Council to make clear the goals and the resources to
accomplish them. According to Fearon and Laitin, the Brahimi Report
provides a political instrument for the secretary-general to negotiate
with the Security Council the goals, the troops, and the resources need
it to the operations. This instrument tries to avoid the cases of
underfunding presented in Missions such as in Bosnia, Somalia, and
Sierra Leone.
Christine Gray analyses the issues of implementing the
recommendations of the Brahimi Report. She explains the difficulty in
implementing these recommendations. In particular, in reducing the gap.
Austria
Brazil
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
India
Iran
Ireland
Italy
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Norway
Pakistan
Philippines
Peru
Poland
Romania
Russia
Singapore
South Korea (Republic of Korea)
Taiwan
Turkey
Ukraine
United Kingdom
United States
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