Political theology is a term which has been used in discussion of the ways in which theological concepts or ways of thinking relate to politics. The term is often used to denote religious thought about political principled questions. Scholars such as Carl Schmitt,
a prominent Nazi jurist and political theorist, who wrote extensively
on how to effectively wield political power, used it to denote religious
concepts that were secularized and thus became key political concepts.
It has often been affiliated with Christianity, but since the 21st
century, it has more recently been discussed with relation to other
religions.
Definition and analysis
The term political theology
has been used in a wide variety of ways by writers exploring different
aspects of believers' relationship with politics. It has been used to
discuss Augustine of Hippo's City of God and Thomas Aquinas's works Summa Theologica and De Regno: On Kingship. It has likewise been used to describe the Eastern Orthodox view of symphonia and the works of the Protestant reformersMartin Luther and John Calvin.
There is a long history in Christian political thought of linking
politics, statecraft, and worldly authority to the broader category of
carnal literalism, typed as “Jewish” by the Pauline tradition. This
tradition produced a tendency to discuss political error in terms of
Judaism, with the difference between mortal and eternal, private and
public, tyrant and legitimate monarch, mapped onto the difference between Jew and Christian.
As a result of this history, transcendence as a political ideal has
often figured (and perhaps still figures?) its enemies as Jewish.
Though the political aspects of Christianity, Islam, Confucianism,
and other traditions has been debated for millennia, political theology
has been an academic discipline since the 20th century.
The recent use of the term is often associated with the work of the prominent German political theorist Carl Schmitt. Writing amidst the turbulence of the GermanWeimar Republic, Schmitt argued in his essay Politische Theologie (1922) that the main concepts of modern politics were secularized versions of older theological concepts. Mikhail Bakunin had used the term in his 1871 text "The Political Theology of Mazzini and the International" to which Schmitt's book was a response. Drawing on Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan he argued that the state exists to maintain its own integrity in order to ensure order in society in times of crisis.
Some
have divided the approach of political theology between a rightist
traditional concern with individual "moral reform" (such as Clyde
Wilcox's God's Warriors [1992] and Ted Jelen's The Political World of the Clergy [1993]) and a leftist focus on collective "social justice" (such as Jeffrey K. Hadden's The Gathering Storm in the Churches [1969] and Harold Quinley's The Prophetic Clergy [1974]).
Kwok Pui-lan
has argued that, while Schmitt may have come up with the term and its
modern usage, political theologies were likewise forming along very
different trajectories elsewhere around the world, such as in Asia. In
China in the 1930s, for instance, the Protestant Wu Yaozong advocated that a social revolution was necessary to save both China and the world. This would likewise be true of the role of Protestants involved in Korean nationalism in the early twentieth century.
Many major non-Christian philosophers have written extensively on the topic of political theology during recent years, such as Jürgen Habermas, Odo Marquard, Giorgio Agamben, Simon Critchley, and Slavoj Zizek. Since the early 21st century, there has also been a growing discourse around Islamic political theology, especially within Western contexts that were previously dominated by Christianity.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, political theology became an
important theme within legal theory, especially in constitutional law,
international law and legal history. The literature draws heavily upon the legacy of Carl Schmitt (though often to debate his premises) and political philosophy (such as Ernesto Laclau), along with political phenomena, such as the 'War on Terror'.
Another term which often occupies similar space in academic discourse is "public theology".
It is said that political theology is directed more towards the
government or the state, whereas public theology is more towards civil society.
Political theology in China includes responses from Chinese
government leaders, scholars, and religious leaders who deal with the
relationship between religion and politics. For two millennia, this was
organized based on a Confucian understanding of religion and politics,
often discussed in terms of Confucian political philosophy.
At various points throughout its history, Chinese Buddhism presented an
alternative to the political import of Confucianism. However, since the
mid-twentieth century, communist understandings of religion have dominated the discourse.
The influence of the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) is also evident throughout much of German political theology. This is particularly clear in the work of the Roman Catholic theologian Johann Baptist Metz (1928-2019) who explored the concept of political theology throughout his work.
He argued for the concept of a "suffering God" who shared the pain of
his creation, writing, "Yet, faced with conditions in God's creation
that cry out to heaven, how can the theology of the creator God avoid
the suspicion of apathy unless it takes up the language of a suffering
God?" This leads Metz to develop a theology that is related to Marxism.
He criticizes what he terms bourgeois Christianity and believes that
the Christian Gospel has become less credible because it has become
entangled with bourgeois religion. His work Faith in History and Society develops apologetics, or fundamental theology, from this perspective.
Two of the other major developers of political theology in Germany were Jürgen Moltmann and Dorothee Sölle.
As in Metz' work, the concept of a suffering God is important to
Moltmann's theological program. Moltmann's political theology was
influenced strongly by the Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch, and both Moltmann and Sölle were influenced heavily by liberation theology, as was Metz. Another early influence was the Frankfurt School of critical theory, especially Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt School's broader critique of modernity.
Christian political theology in the Middle East is a religious response by Christian leaders and scholars to political problems.
Political theologians try to balance the demands of a tumultuous region
with the delicate but long history of Christianity in the Middle East.
This has yielded a diversity of political theology disproportionate to
the small size of Middle East Christian minorities. The region's
importance to Christians worldwide – both for history and doctrinal
authority for many denominations – also shapes the political theologies
of the Middle East.
For many Christian leaders, the dominant approach to political theology is one of survival. Many Arab Christians
see themselves as the heirs of a rich Christian heritage whose
existence is threatened by regional unrest and religious persecution.
Their chief political goal is survival, which sets their political
theology apart.
At times, Arab Christian leaders have appealed to Christians
outside the region through both denominational challenges and broader
calls to Christian unity for humanitarian or political aid. In other
cases, Christian politicians downplay their faith in the public sphere
to avoid conflict with their Muslim neighbours.
In the mid-20th century, many Christians in the Middle East saw
secular politics as a way out of their traditional status as a minority
community in the Islamic world. Christians played prominent roles throughout the pan-Arab nationalist
movement in the mid-20th century, where their experience with Western
politics and generally high educational attainments made their
contributions valuable to nationalist governments around the region. One
prominent example was Michel Aflaq, an Eastern Orthodox Christian who formed the first Ba'ath
group from students in Damascus in the 1940s. His belief was that
Christians should embrace Islam as part of their cultural identity
because nationalism was the best way for Christians to be successful in
the Middle East.
Political theology in sub-Saharan Africa deals with the relationship of theology and politics, arising from the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa and nationalist campaigns of the mid to late twentieth century elsewhere. The increasing numbers of Christians in sub-Saharan Africa has led to an increased interest in Christian responses to the region's continuing issues of poverty, violence, and war. According to the Cameroonian theologian and sociologist Jean-Marc Éla,
African Christianity "has to be formulated from the struggles of our
people, from their joys, from their pains, from their hopes and from
their frustrations today." African theology is heavily influenced by liberation theology, global black theology, and postcolonial theology.
One of the most influential developers of recent political theology is Stanley Hauerwas, though he considers his work to be better termed a "theological politics". Hauerwas has actively critiqued the political theology of both Reinhold Niebuhr and H. Richard Niebuhr,
and has been a frequently critic of Christians' attempt to attain
political power and align themselves with secular political ideologies.
Moreover, he has been a severe critic of liberal democracy, capitalism, and militarism, arguing that all of those ideologies are antithetical to Christian convictions.
Fundamentalism is a phenomena that is often perceived
differently according to where one stands on a matter of religions. For
the orthodox it may be seen as a relatively basic framework that does
not encompass or fully signify the depth of relationships within a
religion. For the unorthodox it may be initially noted by a tendency
among certain groups and individuals that is characterized by the
application of a strict adherence to 'fundamental' scriptures, dogmas, or ideologies, along with a strong belief in the importance of distinguishing one's ingroup and outgroup. It is thought that this leads to an emphasis on some conception of "purity", and a desire to return to a previous ideal from which advocates believe members have strayed. The term is usually used in the context of religion to indicate an unwavering attachment to a set of irreducible beliefs (the "fundamentals").
The term "fundamentalism" is generally regarded by scholars of
religion as referring to a largely modern religious phenomenon which,
while itself a reinterpretation of religion as defined by the parameters
of modernism, reifies religion in reaction against modernist, secularist,
liberal and ecumenical tendencies developing in religion and society in
general that it perceives to be foreign to a particular religious
tradition. Depending upon the context, the label "fundamentalism" can be a pejorative rather than a neutral characterization, similar to the ways that calling political perspectives "right-wing" or "left-wing" can have negative connotations.
Historic and contemporary examples of Buddhist fundamentalism occur in each of the three main branches of Buddhism: Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana. In addition to the above examples of fundamentalism in Theravada-dominated societies, the reification of a protector deity, Dorje Shugden, by 19th-century Tibetan lama Pabongkhapa
could be seen as an example of fundamentalism in the Vajrayana
tradition. Dorje Shugden was a key tool in Pabongkhapa's persecution of
the flourishing Rimé movement, an ecumenical movement which fused the teachings of the Sakya, Kagyu and Nyingma, in response to the dominance of the Gelug
school. While Pabongkhapa had an initially inclusive view early in his
life, he received a number of signs that he had displeased Dorje Shugden
by receiving teachings from non-Gelug schools, and thus initiated a
revival movement that opposed the mixing of non-Gelug practices by Gelug
practitioners.
The main function of the deity was presented as "the protection of the
Ge-luk tradition through violent means, even including the killing of
its enemies." Crucially, however, these "‘enemies’ of the Gelug refers
less to the members of rival
schools than to members of the Gelug tradition ‘who mix Dzong-ka-ba’s
tradition with elements coming from other traditions, particularly the
Nying-ma
Dzok-chen’."
In Japan, a prominent example has been the practice among some members of the Mahayana Nichiren sect of shakubuku – a method of proselytizing which involves the strident condemnation of other sects as deficient or evil.
George Marsden has defined Christian fundamentalism as the demand for strict adherence to certain theological doctrines, in opposition to Modernist theology.
Its supporters originally coined the term in order to describe what
they claimed were five specific classic theological beliefs of
Christianity, and the coinage of the term led to the development of a Christian fundamentalist movement within the Protestant community of the United States in the early part of the 20th century. Fundamentalism as a movement arose in the United States, starting among conservativePresbyterian theologians at Princeton Theological Seminary in the late 19th century. It soon spread to conservatives among the Baptists
and other denominations around 1910 to 1920. The movement's purpose was
to reaffirm key theological tenets and defend them against the
challenges of liberal theology and higher criticism.
The concept of "fundamentalism" has roots in the Niagara Bible Conferences which were held annually between 1878 and 1897. During those conferences, the tenets widely considered to be fundamental Christian belief were identified.
"Fundamentalism" was prefigured by The Fundamentals: A Testimony To The Truth, a collection of twelve pamphlets published between 1910 and 1915 by brothers Milton and Lyman Stewart. It is widely considered to be the foundation of modern Christian fundamentalism.
In 1910, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church identified what became known as the five fundamentals:
In 1920, the word "fundamentalist" was first used in print by Curtis Lee Laws, editor of The Watchman Examiner, a Baptist newspaper. Laws proposed that those Christians who were fighting for the fundamentals of the faith should be called "fundamentalists".
Theological conservatives who rallied around the five
fundamentals came to be known as "fundamentalists". They rejected the
existence of commonalities with theologically related religious
traditions, such as the grouping of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism into one Abrahamic family of religions. By contrast, while Evangelical groups (such as the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association) typically agree with the "fundamentals" as they are expressed in The Fundamentals, they are often willing to participate in events with religious groups that do not hold to the "essential" doctrines.
The existence of fundamentalism in Hinduism is a complex and contradictory phenomenon. While some would argue that certain aspects of GaudiyaVaishnavism manifest fundamentalist tendencies, these tendencies are more clearly displayed in Hindutva, the predominant form of Hindu nationalism
in India today, and an increasingly powerful and influential voice
within the religion. Hinduism includes a diversity of ideas on spirituality
and traditions, but has no ecclesiastical order, no unquestionable
religious authorities, no governing body, no prophet(s) nor any binding
holy book; Hindus can choose to be polytheistic, pantheistic, panentheistic, pandeistic, henotheistic, monotheistic, monistic, agnostic, atheistic or humanist According to Doniger, "ideas about all the major issues of faith and
lifestyle – vegetarianism, nonviolence, belief in rebirth, even caste – are subjects of debate, not dogma."
Some would argue that, because of the wide range of traditions
and ideas covered by the term Hinduism, a lack of theological
'fundamentals' means that a dogmatic 'religious fundamentalism' per se
is hard to find.
Others point to the recent rise of Hindu nationalism in India as
evidence to the contrary. The religion "defies our desire to define and
categorize it." In India, the term “dharma” is preferred, which is
broader than the Western term “religion.”
Hence, certain scholars argue that Hinduism lacks dogma and thus a
specific notion of "fundamentalism," while other scholars identify
several politically active Hindu movements as part of a "Hindu
fundamentalist family."
Fundamentalism within Islam goes back to the early history of Islam in the 7th century, to the time of the Kharijites. From their essentially political position, they developed extreme doctrines that set them apart from both mainstream Shia and SunniMuslims. The Kharijites were particularly noted for adopting a radical approach to takfir, whereby they declared other Muslims to be unbelievers and therefore deemed them worthy of death.
The Shia and Sunni religious conflicts since the 7th century created an opening for radical ideologues, such as Ali Shariati (1933–77), to merge social revolution with Islamic fundamentalism, as exemplified by the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Islamic fundamentalism has appeared in many countries; the Salafi-Wahhabi version is promoted worldwide and financed by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Pakistan.
The Iran hostage crisis
of 1979–80 marked a major turning point in the use of the term
"fundamentalism". The media, in an attempt to explain the ideology of Ayatollah Khomeini
and the Iranian Revolution to a Western audience described it as a
"fundamentalist version of Islam" by way of analogy to the Christian
fundamentalist movement in the U.S. Thus was born the term Islamic fundamentalist, which became a common use of the term in following years.
In modern politics, fundamentalism has been associated with right-wing conservative
ideology, especially social conservatism. Social conservatives often
support policies in line with religious fundamentalism, such as support
for school prayer and opposition to LGBT rights and abortion. Conversely, secularism has been associated with left-wing liberal ideology, as it takes the opposite stance to said policies.
Political usage of the term "fundamentalism" has been criticized.
It has been used by political groups to berate opponents, using the
term flexibly depending on their political interests. According to
Judith Nagata, a professor of Asia Research Institute in the National University of Singapore, "The Afghan mujahiddin,
locked in combat with the Soviet enemy in the 1980s, could be praised
as 'freedom fighters' by their American backers at the time, while the
present Taliban, viewed, among other things, as protectors of American
enemy Osama bin Laden, are unequivocally 'fundamentalist'."
"Fundamentalist" has been used pejoratively to refer to
philosophies perceived as literal-minded or carrying a pretense of being
the sole source of objective truth, regardless of whether it is usually
called a religion. For instance, the Archbishop of Wales has criticized "atheistic fundamentalism" broadly and said "Any kind of fundamentalism, be it Biblical, atheistic or Islamic, is dangerous".
He also said, "the new fundamentalism of our age ... leads to the
language of expulsion and exclusivity, of extremism and polarisation,
and the claim that, because God is on our side, he is not on yours." He claimed it led to situations such as councils calling Christmas "Winterval", schools refusing to put on nativity plays and crosses being removed from chapels. Others have countered that some of these attacks on Christmas are urban legends, not all schools do nativity plays because they choose to perform other traditional plays like A Christmas Carol or "The Snow Queen" and, because of rising tensions between various religions, opening up public spaces to alternate displays rather than the Nativity scene is an attempt to keep government religion-neutral.
In France, during a protestation march against the imposition of
restrictions on the wearing of headscarves in state-run schools, a
banner labeled the ban as "secular fundamentalism". In the United States, private or cultural intolerance of women wearing the hijab (Islamic headcovering) and political activism by Muslims also has been labeled "secular fundamentalism".
The term "fundamentalism" is sometimes applied to signify a
counter-cultural fidelity to a principle or set of principles, as in the
pejorative term "market fundamentalism", used to imply exaggerated religious-like faith in the ability of unfettered laissez-faire or free-marketcapitalist economic views or policies to solve economic and social problems. According to economist John Quiggin,
the standard features of "economic fundamentalist rhetoric" are
"dogmatic" assertions and the claim that anyone who holds contrary views
is not a real economist. Retired professor in religious studies
Roderick Hindery lists positive qualities attributed to political,
economic, or other forms of cultural fundamentalism, including
"vitality, enthusiasm, willingness to back up words with actions, and
the avoidance of facile compromise" as well as negative aspects such as
psychological attitudes, occasionally elitist and pessimistic perspectives, and in some cases literalism.
In order to carry out the fundamentalist program in
practice, one would need a perfect understanding of the ancient language
of the original text, if indeed the true text can be discerned from
among variants. Furthermore, human beings are the ones who transmit this
understanding between generations. Even if one wanted to follow the
literal word of God, the need for people first to understand that word
necessitates human interpretation. Through that process human
fallibility is inextricably mixed into the very meaning of the divine
word. As a result, it is impossible to follow the indisputable word of
God; one can only achieve a human understanding of God's will.
Howard Thurman was interviewed in the late 1970s for a BBC feature on religion. He told the interviewer:
I say that creeds, dogmas, and
theologies are inventions of the mind. It is the nature of the mind to
make sense out of experience, to reduce the conglomerates of experience
to units of comprehension which we call principles, or ideologies, or
concepts. Religious experience is dynamic, fluid, effervescent, yeasty.
But the mind can't handle these so it has to imprison religious
experience in some way, get it bottled up. Then, when the experience
quiets down, the mind draws a bead on it and extracts concepts, notions,
dogmas, so that religious experience can make sense to the mind.
Meanwhile, religious experience goes on experiencing, so that by the
time I get my dogma stated so that I can think about it, the religious
experience becomes an object of thought.
Influential criticisms of fundamentalism include James Barr's books on Christian fundamentalism and Bassam Tibi's analysis of Islamic fundamentalism.
A study at the University of Edinburgh
found that of its six measured dimensions of religiosity, "lower
intelligence is most associated with higher levels of fundamentalism."
Use as a label
The Associated Press' AP Stylebook
recommends that the term fundamentalist not be used for any group that
does not apply the term to itself. Many scholars have adopted a similar
position.
Other scholars, however, use the term in the broader descriptive sense
to refer to various groups in various religious traditions including
those groups that would object to being classified as fundamentalists,
such as in the Fundamentalism Project.
Tex Sample asserts that it is a mistake to refer to a Muslim, Jewish, or Christian
fundamentalist. Rather, a fundamentalist's fundamentalism is their
primary concern, over and above other denominational or faith
considerations.
An ethnic conflict is a conflict between two or more ethnic groups. While the source of the conflict may be political,
social, economic or religious, the individuals in conflict must
expressly fight for their ethnic group's position within society. This
criterion differentiates ethnic conflict from other forms of struggle.
Academic explanations of ethnic conflict generally fall into one of three schools of thought: primordialist, instrumentalist or constructivist.
Recently, some have argued for either top-down or bottom-up
explanations for ethnic conflict. Intellectual debate has also focused
on whether ethnic conflict has become more prevalent since the end of
the Cold War, and on devising ways of managing conflicts, through instruments such as consociationalism and federalisation.
Theories of causes
It
is argued that rebel movements are more likely to organize around
ethnicity because ethnic groups are more apt to be aggrieved, better
able to mobilize, and more likely to face difficult bargaining
challenges compared to other groups. The causes of ethnic conflict are debated by political scientists and sociologists.
Official academic explanations generally fall into one of three schools
of thought: primordialist, instrumentalist, and constructivist. More
recent scholarship draws on all three schools.
Primordialist accounts
Proponents
of primordialist accounts argue that "[e]thnic groups and nationalities
exist because there are traditions of belief and action towards
primordial objects such as biological features and especially
territorial location". Primordialist accounts rely on strong ties of kinship among members of ethnic groups. Donald L. Horowitz argues that this kinship "makes it possible for ethnic groups to think in terms of family resemblances".
Clifford Geertz,
a founding scholar of primordialism, asserts that each person has a
natural connection to perceived kinsmen. In time and through repeated
conflict, essential ties to one's ethnicity will coalesce and will
interfere with ties to civil society. Ethnic groups will consequently
always threaten the survival of civil governments but not the existence
of nations formed by one ethnic group. Thus, when considered through a primordial lens, ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic society is inevitable.
A number of political scientists argue that the root causes of ethnic conflict do not involve ethnicity per se
but rather institutional, political, and economic factors. These
scholars argue that the concept of ethnic war is misleading because it
leads to an essentialist
conclusion that certain groups are doomed to fight each other when in
fact the wars between them that occur are often the result of political
decisions.
Moreover, primordial accounts do not account for the spatial and
temporal variations in ethnic violence. If these "ancient hatreds" are
always simmering under the surface and are at the forefront of people's
consciousness, then ethnic groups should constantly be ensnared in
violence. However, ethnic violence occurs in sporadic outbursts. For
example, Varshney points out that although Yugoslavia broke up due to
ethnic violence in the 1990s, it had enjoyed a long peace of decades
before the USSR collapsed. Therefore, some scholars claim that it is
unlikely that primordial ethnic differences alone caused the outbreak of
violence in the 1990s.
Primordialists have reformulated the "ancient hatreds" hypothesis
and have focused more on the role of human nature. Petersen argues that
the existence of hatred and animosity does not have to be rooted in
history for it to play a role in shaping human behavior and action: "If
'ancient hatred' means a hatred consuming the daily thoughts of great
masses of people, then the 'ancient hatreds' argument deserves to be
readily dismissed. However, if hatred is conceived as a historically
formed 'schema' that guides action in some situations, then the
conception should be taken more seriously."
Instrumentalist accounts
Anthony Smith
notes that the instrumentalist account "came to prominence in the 1960s
and 1970s in the United States, in the debate about (white) ethnic
persistence in what was supposed to have been an effective melting pot".This new theory sought explained persistence as the result of the
actions of community leaders, "who used their cultural groups as sites
of mass mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for
power and resources, because they found them more effective than social
classes". In this account of ethnic identification, ethnicity and race are viewed as instrumental means to achieve particular ends.
Whether ethnicity
is a fixed perception or not is not crucial in the instrumentalist
accounts. Moreover, the scholars of this school generally do not oppose
the view that ethnic difference plays a part in many conflicts. They
simply claim that ethnic difference is not sufficient to explain
conflicts.
Mass mobilization of ethnic groups can only be successful if
there are latent ethnic differences to be exploited, otherwise
politicians would not even attempt to make political appeals based on
ethnicity and would focus instead on economic or ideological appeals.
For these reasons, it is difficult to completely discount the role of
inherent ethnic differences. Additionally, ethnic entrepreneurs, or
elites, could be tempted to mobilize ethnic groups in order to gain
their political support in democratizing states.
Instrumentalists theorists especially emphasize this interpretation in
ethnic states in which one ethnic group is promoted at the expense of
other ethnicities.
Furthermore, ethnic mass mobilization is likely to be plagued by
collective action problems, especially if ethnic protests are likely to
lead to violence. Instrumentalist scholars have tried to respond to
these shortcomings. For example, Russell Hardin argues that ethnic
mobilization faces problems of coordination and not collective action.
He points out that a charismatic leader acts as a focal point around
which members of an ethnic group coalesce. The existence of such an
actor helps to clarify beliefs about the behavior of others within an
ethnic group.
Constructivist accounts
A third, constructivist, set of accounts stress the importance of the socially constructed nature of ethnic groups, drawing on Benedict Anderson's concept of the imagined community. Proponents of this account point to Rwanda as an example because the Tutsi/Hutu distinction was codified by the Belgian colonial power
in the 1930s on the basis of cattle ownership, physical measurements
and church records. Identity cards were issued on this basis, and these
documents played a key role in the genocide of 1994.
Some argue that constructivist narratives of historical master
cleavages are unable to account for local and regional variations in
ethnic violence. For example, Varshney highlights that in the 1960s
"racial violence in the USA was heavily concentrated in northern cities;
southern cities though intensely politically engaged, did not have
riots".
A constructivist master narrative is often a country level variable
whereas studies of incidences of ethnic violence are often done at the
regional and local level.
Scholars of ethnic conflict and civil wars have introduced theories that draw insights from all three traditional schools of thought. In The Geography of Ethnic Violence,
Monica Duffy Toft shows how ethnic group settlement patterns, socially
constructed identities, charismatic leaders, issue indivisibility, and
state concern with precedent setting can lead rational actors to
escalate a dispute to violence, even when doing so is likely to leave
contending groups much worse off. Such research addresses empirical puzzles that are difficult to explain
using primordialist, instrumentalist, or constructivist approaches
alone. As Varshney notes, "pure essentialists and pure instrumentalists
do not exist anymore".
The end of the Cold War thus sparked interest in two important
questions about ethnic conflict: whether ethnic conflict was on the rise
and whether given that some ethnic conflicts had escalated into serious
violence, what, if anything, could scholars of large-scale violence
(security studies, strategic studies, interstate politics) offer by way
of explanation.
One of the most debated issues relating to ethnic conflict is
whether it has become more or less prevalent in the post–Cold War
period. Even
though a decline in the rate of new ethnic conflicts was evident in the
late 1990s, ethnic conflict remains the most common form of
armed intrastate conflict today. At the end of the Cold War, academics including Samuel P. Huntington and Robert D. Kaplan predicted a proliferation of conflicts fueled by civilisational clashes, Tribalism, resourcescarcity and overpopulation.
However, some theorists contend that this does not represent a rise in the incidence of ethnic conflict, because many of the proxy wars fought during the Cold War as ethnic conflicts were actually hot spots of the Cold War. Research shows that the fall of Communism and the increase in the number of capitalist states were accompanied by a decline in total warfare, interstate wars, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, and the number of refugees and displaced persons. Indeed, some scholars have questioned whether the concept of ethnic conflict is useful at all.
Others have attempted to test the "clash of civilisations" thesis,
finding it to be difficult to operationalise and that civilisational
conflicts have not risen in intensity in relation to other ethnic
conflicts since the end of the Cold War.
A key question facing scholars who attempt to adapt their
theories of interstate violence to explain or predict large-scale ethnic
violence is whether ethnic groups could be considered "rational"
actors.
Prior to the end of the Cold War, the consensus among students of
large-scale violence was that ethnic groups should be considered
irrational actors, or semi-rational at best. If true, general
explanations of ethnic violence would be impossible. In the years since,
however, scholarly consensus has shifted to consider that ethnic groups
may in fact be counted as rational actors, and the puzzle of their
apparently irrational actions (for example, fighting over territory of
little or no intrinsic worth) must therefore be explained in some other
way.
As a result, the possibility of a general explanation of ethnic
violence has grown, and collaboration between comparativist and
international-relations sub-fields has resulted in increasingly useful
theories of ethnic conflict.
Public goods provision
A
major source of ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic democracies is over the
access to state patronage. Conflicts over state resources between
ethnic groups can increase the likelihood of ethnic violence. In
ethnically divided societies, demand for public goods decreases as each
ethnic group derives more utility from benefits targeted at their ethnic
group in particular.
These benefits would be less valued if all other ethnic groups had
access to them. Targeted benefits are more appealing because ethnic
groups can solidify or heighten their social and economic status
relative to other ethnic groups whereas broad programmatic policies will
not improve their relative worth. Politicians and political parties in
turn, have an incentive to favor co-ethnics in their distribution of
material benefits. Over the long run, ethnic conflict over access to
state benefits is likely to lead to the ethnification of political
parties and the party system as a whole where the political salience of
ethnic identity increase leading to a self-fulfilling equilibrium: If
politicians only distribute benefits on an ethnic basis, voters will see
themselves primarily belonging to an ethnic group and view politicians
the same way. They will only vote for the politician belonging to the
same ethnic group. In turn, politicians will refrain from providing
public goods because it will not serve them well electorally to provide
services to people not belonging to their ethnic group. In democratizing
societies, this could lead to ethnic outbidding and lead to extreme
politicians pushing out moderate co-ethnics. Patronage politics and ethnic politics eventually reinforce each other, leading to what Chandra terms a "patronage democracy".
The existence of patronage networks between local politicians and
ethnic groups make it easier for politicians to mobilize ethnic groups
and instigate ethnic violence for electoral gain since the neighborhood
or city is already polarized along ethnic lines. The dependence of
ethnic groups on their co-ethnic local politician for access to state
resources is likely to make them more responsive to calls of violence
against other ethnic groups.
Therefore, the existence of these local patronage channels generates
incentives for ethnic groups to engage in politically motivated
violence.
While the link between ethnic heterogeneity and under provision
of public goods is generally accepted, there is little consensus around
the causal mechanism underlying this relationship. To identify possible
causal stories, Humphreys and Habyarimana ran a series of behavioral
games in Kampala, Uganda, that involved several local participants
completing joint tasks and allocating money amongst them.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, they find that participants did
not favor the welfare of their co-ethnics disproportionately. It was
only when anonymity was removed and everyone's ethnicity was known did
co-ethnics decide to favor each other. Humphreys and Habyarimana argue
that cooperation among co-ethnics is primarily driven by reciprocity
norms that tend to be stronger among co-ethnics.
The possibility of social sanctions compelled those who would not
otherwise cooperate with their co-ethnics to do so. The authors find no
evidence to suggest that co-ethnics display a greater degree of altruism
towards each other or have the same preferences. Ethnic cooperation
takes place because co-ethnics have common social networks and therefore
can monitor each other and can threaten to socially sanction any
transgressors.
Ethnic conflict amplification
Online social media
In the early twenty-first century, the online social networking serviceFacebook has played a role in amplifying ethnic violence in the Rohingya genocide that started in October 2016 and in ethnic violence in Ethiopia during 2019–2020.
The United Nations Human Rights Council
described Facebook as having been "a useful instrument for those
seeking to spread hate" and complained that Facebook was unable to
provide data on the extent of its role in the genocide.
During 2019–2020, posts on Facebook dominated the Internet in Ethiopia and played a major role in encouraging ethnic violence. An October 2019 Facebook post led to the deaths of 70 people in Ethiopia. In mid-2020, ethnic tensions in Ethiopia were amplified by online hate speech on Facebook that followed the 29 June assassination of Hachalu Hundessa. The Hachalu Hundessa riots,
in which mobs "lynched, beheaded, and dismembered their victims", took
place with "almost-instant and widespread sharing of hate speech and
incitement to violence on Facebook, which whipped up people's anger",
according to David Gilbert writing in Vice.
People "call[ed] for genocide and attacks against specific religious or
ethnic groups" and "openly post[ed] photographs of burned-out cars,
buildings, schools and houses", according to Network Against Hate Speech, an Ethiopian citizens' group. Berhan Taye of Access Now
stated that in Ethiopia, offline violence quickly leads to online
"calls for ethnic attacks, discrimination, and destruction of property
[that] goes viral". He stated, "Facebook's inaction helps propagate hate
and polarization in a country and has a devastating impact on the
narrative and extent of the violence."
Ethnic conflict resolution
Institutional ethnic conflict resolution
A number of scholars have attempted to synthesize the methods available for the resolution, management or transformation of their ethnic conflict. John Coakley, for example, has developed a typology of the methods of conflict resolution that have been employed by states, which he lists as: indigenization, accommodation, assimilation, acculturation, population transfer, boundary alteration, genocide and ethnic suicide. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary
have developed a taxonomy of eight macro-political ethnic conflict
regulation methods, which they note are often employed by states in
combination with each other. They include a number of methods that they note are clearly morally unacceptable.
With increasing interest in the field of ethnic conflict, many
policy analysts and political scientists theorized potential resolutions
and tracked the results of institutional policy implementation. As
such, theories often focus on which Institutions are the most appropriate for addressing ethnic conflict.
Consociationalism
Consociationalism is a power sharing
agreement which coopts the leaders of ethnic groups into the central
state's government. Each nation or ethnic group is represented in the
government through a supposed spokesman for the group. In the power
sharing agreement, each group has veto powers to varying degrees,
dependent on the particular state. Moreover, the norm of proportional
representation is dominant: each group is represented in the government
in a percentage that reflects the ethnicity's demographic presence in
the state. Another requirement for Arend Lijphart
is that the government must be composed of a "grand coalition" of the
ethnic group leaders which supposes a top-down approach to conflict
resolution.
In theory, this leads to self governance and protection for the ethnic group. Many scholars
maintain that since ethnic tension erupts into ethnic violence when the
ethnic group is threatened by a state, then veto powers should allow
the ethnic group to avoid legislative threats. Switzerland is often
characterized as a successful consociationalist state.
A recent example of a consociational government is the post-conflict Bosnian government that was agreed upon in the Dayton Accords
in 1995. A tripartite presidency was chosen and must have a Croat, a
Serb, and a Bosniak. The presidents take turns acting as the forefront
executive in terms of 8 months for 4 years.
Many have credited this compromise of a consociational government in
Bosnia for the end of the violence and the following long-lasting peace.
In contrast to Lijphart, several political scientists and policy analysts have condemned consociationalism.
One of the many critiques is that consociationalism locks in ethnic
tensions and identities. This assumes a primordial stance that ethnic
identities are permanent and not subject to change. Furthermore, this does not allow for any "others" that might want to partake in the political process.
As of 2012 a Jewish Bosnian is suing the Bosnian government from
precluding him from running for presidential office since only a Croat,
Serb, or Bosniak can run under the consociational government.
Determining ethnic identities in advance and implementing a power
sharing system on the basis of these fixed identities is inherently
discriminatory against minority groups that might be not be recognized.
Moreover, it discriminates against those who do not choose to define
their identity on an ethnic or communal basis. In power sharing-systems
that are based on pre-determined identities, there is a tendency to
rigidly fix shares of representation on a permanent basis which will not
reflect changing demographics over time.
The categorization of individuals in particular ethnic groups might be
controversial anyway and might in fact fuel ethnic tensions.
The inherent weaknesses in using pre-determined ethnic identities
to form power sharing systems has led Ljiphart to argue that adopting a
constructivist approach to consociationalism can increase its
likelihood of success. The self-determination of ethnic identities is more likely to be "non-discriminatory, neutral, flexible and self-adjusting".
For example, in South Africa, the toxic legacy of apartheid meant that
successful consociation could only be built on the basis of the
self-determination of groups. Ljiphart claims that because ethnic
identities are often "unclear, fluid and flexible,"
self-determination is likely to be more successful than
pre-determination of ethnic groups. A constructivist approach to
consociational theory can therefore strengthen its value as a method to
resolve ethnic conflict.
Another critique points to the privileging of ethnic identity over personal political choice. Howard has deemed consociationalism as a form of ethnocracy and not a path to true pluralistic democracy.
Consociationalism assumes that a politician will best represent the
will of his co-ethnics above other political parties. This might lead to
the polarization of ethnic groups and the loss of non-ethnic
ideological parties.
Horowitz has argued that a single transferable vote system could
prevent the ethnification of political parties because voters cast their
ballots in order of preference. This means that a voter could cast some of his votes to parties other than his co-ethnic party.
This in turn would compel political parties to broaden their manifestos
to appeal to voters across the ethnic divide to hoover up second and
third preference votes.
Federalism
The
theory of implementing federalism in order to curtail ethnic conflict
assumes that self-governance reduces "demands for sovereignty".
Hechter argues that some goods such as language of education and
bureaucracy must be provided as local goods, instead of statewide, in
order to satisfy more people and ethnic groups. Some political scientists such as Stroschein contend that ethnofederalism,
or federalism determined along ethnic lines, is "asymmetric" as opposed
to the equal devolution of power found in non-ethnic federal states,
such as the United States. In this sense, special privileges are granted
to specific minority groups as concessions and incentives to end
violence or mute conflict.
The Soviet Union divided its structure into ethnic federal states termed Union Republics.
Each Union Republic was named after a titular ethnic group who
inhabited the area as a way to Sovietize nationalist sentiments during
the 1920s.
Brubaker asserts that these titular republics were formed in order to
absorb any potential elite led nationalist movements against the Soviet
center by incentivizing elite loyalty through advancement in the Soviet
political structure.
Thus, federalism provides some self-governance for local matters
in order to satisfy some of the grievances which might cause ethnic
conflict among the masses. Moreover, federalism brings in the elites and
ethnic entrepreneurs into the central power structure; this prevents a
resurgence of top-down ethnic conflict.
Nevertheless, after the fall of the USSR
many critiques of federalism as an institution to resolve ethnic
conflict emerged. The devolution of power away from the central state
can weaken ties to the central state.
Moreover, the parallel institutions created to serve a particular
nation or ethnic group might provide significant resources for secession from the central state. As most states are unwilling to give up an integral portion of their territory, secessionist movements may trigger violence.
Furthermore, some competing elite political players may not be in
power; they would remain unincorporated into the central system. These
competing elites can gain access through federal structures and their
resources to solidify their political power in the structure. According to V.P. Gagnon this was the case in the former Yugoslavia and its disintegration
into its ethnic federal states. Ethnic entrepreneurs were able to take
control of the institutionally allocated resources to wage war on other
ethnic groups.
Non-territorial autonomy
A recent theory of ethnic tension resolution is non-territorial autonomy
or NTA. NTA has emerged in recent years as an alternative solution to
ethnic tensions and grievances in places that are likely to breed
conflict. For this reason, NTA has been promoted as a more practical and state building solution than consociationalism. NTA, alternatively known as non-cultural autonomy (NCA), is based on the difference of jus solis and jus sanguinis, the principles of territory versus that of personhood.
It gives rights to ethnic groups to self-rule and govern matters
potentially concerning but limited to: education, language, culture,
internal affairs, religion, and the internally established institutions
needed to promote and reproduce these facets. In contrast to federalism, the ethnic groups are not assigned a titular
sub-state, but rather the ethnic groups are dispersed throughout the
state unit. Their group rights and autonomy are not constrained to a
particular territory within the state. This is done in order not to
weaken the center state such as in the case of ethnofederalism.
The origin of NTA can be traced back to the Marxists works of Otto Bauer and Karl Renner.NTA was employed during the interwar period, and the League of Nations
sought to add protection clauses for national minorities in new states. In the 1920s, Estonia
granted some cultural autonomy to the German and Jewish populations in
order to ease conflicts between the groups and the newly independent
state.
In Europe, most notably in Belgium, NTA laws have been enacted and created parallel institutions and political parties in the same country. In Belgium, NTA has been integrated within the federal consociational system.
Some scholars of ethnic conflict resolution claim that the practice of
NTA will be employed dependent on the concentration and size of the
ethnic group asking for group rights.
Other scholars, such as Clarke, argue that the successful
implementation of NTA rests on the acknowledgement in a state of
"universal" principles: true rule of law, established human rights,
stated guarantees to minorities and their members to use their own
quotidien language, religion, and food practices, and a framework of
anti-discrimination legislation in order to enforce these rights.
Moreover, no individual can be forced to adhere, identify, or emphasize
a particular identity (such as race, gender, sexuality, etc.) without
their consent in order for NTA to function for its purpose.
Nonetheless, Clarke critiques the weaknesses of NTA in areas such
as education, a balance between society wide norms and intracommunity
values; policing, for criminal matters and public safety; and political
representation, which limits the political choices of an individual if
based solely on ethnicity. Furthermore, the challenge in evaluating the efficacy of NTA lies in the relatively few legal implementations of NTA.
Cultural rights
Emphasizing
the limits of approaches that focus mainly on institutional answers to
ethnic conflicts—which are essentially driven by ethnocultural dynamics
of which political and/or economic factors are but elements—Gregory Paul
Meyjes urges the use of intercultural communication and cultural-rights
based negotiations as tools with which to effectively and sustainably
address inter-ethnic strife. Meyjes argues that to fully grasp, preempt,
and/or resolve such conflicts—whether with or without the aid of
territorial or non-territorial institutional mechanism(s) -- a cultural rights approach grounded in intercultural knowledge and skill is essential.
Institutionalist
arguments for resolving ethnic conflict often focus on national-level
institutions and do not account for regional and local variation in
ethnic violence within a country. Despite similar levels of ethnic
diversity in a country, some towns and cities have often found to be
especially prone to ethnic violence. For example, Ashutosh Varshney, in
his study of ethnic violence in India,
argues that strong inter-ethnic engagement in villages often
disincentivizes politicians from stoking ethnic violence for electoral
gain.
Informal interactions include joint participation in festivals,
families from different communities eating together or allowing their
children to play with one another.
Every day engagement between ethnic groups at the village level can
help to sustain the peace in the face of national level shocks like an
ethnic riot in another part of the country.
In times of ethnic tension, these communities can quell rumors, police
neighborhoods and come together to resist any attempts by politicians to
polarize the community.
The stronger the inter-ethnic networks are, the harder it is for
politicians to polarize the community even if it may be in their
political interest to do so.
Formal inter-ethnic associations
In
cities where the population tends to be much higher, informal
interactions between ethnic groups might not be sufficient to prevent
violence. This is because many more links are needed to connect
everyone, and therefore it is much more difficult to form and strengthen
inter-ethnic ties.
In cities, formal inter-ethnic associations like trade unions, business
associations and professional organizations are more effective in
encouraging inter-ethnic interactions that could prevent ethnic violence
in the future.
These organizations force ethnic groups to come together based on
shared economic interests that overcomes any pre-existing ethnic
differences. For example, inter-ethnic business organizations serve to
connect the business interests of different ethnic groups which would
increase their desire to maintain ethnic harmony. Any ethnic tension or
outbreak of violence will go against their economic interests and
therefore, over time, the salience of ethnic identity diminishes.
Interactions between ethnic groups in formal settings can also
help countries torn apart by ethnic violence to recover and break down
ethnic divisions. Paula Pickering, a political scientist, who studies
peace-building efforts in Bosnia, finds that formal workplaces are often
the site where inter-ethnic ties are formed.
She claims that mixed workplaces lead to repeated inter-ethnic
interaction where norms of professionalism compel everyone to cooperate
and to treat each other with respect, making it easier for individuals
belonging to the minority group to reach out and form relationships with
everyone else.
Nevertheless, Giuliano's research in Russia has shown that economic
grievances, even in a mixed workplace, can be politicized on ethnic
lines.
