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Saturday, July 11, 2020

At-will employment

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
At-will employment is a term used in U.S. labor law for contractual relationships in which an employee can be dismissed by an employer for any reason (that is, without having to establish "just cause" for termination), and without warning, as long as the reason is not illegal (e.g. firing because of the employee's race, religion or sexuality). When an employee is acknowledged as being hired "at will," courts deny the employee any claim for loss resulting from the dismissal. The rule is justified by its proponents on the basis that an employee may be similarly entitled to leave his or her job without reason or warning. The practice is seen as unjust by those who view the employment relationship as characterized by inequality of bargaining power.

At-will employment gradually became the default rule under the common law of the employment contract in most U.S. states during the late 19th century, and was endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court during the Lochner era, when members of the U.S. judiciary consciously sought to prevent government regulation of labor markets. Over the 20th century, many states modified the rule by adding an increasing number of exceptions, or by changing the default expectations in the employment contract altogether. In workplaces with a trade union recognized for purposes of collective bargaining, and in many public sector jobs, the normal standard for dismissal is that the employer must have a "just cause." Otherwise, subject to statutory rights (particularly the discrimination prohibitions under the Civil Rights Act), most states adhere to the general principle that employer and employee may contract for the dismissal protection they choose. At-will employment remains controversial, and remains a central topic of debate in the study of law and economics, especially with regard to the macroeconomic efficiency of allowing employers to summarily and arbitrarily terminate employees.

Definition

At-will employment is generally described as follows: "any hiring is presumed to be 'at will'; that is, the employer is free to discharge individuals 'for good cause, or bad cause, or no cause at all,' and the employee is equally free to quit, strike, or otherwise cease work." In an October 2000 decision largely reaffirming employers' rights under the at-will doctrine, the Supreme Court of California explained:
Labor Code section 2922 establishes the presumption that an employer may terminate its employees at will, for any or no reason. A fortiori, the employer may act peremptorily, arbitrarily, or inconsistently, without providing specific protections such as prior warning, fair procedures, objective evaluation, or preferential reassignment. Because the employment relationship is "fundamentally contractual" (Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d 654, 696), limitations on these employer prerogatives are a matter of the parties' specific agreement, express or implied in fact. The mere existence of an employment relationship affords no expectation, protectible by law, that employment will continue, or will end only on certain conditions, unless the parties have actually adopted such terms. Thus if the employer's termination decisions, however arbitrary, do not breach such a substantive contract provision, they are not precluded by the covenant.
At-will employment disclaimers are a staple of employee handbooks in the United States. It is common for employers to define what at-will employment means, explain that an employee's at-will status cannot be changed except in a writing signed by the company president (or chief executive), and require that an employee sign an acknowledgment of his or her at-will status. However, the National Labor Relations Board has opposed as unlawful the practice of including in such disclaimers language declaring that the at-will nature of the employment cannot be changed without the written consent of senior management.

History

The original common law rule for dismissal of employees according to William Blackstone envisaged that, unless another practice was agreed, employees would be deemed to be hired for a fixed term of one year. Over the 19th century, most states in the North adhered to the rule that the period by which an employee was paid (a week, a month or a year) determined the period of notice that should be given before a dismissal was effective. For instance, in 1870 in Massachusetts, Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg Co held that an employee's term of hiring dictated the default period of notice. By contrast, in Tennessee, a court stated in 1884 that an employer should be allowed to dismiss any worker, or any number of workers, for any reason at all. An individual, or a collective agreement, according to the general doctrine of freedom of contract could always stipulate that an employee should only be dismissed for a good reason, or a "just cause," or that elected employee representatives would have a say on whether a dismissal should take effect. However, the position of the typical 19th-century worker meant that this was rare.

The at-will practice is typically traced to a treatise published by Horace Gray Wood in 1877, called Master and Servant. Wood cited four U.S. cases as authority for his rule that when a hiring was indefinite, the burden of proof was on the servant to prove that an indefinite employment term was for one year. In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, the Court noted that "Wood's rule was quickly cited as authority for another proposition." Wood, however, misinterpreted two of the cases which in fact showed that in Massachusetts and Michigan, at least, the rule was that employees should have notice before dismissal according to the periods of their contract.

In New York, the first case to adopt Wood's rule was Martin v New York Life Ins Co in 1895. Bartlett J asserted that New York law now followed Wood's treatise, which meant that an employee who received $10,000, paid in a salary over a year, could be dismissed immediately. The case did not make reference to the previous authority. Four years earlier, in 1891, Adams v Fitzpatrick had held that New York law followed the general practice of requiring notice similar to pay periods. However, subsequent New York cases continued to follow the at-will rule into the early 20th century.

Some courts saw the rule as requiring the employee to prove an express contract for a definite term in order to maintain an action based on termination of the employment. Thus was born the U.S. at-will employment rule, which allowed discharge for no reason. This rule was adopted by all U.S. states. In 1959, the first judicial exception to the at-will rule was created by one of the California Courts of Appeal. Later, in a 1980 landmark case involving ARCO, the Supreme Court of California endorsed the rule first articulated by the Court of Appeal. The resulting civil actions by employees are now known in California as Tameny actions for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

Since 1959, several common law and statutory exceptions to at-will employment have been created.

Common law protects an employee from retaliation if the employee disobeys an employer on the grounds that the employer ordered him or her to do something illegal or immoral. However, in the majority of cases, the burden of proof remains upon the discharged employee. No U.S. state but Montana has chosen to statutorily modify the employment at-will rule. In 1987, the Montana legislature passed the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA). The WDEA is unique in that, although it purports to preserve the at-will concept in employment law, it also expressly enumerates the legal bases for a wrongful discharge action. Under the WDEA, a discharge is wrongful only if: "it was in retaliation for the employee's refusal to violate public policy or for reporting a violation of public policy; the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the employer's probationary period of employment; or the employer violated the express provisions of its own written personnel policy."

The doctrine of at-will employment can be overridden by an express contract or civil service statutes (in the case of government employees). As many as 34% of all U.S. employees apparently enjoy the protection of some kind of "just cause" or objectively reasonable requirement for termination that takes them out of the pure "at-will" category, including the 7.5% of unionized private-sector workers, the 0.8% of nonunion private-sector workers protected by union contracts, the 15% of nonunion private-sector workers with individual express contracts that override the at-will doctrine, and the 16% of the total workforce who enjoy civil service protections as public-sector employees.

By state

Public policy exceptions

U.S. states (Blue) without a public policy exception
 
Under the public policy exception, an employer may not fire an employee, if the termination would violate the state's public policy doctrine or a state or federal statute.

This includes retaliating against an employee for performing an action that complies with public policy (such as repeatedly warning that the employer is shipping defective airplane parts in violation of safety regulations promulgated pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958), as well as refusing to perform an action that would violate public policy. In this diagram, the pink states have the 'exception', which protects the employee.

As of October 2000, 42 U.S. states and the District of Columbia recognize public policy as an exception to the at-will rule.

The 8 states which do not have the exception are:

Implied contract exceptions

U.S. states (pink) with an implied-contract exception
 
Thirty-six U.S. states (and the District of Columbia) also recognize an implied contract as an exception to at-will employment. Under the implied contract exception, an employer may not fire an employee "when an implied contract is formed between an employer and employee, even though no express, written instrument regarding the employment relationship exists." Proving the terms of an implied contract is often difficult, and the burden of proof is on the fired employee. Implied employment contracts are most often found when an employer's personnel policies or handbooks indicate that an employee will not be fired except for good cause or specify a process for firing. If the employer fires the employee in violation of an implied employment contract, the employer may be found liable for breach of contract.

Thirty-six U.S. states have an implied-contract exception. The 14 states having no such exception are:
The implied-contract theory to circumvent at-will employment must be treated with caution. In 2006, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Matagorda County Hospital District v. Burwell held that a provision in an employee handbook stating that dismissal may be for cause, and requiring employee records to specify the reason for termination, did not modify an employee's at-will employment. The New York Court of Appeals, that state's highest court, also rejected the implied-contract theory to circumvent employment at will. In Anthony Lobosco, Appellant v. New York Telephone Company/NYNEX, Respondent, the court restated the prevailing rule that an employee could not maintain an action for wrongful discharge where state law recognized neither the tort of wrongful discharge, nor exceptions for firings that violate public policy, and an employee's explicit employee handbook disclaimer preserved the at-will employment relationship. And in the same 2000 decision mentioned above, the Supreme Court of California held that the length of an employee's long and successful service, standing alone, is not evidence in and of itself of an implied-in-fact contract not to terminate except for cause.

"Implied-in-law" contracts

U.S. states (pink) with a covenant-of-good-faith-and-fair-dealing exception

Eleven US states have recognized a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as an exception to at-will employment. The states are:
Court interpretations of this have varied from requiring "just cause" to denial of terminations made for malicious reasons, such as terminating a long-tenured employee solely to avoid the obligation of paying the employee's accrued retirement benefits. Other court rulings have denied the exception, holding that it is too burdensome upon the court for it to have to determine an employer's true motivation for terminating an employee.

Statutory exceptions

Although all U.S. states have a number of statutory protections for employees, most wrongful termination suits brought under statutory causes of action use the federal anti-discrimination statutes which prohibit firing or refusing to hire an employee because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or handicap status. Other reasons an employer may not use to fire an at-will employee are:
  • for refusing to commit illegal acts – An employer is not permitted to fire an employee because the employee refuses to commit an act that is illegal.
  • family or medical leave – federal law permits most employees to take a leave of absence for specific family or medical problems. An employer is not permitted to fire an employee who takes family or medical leave for a reason outlined in the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993.
  • in retaliation against the employee for a protected action taken by the employee – "protected actions" include suing for wrongful termination, testifying as a witness in a wrongful termination case, or even opposing what they believe, whether they can prove it or not, to be wrongful discrimination. In the federal case of Ross v. Vanguard, Raymond Ross successfully sued his employer for firing him due to his allegations of racial discrimination.
Examples of federal statutes include:
  • Equal Pay Act of 1963 (relating to discrimination on the basis of sex in payment of wages);
  • Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (relating to discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin);
  • Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (relating to certain discrimination on the basis of age with respect to persons of at least 40 years of age);
  • Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (related to certain discrimination on the basis of handicap status);
  • Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (relating to certain discrimination on the basis of handicap status).
  • The National Labor Relations Act provides protection to employees who wish to join or form a union and those who engage in union activity. The act also protects employees who engage in a "concerted activity." Most employers set forth their workplace rules and policies in an employee handbook. A common provision in those handbooks is a statement that employment with the employer is "at-will." In 2012, the National Labor Relations Board, the federal administrative agency responsible for enforcing the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), instituted two cases attacking at-will employment disclaimers in employee handbooks. The NLRB challenged broadly worded disclaimers, alleging that the statements improperly suggested that employees could not act concertedly to attempt to change the at-will nature of their employment, and thereby interfered with employees' protected rights under the NLRA.

Controversy

The doctrine of at-will employment has been heavily criticized for its severe harshness upon employees. It has also been criticized as predicated upon flawed assumptions about the inherent distribution of power and information in the employee-employer relationship. On the other hand, conservative scholars in the field of law and economics such as Professors Richard A. Epstein and Richard Posner credit employment-at-will as a major factor underlying the strength of the U.S. economy. 

At-will employment has also been identified as a reason for the success of Silicon Valley as an entrepreneur-friendly environment.

In a 2009 article surveying the academic literature from both U.S. and international sources, University of Virginia law professor J.H. Verkerke explained that "although everyone agrees that raising firing costs must necessarily deter both discharges and new hiring, predictions for all other variables depend heavily on the structure of the model and assumptions about crucial parameters." The effect of raising firing costs is generally accepted in mainstream economics (particularly neoclassical economics); for example, professors Tyler Cowen and Alex Tabarrok explain in their macroeconomics textbook that employers become more reluctant to hire employees if they are uncertain about their ability to immediately fire them. However, according to contract theory, raising firing costs can sometimes be desirable when there are frictions in the working of markets. For instance, Schmitz (2004) argues that employment protection laws can be welfare-enhancing when principal-agent relationships are plagued by asymmetric information.

The first major empirical study on the impact of exceptions to at-will employment was published in 1992 by James N. Dertouzos and Lynn A. Karoly of the RAND Corporation, which found that recognizing tort exceptions to at-will could cause up to a 2.9% decline in aggregate employment and recognizing contract exceptions could cause an additional decline of 1.8%. According to Verkerke, the RAND paper received "considerable attention and publicity." Indeed, it was favorably cited in a 2010 book published by the libertarian Cato Institute.

However, a 2000 paper by Thomas Miles found no effect upon aggregate employment but found that adopting the implied contract exception causes use of temporary employment to rise as much as 15%. Later work by David Autor in the mid-2000s identified multiple flaws in Miles' methodology, found that the implied contract exception decreased aggregate employment 0.8 to 1.6%, and confirmed the outsourcing phenomenon identified by Miles, but also found that the tort exceptions to at-will had no statistically significant influence. Autor and colleagues later found in 2007 that the good faith exception does reduce job flows, and seems to cause labor productivity to rise but total factor productivity to drop. In other words, employers forced to find a "good faith" reason to fire an employee tend to automate operations to avoid hiring new employees, but also suffer an impact on total productivity because of the increased difficulty in discharging unproductive employees.

Other researchers have found that at-will exceptions have a negative effect on the reemployment of terminated workers who have yet to find replacement jobs, while their opponents, citing studies that say "job security has a large negative effect on employment rates," argue that hedonic regressions on at-will exceptions show large negative effects on individual welfare with regard to home values, rents, and wages

Right-to-work law

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
In the context of US labor politics, "right-to-work laws" refers to state laws that prohibit union security agreements between employers and labor unions. Under these laws, employees in unionized workplaces are banned from negotiating contracts which require all members who benefit from the union contract to contribute to the costs of union representation.

According to the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, right-to-work laws prohibit union security agreements, or agreements between employers and labor unions, that govern the extent to which an established union can require employees' membership, payment of union dues, or fees as a condition of employment, either before or after hiring. Right-to-work laws do not aim to provide general guarantee of employment to people seeking work, but rather are a government ban on contractual agreements between employers and union employees requiring workers to pay for the costs of union representation.

Right-to-work laws (either by statutes or by constitutional provision) exist in 27 US states, in the Southern, Midwestern, and interior Western states.[3][4] Such laws are allowed under the 1947 federal Taft–Hartley Act. A further distinction is often made within the law between people employed by state and municipal governments and those employed by the private sector, with states that are otherwise union shop (i.e., workers must pay for union representation in order to obtain or retain a job) having right to work laws in effect for government employees; provided, however, that the law also permits an "agency shop" where employees pay their share for representation (less than union dues), while not joining the union as members.

History

Origins

According to Slate, right-to-work laws are derived from legislation forbidding unions from forcing strikes on workers, as well as from legal principles such as liberty of contract, which as applied here sought to prevent passage of laws regulating workplace conditions.

According to PandoDaily and NSFWCORP, the term itself was coined by Vance Muse, a Republican operative who headed an early right-to-work group, the "Christian American Association", to replace the term "American Plan" after it became associated with the anti-union violence of the First Red Scare. Muse used racist rhetoric in his defense of "right-to-work" laws.

According to the conservative think tank the American Enterprise Institute, the term "right to work" was coined by Dallas Morning News editorial writer William Ruggles in 1941. (An unrelated use of the term right to work had been coined by French socialist leader Louis Blanc before 1848.)

Wagner Act (1935)

The National Labor Relations Act, generally known as the Wagner Act, was passed in 1935 as part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Second New Deal". Among other things, the act provided that a company could lawfully agree to be any of the following:
  • A closed shop, in which employees must be members of the union as a condition of employment. Under a closed shop, an employee who ceased being a member of the union for whatever reason, from failure to pay dues to expulsion from the union as an internal disciplinary punishment, was required to be fired even if the employee did not violate any of the employer's rules.
  • A union shop, which allows for hiring non-union employees, provided that the employees then join the union within a certain period.
  • An agency shop, in which employees must pay the equivalent of the cost of union representation, but need not formally join the union.
  • An open shop, in which an employee cannot be compelled to join or pay the equivalent of dues to a union or be fired for joining the union.
The act tasked the National Labor Relations Board, which had existed since 1933, with overseeing the rules.

Taft–Hartley Act (1947)

In 1947 Congress passed the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, generally known as the Taft–Hartley Act, over President Harry S. Truman's veto. The act repealed some parts of the Wagner Act, including outlawing the closed shop. Section 14(b) of the Taft–Hartley Act also authorizes individual states (but not local governments, such as cities or counties) to outlaw the union shop and agency shop for employees working in their jurisdictions. Any state law that outlaws such arrangements is known as a right-to-work state.

In the early development of the right-to-work policy, segregationist sentiment was used as an argument, as many people in the South felt that it was wrong for blacks and whites to belong to the same unions. Vance Muse, one of the early developers of the policy in Texas, used that argument in the development of anti-union laws in Texas in the 1940s.

Current status

The federal government operates under open shop rules nationwide, but many of its employees are represented by unions. Unions that represent professional athletes have written contracts that include particular representation provisions (such as in the National Football League), but their application is limited to "wherever and whenever legal," as the Supreme Court has clearly held that the application of a right-to-work law is determined by the employee's "predominant job situs". Players on professional sports teams in states with right-to-work laws are thus subject to those laws and cannot be required to pay any portion of union dues as a condition of continued employment.

Arguments for and against

Rights of dissenting minority and due process

The first arguments concerning the right to work centered on the rights of a dissenting minority with respect to an opposing majoritarian collective bargain. President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal had prompted many US Supreme Court challenges, among which were challenges regarding the constitutionality of the National Industry Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA). In 1936, as a part of its ruling in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. the Court ruled against mandatory collective bargaining, stating:
The effect, in respect to wages and hours, is to subject the dissentient minority ... to the will of the stated majority . ... To 'accept' in these circumstances, is not to exercise a choice, but to surrender to force. The power conferred upon the majority is, in effect, the power to regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority. This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an official body ... but to private persons . ... [A] statute which attempts to confer such power undertakes an intolerable and unconstitutional interference with personal liberty and private property. The delegation is so clearly arbitrary, and so clearly a denial of rights safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, that it is unnecessary to do more than refer to decisions of this Court which foreclose the question.

Freedom of association

Besides the US Supreme Court, other proponents of right-to-work laws also point to the Constitution and the right to freedom of association. They argue that workers should both be free to join unions or to refrain, and thus, sometimes refer to states without right-to-work laws as forced unionism states. These proponents argue that by being forced into a collective bargain, what the majoritarian unions call a fair share of collective bargaining costs is actually financial coercion and a violation of freedom of choice. An opponent to the union bargain is forced to financially support an organization they did not vote for, in order to receive monopoly representation they have no choice over.

The Seventh-day Adventist Church discourages the joining of unions, citing the writings of Ellen White, one of the church's founders, and what writer Diana Justice calls the "loss of free will" that occurs when a person joins a labor union.

Unfairness

Proponents such as the Mackinac Center for Public Policy contend that it is unfair that unions can require new and existing employees to either join the union or pay fees for collective bargaining expenses as a condition of employment under union security agreement contracts. Other proponents contend that unions may still be needed in new and growing sectors of the economy, for example, the voluntary and third party sectors, to assure adequate benefits for new immigrant, "part-time" aides in America (e.g., US Direct Support Workforce).

Political contributions

Right-to-work proponents, including the Center for Union Facts, contend that political contributions made by unions are not representative of the union workers. The agency shop portion of this had previously been contested with support of National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation in Communications Workers of America v. Beck, resulting in "Beck rights" preventing agency fees from being used for expenses outside of collective bargaining if the non-union worker notifies the union of their objection. The right to challenge the fees must include the right to have it heard by an impartial fact finder. Beck applies only to unions in the private sector, given agency fees were struck down for public-sector unions in Janus v. AFSCME in 2018.

Free riders

Opponents such as Richard Kahlenberg have argued that right-to-work laws simply "gives employees the right to be free riders—to benefit from collective bargaining without paying for it". Benefits the dissenting union members would receive despite not paying dues also include representation during arbitration proceedings. In Abood v. Detroit BoE, the Supreme Court of the United States permitted public-sector unions to charge non-members agency fees so that employees in the public sector could be required to pay for the costs of representation, even as they opted not to be a member, as long as these fees are not spent on the union's political or ideological agenda. This decision was reversed, however, in Janus v. AFSCME, with the Supreme Court ruling that such fees violate the first amendment in the case of public-sector unions, since all bargaining by a public-sector union can be considered political activity.

Freedom of contract and association

Opponents argue that right-to-work laws restrict freedom of association, and limit the sorts of agreements individuals acting collectively can make with their employer, by prohibiting workers and employers from agreeing to contracts that include fair share fees. Moreover, American law imposes a duty of fair representation on unions; consequently non-members in right to work states can force unions to provide without compensation grievance services that are paid for by union members.

In December 2012, libertarian writer J.D. Tuccille, in Reason magazine, wrote: "I consider the restrictions right-to-work laws impose on bargaining between unions and businesses to violate freedom of contract and association. ... I'm disappointed that the state has, once again, inserted itself into the marketplace to place its thumb on the scale in the never-ending game of playing business and labor off against one another. ... This is not to say that unions are always good. It means that, when the state isn't involved, they're private organizations that can offer value to their members."

Kahlenberg and Marvit also argue that, at least in efforts to pass a right-to-work law in Michigan, excluding police and firefighter unions—traditionally less hostile to Republicans—from the law caused some to question claims that the law was simply an effort to improve Michigan's businesses climate, not to seek partisan advantage.

Studies of economic effect

According to a 2020 study, right-to-work laws lead to greater economic inequality by indirectly reducing the power of labor unions.

A 2019 paper in the American Economic Review by economists from MIT, Stanford, and the US Census Bureau which surveyed 35,000 US manufacturing plants found that right-to-work laws "boosts incentive management practices."

According to Tim Bartik of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, studies of the effect of right-to-work laws abound, but are not consistent. Studies have found both "some positive effect on job growth," and no effect. Thomas Holmes argues that it is difficult to analyze right-to-work laws by comparing states due to other similarities between states that have passed these laws. For instance, right-to-work states often have some strong pro-business policies, making it difficult to isolate the effect of right-to-work laws. Looking at the growth of states in the Southeast following World War II, Bartik notes that while they have right-to-work laws they have also benefited from "factors like the widespread use of air conditioning and different modes of transportation that helped decentralize manufacturing".

Economist Thomas Holmes compared counties close to the border between states with and without right-to-work laws (thereby holding constant an array of factors related to geography and climate). He found that the cumulative growth of employment in manufacturing in the right-to-work states was 26 percentage points greater than that in the non-right-to-work states. However, given the study design, Holmes points out "my results do not say that it is right-to-work laws that matter, but rather that the 'probusiness package' offered by right-to-work states seems to matter." Moreover, as noted by Kevin Drum and others, this result may reflect business relocation rather than an overall enhancement of economic growth, since "businesses prefer locating in states where costs are low and rules are lax."

A February 2011 study by the Economic Policy Institute found:
  • Wages in right-to-work states are 3.2 percent lower than those in non-RTW states, after controlling for a full complement of individual demographic and socioeconomic variables as well as state macroeconomic indicators. Using the average wage in non-RTW states as the base ($22.11), the average full-time, full-year worker in an RTW state makes about $1,500 less annually than a similar worker in a non-RTW state. The study goes on to say "How much of this difference can be attributed to RTW status itself? There is an inherent endogeneity problem in any attempt to answer that question, namely that RTW and non-RTW states differ on a wide variety of measures that are also related to compensation, making it difficult to isolate the impact of RTW status."
  • The rate of employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI) is 2.6 percentage points lower in RTW states compared with non-RTW states, after controlling for individual, job, and state-level characteristics. If workers in non-RTW states were to receive ESI at this lower rate, 2 million fewer workers nationally would be covered.
  • The rate of employer-sponsored pensions is 4.8 percentage points lower in RTW states, using the full complement of control variables in [the study's] regression model. If workers in non-RTW states were to receive pensions at this lower rate, 3.8 million fewer workers nationally would have pensions.
A 2008 editorial in The Wall Street Journal comparing job growth in Ohio and Texas stated that from 1998 to 2008, Ohio lost 10,400 jobs, while Texas gained 1,615,000. The opinion piece suggested right-to-work laws might be among the reasons for the economic expansion in Texas, along with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the absence of a state income tax in Texas. Another Wall Street Journal editorial in 2012, by the president and the labor policy director of the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, reported 71 percent employment growth in right-to-work states from 1980 to 2011, while employment in non-right-to-work states grew just 32 percent during the same period. The 2012 editorial also stated that since 2001, compensation in right-to-work states had increased four times faster than in other states.

Polling

In January 2012, in the immediate aftermath of passage of Indiana's right-to-work law, a Rasmussen Reports telephone survey found that 74 percent of likely American voters disagreed with the question, "Should workers who do not belong to a union be required by law to pay union dues if the company they work is unionized?" but "most also don't think a non-union worker should enjoy benefits negotiated by the union."

In Michigan in January through March 2013, a poll found that 43 percent of those polled thought the law would help Michigan's economy, while 41 percent thought it would hurt.

US states with right-to-work laws

  Statewide Right-to-work law
  Local Right-to-work laws
  No Right-to-work law
The following 27 states have right-to-work laws:
In addition, the territory of Guam also has right-to-work laws, and employees of the US federal government have the right to choose whether or not to join their respective unions.

Local or repealed laws

Some states had right-to-work laws in the past, but repealed them or had them declared invalid. There are also some counties and municipalities located in states without right-to-work laws that have passed local laws to ban union security agreements.

Delaware

Seaford passed a right-to-work ordinance in 2018.

Illinois

Lincolnshire passed a local right-to-work ordinance, but it was struck down by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. An appeal to the Supreme Court resulted in the case being vacated as being moot because in the intervening period Illinois had passed the Illinois Collective Bargaining Freedom Act to invalidate such local ordinances.

Indiana

Before its passage in 2012, the Republican-controlled Indiana General Assembly passed a right-to-work bill in 1957, which led to the Democratic takeover of Indiana's Governor's Mansion and General Assembly in the coming elections, and eventually, the new Democrat-controlled legislature repealing the right-to-work law in 1965. Right-to-work was subsequently reenacted in 2012.

Kentucky

On November 18, 2016, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the right of local governments to enact local right-to-work laws in Kentucky. Kentucky had 12 local ordinances. A statewide law was subsequently enacted in 2017.

Missouri

The legislature passed a right-to-work bill in 2017, but the law was defeated in a 2018 referendum before it could take effect.

New Hampshire

New Hampshire adopted a right-to-work bill in 1947, but it was repealed in 1949 by the state legislature and governor.

New Mexico

New Mexico law was previously silent on local right-to-work laws, and Chaves, Eddy, Lea, Lincoln, McKinley, Otero, Roosevelt, Sandoval, San Juan, and Sierra counties, in addition to Ruidoso village adopted such laws. But in 2019 Governor Grisham signed legislation that prohibits local right-to-work laws and further states that union membership and the payment of union dues may be required as a condition of employment in workplaces subject to a collective bargaining agreement.

National Labor Relations Act of 1935

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act)
Great Seal of the United States
Long titleAn act to diminish the causes of labor disputes burdening or obstructing interstate and foreign commerce, to create a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and for other purposes.
NicknamesWagner Act
Enacted bythe 74th United States Congress
EffectiveJuly 6, 1935
Citations
Public law74-198
Statutes at Large49 Stat. 449
Codification
Titles amended29 U.S.C: Labor
U.S.C. sections amended29 U.S.C. § 151–169
Legislative history
Major amendments
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
United States Supreme Court cases

The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (also known as the Wagner Act) is a foundational statute of United States labor law which guarantees the right of private sector employees to organize into trade unions, engage in collective bargaining, and take collective action such as strikes. Central to the act was a ban on company unions. The act was written by Senator Robert F. Wagner, passed by the 74th United States Congress, and signed into law by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The National Labor Relations Act seeks to correct the "inequality of bargaining power" between employers and employees by promoting collective bargaining between trade unions and employers. The law established the National Labor Relations Board to prosecute violations of labor law and to oversee the process by which employees decide whether to be represented by a labor organization. It also established various rules concerning collective bargaining and defined a series of banned unfair labor practices, including interference with the formation or organization of labor unions by employers. The act does not apply to certain workers, including supervisors, agricultural employees, domestic workers, government employees, and independent contractors.

The NLRA was strongly opposed by conservatives and members of the Republican Party, but it was upheld in the Supreme Court case of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. The 1947 Taft–Hartley Act amended the NLRA, establishing a series of unfair labor practices for unions and granting states the power to pass right-to-work laws.

Background

President Franklin Roosevelt signs the Act on July 5, 1935. With Rep. Theodore A. Peyser (D-NY, left) and U.S.Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins (right).

The acts origins may be traced to the bloody Colorado Fuel and Iron Strike of 1914. Colorado Fuel was a subsidiary of Standard Oil, and Nelson Rockefeller Jr. sought expert advice from the new field of public relations to prolong settlement of the strike. He also recruited the former Canadian Labour Secretary (and future Prime Minister) MacKenzie King to the Rockefeller Foundation to broker a solution to the prolonged strike. The settlement resulted in the establishment of a Management-Labor conciliation board, which evolved into a company union and template for settling labor disputes. Although a step forward in labor relations, the company union was effectively a public relations ploy that had the opposite impact of thwarting the organization of trade unions in the great organizing drives of the period.

President Franklin Roosevelt signed the legislation into law on July 5, 1935.

It also has its roots in a variety of different labor acts previously enacted:

Content

Under section 1 (29 U.S.C. § 151) of the Act, the key principles and policy findings on which the Act was based are explained. The Act aims to correct the "inequality of bargaining power between employees who, according to the Act's proponents, do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association". To achieve this, the central idea is the promotion of collective bargaining between independent trade unions, on behalf of the workforce, and the employer.
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Various definitions are explained in section 2, (29 U.S.C. § 152) including 2(5) defining "labor organization" and 2(9) defining "labor dispute". The Act aims to protect employees as a group, and so is not based on a formal or legal relationship between an employer and employee.

Enforcement

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which was established in NLRA 1935 sections 3 to 6 (29 U.S.C. § 153–156), is the primary enforcer of the Act. Employees and unions may act themselves in support of their rights, however because of collective action problems and the costs of litigation, the National Labor Relations Board is designed to assist and bear some of the costs. Under section 3, (29 U.S.C. § 153) the NLRB has two basic functions: overseeing the process by which employees decide whether to be represented by a labor organization and prosecuting violations. Those processes are initiated in the regional offices of the NLRB. The General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board give legal advice. Sections 4 (29 U.S.C. § 154) and 5 (29 U.S.C. § 155) set out provisions on the officers of the Board and their expenses. Section 6 (29 U.S.C. § 156) empowers the Board to issue rules interpreting the labor legislation. This will generally be binding, unless a court deems it to have acted outside its authority.

Under section 10 (29 U.S.C. § 160) the NLRB is empowered to prevent unfair labor practices, which may ultimately be reviewed by the courts. Under section 11 it can lead investigations, collect evidence, issue subpoenas, and require witnesses to give evidence. Under section 12 (29 U.S.C. § 162) it is an offense for people to unduly interfere with the Board's conduct.

In practice, the act was often ignored when it suited political powers, most notably by Walt Disney in 1940 who formed a company union in violation of the law in order to prevent the Cartoon Unionists Guild, a Trade Union, from gaining a foothold in Disney Studios. This he did on the recommendation of Nazi propagandist Leni Riefenstahl who visited Disney studios in 1939 to direct six films financed by the Nazi government.

Collectively bargaining

Section 7 (29 U.S.C. § 157) sets out the general principle that employees have the right to join a trade union and engage in collective bargaining.
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
Specific rules in support of collective bargaining are as follows.
  • There can be only one exclusive bargaining representative for a unit of employees.
  • Promotion of the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.
  • Employers are compelled to bargain with the representative of its employees.
  • Employees are allowed to discuss wages.

Unfair labor practices

"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158 (a)(3) of this title."
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 §7

Under section 8 (29 U.S.C. § 158) the law defines a set of prohibited actions by employers, employees, and unions, known as an unfair labor practice. The first five unfair labor practices aimed at employers are in section 8(a). These are
  • (a)(1) "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7". This includes freedom of association, mutual aid or protection, self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively for wages and working conditions through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other protected concerted activities with or without a union.
  • (a)(2) "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it"
  • (a)(3) "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization"
  • (a)(4) discriminating against employees who file charges or testify.
  • (a)(5) refusing to bargain collectively with the representative of the employer's employees.
In addition, added by the Taft–Hartley Act, there are seven unfair labor practices aimed at unions and employees.

Election of bargaining representatives

Under section 9 (29 U.S.C. § 159) the people elected by a majority of the workforce have the right to become the exclusive representatives of workers in collective bargaining with the employer.

Exclusions

The NLRA 1935 does not cover two main groups of employees: those working for the government, and in the railway or airline industries. Section 2(2) (29 USC §152(2)) states that the Act does not apply to employees of the "United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act". Under section 19 (29 U.S.C. § 169), people who have religious convictions against joining a trade union are entitled to not associate or financially support it.




The act also excludes independent contractors, domestic workers, and farm workers. In recent years, advocacy organizations like the National Domestic Workers' Alliance have worked on the state level to pass a Domestic Workers' Bill of Rights, to extend to domestic workers the protections granted under the NLRA. Similar advocacy efforts are taking place on behalf of farm workers.

The Social Security Act of 1935 excluded from coverage about half the workers in the American economy. Among the excluded groups were agricultural and domestic workers—a large percentage of whom were African Americans.

Reactions

"Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right."
Wagner Act 1935 §13

The act was bitterly opposed by the Republican Party and business groups. The American Liberty League viewed the act as a threat to freedom and engaged in a campaign of opposition in order to repeal these "socialist" efforts. This included encouraging employers to refuse to comply with the NLRB and supporting the nationwide filing of injunctions to keep the NLRB from functioning. This campaign continued until the NLRA was found constitutional by the Supreme Court in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation (1937).

Labor groups, while overwhelmingly supportive, expressed a set of reservations. The American Federation of Labor and some employers accused the NLRB of favoring the Congress of Industrial Organizations, particularly when determining whether to hold union elections in plant-wide, or wall-to-wall, units, which the CIO usually sought, or to hold separate elections in separate craft units, which the craft unions in the AFL favored. While the NLRB initially favored plant-wide units, which tacitly favored the CIO's industrial unionism, it retreated to a compromise position several years later under pressure from Congress that allowed craft unions to seek separate representation of smaller groups of workers at the same time that another union was seeking a wall-to-wall unit.

Employers and their allies in Congress also criticized the NLRA for its expansive definition of "employee" and for allowing supervisors and plant guards to form unions, sometimes affiliated with the unions that represented the employees whom they were supposed to supervise or police. Many accused the NLRB of a general pro-union and anti-employer bias, pointing to the Board's controversial decisions in such areas as employer free speech and "mixed motive" cases, in which the NLRB held that an employer violated the Act by using misconduct that ordinarily would not result in termination to fire an employee who was engaged in pro-union activity. In addition, employers campaigned over the years to outlaw a number of union practices such as closed shops, secondary boycotts, jurisdictional strikes, mass picketing, strikes in violation of contractual no-strike clauses, pension and health and welfare plans sponsored by unions and multi-employer bargaining.

Many of these criticisms included provisions that employers and their allies were unable to have included in the NLRA. Others developed in reaction to NLRB decisions. Over all, they wanted the NLRB to be neutral as to bargaining power, but the NLRA's policy section takes a decidedly pro-employee position:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Some of these changes were later achieved in the 1947 amendments.

Amendments

Opponents of the Wagner Act introduced several hundred bills to amend or repeal the law in the decade after its passage. All of them failed or were vetoed until the passage of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, or the Taft–Hartley Act, in 1947.

More recent unsuccessful efforts included attempts in 1978 to permit triple backpay awards and union collective bargaining certification based on signed union authorization cards, a provision that is similar to one of the proposed amendments in the Employee Free Choice Act. Under the NLRA, unions can become the representative based on signed union authorization cards only if the employer voluntarily recognizes the union. If the employer refuses to recognize the union, the union can be certified through a secret-ballot election conducted by the NLRB.

Legacy

The Little Wagner Act, written by Ida Klaus, is the New York City version of the Wagner Act.

Along with other factors, the act contributed to tremendous growth of membership in the labor unions, especially in the mass-production sector. The total number of labor union members grew from three million in 1933 to eight million at the end of the 1930s, with the vast majority of union members living outside of the Southern United States.

Political psychology

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