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The
Battle of Fort Sumter was a Confederate attack on a U.S. fort in South Carolina in April 1861. It was the opening battle of the war.
Historians who debate the origins of the American Civil War focus on the reasons that seven southern states (followed by four other states after the onset of the war) declared their secession from the United States (the Union) and united to form the Confederate States (simply known as the "Confederacy"), and the reasons that the North
refused to let them go. Most of the debate is about the first question,
the reason that some Southern states decided to secede. Most historians
in the 21st century agree that conflict over slavery
caused the war, but they disagree sharply on the aspects of this
conflict (ideological, economic, political, or social) that were most
important.
The principal political battle leading to Southern secession was
over whether slavery would be permitted to expand into newly acquired
western territory destined to be formed into states. Initially Congress had annexed new states into the Union alternating between slave and free. This had kept a sectional balance in the Senate but not in the House of Representatives as free states outstripped slave states in population.
Thus, at mid 19th century, the free versus slave status of the new
territory was a critical issue, both for the North where anti-slavery
sentiment had grown, and for the South where the fear of slavery's
abolition had grown. Another factor for secession and the formation of
the Confederacy, was the development of white Southern nationalism in the preceding decades. The primary reason for the North to reject secession was to preserve the Union, a cause based on American nationalism.
Abraham Lincoln won the 1860 presidential election but had not been on the ballot in ten Southern states. His victory triggered declarations of secession by seven slave states of the Deep South,
all of whose riverfront or coastal economies were based on cotton that
was cultivated by slave labor. They formed the Confederate States after
Lincoln was elected but before he had taken office.
Nationalists in the North and "Unionists" in the South refused to
recognize the declarations of secession. No foreign government ever
recognized the Confederacy. The US government under President James Buchanan
refused to relinquish its forts that were in territory claimed by the
Confederacy. The war itself began on April 12, 1861, when Confederate forces bombarded Fort Sumter, a major fortress in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina.
As a panel of historians emphasized in 2011, "while slavery and
its various and multifaceted discontents were the primary cause of
disunion, it was disunion itself that sparked the war." Pulitzer Prize-winning author David Potter
wrote: "The problem for Americans who, in the age of Lincoln, wanted
slaves to be free was not simply that southerners wanted the opposite,
but that they themselves cherished a conflicting value: they wanted the
Constitution, which protected slavery, to be honored, and the Union,
which had fellowship with slaveholders, to be preserved. Thus they were
committed to values that could not logically be reconciled."
Other important factors were partisan politics, abolitionism, nullification vs secession, Southern and Northern nationalism, expansionism, economics, and modernization in the Antebellum period.
Geography and demographics
By the mid-19th century the United States had become a nation of two distinct regions. The free states in New England, the Northeast, and the Midwest
had a rapidly growing economy based on family farms, industry, mining,
commerce and transportation, with a large and rapidly growing urban
population. Their growth was fed by a high birth rate and large numbers
of European immigrants, especially from Ireland and Germany. The South was dominated by a settled plantation system based on slavery; there was some rapid growth taking place in the Southwest (e.g., Texas),
based on high birth rates and high migration from the Southeast; there
was also immigration by Europeans, but in much smaller number. The
heavily rural South had few cities of any size, and little manufacturing
except in border areas such as St. Louis and Baltimore. Slave owners controlled politics and the economy, although about 75% of white Southern families owned no slaves.
1861 United States Secession Crisis map.
Legend:
States that seceded before April 15, 1861
States that seceded after April 15, 1861
States that permitted slavery, but did not secede
States of the Union that banned slavery
Overall, the Northern population was growing much more quickly than
the Southern population, which made it increasingly difficult for the
South to dominate the national government. By the time the 1860 election
occurred, the heavily agricultural southern states as a group had fewer
Electoral College votes than the rapidly industrializing northern states. Abraham Lincoln was able to win the 1860 presidential election
without even being on the ballot in ten Southern states. Southerners
felt a loss of federal concern for Southern pro-slavery political
demands, and their continued domination of the federal government was
threatened. This political calculus provided a very real basis for
Southerners' worry about the relative political decline of their region,
due to the North growing much faster in terms of population and
industrial output.
In the interest of maintaining unity, politicians had mostly
moderated opposition to slavery, resulting in numerous compromises such
as the Missouri Compromise of 1820 under the presidency of James Monroe. After the Mexican–American War of 1846 to 1848, the issue of slavery in the new territories led to the Compromise of 1850. While the compromise averted an immediate political crisis, it did not permanently resolve the issue of the Slave Power (the power of slaveholders to control the national government on the slavery issue). Part of the Compromise of 1850 was the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850
that required Northerners assist Southerners in reclaiming fugitive
slaves, which many Northerners found to be extremely offensive.
Amid the emergence of increasingly virulent and hostile sectional ideologies in national politics, the collapse of the old Second Party System in the 1850s hampered politicians' efforts to reach yet another compromise. The compromise that was reached (the 1854 Kansas–Nebraska Act) outraged many Northerners, and led to the formation of the Republican Party,
the first major party that was almost entirely Northern-based. The
industrializing North and agrarian Midwest became committed to the
economic ethos of free-labor industrial capitalism.
Arguments that slavery was undesirable for the nation had long
existed, and early in U.S. history were made even by some prominent
Southerners. After 1840, abolitionists denounced slavery as not only a
social evil but a moral wrong. Activists in the new Republican Party,
usually Northerners, had another view: they believed the Slave Power
conspiracy was controlling the national government with the goal of
extending slavery and limiting access to good farm land to rich slave
owners. Southern defenders of slavery, for their part, increasingly came to contend that black people benefited from slavery.
Historical tensions and compromises
Early Republic
At the time of the American Revolution, the institution of slavery
was firmly established in the American colonies. It was most important
in the six southern states from Maryland to Georgia, but the total of a
half million slaves were spread out through all of the colonies. In the
South, 40% of the population was made up of slaves, and as Americans
moved into Kentucky and the rest of the southwest, one-sixth of the
settlers were slaves. By the end of the Revolutionary War, the New England
states provided most of the American ships that were used in the
foreign slave trade, while most of their customers were in Georgia and the Carolinas.
During this time many Americans found it easy to reconcile
slavery with the Bible but a growing number rejected this defense of
slavery. A small antislavery movement, led by the Quakers,
appeared in the 1780s, and by the late 1780s all of the states banned
the international slave trade. No serious national political movement
against slavery developed, largely due to the overriding concern over
achieving national unity.
When the Constitutional Convention met, slavery was the one issue "that
left the least possibility of compromise, the one that would most pit
morality against pragmatism." In the end, many would take comfort in the fact that the word "slavery" never occurs in the Constitution. The three-fifths clause
was a compromise between those (in the North) who wanted no slaves
counted, and those (in the South) who wanted all the slaves counted.
The Constitution also allowed the federal government to suppress
domestic violence which would dedicate national resources to defending
against slave revolts. Imports could not be banned for 20 years. The
need for three-fourths approval for amendments made the Constitutional
abolition of slavery virtually impossible .
With the outlawing of the African slave trade on January 1, 1808, many Americans felt that the slavery issue was resolved.
Any national discussion that might have continued over slavery was
drowned out by the years of trade embargoes, maritime competition with
Great Britain and France, and, finally, the War of 1812.
The one exception to this quiet regarding slavery was the New
Englanders' association of their frustration with the war with their
resentment of the three-fifths clause that seemed to allow the South to
dominate national politics.
During and in the aftermath of the American Revolution (1775–1783), the northern states (north of the Mason–Dixon line
separating Pennsylvania from Maryland and Delaware) abolished slavery
by 1804, although in some states older slaves were turned into
indentured servants who could not be bought or sold. In the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, Congress (still under the Articles of Confederation) barred slavery from the Midwestern territory north of the Ohio River. When Congress organized the territories acquired through the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, there was no ban on slavery.
Missouri Compromise
In 1819 Congressman James Tallmadge Jr. of New York initiated an uproar in the South when he proposed two amendments to a bill admitting Missouri
to the Union as a free state. The first barred slaves from being moved
to Missouri, and the second would free all Missouri slaves born after
admission to the Union at age 25. With the admission of Alabama as a slave state
in 1819, the U.S. was equally divided with 11 slave states and 11 free
states. The admission of the new state of Missouri as a slave state
would give the slave states a majority in the Senate; the Tallmadge Amendment would give the free states a majority.
The Tallmadge amendments passed the House of Representatives but
failed in the Senate when five Northern senators voted with all the
Southern senators. The question was now the admission of Missouri as a slave state, and many leaders shared Thomas Jefferson's fear of a crisis over slavery—a fear that Jefferson described as "a fire bell in the night". The crisis was solved by the Missouri Compromise, in which Massachusetts agreed to cede control over its relatively large, sparsely populated and disputed exclave, the District of Maine. The compromise allowed Maine
to be admitted to the Union as a free state at the same time that
Missouri was admitted as a slave state. The Compromise also banned
slavery in the Louisiana Purchase
territory north and west of the state of Missouri along the line of
36–30. The Missouri Compromise quieted the issue until its limitations
on slavery were repealed by the Kansas–Nebraska Act of 1854.
In the South, the Missouri crisis reawakened old fears that a strong federal government could be a fatal threat to slavery. The Jeffersonian coalition that united southern planters and northern farmers, mechanics and artisans in opposition to the threat presented by the Federalist Party had started to dissolve after the War of 1812.
It was not until the Missouri crisis that Americans became aware of the
political possibilities of a sectional attack on slavery, and it was
not until the mass politics of Andrew Jackson's administration that this type of organization around this issue became practical.
Nullification crisis
President
Andrew Jackson
viewed South Carolina's attempts to nullify the tariffs of 1828 and
1832 as being tantamount to treason. The issue of states' rights would
play a large role leading up to the Civil War nearly 30 years later.
The American System, advocated by Henry Clay in Congress and supported by many nationalist supporters of the War of 1812 such as John C. Calhoun, was a program for rapid economic modernization featuring protective tariffs, internal improvements
at federal expense, and a national bank. The purpose was to develop
American industry and international commerce. Since iron, coal, and
water power were mainly in the North, this tax plan was doomed to cause
rancor in the South where economies were agriculture-based. Southerners claimed it demonstrated favoritism toward the North.
The nation suffered an economic downturn throughout the 1820s,
and South Carolina was particularly affected. The highly protective
Tariff of 1828 (called the "Tariff of Abominations"
by its detractors), designed to protect American industry by taxing
imported manufactured goods, was enacted into law during the last year
of the presidency of John Quincy Adams. Opposed in the South and parts of New England, the expectation of the tariff's opponents was that with the election of Andrew Jackson the tariff would be significantly reduced.
By 1828 South Carolina state politics increasingly organized
around the tariff issue. When the Jackson administration failed to take
any actions to address their concerns, the most radical faction in the
state began to advocate that the state declare the tariff null and void
within South Carolina. In Washington, an open split on the issue
occurred between Jackson and his vice-president John C. Calhoun, the
most effective proponent of the constitutional theory of state
nullification through his 1828 "South Carolina Exposition and Protest".
Congress enacted a new tariff in 1832,
but it offered the state little relief, resulting in the most dangerous
sectional crisis since the Union was formed. Some militant South
Carolinians even hinted at withdrawing from the Union in response. The
newly elected South Carolina legislature then quickly called for the
election of delegates to a state convention. Once assembled, the
convention voted to declare null and void the tariffs of 1828 and 1832
within the state. President Andrew Jackson responded firmly, declaring
nullification an act of treason. He then took steps to strengthen federal forts in the state.
Violence seemed a real possibility early in 1833 as Jacksonians in Congress introduced a "Force Bill"
authorizing the President to use the federal army and navy in order to
enforce acts of Congress. No other state had come forward to support
South Carolina, and the state itself was divided on willingness to
continue the showdown with the federal government. The crisis ended when
Clay and Calhoun worked to devise a compromise tariff. Both sides later
claimed victory. Calhoun and his supporters in South Carolina claimed a
victory for nullification, insisting that it had forced the revision of
the tariff. Jackson's followers, however, saw the episode as a
demonstration that no single state could assert its rights by
independent action.
Calhoun, in turn, devoted his efforts to building up a sense of
Southern solidarity so that when another standoff should come, the whole
section might be prepared to act as a bloc in resisting the federal
government. As early as 1830, in the midst of the crisis, Calhoun
identified the right to own slaves—the foundation of the plantation
agricultural system—as the chief southern minority right being
threatened:
I consider the tariff act as the
occasion, rather than the real cause of the present unhappy state of
things. The truth can no longer be disguised, that the peculiar
domestick [sic]
institution of the Southern States and the consequent direction which
that and her soil have given to her industry, has placed them in regard
to taxation and appropriations in opposite relation to the majority of
the Union, against the danger of which, if there be no protective power
in the reserved rights of the states they must in the end be forced to
rebel, or, submit to have their paramount interests sacrificed, their
domestic institutions subordinated by Colonization and other schemes,
and themselves and children reduced to wretchedness.
On May 1, 1833, Jackson wrote of this idea, "the tariff was only the pretext, and disunion and southern confederacy the real object. The next pretext will be the negro, or slavery question."
The issue appeared again after 1842's Black Tariff. A period of relative free trade followed 1846's Walker Tariff,
which had been largely written by Southerners. Northern industrialists
(and some in western Virginia) complained it was too low to encourage
the growth of industry.
Gag Rule debates
From 1831 to 1836 William Lloyd Garrison and the American Anti-Slavery Society (AA-SS) initiated a campaign to petition Congress in favor of ending slavery in the District of Columbia and all federal territories. Hundreds of thousands of petitions were sent, with the number reaching a peak in 1835.
The House
passed the Pinckney Resolutions on May 26, 1836. The first of these
stated that Congress had no constitutional authority to interfere with
slavery in the states and the second that it "ought not" do so in the
District of Columbia. The third resolution, known from the beginning as
the "gag rule", provided that:
All petitions, memorials,
resolutions, propositions, or papers, relating in any way, or to any
extent whatsoever, to the subject of slavery or the abolition of
slavery, shall, without being either printed or referred, be laid on the
table and that no further action whatever shall be had thereon.
The first two resolutions passed by votes of 182 to 9 and 132 to 45.
The gag rule, supported by Northern and Southern Democrats as well as
some Southern Whigs, was passed with a vote of 117 to 68.
Former President John Quincy Adams,
who was elected to the House of Representatives in 1830, became an
early and central figure in the opposition to the gag rules. He argued that they were a direct violation of the First Amendment right "to petition the Government for a redress of grievances". A majority of Northern Whigs
joined the opposition. Rather than suppress anti-slavery petitions,
however, the gag rules only served to offend Americans from Northern
states, and dramatically increase the number of petitions.
Since the original gag was a resolution, not a standing House
Rule, it had to be renewed every session, and the Adams' faction often
gained the floor before the gag could be imposed. However in January
1840, the House of Representatives passed the Twenty-first Rule, which
prohibited even the reception of anti-slavery petitions and was a
standing House rule. Now the pro-petition forces focused on trying to
revoke a standing rule. The Rule raised serious doubts about its
constitutionality and had less support than the original Pinckney gag,
passing only by 114 to 108. Throughout the gag period, Adams' "superior
talent in using and abusing parliamentary rules" and skill in baiting
his enemies into making mistakes, enabled him to evade the rule and
debate the slavery issues. The gag rule was finally rescinded on
December 3, 1844, by a strongly sectional vote of 108 to 80, all the
Northern and four Southern Whigs voting for repeal, along with 55 of the
71 Northern Democrats.
Antebellum South and the Union
There
had been a continuing contest between the states and the national
government over the power of the latter—and over the loyalty of the
citizenry—almost since the founding of the republic. The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798, for example, had defied the Alien and Sedition Acts, and at the Hartford Convention, New England voiced its opposition to President James Madison and the War of 1812, and discussed secession from the Union.
Southern culture
Although a minority of free Southerners owned slaves, free
Southerners of all classes nevertheless defended the institution of
slavery—threatened by the rise of free labor abolitionist movements in the Northern states—as the cornerstone of their social order.
Per the 1860 census, the percentage of slaveholding families was as follows:
- 26% in the 15 Slave states (AL, AR, DE, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, MO, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA)
- 16% in the 4 Border states (DE, KY, MD, MO)
- 31% in the 11 Confederate states (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA)
- 37% in the first 7 Confederate states (AL, FL, GA, LA, MS, SC, TX)
- 25% in the second 4 Confederate states (AR, NC, TN, VA)
Mississippi was the highest at 49%, followed by South Carolina at 46%
Based on a system of plantation
slavery, the social structure of the South was far more stratified and
patriarchal than that of the North. In 1850 there were around 350,000
slaveholders in a total free Southern population of about six million.
Among slaveholders, the concentration of slave ownership was unevenly
distributed. Perhaps around 7 percent of slaveholders owned roughly
three-quarters of the slave population. The largest slaveholders,
generally owners of large plantations, represented the top stratum of
Southern society. They benefited from economies of scale and needed large numbers of slaves on big plantations to produce cotton, a highly profitable labor-intensive crop.
Per the 1860 Census, in the 15 slave states, slaveholders owning
30 or more slaves (7% of all slaveholders) owned approximately 1,540,000
slaves (39% of all slaves). (PDF p. 64/1860 Census p. 247)
In the 1850s, as large plantation owners outcompeted smaller
farmers, more slaves were owned by fewer planters. Yet poor whites and
small farmers generally accepted the political leadership of the planter
elite. Several factors helped explain why slavery was not under serious
threat of internal collapse from any move for democratic change
initiated from the South. First, given the opening of new territories in
the West for white settlement, many non-slaveowners also perceived a
possibility that they, too, might own slaves at some point in their
life.
Violent
repression of slaves was a common theme in abolitionist literature in
the North. Above, this famous 1863 photo of a slave,
Gordon,
deeply scarred from whipping by an overseer, was distributed by
abolitionists to illustrate what they saw as the barbarism of Southern
society.
Second, small free farmers in the South often embraced racism, making them unlikely agents for internal democratic reforms in the South. The principle of white supremacy,
accepted by almost all white Southerners of all classes, made slavery
seem legitimate, natural, and essential for a civilized society.
"Racial" discrimination was completely legal. White racism in the South
was sustained by official systems of repression such as the "slave
codes" and elaborate codes of speech, behavior, and social practices
illustrating the subordination of blacks to whites. For example, the "slave patrols"
were among the institutions bringing together southern whites of all
classes in support of the prevailing economic and racial order. Serving
as slave "patrollers" and "overseers" offered white Southerners
positions of power and honor in their communities. Policing and
punishing Blacks who transgressed the regimentation of slave society was
a valued community service in the South, where the fear of free Blacks
threatening law and order figured heavily in the public discourse of the
period.
Third, many yeomen and small farmers with a few slaves were linked to elite planters through the market economy. In many areas, small farmers depended on local planter elites for vital goods and services, including access to cotton gins,
markets, feed and livestock, and even loans (since the banking system
was not well developed in the antebellum South). Southern tradesmen
often depended on the richest planters for steady work. Such dependency
effectively deterred many white non-slaveholders from engaging in any
political activity that was not in the interest of the large
slaveholders.
Furthermore, whites of varying social class, including
poor whites and "plain folk" who worked outside or in the periphery of
the market economy (and therefore lacked any real economic interest in
the defense of slavery) might nonetheless be linked to elite planters
through extensive kinship networks. Since inheritance
in the South was often unequitable (and generally favored eldest sons),
it was not uncommon for a poor white person to be perhaps the first
cousin of the richest plantation owner of his county and to share the
same militant support of slavery as his richer relatives. Finally, there
was no secret ballot
at the time anywhere in the United States—this innovation did not
become widespread in the U.S. until the 1880s. For a typical white
Southerner, this meant that so much as casting a ballot against the
wishes of the establishment meant running the risk of being socially ostracized.
Thus, by the 1850s, Southern slaveholders and non-slaveholders
alike felt increasingly encircled psychologically and politically in the
national political arena because of the rise of free soilism and abolitionism
in the Northern states. Increasingly dependent on the North for
manufactured goods, for commercial services, and for loans, and
increasingly cut off from the flourishing agricultural regions of the
Northwest, they faced the prospects of a growing free labor and
abolitionist movement in the North.
Historian William C. Davis
refutes the argument that Southern culture was different from that of
Northern states or that it was a cause of the war, stating, "Socially
and culturally the North and South were not much different. They prayed
to the same deity, spoke the same language, shared the same ancestry,
sang the same songs. National triumphs and catastrophes were shared by
both." He stated that culture was not the cause of the war, but rather,
slavery was: "For all the myths they would create to the contrary, the
only significant and defining difference between them was slavery, where
it existed and where it did not, for by 1804 it had virtually ceased to
exist north of Maryland. Slavery demarked not just their labor and
economic situations, but power itself in the new republic."
Militant defense of slavery
With
the outcry over developments in Kansas strong in the North, defenders
of slavery—increasingly committed to a way of life that abolitionists
and their sympathizers considered obsolete or immoral—articulated a
militant pro-slavery ideology that would lay the groundwork for
secession upon the election of a Republican president. Southerners waged
a vitriolic response to political change in the North. Slaveholding
interests sought to uphold their constitutional rights in the
territories and to maintain sufficient political strength to repulse
"hostile" and "ruinous" legislation. Behind this shift was the growth of
the cotton textile industry in the North and in Europe, which left
slavery more important than ever to the Southern economy.
Abolitionism
Southern spokesmen greatly exaggerated the power of abolitionists, looking especially at the great popularity of Uncle Tom's Cabin (1852), the novel and play by Harriet Beecher Stowe
(whom Abraham Lincoln reputedly called "the little woman that started
this great war"). They saw a vast growing abolitionist movement after
the success of The Liberator in 1831 by William Lloyd Garrison. The fear was a race war by blacks that would massacre whites, especially in counties where whites were a small minority.
The South reacted with an elaborate intellectual defense of slavery. J. D. B. De Bow of New Orleans established De Bow's Review
in 1846, which quickly grew to become the leading Southern magazine,
warning about the dangers of depending on the North economically. De Bow's Review
also emerged as the leading voice for secession. The magazine
emphasized the South's economic inequality, relating it to the
concentration of manufacturing, shipping, banking and international
trade in the North. Searching for Biblical passages endorsing slavery
and forming economic, sociological, historical and scientific arguments,
slavery went from being a "necessary evil" to a "positive good". Dr. John H. Van Evrie's book Negroes and Negro slavery: The First an Inferior Race: The Latter Its Normal Condition—setting
out the arguments the title would suggest—was an attempt to apply
scientific support to the Southern arguments in favor of race-based
slavery.
Latent sectional divisions suddenly activated derogatory
sectional imagery which emerged into sectional ideologies. As industrial
capitalism gained momentum in the North, Southern writers emphasized
whatever aristocratic traits they valued (but often did not practice) in
their own society: courtesy, grace, chivalry,
the slow pace of life, orderly life and leisure. This supported their
argument that slavery provided a more humane society than industrial
labor. In his Cannibals All!, George Fitzhugh argued that the antagonism between labor and capital in a free society would result in "robber barons"
and "pauper slavery", while in a slave society such antagonisms were
avoided. He advocated enslaving Northern factory workers, for their own
benefit. Abraham Lincoln, on the other hand, denounced such Southern
insinuations that Northern wage earners were fatally fixed in that
condition for life. To Free Soilers, the stereotype of the South was one
of a diametrically opposite, static society in which the slave system
maintained an entrenched anti-democratic aristocracy.
Southern fears of modernization
According to the historian James M. McPherson,
exceptionalism applied not to the South but to the North after the
North ended slavery and launched an industrial revolution that led to
urbanization, which in turn led to increased education, which in its own
turn gave ever-increasing strength to various reform movements but
especially abolitionism. The fact that seven immigrants out of eight
settled in the North (and the fact that most immigrants viewed slavery
with disfavor), compounded by the fact that twice as many whites left
the South for the North as vice versa, contributed to the South's
defensive-aggressive political behavior. The Charleston Mercury wrote that on the issue of slavery the North and South "are not only two Peoples, but they are rival, hostile Peoples." As De Bow's Review said, "We are resisting revolution. ... We are not engaged in a Quixotic fight for the rights of man. ... We are conservative."
Allan Nevins argued that the Civil War was an "irrepressible" conflict, adopting a phrase from Senator William H. Seward.
Nevins synthesized contending accounts emphasizing moral, cultural,
social, ideological, political, and economic issues. In doing so, he
brought the historical discussion back to an emphasis on social and
cultural factors. Nevins pointed out that the North and the South were
rapidly becoming two different peoples, a point made also by historian Avery Craven.
At the root of these cultural differences was the problem of slavery,
but fundamental assumptions, tastes, and cultural aims of the regions
were diverging in other ways as well. More specifically, the North was
rapidly modernizing in a manner threatening to the South. Historian
McPherson explains:
When secessionists protested in 1861 that they were
acting to preserve traditional rights and values, they were correct.
They fought to preserve their constitutional liberties against the
perceived Northern threat to overthrow them. The South's concept of
republicanism had not changed in three-quarters of a century; the
North's had. ... The ascension to power of the Republican Party, with
its ideology of competitive, egalitarian free-labor capitalism, was a
signal to the South that the Northern majority had turned irrevocably
towards this frightening, revolutionary future.
Harry L. Watson has synthesized research on antebellum southern social, economic, and political history. Self-sufficient yeomen,
in Watson's view, "collaborated in their own transformation" by
allowing promoters of a market economy to gain political influence.
Resultant "doubts and frustrations" provided fertile soil for the
argument that southern rights and liberties were menaced by Black
Republicanism.
J. Mills Thornton III explained the viewpoint of the average
white Alabamian. Thornton contends that Alabama was engulfed in a severe
crisis long before 1860. Deeply held principles of freedom, equality,
and autonomy, as expressed in Republican values,
appeared threatened, especially during the 1850s, by the relentless
expansion of market relations and commercial agriculture. Alabamians
were thus, he judged, prepared to believe the worst once Lincoln was
elected.
Sectional tensions and the emergence of mass politics
The cry of Free Man was raised, not for the extension of liberty to
the black man, but for the protection of the liberty of the white.
—Frederick Douglass
The politicians of the 1850s were acting in a society in which the
traditional restraints that suppressed sectional conflict in the 1820s
and 1850s—the most important of which being the stability of the
two-party system—were being eroded as this rapid extension of democracy
went forward in the North and South. It was an era when the mass
political party galvanized voter participation to 80% or 90% turnout
rates, and a time in which politics formed an essential component of
American mass culture. Historians agree that political involvement was a
larger concern to the average American in the 1850s than today.
Politics was, in one of its functions, a form of mass entertainment, a
spectacle with rallies, parades, and colorful personalities. Leading
politicians, moreover, often served as a focus for popular interests,
aspirations, and values.
Historian Allan Nevins, for instance, writes of political rallies
in 1856 with turnouts of anywhere from twenty to fifty thousand men and
women. Voter turnouts even ran as high as 84% by 1860. An abundance of
new parties emerged 1854–56, including the Republicans, People's party
men, Anti-Nebraskans, Fusionists, Know Nothings,
Know-Somethings (anti-slavery nativists), Maine Lawites, Temperance
men, Rum Democrats, Silver Gray Whigs, Hindus, Hard Shell Democrats,
Soft Shells, Half Shells and Adopted Citizens. By 1858, they were mostly
gone, and politics divided four ways. Republicans controlled most
Northern states with a strong Democratic minority. The Democrats were
split North and South and fielded two tickets in 1860. Southern
non-Democrats tried different coalitions; most supported the
Constitutional Union party in 1860.
Many Southern states held constitutional conventions in 1851 to
consider the questions of nullification and secession. With the
exception of South Carolina, whose convention election did not even
offer the option of "no secession" but rather "no secession without the
collaboration of other states", the Southern conventions were dominated
by Unionists who voted down articles of secession.
Economics
Historians
today generally agree that economic conflicts were not a major cause of
the war. While an economic basis to the sectional crisis was popular
among the "Progressive school" of historians from the 1910s to the
1940s, few professional historians now subscribe to this explanation.
According to economic historian Lee A. Craig, "In fact, numerous
studies by economic historians over the past several decades reveal that
economic conflict was not an inherent condition of North-South
relations during the antebellum era and did not cause the Civil War."
When numerous groups tried at the last minute in 1860–61 to find a
compromise to avert war, they did not turn to economic policies. The
three major attempts at compromise, the Crittenden Compromise, the Corwin Amendment
and the Washington Peace Conference, addressed only the slavery-related
issues of fugitive slave laws, personal liberty laws, slavery in the
territories and interference with slavery within the existing slave
states.
Economic value of slavery to the South
Historian James L. Huston emphasizes the role of slavery as an economic institution. In October 1860 William Lowndes Yancey, a leading advocate of secession, placed the value of Southern-held slaves at $2.8 billion. Huston writes:
Understanding the relations between
wealth, slavery, and property rights in the South provides a powerful
means of understanding southern political behavior leading to disunion.
First, the size dimensions of slavery are important to comprehend, for
slavery was a colossal institution. Second, the property rights argument
was the ultimate defense of slavery, and white southerners and the
proslavery radicals knew it. Third, the weak point in the protection of
slavery by property rights was the federal government. ... Fourth, the
intense need to preserve the sanctity of property rights in Africans led
southern political leaders to demand the nationalization of slavery—the
condition under which slaveholders would always be protected in their
property holdings.
The cotton gin greatly increased the efficiency with which cotton could be harvested, contributing to the consolidation of "King Cotton"
as the backbone of the economy of the Deep South, and to the
entrenchment of the system of slave labor on which the cotton plantation
economy depended. Any chance that the South would industrialize was
over.
The tendency of monoculture
cotton plantings to lead to soil exhaustion created a need for cotton
planters to move their operations to new lands, and therefore to the
westward expansion of slavery from the Eastern seaboard into new areas (e.g., Alabama, Mississippi, and beyond to East Texas).
Regional economic differences
An animation showing the free/slave status of U.S. states and territories, 1789–1861
The South, Midwest, and Northeast had quite different economic
structures. They traded with each other and each became more prosperous
by staying in the Union, a point many businessmen made in 1860–61.
However, Charles A. Beard
in the 1920s made a highly influential argument to the effect that
these differences caused the war (rather than slavery or constitutional
debates). He saw the industrial Northeast forming a coalition with the
agrarian Midwest against the plantation South. Critics challenged his
image of a unified Northeast and said that the region was in fact highly
diverse with many different competing economic interests. In 1860–61,
most business interests in the Northeast opposed war.
After 1950, only a few mainstream historians accepted the Beard interpretation, though it was accepted by libertarian economists. Historian Kenneth Stampp, who abandoned Beardianism after 1950, sums up the scholarly consensus:
"Most historians ... now see no compelling reason why the divergent
economies of the North and South should have led to disunion and civil
war; rather, they find stronger practical reasons why the sections,
whose economies neatly complemented one another, should have found it
advantageous to remain united."
Free labor vs. pro-slavery arguments
Historian Eric Foner
argued that a free-labor ideology dominated thinking in the North,
which emphasized economic opportunity. By contrast, Southerners
described free labor as "greasy mechanics, filthy operators,
small-fisted farmers, and moonstruck theorists". They strongly opposed the homestead laws
that were proposed to give free farms in the west, fearing the small
farmers would oppose plantation slavery. Indeed, opposition to homestead
laws was far more common in secessionist rhetoric than opposition to
tariffs.
Southerners such as Calhoun argued that slavery was "a positive good",
and that slaves were more civilized and morally and intellectually
improved because of slavery.
Religious conflict over the slavery question
Led by Mark Noll, a body of scholarship
has highlighted the fact that the American debate over slavery became a
shooting war in part because the two sides reached diametrically
opposite conclusions based on reading the same authoritative source of
guidance on moral questions: the King James Version of the Bible.
After the American Revolution and the disestablishment of government-sponsored churches, the U.S. experienced the Second Great Awakening, a massive Protestant
revival. Without centralized church authorities, American Protestantism
was heavily reliant on the Bible, which was read in the standard
19th-century Reformed hermeneutic
of "common sense", literal interpretation as if the Bible were speaking
directly about the modern American situation instead of events that
occurred in a much different context, millennia ago.
By the mid-19th century this form of religion and Bible interpretation
had become a dominant strand in American religious, moral and political
discourse, almost serving as a de facto state religion.
The Bible, interpreted under these assumptions, seemed to clearly suggest that slavery was Biblically justified:
"The pro-slavery South could point to slaveholding by the godly patriarch Abraham
(Gen 12:5; 14:14; 24:35–36; 26:13–14), a practice that was later
incorporated into Israelite national law (Lev 25:44–46). It was never
denounced by Jesus, who made slavery a model of discipleship (Mk 10:44). The Apostle Paul
supported slavery, counseling obedience to earthly masters (Eph 6:5–9;
Col 3:22–25) as a duty in agreement with "the sound words of our Lord
Jesus Christ and the teaching which accords with godliness" (1 Tim 6:3).
Because slaves were to remain in their present state unless they could
win their freedom (1 Cor 7:20–24), he sent the fugitive slave Onesimus back to his owner Philemon
(Phlm 10–20). The abolitionist north had a difficult time matching the
pro-slavery south passage for passage. ... Professor Eugene Genovese,
who has studied these biblical debates over slavery in minute detail,
concludes that the pro-slavery faction clearly emerged victorious over
the abolitionists except for one specious argument based on the
so-called Curse of Ham
(Gen 9:18–27). For our purposes, it is important to realize that the
South won this crucial contest with the North by using the prevailing
hermeneutic, or method of interpretation, on which both sides agreed. So
decisive was its triumph that the South mounted a vigorous
counterattack on the abolitionists as infidels who had abandoned the
plain words of Scripture for the secular ideology of the Enlightenment."
Protestant churches in the U.S., unable to agree on what God's Word
said about slavery, ended up with schisms between Northern and Southern
branches: the Methodist Episcopal Church in 1844, the Baptists in 1845, and the Presbyterian Church in 1857.
These splits presaged the subsequent split in the nation: "The churches
played a major role in the dividing of the nation, and it is probably
true that it was the splits in the churches which made a final split of
the nation inevitable." The conflict over how to interpret the Bible was central:
"The theological crisis occasioned by reasoning like
[conservative Presbyterian theologian James H.] Thornwell's was acute.
Many Northern Bible-readers and not a few in the South felt that slavery was evil. They somehow knew
the Bible supported them in that feeling. Yet when it came to using the
Bible as it had been used with such success to evangelize and civilize
the United States, the sacred page was snatched out of their hands.
Trust in the Bible and reliance upon a Reformed, literal hermeneutic had
created a crisis that only bullets, not arguments, could resolve."
The result:
An 1888 map highlights the Religious view over the slavery question
"The question of the Bible and slavery in the era of the
Civil War was never a simple question. The issue involved the American
expression of a Reformed literal hermeneutic, the failure of
hermeneutical alternatives to gain cultural authority, and the exercise
of deeply entrenched intuitive racism, as well as the presence of
Scripture as an authoritative religious book and slavery as an inherited
social-economic relationship. The North—forced to fight on unfriendly
terrain that it had helped to create—lost the exegetical war. The South
certainly lost the shooting war. But constructive orthodox theology was
the major loser when American believers allowed bullets instead of
hermeneutical self-consciousness to determine what the Bible said about
slavery. For the history of theology in America, the great tragedy of
the Civil War is that the most persuasive theologians were the Rev. Drs.
William Tecumseh Sherman and Ulysses S. Grant."
There were many causes of the Civil War, but the religious conflict,
almost unimaginable in modern America, cut very deep at the time. Noll
and others highlight the significance of the religion issue for the
famous phrase in Lincoln's second inaugural: "Both read the same Bible and pray to the same God, and each invokes His aid against the other."
The territorial crisis and the United States Constitution
United States map, 1863
Union states
Union territories not permitting slavery
Border Union states, permitting slavery
Confederate states
Union territories permitting slavery (claimed by Confederacy)
Between 1803 and 1854, the United States achieved a vast expansion of territory through purchase (Louisiana Purchase), negotiation (Adams–Onís Treaty, Oregon Treaty), and conquest (the Mexican Cession).
Of the states carved out of these territories by 1845, all had entered
the union as slave states: Louisiana, Missouri, Arkansas, Florida, and
Texas, as well as the southern portions of Alabama and Mississippi.
With the conquest of northern Mexico, including California, in 1848,
slaveholding interests looked forward to the institution flourishing in
these lands as well. Southerners also anticipated annexing as slave
states Cuba (see Ostend Manifesto), Mexico, and Central America (see Golden Circle (proposed country)).
Northern free soil interests vigorously sought to curtail any further
expansion of slave soil. It was these territorial disputes that the
proslavery and antislavery forces collided over.
The existence of slavery in the southern states was far less
politically polarizing than the explosive question of the territorial
expansion of the institution in the west.
Moreover, Americans were informed by two well-established readings of
the Constitution regarding human bondage: that the slave states had
complete autonomy over the institution within their boundaries, and that
the domestic slave trade—trade among the states—was immune to federal
interference. The only feasible strategy available to attack slavery was to restrict its expansion into the new territories. Slaveholding interests fully grasped the danger that this strategy posed to them.
Both the South and the North believed: "The power to decide the
question of slavery for the territories was the power to determine the
future of slavery itself."
By 1860, four doctrines had emerged to answer the question of
federal control in the territories, and they all claimed to be
sanctioned by the Constitution, implicitly or explicitly.
Two of the "conservative" doctrines emphasized the written text and
historical precedents of the founding document, while the other two
doctrines developed arguments that transcended the Constitution.
One of the "conservative" theories, represented by the Constitutional Union Party,
argued that the historical designation of free and slave apportionments
in territories should become a Constitutional mandate. The Crittenden Compromise of 1860 was an expression of this view.
The second doctrine of Congressional preeminence, championed by Abraham Lincoln and the Republican Party,
insisted that the Constitution did not bind legislators to a policy of
balance—that slavery could be excluded altogether in a territory at the
discretion of Congress—with one caveat: the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment must apply. In other words, Congress could restrict human bondage, but never establish it. The Wilmot Proviso announced this position in 1846.
Of the two doctrines that rejected federal authority, one was articulated by northern Democrat of Illinois Senator Stephen A. Douglas, and the other by southern Democratic Senator Jefferson Davis of Mississippi and Senator John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky.
Douglas devised the doctrine of territorial or "popular" sovereignty,
which declared that the settlers in a territory had the same rights as
states in the Union to establish or disestablish slavery—a purely local
matter.
Congress, having created the territory, was barred, according to
Douglas, from exercising any authority in domestic matters. To do so
would violate historic traditions of self-government, implicit in the US
Constitution. The Kansas–Nebraska Act of 1854 legislated this doctrine.
The fourth in this quartet is the theory of state sovereignty ("states' rights"), also known as the "Calhoun doctrine" after the South Carolinian political theorist and statesman John C. Calhoun.
Rejecting the arguments for federal authority or self-government, state
sovereignty would empower states to promote the expansion of slavery as
part of the federal union under the US Constitution—and not merely as
an argument for secession.
The basic premise was that all authority regarding matters of slavery
in the territories resided in each state. The role of the federal
government was merely to enable the implementation of state laws when
residents of the states entered the territories.
Calhoun asserted that the federal government in the territories was
only the agent of the several sovereign states, and hence incapable of
forbidding the bringing into any territory of anything that was legal
property in any state. State sovereignty, in other words, gave the laws
of the slaveholding states extra-jurisdictional effect.
"States' rights" was an ideology formulated and applied as a means of advancing slave state interests through federal authority.
As historian Thomas L Krannawitter points out, "[T]he Southern demand
for federal slave protection represented a demand for an unprecedented
expansion of federal power."
By 1860, these four doctrines comprised the major ideologies
presented to the American public on the matters of slavery, the
territories and the US Constitution.
Abolitionism
Antislavery movements in the North gained momentum in the 1830s and
1840s, a period of rapid transformation of Northern society that
inspired a social and political reformism. Many of the reformers of the
period, including abolitionists, attempted in one way or another to
transform the lifestyle and work habits of labor, helping workers
respond to the new demands of an industrializing, capitalistic society.
Antislavery, like many other reform movements of the period, was influenced by the legacy of the Second Great Awakening,
a period of religious revival in the new country stressing the reform
of individuals, which was still relatively fresh in the American memory.
Thus, while the reform spirit of the period was expressed by a variety
of movements with often-conflicting political goals, most reform
movements shared a common feature in their emphasis on the Great
Awakening principle of transforming the human personality through
discipline, order, and restraint.
"Abolitionist" had several meanings at the time. The followers of William Lloyd Garrison, including Wendell Phillips and Frederick Douglass, demanded the "immediate abolition of slavery", hence the name. A more pragmatic group of abolitionists, like Theodore Weld and Arthur Tappan,
wanted immediate action, but that action might well be a program of
gradual emancipation, with a long intermediate stage. "Antislavery men",
like John Quincy Adams,
did what they could to limit slavery and end it where possible, but
were not part of any abolitionist group. For example, in 1841 Adams
represented the Amistad African slaves in the Supreme Court of the United States and argued that they should be set free. In the last years before the war, "antislavery" could mean the Northern majority, like Abraham Lincoln, who opposed expansion of slavery or its influence, as by the Kansas–Nebraska Act, or the Fugitive Slave Act. Many Southerners called all these abolitionists, without distinguishing them from the Garrisonians. James M. McPherson
explains the abolitionists' deep beliefs: "All people were equal in
God's sight; the souls of black folks were as valuable as those of
whites; for one of God's children to enslave another was a violation of
the Higher Law, even if it was sanctioned by the Constitution."
A woodcut from the abolitionist
Anti-Slavery Almanac (1839) depicts the kidnapping of a free African American with the intention of selling him as a slave.
Stressing the Yankee Protestant
ideals of self-improvement, industry, and thrift, most
abolitionists—most notably William Lloyd Garrison—condemned slavery as a
lack of control over one's own destiny and the fruits of one's labor.
Wendell Phillips, one of the most ardent abolitionists, attacked the Slave Power and presaged disunion as early as 1845:
The experience of the fifty years ... shows us the
slaves trebling in numbers—slaveholders monopolizing the offices and
dictating the policy of the Government—prostituting the strength and
influence of the Nation to the support of slavery here and
elsewhere—trampling on the rights of the free States, and making the
courts of the country their tools. To continue this disastrous alliance
longer is madness. ... Why prolong the experiment?
Abolitionists also attacked slavery as a threat to the freedom of
white Americans. Defining freedom as more than a simple lack of
restraint, antebellum reformers held that the truly free man was one who
imposed restraints upon himself. Thus, for the anti-slavery reformers
of the 1830s and 1840s, the promise of free labor and upward social
mobility (opportunities for advancement, rights to own property, and to
control one's own labor), was central to the ideal of reforming
individuals.
Controversy over the so-called Ostend Manifesto (which proposed the U.S. annexation of Cuba as a slave state) and the Fugitive Slave Act
kept sectional tensions alive before the issue of slavery in the West
could occupy the country's politics in the mid-to-late 1850s.
Antislavery sentiment among some groups in the North intensified after the Compromise of 1850,
when Southerners began appearing in Northern states to pursue fugitives
or often to claim as slaves free African Americans who had resided
there for years. Meanwhile, some abolitionists openly sought to prevent
enforcement of the law. Violation of the Fugitive Slave Act was often
open and organized. In Boston—a city from which it was boasted that no fugitive had ever been returned—Theodore Parker
and other members of the city's elite helped form mobs to prevent
enforcement of the law as early as April 1851. A pattern of public
resistance emerged in city after city, notably in Syracuse in 1851 (culminating in the Jerry Rescue
incident late that year), and Boston again in 1854. But the issue did
not lead to a crisis until revived by the same issue underlying the Missouri Compromise of 1820: slavery in the territories.
Arguments for and against slavery
William
Lloyd Garrison, a prominent abolitionist, was motivated by a belief in
the growth of democracy. Because the Constitution had a three-fifths clause, a fugitive slave clause, and a 20-year protection of the Atlantic slave trade, Garrison publicly burned a copy of the U.S. Constitution, and called it "a covenant with death and an agreement with hell".
In 1854, he said:
I am a believer in that portion of
the Declaration of American Independence in which it is set forth, as
among self-evident truths, "that all men are created equal; that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among
these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Hence, I am an
abolitionist. Hence, I cannot but regard oppression in every form—and
most of all, that which turns a man into a thing—with indignation and
abhorrence.
Opposite opinions on slavery were expressed by Confederate Vice-President Alexander Stephens in his "Cornerstone Speech". Stephens said:
(Thomas Jefferson's)
ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the
assumption of the equality of races. This was an error. ... Our new
government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations
are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is
not equal to the white man; that slavery—subordination to the superior
race—is his natural and normal condition.
"Free soil" movement
Opposition to the 1847 Wilmot Proviso helped to consolidate the "free-soil" forces. In 1848 Radical New York Democrats known as Barnburners, members of the Liberty Party, and anti-slavery Whigs formed the Free-Soil Party. The party supported former President Martin Van Buren and Charles Francis Adams Sr.
for President and Vice President. The party opposed the expansion of
slavery into territories where it had not yet existed, such as Oregon
and the ceded Mexican territory. It had the effect of dividing the
Democratic Party in the North, especially in areas of Yankee settlement.
Eric Foner in Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War
(1970) emphasized the importance of free labor ideology to Northern
opponents of slavery, pointing out that the moral concerns of the
abolitionists were not necessarily the dominant sentiments in the North.
Many Northerners (including Lincoln) opposed slavery also because they
feared that rich slave owners would buy up the best lands and block
opportunity for free white farmers using family and hired labor. Free
Soilers joined the Republican party in 1854, with their appeal to
powerful demands in the North through a broader commitment to "free labor" principles. Fear of the "Slave Power"
had a far greater appeal to Northern self-interest than did
abolitionist arguments based on the plight of black slaves in the South.
Slavery question in territories acquired from Mexico
Soon after the Mexican War started and long before negotiation of the new US-Mexico border, the question of slavery in the territories to be acquired polarized the Northern and Southern United States in the most bitter sectional conflict up to this time, which lasted for a deadlock of four years during which the Second Party System broke up, Mormon pioneers settled Utah, the California Gold Rush settled California, and New Mexico under a federal military government turned back Texas's attempt to assert control over territory Texas claimed as far west as the Rio Grande. Eventually the Compromise of 1850 preserved the Union, but only for another decade. Proposals included:
- The Wilmot Proviso
banning slavery in any new territory to be acquired from Mexico, not
including Texas, which had been annexed the previous year. Passed by the
United States House of Representatives in August 1846 and February 1847 but not the Senate. Later an effort to attach the proviso to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo also failed.
- Failed amendments to the Wilmot Proviso by William W. Wick and then Stephen Douglas extending the Missouri Compromise line (36°30' parallel north) west to the Pacific Ocean , allowing slavery in most of present-day New Mexico and Arizona, southern Nevada, and Southern California, as well as any other territories that might be acquired from Mexico. The line was again proposed by the Nashville Convention of June 1850.
- Popular sovereignty, developed by Lewis Cass and Douglas as the eventual Democratic Party position, letting each territory decide whether to allow slavery.
- William L. Yancey's "Alabama Platform", endorsed by the Alabama and Georgia legislatures and by Democratic state conventions in Florida and Virginia,
called for no restrictions on slavery in the territories either by the
federal government or by territorial governments before statehood,
opposition to any candidates supporting either the Wilmot Proviso or
popular sovereignty, and federal legislation overruling Mexican
anti-slavery laws.
- General Zachary Taylor, who became the Whig
candidate in 1848 and then President from March 1849 to July 1850,
proposed after becoming President that the entire area become two free
states, called California and New Mexico, but much larger than the
eventual ones. None of the area would be left as an unorganized or organized territory, avoiding the question of slavery in the territories.
- The Mormons' proposal for a State of Deseret, incorporating most of the area of the Mexican Cession but excluding the large non-Mormon populations in Northern California and central New Mexico, was considered unlikely to succeed in Congress, but nevertheless in 1849 President Zachary Taylor sent his agent John Wilson westward with a proposal to combine California and Deseret as a single state, decreasing the number of new free states and the erosion of Southern parity in the Senate.
- The Compromise of 1850, proposed by Henry Clay
in January 1850, guided to passage by Douglas over Northern Whig and
Southern Democrat opposition, and enacted September 1850, admitted
California as a free state, including Southern California, and organized Utah Territory and New Mexico Territory
with slavery to be decided by popular sovereignty. Texas dropped its
claim to the disputed northwestern areas in return for debt relief, and
the areas were divided between the two new territories and unorganized territory. El Paso,
where Texas had successfully established county government, was left in
Texas. No territory dominated by Southerners (like the later
short-lived Confederate Territory of Arizona) was created. Also, the slave trade was abolished in Washington, D.C. (but not slavery itself), and the Fugitive Slave Act was strengthened.
States' rights
States' rights was an issue in the 19th century for those who felt
that the federal government was superseded by the authority of the
individual states and was in violation of the role intended for it by
the Founding Fathers of the United States. Kenneth M. Stampp notes that each section used states' rights arguments when convenient, and shifted positions when convenient.
For example, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was enacted by southern
representatives to use federal authority to suppress northern states'
rights. The constitution gave federal protection to slave property
rights, and slaveholders demanded that this federal power should be
strengthened and take precedence over northern state laws. Anti-slavery
forces in northern legislatures had resisted this constitutional right
in the form of state personal liberty laws that placed state laws above
the federal mandate.
States' rights and slavery
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.
noted that the states' rights "never had any real vitality independent
of underlying conditions of vast social, economic, or political
significance." He further elaborated:
From the close of the nullification
episode of 1832–1833 to the outbreak of the Civil War, the agitation of
state rights was intimately connected with a new issue of growing
importance, the slavery question, and the principal form assumed by the
doctrine was that of the right of secession. The pro-slavery forces
sought refuge in the state rights position as a shield against federal
interference with pro-slavery projects. ... As a natural consequence,
anti-slavery legislatures in the North were led to lay great stress on
the national character of the Union and the broad powers of the general
government in dealing with slavery. Nevertheless, it is significant to
note that when it served anti-slavery purposes better to lapse into
state rights dialectic, northern legislatures did not hesitate to be
inconsistent.
Echoing Schlesinger, Forrest McDonald
wrote that "the dynamics of the tension between federal and state
authority changed abruptly during the late 1840s" as a result of the
acquisition of territory in the Mexican War. McDonald states:
And then, as a by-product or
offshoot of a war of conquest, slavery—a subject that leading
politicians had, with the exception of the gag rule controversy and
Calhoun's occasional outbursts, scrupulously kept out of partisan
debate—erupted as the dominant issue in that arena. So disruptive was
the issue that it subjected the federal Union to the greatest strain the
young republic had yet known.
In a February 1861 speech to the Virginian secession convention, Georgian Henry L. Benning stated the reasoning behind Georgia's declaring secession from the Union:
What was the reason that induced
... secession? This reason may be summed up in one single proposition.
It was a conviction, a deep conviction ... that a separation from the
North—was the only thing that could prevent the abolition of ...
slavery. ... unless there had been a separation from the North, slavery
would be abolished in Georgia ...
States' rights and minority rights
States'
rights theories gained strength from the awareness that the Northern
population was growing much faster than the population of the South, so
it was only a matter of time before the North controlled the federal
government. Acting as a "conscious minority", Southerners hoped that a
strict constructionist interpretation of the Constitution would limit
federal power over the states, and that a defense of states' rights
against federal encroachments or even nullification or secession would
save the South.
Before 1860, most presidents were either Southern or pro-South. The
North's growing population would mean the election of pro-North
presidents, and the addition of free-soil states would end Southern
parity with the North in the Senate. As the historian Allan Nevins
described Calhoun's theory of states' rights, "Governments, observed
Calhoun, were formed to protect minorities, for majorities could take
care of themselves."
Until the 1860 election, the South's interests nationally were
entrusted to the Democratic Party. In 1860, the Democratic Party split
into Northern and Southern factions as the result of a "bitter debate in
the Senate between Jefferson Davis and Stephen Douglas". The debate was
over resolutions proposed by Davis "opposing popular sovereignty and
supporting a federal slave code and states' rights" which carried over
to the national convention in Charleston.
Jefferson Davis defined equality in terms of the equal rights of states, and opposed the declaration that all men are created equal.
Jefferson Davis stated that a "disparaging discrimination" and a fight
for "liberty" against "the tyranny of an unbridled majority" gave the
Confederate states a right to secede. In 1860, Congressman Laurence M. Keitt of South Carolina said, "The anti-slavery party
contend that slavery is wrong in itself, and the Government is a
consolidated national democracy. We of the South contend that slavery is
right, and that this is a confederate Republic of sovereign States."
Stampp mentioned Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens' A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States as an example of a Southern leader who said that slavery was the "cornerstone of the Confederacy"
when the war began and then later switched course in saying that the
war was not about slavery but states' rights after the Confederacy's
defeat. Stampp said that Stephens became one of the most ardent
defenders of the Lost Cause.
Historian William C. Davis also mentioned inconsistencies in Southern states' rights arguments. He explained the Confederate Constitution's protection of slavery at the national level as follows:
To the old Union they had said that
the Federal power had no authority to interfere with slavery issues in a
state. To their new nation they would declare that the state had no
power to interfere with a federal protection of slavery. Of all the many
testimonials to the fact that slavery, and not states rights, really
lay at the heart of their movement, this was the most eloquent of all.
W.C. Davis also stated that:
In fact, the state rights defense
of secession in 1860–1861 did not really appear in force until after
1865 as builders of the Lost Cause myth sought to distance themselves
from slavery.
Southern historian Gordon Rhea wrote in 2011 that:
Tariffs appear nowhere in ...
sermons and speeches, and 'states' rights' are mentioned only in the
context of the rights of states to ... own other humans. The central
message was to play on the fear of African barbarians ... The preachers
and politicians delivered on their promise. The Confederate States were
established explicitly to preserve and expand the institution of
slavery. Alexander Stephens, the Confederacy's vice president, said so himself in 1861, in unambiguous terms.
Compromise of 1850
The victory of the United States over Mexico resulted in the addition
of large new territories conquered from Mexico. Controversy over
whether the territories would be slave or free raised the risk of a war
between slave and free states and over Northern support for the Wilmot Proviso,
which would have banned slavery in the conquered territories, increased
sectional tensions. The controversy was temporarily resolved by the Compromise of 1850, which allowed the territories of Utah and New Mexico to decide for or against slavery, but also allowed the admission of California as a free state, reduced the size of the slave state of Texas by adjusting the boundary, and ended the slave trade but not slavery itself in the District of Columbia. In return, the South got a stronger fugitive slave law than the version mentioned in the US Constitution. The Fugitive Slave Law would reignite controversy over slavery.
Fugitive Slave Law issues
The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 required Northerners to assist Southerners in reclaiming fugitive slaves, which many Northerners strongly opposed. Anthony Burns was among the fugitive slaves captured and returned in chains to slavery as a result of the law. Harriet Beecher Stowe's best-selling novel Uncle Tom's Cabin greatly increased opposition to the Fugitive Slave Act.
Kansas–Nebraska Act (1854)
Most people thought the Compromise had ended the territorial issue, but Stephen A. Douglas
reopened it in 1854. Douglas proposed the Kansas–Nebraska Bill with the
intention of opening up vast new high-quality farm lands to settlement.
As a Chicagoan,
he was especially interested in the railroad connections from Chicago
into Kansas and Nebraska, but that was not a controversial point. More
importantly, Douglas firmly believed in democracy at the grass
roots—that actual settlers have the right to decide on slavery, not
politicians from other states. His bill provided that popular sovereignty, through the territorial legislatures, should decide "all questions pertaining to slavery", thus effectively repealing the Missouri Compromise.
The ensuing public reaction against it created a firestorm of protest
in the Northern states. It was seen as an effort to repeal the Missouri
Compromise. However, the popular reaction in the first month after the
bill's introduction failed to foreshadow the gravity of the situation.
As Northern papers initially ignored the story, Republican leaders
lamented the lack of a popular response.
Eventually, the popular reaction did come, but the leaders had to spark it. Salmon P. Chase's "Appeal of the Independent Democrats" did much to arouse popular opinion. In New York, William H. Seward
finally took it upon himself to organize a rally against the Nebraska
bill, since none had arisen spontaneously. Press such as the National Era, the New-York Tribune, and local free-soil journals, condemned the bill. The Lincoln–Douglas debates of 1858 drew national attention to the issue of slavery expansion.
Fragmentation of the American party system
Founding of the Republican Party (1854)
Charles Sumner, the Senate's leading opponent of slavery
The American party system had been dominated by Whigs and Democrats
for decades leading up to the Civil War. But the Whig party's increasing
internal divisions had made it a party of strange bedfellows by the
1850s. An ascendant anti-slavery wing clashed with a traditionalist and
increasingly pro-slavery southern wing. These divisions came to a head
in the 1852 election, where Whig candidate Winfield Scott was trounced by Franklin Pierce.
Southern Whigs, who had supported the prior Whig president Zachary
Taylor, had been burned by Taylor and were unwilling to support another
Whig. Taylor, who despite being a slaveowner, had proved notably
anti-slave despite campaigning neutrally on the issue. With the loss of
Southern Whig support, and the loss of votes in the North to the Free Soil Party, Whigs seemed doomed. So they were, as they would never again contest a presidential election.
The final nail in the Whig coffin was the Kansas-Nebraska act. It was also the spark that began the Republican Party, which would take in both Whigs and Free Soilers and create an anti-slavery party that the Whigs had always resisted becoming. The Act opened Kansas Territory and Nebraska Territory to slavery and future admission as slave states, thus implicitly repealing the prohibition on slavery in territory north of 36° 30′ latitude that had been part of the Missouri Compromise.
This change was viewed by anti-slavery Northerners as an aggressive,
expansionist maneuver by the slave-owning South. Opponents of the Act
were intensely motivated and began forming a new party. The Party began
as a coalition of anti-slavery Conscience Whigs such as Zachariah Chandler and Free Soilers such as Salmon P. Chase.
The first anti-Nebraska local meeting where "Republican" was suggested as a name for a new anti-slavery party was held in a Ripon, Wisconsin schoolhouse on March 20, 1854. The first statewide convention that formed a platform and nominated candidates under the Republican name was held near Jackson, Michigan,
on July 6, 1854. At that convention, the party opposed the expansion
of slavery into new territories and selected a statewide slate of
candidates. The Midwest took the lead in forming state Republican Party tickets; apart from St. Louis and a few areas adjacent to free states, there were no efforts to organize the Party in the southern states.
So was born the Republican Party—campaigning on the popular, emotional
issue of "free soil" in the frontier—which would capture the White House just six years later.
"Bleeding Kansas" and the elections of 1856
In Kansas around 1855, the slavery issue reached a condition of
intolerable tension and violence. But this was in an area where an
overwhelming proportion of settlers were merely land-hungry Westerners
indifferent to the public issues. The majority of the inhabitants were
not concerned with sectional tensions or the issue of slavery. Instead,
the tension in Kansas began as a contention between rival claimants.
During the first wave of settlement, no one held titles to the land, and
settlers rushed to occupy newly open land fit for cultivation. While the tension and violence did emerge as a pattern pitting Yankee
and Missourian settlers against each other, there is little evidence of
any ideological divides on the questions of slavery. Instead, the
Missouri claimants, thinking of Kansas as their own domain, regarded the
Yankee squatters as invaders, while the Yankees accused the Missourians of grabbing the best land without honestly settling on it.
However, the 1855–56 violence in "Bleeding Kansas" did reach an ideological climax after John Brown—regarded
by followers as the instrument of God's will to destroy slavery—entered
the melee. His assassination of five pro-slavery settlers (the
so-called "Pottawatomie massacre", during the night of May 24, 1856) resulted in some irregular, guerrilla-style
strife. Aside from John Brown's fervor, the strife in Kansas often
involved only armed bands more interested in land claims or loot.
His zeal in the cause of freedom was infinitely superior to mine ...
Mine was as the taper light; his was as the burning sun. I could live
for the slave; John Brown could die for him.
—Frederick Douglass speaking of John Brown
Of greater importance than the civil strife in Kansas, however, was
the reaction against it nationwide and in Congress. In both North and
South, the belief was widespread that the aggressive designs of the
other section were epitomized by (and responsible for) what was
happening in Kansas. Consequently, "Bleeding Kansas" emerged as a symbol
of sectional controversy.
Indignant over the developments in Kansas, the Republicans—the first entirely sectional major party in U.S. history—entered their first presidential campaign with confidence. Their nominee, John C. Frémont, was a generally safe candidate for the new party. Although his nomination upset some of their Nativist Know-Nothing
supporters (his mother was a Catholic), the nomination of the famed
explorer of the Far West and ex-senator from California with a short
political record was an attempt to woo ex-Democrats. The other two
Republican contenders, William H. Seward and Salmon P. Chase, were seen as too radical.
Nevertheless, the campaign of 1856
was waged almost exclusively on the slavery issue—pitted as a struggle
between democracy and aristocracy—focusing on the question of Kansas.
The Republicans condemned the Kansas–Nebraska Act and the expansion of
slavery, but they advanced a program of internal improvements
combining the idealism of anti-slavery with the economic aspirations of
the North. The new party rapidly developed a powerful partisan culture,
and energetic activists drove voters to the polls in unprecedented
numbers. People reacted with fervor. Young Republicans organized the
"Wide Awake" clubs and chanted "Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men,
Frémont!" With Southern Fire-Eaters and even some moderates uttering threats of secession if Frémont won, the Democratic candidate, Buchanan, benefited from apprehensions about the future of the Union.
Millard Fillmore, the candidate of the American Party (Know-Nothings) and the Silver Gray Whigs, said in a speech at Albany, New York, that the election of a Republican candidate would dissolve the Union. Abraham Lincoln replied on July 23 in a speech at Galena, Illinois; Carl Sandburg wrote that this speech probably resembled Lincoln's Lost Speech:
"This Government would be very weak, indeed, if a majority, with a
disciplined army and navy, and a well-filled treasury, could not
preserve itself, when attacked by an unarmed, undisciplined, unorganized
minority. All this talk about the dissolution of the Union is
humbug—nothing but folly. We won't dissolve the Union, and you shan't."
Dred Scott decision (1857) and the Lecompton Constitution
The Lecompton Constitution and Dred Scott v. Sanford [sic] (the Respondent's name, Sandford, was misspelled in the reports) were both part of the Bleeding Kansas controversy over slavery as a result of the Kansas–Nebraska Act, which was Stephen Douglas' attempt at replacing the Missouri Compromise
ban on slavery in the Kansas and Nebraska territories with popular
sovereignty, which meant that the people of a territory could vote
either for or against slavery. The Lecompton Constitution, which would
have allowed slavery in Kansas, was the result of massive vote fraud by
the pro-slavery Border Ruffians.
Douglas defeated the Lecompton Constitution because it was supported by
the minority of pro-slavery people in Kansas, and Douglas believed in
majority rule. Douglas hoped that both South and North would support
popular sovereignty, but the opposite was true. Neither side trusted
Douglas.
The Supreme Court decision of 1857 in Dred Scott v. Sandford added to the controversy. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney's decision said that blacks were "so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect,"
and that slavery could spread into the territories even if the majority
of people in the territories were anti-slavery. Lincoln warned that
"the next Dred Scott decision" could impose slavery on Northern states.
Buchanan, Republicans and anti-administration Democrats
President James Buchanan
President James Buchanan
decided to end the troubles in Kansas by urging Congress to admit
Kansas as a slave state under the Lecompton Constitution. Kansas voters,
however, soundly rejected this constitution by a vote of 10,226 to 138.
As Buchanan directed his presidential authority to promoting the
Lecompton Constitution, he further angered the Republicans and alienated
members of his own party. Prompting their break with the
administration, the Douglasites saw this scheme as an attempt to pervert
the principle of popular sovereignty on which the Kansas–Nebraska Act
was based. Nationwide, conservatives were incensed, feeling as though
the principles of states' rights had been violated. Even in the South, ex-Whigs and border state Know-Nothings—most notably John Bell and John J. Crittenden
(key figures in the event of sectional controversies)—urged the
Republicans to oppose the administration's moves and take up the demand
that the territories be given the power to accept or reject slavery.
As the schism in the Democratic party deepened, moderate
Republicans argued that an alliance with anti-administration Democrats,
especially Stephen Douglas, would be a key advantage in the 1860 elections.
Some Republican observers saw the controversy over the Lecompton
Constitution as an opportunity to peel off Democratic support in the
border states, where Frémont picked up little support. After all, the
border states had often gone for Whigs with a Northern base of support
in the past without prompting threats of Southern withdrawal from the
Union.
Among the proponents of this strategy was The New York Times,
which called on the Republicans to downplay opposition to popular
sovereignty in favor of a compromise policy calling for "no more slave
states" in order to quell sectional tensions. The Times
maintained that for the Republicans to be competitive in the 1860
elections, they would need to broaden their base of support to include
all voters who for one reason or another were upset with the Buchanan
Administration.
Indeed, pressure was strong for an alliance that would unite the
growing opposition to the Democratic Administration. But such an
alliance was no novel idea; it would essentially entail transforming the
Republicans into the national, conservative, Union party of the
country. In effect, this would be a successor to the Whig party.
Republican leaders, however, staunchly opposed any attempts to
modify the party position on slavery, appalled by what they considered a
surrender of their principles when, for example, all the ninety-two
Republican members of Congress voted for the Crittenden-Montgomery bill
in 1858. Although this compromise measure blocked Kansas' entry into
the union as a slave state, the fact that it called for popular
sovereignty, instead of rejecting slavery altogether, was troubling to
the party leaders.
In the end, the Crittenden-Montgomery bill did not create a grand
anti-administration coalition of Republicans, ex-Whig Southerners in
the border states, and Northern Democrats. Instead, the Democratic Party
merely split along sectional lines. Anti-Lecompton Democrats complained
that certain leaders had imposed a pro-slavery policy upon the party.
The Douglasites, however, refused to yield to administration pressure.
Like the anti-Nebraska Democrats, who were now members of the Republican
Party, the Douglasites insisted that they—not the
administration—commanded the support of most northern Democrats.
Extremist sentiment in the South advanced dramatically as the
Southern planter class perceived its hold on the executive, legislative,
and judicial apparatuses of the central government wane. It also grew
increasingly difficult for Southern Democrats to manipulate power in
many of the Northern states through their allies in the Democratic
Party.
Honor
Historians have emphasized that the sense of honor was a central concern of upper-class white Southerners.
The idea of being treated like a second-class citizen was anathema and
could not be tolerated by an honorable southerner. The abolitionist
position held that slavery was a negative or evil phenomenon that
damaged the rights of white men and the prospects of republicanism. To
the white South this rhetoric made Southerners second-class citizens
because it trampled what they believed was their Constitutional right to
take their chattel property anywhere.
Assault on Sumner (1856)
Northern image of the 1856 attack on Sumner
On May 19 Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner gave a long speech in the Senate entitled "The Crime Against Kansas", which condemned the Slave Power
as the evil force behind the nation's troubles. Sumner said the
Southerners had committed a "crime against Kansas", singling out Senator
Andrew P. Butler of South Carolina.
Sumner famously cast the South Carolinian as having "chosen a mistress
... who, though ugly to others, is always lovely to him; though polluted
in the sight of the world, is chaste in his sight—I mean the harlot,
slavery!"
According to Hoffer (2010), "It is also important to note the sexual
imagery that recurred throughout the oration, which was neither
accidental nor without precedent. Abolitionists routinely accused
slaveholders of maintaining slavery so that they could engage in
forcible sexual relations with their slaves." Three days later, Sumner, working at his desk on the Senate floor, was beaten almost to death by Congressman Preston S. Brooks,
Butler's nephew. Sumner took years to recover; he became the martyr to
the antislavery cause who said the episode proved the barbarism of slave
society. Brooks was lauded as a hero upholding Southern honor. Although
Representative Anson Burlingame
managed to publicly embarrass Brooks in retaliation, the original
episode further polarized North and South, strengthened the new
Republican Party, and added a new element of violence on the floor of
Congress.
Emergence of Lincoln
Republican Party structure
Despite their significant loss in the election of 1856,
Republican leaders realized that even though they appealed only to
Northern voters, they need win only two more states, such as Pennsylvania and Illinois, to win the presidency in 1860.
As the Democrats were grappling with their own troubles, leaders
in the Republican party fought to keep elected members focused on the
issue of slavery in the West, which allowed them to mobilize popular
support. Chase wrote Sumner that if the conservatives succeeded, it
might be necessary to recreate the Free Soil Party. He was also
particularly disturbed by the tendency of many Republicans to eschew
moral attacks on slavery for political and economic arguments.
The controversy over slavery in the West was still not creating a
fixation on the issue of slavery. Although the old restraints on the
sectional tensions were being eroded with the rapid extension of mass politics
and mass democracy in the North, the perpetuation of conflict over the
issue of slavery in the West still required the efforts of radical
Democrats in the South and radical Republicans in the North. They had to
ensure that the sectional conflict would remain at the center of the
political debate.
William Seward
contemplated this potential in the 1840s, when the Democrats were the
nation's majority party, usually controlling Congress, the presidency,
and many state offices. The country's institutional structure and party
system allowed slaveholders to prevail in more of the nation's
territories and to garner a great deal of influence over national
policy. With growing popular discontent with the unwillingness of many
Democratic leaders to take a stand against slavery, and growing
consciousness of the party's increasingly pro-Southern stance, Seward
became convinced that the only way for the Whig Party to counteract the
Democrats' strong monopoly of the rhetoric of democracy and equality was
for the Whigs to embrace anti-slavery as a party platform. Once again,
to increasing numbers of Northerners, the Southern labor system was
increasingly seen as contrary to the ideals of American democracy.
Republicans believed in the existence of "the Slave Power
Conspiracy", which had seized control of the federal government and was
attempting to pervert the Constitution for its own purposes. The "Slave
Power" idea gave the Republicans the anti-aristocratic appeal with which
men like Seward had long wished to be associated politically. By fusing
older anti-slavery arguments with the idea that slavery posed a threat
to Northern free labor and democratic values, it enabled the Republicans
to tap into the egalitarian outlook which lay at the heart of Northern
society.
In this sense, during the 1860 presidential campaign, Republican
orators even cast "Honest Abe" as an embodiment of these principles,
repeatedly referring to him as "the child of labor" and "son of the
frontier", who had proved how "honest industry and toil" were rewarded
in the North. Although Lincoln had been a Whig, the "Wide Awakes" (members of the Republican clubs) used replicas of rails that he had split to remind voters of his humble origins.
In almost every northern state, organizers attempted to have a
Republican Party or an anti-Nebraska fusion movement on ballots in 1854.
In areas where the radical Republicans controlled the new
organization, the comprehensive radical program became the party policy.
Just as they helped organize the Republican Party in the summer of
1854, the radicals played an important role in the national organization
of the party in 1856. Republican conventions in New York, Massachusetts, and Illinois adopted radical platforms. These radical platforms in such states as Wisconsin, Michigan, Maine, and Vermont usually called for the divorce of the government from slavery, the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Laws, and no more slave states, as did platforms in Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and Massachusetts when radical influence was high.
Conservatives at the Republican 1860 nominating convention in Chicago were able to block the nomination of William Seward, who had an earlier reputation as a radical (but by 1860 had been criticized by Horace Greeley
as being too moderate). Other candidates had earlier joined or formed
parties opposing the Whigs and had thereby made enemies of many
delegates. Lincoln was selected on the third ballot. However,
conservatives were unable to bring about the resurrection of "Whiggery".
The convention's resolutions regarding slavery were roughly the same as
they had been in 1856, but the language appeared less radical. In the
following months, even Republican conservatives like Thomas Ewing and Edward Baker
embraced the platform language that "the normal condition of
territories was freedom". All in all, the organizers had done an
effective job of shaping the official policy of the Republican Party.
Southern slaveholding interests now faced the prospects of a
Republican president and the entry of new free states that would alter
the nation's balance of power between the sections. To many Southerners,
the resounding defeat of the Lecompton Constitution foreshadowed the
entry of more free states into the Union. Dating back to the Missouri
Compromise, the Southern region desperately sought to maintain an equal
balance of slave states and free states so as to be competitive in the
Senate. Since the last slave state was admitted in 1845, five more free
states had entered. The tradition of maintaining a balance between North
and South was abandoned in favor of the addition of more free soil
states.
Sectional battles over federal policy in the late 1850s
Lincoln–Douglas Debates
The Lincoln-Douglas Debates were a series of seven debates in 1858 between Stephen Douglas, United States senator from Illinois, and Abraham Lincoln, the Republican who sought to replace Douglas in the Senate. The debates were mainly about slavery. Douglas defended his Kansas–Nebraska Act, which replaced the Missouri Compromise ban on slavery in the Louisiana Purchase territory north and west of Missouri with popular sovereignty, which allowed residents of territories such as the Kansas
to vote either for or against slavery. Douglas put Lincoln on the
defensive by accusing him of being a Black Republican abolitionist, but
Lincoln responded by asking Douglas to reconcile popular sovereignty
with the Dred Scott decision. Douglas' Freeport Doctrine
was that residents of a territory could keep slavery out by refusing to
pass a slave code and other laws needed to protect slavery. Douglas'
Freeport Doctrine, and the fact that he helped defeat the pro-slavery Lecompton Constitution,
made Douglas unpopular in the South, which led to the 1860 split of the
Democratic Party into Northern and Southern wings. The Democrats
retained control of the Illinois legislature, and Douglas thus retained
his seat in the U.S. Senate (at that time senators were elected by the
state legislatures, not by popular vote); however, Lincoln's national
profile was greatly raised, paving the way for his election as president
of the United States two years later.
Background
In The Rise of American Civilization (1927), Charles and Mary Beard
argue that slavery was not so much a social or cultural institution as
an economic one (a labor system). The Beards cited inherent conflicts
between Northeastern finance, manufacturing, and commerce and Southern
plantations, which competed to control the federal government so as to
protect their own interests. According to the economic determinists of
the era, both groups used arguments over slavery and states' rights as a
cover.
Recent historians have rejected the Beardian thesis. But their
economic determinism has influenced subsequent historians in important
ways. Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery (1974) by Robert William Fogel (who would win the 1993 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences) and Stanley L. Engerman, wrote that slavery was profitable and that the price of slaves would have continued to rise. Modernization theorists, such as Raimondo Luraghi, have argued that as the Industrial Revolution
was expanding on a worldwide scale, the days of wrath were coming for a
series of agrarian, pre-capitalistic, "backward" societies throughout
the world, from the Italian and American South to India. But most
American historians point out the South was highly developed and on
average about as prosperous as the North.
Panic of 1857 and sectional realignments
"Vote yourself a farm—vote yourself a tariff": a campaign slogan for
Abraham Lincoln in 1860
A few historians believe that the serious financial Panic of 1857
and the economic difficulties leading up to it strengthened the
Republican Party and heightened sectional tensions. Before the panic,
strong economic growth was being achieved under relatively low tariffs.
Hence much of the nation concentrated on growth and prosperity.
The iron and textile industries were facing acute, worsening
trouble each year after 1850. By 1854, stocks of iron were accumulating
in each world market. Iron prices fell, forcing many American iron mills
to shut down.
Republicans urged western farmers and northern manufacturers to
blame the depression on the domination of the low-tariff economic
policies of southern-controlled Democratic administrations. However, the
depression revived suspicion of Northeastern banking interests in both
the South and the West. Eastern demand for western farm products shifted
the West closer to the North. As the "transportation revolution"
(canals and railroads) went forward, an increasingly large share and
absolute amount of wheat, corn, and other staples of western producers—once difficult to haul across the Appalachians—went to markets in the Northeast.
The depression emphasized the value of the western markets for eastern
goods and homesteaders who would furnish markets and respectable
profits.
Aside from the land issue, economic difficulties strengthened the
Republican case for higher tariffs for industries in response to the
depression. This issue was important in Pennsylvania and perhaps New
Jersey.
Southern response
The
United States, immediately before the Civil War. All of the lands east
of, or bordering, the Mississippi River were organized as states in the
Union, but the West was still largely unsettled.
Meanwhile, many Southerners grumbled over "radical" notions of giving
land away to farmers that would "abolitionize" the area. While the
ideology of Southern sectionalism was well-developed before the Panic of
1857 by figures like J.D.B. De Bow, the panic helped convince even more
cotton barons that they had grown too reliant on Eastern financial
interests.
Thomas Prentice Kettell, former editor of the Democratic Review,
was another commentator popular in the South to enjoy a great degree of
prominence between 1857 and 1860. Kettell gathered an array of
statistics in his book on Southern Wealth and Northern Profits,
to show that the South produced vast wealth, while the North, with its
dependence on raw materials, siphoned off the wealth of the South.
Arguing that sectional inequality resulted from the concentration of
manufacturing in the North, and from the North's supremacy in
communications, transportation, finance, and international trade, his
ideas paralleled old physiocratic doctrines that all profits of manufacturing and trade come out of the land.
Political sociologists, such as Barrington Moore, have noted that these
forms of romantic nostalgia tend to crop up whenever industrialization
takes hold.
Such Southern hostility to the free farmers gave the North an
opportunity for an alliance with Western farmers. After the political
realignments of 1857–58—manifested by the emerging strength of the
Republican Party and their networks of local support nationwide—almost
every issue was entangled with the controversy over the expansion of
slavery in the West. While questions of tariffs, banking policy, public
land, and subsidies to railroads did not always unite all elements in
the North and the Northwest against the interests of slaveholders in the
South under the pre-1854 party system, they were translated in terms of
sectional conflict—with the expansion of slavery in the West involved.
As the depression strengthened the Republican Party, slaveholding
interests were becoming convinced that the North had aggressive and
hostile designs on the Southern way of life. The South was thus
increasingly fertile ground for secessionism.
The Republicans' Whig-style personality-driven "hurrah" campaign
helped stir hysteria in the slave states upon the emergence of Lincoln
and intensify divisive tendencies, while Southern "fire eaters" gave
credence to notions of the slave power conspiracy among Republican
constituencies in the North and West. New Southern demands to re-open
the African slave trade further fueled sectional tensions.
From the early 1840s until the outbreak of the Civil War, the
cost of slaves had been rising steadily. Meanwhile, the price of cotton
was experiencing market fluctuations typical of raw commodities. After
the Panic of 1857, the price of cotton fell while the price of slaves
continued its steep rise. At the 1858 Southern commercial convention,
William L. Yancey of Alabama
called for the reopening of the African slave trade. Only the delegates
from the states of the Upper South, who profited from the domestic
trade, opposed the reopening of the slave trade since they saw it as a
potential form of competition. The convention in 1858 wound up voting to
recommend the repeal of all laws against slave imports, despite some
reservations.
John Brown and Harpers Ferry (1859)
On October 16, 1859, radical abolitionist John Brown led an attempt to start an armed slave revolt by seizing the U.S. Army arsenal at Harper's Ferry, Virginia
(now West Virginia). Brown and twenty-one followers, both whites
(including three of Brown's sons) and blacks (three free Blacks, one
freedman, and one fugitive slave), planned to seize the armory and use
weapons stored there to arm Black slaves in order to spark a general
uprising by the slave population.
Although the raiders were initially successful in cutting the
telegraph line and capturing the Armory, they allowed a passing train to
continue, and at the next station with a working telegraph the
conductor alerted authorities to the attack. The raiders were forced by
the militia and other locals to barricade themselves in the Armory, in a
sturdy building later known as John Brown's Fort. Robert E. Lee
(then a colonel in the U.S. Army) led a company of U.S. Marines in
storming the armory on October 18. Ten of the raiders were killed,
including two of Brown's sons; Brown himself along with a half dozen of
his followers were captured; five of the raiders escaped immediate
capture. Six locals were killed and nine injured; the Marines suffered
one dead and one injured.
Brown was subsequently hanged for treason, murder, and inciting a slave insurrection, as were six of his followers. (See John Brown's raiders.)
The raid, trial, and execution were covered in great detail by the
press, which sent reporters and sketch artists to the scene on the next
train. It immediately became a cause célèbre
in both the North and the South, with Brown vilified by Southerners as a
bloodthirsty fanatic, but celebrated by many Northern abolitionists as a
martyr to the cause of ending slavery.
Elections of 1860
Initially, William H. Seward of New York, Salmon P. Chase of Ohio, and Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania were the leading contenders for the Republican presidential nomination. But Abraham Lincoln, a former one-term House member who gained fame amid the Lincoln–Douglas debates
of 1858, had fewer political opponents within the party and
outmaneuvered the other contenders. On May 16, 1860, he received the
Republican nomination at their convention in Chicago.
The schism in the Democratic Party over the Lecompton Constitution and Douglas' Freeport Doctrine caused Southern "Fire-Eaters" to oppose front runner Stephen A. Douglas'
bid for the Democratic presidential nomination. Douglas defeated the
pro-slavery Lecompton Constitution for Kansas because the majority of
Kansans were antislavery, and Douglas' popular sovereignty doctrine
would allow the majority to vote slavery up or down as they chose.
Douglas' Freeport Doctrine alleged that the antislavery majority of
Kansans could thwart the Dred Scott
decision that allowed slavery by withholding legislation for a slave
code and other laws needed to protect slavery. As a result, Southern
extremists demanded a slave code for the territories, and used this
issue to divide the northern and southern wings of the Democratic Party.
Southerners left the party and in June nominated John C. Breckinridge,
while Northern Democrats supported Douglas. As a result, the Southern
planter class lost a considerable measure of sway in national politics.
Because of the Democrats' division, the Republican nominee faced a
divided opposition. Adding to Lincoln's advantage, ex-Whigs from the border states had earlier formed the Constitutional Union Party, nominating John C. Bell
for president. Thus, party nominees waged regional campaigns. Douglas
and Lincoln competed for Northern votes, while Bell, Douglas and
Breckinridge competed for Southern votes.
Result and impact of the election of 1860
Lincoln handily won the electoral votes:
- Abraham Lincoln: 180 (40% of the popular vote)
- J.C. Breckinridge: 72 (18% of the popular vote)
- John Bell: 39 (13% of the popular vote)
- Stephen A. Douglas: 12 (30% of the popular vote)
Voting [on November 6, 1860] split sharply along sectional lines.
Lincoln was elected by carrying the electoral votes of the North; he had
a sweeping majority of 180 electoral votes. Given the vote count in
each state, he would still have won the electoral college even if all
three opponents had somehow been able to merge their tickets.
Split in the Democratic Party
The Alabama extremist William Lowndes Yancey's
demand for a federal slave code for the territories split the
Democratic Party between North and South, which made the election of
Lincoln possible. Yancey tried to make his demand for a slave code
moderate enough to get Southern support and yet extreme enough to enrage
Northerners and split the party. He demanded that the party support a
slave code for the territories if later necessary, so that the
demand would be conditional enough to win Southern support. His tactic
worked, and lower South delegates left the Democratic Convention at
Institute Hall in Charleston, South Carolina, and walked over to Military Hall. The South Carolina extremist Robert Barnwell Rhett hoped that the lower South would completely break with the Northern Democrats and attend a separate convention at Richmond, Virginia, but lower South delegates gave the national Democrats one last chance at unification by going to the convention at Baltimore, Maryland, before the split became permanent. The end result was that John C. Breckinridge became the candidate of the Southern Democrats, and Stephen Douglas became the candidate of the Northern Democrats.
Yancey's previous 1848 attempt at demanding a slave code for the territories was his Alabama Platform, which was in response to the Northern Wilmot Proviso attempt at banning slavery in territories conquered from Mexico. Justice Peter V. Daniel wrote a letter about the Proviso to former President Martin Van Buren:
"It is that view of the case which pretends to an insulting
exclusiveness or superiority on the one hand, and denounces a degrading
inequality or inferiority on the other; which says in effect to the
Southern man, 'Avaunt! you are not my equal, and hence are to be
excluded as carrying a moral taint with you.' Here is at once the
extinction of all fraternity, of all sympathy, of all endurance even;
the creation of animosity fierce, implacable, undying."
Both the Alabama Platform and the Wilmot Proviso failed, but Yancey
learned to be less overtly radical in order to get more support.
Southerners thought they were merely demanding equality, in that they
wanted Southern property in slaves to get the same (or more) protection
as Northern forms of property.
Southern secession
The first published Confederate imprint of secession
With the emergence of the Republicans as the nation's first major
sectional party by the mid-1850s, politics became the stage on which
sectional tensions were played out. Although much of the West—the focal
point of sectional tensions—was unfit for cotton cultivation, Southern
secessionists read the political fallout as a sign that their power in
national politics was rapidly weakening. Before, the slave system had
been buttressed to an extent by the Democratic Party, which was
increasingly seen as representing a more pro-Southern position that
unfairly permitted Southerners to prevail in the nation's territories
and to dominate national policy before the Civil War. But Democrats
suffered a significant reverse in the electoral realignment of the
mid-1850s. 1860 was a critical election that marked a stark change in
existing patterns of party loyalties among groups of voters; Abraham
Lincoln's election was a watershed in the balance of power of competing
national and parochial interests and affiliations.
Immediately after finding out the election results, a special South Carolina
convention declared "that the Union now subsisting between South
Carolina and other states under the name of the 'United States of
America' is hereby dissolved;" by February six more cotton states would
follow (Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Texas),
forming the Confederate States of America.
In 1960, Lipset examined the secessionist vote in each Southern state
in 1860–61. In each state he divided the counties by the proportion of
slaves, low, medium and high. He found that in the 181 high-slavery
counties, the vote was 72% for secession. In the 205 low-slavery
counties, the vote was only 37% for secession, and in the 153 middle
counties, the vote for secession was at 60%.
Both the outgoing Buchanan administration and the incoming Lincoln
administration refused to recognize the legality of secession or the
legitimacy of the Confederacy. After Lincoln called for troops, four
border states (that lacked cotton) seceded (Virginia, Arkansas, North
Carolina, Tennessee).
The Upper Southern States were in a dilemma: they wanted to retain
their slaves but were afraid that if they joined with the lower southern
states that were rebelling they would be caught in the middle of a
conflict, and their states would be the battle ground. By staying in the
Union the Upper Southern states felt that their slave rights would
continue to be recognized by the Union.
Other issues
The tariff issue was and is sometimes cited—long after the war—by Lost Cause historians and neo-Confederate
apologists. In 1860–61 none of the groups that proposed compromises to
head off secession brought up the tariff issue as a major issue. Pamphleteers North and South rarely mentioned the tariff, and when some did, for instance, Matthew Fontaine Maury and John Lothrop Motley, they were generally writing for a foreign audience.
The tariff in effect prior to the enactment of the Morrill Tariff
of 1861 had been written and approved by the South for the benefit of
the South. Complaints came from the Northeast (especially Pennsylvania)
and regarded the rates as too low. Some Southerners feared that
eventually the North would grow so big that it would control Congress
and could raise the tariff at will.
As for states' rights, while a state's right of revolution
mentioned in the Declaration of Independence was based on the
inalienable equal rights of man, secessionists believed in a modified
version of states' rights that was safe for slavery.
These issues were especially important in the lower South, where
47 percent of the population were slaves. The upper South, where 32
percent of the population were slaves, considered the Fort Sumter crisis—especially Lincoln's call for troops
to march south to recapture it—a cause for secession. The northernmost
border slave states, where 13 percent of the population were slaves, did
not secede.
Fort Sumter
When South Carolina seceded in December 1860, Major Robert Anderson, a pro-slavery, former slave owner from Kentucky, remained loyal to the Union. He was the commanding officer of United States Army forces in Charleston, South Carolina—the last remaining important Union post in the Deep South. Acting upon orders from the War Department to hold and defend the U.S. forts, he moved his small garrison from Fort Moultrie, which was indefensible, to the more modern, more defensible, Fort Sumter in the middle of Charleston Harbor.
South Carolina leaders cried betrayal, while the North celebrated with
enormous excitement at this show of defiance against secessionism. In
February 1861 the Confederate States of America
were formed and took charge. Jefferson Davis, the Confederate
president, ordered the fort be captured. The artillery attack was
commanded by Brig. Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard,
who had been Anderson's student at West Point. The attack began April
12, 1861, and continued until Anderson, badly outnumbered and outgunned,
surrendered the fort on April 14. The battle began the American Civil
War, as an overwhelming demand for war swept both the North and South,
with only Kentucky attempting to remain neutral.
Robert Anderson's telegram announcing the surrender of Fort Sumter
According to Adam Goodheart (2011), the modern meaning of the American flag
was also forged in the defense of Fort Sumter. Thereafter, the flag was
used throughout the North to symbolize American nationalism and
rejection of secessionism.
Before that day, the flag had
served mostly as a military ensign or a convenient marking of American
territory, flown from forts, embassies, and ships, and displayed on
special occasions like the Fourth of July.
But in the weeks after Major Anderson's surprising stand, it became
something different. Suddenly the Stars and Stripes flew—as it does
today, and especially as it did after September 11—from
houses, from storefronts, from churches; above the village greens and
college quads. For the first time American flags were mass-produced
rather than individually stitched and even so, manufacturers could not
keep up with demand. As the long winter of 1861 turned into spring, that
old flag meant something new. The abstraction of the Union cause was
transfigured into a physical thing: strips of cloth that millions of
people would fight for, and many thousands die for.
Onset of the Civil War and the question of compromise
Abraham Lincoln's rejection of the Crittenden Compromise, the failure to secure the ratification of the Corwin Amendment in 1861, and the inability of the Washington Peace Conference of 1861
to provide an effective alternative to Crittenden and Corwin came
together to prevent a compromise that is still debated by Civil War
historians. Even as the war was going on, William Seward and James
Buchanan were outlining a debate over the question of inevitability that
would continue among historians.
Needless war argument
Two
competing explanations of the sectional tensions inflaming the nation
emerged even before the war. The first was the "Needless War" argument.
Buchanan believed the sectional hostility to be the accidental,
unnecessary work of self-interested or fanatical agitators. He also
singled out the "fanaticism" of the Republican Party. Seward, on the
other hand, believed there to be an irrepressible conflict between
opposing and enduring forces. Shelden argues that, "Few scholars in the
twenty-first century would call the Civil War 'needless,' as the
emancipation of 4 million slaves hinged on Union victory."
Irrepressible conflict argument
The "Irrepressible Conflict" argument was the first to dominate historical discussion.
In the first decades after the fighting, histories of the Civil War
generally reflected the views of Northerners who had participated in the
conflict. The war appeared to be a stark moral conflict in which the
South was to blame, a conflict that arose as a result of the designs of
slave power. Henry Wilson's History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America
(1872–1877) is the foremost representative of this moral
interpretation, which argued that Northerners had fought to preserve the
union against the aggressive designs of "slave power". Later, in his
seven-volume History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the Civil War (1893–1900), James Ford Rhodes
identified slavery as the central—and virtually only—cause of the Civil
War. The North and South had reached positions on the issue of slavery
that were both irreconcilable and unalterable. The conflict had become
inevitable.
Revisionists
But
the idea that the war was avoidable became central among historians in
the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. Revisionist historians, led by James G. Randall (1881–1953) at the University of Illinois, Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) at Princeton University and Avery Craven
(1885–1980) at the University of Chicago, saw in the social and
economic systems of the South no differences so fundamental as to
require a war. Historian Mark Neely explains their position:
Revisionism challenged the view that fundamental and
irreconcilable sectional differences made the outbreak of war
inevitable. It scorned a previous generation's easy identification of
the Northern cause with abolition, but it continued a tradition of
hostility to the Reconstruction
measures that followed the war. The Civil War became a needless
conflict brought on by a blundering generation that exaggerated
sectional differences between North and South. Revisionists revived the
reputation of the Democratic party as great nationalists before the war
and as dependable loyalists during it. Revisionism gave Lincoln's
Presidency a tragic beginning at Fort Sumter, a rancorous political
setting of bitter factional conflicts between radicals and moderates
within Lincoln's own party, and an even more tragic ending. The
benevolent Lincoln died at the moment when benevolence was most needed
to blunt radical designs for revenge on the South.
Randall blamed the ineptitude of a "blundering generation" of
leaders. He also saw slavery as essentially a benign institution,
crumbling in the presence of 19th century tendencies.
Craven, the other leading revisionist, placed more emphasis on the
issue of slavery than Randall but argued roughly the same points. In The Coming of the Civil War
(1942), Craven argued that slave laborers were not much worse off than
Northern workers, that the institution was already on the road to
ultimate extinction, and that the war could have been averted by
skillful and responsible leaders in the tradition of Congressional
statesmen Henry Clay and Daniel Webster.
Two of the key leaders in antebellum politics, Clay and Webster, in
contrast to the 1850s generation of leaders, shared a predisposition to
compromises marked by a passionate patriotic devotion to the Union.
But it is possible that the politicians of the 1850s were not
inept. More recent studies have kept elements of the revisionist
interpretation alive, emphasizing the role of political agitation (the
efforts of Democratic politicians of the South and Republican
politicians in the North to keep the sectional conflict at the center of
the political debate). David Herbert Donald
(1920–2009), a student of Randall, argued in 1960 that the politicians
of the 1850s were not unusually inept but that they were operating in a
society in which traditional restraints were being eroded in the face of
the rapid extension of democracy. The stability of the two-party system
kept the union together, but would collapse in the 1850s, thus
reinforcing, rather than suppressing, sectional conflict. The union,
Donald said, died of democracy.
Contemporaneous explanations
In December 1860, amid the secession crisis, president-elect Abraham Lincoln wrote a letter to Alexander Stephens, in which he summarized the cause of the crisis:
You think slavery is right and
should be extended; while we think slavery is wrong and ought to be
restricted. That I suppose is the rub. It certainly is the only
substantial difference between us.
Several months later, on March 21, 1861, Alexander Stephens, now the Confederate vice president, delivered his "Cornerstone Speech"
in Savannah, Georgia. In the speech, he states that slavery was the
cause of the secession crisis, and outlines the principal differences
between Confederate ideology and U.S. ideology:
The new [Confederate] Constitution
has put at rest forever all the agitating questions relating to our
peculiar institutions—African slavery as it exists among us—the proper
status of the negro in our form of civilization. This was the immediate
cause of the late rupture and present revolution. ...[Thomas Jefferson]
ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the
assumption of the equality of races. This was an error. ...Our new
government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations
are laid, its cornerstone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is
not equal to the white man; that slavery—subordination to the superior
race—is his natural and normal condition.
In July 1863, as decisive campaigns were fought at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, Republican senator Charles Sumner re-dedicated his speech The Barbarism of Slavery and said that desire to preserve slavery was the sole cause of the war:
[T]here are two apparent rudiments
to this war. One is Slavery and the other is State Rights. But the
latter is only a cover for the former. If Slavery were out of the way
there would be no trouble from State Rights.
The war, then, is for Slavery, and nothing else. It is an insane attempt
to vindicate by arms the lordship which had been already asserted in
debate. With mad-cap audacity it seeks to install this Barbarism as the
truest Civilization. Slavery is declared to be the "corner-stone" of the
new edifice.
Lincoln's war goals were reactions to the war, as opposed to causes.
Abraham Lincoln explained the nationalist goal as the preservation of
the Union on August 22, 1862, one month before his preliminary
Emancipation Proclamation:
I would save the Union. I would
save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national
authority can be restored; the nearer the Union will be "the Union as
it was."... My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union,
and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the
Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by
freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing
some and leaving others alone I would also do that. ...I have here
stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no
modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere
could be free.
On March 4, 1865, Lincoln said in his second inaugural address that slavery was the cause of the War:
One-eighth of the whole population
were colored slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but
localized in the southern part of it. These slaves constituted a
peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that this interest was somehow
the cause of the war. To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this
interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union
even by war, while the Government claimed no right to do more than to
restrict the territorial enlargement of it.