From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
One
year after the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president, American
Facebook users on the political right and political left shared almost
no common interests.
Political polarization is a prominent component of politics in the United States.
Scholars distinguish between ideological polarization (differences
between the policy positions) and affective polarization (a dislike and
distrust of political out-groups), both of which are apparent in the
United States.
In the last few decades, the U.S. has experienced a greater surge in
ideological polarization and affective polarization than comparable
democracies.
Differences in political ideals and policy goals are indicative of a healthy democracy.
Scholarly questions consider changes in the magnitude of political
polarization over time, the extent to which polarization is a feature of
American politics and society,
and whether there has been a shift away from focusing on triumphs to
dominating the perceived abhorrent supporters of the opposing party.
Polarization among U.S. legislators is asymmetric, and Congress has become more conservative since the 1970s, when the U.S. also became more polarized, with rapid increases in polarization during the 2000s onwards. According to the Pew Research Center, members of both parties who have unfavorable opinions of the opposing party have doubled since 1994, while those who have very unfavorable opinions of the opposing party are at record highs as of 2022.
Definition
The percentage of people who took between 0 and 7 "Democratic" positions on 7 issues
According to psychology professors Gordon Heltzel and Kristin Laurin,
political polarization occurs when "subsets of a population adopt
increasingly dissimilar attitudes toward parties and party members
(i.e., affective polarization), as well as ideologies and policies (ideological polarization)". The Pew Research Center defines political polarization as "the vast and growing gap between liberals and conservatives, Republicans and Democrats".
Polarization has been defined as both a process and a state of
being. A defining aspect of polarization, though not its only facet, is a
bimodal distribution
around conflicting points of view or philosophies. In general, defining
a threshold at which an issue is "polarized" is imprecise; detecting
the trend of polarization, however, (increasing, decreasing, or stable)
is more straightforward.
A related concept is that of party homogeneity, which describes
the similarities of the constituencies of two officials of the same
party. There is also party polarization, which refers to the gap between
the typical constituency of one party as compared to the other in a two-party system.
History
Gilded Age
The Gilded Age of the late 19th century (c. 1870 – 1900) is considered to be one of the most politically polarized periods in American history, with open political violence and highly polarized political discourse. A key event during this era was the election of 1896,
which some scholars say led to an era of one-party rule, created "safe
seats" for elected officials to build careers as politicians, increased
party homogeneity, and increased party polarization. Political polarization was overall heightened, with Republicans strengthening their hold on industrial areas, and Democrats losing ground in the North and upper Midwest.
1950s and 1960s
The 1950s and 1960s were marked by high levels of political bipartisanship, the results of a post-World War II "consensus" in American politics, as well as ideological diversity within each of the two major parties.
1990–present
Media and political figures began espousing the narrative of polarization in the early 1990s, with a notable example being Pat Buchanan's speech at the 1992 Republican National Convention. In the speech, he declared a culture war
for the future of the country. In 1994, the Democratic Party lost
control of the House of Representatives for the first time in forty
years. The narrative of political polarization became a recurring theme
in the elections of 2000 and 2004. After George W. Bush was reelected in 2004, English historian Simon Schama noted that the US had not been so polarized since the American Civil War, and that a more apt name might be the Divided States of America.
From 1994 to 2014, the share of Americans who expressed either
"consistently liberal" or "consistently conservative" opinions doubled
from 10% to 21%. In 1994, the average Republican was more conservative
than 70% of Democrats, compared to more conservative than 94% of
Democrats in 2014. The average Democrat went from more liberal than 64%
of Republicans to more liberal than 92% of Republicans during the same
era.
In contrast, families are becoming more politically homogenous. As of
2018, 80% of marriages had spousal alignment on party affiliation.
Parent-child agreement was 75%. Both of these represent significant
increases from family homogeneity in the 1960s.
A 2022 study found that there had been a substantial increase since
1980 in political polarization among adolescents, driven by parental
influence.
A Brown University study released in 2020 found that the U.S. was polarizing faster compared to other democratic countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia.
According to Stony Brook University political scientists Yanna
Krupnikov and John Barry Ryan, polarization in American politics is
primarily a phenomenon among Americans who are deeply involved in
politics and very expressive about their political views. Americans who
are not as involved in politics are not as polarized.
Politically polarizing issues
As of February 2020, a study conducted by the Pew Research Center highlights the current political issues that have the most partisanship. By far, addressing climate change was the most partisan issue with only 21% of Republicans considering it a top policy priority as opposed to 78% of Democrats. Issues that are also extremely partisan include protecting the environment, reforming gun policy, and bolstering the country's military strength.
These differences in policy priorities emerge as both Democrats and
Republicans shift their focus away from improving the economy. Since
2011, both parties have gradually placed economic stimulation and job
growth lower on their priority list, with Democrats experiencing a
sharper decline of importance when compared to Republicans.
This is in stark contrast to the 1990s, when both Democrats and
Republicans shared similar views on climate change and showed
significantly much more agreement.
A 2017 poll conducted by Gallup identifies issues where the partisan
gap has significantly increased over a period of about fifteen years.
For Republicans, the most significant shift was the idea that the
"federal government has too much power", with 39% of Republicans
agreeing with that notion in 2002 as opposed to 82% agreeing in 2016. On
the Democratic side, the largest shift was increasing favorability
towards Cuba, changing from 32% in 2002 to 66% in 2017.
Ultimately, as partisanship continues to permeate and dominate policy,
citizens who adhere and align themselves with political parties become
increasingly polarized.
On some issues with a wide public consensus, partisan politics
still divides citizens. For instance, even though 60% of Americans
believe that the government should provide healthcare for its citizens,
opinions are split among party lines with 85% of Democrats, including
left-leaning independents, believing that healthcare is the government's
responsibility and 68% of Republicans believe that it is not the
government's responsibility.
Likewise, on some prominent issues where the parties are broadly split,
there is bipartisan support for specific policies. For example, in
health care, 79% of Americans think pre-existing conditions should be covered by health insurance; 60% think abortion should be broadly legal in the first trimester but only 28% in the second trimester and 13% in the third trimester. 77% of Americans think immigration is good for the country. On gun rights, 89% support more mental health funding, 83% support closing the gun show loophole, 72% support red flag laws, and 72% support requiring gun permits when purchasing. In the federal budget, there is 80% or more support to retain funding for veterans, infrastructure, Social Security, Medicare, and education.
Political polarization also shaped the public's reaction to COVID-19. A study that observed the online conversations surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic
found that left-leaning individuals were more likely to criticize
politicians compared to right-leaning users. Additionally, left-leaning
social media accounts often shared health prevention measures through
hashtags, while right-leaning posts were more likely to spread
conspiracies and retweet posts from the White House's Twitter account.
The study continues to explain that, when considering geographic
location, because individuals in conservative and right leaning areas
are more likely to see COVID-19 as a non-threat, they are less likely to
stay home and follow health guidelines.
Potential causes
Congress leads the public
Some scholars argue that diverging parties has been one of the major
driving forces of polarization as policy platforms have become more
distant. This theory is based on recent trends in the United States Congress, where the majority party prioritizes the positions that are most aligned with its party platform and political ideology.
The adoption of more ideologically distinct positions by political
parties can cause polarization among both elites and the electorate. For
example, after the passage of the Voting Rights Act,
the number of conservative Democrats in Congress decreased, while the
number of conservative Republicans increased. Within the electorate
during the 1970s, Southern Democrats shifted toward the Republican Party, showing polarization among both the elites and the electorate of both main parties.
Political scientists have shown politicians have an incentive to advance and support polarized positions. These argue that during the early 1990s, the Republican Party used polarizing tactics to become the majority party in the United States House of Representatives—which political scientists Thomas E. Mann and Norman Ornstein refer to as Newt Gingrich's "guerrilla war".
What political scientists have found is that moderates are less likely
to run than are candidates who are in line with party doctrine,
otherwise known as "party fit".
Other theories state politicians who cater to more extreme groups
within their party tend to be more successful, helping them stay in
office while simultaneously pulling their constituency toward a polar
extreme.
A study by Nicholson (2012) found voters are more polarized by
contentious statements from leaders of the opposing party than from the
leaders of their own party. As a result, political leaders may be more
likely to take polarized stances.
Political fund-raisers and donors can also exert significant
influence and control over legislators. Party leaders are expected to be
productive fund-raisers, in order to support the party's campaigns.
After Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, special interests in the U.S. were able to greatly impact elections through increased undisclosed spending, notably through Super political action committees. Some, such as Washington Post opinion writer Robert Kaiser,
argued this allowed wealthy people, corporations, unions, and other
groups to push the parties' policy platforms toward ideological
extremes, resulting in a state of greater polarization.
Other scholars, such as Raymond J. La Raja and David L. Wiltse, note
that this does not necessarily hold true for mass donors to political
campaigns. These scholars argue a single donor who is polarized and
contributes large sums to a campaign does not seem to usually drive a
politician toward political extremes.
Polarization among U.S. legislators is asymmetric, as it has
primarily been driven by a substantial rightward shift among
congressional Republicans since the 1970s, alongside a much smaller leftward shift among congressional Democrats, which mainly occurred in the early 2010s and mostly on social, cultural, and religious issues.
Voting patterns
In democracies and other representative governments,
citizens vote for the political actors who will represent them. Some
scholars argue that political polarization reflects the public's
ideology and voting preferences.
Dixit and Weibull (2007) claim that political polarization is a natural
and regular phenomenon. They argue that there is a link between public
differences in ideology and the polarization of representatives, but
that an increase in preference differences is usually temporary and
ultimately results in compromise.
Fernbach, Rogers, Fox and Sloman (2013) argue that it is a result of
people having an exaggerated faith in their understanding of complex
issues. Asking people to explain their policy preferences in detail
typically resulted in more moderate views. Simply asking them to list
the reasons for their preferences did not result in any such moderation.
Morris P. Fiorina
(2006, 2008) posits the hypothesis that polarization is a phenomenon
which does not hold for the public, and instead is formulated by
commentators to draw further division in government. Others, such as social psychologist Jonathan Haidt and journalists Bill Bishop and Harry Enten, instead note the growing percentage of the U.S. electorate living in "landslide counties", counties where the popular vote margin between the Democratic and Republican candidate is 20 percentage points or greater. In 1976, only 27 percent of U.S. voters lived in landslide counties, which increased to 39 percent by 1992. Nearly half of U.S. voters resided in counties that voted for George W. Bush or John Kerry by 20 percentage points or more in 2004. In 2008, 48 percent of U.S. voters lived in such counties, which increased to 50 percent in 2012 and increased further to 61 percent in 2016. In 2020, 58 percent of U.S. voters lived in landslide counties. At the same time, the 2020 U.S. presidential election marked the ninth consecutive presidential election where the victorious major party nominee did not win a popular vote majority by a double-digit margin
over the losing major party nominee(s), continuing the longest sequence
of such presidential elections in U.S. history that began in 1988 and in 2016 eclipsed the previous longest sequences from 1836 through 1860 and from 1876 through 1900.
Other studies indicate that cultural differences focusing on
ideological movements and geographical polarization within the United
States constituency is correlated with rises in overall political
polarization between 1972 and 2004.
Demographic changes
Religious,
ethnic, and other cultural divides within the public have often
influenced the emergence of polarization. According to Layman et al.
(2005), the ideological split between U.S. Republicans and Democrats
also crosses into the religious cultural divide. They claim that
Democrats have generally become more moderate
in religious views whereas Republicans have become more traditionalist.
For example, political scientists have shown that in the United States,
voters who identify as Republican are more likely to vote for a
strongly evangelical candidate than Democratic voters. This correlates with the rise in polarization in the United States. Another theory contends that religion does not contribute to full-group polarization, but rather, coalition and party activist polarization causes party shifts toward a political extreme.
A 2020 paper studying polarization across countries found a
correlation between increasing polarization and increasing ethnic
diversity, both of which are happening in the United States.
Redistricting
The impact of redistricting—potentially through gerrymandering
or the manipulation of electoral borders to favor a political party—on
political polarization in the United States has been found to be minimal
in research by leading political scientists. The logic for this minimal
effect is twofold: first, gerrymandering is typically accomplished by
packing opposition voters into a minority of congressional districts in a
region, while distributing the preferred party's voters over a majority
of districts by a slimmer majority than otherwise would have existed.
The result of this is that the number of competitive congressional
districts would be expected to increase, and in competitive districts
representatives have to compete with the other party for the median
voter, who tends to be more ideologically moderate. Second, political
polarization has also occurred in the Senate, which does not experience
redistricting because Senators represent fixed geographical units, i.e.
states.
The argument that redistricting, through gerrymandering, would
contribute to political polarization is based on the idea that new
non-competitive districts created would lead to the election of
extremist candidates representing the supermajority
party, with no accountability to the voice of the minority. One
difficulty in testing this hypothesis is to disentangle gerrymandering
effects from natural geographical sorting through individuals moving to
congressional districts with a similar ideological makeup to their own.
Carson et al. (2007), has found that redistricting has contributed to
the greater level of polarization in the House of Representatives than
in the Senate, however that this effect has been "relatively modest".
Politically motivated redistricting has been associated with the rise
in partisanship in the U.S. House of Representatives between 1992 and
1994.
Majoritarian electoral institutions have been linked to polarization.
However, ending gerrymandering practices in redistricting cannot
correct for increased polarization due to the growing percentage of the
U.S. electorate living in "landslide counties", counties where the
popular vote margin between the Democratic and Republican candidate is
20 percentage points or greater. Of the 92 U.S. House seats ranked by The Cook Political Report
as swing seats in 1996 that transitioned to being non-competitive by
2016, only 17 percent came as a result of changes to district boundaries
while 83 percent came from natural geographic sorting of the electorate
election to election.
Television and the Internet
A 2013 review concluded that there is no firm evidence that media
institutions contributed to the polarization of average Americans in the
last three decades of the 20th century. No evidence supports the idea
that longstanding news outlets become increasingly partisan. Analyses
confirm that the tone of evening news broadcasts remained unchanged from
1968 to 1996: largely centrist, with a small but constant bias towards Democratic Party
positions. However, more partisan media pockets have emerged in blogs,
talk radio, websites, and cable news channels, which are much more
likely to use insulting language, mockery, and extremely dramatic
reactions, collectively referred to as "outrage". People who have strongly partisan viewpoints are more likely to watch partisan news.
A 2017 study found no correlation between increased media and Internet
consumption and increased political polarization, although the data did
confirm a larger increase in polarization among individuals over 65
compared to those aged 18–39. A 2020 paper comparing polarization across several wealthy countries found no consistent trend,
prompting Ezra Klein to reject the theory that the Internet and social
media were the underlying cause of the increase in the United States.
Along with political scientist Sam Abrams, social psychologist Jonathan Haidt argues that political elites in the United States became more polarized beginning in the 1990s as the Greatest Generation and the Silent Generation (fundamentally shaped by their living memories of World War I, World War II, and the Korean War) were gradually replaced with Baby boomers and Generation Jones (fundamentally shaped by their living memories of the U.S. culture war of the 1960s).
Haidt argues that because of the difference in their life experience
relevant to moral foundations, Baby boomers and Generation Jones may be
more prone to what he calls "Manichean thinking," and along with Abrams and FIRE President Greg Lukianoff, Haidt argues that changes made by Newt Gingrich to the parliamentary procedure of the U.S. House of Representatives beginning in 1995 made the chamber more partisan.
Unlike the first half of the 20th century, protests of the 1960s civil rights movement (such as the Selma to Montgomery marches in 1965) were televised, along with police brutality and urban race rioting during the latter half of the decade. In 1992, 60 percent of U.S. households held cable television subscriptions in the United States, and Haidt, Abrams, and Lukianoff argue that the expansion of cable television, and Fox News in particular since 2015 in their coverage of student activism over political correctness at colleges and universities in the United States, is one of the principal factors amplifying political polarization since the 1990s. Haidt and Lukianoff argue that the filter bubbles created by the News Feed algorithm of Facebook and other social media platforms
are also one of the principal factors amplifying political polarization
since 2000 (when a majority of U.S. households first had at least one
personal computer and then internet access the following year). In 2002, a majority of U.S. survey respondents reported having a mobile phone.
Big data
algorithms are used in personalized content creation and
automatization; however, this method can be used to manipulate users in
various ways. The problem of misinformation is exacerbated by the educational bubble, users' critical thinking ability and news culture. Based on a 2015 study, 62.5% of the Facebook users are oblivious to any curation of their News Feed.
Furthermore, scientists have started to investigate algorithms with
unexpected outcomes that may lead to antisocial political, economic,
geographic, racial, or other discrimination. Facebook has remained
scarce in transparency of the inner workings of the algorithms used for
News Feed correlation.
Algorithms use the past activities as a reference point for predicting
users' taste to keep them engaged. However, this leads to the formation
of a filter bubble
that starts to refrain users from diverse information. Users are left
with a skewed worldview derived from their own preferences and biases.
In 2015, researchers from Facebook published a study indicating
that the Facebook algorithm perpetuates an echo chamber amongst users by
occasionally hiding content from individual feeds that users
potentially would disagree with: for example the algorithm removed one
in every 13 diverse content from news sources for self-identified
liberals. In general, the results from the study indicated that the
Facebook algorithm ranking system caused approximately 15% less diverse
material in users' content feeds, and a 70% reduction in the
click-through-rate of the diverse material.
At least in the political field, Facebook has a counter-effect on being
informed: in two studies from the US with a total of more than 2,000
participants, the influence of social media on the general knowledge on
political issues was examined in the context of two US presidential
elections. The results showed that the frequency of Facebook use was
moderately negatively related to general political knowledge. This was
also the case when considering demographic, political-ideological
variables and previous political knowledge. According to the latter, a
causal relationship is indicated: the higher the Facebook use, the more
the general political knowledge declines.
In 2019, Jonathan Haidt argued that there is a "very good chance
American democracy will fail, that in the next 30 years we will have a
catastrophic failure of our democracy."
Influence operations
According to a report by Oxford researchers including sociologist Philip N. Howard, social media played a major role in political polarization in the United States, due to computational propaganda -- "the use of automation, algorithms, and big-data analytics to manipulate public life"—such as the spread of fake news and conspiracy theories. The researchers highlighted the role of the Russian Internet Research Agency
in attempts to undermine democracy in the US and exacerbate existing
political divisions. The most prominent methods of misinformation were
ostensibly organic posts rather than ads, and influence operation
activity increased after, and was not limited to, the 2016 election. During the Russian interference in the 2016 United States elections,
examples of efforts included "campaigning for African American voters
to boycott elections or follow the wrong voting procedures in 2016",
"encouraging extreme right-wing voters to be more confrontational", and
"spreading sensationalist, conspiratorial, and other forms of junk
political news and misinformation to voters across the political
spectrum." Sarah Kreps of Brookings Institution
argue that in the wake of foreign influence operations which are
nothing new but boosted by digital tools, the U.S. has had to spend
exorbitantly on defensive measures "just to break even on democratic
legitimacy."
According to the United States House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, by 2018 organic content created by Russia's Internet Research Agency
reached at least 126 million US Facebook users, while its politically
divisive ads reached 11.4 million US Facebook users. Tweets by the IRA
reached approximately 288 million American users. According to committee
chair Adam Schiff,
"[The Russian] social media campaign was designed to further a broader
Kremlin objective: sowing discord in the U.S. by inflaming passions on a
range of divisive issues. The Russians did so by weaving together fake
accounts, pages, and communities to push politicized content and videos,
and to mobilize real Americans to sign online petitions and join
rallies and protests." Michael McFaul, former U.S. Ambassador to Russia
from 2012 to 2014, believes the U.S. has faced a democratic decline,
stemming from elite polarization and damage done by former President Donald Trump
to trust in elections and bonds with democratic allies. McFaul states
that the decline in democracy weakens national security and heavily
restrains foreign policy.
Portrayals of violence in the media can lead to fear of crime or
terrorism or fear of "other" groups. These can appear out of proportion
to their actual frequency, and due to the availability heuristic, these fears can be out of proportion to the actual threat from other groups.
Campaigning
A
change in campaigning in 2022 that has been called "both a symptom of
and a contributor to the ills" of American politics is a move away from
participation in debates between candidates, in "retail politicking"
that has been a political "cliché ... for generations" in American
politics: pressing the flesh at "diners and state fairs ...
town-hall-style meetings ... where citizens get to question their
elected leaders and those running to replace them".
Replacing these are "safer spaces" for candidates, "partisan news
outlets, fund-raisers with supporters, friendly local crowds," where
reporters and their challenging questions are "muscled away".
Candidates in ten of the most competitive contests in 2022 for
Senate (Arizona, North Carolina, Ohio, Georgia and Wisconsin) and
governor (Texas and Wisconsin) have "agreed to just one debate, where
voters not long ago could have expected to watch two or three".
Observers see a danger in candidates
Avoiding those tougher interactions cuts down on the
opportunities for candidates’ characters and limitations to be revealed,
and for elected officials to be held accountable to those who elected
them. For the politicians, it creates an artificial environment where
their positions appear uniformly popular and opposing views are angrily
denounced, making compromise seem risky.
“They run these campaigns in bubbles to these voters who are in
bubbles,” said former Representative Tom Davis, a moderate Republican
who won seven terms in Congress in a Northern Virginia district and
headed his party’s congressional campaign committee.
Causes suggested for the disinterest include the fewer competitive
House of Representative districts, and fewer "swing voters", making
attempts to appeal to those voters not cost effective.
According to journalists Lisa Lerer and Jazmine Ulloa, "the trend of
avoiding the public was initially driven by Republicans" but has "seeped
across party lines."
Issues
According
to a 2020 study, "polarization is more intense when unemployment and
inequality are high" and "when political elites clash over cultural
issues such as immigration and national identity."
Absence of external threats
One
common hypothesis for polarization in the United States is the end of
the Cold War and a greater absence of severe security threats. A 2021
study disputed this, finding little evidence that external threats
reduce polarization.
Effects
Demonization
Potentially
both a cause and effect of polarization is "demonization" of political
opponents, such as accusing them not just of being wrong about certain
legislation or policies but of hating their country, or the use of "what
are called ‘devil terms’ — things that are so unquestionably bad that
you can’t have a debate about them” (according to Jennifer Mercieca).
Some examples include the accusations that President Biden has a plan,
to “flood our country with terrorists, fentanyl, child traffickers, and
MS-13 gang members", and that "Under President Biden's leadership ... We
face an unprecedented assault on the American way of life by the
radical left" (Mary E. Miller-IL), that “Democrats are so enamored of power that they want to legalize cheating in elections,” (Andy Biggs-AZ),
"America-hating Socialists seek to upend the American way of life based
on freedom and liberty and replace it with dictatorial government that
controls every aspect of our lives" (Mo Brooks-AL).
While "demonizing communication style" has been in use "for
years" among "media personalities and the occasional firebrand
lawmaker", its use became popular among high level politicians with the
election of Donald Trump
and with the 2022 election has become widespread among "the 139 House
Republicans who challenged the Electoral College vote" in January 2021,
according to a 2022 study of "divisive rhetoric" in 3.7 million "tweets,
Facebook ads, newsletters and congressional speeches" by the New York Times.
Checking the Congressional Record, the Times found Republicans have
"more than quadrupled their use of divisive rhetoric" since the early
2010s.
An example of the escalation in aggressive attack is Republican House leader Kevin McCarthy, who after the January 6 insurrection
"implored members of his party to tone down their speech", saying, 'We
all must acknowledge how our words have contributed to the discord in
America ... No more name calling, us versus them.'” However in "dozens
of tweets since then" McCarthy has referred to "Democrats as 'radical'
leftists" who "prefer China to the United States" and are "ruining
America". (A "few Democrats", such as Representative Bill Pascrell of New Jersey, also have "frequently" used "demonizing speech on Twitter".)
Some political scientists have warned that "factionalism is alarming
because it makes compromise harder and normalizes" divisive rhetoric
throughout the country.
Political violence
Some authors have found a correlation between polarization of political discourse and the prevalence of political violence.
For instance, Rachel Kleinfeld, an expert on the rule of law and
post-conflict governance, writes that political violence is extremely
calculated and, while it may appear "spontaneous," it is the culmination
of years of "discrimination and social segregation." Part of the
problem lies in partisan politics, as partisanship in the political
arena fosters partisan violence. In return, this increases polarization
within the public, resulting in a public that ends up justifying
political violence.
Politicians may use political polarization as a weapon to further push
existing institutions, which may also foster political violence. When
applied to the United States, the current polarized climate may create
conditions that can lead political violence within the country, unless
there is meaningful reform.
In fact, data shows that within three years, both Democrats and
Republicans increasingly agree that political violence is at least "a
little" justified as long as their party's political agenda is advanced.
In 2017, only 8% of both Democrats and Republicans justified the use of
political violence, but as of September 2020, that number jumped to 33%
and 36%, respectively.
Trust in science
The General Social Survey
periodically asks Americans whether they trust scientists. The
proportion of American conservatives who say they place "a great deal of
trust" in scientists fell from 48% in 1974 to 35% in 2010 and rose again to 39% in 2018. Instead, liberals and independents report different levels of trust in science. The COVID-19 pandemic
brought these differences front and center, with partisanship often
being an indicator of how a citizen saw the gravity of the crisis. In
the early stages of the pandemic, Republican governors often went
against the advice of infectious disease experts while most of their
Democratic counterparts translated the advice into policy through
policies such as stay at home orders.
Similar to other polarizing topics in the United States, a
person's attitude towards COVID-19 became a matter of political
identity. While the crisis had very little precedent in U.S. history,
reactions from both liberals and conservatives stemmed from long-held
messaging cues among their parties. Conservatives responded to the
anti-elite, states' rights, and small government messaging cues
surrounding the virus. This then translated into avid hostility towards
any measure that limited a person's autonomy (mask requirements, schools
closing, lockdowns, vaccine mandates, etc.). Meanwhile, liberals'
attitude towards science made them more likely to follow the guidance
from institutions like the CDC and well-known medical experts, such as
Dr. Anthony Fauci.
Congress
Political
polarization among elites is negatively correlated with legislative
efficiency, which is defined by the total number of laws passed, as well
as the number of "major enactments" and "key votes". Evidence suggests that political polarization of elites may more strongly affect efficiency than polarization of Congress
itself, with authors hypothesizing that the personal relationships
among members of Congress may enable them to reach compromises on
contentiously advocated legislation, though not if elites allow no
leeway for such.
Negative effects of polarization on the United States Congress include increased gridlock and partisanship at the cost of quality and quantity of passed legislation. It also incentivizes stall tactics and closed rules, such as filibusters and excluding minority party members from committee deliberations.
These strategies hamper transparency, oversight, and the government's
ability to handle long-term domestic issues, especially those regarding
the distribution of benefits.
Further, they foster animosity, as majority parties lose bipartisan and
legislative coordination trying to expedite legislation to overcome
them.
Some scholars claim that political polarization is not so
pervasive or destructive in influence, contending that partisan
agreement is the historical trend in Congress and still frequent in the
modern era, including on bills of political importance. Some studies have found approximately 80% of House bills passed in the modern era to have had support from both parties.
The public
ANES feeling thermometer responses 1980–2016, showing a rise in affective polarization
Opinions on polarization's effects on the public are mixed. Some
argue that the growing polarization in government has directly
contributed to political polarization in the electorate, but this is not unanimous.
Some scholars argue that polarization lowers public interest in politics, party identification and voter turnout. It encourages confrontational dynamics between parties that can lower overall public trust and approval in government., and causes the public to perceive the general political debate as less civil,
which can alienate voters. More polarized candidates, especially when
voters aren't aware of the increase, also tend to be less representative
of the public's wishes.
On the other hand, others assert that elite polarization has
galvanized the public's political participation in the United States,
citing greater voting and nonvoting participation, engagement and
investment in campaigns, and increased positive attitude toward
government responsiveness.
Polarized parties become more ideologically unified, furthering voter
knowledge about their positions and increasing their standard to
similarly aligned voters.
Affective polarization has risen in the US, with members of the
public likely to say that supporters of the other major political party
are hypocritical, closed-minded, and selfish. Based on survey results by
the American National Election Study,
affective polarization has increased significantly since 1980. This was
determined by the differences of views an individual had of their
political party and the views they had of the other party. Americans
have also gotten increasingly uncomfortable with the idea of their child
marrying someone of another political party. In 1960, 4–5% of Americans
said they were uncomfortable with the idea. By 2010, a third of
Democrats would be upset at this outcome, and half of all Republicans. However, a recent study shows that affective polarization in Europe may not be primarily driven by outgroup derogation.
The media
As Mann and Ornstein argue, political polarization and the
proliferation of media sources have "reinforce[d] tribal divisions,
while enhancing a climate where facts are no longer driving the debate
and deliberation, nor are they shared by the larger public."
As other scholars have argued, the media often support and provoke the
stall and closed rules tactics that disrupt regular policy procedure.
Media can give the illusion that the electorate is more polarized than it truly is, pushing each end farther from the middle.
The digital environment allows for the customization of information,
with individuals never seemingly being exposed to opposing viewpoints.
There is a long-standing belief that exposure to both sides of an
argument will moderate political attitudes, and there is empirical
evidence that voters often do self-moderate, saying that internet users
do also search for news in the opposing viewpoint.
The increased use of social media since 2008 has encouraged those
who normally did not consume news coverage to now encounter headlines
on their newsfeeds on a regular basis.
The media has become more skilled about framing news stories to create
the greatest outrage, regardless of their spot on the political
spectrum. With the introduction of "fake news", voters are more apt to
cherry-pick between news sources as mistrust in the mainstream media
rises. This mistrust stems from a number of factors. Some of which
include, political micro-targeting, bots, trolls, and digital
algorithms- research has only just begun to name all of the factors at
play. Allowing these perpetrators of political polarization to stand in
the way of democracy is the biggest hindrance to healthy party
disagreement.
A concern with the increasing trend of political polarization is
the social stigma stemming from either side towards their perceived
opposition. It contributes to the chronic lack of compromise and
uncivilized discourse leading to both extremism and policy stalemates.
The media takes advantage of such discord and shares anecdotal headlines
meant to stoke the flames of polarization, rather than sharing
generalized and subsequently tamer broad statistics.
While the media are not immune to general public opinion and reduced polarization allows them to appeal to a larger audience, polarized environments make it easier for the media and interest groups to hold elected officials more accountable for their policy promises and positions, which is generally healthy for democracy.
Trust in the democratic process
The
issue of political polarization in the US has also had noticeable
effects on how citizens view the democratic process. In both of the two
last presidential elections, a large segment of voters among the losing
party raised concerns about the fairness of the election. When Donald Trump
won the 2016 election, the share of Democratic voters who were "not
confident" in the election results more than doubled compared to
pre-election day data (14% on October 15, 2016, versus 28% on January
28, 2017). In 2020, three-in-four Republicans doubted the fairness of
the presidential election.
This narrative of a stolen election narrative was in large part driven
by Trump himself, who refused to concede the election up until less than
two weeks before Joe Biden's inauguration. This took place after the events of January 6, 2021, when thousands of Trump's supporters stormed the United States Capitol in an attempt to overturn the results of the election.
Judicial systems
Judicial systems can also be affected by the implications of political polarization. For the United States, in particular, polarization lowers confirmation rates of judges;
In 2012, the confirmation rate of presidential circuit court
appointments was approximately 50% as opposed to the above 90% rate in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. More polarized parties have more aggressively blocked nominees and used tactics to hinder executive agendas.
Political scientist Sarah Binder (2000) argues that "senatorial
intolerance for the opposing party's nominees is itself a function of
polarization."
Negative consequences of this include higher vacancy rates on appellate
courts, longer case-processing times and increased caseloads for
judges. Voting margins have also become much closer for filling vacancies on the Supreme Court. Justice Antonin Scalia was confirmed 98–0 in 1986; Ruth Bader Ginsburg was confirmed 96–3 in 1993. Samuel Alito was confirmed 58–42 in 2005, and Brett Kavanaugh was confirmed 50–48 in 2018.
Political scientists argue that in highly polarized periods,
nominees become less reflective of the moderate voter as "polarization
impacts the appointment and ideological tenor of new federal judges." It also influences the politics of senatorial advice and consent,
giving partisan presidents the power to appoint judges far to the left
or right of center on the federal bench, obstructing the legitimacy of
the judicial branch.
Ultimately, the increasing presence of ideology in a judicial system impacts the judiciary's credibility.
Polarization can generate strong partisan critiques of federal judges,
which can damage the public perception of the justice system and the
legitimacy of the courts as nonpartisan legal arbiters.
Foreign policy
Political polarization can undercut unified agreement on foreign policy and harm a nation's international standing; divisiveness on foreign affairs strengthens enemies, discourages allies, and destabilizes a nation's determination.
Political scientists point to two primary implications of polarization with regards to the foreign policy of the United States.
First, when the United States conducts relations abroad and appears
divided, allies are less likely to trust its promises, enemies are more
likely to predict its weaknesses, and uncertainty as to the country's
position in world affairs rises. Second, elite opinion has a significant impact on the public's perception and understanding of foreign policy, a field where Americans have less prior knowledge to rely on.
Democratic backsliding
A 2021 study in Public Opinion Quarterly found evidence that polarization contributed to reductions in support for democratic norms.
In a 2021 report Freedom House
said that political polarization was a cause of democratic backsliding
in the U.S. since political polarization undermines the "idea of a
common national identity" and impedes solutions to governance problems.
Gerrymandering was singled out as a cause for this since it creates safe
seats for one party that can lead it to become more radical so its
candidates can win their primary elections.
Proposed solutions
As
polarization creates a less than ideal political climate, scholars have
proposed multiple solutions to fix or mitigate the effects of the
political polarization in the United States. The country is more
politically divided now than it has been in the past twenty years. Not
only is there less collaboration and mutual understanding between
Democrats and Republicans, but members of both political parties
increasingly view each other in an extremely negative way.
As a result, partisan politics has begun to shape the relationships
individuals have with others, with 50% of Republicans and 35% of
Democrats likely to surround themselves with friends who share similar
political views. Towards the respective ends of the political spectrum,
nearly two-thirds (63%) of consistent conservatives and about half (49%)
of consistent liberals say most of their close friends share their
political views.
Additionally, increased animosity and distrust among American
politicians and citizens can be attributed to the increased skepticism
of American institutions, which is a problem that is extremely catalyzed
by political polarization and may lead to democratic backsliding.
Voting process reform
Various changes to voting procedures have been proposed to reduce political polarization. Two proposed reforms would potentially move the U.S. from a two-party system to a multi-party system. Proportional representation
would divide Congressional seats based on the percentage of people who
voted for a specific political party. For instance, if Democrats won 20%
of the vote, they would receive 20% of the Congressional seats. Advocates of instant-runoff voting
say it encourages more moderation in political campaigns by allowing
candidates to argue they should be the second choice for supporters of
an opponent. It could potentially be used to replace the Electoral College with a less partisan popular vote. IRV also makes third parties more viable because it removes the spoiler effect.
Elaine Kamarck of the Brookings Institution suggest ways to work within the two-party system, such as taking measures to increase voter turnout to elect more moderate representatives in Congress. She reasons that abolishing closed primaries
may invite independents or individuals from the opposing political
party to vote for a representative other than their registered party's
candidate. In doing so, the strict ideological divides may subside,
allowing for more moderate representatives to be elected. Thus, as a
result there would be an increasing ideological overlap in Congress and
less polarization.
Kamarck also proposes instituting a nationwide voting process like
"California's top-two method," where there is only one general election
for all political parties, and the top two candidates advance into the
general election. Once again, this process is meant to elect more
moderates into government, but there is no evidence that this has
happened.
Advocates for setting fixed terms for selection of the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States
argue it will reduce the partisanship of confirmation battles if both
major parties are satisfied they will have the chance to make a certain
number of appointments.
Intergroup contact
Shifting
to a more societal-based solution, social psychologists state that more
social contact with those holding opposing political views may help
mitigate political polarization. Focusing specifically on the creation of citizens' assemblies,
the idea is to create a space where representatives and citizens are
encouraged to discuss political topics and issues in a constructive
fashion, hopefully resulting in compromise or mutual understanding. Yet,
intergroup contact, as psychologists warn, must be created within
specific parameters in order to create meaningful change. These
boundaries, which make actual social implementation difficult, include a
constant, meaningful dialogue between multiple members of each group.
Constructive conversations should focus on principles, legislation, and
policies and avoid inflammatory trigger words such as left and right,
blue and red, and liberal and conservative. These words can make people
become emotional and defensive when supporting their own side and stop
listening with an open mind to what those on the other side are saying.
In short, conversations can be more productive and meaningful by
avoiding contrasting tribal and political identities. In Talking Sense about Politics: How to Overcome Political Polarization in Your Next Conversation, Jack Meacham
encourages having conversations based on four neutral, impartial
perspectives—detached, loyal, caring, and tactful—that underlie how
people think about and respond to political issues.
A number of groups in the U.S. actively host interpartisan discussions
in an attempt to promote understanding and social cohesion.
Social and historical complexity
A
third solution recognizes that American society, history, and political
thought are more complex than what can be conveyed by only two partisan
positions. Joel Garreau's The Nine Nations of North America, first published in 1981, was an early attempt to analyse such multiple positions. Colin Woodard revisited Garreau's theories in his 2011 book American Nations. Frank Bruni
wrote that America was emerging from the 2016 election with four
political parties: Paul Ryan Republicans, a Freedom Caucus,
establishment Democrats, and an Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders
party. Similarly, David Brooks
in 2016 identified four political parties: Trump's populist
nationalism, a libertarian Freedom Caucus, a Bernie Sanders and
Elizabeth Warren progressive party, and a Chuck Schumer and Nancy Pelosi
Democratic establishment party.
In Talking Sense about Politics: How to Overcome Political Polarization in Your Next Conversation,
Jack Meacham argues that four fundamental, impartial perspectives have
powered our economic and social progress and enabled Americans to better
understand themselves and others. People holding the first of these
four perspectives, the loyal perspective, aim to compete, be in charge,
and win. The aim of people holding the second perspective, tactful, is
to negotiate and get along with others. The third perspective, detached,
is represented by people who want to disengage from others and work
things out for themselves. People who reflect the fourth perspective,
caring, aim to cooperate with and look out for others.
George Packer, in Last Best Hope: America in Crisis and Renewal, also argues that America can best be understood not as two polarities but instead as four American narratives:
- Free America, focuses on personal freedom, consumer capitalism, and hostility to government.
- The smart America narrative includes professionals who value novelty and diversity, embrace meritocracy, and welcome globalization.
- The real America narrative includes the working class—anti-intellectual, nationalist, religious, and white supremacist.
- And the just America narrative includes educated younger
people for whom American institutions are unjust, corrupt, and fail to
address issues of environment, race, and gender.
There are eight social classes in America, according to David Brooks.
- The four classes of a red hierarchy include (1) corporate
executives and entrepreneurs; (2) large property-owning families; (3)
middle managers and small-business owners; and (4) the rural working
class.
- The four classes of a blue hierarchy include (5) tech and media
executives, (6) foundation heads and highly successful doctors and
lawyers; (7) a creative class of scientists, engineers, lawyers,
professors, doctors, and other professionals; a younger educated elite
with growing cultural power; and (8) low-paid members of the service
sector.
The Pew Research Center's political typology, based on a survey of
10,221 adults in July 2021, includes nine groups. There are substantial
divisions within both the Democratic and Republican parties.
- The Democrats include (a) progressive left, (b) establishment liberals, (c) democratic mainstays, and (d) outsider left.
- The Republicans include (e) faith and flag conservatives, (f)
committed conservatives, (g) populist right, and (h) ambivalent right.
- Stressed sideliner is a ninth group with no partisan leaning.
Outsider left, ambivalent right, and stressed sideliners have low interest in politics and low rates of voting.
Accommodation
Some commentators propose accommodating partisan differences by taking advantage of federalism and moving more authority away from the federal government and into state and local governments.
Ezra Klein proposes that having clear differences between the two main
parties gives voters a better choice than having two political parties
that have mostly the same views. But he suggests reducing the negative
consequences of partisanship by eliminating "ticking time bombs" like
fights over raising the federal debt ceiling.
