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Monday, May 6, 2024

Narcissism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Narcissism
Narcissus (1597–99) by Caravaggio; the man in love with his own reflection

Narcissism is a self–centered personality style characterized as having an excessive preoccupation with oneself and one's own needs, often at the expense of others.

Narcissism exists on a continuum that ranges from normal to abnormal personality expression. While many psychologists believe that a moderate degree of narcissism is normal and healthy in humans, there are also more extreme forms, observable particularly in people who are excessively self-absorbed, or who have a mental illness like narcissistic personality disorder (NPD), where the narcissistic tendency has become pathological, leading to functional impairment and psychosocial disability.

Historical background

The term narcissism is derived from Narcissus, a character in Greek mythology best known from the telling in Roman poet Ovid's Metamorphoses, written in 8 CE. Book III of the poem tells the mythical story of a handsome young man, Narcissus, who spurns the advances of many potential lovers. When Narcissus rejects the nymph Echo, who was cursed to only echo the sounds that others made, the gods punish Narcissus by making him fall in love with his own reflection in a pool of water. When Narcissus discovers that the object of his love cannot love him back, he slowly pines away and dies.

The concept of excessive selfishness has been recognized throughout history. In ancient Greece, the concept was understood as hubris. Some religious movements such as the Hussites attempted to rectify what they viewed as the shattering and narcissistic cultures of recent centuries.

It was not until the late 1800s that narcissism began to be defined in psychological terms. Since that time, the term has had a significant divergence in meaning in psychology. It has been used to describe:

  • A sexual perversion,
  • A normal developmental stage,
  • A symptom in psychosis, and
  • A characteristic in several of the object relations [subtypes].

In 1889, psychiatrists Paul Näcke and Havelock Ellis used the term "narcissism", independently of each other, to describe a person who treats their own body in the same way in which the body of a sexual partner is ordinarily treated. Narcissism, in this context, was seen as a perversion that consumed a person's entire sexual life. In 1911 Otto Rank published the first clinical paper about narcissism, linking it to vanity and self-admiration.

In an essay in 1913 called "The God-complex", Ernest Jones considered extreme narcissism as a character trait. He described people with the God-complex as being aloof, self-important, overconfident, auto-erotic, inaccessible, self-admiring, and exhibitionistic, with fantasies of omnipotence and omniscience. He observed that these people had a high need for uniqueness.

Sigmund Freud (1914) published his theory of narcissism in a lengthy essay titled "On Narcissism: An Introduction". For Freud, narcissism refers to the individual's direction of libidinal energy toward themselves rather than objects and others. He postulated a universal "primary narcissism", that was a phase of sexual development in early infancy – a necessary intermediate stage between auto-eroticism and object-love, love for others. Portions of this 'self-love' or ego-libido are, at later stages of development, expressed outwardly, or "given off" toward others. Freud's postulation of a "secondary narcissism" came as a result of his observation of the peculiar nature of the schizophrenic's relation to themselves and the world. He observed that the two fundamental qualities of such patients were megalomania and withdrawal of interest from the real world of people and things: "the libido that has been withdrawn from the external world has been directed to the ego and thus gives rise to an attitude which may be called narcissism." It is a secondary narcissism because it is not a new creation but a magnification of an already existing condition (primary narcissism).

In 1925, Robert Waelder conceptualized narcissism as a personality trait. His definition described individuals who are condescending, feel superior to others, are preoccupied with admiration, and exhibit a lack of empathy. Waelder's work and his case study have been influential in the way narcissism and the clinical disorder narcissistic personality disorder are defined today. His patient was a successful scientist with an attitude of superiority, an obsession with fostering self-respect, and a lack of normal feelings of guilt. The patient was aloof and independent from others, had an inability to empathize with others, and was selfish sexually. Waelder's patient was also overly logical and analytical and valued abstract intellectual thought over the practical application of scientific knowledge.

Karen Horney (1939) postulated that narcissism was on a spectrum that ranged from healthy self-esteem to a pathological state.

The term entered the broader social consciousness following the publication of The Culture of Narcissism by Christopher Lasch in 1979. Since then, social media, bloggers, and self-help authors have indiscriminately applied "narcissism" as a label for the self-serving and for all domestic abusers.

Characteristics

Normal and healthy levels of narcissism

Some psychologists suggest that a moderate level of narcissism is supportive of good psychological health. Self-esteem works as a mediator between narcissism and psychological health. Therefore, because of their elevated self-esteem, deriving from self-perceptions of competence and likability, high narcissists are relatively free of worry and gloom.

Destructive levels of narcissism

While narcissism, in and of itself, can be considered a normal personality trait, high levels of narcissistic behavior can be harmful to both self and others. Destructive narcissism is the constant exhibition of a few of the intense characteristics usually associated with pathological narcissistic personality disorder such as a "pervasive pattern of grandiosity", which is characterized by feelings of entitlement and superiority, arrogant or haughty behaviors, and a generalized lack of empathy and concern for others. On a spectrum, destructive narcissism is more extreme than healthy narcissism but not as extreme as the pathological condition.

Pathological levels of narcissism

Extremely high levels of narcissistic behavior are considered pathological. The pathological condition of narcissism is a magnified, extreme manifestation of healthy narcissism. It manifests itself in the inability to love others, lack of empathy, emptiness, boredom, and an unremitting need to search for power, while making the person unavailable to others. The clinical theorists Kernberg, Kohut, and Theodore Millon all saw pathological narcissism as a possible outcome in response to unempathetic and inconsistent early childhood interactions. They suggested that narcissists try to compensate in adult relationships. German psychoanalyst Karen Horney (1885–1952) also saw the narcissistic personality as a temperament trait molded by a certain kind of early environment.

Heritability

Heritability studies using twins have shown that narcissistic traits, as measured by standardized tests, are often inherited. Narcissism was found to have a high heritability score (0.64) indicating that the concordance of this trait in the identical twins was significantly influenced by genetics as compared to an environmental causation. It has also been shown that there is a continuum or spectrum of narcissistic traits ranging from normal to a pathological personality. Furthermore, evidence suggests that individual elements of narcissism have their own heritability score. For example, intrapersonal grandiosity has a score of 0.23, and interpersonal entitlement has a score of 0.35. While the genetic impact on narcissism levels is significant, it is not the only factor at play.

Expressions of narcissism

Primary expressions

Two primary expressions of narcissism have been identified: grandiose ("thick-skinned") and vulnerable ("thin-skinned"). Recent accounts posit that the core of narcissism is self-centred antagonism (or "entitled self-importance"), namely selfishness, entitlement, lack of empathy, and devaluation of others. Grandiosity and vulnerability are seen as different expressions of this antagonistic core, arising from individual differences in the strength of the approach and avoidance motivational systems.

Grandiose

Narcissistic grandiosity is thought to arise from a combination of the antagonistic core with temperamental boldness—defined by positive emotionality, social dominance, reward-seeking and risk-taking. Grandiosity is defined—in addition to antagonism—by a confident, exhibitionistic and manipulative self-regulatory style:

  1. High self-esteem and a clear sense of uniqueness and superiority, with fantasies of success and power, and lofty ambitions
  2. Social potency, marked by exhibitionistic, authoritative, charismatic and self-promoting interpersonal behaviours
  3. Exploitative, self-serving relational dynamics; short-term relationship transactions defined by manipulation and privileging of personal gain over other benefits of socialisation

Vulnerable

Narcissistic vulnerability is thought to arise from a combination of the antagonistic core with temperamental reactivity—defined by negative emotionality, social avoidance, passivity and marked proneness to rage. Vulnerability is defined—in addition to antagonism—by a shy, vindictive and needy self-regulatory style:

  1. Low and contingent self-esteem, unstable and unclear sense of self, and resentment of others' success
  2. Social withdrawal, resulting from shame, distrust of others' intentions, and concerns over being accepted
  3. Needy, obsessive relational dynamics; long-term relationship transactions defined by an excessive need for admiration, approval and support, and vengefulness when needs are unmet

Other expressions

Sexual

Sexual narcissism has been described as an egocentric pattern of sexual behavior that involves an inflated sense of sexual ability or sexual entitlement, sometimes in the form of extramarital affairs. This can be overcompensation for low self-esteem or an inability to sustain true intimacy.

While this behavioral pattern is believed to be more common in men than in women, it occurs in both males and females who compensate for feelings of sexual inadequacy by becoming overly proud or obsessed with their masculinity or femininity.

The controversial condition referred to as "sexual addiction" is believed by some experts to be sexual narcissism or sexual compulsivity, rather than an addictive behavior.

Parental

Narcissistic parents often see their children as extensions of themselves and encourage the children to act in ways that support the parents' emotional and self-esteem needs. Due to their vulnerability, children may be significantly affected by this behavior. To meet the parents' needs, the child may sacrifice their own wants and feelings. A child subjected to this type of parenting may struggle in adulthood with their intimate relationships.

In extreme situations, this parenting style can result in estranged relationships with the children, coupled with feelings of resentment, and in some cases, self-destructive tendencies.

Origins of narcissism in children can often come from the social learning theory. The social learning theory proposes that social behavior is learned by observing and imitating others' behavior. This suggests that children are anticipated to grow up to be narcissistic when their parents overvalue them.

Workplace

There is a compulsion of some professionals to constantly assert their competence, even when they are wrong. Professional narcissism can lead otherwise capable, and even exceptional, professionals to fall into narcissistic traps. "Most professionals work on cultivating a self that exudes authority, control, knowledge, competence and respectability. It's the narcissist in us all—we dread appearing stupid or incompetent."

Executives are often provided with potential narcissistic triggers. Inanimate triggers include status symbols like company cars, company-issued smartphone, or prestigious offices with window views; animate triggers include flattery and attention from colleagues and subordinates.

Narcissism has been linked to a range of potential leadership problems ranging from poor motivational skills to risky decision making, and in extreme cases, white-collar crime. High-profile corporate leaders that place an extreme emphasis on profits may yield positive short-term benefits for their organizations, but ultimately it drags down individual employees as well as entire companies.

Subordinates may find everyday offers of support swiftly turn them into enabling sources, unless they are very careful to maintain proper boundaries.

Studies examining the role of personality in the rise to leadership have shown that individuals who rise to leadership positions can be described as inter-personally dominant, extraverted, and socially skilled. When examining the correlation of narcissism in the rise to leadership positions, narcissists who are often inter-personally dominant, extraverted, and socially skilled, were also likely to rise to leadership but were more likely to emerge as leaders in situations where they were not known, such as in outside hires (versus internal promotions). Paradoxically, narcissism can present as characteristics that facilitate an individual's rise to leadership, and ultimately lead that person to underachieve or even to fail.

Narcissism can also create problems in the general workforce. For example, individuals high in narcissism inventories are more likely to engage in counterproductive behavior that harms organizations or other people in the workplace. Aggressive (and counterproductive) behaviors tend to surface when self-esteem is threatened. Individuals high in narcissism have fragile self-esteem and are easily threatened. One study found that employees who are high in narcissism are more likely to perceive the behaviors of others in the workplace as abusive and threatening than individuals who are low in narcissism.

Celebrity

Celebrity narcissism (sometimes referred to as acquired situational narcissism) is a form of narcissism that develops in late adolescence or adulthood, brought on by wealth, fame and the other trappings of celebrity. Celebrity narcissism develops after childhood, and is triggered and supported by the celebrity-obsessed society. Fans, assistants and tabloid media all play into the idea that the person really is vastly more important than other people, triggering a narcissistic problem that might have been only a tendency, or latent, and helping it to become a full-blown personality disorder. "Robert Millman says that what happens to celebrities is that they get so used to people looking at them that they stop looking back at other people." In its most extreme presentation and symptoms, it is indistinguishable from narcissistic personality disorder, differing only in its late onset and its environmental support by large numbers of fans. "The lack of social norms, controls, and of people centering them makes these people believe they're invulnerable," so that the person may suffer from unstable relationships, substance abuse or erratic behaviors.

Collective narcissism

Collective narcissism is a type of narcissism where an individual has an inflated self-love of their own group. While the classic definition of narcissism focuses on the individual, collective narcissism asserts that one can have a similar excessively high opinion of a group, and that a group can function as a narcissistic entity. Collective narcissism is related to ethnocentrism; however, ethnocentrism primarily focuses on self-centeredness at an ethnic or cultural level, while collective narcissism is extended to any type of ingroup beyond just cultures and ethnicities.

Normalization of narcissistic behaviors

Some commentators contend that the American populace has become increasingly narcissistic since the end of World War II. According to sociologist Charles Derber, people pursue and compete for attention on an unprecedented scale. The profusion of popular literature about "listening" and "managing those who talk constantly about themselves" suggests its pervasiveness in everyday life. The growth of media phenomena such as "reality TV" programs and social media are generating a "new era of public narcissism".

Also supporting the contention that American culture has become more narcissistic is an analysis of US popular song lyrics between 1987 and 2007. This found a growth in the use of first-person singular pronouns, reflecting a greater focus on the self, and also of references to antisocial behavior; during the same period, there was a diminution of words reflecting a focus on others, positive emotions, and social interactions. References to narcissism and self-esteem in American popular print media have experienced vast inflation since the late 1980s. Between 1987 and 2007 direct mentions of self-esteem in leading US newspapers and magazines increased by 4,540 per cent while narcissism, which had been almost non-existent in the press during the 1970s, was referred to over 5,000 times between 2002 and 2007.

Individualistic vs collectivist national cultures

Similar patterns of change in cultural production are observable in other Western states. For example, a linguistic analysis of the largest circulation Norwegian newspaper found that the use of self-focused and individualistic terms increased in frequency by 69 per cent between 1984 and 2005 while collectivist terms declined by 32 per cent.

One study looked at differences in advertising between an individualistic culture, United States, and a collectivist culture, South Korea and found that in the US there was a greater tendency to stress the distinctiveness and uniqueness of the person; whereas advertising in South Korean stressed the importance of social conformity and harmony. These cultural differences were greater than the effects of individual differences within national cultures.

Controversies

There has been an increased interest in narcissism and narcissistic personality disorder (NPD) in the last 10 years. There are areas of substantial debate that surround the subject including:

  • Clearly defining the difference between normal and pathological narcissism,
  • Understanding the role of self-esteem in narcissism,
  • Reaching a consensus on the classifications and definitions of sub-types such as "grandiose" and "vulnerable dimensions" or variants of these,
  • Understanding what are the central versus peripheral, primary versus secondary features/characteristics of narcissism,
  • Determining if there is consensual description,
  • Agreeing on the etiological factors,
  • Deciding what field or discipline narcissism should be studied by,
  • Agreeing on how it should be assessed and measured, and
  • Agreeing on its representation in textbooks and classification manuals.
This extent of the controversy was on public display in 2010–2013 when the committee on personality disorders for the 5th Edition (2013) of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders recommended the removal of Narcissistic Personality from the manual. A contentious three-year debate unfolded in the clinical community with one of the sharpest critics being John Gunderson, MD, the person who led the DSM personality disorders committee for the 4th edition of the manual.

Sunday, May 5, 2024

Cousin marriage in the Middle East

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Global prevalence of consanguinity up to second cousins or closer

Cousin marriage is a form of consanguinity (marriages among couples who are related as second cousins or closer). As of 2003, an average of 45% of married couples were related in Saudi Arabia.[While consanguinity is not unique to the Arab or Islamic world, Arab countries have had "some of the highest rates of consanguineous marriages in the world". The bint 'amm marriage, or marriage with one's father's brother's daughter (bint al-'amm) is especially common, especially in tribal and traditional Muslim communities, where men and women seldom meet potential spouses outside the extended family.

Anthropologists have debated the significance of the practice; some view it as the defining feature of the Middle Eastern kinship system while others note that overall rates of cousin marriage have varied sharply between different Middle Eastern communities. In pre-modern times rates of cousin marriage were seldom recorded. In recent times, geneticists have warned that the tradition of cousin marriage over centuries has led to recessive genetic disorders, due to inbreeding.

History

Pre-Islamic

Prior to the origins of Islam cousin marriage was an acceptable practice in the Middle East according to writings in the Bible. Abraham sent his servant back to his brother to get a wife for his son Isaac. Isaac eventually married his first cousin once removed Rebekah (daughter of Bethuel the son of Nahor, Abraham's brother.)

The Persian king Ardashir I of the Sasanian Empire advised his lawyers, secretaries, officers, and husbandmen to "marry near relatives for the sympathy of kinship is kept alive thereby." The same motivation is given in ancient Arabic sources referring to the practice of marriage between paternal cousins prevalent in pre-Islamic Arabia. The Kitab al-Aghani similarly features the story of Qays ibn Dharih, who was not allowed by his father to marry a beautiful maiden from another tribe because, in the words of the father felt that as a rich and wealthy man he did not want his son to take the side of a stranger. There is the related consideration that a man who grows up with a cousin in the intimate setting of one extended family knows her and so may develop his own liking or love for her. There is also the benefit of knowing the qualities of the spouse: a Syrian proverb reads, "Ill luck which you know is better than good luck with which you get acquainted." Keeping property in the family is a final reason for cousin marriage. One of the earliest examples of this is the five daughters of Zelophehad from ancient Israel (Numbers 36:10–13) who upon inheriting from their father all married their father's brother's sons.

Relation with spread of Islam

A 2000 study (by Andrey Korotayev) found that parallel-cousin (Father's Brother's Daughter – FBD) marriage is likely to be common in areas that were part of the eighth-century Umayyad Caliphate and remained in the Islamic world, i.e. North Africa and Middle East. Korotayev argues that while there is some functional connection between Islam and FBD marriage, the permission to marry a FBD does not appear to be sufficient to persuade people to actually marry FBD, even if the marriage brings with it economic advantages. According to Korotayev, a systematic acceptance and practice of parallel-cousin marriage took place when Islamized non-Arab groups adopted Arab norms and practices even if they had no direct connection with Islam to raise their social standing.

Religious aspects

In the holy book of Islam, the Quran, Sura An-Nisa gives a fairly detailed list of what sort of marriages are prohibited in Islam, (including "your fathers' sisters, and your mothers' sisters, and brother's daughters, and sister's daughters, and your foster-mothers") but does not include first cousins, and ends by saying: "Lawful to you are all beyond these".

Pious Muslims look to the life of the Islamic prophet Muhammad and early Muslims as examples to be followed." One of Muhammad's wives – Zaynab bint Jahsh was the daughter of Muhammad's aunt. However, Muhammad had no children with Zaynab, only with Khadija bint Khuwaylid, and Maria al-Qibtiyya. Ali, Muhammad's cousin and the fourth Rashidun caliph, was married to Muhammad's daughter Fatimah.

The Quranic law dictating that daughters receive a portion of the inheritance appears to have provided a financial incentive to cousin marriage, as the inheritance would remain in the extended family. Answering a 2012 audience question, the Islamic preacher Zakir Naik said that the Quran does not forbid cousin marriage but quotes Dr. Ahmed Sakr as saying that there is a hadith of Muhammad that says: "Do not marry generation after generation among first cousins". The fatwa center at IslamWeb.net was unable to find "any scholar who mentioned" this hadith, and lists several scholars (Al-Qaadhi Al-Husayn, Imaam al-Haramayn (Al-Juwayni), Ibn al-Salah) who have stated the hadith is inauthentic.

Prevalence in modern times

Prevalence of marriages up to and including distance of second-degree cousin in the world according to The National Center for Biotechnology Information in 2012.

Besides Muslims, some Jewish and Arab Christians in the Middle East have a history of cousin marriage. In addition, some Muslim groups living outside the Middle East, such as Bangladeshi Muslims or expatriate Pakistanis living in England, also practice consanguinity.

Arabian Peninsula

Raphael Patai reports that in central Arabia no relaxation of a man's right to the father's brother's daughter (FBD, or paternal female cousin) seems to have taken place in the past hundred years before his 1962 work. Here the girl is not forced to marry her paternal male cousin but she cannot marry another unless he gives consent. Among the Jews of Yemen this rule is also followed albeit not as rigidly. In northern Arabia the custom is very strong and any outsider wishing to marry a woman must first come to the paternal male cousin, ask his permission, and pay him what he wants, and a man who marries off his daughter without the consent of the paternal male cousin may be killed by family members. The right of the paternal male cousin is such that a shaykh may not be able to prevail against it. Among the Bedouin it can happen that a paternal male cousin can lodge a complaint after the marriage has taken place, compelling the father to reimburse the bride price or have the marriage annulled. If the paternal male cousin cannot marry his paternal female cousin immediately due to financial or other considerations, the paternal male cousin can also "reserve" her by making a public and formal statement of his intentions to marry her at a future date. A more distant relative acquires priority to marry a girl over her paternal male cousin by reserving her soon after her birth...

In Kuwait, 22.5-64.3% of marriages are consanguineous according to a 2009 study in the journal Reproductive Health. The same study found that the rate in Bahrain was 39-45% of marriages, Oman 56.3 in Oman, and 54 in Qatar.

Egypt

As of 2016, about 40% of marriages in Egypt were between cousins. Another source (Reproductive Health) puts the figure at 20.9-32.8% for marriages between blood related partners as of 2009.

In Egypt cousin marriage may have been even more prevalent than in Arabia in past periods, with one source from the 1830s observing that it was common among Egyptian Arabs and native Egyptian Muslims, but less so in Cairo, where first cousin marriage accounts for 35 percent of marriages. Reportedly the husband and wife would continue to call each other "cousin" because the tie of blood was seen as indissoluble while the marriage was not. In the upper and middle classes, the young man was seldom allowed to see the face of his female cousin after she reached puberty. Cousin marriage is not only practiced by Muslims, but also by Egyptian Copts in the past century, although at a lesser rate (approximately 7-12% of all Coptic marriages). This rate has decreased to a very small percentage where Copts choose to marry cousins. Estimates from the late 19th and early 20th century state variously that either 80 percent of the Egyptian fellahin marry first cousins or two-thirds marry them if they exist. Cousin marriage was also practiced in the Sinai Peninsula, where a girl is sometimes reserved by her cousin with money long before puberty, and among Bedouins in the desert between the Nile and the Red Sea. Cousin marriage was practiced in Medina during Muhammad's time, but out of 113 recorded marriages in one sample only 15 were between abnaa 'amm or paternal cousins of any degree.

Iran

Cousin marriages are decreasing among Iranians. Since the Pahlavi era fewer Iranians have practised cousin marriages. There is a strong preference for marrying a first cousin, but no specific preference for the father's brother's daughter. For the quarter of women married after age 21 it was found that the incidence of consanguinity declined to 28%. Additionally, the proportion of cousin marriage among urban families stayed constant: it was only rural families that drove the increase. For all periods the proportion of cousin marriage among highly educated women was somewhat lower than among uneducated women. It is hypothesized that decreases in infant mortality during the period may have created a larger pool of eligible cousins to marry.

Iraq

47-60% of marriages in Iraq are consanguineous, according to a 2009 study in the journal Reproductive Health. In Iraq the right of the cousin has also traditionally been followed as cousin marriage accounts 50%. The uncle of the girl – or father of the boy – assigns or reserves his niece to his son at an early age, the parents from both families arrange for the marriage usually early. This is usually done to preserve wealth in the family and is more common in rural areas. Among the Jews of Iraq, if the cousin cannot be persuaded to forgo his rights, then he is paid a sum of money by the girl's father. Among the Kurdish Hamawand tribe the paternal male cousin must give his consent for the marriage to take place, though in the southern Kurdish regions the cousin right is not as strongly emphasized. Among Arabs in Iraq the cousin right has also traditionally prevailed.

Barth finds in his study of southern Kurdistan that in tribal villages 57% of all marriages were cousin marriages (48% bint 'amm marriages) while in a nontribal village made up of recent immigrant families only 17% were cousin marriages (13% bint 'amm).

Palestine

Jews

Patai states in his other book The Myth of the Jewish Race that the percentage of cousin marriage among Jews varies extensively with geographic location. Among Israeli Ashkenazi Jews, the first-cousin marriage rate was measured in a 1955–7 study at 1.4% and other cousin marriages at 1.06% of all marriages. But among non-Ashkenazim the first-cousin marriage rate was 8.8% and an additional 6.0% of marriages were between more distant cousins. Thus a total 14.6% of marriages between non-Ashkenazim were consanguineous compared with only 2.5% for Ashkenazim. The highest frequencies of cousin marriages were found among Jews from Iraq (28.7%) and Iran (26.3%). High rates were also found among couples from Yemen (18.3%), Aden (17.8%), Tunisia (13.4%), and among Oriental Jews from the USSR (6.9%). Jews from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey saw rates of 7–10.7%. A later 1969–70 study rated the first-cousin marriage rate among Ashkenazim at 0.3% and other cousin marriages at 1.0%, while for non-Askhenazim the respective figures were 6.2% and 8.1%. Among the Habbani Jews in Israel, 56% of marriages are between first cousins. The Samaritans also had very high rates of inbreeding, with 43% of marriages between first cousins and 33.3% between other cousins.

Arabs

A 1984 study of consanguineous (primarily first cousin) marriages among the Arab population in rural Western Galilee found it occurred among 49% of Druze, 40% Muslims, and 29% of Christians. A 1990–92 study of all of Israel found similar results: 47% among Druze, 42% among Muslim Arabs, and 22% among Christian Arabs. In the South Palestinian village of Artas in the 1920s, 13.3% of marriages, were paternal male cousin marriages; 26.1%, were cousin marriages.

Levant

Jordan

28.5-63.7% of marriages in Jordan are consanguineous according to a 2009 study in the journal Reproductive Health.

Lebanon

12.8-42% of marriages in Lebanon are consanguineous according to a 2009 study in the journal Reproductive Health. A 1983-84 study of cousin marriage among 2,752 households in the capital, Beirut, found a 7.9% rate of marriage between first cousins among Christians, and a 17.3% rate among Muslims.

In Lebanon first-cousin marriage rates differ among religious affiliation as it is found to be 17% for Christians and 30% for Muslims throughout the past century, however first-cousin marriage is declining among all marriages in Lebanon.

Syria

30-40% of marriages in Syria are consanguineous as of 2009.

In Syria the right belongs to the paternal male cousin alone and the maternal male cousin has no special rights. The custom is however less frequent in big cities such as Damascus and Aleppo. Patai reports that in the decades preceding 1962 the right was often ignored among the Syrian urban middle class. Among the upper classes it appeared to be again more common, as certain leading families protected their wealth and status by reserving daughters for their cousins, though sons had more freedom of choice. This situation was also loosening at the time of Patai's work. This holds also among the Syrian Turks and Kurds. But the Syrian Circassians hold cousin marriage absolutely forbidden, similar to the Circassians of the Caucasus.

In her discussion of the city of Aleppo during the Ottoman Empire, Meriwether finds a rate of cousin marriage among the elite of 24%. Father's brother's daughter was most common but still only represented 38% of all cousin marriages, while 62% were with first or second cousins. But most families had either no cousin marriages or only one, while for a few the rate was as high as 70%. Cousin marriage rates were higher among women, merchant families, and older well-established families. Meriwether cites one case of cousin marriage increasing in a prominent family as it consolidated its position and forging new alliances became less critical. Marriage patterns among the elite were, however, always diverse and cousin marriage was only one option of many. Rates were probably lower among the general population.

Turkey

In Turkey the rate of consanguineous marriages based on previous studies is around 1 in 5 marriages, where most cases of consanguineous marriage are found commonly in rural Turkey and Eastern Anatolia regions of Turkey where the population is mainly Kurdish.

Outside the Middle East

Consanguineous marriage are also notably high in several places nearby the Middle East.

Caucasus

In the Southern Caucasus, cousin marriages usually happen among Azeris and ethnically related minorities such as Tats, Talysh and Mountain Jews, whereas among the neighboring Armenians and Georgians, It is considered a social taboo to marry up to seventh generation cousin, however, the practice is common among the Yazidi communities living in these counties.

In the Northern Caucasus, cousin marriages only happen among the ethnicities of Dagestan, while the ethnicities of the rest of the neighboring North Caucasian republics hold similar taboo to these of their counterparts in Armenia and Georgia.

Sub-Saharan Africa

In the Malian town of Timbuctoo, a field investigator found that among the Arabs one third of marriages are with first cousins. Half of these are with the father's brother's daughter and slightly fewer with the mother's brother's daughter. It is possible that the high MBD marriage rate is the result of Songhai influence, one group of which prefers the MBD type and shuns the FBD type, and another group of which have a preference for both. The third ethnic group of Timbuctoo are the Bela, who are Tuareg slaves, and among whom marriage between cross cousins is preferred in principle, though in practice FBD marriage also occurs.

According to a 2009 study, the percentage of consanguineous marriages in Sudan is between 44.2 and 63.3%. Cousin marriage is common among the Kababish tribe of Sudan.

North Africa

5-10% of all marriages in Algeria are consanguineous according to a 2009 study in Reproductive Health. In the oasis-village of Sidi Khaled, some 170 miles south of Algiers, among the Mzabites further south, among the Chaamba, and among the Moors of the extreme western Sahara, cousin marriage is preferred.

A 2009 study put the percentage of consanguineous marriages in Libya at 48.4%. In Mauritania the study found the rate to be 47.2%; and Morocco at 20–28%.

South Asia

The prevalence of cousin marriages is estimated to be 46.2% in Afghanistan. Regional differences exist in the rate, the Kabul province has a rate of 38.2% while Bamayan is higher at 51.2%. First cousin marriages (27.8%) were the most common type of consanguineous marriages, followed by double first cousin (6.9%), second cousin (5.8%), beyond second cousin (3.9%) and first cousin once removed (1.8%). The pattern of inheritance of genetic abnormalities in Afghanistan has a significant impact on prevalence. Autosomal recessive genetic abnormalities were observed at most and 75.4% of the total reported cases, followed by autosomal dominant 19.7%. The main reason behind the high percentage of autosomal recessive conditions is the union between groups of people known to share genetic traits inherited from one or more common ancestors. Hereditary disorder might be one of the fundamental causes of the high death rate in Afghanistan. Based on this study, infants under the age of 2 years are mostly experiencing metabolic disorders and its frequency is up to 38.9%, followed by children in the age group 3–11 years (22.2%). Adolescents have comparatively less percentage (12.5%), but with diverse genetic anomalies, and adults have a high percentage (25.0%) of various genetic disorders, while older people (1.4%) are only affected by neurological disorders.

In Pakistan, cousin marriage is legal and common for economic, religious and cultural reasons. Consanguineous marriage in Pakistan was reported to be higher than 60% of the population in 2014. In some areas, higher proportion of first-cousin marriages in Pakistan has been noted to be the cause of an increased rate of blood disorders in the population. According to a 2005 BBC report on Pakistani marriage in the United Kingdom, 55% of British Pakistanis marry a first cousin.

In India, consanguineous marriage is seen mostly among first-cousins, and mostly practiced in the southern states of Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka except Kerala. The overall prevalence of consanguineous marriage was 9.9%; the South region (23%) and North-East region (3.1%) showed the highest and lowest prevalence, respectively. Muslims had a higher prevalence (15%) than Hindus (9%). The prevalence of first cousin marriage (8.7%) was more than that of second cousin (0.7%) and of uncle-niece marriages (0.6%).

Social aspects

Familial responsibility and honor

Of particular significance in the Middle East is marriage to a father's brother's daughter. Many Middle Eastern peoples express a preference for this form of marriage. Ladislav Holý explains that it is not an independent phenomenon but merely one expression of a wider preference for agnatic solidarity, or solidarity with one's father's lineage. Due to placing emphasis on the male line, the daughter of the father's brother is seen as the closest marriageable relation. According to Holý the oft-quoted reason for cousin marriage of keeping property in the family is, in the Middle Eastern case, just one specific manifestation of keeping intact a family's whole "symbolic capital". Along with an aversion to hypogamy that prevents the loss of a man's loyalties to the higher ranking relatives of his wife, FBD marriage more closely binds the agnatic group by ensuring that wives are agnatic as well as affinal relatives. In fact cousin marriage in general can be seen as trading off one socially valuable outcome, namely marital alliances with outsiders and the resulting integration of society, with the alternative outcome of greater group solidarity. But for demographic reasons the ideal of in-marriage can never be fully realized and hence societies allowing it can always draw on the advantageous aspects of both in- and out-marriage.

The notion of honor is another social characteristic Holý identifies as being related to Middle Eastern cousin marriage. The honor of the males surrounding a woman is sullied in many societies when she misbehaves or when she is attacked. In societies like Europe that place greater value on affinal relations, responsibility for a married woman rests with both her husband's family and her own. In the Middle East the situation is different in that primary responsibility continues to rest with the woman's own family even after she is married. Her agnates therefore cannot release her from control upon marriage due to the risk to their honor. They and not the husband may be responsible for killing her, or sometimes her lover, if she commits adultery. Similar rules may apply in case of the payment if she is killed and for the inheritance of her property if she has no male heirs. Her natal family may continue supporting her even against her husband. This is an idealized system: some Middle Eastern societies do mix it with other systems that assign more responsibility to the husband's family.

Berti people in Pakistan

Holý's field experience among the Berti people of Pakistan allowed him to undertake an extensive study of cousin marriage in their culture. Holý believed that many of his findings from field experience among the Berti people of Pakistan could generalize to other Middle Eastern groups. He noted that stated reasons for cousin marriage could be both pragmatic and symbolic. Stated pragmatic reasons for cousin marriage might be stated in terms of advantages for the husband such as warmer relations with his father-in-law, quicker entertainment of the husband's family by the wife in the case of a visit due to them being her relations, greater loyalty and devotion of the wife, and the ease of regaining a wife after a serious quarrel where she has withdrawn to the house of her own family. Stated pragmatic reasons for the parents included gaining access to the labor of a daughter's children by marrying her to a kinsman and thereby keeping her family close by, increased attentiveness on the part of a wife to her aging in-laws if she is related to them, and the ease of marital negotiations if the parents are brothers, or in the next best case, if the mother of one child is the sister of the father of the other child.

Holý states that despite all this, creating a general theory of the existence of a preference for FBD marriage in terms of pragmatic reasons is not possible. Instead any realistic theory must take into account the symbolic reasons that both are created by and help to create Berti culture. Frequently such reasons protected the symbolic but vitally important honor of the stakeholders involved. One reason was that in Berti (and Middle Eastern) culture one's honor is affected if a cousin becomes pregnant out of wedlock. The responsibility to see her married is directly proportional to the responsibility for her chastity and one's genealogical distance from her. One can eliminate this directly by becoming her husband. Another reason is the relationship between cousin marriage and agnatic solidarity. Holý argues from the case of the Palestinians that FBD marriage should not be viewed as simply "adding" affinal ties to previous agnatic ones. Instead they recognize the strength of the existing ties. Distant agnates can increase their bond and become close agnates via intermarriage.

Discouragement

Advice on cousin marriage in the Middle East has not always been positive, however. Al-Maydani makes the following exhortation: "Marry the distant, but not the near." The reason given for the inadvisability of cousin marriages is most frequently the belief that the offspring of such marriages will be feeble. An early Arab author, Ibn 'Abd Rabbihi, states in his work Kitab al-'iqd al-farid of a hero that "He is a hero not borne by the cousin (of his father), he is not weakly; for the seed of relations brings forth feeble fruit." Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1059–1111) in his principal ethical work, the Ihya 'ulum al-din, gives the different reason that "the woman should not be a near relative of the husband, because near relationship diminishes the sensuous desire." Finally the ancient Arabic poet 'Amr b. Kulthum states, "Do not marry in your own family, for domestic enmity arises therefrom." Similar sentiments are expressed by certain Moroccan and Syrian proverbs.

Patai summarizes the Middle Eastern situation by saying that a preference for paternal male cousin marriage exists in many Middle Eastern ethnic groups but that right to the bint 'amm exists in only some of these. The cousin right is the "complete" form of the institution of the cousin marriage and preference without right the "incomplete" form. Patai explains the differences between cultures exhibiting these two forms in terms of the geographic centrality to Middle Eastern culture, with groups on the outskirts of the Middle East likely to fall into the "incomplete" category, in terms of the cultural marginality of the group, with groups adhering tightly to older traditions better able to resist the "complete" form, in terms of modernization and Westernization, with this tending to discourage cousin marriage. The Copts of Egypt who chose to marry a cousin is considered not ideal among Copts due to cultural traditions although not common among Copts in comparison to other ethnic groups and those of different beliefs.

Bride prices

Cousin marriage normally results in a reduced mahr in Islam. Patai states that bride price to a cousin is usually about half as high as to a nonrelative. Due to the poverty of many families this outlay often requires exceptional effort, and especially because the decision traditionally is in the hands of the groom's father, these considerations may weigh heavily on the outcome. The bride's family moreover is expected to spend much of the bride price on the bride herself, so there is a reduced incentive to gain a higher price by avoiding cousin marriage.

Biological impact

Marrying a close relative significantly increases the chance that both parents carry recessive genes, which can carry defects and diseases. While babies of Pakistani heritage accounted for roughly 3.4% of all births in the UK (2005), "they had 30% of all British children with recessive disorders and a higher rate of infant mortality," according to research done by the BBC.

Polygyny in Islam

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Traditional Sunni and Shia Islamic marital jurisprudence allows Muslim men to be married to multiple women (a practice known as polygyny). Men can have up to four wives at a time according to the islamic jurisprudence.

Scriptural basis

The verse most commonly referred to with the topic of polygamy is verse 3 of Surah 4 An-Nisa (Women). A translation by Yusuf Ali is shown below:

If you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans, Marry women of your choice, Two or three or four; but if you fear that you shall not be able to deal justly (with them), then only one, or (a captive) that your right hands possess, that will be more suitable, to prevent you from doing injustice.

— Qur'an, Sura 4 (An-Nisa), Ayah 3

It is believed these verses were revealed after the Battle of Uhud, in which many Muslim men were killed, leaving widows and orphans. Thus, many argue that these verses have been revealed "because of Allah's concern for the welfare of women and orphans who were left without husbands and fathers who died fighting for the Prophet and for Islam. It is a verse about compassion towards women and their children; it is not about men or their sexuality."

In the second part of verse 4:3, the Qu’ran states "but if ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly (with them), then only one, or (a captive) that your right hands possess, that will be more suitable, to prevent you from doing injustice." If a man cannot deal justly with more than one wife, then he must marry only one. A common modern interpretation is that these verses were revealed out of compassion towards women, and not as a means to please male sexuality.

Other verses in the Quran do not directly address the practice of polygyny by the faithful, though verses discussing marriage generally have, of course, relevance to polygynous relationships.

Opinions of classical Islamic scholars

Whilst traditional Islamic scholarship upholds the notion that Islamic law permits polygyny and furthermore enforces the divine command to "marry only one" where the man fears being unable to fulfil the rights of two in a fair manner, a substantial segment of the Islamic scholarship elaborates further on the ruling regarding men who are able to ensure complete equality amongst the multiple wives.

Their opinion was derived from performing ijtihad (independent legal reasoning) which determined their belief that it is to be deemed preferable (even for the male individual who is capable of delivering justice to the multiple families) to refrain from joining more than one wife in the marital bond.

This opinion has been codified into the official positions of the Hanbali and Shaafi’i schools of jurisprudence which assert that it is held recommended for a Muslim male to have only one wife, even if he may act equitably with more than one woman.

Ash-Shirbeeni from the Shaafi’i School of jurisprudence, said: "It is a Sunnah not to marry more than one wife if there is no apparent need." [Mughni al-Muhtaj 4/207]. Al-Maawardi, from the Shaafi’i School of jurisprudence, said: "Allah has permitted a man to marry up to four wives, saying: {…two or three or four…}, but Allah advised that it is desirable for man to marry only one wife, saying: {…But if you fear that you will not be just, then [marry only] one}" [al-Hawi al-Kabir 11/417].

Ibn Qudaamah from the Hanbali School of jurisprudence, said in Ash-Sharh Al-Kabeer: "It is more appropriate to marry only one wife. The author of Al-Muharrar [i.e. Abul Barakaat Al-Majd ibn Taymiyyah] said this, based on the saying of Allaah (which means) {…But if you fear that you will not be just, then [marry only] one}." [Ash-Sharh Al-Kabeer authored by Shams-ud-deen Ibn Qudaamah].

Imam Ahmed ibn Naqib al Masri, from the Shaafi’i School of jurisprudence, said ‘’It is fitter to confine oneself to just one’’ [Umdatu Salik].

Imam Ghazali, from the Shaafi’i School of jurisprudence, stated: "It does not call for two wives, [since] plurality may render life miserable and disrupt the affairs of the home." [Kitab al Nikah, Ihya Uloom ud Din].

Imam Shaafi’i offered an additional exegesis for the final clause of the pivotal verse discussing the divine legislation of polygyny and the divine limitations imposed upon this ancient institution.[4] He espoused that the closing clause of verse 4:3, usually interpreted as ‘that is more suitable that you may not incline to injustice’ should be understood as ‘that is more suitable that you may not be financially strained by numerous children’.

Imam Shaafi’i reasoned that divine decree had already listed fear of committing injustice as a reason to not wed more than once, hence it was pointless for the same reason (for not wedding more than once) to be expounded twice in the same verse.

His alternative interpretation pursued the perception which held that the presence of a plurality of women in a man's conjugal life would produce undesirably large numbers of offspring, which could be a potential cause of financial hardship and poverty in the future.

Given the emphasis that Islamic law stipulates on the welfare of children and nurturing children with permitted means of income, Imam Shaafi’i opined that it was legislated for a man to marry just once as an increase in the population of a family due to multiple marriages could potentially harbour harmful monetary consequences for the man who marries more than once.

Ash-Shaafi’i is of the view that it is desirable to confine oneself to marrying only one although it is permissible for him to marry more than one. This is to avoid being unfair by being more inclined to some of them than others, or being unable to financially support them. [al-Hawi al-Kabir 11/417].

Pre-Islamic (jahiliyya) context

Prior to the emergence of Islam, the Arabian Peninsula was characterized by a wide range of marriage practices—both polygynous and polyandrous alike, as well as monogamous. As Leila Ahmed states in her work, Women and Gender in Islam, "evidence suggests that among the types of marriage practiced was matrilineal, uxorilocal marriage, found in Arabia, including Mecca, about the time of the birth of Muhammad (circa 570)--the woman remaining with her tribe, where the man could visit or reside with her, and the children belonging to the mother's tribe--as well as polyandrous and polygamous marriages." Thus, it is widely accepted that polygyny was not the only type of matrimony practiced during the jahiliyya (pre-Islamic era), but one part of a highly variegated and diverse pool of matrimony types.

Noteworthy was the fact that it was customary for men to marry women without limit, a practice that ended with the advent of the Qur'an and its divine revelation. It was common in jahiliyya Arabia for there to be no restriction on the number of wives a man could have. Often, tribal leadership tended toward polygynous marriages with the express purpose of establishing relationships with other powerful families, effectively injecting the practice of marriage with a political purpose. Further, it is important to note that marriages in this era, including polygynous ones, were not sacramental in nature, but purely contractual. It was not until Islam, one could say, standardized marriage and therefore what it constituted, that matrimony assumed a different set of characteristics beyond those of the purely contractual.

To amplify the context within which polygyny occupies an Islamic relevance, one should look to the current debates surrounding polygyny in Islam, and more broadly, polygamy, and the implications that emerged from their contextual transition from the jahiliyya to the Islamic era. Two highly dichotomous views on the social significance of the institutionalization of polygyny by Islam are provided by Leila Ahmed and Asghar Ali Engineer, and their views differ on the question of women. How did the establishment of polygyny in Islam as the only alternative to monogamy change the social condition of women? One verse that is often cited in these arguments is that which was quoted earlier — verse 3 of Surah 4.

Some, like Ali, argue that the overall condition of women who lived in the jahiliyya improved with the advent of Islam. These scholars cite a general establishment of order and protection provided by the Qur'anic verses, espousing the view that "the position of women was ameliorated to a greater degree by the mission of Muhammad." Nefarious practices of infanticide-particularly that of female newborns-capricious divorces, and unlimited license of polygyny all were social phenomena eradicated by the revelation of Qur'anic verses relating to the question of polygyny. Moulavi Chiragh Ali summarizes this view, stating, "The Qur’an gradually improved and elevated the degraded condition of women [in the jahiliyya] by curtailing, in the first place, the unlimited number of wives to four...and, in the second place, declaring it impossible to deal equitably with more than one wife even if men ‘would fain to do so,’ and thus virtually abolishing polygamy." Conversely, those of Ahmed's perspective would argue that with the arrival of Qur’anic law came the loss of sexual autonomy for women. In this view, jahiliyya marriage practices, including that of pre-Islamic polygyny, correlated with women's being "active participants, even leaders, in a wide range of community activities...their autonomy and participation were curtailed with the establishment of Islam, its institution of patrilineal, patriarchal marriage as solely legitimiate, and the social transformation that ensued." An extended discussion of the intersection of feminism and polygyny can be found in later sections of this article; see Muslim Feminism and Polygyny.

Modern interpretations and practice

Most modern Muslims view the practice of polygyny as allowed, but unusual and not recommended. The practice of polygyny is often viewed in its historical context, as the marriage was the only way for a woman to be provided for during the time of Muhammad. Many countries today either outlaw the practice of polygyny or place restrictions on it.

Several countries, such as Libya, allow polygyny with few or no restrictions.

In Indonesia, a majority-Muslim secular nation, polygyny is rare. In 2018, it was practiced by approximately 1% of the population.

Polygamy has always been rare among South Asian Muslims. In medieval India, most ordinary Muslim men only had one wife. Polygamy was rare outside the wealthy class, unless in case of infertility of the first wife. It was rare for a lower or middle class woman to have a rival.

Most men in the Ottoman Empire were monogamous while only a small minority were polygamous. Salomon Schweigger who travelled in the Ottoman Empire wrote in the late 16th century that polygamy was absent. In the 1700s wealthy families in Istanbul looked down on elite men who married more than once. High level officials were required to leave their wives and concubines if they were to marry an Ottoman princess. Lady Mary Wortley Montagu visited the Ottoman Empire in 1717 and noticed that while Muslims were allowed four wives no "man of quality" used this right. Of all the top Ottoman men at court, the author only found one who had female slaves.

Countries that ban polygyny

Turkey was the first Muslim-majority country to legally ban polygyny in 1926. This decision was not based on religious reasons, but rather was an entirely secular ban. Tunisia was the next country to ban polygyny through legislation passed in 1956 and restated in 1964. Unlike Turkey, Tunisia banned polygyny on religious grounds, citing two main reasons. First, the Quran limited the practice of polygyny, thus it did not support the practice and clearly intended for the practice to be eliminated over time. Second, the Quran demands equal treatment of all wives in a polygynous marriage, which was deemed impossible, thus making the practice illegal. Finally, Israel banned polygyny as well by 1978.

Countries that restrict polygyny

The following countries restrict the practice of polygyny:

Some countries, including India, Iran, Iraq, Bangladesh, Algeria, Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan, and Kuwait, allow women to include a clause prohibiting polygyny in marriage contracts. Other countries, such as Iran and Pakistan, require that a man get permission to take a second wife from his first wife, and then show the court proof of his first wife's consent. Finally, countries such as Malaysia state that a man must get permission from both his wife and from the governmental religious authority in order to take a second.

Although many countries have laws restricting or banning polygyny, it is still practiced illegally. It is difficult to enforce anti-polygyny laws and restrictions in countries with large rural populations. Furthermore, illegal polygyny often occurs in countries with poor social services as women rely on husbands to support them in these situations.

One way that polygyny is still legally practiced in Iran today is through the practice of mut'a, a temporary contractual relationship based on the mutual consent of a man and a woman. Throughout the contracted time, the woman must remain exclusively faithful to the man, and in return he must provide for her financially. Although this practice is technically legal, it is very highly disputed.

Muslim feminism and polygyny

Emergence of feminism

Muslim feminism is a fairly new movement, even though women's rights issues have been at the forefront of social reform for a while. This began to change when Muslim women realized they could alter their roles in society by rereading the main religious texts that dictated Muslim society and ethics. This return to reinterpretation was not a new practice – male Islamic scholars had been doing it ever since Muhammad's death – but for women, it was unprecedented: this was the first time that women were learning how to read and study the Qur'an and the hadiths in an analytical way. Their new religious knowledge led them to a better understanding of their faith, as well as the ability to make educated interpretations of the texts. Many of these Islamic feminist scholars began to realize that there was no inherent tie between Islam and the patriarchal practices of Islamic society. For example, these feminists studied Muhammad's life and argued that he treated women very progressively for that era. Muhammad included all of his wives in his religious practices and respected them enough to take their advice and grievances seriously. They also even accompanied him to battle. According to Muslim feminists, Islamic polygyny was meant to curtail the practice that was already widespread in pre-Islamic times. Conquering rulers would collect massive harems of women and treat them without any respect; whereas Islam reduced the allowable amount of wives each husband could have and required that he treat them all equally. These feminists place emphasis on the idea that only those men who are capable of loving and financially providing for each wife equally are permitted to have more than one. They also point out the practice of polygyny in Islam was created for the purpose of taking care of fatherless children, or orphans. Thus, polygyny was allowable for charitable and honorable purposes. Islamic feminists point out that "a recognition that gender inequality in the old world was assumed and that perceptions of women in Christian and Jewish texts are not that different from those of Islamic texts" is lacking from common understandings of Islam.

Two leading feminist Muslim scholars who are seeking to increase women's rights through the reinterpretation of religious texts are Amina Wadud and Asma Barlas. Both women embrace Islam as a religion that preaches gender equality. They see societal practices, not Islam, as the main problem. Wadud points out the three reasons that the Qur'an views as acceptable forms of polygyny: if the husband is not sexually satisfied he may take another wife rather than turn to prostitutes or an affair, if the first wife is unable to reproduce or another woman with child needs to be taken care of, and/or if the husband is financially stable enough to care for another woman in the Muslim community. According to Wadud, the form of polygyny that the Qur'an supports focuses on "justice: dealing justly, managing funds justly, justice to the orphans, and justice to the wives." Barlas, who published her theological research several years later, argues a very similar point. Both feminist scholars point out the origin of the Islamic theory of polygyny in Ayah 4:3. This verse of the Qur'an was not meant to utilize polygyny as a way to oppress women, but to ensure that they were taken care of.

The other form of feminism in the Islamic world is independent or state feminism. The premise behind this movement is that "no reform is possible in an Islamic legal and political system where ‘the very structure of power is male dominated to an absolute degree, back by the Constitution, an all-male clerical system ruling the country.’" They also point out that Islam supports and perpetuates a clear female role that designates women to the margins of society. These Muslim feminists argue that there is only so much that reinterpreting the texts can do and believe that the best – and perhaps only – way to increasing women's rights is outside of the parameters of Islam. Therefore, changing polygynist practices would involve reforming the political and legal systems instead of just trying to reinterpret the Qur’an and the hadiths to determine if they really support the practice and to what extent.

Women's movements and family law reforms in the Middle East

Feminism's effect on polygyny in Islam is different in every Muslim society, depending on the different cultures that are interacting with Islam in each location. For example, in Iran, changes to women's rights occurred in the wake of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. During this revolution the Family Protection Law, which had given some power to women and imposed minimal restrictions on polygyny, was overturned. Muslim women were encouraged to return to their traditional roles. This loss of rights led to the movement realizing that they could not necessarily rely on the government alone to protect their rights. This spurred the creation of the personal status laws, which covered many issues relating to marriage and divorce including polygyny. Passed in 1986, the law "effectively reinstates the provision of the 1975 Family Protection Law granting a wife the right to obtain a divorce if her husband marries a second woman without the wife's permission of if…a man does not treat his wives fairly and equally." This offers Iranian Muslim women some legal protection against polygyny, but the enforcement of the law is still up to the interpretation of the courts. Muslim women's movement organizations have begun to gain more power in Iran due to the increasing number of Muslim women who are studying the Qur'an analytically. These new scholars are able to argue for interpretations of Islam that empower rather than oppress women. They also lead organizations like the Association of Muslim Women and Zeynab. Many Muslim women also go jalasehs where they can openly discuss religious texts in a safe environment.

Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco also began restricting polygynous practices in Islam. Egypt's personal status laws underwent many changes between 1979 and 1985, but in the end they were very restrictive for women and reduced the limits on polygyny. This incentivized Egyptian feminists to create a new marriage contract (approved in 2000) that would give women some rights concerning divorce and what was allowable in marriage. Jordan was able to have more success in 2001 when it amended its Civil Status Law, which requires the consent of the wife before the husband marries again. This change was accompanied by a handful of other progressive decisions on women's rights in the country, greatly improving the status of women. Morocco was also pushed along by its Muslim feminist groups to make entering into a polygynous marriage more difficult.

Muslim feminism in Asia

Islamic communities in Asia, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, have also experienced feminist movements which work to restrict polygynous practices. Indonesian feminists have challenged these practices through the study and reinterpretation of religious texts. Fatayat NU, a voluntary Muslim women's organization, was created in 1950 for middle-aged women who were a part of Nahdlatul Ulama, a Sunni Islam group, and wanted to have a voice. Initially experiencing membership issues due to large percentage of women who were married or uneducated, Fatayat NU began to gain power as institutions outside of Indonesia took notice of it and supported the organizations work. The women in Fatayat NU use Islam and the religious texts to justify their actions and guide their decisions, so women who have extensively studied the religion are crucial. Out of the many controversial issues that Fatayat NU takes a stand on, polygyny is one that has recently come into contention. Although polygyny in Indonesia was never very popular, some Muslim women are worried that it is starting to gain more support. Nahdlatul Ulama is one of the organizations that approves of polygyny as an Islamic practice, but Fatayat NU is taking a contradicting stance; the members believe that polygyny can only be possible if men and women are unequal, which goes against their interpretation of the Qur'an's message on gender status.

In Malaysia, polygyny has been considered a topic that is not fit to be brought up in public, but recently it has begun to enter public discourse. This change came about through the passage of a new Islamic family law, which supports polygynous practices by making them easier for men to take part in. This has created a "debate between Islamic fundamentalists who dominate the burgeoning Islamic Affairs Department that administers Shariah law and mostly Western-educated Muslim feminists who say the department, in its overzealous interpretation of the Qur’an, has gone overboard in making new laws that discriminate against women and children." The campaign against this law was very popular, but the law was still passed. Muslim women's organizations in Malaysia plan to continue protesting it until it is revoked.

Polygyny in Islamic popular culture

Literature

Polygyny has appeared in literature in many different Islamic societies. Indian Muslim literature has traditionally stood divided on its position on polygyny as a justifiable practice. Two Indian authors, Akbari Begum and Bashiruddin Ahmad, revealed in their novels a belief that polygyny is acceptable in certain circumstances; whereas Nazr Sajjad Hyder opposed this notion and completely rejected the practice in her work. Gudar ka Lal (The Ruby in Rags), written in 1907 by Akbari Begum, projected the author's beliefs on a wide range of subjects involving the treatment of Muslim women and girls, including polygyny. The story's plotline revolves around the relationships between Yusuf Raza and his two wives, Maqbool and Mehr Jabeen. Yusuf Raza remarries when he realizes that his first wife is so uneducated that she does not know how to properly take care of her children or the household. At first, Maqbool is resentful of Mehr Jabeen, but eventually she recognizes Mehr Jabeen's kind and friendly nature, and the two become friends. This happy outcome reflects Begum's belief that polygyny in Islam can be justified when marriages are seen as incompatible and could benefit from a second wife who could help around the house and thus ease tensions. Bashiruddin Ahmad's novel, Iqbal Dulham (The Bride Iqbal), also promotes the ideal polygynous relationship where the wives become friends and find vital companionship instead of competition. Published in 1908, Iqbal Dulham follows a young man, Iqbal Mirza, who marries a second wife after his first wife fails to conceive children. The initial tension between the wives is relieved when the second wife gives birth. Once Iqbal Mirza has children, his relationship with his first wife improves, and the two wives are then able to become friends. Thus, Ahmad portrays how polygyny can be used to ease the pressure on the first wife to produce children. In both stories polygyny is a solution to domestic disharmony.

Nazr Sajjad Hyder, however, shows her disproval of the practice of polygyny in Ah-e Mazluman (Sighs of the Oppressed), written around 1912. The two households in Ah-e Mazluman, both engage in polygynous practices, but Hyder presents the relationships between husband and wives as very negatively affected; the stories "accentuate the cruelty of husbands towards their wives and aim to intensify the exclusion and alienation experienced by the first wife." Hyder perceives polygyny as a practice that is harming Islam and giving it a bad reputation. She recommends its end and pleads that Muslim men act in a more just manner towards their women.

The complexity of Islamic polygyny is also revealed in Assia Djebar's Ombre sultane (Shadow sultana). Written in Algeria in 1987, it is told from the perspective of the first wife, Isma. She thus constructs through her descriptions how the reader perceives the second wife and the husband. The second wife, Hajila, is seen as a rival and is reduced through Isma's portrayals to body parts that are disassociated from Hajila as a whole person. This reveals Isma's lack of respect for Hajila and the process of "othering" that Isma uses to degrade Hajila. Hence, the idea that polygyny creates a sense of solidarity between wives is shown to be flawed. Isma also describes Hajila in unflattering terms that distance her from the attentions of the husband they share and of other men. This is in contrast to Isma's depiction of herself as constantly being the object of male desire, creating a sense that sisterhood between the two women is out of the question. However, Isma's diction also creates a relationship between herself and Hajila in which neither can exist without the other; "they are locked in a sorority created, in a way, in tandem with the patriarchal force that remains a threat to their very existence." Therefore, Djebar's portrayal of polygyny is multifaceted and conflicting: it has the ability to create both rivalry and solidarity.

Music

Polygyny in Islam has surfaced in music around the world and across the decades. For instance, in Malaysia in the 1950s and 60s, the famous entertainer P. Ramlee dealt with many sociopolitical issues in his art. Whereas the rest of the music industry was under the outside influence of Latin America, India, and the United States, Ramlee's music was inspired by what was going on in Malaysian society. He critiqued the practice of polygyny to keep in line with his self-proclaimed role of exposing the weaknesses of his society. These socially critical songs did not necessarily fit into the categories of popular music at the time, but they were still embraced by his audiences.

Hip hop has become increasingly popular across the world, and Islam has had a significant influence in rap music in the United States where hip hop first emerged. Two Muslim hip hop artists who bring up the concept of polygyny in their music are Miss Undastood and Sons of Hagar. "Miss Undastood, a young veiled, African-American lyricist, raps on her CD Dunya or Deen (Life or Faith) about war, love, the challenges of being a young Muslim woman in America, and the power of faith." Sons of Hagar is another hip hop group that seeks to positively portray Islam in their lyrics and support Islamic practices in their actions. Their song, "Sisterssss," supports polygynous practices. The members of the group rationalize that even though polygyny is illegal in America, rapping about it is much less offensive than when other artists rap about prostitutes.

Film

Islamic polygyny has also appeared as a controversial issue in films. For example, Ayat-ayat Cinta (Verses of Love) was released in Indonesia in 2008. This movie follows the life of Fahri bin Abdillah, a student in Egypt, and his relationships with four women. The film inspired more open, public discussion on polygyny in Indonesia by calling attention to the conditions of women who enter into polygynous relationships. Another Indonesian movie that tackles the subject of polygyny is Berbagi Suami (Husband for Share), which came out in 2006. The director, Nia Dinata, was inspired by her experiences in Indonesia with women who were in polygynous relationships. She acknowledges that every woman reacted in different ways to their marriage but ultimately all felt isolated and saddened by the addition of a new wife. Three stories are told within the movie and all three leading actresses learn to at least outwardly accept their situations, whether they are the first wife finding about the existence of other women or the new addition to the family who has to situate herself in the household hierarchy.

Television

The Philippine television series, Legal Wives, focuses on a Muslim man marrying three women. It is noted as the first Islam-oriented television series in the country.

Zero-sum game

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