A 1986 investigation by a sub-committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (the Kerry Committee), found that "the Contra drug links included", among other connections, "[...] payments to drug traffickers by the U.S. State Department of funds authorized by the Congress for humanitarian assistance
to the Contras, in some cases after the traffickers had been indicted
by federal law enforcement agencies on drug charges, in others while
traffickers were under active investigation by these same agencies."
The charges of CIA involvement in Contra cocaine trafficking were revived in 1996, when a newspaper series by reporter Gary Webb in the San Jose Mercury News claimed that the trafficking had played an important role in the creation of the crack cocaine
drug problem in the United States. Webb's series led to three federal
investigations, all of which concluded there was no evidence of a
conspiracy by CIA officials or its employees to bring drugs into the
United States. The Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, and The Washington Post launched their own investigations and rejected Webb's allegations.
However, an internal report issued by the CIA would admit that the
agency was at least aware of Contra involvement in drug trafficking, and
in some cases dissuaded the DEA and other agencies from investigating the Contra supply networks involved.
Early reports of Contra cocaine trafficking
In
1984, U.S. officials began receiving reports of Contra cocaine
trafficking. Three officials told journalists that they considered
these reports "reliable." Former Panamanian deputy health minister Hugo Spadafora, who had fought with the Contra army, outlined charges of cocaine trafficking to a prominent Panamanian official.
Spadafora was later found murdered. The charges linked the Contra
trafficking to Sebastián González Mendiola, who was charged with cocaine
trafficking on November 26, 1984, in Costa Rica.
In 1985, another Contra leader "told U.S. authorities that his group was being paid $50,000 by Colombian traffickers
for help with a 100 kilograms (220 lb) cocaine shipment and that the
money would go 'for the cause' of fighting the Nicaraguan government." A
1985 National Intelligence Estimate by the CIA revealed cocaine trafficking links to a top commander working under Contra leader Edén Pastora.
Pastora had complained about such charges as early as March 1985,
claiming that "two 'political figures' in Washington told him last week
that State Department and CIA personnel were spreading the rumor that he
is linked to drug trafficking in order to isolate his movement."
On December 20, 1985, these and other additional charges were laid out in an Associated Press article after an extensive investigation, which included interviews with "officials from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Customs Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Costa Rica's Public Security Ministry,
as well as rebels and Americans who work with them". Five American
Contra supporters who worked with the rebels confirmed the charges,
noting that "two Cuban-Americans used armed rebel troops to guard
cocaine at clandestine airfields in northern Costa Rica. They identified
the Cuban-Americans as members of Brigade 2506, an anti-Castro group that participated in the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion
of Cuba. Several also said they supplied information about the
smuggling to U.S. investigators." One of the Americans said "that in
one ongoing operation, the cocaine is unloaded from planes at rebel
airstrips and taken to an Atlantic coast port where it is concealed on shrimp boats that are later unloaded in the Miami area."
On March 16, 1986, the San Francisco Examiner published a report on the "1983 seizure of 430 pounds (200 kg) of cocaine from a Colombian freighter" in San Francisco;
it said that a "cocaine ring in the San Francisco Bay area helped
finance Nicaragua's Contra rebels." Carlos Cabezas, convicted of
conspiracy to traffic cocaine, said that the profits from his crimes
"belonged to ... the Contra revolution." He told the Examiner, "I just wanted to get the Communists out of my country." Julio Zavala,
also convicted on trafficking charges, said "that he supplied $500,000
to two Costa Rican-based Contra groups and that the majority of it came
from cocaine trafficking in the San Francisco Bay area, Miami and New Orleans."
FBI probe
In April 1986, Associated Press reported on an FBI
probe into Contra cocaine trafficking. According to the report,
"Twelve American, Nicaraguan and Cuban-American rebel backers
interviewed by The Associated Press said they had been questioned over
the past several months [about contra cocaine trafficking] by the FBI.
In the interviews, some covering several days and being conducted in
Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Colorado and
California, several of the Contra backers told AP of firsthand knowledge
of cocaine trafficking."
On April 17, 1986, the Reagan administration
released a three-page report stating that there were some
Contra-cocaine connections in 1984 and 1985, and that these connections
occurred at a time when the rebels were "particularly hard pressed for
financial support" because aid from the United States had been cut off.
The report said: "We have evidence of a limited number of incidents in
which known drug traffickers have tried to establish connections with
Nicaraguan resistance groups" and that the drug activity took place
"without the authorization of resistance leaders."
Once you set up a covert operation to supply arms and money, it's
very difficult to separate it from the kind of people who are involved
in other forms of trade, and especially drugs. There is a limited number
of planes, pilots and landing strips. By developing a system for supply
of the Contras, the US built a road for drug supply into the US.
The Subcommittee's final report, issued in 1989, said that Contra drug links included:
Involvement in narcotics trafficking by individuals associated with the Contra movement.
Participation of narcotics traffickers in Contra supply operations through business relationships with Contra organizations.
Provision of assistance to the Contras by narcotics traffickers,
including cash, weapons, planes, pilots, air supply services and other
materials, on a voluntary basis by the traffickers.
Payments to drug traffickers by the U.S. State Department
of funds authorized by the Congress for humanitarian assistance to the
Contras, in some cases after the traffickers had been indicted by federal law enforcement agencies on drug charges, in others while traffickers were under active investigation by these same agencies.
According to the report, the U.S. State Department paid over $806,000
to "four companies owned and operated by narcotics traffickers" to
carry humanitarian assistance to the Contras.
Dark Alliance series
From August 18–20, 1996, the San Jose Mercury News published the Dark Alliance series by Gary Webb, which claimed:
For the better part of a decade, a San Francisco Bay Area drug ring sold tons of cocaine to the Crips and Bloods
street gangs of Los Angeles and funneled millions in drug profits to a
Latin American guerrilla army run by the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency. [This drug ring] opened the first pipeline between Colombia's
cocaine cartels and the black neighborhoods of Los Angeles [and, as a
result,] the cocaine that flooded in helped spark a crack explosion in urban America.
To support these claims, the series focused on three men: Ricky Ross, Oscar Danilo Blandón, and Norwin Meneses. According to the series, Ross was a major drug dealer in Los Angeles, and Blandón and Meneses were Nicaraguans
who smuggled drugs into the U.S. and supplied dealers like Ross. The
series alleged that the three had relationships with the Contras and the
CIA, and that law enforcement agencies failed to successfully prosecute
them largely due to their Contra and CIA connections.
California senators Barbara Boxer and Dianne Feinstein also took note and wrote to CIA director John Deutch and Attorney General Janet Reno, asking for investigations into the articles. Maxine Waters,
the Representative for California's 35th district, which includes
South-Central Los Angeles, was also outraged by the articles and became
one of Webb's strongest supporters. Waters urged the CIA, the Department of Justice, and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to investigate.
By the end of September, three federal investigations had been
announced: an investigation into the CIA allegations conducted by CIA
Inspector-General Frederick Hitz, an investigation into the law enforcement allegations by Justice Department Inspector-General Michael Bromwich, and a second investigation into the CIA by the House Intelligence Committee.
On October 3, 1996, LA County Sheriff Sherman Block
ordered a fourth investigation into Webb's claims that a 1986 raid on
Blandón's drug organization by the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department had
produced evidence of CIA ties to drug smuggling and that this was later
suppressed.
Coverage in other papers
In early October, 1996, a front-page article in The Washington Post by reporters Roberto Suro and Walter Pincus,
argued that "available information" did not support the series's
claims, and that "the rise of crack" was "a broad-based phenomenon"
driven in numerous places by diverse players. The article also discussed
Webb's contacts with Ross's attorney and prosecution complaints of how
Ross's defense had used Webb's series.
The New York Times published two articles on the series in mid-October, both written by reporter Tim Golden. One described the series' evidence as "thin";
the second, citing interviews with current and former intelligence and
law-enforcement officials, questioned the importance of the drug dealers
discussed in the series, both in the crack cocaine trade and in
supporting the Nicaraguan Contras' fight against the Sandinista
government.
The Los Angeles Times devoted the most space to the story, developing its own three-part series called The Cocaine Trail.
The series ran from October 20–22, 1996, and was researched by a team
of 17 reporters. The three articles in the series were written by four
reporters: Jesse Katz, Doyle McManus, John Mitchell, and Sam Fulwood.
The first article, by Katz, developed a different picture of the origins
of the crack trade than Dark Alliance had described, with more gangs and smugglers participating. The second article, by McManus, was the longest of the series, and dealt with the role of the Contras in the drug trade and CIA knowledge of drug activities by the Contras.
McManus found Blandón and Meneses's financial contributions to Contra
organizations to be significantly less than the "millions" claimed in
Webb's series, and no evidence that the CIA had tried to protect them.
The third article, by Mitchell and Fulwood, covered the effects of crack
on African Americans and how it affected their reaction to some of the
rumors that arose after the Dark Alliance series.
Mercury News response
Surprised by The Washington Post article, Mercury News executive editor Jerome Ceppos wrote to the Post defending the series. The Post ultimately refused to print his letter. Ceppos also asked reporter Pete Carey to write a critique of the series for publication in The Mercury News, and had the controversial website artwork changed.
Carey's critique appeared in mid-October and went through several of
the Post criticisms of the series, including the importance of Blandón's
drug ring in spreading crack, questions about Blandón's testimony in
court, and how specific series allegations about CIA involvement had
been, giving Webb's responses.
When the Los Angeles Times
series appeared, Ceppos again wrote to defend the original series. He
also defended the series in interviews with all three papers. The extent of the criticism, however, convinced Ceppos that The Mercury News had to acknowledge to its readers that the series had not been subjected to strong criticism.
He did this in a column that appeared on November 3, defending the
series, but also committing the paper to a review of major criticisms.
Ceppos' column drew editorial responses from both The New York Times and The Washington Post. An editorial in the Times,
while criticizing the series for making "unsubstantiated charges",
conceded that it did find "drug-smuggling and dealing by Nicaraguans
with at least tentative connections to the Contras" and called for
further investigation.
The Post response came from the paper's ombudsman, Geneva Overholser.
Overholser was harshly critical of the series, "reported by a seemingly
hotheaded fellow willing to have people leap to conclusions his
reporting couldn't back up." But while calling the flaws in the series
"unforgivably careless journalism", Overholser also criticized the Post's refusal to print Ceppos' letter defending the series and sharply criticized the Post's coverage of the story. Calling the Post's
overall focus "misplaced", Overholser expressed regret that the paper
had not taken the opportunity to re-examine whether the CIA had
overlooked Contra involvement in drug smuggling, "a subject The Post and
the public had given short shrift."
In contrast, the series received support from Steve Weinberg, a former executive director of Investigative Reporters and Editors. In a long review of the series' claims in The Baltimore Sun,
Weinberg said: "I think the critics have been far too harsh. Despite
some hyped phrasing, 'Dark Alliance' appears to be praiseworthy
investigative reporting."
After the series' publication, the Northern California branch of the national Society of Professional Journalists had voted Webb "Journalist of the Year" for 1996.
Despite the controversy that soon overtook the series, and the request
of one board member to reconsider, the branch's board went ahead with
the award in November.
End of the series
After Ceppos' column, The Mercury News
spent the next several months conducting an internal review of the
story. The review was conducted primarily by editor Jonathan Krim and
reporter Pete Carey,
who had written the paper's first published analysis of the series.
Carey ultimately decided that there were problems with several parts of
the story and wrote a draft article incorporating his findings.
The paper also gave Webb permission to visit Central America again to get more evidence supporting the story.
By January, Webb filed drafts of four more articles based on his trip,
but his editors concluded that the new articles would not help shore up
the original series' claims.
The editors met with Webb several times in February to discuss the
results of the paper's internal review and eventually decided to print
neither Carey's draft article nor the articles Webb had filed. Webb was allowed to keep working on the story and made one more trip to Nicaragua in March.
At the end of March, however, Ceppos told Webb that he was going to present the internal review findings in a column. After discussions with Webb, the column was published on May 11, 1997.
In the column Ceppos continued to defend parts of the article, writing
that the series had "solidly documented" that the drug ring described in
the series did have connections with the Contras and did sell large
quantities of cocaine in inner-city Los Angeles.
But, Ceppos wrote, the series "did not meet our standards" in
four areas. 1) It presented only one interpretation of conflicting
evidence and in one case "did not include information that contradicted a
central assertion of the series." 2) The series' estimates of the money
involved was presented as fact instead of an estimate. 3) The series
oversimplified how the crack epidemic grew. 4) The series "created impressions that were open to misinterpretation" through "imprecise language and graphics."
Ceppos noted that Webb did not agree with these conclusions. He
concluded: "How did these shortcomings occur? ... I believe that we fell
short at every step of our process: in the writing, editing and
production of our work. Several people here share that burden ... But
ultimately, the responsibility was, and is, mine."
Investigation after Dark Alliance
Justice Department report
The Department of Justice Inspector-General's report
was released on July 23, 1998. According to the report's "Epilogue",
the report was completed in December 1997 but was not released because
the DEA was still attempting to use Danilo Blandón
in an investigation of international drug dealers and was concerned
that the report would affect the viability of the investigation. When
Attorney General Janet Reno determined that a delay was no longer necessary, the report was released unchanged.
The report covered actions by Department of Justice employees in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the DEA, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and U.S. Attorneys'
Offices. It found that "the allegations contained in the original
Mercury News articles were exaggerations of the actual facts." After
examining the investigations and prosecutions of the main figures in the
series, Blandón, Meneses and Ross, it concluded: "Although the
investigations suffered from various problems of communication and
coordination, their successes and failures were determined by the normal
dynamics that affect the success of scores of investigations of
high-level drug traffickers ... These factors, rather than anything as
spectacular as a systematic effort by the CIA or any other intelligence
agency to protect the drug trafficking activities of Contra supporters,
determined what occurred in the cases we examined."
It also concluded that "the claims that Blandón and Meneses were
responsible for introducing crack cocaine into South Central Los Angeles
and spreading the crack epidemic throughout the country were
unsupported." Although it did find that both men were major drug
dealers, "guilty of enriching themselves at the expense of countless
drug users", and that they had contributed money to the Contra cause,
"we did not find that their activities were responsible for the crack
cocaine epidemic in South Central Los Angeles, much less the rise of
crack throughout the nation, or that they were a significant source of
support for the Contras."
The report called several of its findings "troubling." It found that Blandón received permanent resident
status "in a wholly improper manner" and that for some time the
Department "was not certain whether to prosecute Meneses, or use him as a
cooperating witness."
Regarding issues raised in the series' shorter sidebar stories, it
found that some in the government were "not eager" to have DEA agent Celerino Castillo "openly probe" activities at Ilopango Airport in El Salvador,
where covert operations in support of the Contras were undertaken, and
that the CIA had indeed intervened in a case involving smuggler Julio Zavala.
It concluded, however, that these problems were "a far cry from the
type of broad manipulation and corruption of the federal criminal
justice system suggested by the original allegations."
CIA report
The CIA Inspector-General's
report was issued in two volumes. The first one, "The California
Story", was issued in a classified version on December 17, 1997, and in
an unclassified version on January 29, 1998.
The second volume, "The Contra Story", was issued in a classified
version on April 27, 1998, and in an unclassified version on October 8,
1998.
According to the report, the Inspector-General's office (OIG)
examined all information the agency had "relating to CIA knowledge of
drug trafficking allegations in regard to any person directly or
indirectly involved in Contra activities." It also examined "how CIA
handled and responded to information regarding allegations of drug
trafficking" by people involved in Contra activities or support.
The first volume of the report found no evidence that "any past
or present employee of CIA, or anyone acting on behalf of CIA, had any
direct or indirect dealing" with Ross, Blandón, or Meneses or that any
of the other figures mentioned in Dark Alliance were ever employed by or associated with or contacted by the agency.
It found nothing to support the claim that "the drug trafficking
activities of Blandón and Meneses were motivated by any commitment to
support the Contra cause or Contra activities undertaken by CIA." It
noted that Blandón and Meneses claimed to have donated money to Contra
sympathizers in Los Angeles, but found no information to confirm that it
was true or that the agency had heard of it.
It found no information to support the claim that the agency
interfered with law enforcement actions against Ross, Blandón or
Meneses.
In the 623rd paragraph, the report described a cable from the CIA's Directorate of Operations
dated October 22, 1982, describing a prospective meeting between Contra
leaders in Costa Rica for "an exchange in [the United States] of
narcotics for arms, which then are shipped to Nicaragua." The two main Contra groups, US arms dealers,
and a lieutenant of a drug ring which imported drugs from Latin America
to the US west coast were set to attend the Costa Rica meeting. The
lieutenant trafficker was also a Contra, and the CIA knew that there was an arms-for-drugs shuttle and did nothing to stop it.
The report stated that the CIA had requested the Justice Department return $36,800 to a member of the Meneses drug ring, which had been seized by DEA agents in the Frogman raid
in San Francisco. The CIA's Inspector General said the Agency wanted
the money returned "to protect an operational equity, i.e., a Contra
support group in which it [CIA] had an operational interest."
The report also stated that former DEA agent Celerino Castillo alleged that during the 1980s, Ilopango Airport in El Salvador
was used by Contras for drug smuggling flights, and "his attempts to
investigate Contra drug smuggling were stymied by DEA management, the
U.S. Embassy in El Salvador, and the CIA".
During a PBSFrontline
investigation, DEA field agent Hector Berrellez said, "I believe that
elements working for the CIA were involved in bringing drugs into the
country."
"I know specifically that some of the CIA contract workers,
meaning some of the pilots, in fact were bringing drugs into the U.S.
and landing some of these drugs in government air bases. And I know so
because I was told by some of these pilots that in fact they had done
that."
Testimony of the CIA Inspector General
Six weeks after the declassified and heavily censored first volume of the CIA report was made public, Inspector General Frederick Hitz testified before a House congressional committee. Hitz stated that:
Volume II ... will be devoted to a
detailed treatment of what was known to CIA regarding dozens of people
and a number of companies connected in some fashion to the Contra
program or the Contra movement that were the subject of any sort of drug
trafficking allegations. Each is closely examined in terms of their
relationship with CIA, the drug trafficking activity that was alleged,
the actions CIA took in response to the allegations, and the extent of
information concerning the allegations that was Shared with U.S. law
enforcement and Congress.
As I said earlier, we have found no evidence in the course of this
lengthy investigation of any conspiracy by CIA or its employees to bring
drugs into the United States. However, during the Contra era, CIA
worked with a variety of people to support the Contra program. These
included CIA assets, pilots who ferried supplies to the Contras, as well
as Contra officials and others. Let me be frank about what we are
finding. There are instances where CIA did not, in an expeditious or
consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting
the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking
activity or take action to resolve the allegations.
Also revealed was a letter between the Attorney General William French Smith and the CIA that omitted narcotics
violations among the list of crimes agency officers were required to
report. In a follow-up letter later Smith stated "I have been advised
that a question arose regarding the need to add all narcotics violations
to the list of 'non-employee' crimes...". Citing existing federal
policy on narcotics enforcement, Smith wrote: "In light of these
provisions and in view of the fine cooperation the Drug Enforcement
Administration has received from CIA, no formal requirement regarding
the reporting of narcotics violations has been included in these
procedures."
This agreement, which had not previously been revealed, came at a
time when there were allegations that the CIA was using drug dealers in
its controversial covert operation to bring down the leftist Sandinista
government in Nicaragua. In 1986, the agreement was modified to require the CIA to stop paying agents who it believed were involved in the drug trade.
House committee report
The House Intelligence Committee issued its report in February 2000.
According to the report, it used Webb's reporting and writing as "key
resources in focusing and refining the investigation." Like the CIA and
Justice Department reports, it also found that neither Blandón, Meneses,
nor Ross were associated with the CIA.
Examining the support that Meneses and Blandón gave to the local
Contra organization in San Francisco, the report concluded that it was
"not sufficient to finance the organization" and did not consist of
'millions', contrary to the claims of the Dark Alliance series.
This support "was not directed by anyone within the Contra movement who
had an association with the CIA," and the Committee found "no evidence
that the CIA or the Intelligence Community was aware of these
individuals' support."
It also found no evidence to support Webb's suggestion that several
other drug smugglers mentioned in the series were associated with the
CIA, or that anyone associated with the CIA or other intelligence
agencies was involved in supplying or selling drugs in Los Angeles.
The Iran–Contra affair (Persian: ماجرای ایران-کنترا; Spanish: Caso Irán-Contra), often referred to as the Iran–Contra scandal, was a political scandal in the United States that occurred during the second term of the Reagan administration. Between 1981 and 1986, senior administration officials secretly facilitated the illegal sale of arms to Iran, who was subjected to an arms embargo at the time. The administration hoped to use the proceeds of the arms sale to fund the Contras, an anti-Sandinista rebel group in Nicaragua. Under the Boland Amendment, further funding of the Contras by legislative appropriations was prohibited by Congress, but the Reagan administration figured out a loophole by secretively using non-appropriated funds instead. The Iran–Contra affair is sometimes referred to as the McFarlane affair in Iran.
The official justification for the arms shipments was that they were part of an operation to free seven US hostages being held in Lebanon by Hezbollah, an Islamist paramilitary group with Iranian ties connected to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The idea to exchange arms for hostages was proposed by Manucher Ghorbanifar, an expatriate Iranian arms dealer. Some within the Reagan administration hoped the sales would influence Iran to get Hezbollah to release the hostages.
In late 1985, Lieutenant ColonelOliver North of the National Security Council (NSC) diverted a portion of the proceeds from the Iranian weapon sales to fund the Contras, a group of anti-Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) rebels, in their insurgency against the socialist government of Nicaragua. North later claimed that Ghorbanifar had given him the idea for diverting profits from BGM-71 TOW and MIM-23 Hawk missile sales to Iran to the Nicaraguan Contras. While President Ronald Reagan was a vocal supporter of the Contra cause, the evidence is disputed as to whether he personally authorized the diversion of funds to the Contras. Handwritten notes taken by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger
on 7 December 1985 indicate that Reagan was aware of potential hostage
transfers with Iran, by Israel, as well as the sale of Hawk and TOW
missiles to "moderate elements" within that country. Weinberger wrote that Reagan said "he could answer charges of illegality but he couldn't answer charge [sic] that 'big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free hostages.'"
After the weapon sales were revealed in November 1986, Reagan appeared
on national television and stated that the weapons transfers had indeed
occurred, but that the US did not trade arms for hostages.
The investigation was impeded when large volumes of documents relating
to the affair were destroyed or withheld from investigators by Reagan
administration officials.
On 4 March 1987, Reagan made a further nationally televised address,
saying he was taking full responsibility for the affair and stating that
"what began as a strategic opening to Iran deteriorated, in its
implementation, into trading arms for hostages."
The affair was investigated by Congress and by the three-person, Reagan-appointed Tower Commission. Neither investigation found evidence that President Reagan himself knew of the extent of the multiple programs. Additionally, US Deputy Attorney GeneralLawrence Walsh was appointed Independent Counsel
in December 1986 to investigate possible criminal actions by officials
involved in the scheme. In the end, several dozen administration
officials were indicted, including then-Secretary of DefenseCaspar Weinberger. Eleven convictions resulted, some of which were vacated on appeal.
The rest of those indicted or convicted were all pardoned in the final days of the presidency of George H. W. Bush, who had been vice president at the time of the affair.
Former Independent Counsel Walsh noted that, in issuing the pardons,
Bush appeared to have been preempting being implicated himself by
evidence that came to light during the Weinberger trial and noted that
there was a pattern of "deception and obstruction" by Bush, Weinberger,
and other senior Reagan administration officials. Walsh submitted his final report on 4 August 1993 and later wrote an account of his experiences as counsel, Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up.
Background
The US was the largest seller of arms to Iran under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and the vast majority of the weapons that the Islamic Republic of Iran inherited in January 1979 were US-made.
To maintain this arsenal, Iran required a steady supply of spare parts
to replace those broken and worn out. After Iranian students stormed the
US embassy in Tehran in November 1979 and took 52 Americans hostage, US
President Jimmy Carter imposed an arms embargo on Iran. After Iraq invaded Iran
in September 1980, Iran desperately needed weapons and spare parts for
its current weapons. After Ronald Reagan took office as president on 20
January 1981, he vowed to continue Carter's policy of blocking arms
sales to Iran on the grounds that Iran supported terrorism.
A group of senior Reagan administration officials in the Senior
Interdepartmental Group conducted a secret study on 21 July 1981 and
concluded that the arms embargo was ineffective because Iran could
always buy arms and spare parts for its US weapons elsewhere, while, at
the same time, the arms embargo opened the door for Iran to fall into
the Soviet sphere of influence as the Kremlin could sell Iran weapons if the US would not.
The conclusion was that the US should start selling Iran arms as soon
as it was politically possible in order to keep Iran from falling into
the Soviet sphere of influence.
At the same time, the openly declared goal of Ayatollah Khomeini to
export his Islamic revolution all over the Middle East and overthrow the
governments of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the other states around the Persian Gulf led to the Americans perceiving Khomeini as a major threat to the US.
In the spring of 1983, the US launched Operation Staunch,
a wide-ranging diplomatic effort to persuade other nations all over the
world not to sell arms or spare parts for weapons to Iran.
This was at least part of the reason the Iran–Contra affair proved so
humiliating for the US when the story first broke in November 1986 that
the US itself was selling arms to Iran.
At the same time that the US government was considering its options on selling arms to Iran, Contra militants based in Honduras were waging a guerrilla war to topple the FSLN revolutionary government of Nicaragua.
Almost from the time he took office in 1981, a major goal of the Reagan
administration was the overthrow of the left-wing Sandinista government
in Nicaragua and to support the Contra rebels.
The Reagan administration's policy toward Nicaragua produced a major
clash between the executive and legislative branches as Congress sought
to limit, if not curb altogether, the ability of the White House to
support the Contras. Direct US funding of the Contras insurgency was made illegal through the Boland Amendment,
the name given to three US legislative amendments between 1982 and 1984
aimed at limiting US government assistance to Contra militants. By
1984, funding for the Contras had run out; and, in October of that year,
a total ban came into effect. The second Boland Amendment, in effect
from 3 October 1984 to 3 December 1985, stated:
During
the fiscal year 1985 no funds available to the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Department of Defense or any other agency or entity of the
United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or
expended for the purpose of or which may have the effect of supporting
directly or indirectly military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua
by any nation, organization, group, movement, or individual.
In violation of the Boland Amendment, senior officials of the Reagan
administration continued to secretly arm and train the Contras and
provide arms to Iran, an operation they called "the Enterprise".
Given the Contras' heavy dependence on US military and financial
support, the second Boland Amendment threatened to break the Contra
movement and led to President Reagan ordering in 1984 that the NSC "keep the Contras together 'body and soul'", no matter what Congress voted for.
A major legal debate at the center of the Iran–Contra affair
concerned the question of whether the NSC was one of the "any other
agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence
activities" covered by the Boland Amendment. The Reagan administration
argued it was not, and many in Congress argued that it was.
The majority of constitutional scholars have asserted the NSC did
indeed fall within the purview of the second Boland Amendment, though
the amendment did not mention the NSC by name.
The broader constitutional question at stake was the power of Congress
versus the power of the presidency. The Reagan administration argued
that, because the constitution assigned the right to conduct foreign
policy to the executive, its efforts to overthrow the government of
Nicaragua were a presidential prerogative that Congress had no right to
try to halt via the Boland Amendments.
By contrast, Congressional leaders argued that the constitution had
assigned Congress control of the budget, and Congress had every right to
use that power not to fund projects like attempting to overthrow the
government of Nicaragua that they disapproved of.
As part of the effort to circumvent the Boland Amendment, the NSC
established "the Enterprise", an arms-smuggling network headed by a
retired US Air Force officer turned arms dealer Richard Secord that supplied arms to the Contras. It was ostensibly a private sector operation, but in fact was controlled by the NSC.
To fund "the Enterprise", the Reagan administration was constantly on
the look-out for funds that came from outside the US government in order
not to explicitly violate the letter of the Boland Amendment, though
the efforts to find alternative funding for the Contras violated the
spirit of the Boland Amendment.
Ironically, military aid to the Contras was reinstated with
Congressional consent in October 1986, a month before the scandal broke.
In his 1995 memoir My American Journey, General Colin Powell, the US Deputy National Security Advisor,
wrote that the weapons sales to Iran were used "for purposes prohibited
by the elected representatives of the American people [...] in a way
that avoided accountability to the President and Congress. It was
wrong."
In 1985, Manuel Noriega offered to help the US by allowing Panama
as a staging ground for operations against the FSLN and offering to
train Contras in Panama, but this would later be overshadowed by the
Iran–Contra affair itself.
At around the same time, the Soviet Bloc also engaged in arms deals with ideologically opponent buyers, possibly involving some of the same players as the Iran–Contra affair. In 1986, a complex operation involving East Germany's Stasi and the Danish-registered ship Pia Vesta ultimately aimed to sell Soviet arms and military vehicles to South Africa's Armscor,
using various intermediaries to distance themselves from the deal.
Manuel Noriega of Panama was apparently one of these intermediaries but
backed out on the deal as the ship and weapons were seized at a
Panamanian port. The Pia Vesta
led to a small controversy, as the Panama and Peru governments in 1986
accused the US and each other of being involved in the East
Germany-originated shipment.
As reported in The New York Times
in 1991, "continuing allegations that Reagan campaign officials made a
deal with the Iranian Government of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the
fall of 1980" led to "limited investigations". However "limited", those
investigations established that "Soon after taking office in 1981, the
Reagan Administration secretly and abruptly changed United States
policy." Secret Israeli arms sales and shipments to Iran began in that
year, even as, in public, "the Reagan Administration" presented a
different face, and "aggressively promoted a public campaign [...] to
stop worldwide transfers of military goods to Iran". The New York Times
explains: "Iran at that time was in dire need of arms and spare parts
for its American-made arsenal to defend itself against Iraq, which had
attacked it in September 1980", while "Israel [a US ally] was interested
in keeping the war between Iran and Iraq going to ensure that these two
potential enemies remained preoccupied with each other". Major General
Avraham Tamir, a high-ranking Israeli Defense Ministry official in 1981,
said there was an "oral agreement" to allow the sale of "spare parts"
to Iran. This was based on an "understanding" with Secretary Alexander Haig
(which a Haig adviser denied). This account was confirmed by a former
senior US diplomat with a few modifications. The diplomat claimed that
"[Ariel] Sharon violated it, and Haig backed away". A former
"high-level" Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) official who saw reports of arms sales to Iran by Israel in the
early 1980s estimated that the total was about $2 billion a year—but
also said, "The degree to which it was sanctioned I don't know."
On 17 June 1985, National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane
wrote a National Security Decision Directive which called for the US to
begin a rapprochement with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The paper read:
Dynamic political evolution is taking place inside Iran.
Instability caused by the pressures of the Iraq-Iran war, economic
deterioration and regime in-fighting create the potential for major
changes inside Iran. The Soviet Union is better positioned than the U.S.
to exploit and benefit from any power struggle that results in changes
from the Iranian regime [...]. The U.S. should encourage Western allies
and friends to help Iran meet its import requirements so as to reduce
the attractiveness of Soviet assistance [...]. This includes provision
of selected military equipment.
Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger
was highly negative, writing on his copy of McFarlane's paper: "This is
almost too absurd to comment on [...] like asking Qaddafi to Washington
for a cozy chat." Secretary of State George Shultz was also opposed, stating that having designated Iran a State Sponsor of Terrorism in January 1984, how could the US possibly sell arms to Iran? Only the Director of the CIA William J. Casey supported McFarlane's plan to start selling arms to Iran.
In early July 1985, the historian Michael Ledeen, a consultant of National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, requested assistance from Israeli Prime MinisterShimon Peres for help in the sale of arms to Iran. Having talked to an Israeli diplomat David Kimche and Ledeen, McFarlane learned that the Iranians were prepared to have Hezbollah release US hostages in Lebanon in exchange for Israelis shipping Iran US weapons. Having been designated a State Sponsor of Terrorism since January 1984, Iran was in the midst of the Iran–Iraq War and could find few Western nations willing to supply it with weapons. The idea behind the plan was for Israel to ship weapons through an intermediary (identified as Manucher Ghorbanifar) to the Islamic Republic as a way of aiding a supposedly moderate, politically influential faction within the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini
who was believed to be seeking a rapprochement with the US; after the
transaction, the US would reimburse Israel with the same weapons, while
receiving monetary benefits. McFarlane in a memo to Shultz and Weinberger wrote:
The short term dimension concerns the seven hostages; the
long term dimension involves the establishment of a private dialogue
with Iranian officials on the broader relations [...]. They sought
specifically the delivery from Israel of 100 TOW missiles [...].
The plan was discussed with President Reagan on 18 July 1985 and again on 6 August 1985.
Shultz at the latter meeting warned Reagan that "we were just falling
into the arms-for-hostages business and we shouldn't do it".
The Americans believed that there was a moderate faction in the Islamic Republic headed by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the powerful speaker of the Majlis who was seen as a leading potential successor to Khomeini and who was alleged to want a rapprochement with the US.
The Americans believed that Rafsanjani had the power to order Hezbollah
to free the US hostages and establishing a relationship with him by
selling Iran arms would ultimately place Iran back within the US sphere
of influence.
It remains unclear if Rafsanjani really wanted a rapprochement with the
US or was just deceiving Reagan administration officials who were
willing to believe that he was a moderate who would effect a
rapprochement.
Rafsanjani, whose nickname is "the Shark", was described by the UK
journalist Patrick Brogan as a man of great charm and formidable
intelligence known for his subtlety and ruthlessness whose motives in
the Iran–Contra affair remain completely mysterious.
The Israeli government required that the sale of arms meet high-level
approval from the US government, and, when McFarlane convinced them that
the US government approved the sale, Israel obliged by agreeing to sell
the arms.
In 1985, President Reagan entered Walter Reed National Military Medical Center for colon cancer
surgery. Reagan's recovery was nothing short of miserable, as the
74-year-old President admitted having little sleep for days in addition
to his immense physical discomfort. While doctors seemed to be confident
that the surgery was successful, the discovery of his localized cancer
was a daunting realization for Reagan. From seeing the recovery process
of other patients, as well as medical “experts” on television predicting
his death to be soon, Reagan's typical optimistic outlook was dampened.
These factors were bound to contribute to psychological distress in the
midst of an already distressing situation. Additionally, Reagan's invocation of the 25th Amendment
prior to the surgery was a risky and unprecedented decision that
smoothly flew under the radar for the duration of the complex situation.
While it only lasted slightly longer than the length of the procedure
(approximately seven hours and 54 minutes), this temporary transfer of
power was never formally recognized by the White House. It was later
revealed that this decision was made on the grounds that "Mr. Reagan and
his advisors did not want his actions to establish a definition of
incapacitation that would bind future presidents." Reagan expressed this
transfer of power in two identical letters that were sent to the
speaker of the House of Representatives, Representative Tip O'Neill, and the president pro tempore of the senate, Senator Strom Thurmond.
While the President was recovering in the hospital, McFarlane met
with him and told him that representatives from Israel had contacted
the National Security Agency
to pass on confidential information from what Reagan later described as
the "moderate" Iranian faction headed by Rafsanjani opposed to the
Ayatollah's hardline anti-US policies.
The visit from McFarlane in Reagan's hospital room was the first visit
from an administration official outside of Donald Regan since the
surgery. The meeting took place five days after the surgery and only
three days after doctors gave the news that his polyp had been
malignant. The three participants of this meeting had very different
recollections of what was discussed during its 23-minute duration.
Months later, Reagan even stated that he "had no recollection of a
meeting in the hospital in July with McFarlane and that he had no notes
which would show such a meeting". This does not come as a surprise
considering the possible short and long-term effects of anesthesia on
patients above the age of 60, in addition to his already weakened
physical and mental state.
According to Reagan, these Iranians sought to establish a quiet
relationship with the US, before establishing formal relationships upon
the death of the aging Ayatollah.
In Reagan's account, McFarlane told Reagan that the Iranians, to
demonstrate their seriousness, offered to persuade the Hezbollah
militants to release the seven US hostages. McFarlane met with the Israeli intermediaries;
Reagan claimed that he allowed this because he believed that
establishing relations with a strategically located country, and
preventing the Soviet Union from doing the same, was a beneficial move.
Although Reagan claims that the arms sales were to a "moderate" faction
of Iranians, the Walsh Iran–Contra Report states that the arms sales
were "to Iran" itself, which was under the control of the Ayatollah.
Following the Israeli–US meeting, Israel requested permission from the US to sell a small number of BGM-71 TOW antitank missiles to Iran, claiming that this would aid the "moderate" Iranian faction, by demonstrating that the group actually had high-level connections to the US government.
Reagan initially rejected the plan, until Israel sent information to
the US showing that the "moderate" Iranians were opposed to terrorism
and had fought against it.
Now having a reason to trust the "moderates", Reagan approved the
transaction, which was meant to be between Israel and the "moderates" in
Iran, with the US reimbursing Israel. In his 1990 autobiography An American Life,
Reagan claimed that he was deeply committed to securing the release of
the hostages; it was this compassion that supposedly motivated his
support for the arms initiatives. The president requested that the
"moderate" Iranians do everything in their capability to free the
hostages held by Hezbollah.
Reagan always publicly insisted after the scandal broke in late 1986
that the purpose behind the arms-for-hostages trade was to establish a
working relationship with the "moderate" faction associated with
Rafsanjani to facilitate the reestablishment of the US–Iranian alliance
after the soon to be expected death of Khomeini, to end the Iran–Iraq
War and end Iranian support for Islamic terrorism while downplaying the
importance of freeing the hostages in Lebanon as a secondary issue.
By contrast, when testifying before the Tower Commission, Reagan
declared that hostage issue was the main reason for selling arms to
Iran.
The
first arms sales to Iran began in 1981, though the official paper trail
has them beginning in 1985 (see above). On 20 August 1985, Israel sent
96 US-made TOW missiles to Iran through an arms dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar.
Subsequently, on 14 September 1985, 408 more TOW missiles were
delivered. On 15 September 1985, following the second delivery, Reverend
Benjamin Weir was released by his captors, the Islamic Jihad Organization. On 24 November 1985, 18 Hawk antiaircraft missiles were delivered.
Modifications in plans
Robert McFarlane resigned on 4 December 1985, stating that he wanted to spend more time with his family, and was replaced by Admiral John Poindexter.
Two days later, Reagan met with his advisors at the White House, where a
new plan was introduced. This called for a slight change in the arms
transactions: instead of the weapons going to the "moderate" Iranian
group, they would go to "moderate" Iranian army leaders. As each weapons delivery was made from Israel by air, hostages held by Hezbollah would be released. Israel would continue to be reimbursed by the US for the weapons. Though staunchly opposed by Secretary of StateGeorge Shultz and Secretary of DefenseCaspar Weinberger, the plan was authorized by Reagan, who stated that, "We were not trading arms for hostages, nor were we negotiating with terrorists".
In his notes of a meeting held in the White House on 7 December 1985,
Weinberger wrote he told Reagan that this plan was illegal, writing:
I
argued strongly that we have an embargo that makes arms sales to Iran
illegal and President couldn't violate it and that 'washing'
transactions through Israel wouldn't make it legal. Shultz, Don Regan
agreed.
Weinberger's notes have Reagan saying he "could answer charges of illegality but he couldn't answer charge [sic] that 'big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free hostages'."
Now retired National Security Advisor McFarlane flew to London to meet
with Israelis and Ghorbanifar in an attempt to persuade the Iranian to
use his influence to release the hostages before any arms transactions
occurred; this plan was rejected by Ghorbanifar.
On the day of McFarlane's resignation, Oliver North, a military aide to the US National Security Council
(NSC), proposed a new plan for selling arms to Iran, which included two
major adjustments: instead of selling arms through Israel, the sale was
to be direct at a markup; and a portion of the proceeds would go to Contras, or Nicaraguan paramilitary fighters waging guerrilla warfare against the Sandinista government, claiming power after an election full of irregularities.
The dealings with the Iranians were conducted via the NSC with Admiral
Poindexter and his deputy Colonel North, with the US historians Malcolm
Byrne and Peter Kornbluh writing that Poindexter granted much power to
North "who made the most of the situation, often deciding important
matters on his own, striking outlandish deals with the Iranians, and
acting in the name of the president on issues that were far beyond his
competence. All of these activities continued to take place within the
framework of the president's broad authorization. Until the press
reported on the existence of the operation, nobody in the administration
questioned the authority of Poindexter's and North's team to implement
the president's decisions". North proposed a $15 million markup, while contracted arms broker Ghorbanifar added a 41-percent markup of his own.
Other members of the NSC were in favor of North's plan; with large
support, Poindexter authorized it without notifying President Reagan,
and it went into effect.
At first, the Iranians refused to buy the arms at the inflated price
because of the excessive markup imposed by North and Ghorbanifar. They
eventually relented, and, in February 1986, 1,000 TOW missiles were
shipped to the country. From May to November 1986, there were additional shipments of miscellaneous weapons and parts.
Both the sale of weapons to Iran and the funding of the Contras
attempted to circumvent not only stated administration policy, but also
the Boland Amendment.
Administration officials argued that, regardless of Congress
restricting funds for the Contras, or any affair, the President (or in
this case the administration) could carry on by seeking alternative
means of funding such as private entities and foreign governments. Funding from one foreign country, Brunei, was botched when North's secretary, Fawn Hall, transposed the numbers of North's Swiss bank
account number. A Swiss businessperson, suddenly $10 million richer,
alerted the authorities of the mistake. The money was eventually
returned to the Sultan of Brunei, with interest.
On 7 January 1986, John Poindexter proposed to Reagan a
modification of the approved plan: instead of negotiating with the
"moderate" Iranian political group, the US would negotiate with
"moderate" members of the Iranian government.
Poindexter told Reagan that Ghorbanifar had important connections
within the Iranian government, so, with the hope of the release of the
hostages, Reagan approved this plan as well.
Throughout February 1986, weapons were shipped directly to Iran by the
US (as part of Oliver North's plan), but none of the hostages were
released. Retired National Security Advisor McFarlane conducted another
international voyage, this one to Tehran—bringing with him a gift of a Bible with a handwritten inscription by Ronald Reagan and, according to George W. Cave, a cake baked in the shape of a key. Howard Teicher described the cake as a joke between North and Ghorbanifar.
McFarlane met directly with Iranian officials associated with
Rafsanjani, who sought to establish US–Iranian relations in an attempt
to free the four remaining hostages.
The US delegation comprised McFarlane, North, Cave (a retired CIA
officer who served as the group's translator), Teicher, Israeli
diplomat Amiram Nir, and a CIA communicator. They arrived in Tehran in an Israeli plane carrying forged Irish passports on 25 May 1986.
This meeting also failed. Much to McFarlane's disgust, he did not meet
ministers, and instead met in his words "third and fourth level
officials".
At one point, an angry McFarlane shouted: "As I am a Minister, I expect
to meet with decision-makers. Otherwise, you can work with my staff." The Iranians requested concessions such as Israel's withdrawal from the Golan Heights, which the US rejected.
More importantly, McFarlane refused to ship spare parts for the Hawk
missiles until the Iranians had Hezbollah release the US hostages,
whereas the Iranians wanted to reverse that sequence with the spare
parts being shipped first before the hostages were freed. The differing negotiating positions led to McFarlane's mission going home after four days.
After the failure of the secret visit to Tehran, McFarlane advised
Reagan not to talk to the Iranians anymore, advice that was disregarded.
Subsequent dealings
On 26 July 1986, Hezbollah freed the US hostage Father Lawrence Jenco, former head of Catholic Relief Services in Lebanon. Following this, William J. Casey,
head of the CIA, requested that the US authorize sending a shipment of
small missile parts to Iranian military forces as a way of expressing
gratitude.
Casey also justified this request by stating that the contact in the
Iranian government might otherwise lose face or be executed, and
hostages might be killed. Reagan authorized the shipment to ensure that
those potential events would not occur.
North used this release to persuade Reagan to switch over to a
"sequential" policy of freeing the hostages one by one, instead of the
"all or nothing" policy that the Americans had pursued until then.
By this point, the Americans had grown tired of Ghorbanifar who had
proven himself a dishonest intermediary who played off both sides to his
own commercial advantage.
In August 1986, the Americans had established a new contact in the
Iranian government, Ali Hashemi Bahramani, the nephew of Rafsanjani and
an officer in the Revolutionary Guard.
The fact that the Revolutionary Guard was deeply involved in
international terrorism seemed only to attract the Americans more to
Bahramani, who was seen as someone with the influence to change Iran's
policies. Richard Secord,
a US arms dealer, who was being used as a contact with Iran, wrote to
North: "My judgment is that we have opened up a new and probably better
channel into Iran". North was so impressed with Bahramani that he arranged for him to secretly visit Washington DC and gave him a guided tour at midnight of the White House.
North frequently met with Bahramani in the summer and autumn of
1986 in West Germany, discussing arms sales to Iran, the freeing of
hostages held by Hezbollah and how best to overthrow President Saddam Hussein of Iraq and the establishment of "a non-hostile regime in Baghdad".
In September and October 1986, three more Americans—Frank Reed, Joseph
Cicippio, and Edward Tracy—were abducted in Lebanon by a separate
terrorist group, who referred to them simply as "G.I. Joe", after the
popular US toy. The reasons for their abduction are unknown, although it
is speculated that they were kidnapped to replace the freed Americans.
One more original hostage, David Jacobsen, was later released. The
captors promised to release the remaining two, but the release never
happened.
During a secret meeting in Frankfurt in October 1986, North told Bahramani that: "Saddam Hussein must go". North also claimed that Reagan had told him to tell Bahramani that: "Saddam Hussein is an asshole."
Behramani during a secret meeting in Mainz informed North that
Rafsanjani "for his own politics [...] decided to get all the groups
involved and give them a role to play".
Thus, all the factions in the Iranian government would be jointly
responsible for the talks with the Americans and "there would not be an
internal war".
This demand of Behramani caused much dismay on the US side as it made
clear to them that they would not be dealing solely with a "moderate"
faction in the Islamic Republic, as the Americans liked to pretend to
themselves, but rather with all the factions in the Iranian
government—including those who were very much involved in terrorism. Despite this, the talks were not broken off.
Discovery and scandal
After a leak by Mehdi Hashemi, a senior official in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Lebanese magazine Ash-Shiraa exposed the arrangement on 3 November 1986. According to Seymour Hersh, an unnamed former military officer told him that the leak may have been orchestrated by a covert team led by Arthur S. Moreau Jr., assistant to the chair of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, due to fears the scheme had grown out of control.
This was the first public report of the weapons-for-hostages deal. The operation was discovered only after an airlift of guns (Corporate Air Services HPF821) was downed over Nicaragua. Eugene Hasenfus,
who was captured by Nicaraguan authorities after surviving the plane
crash, initially alleged in a press conference on Nicaraguan soil that
two of his coworkers, Max Gomez and Ramon Medina, worked for the CIA. He later said he did not know whether they did or not. The Iranian government confirmed the Ash-Shiraa story, and, 10 days after the story was first published, President Reagan appeared on national television from the Oval Office on 13 November, stating:
My purpose was [...] to send a signal that the United
States was prepared to replace the animosity between [the US and Iran]
with a new relationship [...]. At the same time we undertook this
initiative, we made clear that Iran must oppose all forms of
international terrorism as a condition of progress in our relationship.
The most significant step which Iran could take, we indicated, would be
to use its influence in Lebanon to secure the release of all hostages
held there.
The scandal was compounded when Oliver North destroyed or hid pertinent documents between 21 November and 25 November 1986. During North's trial in 1989, his secretary, Fawn Hall,
testified extensively about helping North alter and shred official US
National Security Council (NSC) documents from the White House.
According to The New York Times, enough documents were put into a government shredder to jam it. Hall also testified that she smuggled classified documents out of the Old Executive Office Building by concealing them in her boots and dress. North's explanation for destroying some documents was to protect the lives of individuals involved in Iran and Contra operations. It was not until 1993, years after the trial, that North's notebooks were made public, and only after the National Security Archive and Public Citizen sued the Office of the Independent Counsel under the Freedom of Information Act.
The diversion of funds is revealed
What is involved is that in the course of the arms transfers, which
involved the United States providing the arms to Israel and Israel in
turn transferring the arms -- in effect, selling the arms to
representatives of Iran. Certain monies which were received in the
transaction between representatives of Israel and representatives of
Iran were taken and made available to the forces in Central America,
which are opposing the Sandinista government there.
During the trial, North testified that on 21, 22 or 24 November, he
witnessed Poindexter destroy what may have been the only signed copy of a
presidential covert-action finding that sought to authorize CIA
participation in the November 1985 Hawk missile shipment to Iran. U.S. Attorney GeneralEdwin Meese
admitted on 25 November that profits from weapons sales to Iran were
made available to assist the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. On the same
day, John Poindexter resigned, and President Reagan fired Oliver North. Poindexter was replaced by Frank Carlucci on 2 December 1986.
When the story broke, many legal and constitutional scholars
expressed dismay that the NSC, which was supposed to be just an advisory
body to assist the President with formulating foreign policy, had "gone
operational" by becoming an executive body covertly executing foreign
policy on its own. The National Security Act of 1947,
which created the NSC, gave it the vague right to perform "such other
functions and duties related to the intelligence as the National
Security Council may from time to time direct."
However, the NSC had usually, although not always, acted as an advisory
agency until the Reagan administration when the NSC had "gone
operational", a situation that was condemned by both the Tower
Commission and by Congress as a departure from the norm.
The American historian John Canham-Clyne asserted that the Iran–Contra
affair and the NSC "going operational" were not departures from the
norm, but were the logical and natural consequence of the existence of
the "national security state", the plethora of shadowy government
agencies with multi-million dollar budgets operating with little
oversight from Congress, the courts or the media, and for whom upholding
national security justified almost everything.
Canham-Clyne argued that for the "national security state", the law was
an obstacle to be surmounted rather than something to uphold and that
the Iran–Contra affair was just "business as usual", something he
asserted that the media missed by focusing on the NSC having "gone
operational."
In Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981–1987, journalist Bob Woodward
chronicled the role of the CIA in facilitating the transfer of funds
from the Iran arms sales to the Nicaraguan Contras spearheaded by Oliver
North. According to Woodward, then-Director of the CIA William J. Casey admitted to him in February 1987 that he was aware of the diversion of funds to the Contras. The controversial admission occurred while Casey was hospitalized for a stroke,
and, according to his wife, was unable to communicate. On 6 May 1987,
William Casey died the day after Congress began public hearings on
Iran–Contra. Independent Counsel, Lawrence Walsh
later wrote: "Independent Counsel obtained no documentary evidence
showing Casey knew about or approved the diversion. The only direct
testimony linking Casey to early knowledge of the diversion came from
[Oliver] North."
Gust Avrakodos, who was responsible for the arms supplies to the
Afghans at this time, was aware of the operation as well and strongly
opposed it, in particular the diversion of funds allotted to the Afghan
operation. According to his Middle Eastern experts, the operation was
pointless because the moderates in Iran were not in a position to
challenge the fundamentalists. However, he was overruled by Clair
George.
On 25 November 1986, President Reagan announced the creation of a
Special Review Board to look into the matter; the following day, he
appointed former Senator John Tower, former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, and former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to serve as members. This Presidential Commission took effect on 1 December and became known as the Tower Commission.
The main objectives of the commission were to inquire into "the
circumstances surrounding the Iran–Contra matter, other case studies
that might reveal strengths and weaknesses in the operation of the National Security Council
system under stress, and the manner in which that system has served
eight different presidents since its inception in 1947". The Tower
Commission was the first presidential commission to review and evaluate
the National Security Council.
President Reagan (center) receives the Tower Commission Report in the White House Cabinet Room; John Tower is at left and Edmund Muskie is at right, 1987.
President Reagan appeared before the Tower Commission on 2 December
1986, to answer questions regarding his involvement in the affair. When
asked about his role in authorizing the arms deals, he first stated that
he had; later, he appeared to contradict himself by stating that he had
no recollection of doing so. In his 1990 autobiography, An American Life, Reagan acknowledges authorizing the shipments to Israel.
The report published by the Tower Commission was delivered to the
president on 26 February 1987. The commission had interviewed 80
witnesses to the scheme, including Reagan, and two of the arms trade
middlemen: Manucher Ghorbanifar and Adnan Khashoggi. The 200-page report was the most comprehensive of any released,
criticizing the actions of Oliver North, John Poindexter, Caspar
Weinberger, and others. It determined that President Reagan did not have
knowledge of the extent of the program, especially about the diversion
of funds to the Contras, although it argued that the president ought to
have had better control of the National Security Council staff. The
report heavily criticized Reagan for not properly supervising his
subordinates or being aware of their actions. A major result of the
Tower Commission was the consensus that Reagan should have listened to
his National Security Advisor more, thereby placing more power in the
hands of that chair.
In January 1987, Congress announced it was opening an investigation
into the Iran–Contra affair. Depending upon one's political perspective,
the Congressional investigation into the Iran–Contra affair was either
an attempt by the legislative arm to gain control over an out-of-control
executive arm, a partisan "witch hunt" by the Democrats against a
Republican administration or a feeble effort by Congress that did far
too little to rein in the "imperial presidency" that had run amok by
breaking numerous laws. The Democratic-controlled United States Congress
issued its own report on 18 November 1987, stating that "If the
president did not know what his national security advisers were doing,
he should have."
The Congressional report wrote that the president bore "ultimate
responsibility" for wrongdoing by his aides, and his administration
exhibited "secrecy, deception and disdain for the law".
It also read that "the central remaining question is the role of the
President in the Iran–Contra affair. On this critical point, the
shredding of documents by Poindexter, North and others, and the death of
Casey, leave the record incomplete".
Aftermath
Reagan expressed regret with regard to the situation in a nationally televised address from the Oval Office on 4 March 1987, and in two other speeches. Reagan had not spoken to the American people directly for three months amidst the scandal, and he offered the following explanation for his silence:
The reason I haven't spoken to you before now is this:
You deserve the truth. And as frustrating as the waiting has been, I
felt it was improper to come to you with sketchy reports, or possibly
even erroneous statements, which would then have to be corrected,
creating even more doubt and confusion. There's been enough of that.
Reagan then took full responsibility for the acts committed:
First, let me say I take full responsibility for my own
actions and for those of my administration. As angry as I may be about
activities undertaken without my knowledge, I am still accountable for
those activities. As disappointed as I may be in some who served me, I'm
still the one who must answer to the American people for this behavior.
Finally, the president acknowledged that his previous assertions that the U.S. did not trade arms for hostages were incorrect:
A few months ago I told the American people I did not
trade arms for hostages. My heart and my best intentions still tell me
that's true, but the facts and the evidence tell me it is not. As the
Tower board reported, what began as a strategic opening to Iran
deteriorated, in its implementation, into trading arms for hostages.
This runs counter to my own beliefs, to administration policy, and to
the original strategy we had in mind.
Reagan's role in these transactions is still not definitively known. It
is unclear exactly what Reagan knew and when, and whether the arms sales
were motivated by his desire to save the U.S. hostages. Oliver North
wrote that "Ronald Reagan knew of and approved a great deal of what
went on with both the Iranian initiative and private efforts on behalf
of the contras and he received regular, detailed briefings on both...I
have no doubt that he was told about the use of residuals for the
Contras, and that he approved it. Enthusiastically." Handwritten notes by Defense Secretary Weinberger indicate that the President was aware of potential hostage transfers with Iran, as well as the sale of Hawk and TOW missiles to what he was told were "moderate elements" within Iran.
Notes taken by Weinberger on 7 December 1985 record that Reagan said
that "he could answer charges of illegality but he couldn't answer
charge that 'big strong President Reagan passed up a chance to free
hostages'".
The Republican-written "Report of the Congressional Committees
Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair" made the following conclusion:
There
is some question and dispute about precisely the level at which he
chose to follow the operation details. There is no doubt, however, ...
[that] the President set the US policy towards Nicaragua, with few if
any ambiguities, and then left subordinates more or less free to
implement it.
Domestically,
the affair precipitated a drop in President Reagan's popularity. His
approval ratings suffered "the largest single drop for any U.S.
president in history", from 67% to 46% in November 1986, according to a New York Times/CBS News poll. The "Teflon President", as Reagan was nicknamed by critics, survived the affair, however, and his approval rating recovered.
Internationally, the damage was more severe. Magnus Ranstorp
wrote, "U.S. willingness to engage in concessions with Iran and the
Hezbollah not only signaled to its adversaries that hostage-taking was
an extremely useful instrument in extracting political and financial
concessions for the West but also undermined any credibility of U.S.
criticism of other states' deviation from the principles of
no-negotiation and no concession to terrorists and their demands."
In Iran, Mehdi Hashemi,
the leaker of the scandal, was executed in 1987, allegedly for
activities unrelated to the scandal. Though Hashemi made a full video
confession to numerous serious charges, some observers find the
coincidence of his leak and the subsequent prosecution highly
suspicious.
In 1994, just five years after leaving office, President Reagan announced that he had been diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease.
Lawrence Walsh, who was appointed Independent Counsel in 1986 to
investigate the transactions later implied Reagan's declining health may
have played a role in his handling of the situation. However, Walsh did
note that he believed President Reagan's "instincts for the country's
good were right".
Robert C. McFarlane,
National Security Adviser, convicted of withholding evidence, but after
a plea bargain was given only two years of probation. Later pardoned by
President George H. W. Bush.
Alan D. Fiers,
Chief of the CIA's Central American Task Force, convicted of
withholding evidence and sentenced to one year probation. Later pardoned
by President George H. W. Bush.
Clair George, Chief of Covert Ops-CIA, convicted on two charges of perjury, but pardoned by President George H. W. Bush before sentencing.
Oliver North, member of the National Security Council was indicted on 16 charges.
A jury convicted him of accepting an illegal gratuity, obstruction of a
Congressional inquiry, and destruction of documents. The convictions
were overturned on appeal because his Fifth Amendment rights may have been violated by use of his immunized public testimony and because the judge had incorrectly explained the crime of destruction of documents to the jury.
Fawn Hall,
Oliver North's secretary, was given immunity from prosecution on
charges of conspiracy and destroying documents in exchange for her
testimony.
Jonathan Scott Royster, Liaison to Oliver North, was given immunity
from prosecution on charges of conspiracy and destroying documents in
exchange for his testimony.
National Security Advisor John Poindexter was convicted of five counts of conspiracy, obstruction of justice, perjury, defrauding the government, and the alteration and destruction of evidence. A panel of the D.C. Circuit
overturned the convictions on 15 November 1991 for the same reason the
court had overturned Oliver North's, and by the same 2 to 1 vote. The Supreme Court refused to hear the case.
Duane Clarridge.
An ex-CIA senior official, he was indicted in November 1991 on seven
counts of perjury and false statements relating to a November 1985
shipment to Iran. Pardoned before trial by President George H. W. Bush.
Richard V. Secord.
Former Air Force major general, who was involved in arms transfers to
Iran and diversion of funds to Contras, he pleaded guilty in November
1989 to making false statements to Congress and was sentenced to two
years of probation. As part of his plea bargain, Secord agreed to
provide further truthful testimony in exchange for the dismissal of
remaining criminal charges against him.
Albert Hakim.
A businessman, he pleaded guilty in November 1989 to supplementing the
salary of North by buying a $13,800 fence for North with money from "the
Enterprise," which was a set of foreign companies Hakim used in
Iran–Contra. In addition, Swiss company Lake Resources Inc., used for
storing money from arms sales to Iran to give to the Contras, plead
guilty to stealing government property. Hakim was given two years of probation and a $5,000 fine, while Lake Resources Inc. was ordered to dissolve.
Thomas G. Clines.
A former CIA clandestine service officer. According to Special
Prosecutor Walsh, he earned nearly $883,000 helping retired Air Force
Maj. Gen. Richard V. Secord and Albert Hakim carry out the secret
operations of "the Enterprise". He was indicted for concealing the full
amount of his Enterprise profits for the 1985 and 1986 tax years, and
for failing to declare his foreign financial accounts. He was convicted
and served 16 months in prison, the only Iran–Contra defendant to have
served a prison sentence.
The Independent Counsel, Lawrence E. Walsh, chose not to re-try North or Poindexter. In total, several dozen people were investigated by Walsh's office.
George H. W. Bush's involvement
On 27 July 1986, Israeli counterterrorism expert Amiram Nir briefed Vice President Bush in Jerusalem about the weapon sales to Iran.
In an interview with The Washington Post in August 1987, Bush stated that he was denied information about the operation and did not know about the diversion of funds. Bush said that he had not advised Reagan to reject the initiative because he had not heard strong objections to it. The Post quoted him as stating, "We were not in the loop." The following month, Bush recounted meeting Nir in his September 1987 autobiography Looking Forward, stating that he began to develop misgivings about the Iran initiative. He wrote that he did not learn the full extent of the Iran dealings until he was briefed by Senator David Durenberger regarding a Senate inquiry into them.
Bush added the briefing with Durenberger left him with the feeling he
had "been deliberately excluded from key meetings involving details of
the Iran operation".
In January 1988 during a live interview with Bush on CBS Evening News, Dan Rather
told Bush that his unwillingness to speak about the scandal led "people
to say 'either George Bush was irrelevant or he was ineffective, he set
himself outside of the loop.'" Bush replied, "May I explain what I mean by 'out of the loop'? No operational role."
Although Bush publicly insisted that he knew little about the
operation, his statements were contradicted by excerpts of his diary
released by the White House in January 1993.
An entry dated 5 November 1986 stated: "On the news at this time is the
question of the hostages... I'm one of the few people that know fully
the details, and there is a lot of flak and misinformation out there. It
is not a subject we can talk about..."
Pardons
On 24 December 1992, after he had been defeated for reelection, lame duck President George H. W. Bush pardoned five administration officials who had been found guilty on charges relating to the affair. They were:
Bush also pardoned Caspar Weinberger, who had not yet come to trial. Attorney General William P. Barr advised the President on these pardons, especially that of Caspar Weinberger.
In response to these Bush pardons, Independent CounselLawrence E. Walsh,
who headed the investigation of Reagan administration officials'
criminal conduct in the Iran–Contra scandal, stated that "the
Iran-contra cover-up, which has continued for more than six years, has
now been completed." Walsh noted that in issuing the pardons Bush
appears to have been preempting being implicated himself in the crimes
of Iran–Contra by evidence that was to come to light during the
Weinberger trial, and noted that there was a pattern of "deception and
obstruction" by Bush, Weinberger and other senior Reagan administration
officials.
Modern interpretations
The
Iran–Contra affair and the ensuing deception to protect senior
administration officials (including President Reagan) was cast as an
example of post-truth politics by Malcolm Byrne of George Washington University.
Reports and documents
The 100th Congress formed a Joint Committee of the United States Congress (Congressional committees investigating the Iran–Contra affair) and held hearings in mid-1987. Transcripts were published as: Iran-Contra
Investigation: Joint Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on
Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the
House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with
Iran (U.S. GPO 1987–88). A closed Executive Session heard classified testimony from North and Poindexter; this transcript was published in a redacted format. The joint committee's final report was Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair With Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views (U.S. GPO 17 November 1987). The records of the committee are at the National Archives, but many are still non-public.
The Tower Commission Report was published as the Report of the President's Special Review Board (U.S. GPO 26 February 1987). It was also published as The Tower Commission Report by Bantam Books (ISBN0-553-26968-2).
The Office of Independent Counsel/Walsh investigation produced
four interim reports to Congress. Its final report was published as the Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters. Walsh's records are available at the National Archives.
