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Sunday, July 2, 2023

Acid–base reaction

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

An acid–base reaction is a chemical reaction that occurs between an acid and a base. It can be used to determine pH via titration. Several theoretical frameworks provide alternative conceptions of the reaction mechanisms and their application in solving related problems; these are called the acid–base theories, for example, Brønsted–Lowry acid–base theory.

Their importance becomes apparent in analyzing acid–base reactions for gaseous or liquid species, or when acid or base character may be somewhat less apparent. The first of these concepts was provided by the French chemist Antoine Lavoisier, around 1776.

It is important to think of the acid-base reaction models as theories that complement each other. For example, the current Lewis model has the broadest definition of what an acid and base are, with the Brønsted-Lowry theory being a subset of what acids and bases are, and the Arrhenius theory being the most restrictive.

Acid–base definitions

Historic development

The concept of an acid-base reaction was first proposed in 1754 by Guillaume-François Rouelle, who introduced the word "base" into chemistry to mean a substance which reacts with an acid to give it solid form (as a salt). Bases are mostly bitter in nature.

Lavoisier's oxygen theory of acids

The first scientific concept of acids and bases was provided by Lavoisier in around 1776. Since Lavoisier's knowledge of strong acids was mainly restricted to oxoacids, such as HNO
3
(nitric acid) and H
2
SO
4
(sulfuric acid), which tend to contain central atoms in high oxidation states surrounded by oxygen, and since he was not aware of the true composition of the hydrohalic acids (HF, HCl, HBr, and HI), he defined acids in terms of their containing oxygen, which in fact he named from Greek words meaning "acid-former" (from the Greek ὀξύς (oxys) meaning "acid" or "sharp" and γεινομαι (geinomai) meaning "engender"). The Lavoisier definition held for over 30 years, until the 1810 article and subsequent lectures by Sir Humphry Davy in which he proved the lack of oxygen in H
2
S
, H2Te, and the hydrohalic acids. However, Davy failed to develop a new theory, concluding that "acidity does not depend upon any particular elementary substance, but upon peculiar arrangement of various substances". One notable modification of oxygen theory was provided by Jöns Jacob Berzelius, who stated that acids are oxides of nonmetals while bases are oxides of metals.

Liebig's hydrogen theory of acids

In 1838, Justus von Liebig proposed that an acid is a hydrogen-containing compound whose hydrogen can be replaced by a metal. This redefinition was based on his extensive work on the chemical composition of organic acids, finishing the doctrinal shift from oxygen-based acids to hydrogen-based acids started by Davy. Liebig's definition, while completely empirical, remained in use for almost 50 years until the adoption of the Arrhenius definition.

Arrhenius definition

The first modern definition of acids and bases in molecular terms was devised by Svante Arrhenius. A hydrogen theory of acids, it followed from his 1884 work with Friedrich Wilhelm Ostwald in establishing the presence of ions in aqueous solution and led to Arrhenius receiving the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1903.

As defined by Arrhenius:

  • an Arrhenius acid is a substance that ionises in water to form hydrogen ions (H+); that is, an acid increases the concentration of H+ ions in an aqueous solution.

This causes the protonation of water, or the creation of the hydronium (H3O+) ion. Thus, in modern times, the symbol H+ is interpreted as a shorthand for H3O+, because it is now known that a bare proton does not exist as a free species in aqueous solution. This is the species which is measured by pH indicators to measure the acidity or basicity of a solution.

  • an Arrhenius base is a substance that dissociates in water to form hydroxide (OH) ions; that is, a base increases the concentration of OH ions in an aqueous solution.

The Arrhenius definitions of acidity and alkalinity are restricted to aqueous solutions and are not valid for most non-aqueous solutions, and refer to the concentration of the solvent ions. Under this definition, pure H2SO4 and HCl dissolved in toluene are not acidic, and molten NaOH and solutions of calcium amide in liquid ammonia are not alkaline. This led to the development of the Brønsted-Lowry theory and subsequent Lewis theory to account for these non-aqueous exceptions.

The reaction of an acid with a base is called a neutralization reaction. The products of this reaction are a salt and water.

acid + base → salt + water

In this traditional representation an acid–base neutralization reaction is formulated as a double-replacement reaction. For example, the reaction of hydrochloric acid, HCl, with sodium hydroxide, NaOH, solutions produces a solution of sodium chloride, NaCl, and some additional water molecules.

HCl(aq) + NaOH(aq) → NaCl(aq) + H2O

The modifier (aq) in this equation was implied by Arrhenius, rather than included explicitly. It indicates that the substances are dissolved in water. Though all three substances, HCl, NaOH and NaCl are capable of existing as pure compounds, in aqueous solutions they are fully dissociated into the aquated ions H+, Cl, Na+ and OH.

Example: baking powder

When combined with water, the sodium bicarbonate and acid salts react to produce gaseous carbon dioxide. Whether commercially or domestically prepared, the principles behind baking powder formulations remain the same. The acid-base reaction can be generically represented as shown:

NaHCO3 + H+ → Na+ + CO2 + H2O

The real reactions are more complicated because the acids are complicated. For example, starting with baking soda and monocalcium phosphate, the reaction produces carbon dioxide by the following stoichiometry:

14 NaHCO3 + 5 Ca(H2PO4)2 → 14 CO2 + Ca5(PO4)3OH + 7 Na2HPO4 + 13 H2O
Monocalcium phosphate ("MCP") is a common acid component in domestic baking powders.

A typical formulation (by weight) could call for 30% sodium bicarbonate, 5–12% monocalcium phosphate, and 21–26% sodium aluminium sulfate. Alternately, a commercial baking powder might use sodium acid pyrophosphate as one of the two acidic components instead of sodium aluminium sulfate. Another typical acid in such formulations is cream of tartar (KC4H5O6), a derivative of tartaric acid.

Brønsted–Lowry definition

Johannes Brønsted.jpg Thomas Martin Lowry2.jpg
Johannes Nicolaus Brønsted and Thomas Martin Lowry

The Brønsted–Lowry definition, formulated in 1923, independently by Johannes Nicolaus Brønsted in Denmark and Martin Lowry in England, is based upon the idea of protonation of bases through the deprotonation of acids – that is, the ability of acids to "donate" hydrogen ions (H+)—otherwise known as protons—to bases, which "accept" them.

An acid–base reaction is, thus, the removal of a hydrogen ion from the acid and its addition to the base. The removal of a hydrogen ion from an acid produces its conjugate base, which is the acid with a hydrogen ion removed. The reception of a proton by a base produces its conjugate acid, which is the base with a hydrogen ion added.

Unlike the previous definitions, the Brønsted–Lowry definition does not refer to the formation of salt and solvent, but instead to the formation of conjugate acids and conjugate bases, produced by the transfer of a proton from the acid to the base. In this approach, acids and bases are fundamentally different in behavior from salts, which are seen as electrolytes, subject to the theories of Debye, Onsager, and others. An acid and a base react not to produce a salt and a solvent, but to form a new acid and a new base. The concept of neutralization is thus absent. Brønsted–Lowry acid–base behavior is formally independent of any solvent, making it more all-encompassing than the Arrhenius model. The calculation of pH under the Arrhenius model depended on alkalis (bases) dissolving in water (aqueous solution). The Brønsted–Lowry model expanded what could be pH tested using insoluble and soluble solutions (gas, liquid, solid).

The general formula for acid–base reactions according to the Brønsted–Lowry definition is:

HA + B → BH+ + A

where HA represents the acid, B represents the base, BH+ represents the conjugate acid of B, and A represents the conjugate base of HA.

For example, a Brønsted–Lowry model for the dissociation of hydrochloric acid (HCl) in aqueous solution would be the following:

HCl + H2O ⇌ H3O+ + Cl

The removal of H+ from the HCl produces the chloride ion, Cl, the conjugate base of the acid. The addition of H+ to the H2O (acting as a base) forms the hydronium ion, H3O+, the conjugate acid of the base.

Water is amphoteric—that is, it can act as both an acid and a base. The Brønsted–Lowry model explains this, showing the dissociation of water into low concentrations of hydronium and hydroxide ions:

H2O + H2O ⇌ H3O+ + OH

This equation is demonstrated in the image below:

Bronsted lowry 3d diagram.png

Here, one molecule of water acts as an acid, donating an H+ and forming the conjugate base, OH, and a second molecule of water acts as a base, accepting the H+ ion and forming the conjugate acid, H3O+.

As an example of water acting as an acid, consider an aqueous solution of pyridine, C5H5N.

C5H5N + H2O ⇌ [C5H5NH]+ + OH

In this example, a water molecule is split into a hydrogen ion, which is donated to a pyridine molecule, and a hydroxide ion.

In the Brønsted–Lowry model, the solvent does not necessarily have to be water, as is required by the Arrhenius Acid-Base model. For example, consider what happens when acetic acid, CH3COOH, dissolves in liquid ammonia.

CH
3
COOH
+ NH
3
NH+
4
+ CH
3
COO

An H+ ion is removed from acetic acid, forming its conjugate base, the acetate ion, CH3COO. The addition of an H+ ion to an ammonia molecule of the solvent creates its conjugate acid, the ammonium ion, NH+
4
.

The Brønsted–Lowry model calls hydrogen-containing substances (like HCl) acids. Thus, some substances, which many chemists considered to be acids, such as SO3 or BCl3, are excluded from this classification due to lack of hydrogen. Gilbert N. Lewis wrote in 1938, "To restrict the group of acids to those substances that contain hydrogen interferes as seriously with the systematic understanding of chemistry as would the restriction of the term oxidizing agent to substances containing oxygen." Furthermore, KOH and KNH2 are not considered Brønsted bases, but rather salts containing the bases OH and NH
2
.

Lewis definition

The hydrogen requirement of Arrhenius and Brønsted–Lowry was removed by the Lewis definition of acid–base reactions, devised by Gilbert N. Lewis in 1923, in the same year as Brønsted–Lowry, but it was not elaborated by him until 1938. Instead of defining acid–base reactions in terms of protons or other bonded substances, the Lewis definition defines a base (referred to as a Lewis base) to be a compound that can donate an electron pair, and an acid (a Lewis acid) to be a compound that can receive this electron pair.

For example, boron trifluoride, BF3 is a typical Lewis acid. It can accept a pair of electrons as it has a vacancy in its octet. The fluoride ion has a full octet and can donate a pair of electrons. Thus

BF3 + FBF
4

is a typical Lewis acid, Lewis base reaction. All compounds of group 13 elements with a formula AX3 can behave as Lewis acids. Similarly, compounds of group 15 elements with a formula DY3, such as amines, NR3, and phosphines, PR3, can behave as Lewis bases. Adducts between them have the formula X3A←DY3 with a dative covalent bond, shown symbolically as ←, between the atoms A (acceptor) and D (donor). Compounds of group 16 with a formula DX2 may also act as Lewis bases; in this way, a compound like an ether, R2O, or a thioether, R2S, can act as a Lewis base. The Lewis definition is not limited to these examples. For instance, carbon monoxide acts as a Lewis base when it forms an adduct with boron trifluoride, of formula F3B←CO.

Adducts involving metal ions are referred to as co-ordination compounds; each ligand donates a pair of electrons to the metal ion. The reaction

[Ag(H2O)4]+ + 2NH3 → [Ag(NH3)2]+ + 4H2O

can be seen as an acid–base reaction in which a stronger base (ammonia) replaces a weaker one (water)

The Lewis and Brønsted–Lowry definitions are consistent with each other since the reaction

H+ + OH ⇌ H2O

is an acid–base reaction in both theories.

Solvent system definition

One of the limitations of the Arrhenius definition is its reliance on water solutions. Edward Curtis Franklin studied the acid–base reactions in liquid ammonia in 1905 and pointed out the similarities to the water-based Arrhenius theory. Albert F.O. Germann, working with liquid phosgene, COCl
2
, formulated the solvent-based theory in 1925, thereby generalizing the Arrhenius definition to cover aprotic solvents.

Germann pointed out that in many solutions, there are ions in equilibrium with the neutral solvent molecules:

  • solvonium ions: a generic name for positive ions. (The term solvonium has replaced the older term lyonium ions: positive ions formed by protonation of solvent molecules.)
  • solvate ions: a generic name for negative ions. (The term solvate has replaced the older term lyate ions: negative ions formed by deprotonation of solvent molecules.)

For example, water and ammonia undergo such dissociation into hydronium and hydroxide, and ammonium and amide, respectively:

2 H
2
O
H
3
O+
+ OH
2 NH
3
NH+
4
+ NH
2

Some aprotic systems also undergo such dissociation, such as dinitrogen tetroxide into nitrosonium and nitrate, antimony trichloride into dichloroantimonium and tetrachloroantimonate, and phosgene into chlorocarboxonium and chloride:

N
2
O
4
NO+
+ NO
3
2 SbCl
3
SbCl+
2
+ SbCl
4
COCl
2
COCl+
+ Cl

A solute that causes an increase in the concentration of the solvonium ions and a decrease in the concentration of solvate ions is defined as an acid. A solute that causes an increase in the concentration of the solvate ions and a decrease in the concentration of the solvonium ions is defined as a base.

Thus, in liquid ammonia, KNH
2
(supplying NH
2
) is a strong base, and NH
4
NO
3
(supplying NH+
4
) is a strong acid. In liquid sulfur dioxide (SO
2
), thionyl compounds (supplying SO2+
) behave as acids, and sulfites (supplying SO2−
3
) behave as bases.

The non-aqueous acid–base reactions in liquid ammonia are similar to the reactions in water:

2 NaNH
2

(base)
+ Zn(NH
2
)
2

(amphiphilic amide)
Na
2
[Zn(NH
2
)
4
]
2 NH
4
I

(acid)
+ Zn(NH
2
)
2

(amphiphilic amide)
[Zn(NH
3
)
4
]I
2

Nitric acid can be a base in liquid sulfuric acid:

HNO
3

(base)
+ 2 H
2
SO
4
NO+
2
+ H
3
O+
+ 2 HSO
4

The unique strength of this definition shows in describing the reactions in aprotic solvents; for example, in liquid N
2
O
4
:

AgNO
3

(base)
+ NOCl
(acid)
N
2
O
4

(solvent)
+ AgCl
(salt)

Because the solvent system definition depends on the solute as well as on the solvent itself, a particular solute can be either an acid or a base depending on the choice of the solvent: HClO
4
is a strong acid in water, a weak acid in acetic acid, and a weak base in fluorosulfonic acid; this characteristic of the theory has been seen as both a strength and a weakness, because some substances (such as SO
3
and NH
3
) have been seen to be acidic or basic on their own right. On the other hand, solvent system theory has been criticized as being too general to be useful. Also, it has been thought that there is something intrinsically acidic about hydrogen compounds, a property not shared by non-hydrogenic solvonium salts.

Lux–Flood definition

This acid–base theory was a revival of the oxygen theory of acids and bases proposed by German chemist Hermann Lux in 1939, further improved by Håkon Flood circa 1947 and is still used in modern geochemistry and electrochemistry of molten salts. This definition describes an acid as an oxide ion    (O2−
) acceptor and a base as an oxide ion donor. For example:

MgO
(base)
+ CO
2

(acid)
MgCO
3
CaO
(base)
+ SiO
2

(acid)
CaSiO
3
NO
3

(base)
+ S
2
O2−
7

(acid)
NO+
2
+ 2 SO2−
4

This theory is also useful in the systematisation of the reactions of noble gas compounds, especially the xenon oxides, fluorides, and oxofluorides.

Usanovich definition

Mikhail Usanovich developed a general theory that does not restrict acidity to hydrogen-containing compounds, but his approach, published in 1938, was even more general than Lewis theory. Usanovich's theory can be summarized as defining an acid as anything that accepts negative species or donates positive ones, and a base as the reverse. This defined the concept of redox (oxidation-reduction) as a special case of acid–base reactions

Some examples of Usanovich acid–base reactions include:

Na
2
O

(base)
+ SO
3

(acid)
→ 2 Na+
+ SO2−
4
(species exchanged: O2−
anion)
3 (NH
4
)
2
S

(base)
+ Sb
2
S
5

(acid)
→ 6 NH+
4
+ 2 SbS3−
4
(species exchanged: 3 S2−
anions)
2Na
(base)
+ Cl
2

(acid)
→ 2Na+
+ 2Cl
(species exchanged: 2 electrons)

Rationalizing the strength of Lewis acid–base interactions

HSAB theory

In 1963, Ralph Pearson proposed a qualitative concept known as the Hard and Soft Acids and Bases principle. later made quantitative with help of Robert Parr in 1984. 'Hard' applies to species that are small, have high charge states, and are weakly polarizable. 'Soft' applies to species that are large, have low charge states and are strongly polarizable. Acids and bases interact, and the most stable interactions are hard–hard and soft–soft. This theory has found use in organic and inorganic chemistry.

ECW model

The ECW model created by Russell S. Drago is a quantitative model that describes and predicts the strength of Lewis acid base interactions, −ΔH. The model assigned E and C parameters to many Lewis acids and bases. Each acid is characterized by an EA and a CA. Each base is likewise characterized by its own EB and CB. The E and C parameters refer, respectively, to the electrostatic and covalent contributions to the strength of the bonds that the acid and base will form. The equation is

−ΔH = EAEB + CACB + W

The W term represents a constant energy contribution for acid–base reaction such as the cleavage of a dimeric acid or base. The equation predicts reversal of acids and base strengths. The graphical presentations of the equation show that there is no single order of Lewis base strengths or Lewis acid strengths.

Acid–base equilibrium

The reaction of a strong acid with a strong base is essentially a quantitative reaction. For example,

HCl(aq) + Na(OH)(aq) → H2O + NaCl(aq)

In this reaction both the sodium and chloride ions are spectators as the neutralization reaction,

H+ + OH → H2O

does not involve them. With weak bases addition of acid is not quantitative because a solution of a weak base is a buffer solution. A solution of a weak acid is also a buffer solution. When a weak acid reacts with a weak base an equilibrium mixture is produced. For example, adenine, written as AH, can react with a hydrogen phosphate ion, HPO2−
4
.

AH + HPO2−
4
⇌ A + H
2
PO
4

The equilibrium constant for this reaction can be derived from the acid dissociation constants of adenine and of the dihydrogen phosphate ion.

[A] [H+] = Ka1[AH]
[HPO2−
4
] [H+] = Ka2[H
2
PO
4
]

The notation [X] signifies "concentration of X". When these two equations are combined by eliminating the hydrogen ion concentration, an expression for the equilibrium constant, K is obtained.

[A] [H
2
PO
4
] = K[AH] [HPO2−
4
];      K = Ka1/Ka2

Acid–alkali reaction

An acid–alkali reaction is a special case of an acid–base reaction, where the base used is also an alkali. When an acid reacts with an alkali salt (a metal hydroxide), the product is a metal salt and water. Acid–alkali reactions are also neutralization reactions.

In general, acid–alkali reactions can be simplified to

OH
(aq)
+ H+
(aq)H
2
O

by omitting spectator ions.

Acids are in general pure substances that contain hydrogen cations (H+
) or cause them to be produced in solutions. Hydrochloric acid (HCl) and sulfuric acid (H
2
SO
4
) are common examples. In water, these break apart into ions:

HClH+
(aq) + Cl
(aq)
H
2
SO
4
H+
(aq) + HSO
4
(aq)

The alkali breaks apart in water, yielding dissolved hydroxide ions:

NaOHNa+
(aq) + OH
(aq)

Child abductions in the Russian invasion of Ukraine

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Child abductions in the Russian invasion of Ukraine

During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia has forcibly transferred thousands of Ukrainian children to areas under its control, assigned them Russian citizenship, forcibly adopted them into Russian families, and created obstacles for their reunification with their parents and homeland. The United Nations has stated that these deportations constitute war crimes. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued arrest warrants for President of Russia Vladimir Putin (who has explicitly supported the forced adoptions, including by enacting legislation to facilitate them) and Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova for their alleged involvement. According to international law, including the 1948 Genocide Convention, such acts constitute genocide if done with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a nation or ethnic group.

Ukrainian children have been abducted by the Russian state after their parents had been arrested by Russian occupation authorities or killed in the invasion, or after becoming separated from their parents in an active war zone. Children have also been abducted from Ukrainian state institutions in occupied areas, and through children's "summer camps" on Russian territory. The abducted children have been subject to Russification; raising children of war in a foreign nation and culture may constitute an act of genocide if intended to erase their national identity.

Ukrainian authorities have verified the identities of over 19,000 abducted children, compiling and actively updating the data as part of an online platform: "Children of War". Russian authorities have claimed that over 700,000 Ukrainian children have been "evacuated", and Ukraine's ombudsman on children's rights believes that the actual number of abducted children may be in the hundreds of thousands. A charitable organisation - Save Ukraine - facilitates the repatriation and family reunification of abducted Ukrainian children.

Overview

Abductions

The vast majority of the abducted children have been abducted from southern and eastern Ukraine (Kherson, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Luhansk and Mykolaiv regions).

Parental separation

Some children have been abducted after becoming separated from their parents while fleeing active war zones, and some have been abducted after their parents were detained in filtration camps. Some children have been abducted and taken to Russia by family friends or relatives seeking financial and material gain from incentives instituted by the Russian state intended to promote adoption of Ukrainian children by Russian families. Ukraine's ombudsman on children's rights has alleged that Russian occupation authorities have used abductions as a punitive measure against parents who disobey occupation authorities, revoking their parental rights as punishment for dissent. Some children are abducted by Russian authorities after their parents are killed by Russian forces, Ukrainian officials have said.

State institutions

Children have been abducted from Ukrainian state-run institutions such as orphanages, group homes, care homes, hospitals, and boarding schools; many of the forcibly transferred children were taken from orphanages and group homes. State institutions furthermore lost track of thousands of children in their care amid the turmoil of the war.

Most children in the care of Ukrainian state institutions (including some of those in orphanages) are not orphans but were only temporarily or permanently placed under the care of the state by parents facing personal hardships such as poverty, illness, or addiction. The Ukrainian state facilitates the voluntary temporary or permanent placement of children under the care of state institutions by parents. Some 90% of Ukrainian children living under state care were thus "social orphans" – children with family members who are for various reasons unable to care for them. The United Nations estimated that some 90,000 children resided in state-run homes in Ukraine prior to the 2022 invasion. Regardless of whether the children had living parents or were indeed wards of the state, such forced transfers during wartime likely constitute a war crime.

Summer camp stays

Parents in Russian-occupied areas have been encouraged by Russian occupation authorities, Russian forces, and teachers to send their children to so-called "summer camps" (in fact re-education camps for Ukrainian children) for a respite from the Russo-Ukrainian War. Some parents were pressured to allow their children to go to the camps, while others agreed in order to get their children out of an active war zone, or to take advantage of an opportunity to provide them a free trip (many families that agreed to send their children were economically disadvantaged) or better living conditions amid the ravages of war.

Some of these children have been subsequently detained in the camps indefinitely, while others were returned weeks or months later than promised. Some parents who sent their children to the "summer camps" were subsequently told that their children would be returned only if their parents pick them up in person, but travel between Ukraine and Russia is difficult, dangerous and expensive, some camps are located far from Ukraine (including as far as Magadan Oblast in the Russian Far East, which abuts the Pacific coast), and many children are from low-income families that cannot afford the journey (some had to sell their belongings to afford the journey and travel through four countries to collect their children from the camps); even relatives granted power of attorney by parents are not allowed to collect the children, and all men (including parents) of ages between 18 and 60 are forbidden from leaving Ukraine as they are eligible for conscription and additionally risk "filtration" and possible persecution when attempting to enter Russia, so that in practice, in most cases only the mothers are able to retrieve the children. In some instances, camp officials said that the return of children was dependent upon Russia recapturing since liberated Ukrainian territory where the child's family lives, and one child was told that he would not be returned home due to his "pro-Ukrainian views". Some children said they were told they would be given up for adoption or placed into foster homes if their parents did not come to collect them soon. Some children were retrieved through intervention by the Ukrainian government. Parents' ability to communicate with their children during their stay in the camps has been curtailed, and parents have been denied information about their child's status.

Allegations of maltreatment

According to witness testimonies obtained by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, some of the children have experienced poor living conditions, inadequate care, and verbal abuse while living under the custody of the Russian state. Some returned children have attested to harsh punishments and restrictive living conditions while in Russia. The Ukrainian government has claimed that some children have experienced sexual exploitation after being forcibly transferred to Russia. Children detained in summer camps have testified to frequent punishment, bullying by peers, and pressure to sing the Russian anthem.

Abducted children are offered a three month-long rehabilitation with mental health care teams upon returning to Ukraine.

Russian policies

Adoptions

Russian law prohibits adoptions of children who are citizens of other countries by Russian citizens without the consent of the child's home country. In May 2022, Vladimir Putin signed a decree facilitating the granting of Russian citizenship to Ukrainian children to enable their permanent adoption into Russian families - this change represents a legal obstacle to future reunification of the abducted children with their Ukrainian families or their repatriation to Ukraine. Orphanages, group homes, and social service agencies are also allowed to file for adoption of abducted children, thus initiating their naturalisation.

The Russian government has created a register of Russian families that may adopt Ukrainian children, and a hotline for Russian families seeking to adopt Ukrainian children from Donbas. Adoptive families receive a cash payment for each adopted Ukrainian child that is granted Russian citizenship. Lvova-Belova has suggested the creation of a database of Ukrainian (ostensible) orphans to improve matching of these children with prospective adoptive families in occupied Ukraine or Russia, and expressed a wish to systematise the adoption process.

Russification

According to The New York Times, "Russian officials have made clear that their goal is to replace any childhood attachment to home with a love for Russia". Upon arriving in Russia, the children are placed in homes and subjected to re-education.

During the occupation of Novopskov, occupation authorities threatened to deprive parents of parental rights if their child did not attend a school with a Russian curriculum.

Ukraine's ombudsman on children's rights has alleged that Russia is carrying out the abductions with the goal of supplementing its own population, and that Russia is conducting health examinations on the children in order to integrate only healthy Ukrainian children into the Russian nation.

Re-education camps

In 2022, the Russian government established a large-scale system of at least 43 children's camps in Russia and Crimea (most of which previously served as children's summer resorts) the main purpose of which appears to be "integrating children from Ukraine into the Russian government's vision of national culture, history, and society", according to a report by Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab. Some children have been placed in summer camps in Belarus that are run by Belarussian state-owned corporations by virtue of a decree issued by the Russo-Belarussian Union State. Children in such camps have been subjected to Russification, Russian state propaganda, and military education (including firearm training). Children have also been provided with formal education in accordance with Russia's educational standards (either at the camps or at local schools) in an effort to steer them towards attending university in Russia.

Parents in Russian-occupied areas are encouraged or coerced to send their children to these camps (described to them as children's "summer camps") for a respite from the war, with the children subsequently subject to indoctrination during their stay and sometimes not returned to the parents as promised. Orphans, children from Ukrainian state institutions, and children who have become separated from their legal guardians due to the conflict are also sent to these camps before their eventual adoption and/or placement in foster care in Russia. At least 6,000 Ukrainian children have attended such camps; analysis of information from public accounts and satellite imagery has indicated the number of children housed in such camps to be far higher.

All levels of the Russian government - federal, regional, and local - are involved in the operation of the camps, and their operation is also supported by Russian occupation authorities and proxies, and members of Russia's civil society and private sector. Vladimir Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova have promoted the camps.

Propaganda

The Russian state begun using abducted Ukrainian children for propaganda purposes during the War in Donbas. The domestic narrative of the Russian state is that abandoned children are rescued from the ravages of war by the magnanimous Russian state. The forced transfer of Ukrainian children forms part of a broader propaganda strategy by Vladimir Putin attempting to portray Ukraine as part of the Russian nation, justify the invasion, and bolster support for the war. Abducted children were paraded at a government pro-war rally marking the first anniversary of the invasion, where they were shown thanking Russian soldiers for "saving them". The Russian state has carefully crafted the portrayal of the forced transfers of children to the Russian public. Russian state television has broadcast footage of Russian officials handing out teddy bears to newly arrived abducted children, and Russian officials in Donetsk have invited reporters to events where gifts were handed out to abducted children.

Preventing repatriation and family reunification

Many parents wish to reunite with their children (some do not, either due to financial reasons or previous estrangement). Russian authorities do not make any attempt to contact parents to notify them that their children are in the custody of the Russian state and have refused to cooperate with the Ukrainian government and international organisations in tracking the children. Likewise, they do not release any information regarding the identities of the transferred children, making it difficult for Ukrainian and international authorities to locate and identify the children. The first and last names of the abducted children are also changed, making it even more difficult to track down and identify the children. Ukraine's ombudsman on children's rights has said the process of tracking down abducted children is especially difficult with young children that may not remember where they are from. Even in cases where parents have successfully tracked down their children and formally applied to the Russian authorities to be reunited with them, Russian officials have attempted to pressure or persuade the parents and children to consent to transfer, promising creature comforts and a better life. In cases where parents (or other legal guardian) and children are unable to establish contact or parents are unable or unwilling to personally come collect the children, children are deported to Russia even if they personally express a desire to remain in Ukraine. Abducted children have been lied to by Russian officials about their parents having abandoned them.

History

Russia started transferring children from Ukrainian territories as early as 2014, the first year of the Russo-Ukrainian War.

In early February 2022, Russia "evacuated" 500 supposed orphans from Donetsk Oblast to Russian territory, supposedly due to a risk of a Ukrainian attack on the seperatist Donetsk People's Republic.

The first reports of forced deportations to Russia as part of the Russian invasion of Ukraine came mid-March 2022, during the siege of Mariupol. The same month, Russian children's rights commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova has stated that a group of Ukrainian children transferred to Russia from Mariupol had initially asserted their Ukrainian identity, but that it had since transformed into a love for Russia, saying that she had adopted one of the children herself.

On 22 March 2022, Ukraine and U.S. authorities claimed more than 2,300 children had been kidnapped by Russian forces from the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.

On 30 May 2022, Vladimir Putin signed a decree that streamlined the process of adopting Ukrainian orphans or those without parental care and giving them Russian citizenship.

According to a May 2022 report by the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights in Montreal and the New Lines Institute in Washington, there are "reasonable grounds to conclude" that Russia is in breach of two articles of the 1948 Genocide Convention, among them the forcible transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia, in itself a genocidal act.

By 11 April, two-thirds of Ukraine's 7.5 million children had been displaced according to the U.N. Ukraine's human rights commissioner, Lyudmila Denysova, and U.N. ambassador Sergiy Kyslytsya, stated at that time that more than 120,000 children had been deported to Russia. By 26 May, more than 238,000 Ukrainian children were reported to have been deported to Russian territory.

Ukraine raised the issue at a meeting of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in early June, where the head of Ukraine's mission, Yevhenii Tsymbaliuk, quoted a message from a Ukrainian child who had been forcibly adopted despite having close living relations; addressed to his aunt, it read, in part, "They say I'm an orphan. But I'm not an orphan, I have you, I have grandparents. There are so many children like me here. They say they want to leave us in Russia. And I don't want to stay in Russia!"

According to Ukrainska Pravda, Russia has taken 267 orphans from Mariupol to Rostov to be made Russian citizens, supervised by Maria Lvova-Belova. It also reported that Russian authorities had looked for and collected orphaned children, to be taken to an unknown destination.

Sky News released CCTV footage dated June 2022 of Russian FSB officials entering an orphanage Kherson to search for orphans. Aware of the risk of child abductions, the staff hid the children prior to their arrival. Finding the orphanage empty, the FSB agents seized records, computers, and the CCTV system from the orphanage in an apparent effort to track down the missing children. Russian authorities subsequently sent abducted 15 children to be housed in the orphanage, only to be taken away by the Russian occupiers as they retreated from Kherson. Russian forces also successfully abducted children from a different Kherson orphanage, an eyewitness told Sky News.

In June 2022, Mikhail Mizintsev, head of the National Defense Management Center, claimed 1,936,911 Ukrainians had been deported to Russia, of whom 307,423 were children.

On 7 September a United Nations official reported that there were credible accusations that Russian forces had sent Ukrainian children to Russia for adoption as part of a forced deportation programme, and the US ambassador informed the UN Security Council that more than 1,800 Ukrainian children had been transferred to Russia in July alone.

Child abduction during "filtration" procedures was documented in a 10 November 2022 Amnesty International report entitled "Russia’s Unlawful Transfer And Abuse Of Civilians In Ukraine During 'Filtration'". An 11-year-old boy testified to Amnesty International:

They took my mom to another tent. She was being questioned... They told me I was going to be taken away from my mom... I was shocked... They didn’t say anything about where my mom was going. A lady from Novoazovsk [child protection] service said maybe my mom would be let go... I didn’t get to see my mom... I have not heard from her since.

In December 2022, a report published by the Eastern Human Rights Group and the Institute for Strategic Research and Security concluded that the deportations in Donbas were prepared by the Russian Federation under the guise of "evacuation" ahead of time.

Reactions

Russia

Lvova-Belova has claimed that the Russian state is entirely willing to reunite the children with their parents if they come forward.

On 17 June 2023, Vladimir Putin rejected the request of a peace delegation from Africa to return the children back home, saying that "We moved them out of the conflict zone, saving their lives and health."

A man dressed up as Vladimir Putin in central Helsinki, Finland

Ukraine

Ukrainian authorities have claimed Putin's decree to be a way to "legalize the abduction of children from the territory of Ukraine". They have maintained this "grossly violate[s]" the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The Foreign Ministry of Ukraine also believes that the actions may qualify as a forcible transfer of children from one human group to another. In a statement: "The most serious international crimes against children committed by Russian high-ranking officials and servicemen in Ukraine will be investigated, and the perpetrators will be prosecuted. Russia will not be able to avoid the strictest accountability."

By 31 May 2023, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Ukrainian Service reported that Zelenskiy said 371 deported Ukraine children have been returned by Russia. More than 19,000 children have been deported to Russia.

United Nations

UNICEF Emergency Programs Director Manuel Fontaine told CBS News that UNICEF was "looking into how we can track or help on that", though stating they did not have ability to investigate at the moment.

Michelle Bachelet, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, announced on 15 June 2022 that her agency had started an investigation into allegations of children forcibly deported from Ukraine to the Russian Federation.

On 15 March 2023, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) released a report declaring these forced transfers of children are illegal and a war crime. It broadly gave three categories of deported children: those who lost contact with their parents due to the Russian invasion, those who were separated when their parents were sent to a Russian filtration camp, and those who were in institutions. The report concluded:

International humanitarian law prohibits the evacuation of children by a party to the armed conflict, with the exception of a temporary evacuation where compelling reasons relating to the health or medical treatment of the children or, except in occupied territory, their safety, so requires. The written consent of parents or legal guardians is required. In none of the situations which the Commission has examined, transfers of children appear to have satisfied the requirements set forth by international humanitarian law. The transfers were not justified by safety or medical reasons. There seems to be no indication that it was impossible to allow the children to relocate to territory under Ukrainian Government control... The Commission has concluded that the situations it has examined concerning the transfer and deportation of children, within Ukraine and to the Russian Federation respectively, violate international humanitarian law, and amount to a war crime.

Civil society

On 21 December 2022, a French NGO, "For Ukraine, for their Freedom and Ours!", submitted via the law firm Vigo a communication to Karim Khan, Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Court, to contribute to "the investigation opened on 2 March 2022 by the Office of the Prosecutor, upon referral of the situation in Ukraine by a coordinated group of States Parties to the Rome Statute". The communication "relates to the forcible transfer and large-scale deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia, in a clear attempt by the Russian authorities to erase, at least in part, Ukrainians as a national group with a distinct identity. These facts are likely to constitute several of the crimes listed in Article 5 of the Rome Statute, and more specifically the crime of genocide (Article 6-e) and crimes against humanity (Article 7-d)".

Genocide scholar Timothy D. Snyder tweeted: "Kidnapping children en masse and seeking to assimilate them in a foreign culture is genocide according to Article 2 Section E of the 1948 genocide convention."

Other

In April 2023, the Council of Europe deemed the forced transfers of children as constituting an act of genocide in with an overwhelming majority of 87 in favour of the resolution to 1 against and 1 abstaining.

Sanctions

Russian children's rights commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova has been sanctioned by the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.

Arrest warrants

On 17 March 2023, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Putin and Lvova-Belova, alleging criminal responsibility for the unlawful deportation and transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia. It decided that they are covered by articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and article 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute and intended by Russia as permanent. The charges carry a potential life sentence. It is the first time the court has issued an arrest warrant against the leader of a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan said, "We must ensure that those responsible for alleged crimes are held accountable and that children are returned to their families and communities. We cannot allow children to be treated as if they are the spoils of war."

No-till farming

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
No-till farming
Young soybean plants are being planted in long rows
Young soybean plants thrive in and are protected by the residue of a wheat crop. This form of no-till farming provides good protection for the soil from erosion and helps retain moisture for the new crop.

No-till farming (also known as zero tillage or direct drilling) is an agricultural technique for growing crops or pasture without disturbing the soil through tillage. No-till farming decreases the amount of soil erosion tillage causes in certain soils, especially in sandy and dry soils on sloping terrain. Other possible benefits include an increase in the amount of water that infiltrates into the soil, soil retention of organic matter, and nutrient cycling. These methods may increase the amount and variety of life in and on the soil. While conventional no-tillage systems use herbicides to control weeds, organic systems use a combination of strategies, such as planting cover crops as mulch to suppress weeds.

There are three basic methods of no-till farming. "Sod seeding" is when crops are sown with seeding machinery into a sod produced by applying herbicides on a cover crop (killing that vegetation). "Direct seeding" is when crops are sown through the residue of previous crop. "Surface seeding" or "direct seeding" is when crops are left on the surface of the soil; on flatlands, this requires no machinery and minimal labor.

Tillage is dominant in agriculture today, but no-till methods may have success in some contexts. In some cases minimum tillage or "low-till" methods combine till and no-till methods. For example, some approaches may use shallow cultivation (i.e. using a disc harrow) but no plowing or use strip tillage.

Background

Tillage is the agricultural preparation of soil by mechanical agitation, typically removing weeds established in the previous season. Tilling can create a flat seed bed or one that has formed areas, such as rows or raised beds, to enhance the growth of desired plants. It is an ancient technique with clear evidence of its use since at least 3000 B.C.

No-till farming is not equivalent to conservation tillage or strip tillage. Conservation tillage is a group of practices that reduce the amount of tillage needed. No-till and strip tillage are both forms of conservation tillage. No-till is the practice of never tilling a field. Tilling every other year is called rotational tillage.

The effects of tillage can include soil compaction; loss of organic matter; degradation of soil aggregates; death or disruption of soil microbes and other organisms including mycorrhizae, arthropods, and earthworms; and soil erosion where topsoil is washed or blown away.

Origin

The idea of modern no-till farming started in the 1940s with Edward H. Faulkner, author of Plowman's Folly, but it was not until the development after WWII of powerful herbicides such as paraquat that various researchers and farmers started to try out the idea. The first adopters of no-till include Klingman (North Carolina), Edward Faulkner, L.A. Porter (New Zealand), Harry and Lawrence Young (Herndon, Kentucky), the Instituto de Pesquisas Agropecuarias Meridional (1971 in Brazil) with Herbert Bartz.

Adoption across the world

Land under no-till farming has increased across the world. In 1999, about 45 million ha (170,000 sq mi) was under no-till farming worldwide, which increased to 72 million ha (280,000 sq mi) in 2003 and to 111 million ha (430,000 sq mi) in 2009.

Australia

Per figures from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Agricultural Resource Management Survey, in Australia the percentage of agricultural land under No-till farming methods was 26% in 2000–01, which more than doubled to 57% in 2007–08. As at 30 June 2017, of the 20 million ha (77,000 sq mi) of crop land cultivated 79% (or 16 million hectares) received no cultivation. Similarly, 70% (or 2 million hectares) of the 3 million hectares of pasture land cultivated received no cultivation, apart from sowing.

South America

South America had the highest adoption of No-till farming in the world, which in 2014 constituted 47% of the total global area under no-till farming. The countries with highest adoption are Argentina (80%), Brazil (50%), Paraguay (90%), and Uruguay (82%).

In Argentina the usage of no-till resulted in reduction of soil erosion losses by 80%, cost reductions by more than 50% and increased farm incomes.

In Brazil the usage of no-till resulted in reduction of soil erosion losses by 97%, higher farm productivity and income increase by 57% five years after the starting of no-till farming.

In Paraguay, net farm incomes increased by 77% after adoption of no-till farming.

United States

No-till farming is used in the United States and the area managed in this way continues to grow. This growth is supported by a decrease in costs. No-till management results in fewer passes with equipment, and the crop residue prevents evaporation of rainfall and increases water infiltration into the soil.

In 2017, no-till farming was being used in about 21% of the cultivated cropland in the US.

Benefits and issues

Profit, economics, yield

Some studies have found that no-till farming can be more profitable in some cases.

In some cases it may reduce labour, fuel, irrigation and machinery costs. No-till can increase yield because of higher water infiltration and storage capacity, and less erosion. Another possible benefit is that because of the higher water content, instead of leaving a field fallow it can make economic sense to plant another crop instead.

A problem of no-till farming is that in spring, the soil both warms and dries more slowly, which may delay planting. Harvest can thus occur later than in a conventionally tilled field. The slower warming is due to crop residue being a lighter color than the soil which would be exposed in conventional tillage, which then absorbs less solar energy. However, that is being affected by climate change, so warmer temperatures may offset these effects. But in the meantime, this can be managed by using row cleaners on a planter.

A problem with no-till farming is that if production is impacted negatively by the implemented process then the profitability of the practice also may decrease in relation to increasing gas prices and high labor costs. As the prices for fuel and labor continue to rise, it may be more practical for farms and farming productions to turn toward a no-till operation. In spring, poor draining clay soil may have lower production due to a cold and wet year.

The economic and ecological benefits of implementing no-till practices can require sixteen to nineteen years. The first decade of no-till implementation often will show trends of revenue decrease. Implementation periods greater than ten years in length usually show a gain in profit, rather than a decrease in profitability.

Costs and management

No-till farming requires some different skills from those of conventional farming. A combination of technique, equipment, pesticides, crop rotation, fertilization, and irrigation have to be used for local conditions.

Equipment

On some crops, like continuous no-till corn, the thickness of the residue on the surface of the field can become a problem without proper preparation and/or equipment. No-till farming requires specialized seeding equipment, such as heavier seed drills to penetrate through the residue. Ploughing requires more powerful tractors, so tractors can be smaller with no-tillage. Costs can be offset by selling ploughs and tractors, but farmers often keep their old equipment while trying out no-till farming. This results in a higher investment into equipment.

Increased herbicide use

One of the purposes of tilling is to remove weeds. No-till farming changes weed composition: faster growing weeds may be reduced as increased competition with eventual growth of perennials, shrubs and trees. This problem is usually solved with a herbicide such as glyphosate in lieu of tillage for seedbed preparation, so no-tillage often uses more herbicides in comparison to conventional tillage. Some alternatives can be winter cover crops, soil solarization or burning. However the use of herbicides is not strictly necessary, as demonstrated by Masanobu Fukuoka.

No-till occasionally uses cover crops to help control weeds and increase organic residue in the soil (or nutrients by using legumes). Cover crops then need to be killed so that the newly planted crops can get enough light, water, nutrients, etc. This can be done by rollers, crimpers, choppers and other ways. The residue is then planted through, and left as a mulch. Cover crops typically must be crimped when they enter the flowering stage.

With no-till farming, residue from the previous year's crops lie on the surface of the field, which can cause different, greater, or more frequent disease or weed problems compared to tillage farming.

Fertilizer

One of the most common yield reducers is nitrogen being immobilized in the crop residue, which can take a few months to several years to decompose, depending on the crop's C to N ratio and the local environment. Fertilizer needs to be applied at a higher rate. An innovative solution to this problem is to integrate animal husbandry in various ways to aid in decomposition. After a transition period (4–5 years for Kansas, USA) the soil may build up in organic matter. Nutrients in the organic matter are eventually released into the soil.

Environmental Policy

A legislative bill, H.R.2508 of the 117th Congress, also known as the NO EMITS act, has been proposed to amend the Food Security Act of 1985, that was introduced by Representative Rodney Davis of Illinois. Davis is a member of the House Committee on Agriculture. This bill proposes suggestions for offsetting emissions that are focused in agricultural means, doing so by implementing new strategies such as minimal tillage or no tillage. H.R.2508 is currently under reference by the House Committee of Agriculture. H.R.2508 is also backed by two other representatives from high agricultural states, Rep. Eric A. Crawford of Arkansas and Rep. Don Bacon of Nebraska. H.R.2508 is proposing to set up incentive programs to provide financial and mechanical assistance to farmers and agriculture plots that transition their production processes, as well as providing contacts to lower risk for producers. Funding has also been proposed for Conservation Innovation Trails.

Farmers within the U.S. are encouraged through subsidies and other programs provided by the government to meet a defined level of tillage conservation. Such subsidies and programs provided by the U.S. government include: Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP). The EQIP is a voluntary program that attempts to assists farmers and other participants help through conservation and not financially suffer from doing so. Efforts are put out to help reduce the amount of contamination from the agricultural industry as well as increasing the health of the soil. The CSP attempts to assist those who are looking to implement conservation effort into their practices by giving suggestions on what might be done for their given circumstance and needs.

Environmental

Greenhouse gases

No-till farming has been claimed to increase soil organic matter, and thus increase carbon sequestration. While many studies report soil organic carbon increases in no-till systems, others conclude that these effects may not be observed in all systems, depending on factors, such as climate and topsoil carbon content. A 2020 study demonstrated that the combination of no-till and cover cropping sequesters more carbon than either practice alone, suggesting that the two practices have a synergistic effect in carbon capture.

There is debate over whether the increased sequestration sometimes detected is actually occurring, or is due to flawed testing methods or other factors. A 2014 study claimed that certain no-till systems may sequester less carbon than conventional tillage systems, saying that the “no-till subsurface layer is often losing more soil organic carbon stock over time than is gained in the surface layer.” The study also pointed out the need for a uniform definition of soil organic carbon sequestration among researchers. The study concludes, "Additional investments in soil organic carbon (SOC) research is needed to better understand the agricultural management practices that are most likely to sequester SOC or at least retain more net SOC stocks."

No-till farming reduces nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions by 40-70%, depending on rotation. Nitrous oxide is a potent greenhouse gas, 300 times stronger than CO2, and stays in the atmosphere for 120 years.

Soil and desertification

No-till farming improves aggregates and reduces erosion. Soil erosion might be reduced almost to soil production rates.

Research from over 19 years of tillage studies at the United States Department of Agriculture Agricultural Research Service found that no-till farming makes soil less erodible than ploughed soil in areas of the Great Plains. The first inch of no-till soil contains more aggregates and is two to seven times less vulnerable than that of ploughed soil. More organic matter in this layer is thought to help hold soil particles together.

As per the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, no-till farming can stop desertification by maintaining soil organic matter and reducing wind and water erosion.

No ploughing also means less airborne dust.

Water

No-till farming improves water retention: crop residues help water from natural precipitation and irrigation to infiltrate the soil. Residue limits evaporation, conserving water. Evaporation from tilling increases the amount of water by around 1/3 to 3/4 inches (0.85 to 1.9 cm) per pass.

Gully formation can cause soil erosion in some crops such as soybeans with no-tillage, although models of other crops under no-tillage show less erosion than conventional tillage. Grass waterways can be a solution. Any gullies that form in fields not being tilled get deeper each year instead of being smoothed out by regular plowing.

A problem in some fields is water saturation in soils. Switching to no-till farming may increase drainage because soil under continuous no-till include a higher water infiltration rate.

Biota and wildlife

No-tilled fields often have more annelids, invertebrates and wildlife such as deer mice.

Albedo

Tillage lowers the albedo of croplands. The potential for global cooling as a result of increased albedo in no-till croplands is similar in magnitude to other biogeochemical carbon sequestration processes.

Yom HaShoah

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Yom HaShoah
Na terenie obozu Birkenau (14573491352).jpg
"March of the Living" at Auschwitz, 2014
Also calledYom HaZikaron laShoah ve-laG'vurah
Holocaust Remembrance Day
Observed byState of Israel
Many Jews elsewhere
TypeJewish (national)
SignificanceCommemorating the six million Jews murdered in the Holocaust, and the heroism of survivors and rescuers
ObservancesFlags lowered to half-mast, public places of entertainment closed; national opening ceremony and closing ceremonies; siren at 10:00 signaling the start of two minutes of silence
Date27th day of Nisan
2022 dateSunset, 27 April – nightfall, 28 April
2023 dateSunset, 17 April – nightfall, 18 April
2024 dateSunset, 5 May – nightfall, 6 May
2025 dateSunset, 23 April – nightfall, 24 April

Yom HaZikaron laShoah ve-laG'vurah (Hebrew: יום הזיכרון לשואה ולגבורה, lit.'Holocaust and Heroism Remembrance Day'), known colloquially in Israel and abroad as Yom HaShoah (Hebrew: יום השואה, Yiddish: יום השואה) and in English as Holocaust Remembrance Day, or Holocaust Day, is observed as Israel's day of commemoration for the approximately six million Jews murdered in the Holocaust by Nazi Germany and its collaborators, and for the Jewish resistance in that period. In Israel, it is a national memorial day. The first official commemorations took place in 1951, and the observance of the day was anchored in a law passed by the Knesset in 1959. It is held on the 27th of Nisan (which falls in April or May), unless the 27th would be adjacent to the Jewish Sabbath, in which case the date is shifted by a day.

Origins

Rabbinate-instituted day (1949–1950)

The first Holocaust Remembrance Day in Israel took place on December 28, 1949, following a decision of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel that an annual memorial should take place on the Tenth of Tevet, a traditional day of mourning and fasting in the Hebrew calendar. The day was marked by the burial in a Jerusalem cemetery of ashes and bones of thousands of Jews brought from the Flossenbürg concentration camp and religious ceremonies held in honor of the victims. A radio program on the Holocaust was broadcast that evening. The following year, in December 1950, the Rabbinate, organizations of former European Jewish communities and the Israel Defense Forces held memorial ceremonies around the country; they mostly involved funerals, in which objects such as desecrated Torah scrolls and the bones and ashes of the dead brought from Europe were interred.

Knesset-instituted day (1951–1958)

In 1951, the Knesset began deliberations to choose a date for Holocaust Remembrance Day. On April 12, 1951, after also considering as possibilities the Tenth of Tevet, the 14th of Nisan, which is the day before Passover and the day on which the Warsaw Ghetto uprising (April 19, 1943) began, and September 1, the date on which the Second World War began, the Knesset passed a resolution establishing the 27 Nisan in the Hebrew calendar, a week after Passover, and eight days before Israel Independence Day as the annual Holocaust and Ghetto Uprising Remembrance Day.

On May 3, 1951, the first officially organized Holocaust Remembrance Day event was held at the Chamber of the Holocaust on Mount Zion; the Israel Postal Service issued a special commemorative envelope; and a bronze statue of Mordechai Anielewicz, the leader of the Warsaw Ghetto revolt, was unveiled at Yad Mordechai, a kibbutz named for him. From the following year, the lighting of six beacons in memory of the six million Jews murdered by the Nazis became a standard feature of the official commemoration of Holocaust Memorial Day.

Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Day Law (1959)

On April 8, 1959, the Knesset officially established the day when it passed the Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Day Law with the purpose of instituting an annual "commemoration of the disaster which the Nazis and their collaborators brought upon the Jewish people and the acts of heroism and revolt performed." The law was signed by the Prime Minister of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, and the President of Israel, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi. It established that the day would be observed by a two-minute silence when all work would come to a halt throughout the country, memorial gatherings and commemorative events in public and educational institutions would be held, flags would be flown at half mast, and programs relevant to the day would be presented on the radio and in places of entertainment. An amendment to the law in 1961 mandated that cafes, restaurants and clubs be closed on the day.

Commemoration

Israel

Date

The date is set in accordance with the Hebrew calendar, on 27 Nisan, so that it varies in regard to the Gregorian calendar. Observance of the day is moved back to the Thursday before, if 27 Nisan falls on a Friday (as in 2021), or forward a day, if 27 Nisan falls on a Sunday (to avoid adjacency with the Jewish Sabbath, as in 2024). The fixed Jewish calendar ensures 27 Nisan does not fall on Saturday.

Evening

Yom HaShoah opens in Israel at sundown in a state ceremony held in Warsaw Ghetto Square at Yad Vashem, the Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes Authority, in Jerusalem. During the ceremony the national flag is lowered to half mast, the President and the Prime Minister both deliver speeches, Holocaust survivors light six torches symbolizing the approximately six million Jews murdered in the Holocaust and the Chief Rabbis recite prayers.

Daytime

On Yom HaShoah, ceremonies and services are held at schools, military bases and by other public and community organizations.

On the eve of Yom HaShoah and the day itself, places of public entertainment are closed by law. Israeli television airs Holocaust documentaries and Holocaust-related talk shows, and low-key songs are played on the radio. Flags on public buildings are flown at half mast. At 10:00, an air raid siren sounds throughout the country and Israelis are expected to observe two minutes of solemn reflection. It is customary to pause what is being done and to reflect, including motorists who stop their cars in the middle of the road, standing beside their vehicles in silence as the siren is sounded.

Abroad

The March of the Living from Auschwitz to Birkenau is held annually on Yom HaShoah.

Jewish communities and individuals throughout the world commemorate Yom HaShoah in synagogues as well as in the broader Jewish community. Many hold their commemorative ceremonies on the closest Sunday to Yom HaShoah as a more practical day for people to attend, while some mark the day on April 19, the anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising. Jewish schools also hold Holocaust-related educational programs on or near Yom HaShoah.

Commemorations typically include memorial services and communal vigils and educational programs. These programs often include talks by Holocaust survivors (although this is becoming less common as time passes and there are fewer survivors who remain alive), candle-lighting ceremonies, the recitation of memorial prayers, the Mourner's Kaddish and appropriate songs and readings. Some communities read the names of Holocaust victims or show Holocaust-themed films.

Since 1988 in Poland, a memorial service has been held after a three-kilometer walk by thousands of participants from Auschwitz to Birkenau in what has become known as "The March of the Living".

Yom HaShoah is also commemorated by Australian Jews. In 2022, Treasurer Josh Frydenberg, who is Jewish, commemorated Yom HaShoah at the Melbourne Hebrew Congregation on the synagogue's 180th anniversary.

While in Europe Holocaust Remembrance Day is celebrated on the anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz concentration camp by the Soviet military in 1945, the Israeli government chose to commemorate a day that honored Jewish resistance and heroism in the face of the Nazi genocide. To shift the date of this somber remembrance to that of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising is to recognize and exalt the unceasing bravery and defiance of the Jewish people, as opposed to that of outside military personnel.

Religious observances and liturgy

In the last few decades all the prayerbooks of Conservative and Reform Judaism have developed similar liturgies to be used on Yom HaShoah. The siddurim of these groups add passages that are meant to be added to standard weekday service, as well as stand-alone sections. These liturgies generally include:

  • Lighting of a candle (often each member of the congregation lights one)
  • Modern poems, including "I believe in the sun even when it is not shining..."
  • El Malei Rahamim (God, full of mercy, dwelling on high)
  • Mourner's Kaddish

In response to the lack of liturgy dedicated to Yom HaShoah, Daniel Gross composed, in 2009, I Believe: A Shoah Requiem, a complete musical liturgy dedicated to the observance of Yom HaShoah. An a cappella oratorio scored for cantor, soprano solo, adult chorus and children's chorus, I Believe features several traditional prayer texts such as the Mourner's Kaddish (Kaddish Yatom) and the El Malei memorial prayer, and also includes the poetry of Paul Celan and Primo Levi. On April 7, 2013, I Believe had its world premiere presentation at Orchestra Hall at the Max M. Fisher Music Center in Detroit, Michigan.

Orthodox Judaism

While there are Orthodox Jews who commemorate the Holocaust on Yom HaShoah, others in the Orthodox community, especially Haredim, including Hasidim, remember the victims of the Holocaust in their daily prayers and on traditional days of mourning that were already in place before the Holocaust, such as Tisha B'Av in the summer, and the Tenth of Tevet in the winter, because in the Jewish tradition the month of Nisan is considered a joyous month associated with Passover and messianic redemption. The moment of silence is by some purposely ignored because of the non-Jewish origins of this sort of memorial. Some ultra-Orthodox rabbis recommend adding piyyutim (religious poems) about the Holocaust to the liturgy of Tisha B’Av; some adherents follow this advice.

Conservative Judaism

A lit Yom HaShoah Yellow Candle

In 1981, members of the Federation of Jewish Men's Clubs FJMC, a branch of the mainstream Conservative/Masorti movement, created a special memorial project specifically for Yom HaShoah. A dedicated yahrzeit candle was conceived, with yellow wax and a barbed-wire Star of David logo reminiscent of the armbands Jews were forced to wear during the Holocaust. This object has come to be known as the Yellow Candle (TM). Approximately 200,000 candles are distributed around the world each year, along with relevant prayers and meditations.

In 1984, Conservative Rabbi David Golinkin wrote an article in Conservative Judaism journal suggesting a program of observance for the holiday, including fasting. In his article he noted that while private fasts are indeed prohibited during the month of Nisan (a major Orthodox objection to the placement of the day), communal fasts for tragedies befalling Jewish communities had indeed been declared throughout the pre-Modern period.

Another prominent Conservative Jewish figure shared the Orthodox sentiment about not adopting Yom HaShoah. Ismar Schorsch, former Chancellor of Conservative Judaism's Jewish Theological Seminary of America held that Holocaust commemoration should take place on Tisha b'Av.

The Masorti (Conservative) movement in Israel has created Megillat HaShoah, a scroll and liturgical reading for Yom HaShoah. This publication was a joint project of Jewish leaders in Israel, the United States and Canada.

In 2011, the FJMC introduced a related Yellow Candle concept for use on Kristallnacht (The Night of Shattered Glass), November 9–10, commemorating the first organised Nazi pogrom of Jews in 1938, and other important Shoah commemoration dates. Called the Ner Katan, FJMC's new version consists of six Yellow Candles provided for communal observances and ceremonies.

More recently Conservative rabbis and lay leaders in the US, Israel and Canada collaborated to write Megillat Hashoah (The Holocaust Scroll). It contains personal recollections of Holocaust survivors. A responsum was written by Rabbi Golinkin expressing the view that not only is it legitimate for the modern Jewish community to write a new scroll of mourning, it was also incumbent to do so.

Reform Judaism

Reform Jewish congregations have tended to commemorate the memory of the Holocaust either on International Holocaust Remembrance Day or on Yom HaShoah. These commemorations of the Holocaust have used a ceremony that is loosely modeled after a Passover Seder. The focus of the seder has changed with time. The earlier Holocaust seders commemorated the losses of the Holocaust through a reenactment events from the Holocaust and through the lighting of six yahrzeit candles to reflect the approximately 6 million Jews murdered. More modern Haggadot for Yom HaShoah, such as Gathering from the Whirlwind, have concentrated on renewal, remembrance, and the continuity of Jewish life.

In 1988 the American Reform movement published Six Days of Destruction (Elie Wiesel and Rabbi Albert Friedlander). Narratives from Holocaust survivors are juxtaposed with the six days of creation found in Genesis.

Gregorian dates

Upcoming dates of observance:

  • 2023: Tuesday, April 18
  • 2024: Monday, May 6
  • 2025: Thursday, April 24

Politics of Europe

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