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Sunday, February 11, 2024

Functional specialization (brain)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In neuroscience, functional specialization is a theory which suggests that different areas in the brain are specialized for different functions.

Historical origins

1848 edition of American Phrenological Journal published by Fowlers & Wells, New York City

Phrenology, created by Franz Joseph Gall (1758–1828) and Johann Gaspar Spurzheim (1776–1832) and best known for the idea that one's personality could be determined by the variation of bumps on their skull, proposed that different regions in one's brain have different functions and may very well be associated with different behaviours. Gall and Spurzheim were the first to observe the crossing of pyramidal tracts, thus explaining why lesions in one hemisphere are manifested in the opposite side of the body. However, Gall and Spurzheim did not attempt to justify phrenology on anatomical grounds. It has been argued that phrenology was fundamentally a science of race. Gall considered the most compelling argument in favor of phrenology the differences in skull shape found in sub-Saharan Africans and the anecdotal evidence (due to scientific travelers and colonists) of their intellectual inferiority and emotional volatility. In Italy, Luigi Rolando carried out lesion experiments and performed electrical stimulation of the brain, including the Rolandic area.

A
Phineas Gage's accident

Phineas Gage became one of the first lesion case studies in 1848 when an explosion drove a large iron rod completely through his head, destroying his left frontal lobe. He recovered with no apparent sensory, motor, or gross cognitive deficits, but with behaviour so altered that friends described him as "no longer being Gage," suggesting that the damaged areas are involved in "higher functions" such as personality. However, Gage's mental changes are usually grossly exaggerated in modern presentations.

Subsequent cases (such as Broca's patient Tan) gave further support to the doctrine of specialization.

In the XX century, in the process of treating epilepsy, Wilder Penfield produced maps of the location of various functions (motor, sensory, memory, vision) in the brain.

Major theories of the brain

Currently, there are two major theories of the brain's cognitive function. The first is the theory of modularity. Stemming from phrenology, this theory supports functional specialization, suggesting the brain has different modules that are domain specific in function. The second theory, distributive processing, proposes that the brain is more interactive and its regions are functionally interconnected rather than specialized. Each orientation plays a role within certain aims and tend to complement each other (see below section `Collaboration´).

Modularity

The theory of modularity suggests that there are functionally specialized regions in the brain that are domain specific for different cognitive processes. Jerry Fodor expanded the initial notion of phrenology by creating his Modularity of the Mind theory. The Modularity of the Mind theory indicates that distinct neurological regions called modules are defined by their functional roles in cognition. He also rooted many of his concepts on modularity back to philosophers like Descartes, who wrote about the mind being composed of "organs" or "psychological faculties". An example of Fodor's concept of modules is seen in cognitive processes such as vision, which have many separate mechanisms for colour, shape and spatial perception.

One of the fundamental beliefs of domain specificity and the theory of modularity suggests that it is a consequence of natural selection and is a feature of our cognitive architecture. Researchers Hirschfeld and Gelman propose that because the human mind has evolved by natural selection, it implies that enhanced functionality would develop if it produced an increase in "fit" behaviour. Research on this evolutionary perspective suggests that domain specificity is involved in the development of cognition because it allows one to pinpoint adaptive problems.

An issue for the modular theory of cognitive neuroscience is that there are cortical anatomical differences from person to person. Although many studies of modularity are undertaken from very specific lesion case studies, the idea is to create a neurological function map that applies to people in general. To extrapolate from lesion studies and other case studies this requires adherence to the universality assumption, that there is no difference, in a qualitative sense, between subjects who are intact neurologically. For example, two subjects would fundamentally be the same neurologically before their lesions, and after have distinctly different cognitive deficits. Subject 1 with a lesion in the "A" region of the brain may show impaired functioning in cognitive ability "X" but not "Y", while subject 2 with a lesion in area "B" demonstrates reduced "Y" ability but "X" is unaffected; results like these allow inferences to be made about brain specialization and localization, also known as using a double dissociation.

The difficulty with this theory is that in typical non-lesioned subjects, locations within the brain anatomy are similar but not completely identical. There is a strong defense for this inherent deficit in our ability to generalize when using functional localizing techniques (fMRI, PET etc.). To account for this problem, the coordinate-based Talairach and Tournoux stereotaxic system is widely used to compare subjects' results to a standard brain using an algorithm. Another solution using coordinates involves comparing brains using sulcal reference points. A slightly newer technique is to use functional landmarks, which combines sulcal and gyral landmarks (the groves and folds of the cortex) and then finding an area well known for its modularity such as the fusiform face area. This landmark area then serves to orient the researcher to the neighboring cortex.

Future developments for modular theories of neuropsychology may lie in "modular psychiatry". The concept is that a modular understanding of the brain and advanced neuro-imaging techniques will allow for a more empirical diagnosis of mental and emotional disorders. There has been some work done towards this extension of the modularity theory with regards to the physical neurological differences in subjects with depression and schizophrenia, for example. Zielasek and Gaeble have set out a list of requirements in the field of neuropsychology in order to move towards neuropsychiatry:

  1. To assemble a complete overview of putative modules of the human mind
  2. To establish module-specific diagnostic tests (specificity, sensitivity, reliability)
  3. To assess how far individual modules, sets of modules or their connections are affected in certain psychopathological situations
  4. To probe novel module-specific therapies like the facial affect recognition training or to retrain access to context information in the case of delusions and hallucinations, in which "hyper-modularity" may play a role 

Research in the study of brain function can also be applied to cognitive behaviour therapy. As therapy becomes increasingly refined, it is important to differentiate cognitive processes in order to discover their relevance towards different patient treatments. An example comes specifically from studies on lateral specialization between the left and right cerebral hemispheres of the brain. The functional specialization of these hemispheres are offering insight on different forms of cognitive behaviour therapy methods, one focusing on verbal cognition (the main function of the left hemisphere) and the other emphasizing imagery or spatial cognition (the main function of the right hemisphere). Examples of therapies that involve imagery, requiring right hemisphere activity in the brain, include systematic desensitization and anxiety management training. Both of these therapy techniques rely on the patient's ability to use visual imagery to cope with or replace patients symptoms, such as anxiety. Examples of cognitive behaviour therapies that involve verbal cognition, requiring left hemisphere activity in the brain, include self-instructional training and stress inoculation. Both of these therapy techniques focus on patients' internal self-statements, requiring them to use vocal cognition. When deciding which cognitive therapy to employ, it is important to consider the primary cognitive style of the patient. Many individuals have a tendency to prefer visual imagery over verbalization and vice versa. One way of figuring out which hemisphere a patient favours is by observing their lateral eye movements. Studies suggest that eye gaze reflects the activation of cerebral hemisphere contralateral to the direction. Thus, when asking questions that require spatial thinking, individuals tend to move their eyes to the left, whereas when asked questions that require verbal thinking, individuals usually move their eyes to the right. In conclusion, this information allows one to choose the optimal cognitive behaviour therapeutic technique, thereby enhancing the treatment of many patients.

Areas representing modularity in the brain

Fusiform face area

One of the most well known examples of functional specialization is the fusiform face area (FFA). Justine Sergent was one of the first researchers that brought forth evidence towards the functional neuroanatomy of face processing. Using positron emission tomography (PET), Sergent found that there were different patterns of activation in response to the two different required tasks, face processing verses object processing. These results can be linked with her studies of brain-damaged patients with lesions in the occipital and temporal lobes. Patients revealed that there was an impairment of face processing but no difficulty recognizing everyday objects, a disorder also known as prosopagnosia. Later research by Nancy Kanwisher using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), found specifically that the region of the inferior temporal cortex, known as the fusiform gyrus, was significantly more active when subjects viewed, recognized and categorized faces in comparison to other regions of the brain. Lesion studies also supported this finding where patients were able to recognize objects but unable to recognize faces. This provided evidence towards domain specificity in the visual system, as Kanwisher acknowledges the Fusiform Face Area as a module in the brain, specifically the extrastriate cortex, that is specialized for face perception.

Visual area V4 and V5

While looking at the regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF), using PET, researcher Semir Zeki directly demonstrated functional specialization within the visual cortex known as visual modularity, first in the monkey and then in the human visual brain. He localized regions involved specifically in the perception of colour and vision motion, as well as of orientation (form). For colour, visual area V4 was located when subjects were shown two identical displays, one being multicoloured and the other shades of grey. This was further supported from lesion studies where individuals were unable to see colours after damage, a disorder known as achromatopsia. Combining PET and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), subjects viewing a moving checker board pattern verses a stationary checker board pattern located visual area V5, which is now considered to be specialized for vision motion. (Watson et al., 1993) This area of functional specialization was also supported by lesion study patients whose damage caused cerebral motion blindness, a condition now referred to as cerebral akinetopsia

Frontal lobes

Studies have found the frontal lobes to be involved in the executive functions of the brain, which are higher level cognitive processes. This control process is involved in the coordination, planning and organizing of actions towards an individual's goals. It contributes to such things as one's behaviour, language and reasoning. More specifically, it was found to be the function of the prefrontal cortex, and evidence suggest that these executive functions control processes such as planning and decision making, error correction and assisting overcoming habitual responses. Miller and Cummings used PET and functional magnetic imaging (fMRI) to further support functional specialization of the frontal cortex. They found lateralization of verbal working memory in the left frontal cortex and visuospatial working memory in the right frontal cortex. Lesion studies support these findings where left frontal lobe patients exhibited problems in controlling executive functions such as creating strategies. The dorsolateral, ventrolateral and anterior cingulate regions within the prefrontal cortex are proposed to work together in different cognitive tasks, which is related to interaction theories. However, there has also been evidence suggesting strong individual specializations within this network. For instance, Miller and Cummings found that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is specifically involved in the manipulation and monitoring of sensorimotor information within working memory.

Right and left hemispheres

During the 1960s, Roger Sperry conducted a natural experiment on epileptic patients who had previously had their corpora callosa cut. The corpus callosum is the area of the brain dedicated to linking both the right and left hemisphere together. Sperry et al.'s experiment was based on flashing images in the right and left visual fields of his participants. Because the participant's corpus callosum was cut, the information processed by each visual field could not be transmitted to the other hemisphere. In one experiment, Sperry flashed images in the right visual field (RVF), which would subsequently be transmitted to the left hemisphere (LH) of the brain. When asked to repeat what they had previously seen, participants were fully capable of remembering the image flashed. However, when the participants were then asked to draw what they had seen, they were unable to. When Sperry et al. flashed images in the left visual field (LVF), the information processed would be sent to the right hemisphere (RH) of the brain. When asked to repeat what they had previously seen, participants were unable to recall the image flashed, but were very successful in drawing the image. Therefore, Sperry concluded that the left hemisphere of the brain was dedicated to language as the participants could clearly speak the image flashed. On the other hand, Sperry concluded that the right hemisphere of the brain was involved in more creative activities such as drawing.

Parahippocampal place area

Located in the parahippocampal gyrus, the parahippocampal place area (PPA) was coined by Nancy Kanwisher and Russell Epstein after an fMRI study showed that the PPA responds optimally to scenes presented containing a spatial layout, minimally to single objects and not at all to faces. It was also noted in this experiment that activity remains the same in the PPA when viewing a scene with an empty room or a room filled with meaningful objects. Kanwisher and Epstein proposed "that the PPA represents places by encoding the geometry of the local environment". In addition, Soojin Park and Marvin Chun posited that activation in the PPA is viewpoint specific, and so responds to changes in the angle of the scene. In contrast, another special mapping area, the retrosplenial cortex (RSC), is viewpoint invariant or does not change response levels when views change. This perhaps indicates a complementary arrangement of functionally and anatomically separate visual processing brain areas.

Extrastriate body area

Located in the lateral occipitotemporal cortex, fMRI studies have shown the extrastriate body area (EBA) to have selective responding when subjects see human bodies or body parts, implying that it has functional specialization. The EBA does not optimally respond to objects or parts of objects but to human bodies and body parts, a hand for example. In fMRI experiments conducted by Downing et al. participants were asked to look at a series of pictures. These stimuli includes objects, parts of objects (for example just the head of a hammer), figures of the human body in all sorts of positions and types of detail (including line drawings or stick men), and body parts (hands or feet) without any body attached. There was significantly more blood flow (and thus activation) to human bodies, no matter how detailed, and body parts than to objects or object parts.

Distributive processing

The cognitive theory of distributed processing suggests that brain areas are highly interconnected and process information in a distributed manner.

A remarkable precedent of this orientation is the research of Justo Gonzalo on brain dynamics where several phenomena that he observed could not be explained by the traditional theory of localizations. From the gradation he observed between different syndromes in patients with different cortical lesions, this author proposed in 1952 a functional gradients model, which permits an ordering and an interpretation of multiple phenomena and syndromes. The functional gradients are continuous functions through the cortex describing a distributed specificity, so that, for a given sensory system, the specific gradient, of contralateral character, is maximum in the corresponding projection area and decreases in gradation towards more "central" zone and beyond so that the final decline reaches other primary areas. As a consequence of the crossing and overlapping of the specific gradients, in the central zone where the overlap is greater, there would be an action of mutual integration, rather nonspecific (or multisensory) with bilateral character due to the corpus callosum. This action would be maximum in the central zone and minimal towards the projection areas. As the author stated (p. 20 of the English translation) "a functional continuity with regional variation is then offered, each point of the cortex acquiring different properties but with certain unity with the rest of the cortex. It is a dynamic conception of quantitative localizations". A very similar gradients scheme was proposed by Elkhonon Goldberg in 1989.

Other researchers who provide evidence to support the theory of distributive processing include Anthony McIntosh and William Uttal, who question and debate localization and modality specialization within the brain. McIntosh's research suggests that human cognition involves interactions between the brain regions responsible for processes sensory information, such as vision, audition, and other mediating areas like the prefrontal cortex. McIntosh explains that modularity is mainly observed in sensory and motor systems, however, beyond these very receptors, modularity becomes "fuzzier" and you see the cross connections between systems increase. He also illustrates that there is an overlapping of functional characteristics between the sensory and motor systems, where these regions are close to one another. These different neural interactions influence each other, where activity changes in one area influence other connected areas. With this, McIntosh suggest that if you only focus on activity in one area, you may miss the changes in other integrative areas. Neural interactions can be measured using analysis of covariance in neuroimaging. McIntosh used this analysis to convey a clear example of the interaction theory of distributive processing. In this study, subjects learned that an auditory stimulus signalled a visual event. McIntosh found activation (an increase blood flow), in an area of the occipital cortex, a region of the brain involved in visual processing, when the auditory stimulus was presented alone. Correlations between the occipital cortex and different areas of the brain such as the prefrontal cortex, premotor cortex and superior temporal cortex showed a pattern of co-variation and functional connectivity.

Uttal focusses on the limits of localizing cognitive processes in the brain. One of his main arguments is that since the late 1990s, research in cognitive neuroscience has forgotten about conventional psychophysical studies based on behavioural observation. He believes that current research focusses on the technological advances of brain imaging techniques such as MRI and PET scans. Thus, he further suggest that this research is dependent on the assumptions of localization and hypothetical cognitive modules that use such imaging techniques to pursuit these assumptions. Uttal's major concern incorporates many controversies with the validly, over-assumptions and strong inferences some of these images are trying to illustrate. For instance, there is concern over the proper utilization of control images in an experiment. Most of the cerebrum is active during cognitive activity, therefore the amount of increased activity in a region must be greater when compared to a controlled area. In general, this may produce false or exaggerated findings and may increase potential tendency to ignore regions of diminished activity which may be crucial to the particular cognitive process being studied. Moreover, Uttal believes that localization researchers tend to ignore the complexity of the nervous system. Many regions in the brain are physically interconnected in a nonlinear system, hence, Uttal believes that behaviour is produced by a variety of system organizations.

Collaboration

The two theories, modularity and distributive processing, can also be combined. By operating simultaneously, these principles may interact with each other in a collaborative effort to characterize the functioning of the brain. Fodor himself, one of the major contributors to the modularity theory, appears to have this sentiment. He noted that modularity is a matter of degrees, and that the brain is modular to the extent that it warrants studying it in regards to its functional specialization. Although there are areas in the brain that are more specialized for cognitive processes than others, the nervous system also integrates and connects the information produced in these regions. In fact, the proposed distributive scheme of the functional cortical gradientes by J. Gonzalo already tries to join both concepts modular and distributive: regional heterogeneity should be a definitive acquisition (maximum specificity in the projection paths and primary areas), but the rigid separation between projection and association areas would be erased through the continuous functions of gradient.

The collaboration between the two theories not only would provide a more unified perception and understanding of the world but also make available the ability to learn from it.

Human taxonomy

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Homo ("humans")
Temporal range: Piacenzian-Present, 2.865–0 Ma
Scientific classification 
Domain: Eukaryota
Kingdom: Animalia
Phylum: Chordata
Class: Mammalia
Order: Primates
Suborder: Haplorhini
Infraorder: Simiiformes
Family: Hominidae
Subfamily: Homininae
Tribe: Hominini
Genus: Homo
Linnaeus, 1758
Type species
Homo sapiens
Linnaeus, 1758
Species

other species or subspecies suggested

Synonyms

Human taxonomy is the classification of the human species (systematic name Homo sapiens, Latin: "wise man") within zoological taxonomy. The systematic genus, Homo, is designed to include both anatomically modern humans and extinct varieties of archaic humans. Current humans have been designated as subspecies Homo sapiens sapiens, differentiated, according to some, from the direct ancestor, Homo sapiens idaltu (with some other research instead classifying idaltu and current humans as belonging to the same subspecies).

Since the introduction of systematic names in the 18th century, knowledge of human evolution has increased drastically, and a number of intermediate taxa have been proposed in the 20th and early 21st centuries. The most widely accepted taxonomy grouping takes the genus Homo as originating between two and three million years ago, divided into at least two species, archaic Homo erectus and modern Homo sapiens, with about a dozen further suggestions for species without universal recognition.

The genus Homo is placed in the tribe Hominini alongside Pan (chimpanzees). The two genera are estimated to have diverged over an extended time of hybridization, spanning roughly 10 to 6 million years ago, with possible admixture as late as 4 million years ago. A subtribe of uncertain validity, grouping archaic "pre-human" or "para-human" species younger than the Homo-Pan split, is Australopithecina (proposed in 1939).

A proposal by Wood and Richmond (2000) would introduce Hominina as a subtribe alongside Australopithecina, with Homo the only known genus within Hominina. Alternatively, following Cela-Conde and Ayala (2003), the "pre-human" or "proto-human" genera of Australopithecus, Ardipithecus, Praeanthropus, and possibly Sahelanthropus, may be placed on equal footing alongside the genus Homo. An even more extreme view rejects the division of Pan and Homo as separate genera, which based on the Principle of Priority would imply the reclassification of chimpanzees as Homo paniscus (or similar).

Categorizing humans based on phenotypes is a socially controversial subject. Biologists originally classified races as subspecies, but contemporary anthropologists reject the concept of race as a useful tool to understanding humanity, and instead view humanity as a complex, interrelated genetic continuum. Taxonomy of the hominins continues to evolve.

History

The taxonomic classification of humans following John Edward Gray (1825).

Human taxonomy on one hand involves the placement of humans within the taxonomy of the hominids (great apes), and on the other the division of archaic and modern humans into species and, if applicable, subspecies. Modern zoological taxonomy was developed by Carl Linnaeus during the 1730s to 1750s. He was the first to develop the idea that, like other biological entities, groups of people could too share taxonomic classifications. He named the human species as Homo sapiens in 1758, as the only member species of the genus Homo, divided into several subspecies corresponding to the great races. The Latin noun homล (genitive hominis) means "human being". The systematic name Hominidae for the family of the great apes was introduced by John Edward Gray (1825). Gray also supplied Hominini as the name of the tribe including both chimpanzees (genus Pan) and humans (genus Homo).

The discovery of the first extinct archaic human species from the fossil record dates to the mid 19th century: Homo neanderthalensis, classified in 1864. Since then, a number of other archaic species have been named, but there is no universal consensus as to their exact number. After the discovery of H. neanderthalensis, which even if "archaic" is recognizable as clearly human, late 19th to early 20th century anthropology for a time was occupied with finding the supposedly "missing link" between Homo and Pan. The "Piltdown Man" hoax of 1912 was the fraudulent presentation of such a transitional species. Since the mid-20th century, knowledge of the development of Hominini has become much more detailed, and taxonomical terminology has been altered a number of times to reflect this.

The introduction of Australopithecus as a third genus, alongside Homo and Pan, in the tribe Hominini is due to Raymond Dart (1925). Australopithecina as a subtribe containing Australopithecus as well as Paranthropus (Broom 1938) is a proposal by Gregory & Hellman (1939). More recently proposed additions to the Australopithecina subtribe include Ardipithecus (1995) and Kenyanthropus (2001). The position of Sahelanthropus (2002) relative to Australopithecina within Hominini is unclear. Cela-Conde and Ayala (2003) propose the recognition of Australopithecus, Ardipithecus, Praeanthropus, and Sahelanthropus (the latter incertae sedis)as separate genera.

Other proposed genera, now mostly considered part of Homo, include: Pithecanthropus (Dubois, 1894), Protanthropus (Haeckel, 1895), Sinanthropus (Black, 1927), Cyphanthropus (Pycraft, 1928) Africanthropus (Dreyer, 1935), Telanthropus (Broom & Anderson 1949), Atlanthropus (Arambourg, 1954), Tchadanthropus (Coppens, 1965).

The genus Homo has been taken to originate some two million years ago, since the discovery of stone tools in Olduvai Gorge, Tanzania, in the 1960s. Homo habilis (Leakey et al., 1964) would be the first "human" species (member of genus Homo) by definition, its type specimen being the OH 7 fossils. However, the discovery of more fossils of this type has opened up the debate on the delineation of H. habilis from Australopithecus. Especially, the LD 350-1 jawbone fossil discovered in 2013, dated to 2.8 Mya, has been argued as being transitional between the two. It is also disputed whether H. habilis was the first hominin to use stone tools, as Australopithecus garhi, dated to c. 2.5 Mya, has been found along with stone tool implements. Fossil KNM-ER 1470 (discovered in 1972, designated Pithecanthropus rudolfensis by Alekseyev 1978) is now seen as either a third early species of Homo (alongside H. habilis and H. erectus) at about 2 million years ago, or alternatively as transitional between Australopithecus and Homo.

Wood and Richmond (2000) proposed that Gray's tribe Hominini ("hominins") be designated as comprising all species after the chimpanzee–human last common ancestor by definition, to the inclusion of Australopithecines and other possible pre-human or para-human species (such as Ardipithecus and Sahelanthropus) not known in Gray's time. In this suggestion, the new subtribe of Hominina was to be designated as including the genus Homo exclusively, so that Hominini would have two subtribes, Australopithecina and Hominina, with the only known genus in Hominina being Homo. Orrorin (2001) has been proposed as a possible ancestor of Hominina but not Australopithecina.

Designations alternative to Hominina have been proposed: Australopithecinae (Gregory & Hellman 1939) and Preanthropinae (Cela-Conde & Altaba 2002);

Species

At least a dozen species of Homo other than Homo sapiens have been proposed, with varying degrees of consensus. Homo erectus is widely recognized as the species directly ancestral to Homo sapiens. Most other proposed species are proposed as alternatively belonging to either Homo erectus or Homo sapiens as a subspecies. This concerns Homo ergaster in particular. One proposal divides Homo erectus into an African and an Asian variety; the African is Homo ergaster, and the Asian is Homo erectus sensu stricto. (Inclusion of Homo ergaster with Asian Homo erectus is Homo erectus sensu lato.) There appears to be a recent trend, with the availability of ever more difficult-to-classify fossils such as the Dmanisi skulls (2013) or Homo naledi fossils (2015) to subsume all archaic varieties under Homo erectus.

Comparative table of Homo lineages
Lineages Temporal range
(kya)
Habitat Adult height Adult mass Cranial capacity
(cm3)
Fossil record Discovery Publication
of name
H. habilis
membership in Homo uncertain
2,100–1,500 Tanzania 110–140 cm (3 ft 7 in – 4 ft 7 in) 33–55 kg (73–121 lb) 510–660 Many 1960 1964
H. rudolfensis
membership in Homo uncertain
1,900 Kenya

700 2 sites 1972 1986
H. gautengensis
also classified as H. habilis
1,900–600 South Africa 100 cm (3 ft 3 in)

3 individuals 2010 2010
H. erectus 1,900–140 Africa, Eurasia 180 cm (5 ft 11 in) 60 kg (130 lb) 850 (early) – 1,100 (late) Many 1891 1892
H. ergaster
African H. erectus
1,800–1,300 East and Southern Africa

700–850 Many 1949 1975
H. antecessor 1,200–800 Western Europe 175 cm (5 ft 9 in) 90 kg (200 lb) 1,000 2 sites 1994 1997
H. heidelbergensis
early H. neanderthalensis
600–300 Europe, Africa 180 cm (5 ft 11 in) 90 kg (200 lb) 1,100–1,400 Many 1907 1908
H. cepranensis
a single fossil, possibly H. heidelbergensis
c. 450 Italy

1,000 1 skull cap 1994 2003
H. longi 309–138 Northeast China

1,420 1 individual 1933 2021
H. rhodesiensis
early H. sapiens
c. 300 Zambia

1,300 Single or very few 1921 1921
H. naledi c. 300 South Africa 150 cm (4 ft 11 in) 45 kg (99 lb) 450 15 individuals 2013 2015
H. sapiens
(anatomically modern humans)
c. 300–present Worldwide 150–190 cm (4 ft 11 in – 6 ft 3 in) 50–100 kg (110–220 lb) 950–1,800 (extant) —— 1758
H. neanderthalensis
240–40 Europe, Western Asia 170 cm (5 ft 7 in) 55–70 kg (121–154 lb)
(heavily built)
1,200–1,900 Many 1829 1864
H. floresiensis
classification uncertain
190–50 Indonesia 100 cm (3 ft 3 in) 25 kg (55 lb) 400 7 individuals 2003 2004
Nesher Ramla Homo
classification uncertain
140–120 Palestine


several individuals 2021
H. tsaichangensis
possibly H. erectus or Denisova
c. 100 Taiwan


1 individual 2008(?) 2015
H. luzonensis
c. 67 Philippines


3 individuals 2007 2019
Denisova hominin 40 Siberia


2 sites 2000
2010

Subspecies

Homo sapiens subspecies

1737 painting of Carl Linnaeus wearing a traditional Sami costume. Linnaeus is sometimes named as the lectotype of both H. sapiens and H. s. sapiens.

The recognition or nonrecognition of subspecies of Homo sapiens has a complicated history. The rank of subspecies in zoology is introduced for convenience, and not by objective criteria, based on pragmatic consideration of factors such as geographic isolation and sexual selection. The informal taxonomic rank of race is variously considered equivalent or subordinate to the rank of subspecies, and the division of anatomically modern humans (H. sapiens) into subspecies is closely tied to the recognition of major racial groupings based on human genetic variation.

A subspecies cannot be recognized independently: a species will either be recognized as having no subspecies at all or at least two (including any that are extinct). Therefore, the designation of an extant subspecies Homo sapiens sapiens only makes sense if at least one other subspecies is recognized. H. s. sapiens is attributed to "Linnaeus (1758)" by the taxonomic Principle of Coordination. During the 19th to mid-20th century, it was common practice to classify the major divisions of extant H. sapiens as subspecies, following Linnaeus (1758), who had recognized H. s. americanus, H. s. europaeus, H. s. asiaticus and H. s. afer as grouping the native populations of the Americas, West Eurasia, East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, respectively. Linnaeus also included H. s. ferus, for the "wild" form which he identified with feral children, and two other "wild" forms for reported specimens now considered very dubious (see cryptozoology), H. s. monstrosus and H. s. troglodytes.

There were variations and additions to the categories of Linnaeus, such as H. s. tasmanianus for the native population of Australia. Bory de St. Vincent in his Essai sur l'Homme (1825) extended Linnaeus's "racial" categories to as many as fifteen: Leiotrichi ("smooth-haired"): japeticus (with subraces), arabicus, iranicus, indicus, sinicus, hyperboreus, neptunianus, australasicus, columbicus, americanus, patagonicus; Oulotrichi ("crisp-haired"): aethiopicus, cafer, hottentotus, melaninus. Similarly, Georges Vacher de Lapouge (1899) also had categories based on race, such as priscus, spelaeus (etc.).

Homo sapiens neanderthalensis was proposed by King (1864) as an alternative to Homo neanderthalensis. There have been "taxonomic wars" over whether Neanderthals were a separate species since their discovery in the 1860s. Pรครคbo (2014) frames this as a debate that is unresolvable in principle, "since there is no definition of species perfectly describing the case." Louis Lartet (1869) proposed Homo sapiens fossilis based on the Cro-Magnon fossils.

There are a number of proposals of extinct varieties of Homo sapiens made in the 20th century. Many of the original proposals were not using explicit trinomial nomenclature, even though they are still cited as valid synonyms of H. sapiens by Wilson & Reeder (2005). These include: Homo grimaldii (Lapouge, 1906), Homo aurignacensis hauseri (Klaatsch & Hauser, 1910), Notanthropus eurafricanus (Sergi, 1911), Homo fossilis infrasp. proto-aethiopicus (Giuffrida-Ruggeri, 1915), Telanthropus capensis (Broom, 1917), Homo wadjakensis (Dubois, 1921), Homo sapiens cro-magnonensis, Homo sapiens grimaldiensis (Gregory, 1921), Homo drennani (Kleinschmidt, 1931), Homo galilensis (Joleaud, 1931) = Paleanthropus palestinus (McCown & Keith, 1932). Rightmire (1983) proposed Homo sapiens rhodesiensis.

After World War II, the practice of dividing extant populations of Homo sapiens into subspecies declined. An early authority explicitly avoiding the division of H. sapiens into subspecies was Grzimeks Tierleben, published 1967–1972. A late example of an academic authority proposing that the human racial groups should be considered taxonomical subspecies is John Baker (1974). The trinomial nomenclature Homo sapiens sapiens became popular for "modern humans" in the context of Neanderthals being considered a subspecies of H. sapiens in the second half of the 20th century. Derived from the convention, widespread in the 1980s, of considering two subspecies, H. s. neanderthalensis and H. s. sapiens, the explicit claim that "H. s. sapiens is the only extant human subspecies" appears in the early 1990s.

Since the 2000s, the extinct Homo sapiens idaltu (White et al., 2003) has gained wide recognition as a subspecies of Homo sapiens, but even in this case there is a dissenting view arguing that "the skulls may not be distinctive enough to warrant a new subspecies name". H. s. neanderthalensis and H. s. rhodesiensis continue to be considered separate species by some authorities, but the 2010s discovery of genetic evidence of archaic human admixture with modern humans has reopened the details of taxonomy of archaic humans.

Homo erectus subspecies

Homo erectus since its introduction in 1892 has been divided into numerous subspecies, many of them formerly considered individual species of Homo. None of these subspecies have universal consensus among paleontologists.

Inhalant

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