https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Untouchability Untouchability is a form of social institution that
legitimises and enforces practices that are discriminatory, humiliating,
exclusionary and exploitative against people belonging to certain
social groups. Although comparable forms of discrimination are found all
over the world, untouchability involving the caste system is largely unique to South Asia.
The term is most commonly associated with treatment of the Dalit communities in the Indian subcontinent who were considered "polluting". The term has also been used to refer to other groups, including the Burakumin of Japan, the Baekjeong of Korea, and the Ragyabpa of Tibet, as well as the Romani people and Cagot in Europe, and the Al-Akhdam in Yemen.
Traditionally, the groups characterized as untouchable were those whose
occupations and habits of life involved ritually "polluting"
activities, such as pursuing a career based on killing (e.g. fishermen)
or engaging in common contact with others' feces or sweat (e.g. manual scavengers, sweepers and washermen).
Due to many caste-based discriminations in Nepal, the government of Nepal legally abolished the caste-system and criminalized any caste-based discrimination, including "untouchability" in 1963.
Untouchability has been outlawed in India, Nepal and Pakistan. However, "untouchability" has not been legally defined.
The origin of untouchability and its historicity are still debated. A
2020 study of a sample of households in India concludes that
"Notwithstanding the likelihood of under-reporting of the practice of
untouchability, 70 percent of the population reported not indulging in
this practice. This is an encouraging sign."
Origin
B. R. Ambedkar with the leaders and activists of the All India Untouchable Women Conference held at Nagpur in 1942
B. R. Ambedkar,
an Indian social reformer and politician who came from a social group
that was considered untouchable, theorized that untouchability
originated because of the deliberate policy of the Brahmins. According to him, the Brahmanas despised the people who gave up the Brahmanism in favour of Buddhism. Later scholars such as Vivekanand Jha have refuted this theory.
Nripendra Kumar Dutt, a professor of history, theorized that the concept of untouchability originated from the "pariah"-like treatment accorded to the indigenous people of India by the early Dravidians, and that the concept was borrowed by the Indo-Aryans from the Dravidians. Scholars such as R. S. Sharma
have rejected this theory, arguing that there is no evidence that
Dravidians practised untouchability before coming into contact with the
Indo-Aryans.
Austrian ethnologist Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf theorized that untouchability originated as class stratification in urban areas of the Indus Valley civilisation. According to this theory, the poorer workers involved in 'unclean' occupations such as sweeping or leather work
were historically segregated and banished outside the city limits. Over
time, personal cleanliness came to be identified with "purity", and the
concept of untouchability eventually spread to rural areas as well.
After the decline of the Indus Valley towns, these untouchables probably
spread to other parts of India. Scholars such as Suvira Jaiswal
reject this theory, arguing that it lacks evidence, and does not
explain why the concept of untouchability is more pronounced in rural
areas.
American scholar George L. Hart, based on his interpretation of Old Tamil texts such as Purananuru, traced the origin of untouchability to ancient Tamil
society. According to him, in this society, certain occupational groups
were thought to be involved in controlling the malevolent supernatural
forces; as an example, Hart mentions the Paraiyars,
who played the drums during battles and solemn events such as births
and deaths. People from these occupational groups came to be avoided by
others, who believed that they were "dangerous and had the power to
pollute the others".
Jaiswal dismisses the evidence produced by Hart as "extremely weak" and
contradictory. Jaiswal points out that the authors of the ancient Tamil
texts included several Brahmanas (a fact accepted by Hart); thus, the
society described in these texts was already under Brahmanical influence, and could have borrowed the concept of untouchability from them.
British anthropologist John Henry Hutton
traced the origin of untouchability to the taboo on accepting food
cooked by a person from a different caste. This taboo presumably
originated because of cleanliness concerns, and ultimately, led to other
prejudices such as the taboo on marrying outside one's caste. Jaiswal
argues that this theory cannot explain how various social groups were
isolated as untouchable or accorded a social rank.
Jaiswal also notes that several passages from the ancient Vedic texts
indicate that there was no taboo against accepting food from people
belonging to a different varna or tribe. For example, some Shrauta Sutras mandate that a performer of the Vishvajit sacrifice must live with the Nishadas (a tribe regarded as untouchable in later period) for three days, in their village, and eat their food.
Scholars such as Suvira Jaiswal, R. S. Sharma, and Vivekanand Jha
characterize untouchability as a relatively later development after the
establishment of the varna and caste system. Jha notes that the earliest Vedic text Rigveda makes no mention of untouchability, and even the later Vedic texts, which revile certain groups such as the Chandalas,
do not suggest that untouchability existed in the contemporary society.
According to Jha, in the later period, several groups began to be
characterized as untouchable, a development which reached its peak
during 600–1200 AD. Sharma theorizes that institution of untouchability
arose when the aboriginal tribes with "low material culture" and
"uncertain means of livelihood" came to be regarded as impure by the
privileged classes who despised manual labour, and regarded associated
impurity with "certain material objects".
According to Jaiswal, when the members of aboriginal groups were
assimilated into the Brahmanical society, the privileged among them may
have tried to assert their higher status by disassociating themselves
from their lower-status counterparts, who were gradually branded as
untouchables.
According to the Dharmashastras
which are ancient legal codes from various kingdoms in ancient India,
certain peoples grouped either by ethnicity or profession were not
considered a part of the varna based society. Therefore, they were not treated like the savarnas (Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras).
According to Sarah Pinto, an anthropologist, modern untouchability in India applies to people whose work relates to "meat, and bodily fluids".
Based on the punishments prescribed in The Untouchability (Offences)
Act, 1955 the following practices could be understood to have been
associated with Untouchability in India:
Prohibition from eating with other members
Provision of separate cups in village tea stalls
Separate seating arrangements and utensils in restaurants
Segregation in seating and food arrangements at village functions and festivals
Prohibition from entering places of public worship
Prohibition from wearing sandals or holding umbrellas in front of higher caste members
Prohibition from entering other caste homes
Prohibition from using common village paths
Separate burial/cremation grounds
Prohibition from accessing common/public properties and resources (wells, ponds, temples, etc.)
Segregation (separate seating area) of children in schools
Social boycotts by other castes for refusing to perform their "duties"
Government action in India
India is home to over 200 million Dalits. At the time of Indian independence, Dalit activists began calling for separate electorates
for untouchables in India to allow fair representation. Officially
labeled the Minorities Act, it would guarantee representation for Sikhs, Muslims, Christians, and Untouchables in the newly formed Indian government. The Act was supported by British representatives such as Ramsay MacDonald. According to the textbook Religions in the Modern World, B. R. Ambedkar,
who was also a supporter of the Act, was considered to be the
"untouchable leader" who made great efforts to eliminate caste system
privileges that included participation in public festivals, access to
temples, and wedding rituals. In 1932, Ambedkar proposed that the
untouchables create a separate electorate that ultimately led Gandhi to fast until it was rejected.
A separation within Hindu
society was opposed by national leaders at the time such as Gandhi,
although he took no exception to the demands of the other minorities. He
began a hunger strike, citing that such a separation would create an unhealthy divide within the religion. At the Round Table Conferences, he provided this explanation for his reasoning:
I
don't mind untouchables if they so desire, being converted to Islam or
Christianity. I should tolerate that, but I cannot possibly tolerate
what is in store for Hinduism if there are two divisions set forth in
the villages. Those who speak of the political rights of the
untouchables don't know their India, don't know how Indian society is
today constituted and therefore I want to say with all the emphasis that
I can command that if I was the only person to resist this thing that I
would resist it with my life.
Gandhi
achieved some success through his hunger strike however Dalit activists
faced pressure from the Hindu population at large to end his protest at
the risk of his ailing health. The two sides eventually came to a
compromise where the number of guaranteed seats for Untouchables would
be increased at both central and provincial levels, but there would be a
common electorate.
Halakha (/hɑːˈlɔːxə/hah-LAW-khə; Hebrew: הֲלָכָה, romanized: hălāḵā, Sephardic:[halaˈχa]), also transliterated as halacha, halakhah, and halocho (Ashkenazic:[haˈlɔχɔ]), is the collective body of Jewishreligious laws that are derived from the Written and Oral Torah. Halakha is based on biblical commandments (mitzvot), subsequent Talmudic and rabbinic laws, and the customs and traditions which were compiled in the many books such as the Shulchan Aruch. Halakha
is often translated as "Jewish law", although a more literal
translation of it might be "the way to behave" or "the way of walking".
The word is derived from the root which means "to behave" (also "to go" or "to walk"). Halakha not only guides religious practices and beliefs, it also guides numerous aspects of day-to-day life.
Historically, widespread observance of the laws of the Torah is first in evidence beginning in the second century BCE. In the Jewish diaspora, halakha served many Jewish communities as an enforceable avenue of law – both civil and religious, since no differentiation of them exists in classical Judaism. Since the Jewish Enlightenment (Haskalah) and Jewish emancipation, some have come to view the halakha
as less binding in day-to-day life, because it relies on rabbinic
interpretation, as opposed to the authoritative, canonical text which is
recorded in the Hebrew Bible. Under contemporary Israeli law,
certain areas of Israeli family and personal status law are under the
authority of the rabbinic courts, so they are treated according to halakha. Some minor differences in halakha are found among Ashkenazi Jews, Mizrahi Jews, Sephardi Jews, Yemenite, Ethiopian and other Jewish communities which historically lived in isolation.
The word halakha is derived from the Hebrew root halakh – "to walk" or "to go". Taken literally, therefore, halakha translates as "the way to walk", rather than "law". The word halakha refers to the corpus of rabbinic legal texts, or to the overall system of religious law. The term may also be related to Akkadianilku, a property tax, rendered in Aramaic as halakh, designating one or several obligations. It may be descended from hypothetical reconstructed Proto-Semitic root *halak- meaning "to go", which also has descendants in Akkadian, Arabic, Aramaic, and Ugaritic.
Halakha is often contrasted with aggadah ("the telling"), the diverse corpus of rabbinic exegetical, narrative, philosophical, mystical, and other "non-legal" texts. At the same time, since writers of halakha may draw upon the aggadic and even mystical literature, a dynamic interchange occurs between the genres. Halakha also does not include the parts of the Torah not related to commandments.
Halakha constitutes the practical application of the 613 mitzvot ("commandments") in the Torah, as developed through discussion and debate in the classical rabbinic literature, especially the Mishnah and the Talmud (the "Oral Torah"), and as codified in the Mishneh Torah and Shulchan Aruch. Because halakha
is developed and applied by various halakhic authorities rather than
one sole "official voice", different individuals and communities may
well have different answers to halakhic questions. With few exceptions,
controversies are not settled through authoritative structures because
during the Jewish diaspora, Jews lacked a single judicial hierarchy or appellate review process for halakha.
According to some scholars, the words halakha and sharia both mean literally "the path to follow". The fiqh literature parallels rabbinical law developed in the Talmud, with fatwas being analogous to rabbinic responsa.
According to the Talmud (Tractate Makot), 613 mitzvot are in the Torah, 248 positive ("thou shalt") mitzvot and 365 negative ("thou shalt not") mitzvot, supplemented by seven mitzvotlegislated by the rabbis of antiquity. Currently, many of the 613 commandments cannot be performed until the building of the Temple in Jerusalem and the universal resettlement of the Jewish people in the Land of Israel by the Messiah. According to one count, only 369 can be kept, meaning that 40% of mitzvot are not possible to perform.
The Oral Torah,
laws believed to have been transmitted orally prior to their later
compilation in texts such as the Mishnah, Talmud, and rabbinic codes.
Laws of human origin, including rabbinic decrees, interpretations, customs, etc.
This division between revealed and rabbinic commandments may
influence the importance of a rule, its enforcement and the nature of
its ongoing interpretation.
Halakhic authorities may disagree on which laws fall into which
categories or the circumstances (if any) under which prior rabbinic
rulings can be re-examined by contemporary rabbis, but all Halakhic Jews
hold that both categories existand that the first category is immutable, with exceptions only for life-saving and similar emergency circumstances.
A second classical distinction is between the Written Law, laws written in the Hebrew Bible,
and the Oral Law, laws which are believed to have been transmitted
orally prior to their later compilation in texts such as the Mishnah,
Talmud, and rabbinic codes.
Commandments are divided into positive and negative commands,
which are treated differently in terms of divine and human punishment.
Positive commandments require an action to be performed and are
considered to bring the performer closer to God. Negative commandments
(traditionally 365 in number) forbid a specific action, and violations create a distance from God.
A further division is made between chukim ("decrees" – laws without obvious explanation, such as shatnez, the law prohibiting wearing clothing made of mixtures of linen and wool), mishpatim ("judgements" – laws with obvious social implications) and eduyot ("testimonies" or "commemorations", such as the Shabbat and holidays). Through the ages, various rabbinical authorities have classified some of the 613 commandments in many ways.
A different approach divides the laws into a different set of categories:
Laws in relation to God (bein adam laMakom, lit. "between a person and the Place"), and
Laws about relations with other people (bein adam le-chavero, "between a person and his friend").
Sources and process
Eras of Jewish law
Chazal (lit. "Our Sages, may their memory be blessed"): all Jewish sages of the Mishna, Tosefta and Talmud eras (c. 250 BCE – c. 625 CE).
The Zugot ("pairs"), both the 200-year period (c. 170 BCE – 30 CE, "Era of the Pairs") during the Second Temple period
in which the spiritual leadership was in the hands of five successions
of "pairs" of religious teachers, and to each of these pairs themselves.
The Tannaim ("repeaters") were rabbis living primarily in Eretz Yisrael who codified the Oral Torah in the form of the Mishnah; 0–200 CE.
The Amoraim ("sayers") lived in both Eretz Yisrael and Babylonia. Their teachings and discussions were compiled into the two versions of the Gemara; 200–500.
The development of halakha in the period before the Maccabees, which has been described as the formative period in the history of its development, is shrouded in obscurity. Historian Yitzhak Baer
argued that there was little pure academic legal activity at this
period and that many of the laws originating at this time were produced
by a means of neighbourly good conduct rules in a similar way as carried
out by Greeks in the age of Solon. For example, the first chapter of Bava Kamma, contains a formulation of the law of torts worded in the first person.
The boundaries of Jewish law are determined through the Halakhic
process, a religious-ethical system of legal reasoning. Rabbis generally
base their opinions on the primary sources of halakha as well as on precedent set by previous rabbinic opinions. The major sources and genre of halakha consulted include:
The foundational Talmudic literature (especially the Mishna and the Babylonian Talmud) with commentaries;
Talmudic hermeneutics:
the science which defines the rules and methods for the investigation
and exact determination of the meaning of the Scriptures; also includes
the rules from which the Halakhot are derived and which were established
by the written law. These may be seen as the rules from which early
Jewish law is derived.
Gemara – the Talmudic process of elucidating the halakha
Regulations and other "legislative" enactments promulgated by rabbis and communal bodies:
Gezeirah ("declaration"): "preventative legislation" of the rabbis, intended to prevent violations of the commandments
Takkanah ("repair" or "regulation"): "positive legislation", practices instituted by the rabbis not based (directly) on the commandments
Minhag: Customs, community practices, and customary law, as well as the exemplary deeds of prominent (or local) rabbis;
The she'eloth u-teshuvoth (responsa, "questions and answers") literature.
Dina d'malchuta dina ("the law of the king is law"): an additional aspect of halakha,
being the principle recognizing non-Jewish laws and non-Jewish legal
jurisdiction as binding on Jewish citizens, provided that they are not
contrary to a law in Judaism. This principle applies primarily in areas
of commercial, civil and criminal law.
In antiquity, the Sanhedrin
functioned essentially as the Supreme Court and legislature (in the US
judicial system) for Judaism, and had the power to administer binding
law, including both received law and its own rabbinic decrees, on all
Jews—rulings of the Sanhedrin became halakha; see Oral law.
That court ceased to function in its full mode in 40 CE. Today, the
authoritative application of Jewish law is left to the local rabbi, and
the local rabbinical courts, with only local applicability. In branches
of Judaism that follow halakha, lay individuals make numerous ad-hoc decisions but are regarded as not having authority to decide certain issues definitively.
Since the days of the Sanhedrin, however, no body or authority
has been generally regarded as having the authority to create
universally recognized precedents. As a result, halakha has
developed in a somewhat different fashion from Anglo-American legal
systems with a Supreme Court able to provide universally accepted
precedents. Generally, Halakhic arguments are effectively, yet
unofficially, peer-reviewed. When a rabbinic posek
("he who makes a statement", "decisor") proposes an additional
interpretation of a law, that interpretation may be considered binding
for the posek's questioner or immediate community. Depending on the
stature of the posek and the quality of the decision, an interpretation
may also be gradually accepted by other rabbis and members of other
Jewish communities.
Under this system there is a tension between the relevance of
earlier and later authorities in constraining Halakhic interpretation
and innovation. On the one hand, there is a principle in halakha not to overrule a specific law from an earlier era, after it is accepted by the community as a law or vow,
unless supported by another, relevant earlier precedent; see list
below. On the other hand, another principle recognizes the
responsibility and authority of later authorities, and especially the posek handling a then-current question. In addition, the halakha embodies a wide range of principles that permit judicial discretion and deviation (Ben-Menahem).
Notwithstanding the potential for innovation, rabbis and Jewish communities differ greatly on how they make changes in halakha. Notably, poskim
frequently extend the application of a law to new situations, but do
not consider such applications as constituting a "change" in halakha. For example, many Orthodox
rulings concerning electricity are derived from rulings concerning
fire, as closing an electrical circuit may cause a spark. In contrast,
Conservative poskim consider that switching on electrical
equipment is physically and chemically more like turning on a water tap
(which is permissible by halakha) than lighting a fire (which is not permissible), and therefore permitted on Shabbat. The reformative Judaism in some cases explicitly interprets halakha
to take into account its view of contemporary society. For instance,
most Conservative rabbis extend the application of certain Jewish
obligations and permissible activities to women (see below).
Note that takkanot (plural of takkanah) in general do not affect or restrict observance of Torah mitzvot. (Sometimes takkanah refers to either gezeirot or takkanot.)
However, the Talmud states that in exceptional cases, the Sages had the
authority to "uproot matters from the Torah". In Talmudic and classical
Halakhic literature, this authority refers to the authority to prohibit
some things that would otherwise be Biblically sanctioned (shev v'al ta'aseh,
"thou shall stay seated and not do"). Rabbis may rule that a specific
mitzvah from the Torah should not be performed, e. g., blowing the shofar on Shabbat, or taking the lulav and etrog
on Shabbat. These examples of takkanot which may be executed out of
caution lest some might otherwise carry the mentioned items between home
and the synagogue, thus inadvertently violating a Sabbath melakha.
Another rare and limited form of takkanah involved overriding Torah
prohibitions. In some cases, the Sages allowed the temporary violation
of a prohibition in order to maintain the Jewish system as a whole. This
was part of the basis for Esther's relationship with Ahasuerus (Xeres). For general usage of takkanaot in Jewish history see the article Takkanah. For examples of this being used in Conservative Judaism, see Conservative halakha.
Historical analysis
The antiquity of the rules can be determined only by the dates of the
authorities who quote them; in general, they cannot safely be declared
older than the tanna
("repeater") to whom they are first ascribed. It is certain, however,
that the seven middot ("measurements", and referring to [good] behavior)
of Hillel and the thirteen of Ishmael are earlier than the time of
Hillel himself, who was the first to transmit them.
The Talmud gives no information concerning the origin of the middot, although the Geonim ("Sages") regarded them as Sinaitic (Law given to Moses at Sinai).
The middot seem to have been first laid down as abstract rules by
the teachers of Hillel, though they were not immediately recognized by
all as valid and binding. Different schools interpreted and modified
them, restricted or expanded them, in various ways. Rabbi Akiva and rabbi Ishmael
and their scholars especially contributed to the development or
establishment of these rules. "It must be borne in mind, however, that
neither Hillel, Ishmael, nor [a contemporary of theirs named] Eliezer ben Jose
sought to give a complete enumeration of the rules of interpretation
current in his day, but that they omitted from their collections many
rules which were then followed."
Akiva devoted his attention particularly to the grammatical and
exegetical rules, while Ishmael developed the logical. The rules laid
down by one school were frequently rejected by another because the
principles that guided them in their respective formulations were
essentially different. According to Akiva, the divine language of the
Torah is distinguished from the speech of men by the fact that in the
former no word or sound is superfluous.
Some scholars have observed a similarity between these rabbinic
rules of interpretation and the hermeneutics of ancient Hellenistic
culture. For example, Saul Lieberman argues that the names of rabbi
Ishmael's middot (e. g., kal vahomer, a combination of the
archaic form of the word for "straw" and the word for "clay" – "straw
and clay", referring to the obvious [means of making a mud brick]) are
Hebrew translations of Greek terms, although the methods of those middot are not Greek in origin.
Views today
The artistic freedom spirit of Aggadah (left, represented by Solomon) and the legal divine judgment rulings of Halakhah (right, represented by Aaron and his sons) on the Knesset Menorah
Conservative Judaism holds that halakha
is normative and binding, and is developed as a partnership between
people and God based on Sinaitic Torah. While there are a wide variety
of Conservative views, a common belief is that halakha is, and has always been, an evolving process subject to interpretation by rabbis in every time period. See Conservative Judaism, Beliefs.
Reconstructionist Judaism
holds that halakha is normative and binding, while also believing that
it is an evolving concept and that the traditional halakhic system is
incapable of producing a code of conduct that is meaningful for, and
acceptable to, the vast majority of contemporary Jews. Reconstructionist
founder Mordecai Kaplan
believed that "Jewish life [is] meaningless without Jewish law.", and
one of the planks of the Society for the Jewish Renascence, of which
Kaplan was one of the founders, stated: "We accept the halakha, which is
rooted in the Talmud, as the norm of Jewish life, availing ourselves,
at the same time, of the method implicit therein to interpret and
develop the body of Jewish Law in accordance with the actual conditions
and spiritual needs of modern life."
Reform Judaism
holds that modern views of how the Torah and rabbinic law developed
imply that the body of rabbinic Jewish law is no longer normative (seen
as binding) on Jews today. Those in the "traditionalist" wing believe
that the halakha represents a personal starting-point, holding
that each Jew is obligated to interpret the Torah, Talmud and other
Jewish works for themselves, and this interpretation will create
separate commandments for each person. Those in the liberal and
classical wings of Reform believe that in this day and era, most Jewish
religious rituals are no longer necessary, and many hold that following
most Jewish laws is actually counter-productive. They propose that
Judaism has entered a phase of ethical monotheism, and that the laws of
Judaism are only remnants of an earlier stage of religious evolution,
and need not be followed. This is considered wrong, and even heretical, by Orthodox and Conservative Judaism.
Humanistic Jews value the Torah as a historical, political, and
sociological text written by their ancestors. They do not believe "that
every word of the Torah is true, or even morally correct, just because
the Torah is old". The Torah is both disagreed with and questioned.
Humanistic Jews believe that the entire Jewish experience, and not only
the Torah, should be studied as a source for Jewish behavior and ethical
values.
Some Jews believe that gentiles are bound by a subset of halakha called the Seven Laws of Noah,
also referred to as the Noahide Laws. They are a set of imperatives
which, according to the Talmud, were given by God to the "children of
Noah" – that is, all of humanity.
Flexibility
Despite its internal rigidity, halakha
has a degree of flexibility in finding solutions to modern problems
that are not explicitly mentioned in the Torah. From the very beginnings
of Rabbinic Judaism, halakhic inquiry allowed for a "sense of
continuity between past and present, a self-evident trust that their
pattern of life and belief now conformed to the sacred patterns and
beliefs presented by scripture and tradition". According to an analysis by Jewish scholar Jeffrey Rubenstein of Michael Berger's book Rabbinic Authority, the authority that rabbis hold "derives not from the institutional or personal authority of the sages but from a communal
decision to recognize that authority, much as a community recognizes a
certain judicial system to resolve its disputes and interpret its laws."
Given this covenantal relationship, rabbis are charged with connecting
their contemporary community with the traditions and precedents of the
past.
When presented with contemporary issues, rabbis go through a
halakhic process to find an answer. The classical approach has permitted
new rulings regarding modern technology. For example, some of these
rulings guide Jewish observers about the proper use of electricity
on the Sabbath and holidays. Often, as to the applicability of the law
in any given situation, the proviso is to "consult your local rabbi or posek".
This notion lends rabbis a certain degree of local authority; however,
for more complex questions the issue is passed on to higher rabbis who
will then issue a teshuva, which is a responsa that is binding.
Indeed, rabbis will continuously issue different opinions and will
constantly review each other's work so as to maintain the truest sense
of halakha. Overall, this process allows rabbis to maintain
connection of traditional Jewish law to modern life. Of course, the
degree of flexibility depends on the sect of Judaism, with Reform being
the most flexible, Conservative somewhat in the middle, and Orthodox
being much more stringent and rigid. Modern critics, however, have
charged that with the rise of movements that challenge the "divine"
authority of halakha, traditional Jews have greater reluctance to
change, not only the laws themselves but also other customs and habits,
than traditional Rabbinical Judaism did prior to the advent of Reform
in the 19th century.
Orthodox Jews believe that halakha is a religious system whose core represents the revealed
will of God. Although Orthodox Judaism acknowledges that rabbis have
made many decisions and decrees regarding Jewish Law where the written
Torah itself is nonspecific, they did so only in accordance with
regulations received by Moses on Mount Sinai (see Deuteronomy 5:8–13). These regulations were transmitted orally until shortly after the destruction of the Second Temple.
They were then recorded in the Mishnah, and explained in the Talmud and
commentaries throughout history up until the present day. Orthodox
Judaism believes that subsequent interpretations have been derived with
the utmost accuracy and care. The most widely accepted codes of Jewish
law are known as Mishneh Torah and the Shulchan Aruch.
Orthodox Judaism has a range of opinions on the circumstances and extent to which change is permissible. Haredi Jews generally hold that even minhagim (customs) must be retained, and existing precedents cannot be reconsidered. Modern Orthodox authorities are more inclined to permit limited changes in customs and some reconsideration of precedent.
Despite the Orthodox views that halakha was given at
Sinai, Orthodox thought (and especially modern Orthodox thought)
encourages debate, allows for disagreement, and encourages rabbis to
enact decisions based on contemporary needs. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein says in his introduction to his collection of responsa
that a rabbi who studies the texts carefully is required to provide a
halakhic decision. That decision is considered to be a true teaching,
even if it is not the true teaching in according to the heavens. For instance, Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik believes that the job of a halakhic decisor is to apply halakha − which exists in an ideal realm−to people's lived experiences. Moshe Shmuel Glasner, the chief rabbi of Cluj (Klausenberg in German or קלויזנבורג
in Yiddish) stated that the Oral Torah was an oral tradition by design,
to allow for the creative application of halakha to each time period,
and even enabling halakha to evolve. He writes:
Thus, whoever has due regard for
the truth will conclude that the reason the [proper] interpretation of
the Torah was transmitted orally and forbidden to be written down was
not to make [the Torah] unchanging and not to tie the hands of the sages
of every generation from interpreting Scripture according to their
understanding. Only in this way can the eternity of Torah be understood
[properly], for the changes in the generations and their opinions,
situation and material and moral condition requires changes in their
laws, decrees and improvements.
The view held by Conservative Judaism
is that the Torah is not the word of God in a literal sense. However,
the Torah is still held as mankind's record of its understanding of
God's revelation, and thus still has divine authority. Therefore, halakha
is still seen as binding. Conservative Jews use modern methods of
historical study to learn how Jewish law has changed over time, and are,
in some cases, willing to change Jewish law in the present.
A key practical difference between Conservative and Orthodox
approaches is that Conservative Judaism holds that its rabbinical body's
powers are not limited to reconsidering later precedents based on
earlier sources, but the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards (CJLS) is empowered to override Biblical and Taanitic prohibitions by takkanah
(decree) when perceived to be inconsistent with modern requirements or
views of ethics. The CJLS has used this power on a number of occasions,
most famously in the "driving teshuva", which says that if someone is
unable to walk to any synagogue on the Sabbath, and their commitment to
observance is so loose that not attending synagogue may lead them to
drop it altogether, their rabbi may give them a dispensation to drive
there and back; and more recently in its decision prohibiting the taking
of evidence on mamzer status on the grounds that implementing such a status is immoral. The CJLS has also held that the Talmudic concept of Kavod HaBriyot
permits lifting rabbinic decrees (as distinct from carving narrow
exceptions) on grounds of human dignity, and used this principle in a
December 2006 opinion lifting all rabbinic prohibitions on homosexual conduct (the opinion held that only male-male anal sex was forbidden by the Bible and that this remained prohibited). Conservative Judaism also made a number of changes to the role of women in Judaism including counting women in a minyan, permitting women to chant from the Torah, and ordaining women as rabbis.
The Conservative approach to halakhic interpretation can be seen
in the CJLS's acceptance of Rabbi Elie Kaplan Spitz's responsum
decreeing the biblical category of mamzer as "inoperative."
The CJLS adopted the responsum's view that the "morality which we learn
through the larger, unfolding narrative of our tradition" informs the
application of Mosaic law.
The responsum cited several examples of how the rabbinic sages declined
to enforce punishments explicitly mandated by Torah law. The examples
include the trial of the accused adulteress (sotah), the "law of breaking the neck of the heifer," and the application of the death penalty for the "rebellious child." Kaplan Spitz argues that the punishment of the mamzer
has been effectively inoperative for nearly two thousand years due to
deliberate rabbinic inaction. Further he suggested that the rabbis have
long regarded the punishment declared by the Torah as immoral, and came
to the conclusion that no court should agree to hear testimony on mamzerut.
The most important codifications of Jewish law include the following; for complementary discussion, see also History of responsa in Judaism.
The Mishnah, composed by Judah haNasi,
in 200 CE, as a basic outline of the state of the Oral Law in his time.
This was the framework upon which the Talmud was based; the Talmud's dialectic analysis of the content of the Mishna (gemara; completed c. 500) became the basis for all later halakhic decisions and subsequent codes.
An early work, She'iltot ("Questions") by Ahai of Shabha (c. 752) discusses over 190 mitzvot – exploring and addressing various questions on these. The She'iltot was influential on both of the following, subsequent works.
The first legal codex proper, Halakhot Pesukot ("Decided Laws"), by Yehudai ben Nahman (c. 760), rearranges the Talmud passages in a structure manageable to the layman. (It was written in vernacular Aramaic, and subsequently translated into Hebrew as Hilkhot Riu.)
Halakhot Gedolot ("Great Law Book"), by Simeon Kayyara, published two generations later (but possibly written c. 743 CE), contains extensive additional material, mainly from Responsa and Monographs
of the Geonim, and is presented in a form that is closer to the
original Talmud language and structure. (Probably since it was
distributed, also, amongst the newly established Ashkenazi communities.)
The Hilchot HaRif was written by the Rabbi Isaac Alfasi
(1013–1103); it has summations of the legal material found in the
Talmud. Alfasi transcribed the Talmud's halakhic conclusions verbatim,
without the surrounding deliberation; he also excluded all aggadic (non-legal, and homiletic) matter. The Hilchot
soon superseded the geonic codes, as it contained all the decisions and
the laws then relevant, and additionally, served as an accessible
Talmudic commentary; it has been printed with almost every subsequent
edition of the Talmud.
The Mishneh Torah by Maimonides
(1135–1204). This work encompasses the full range of Talmudic law; it
is organized and reformulated in a logical system – in 14 books, 83
sections and 1000 chapters – with each halakha stated clearly.
The Mishneh Torah is very influential to this day, and several later
works reproduce passages verbatim. It also includes a section on Metaphysics and fundamental beliefs. (Some claim this section draws heavily on Aristotelian science and metaphysics; others suggest that it is within the tradition of Saadia Gaon.) It is the main source of practical halakha for many Yemenite Jews – mainly Baladi and Dor Daim – as well as for a growing community referred to as talmidei haRambam.
The work of the Rosh, Rabbi Asher ben Jehiel
(1250?/1259?–1328), an abstract of the Talmud, concisely stating the
final halakhic decision and quoting later authorities, notably Alfasi,
Maimonides, and the Tosafists. This work superseded Rabbi Alfasi's and has been printed with almost every subsequent edition of the Talmud.
The Sefer Mitzvot Gadol (The "SeMaG") of Rabbi Moses ben Jacob of Coucy (first half of the 13th century, Coucy,
northern France). "SeMaG" is organised around the 365 negative and the
248 positive commandments, separately discussing each of them according
to the Talmud (in light of the commentaries of Rashi and the Tosafot) and the other codes existent at the time. Sefer Mitzvot Katan ("SeMaK") by Isaac ben Joseph of Corbeil is an abridgement of the SeMaG, including additional practical halakha, as well as aggadic and ethical material.
"The Mordechai" – by Mordecai ben Hillel (d. Nuremberg
1298) – serves both as a source of analysis, as well as of decided law.
Mordechai considered about 350 halakhic authorities, and was widely
influential, particularly amongst the Ashkenazi and Italian communities. Although organised around the Hilchot of the Rif, it is, in fact, an independent work. It has been printed with every edition of the Talmud since 1482.
An illuminated manuscript of Arba'ah Turim from 1435
The Arba'ah Turim (lit. "The Four Columns"; the Tur) by Rabbi Jacob ben Asher (1270–1343, Toledo, Spain). This work traces the halakha from the Torah text and the Talmud through the Rishonim, with the Hilchot
of Alfasi as its starting point. Ben Asher followed Maimonides's
precedent in arranging his work in a topical order, however, the Tur
covers only those areas of Jewish law that were in force in the
author's time. The code is divided into four main sections; almost all
codes since this time have followed the Tur's arrangement of material.
Orach Chayim ("The Way of Life"): worship and ritual observance in the home and synagogue, through the course of the day, the weekly sabbath and the festival cycle.
The Beit Yosef and the Shulchan Aruch of Rabbi Yosef Karo (1488–1575). The Beit Yosef is a huge commentary on the Tur in which Rabbi Karo traces the development of each law from the Talmud through later rabbinical literature (examining 32 authorities, beginning with the Talmud and ending with the works of Rabbi Israel Isserlein). The Shulchan Aruch (literally "set table") is, in turn, a condensation of the Beit Yosef – stating each ruling simply; this work follows the chapter divisions of the Tur. The Shulchan Aruch, together with its related commentaries, is considered by many to be the most authoritative compilation of halakha since the Talmud. In writing the Shulchan Aruch, Rabbi Karo based his rulings on three authorities – Maimonides, Asher ben Jehiel (Rosh), and Isaac Alfasi (Rif); he considered the Mordechai in inconclusive cases. Sephardic Jews, generally, refer to the Shulchan Aruch as the basis for their daily practice.
The works of Rabbi Moshe Isserles ("Rema"; Kraków, Poland, 1525 to 1572). Isserles noted that the Shulchan Aruch was based on the Sephardic tradition, and he created a series of glosses to be appended to the text of the Shulkhan Aruch for cases where Sephardi and Ashkenazicustoms differed (based on the works of Yaakov Moelin, Israel Isserlein, and Israel Bruna). The glosses are called ha-Mapah ("the Tablecloth"). His comments are now incorporated into the body of all printed editions of the Shulchan Aruch, typeset in a different script; today, "Shulchan Aruch" refers to the combined work of Karo and Isserles. Isserles' Darkhei Moshe is similarly a commentary on the Tur and the Beit Yosef.
The Levush Malkhut ("Levush") of Rabbi Mordecai Yoffe (c. 1530–1612). A ten-volume work, five discussing halakha at a level "midway between the two extremes: the lengthy Beit Yosef of Karo on the one hand, and on the other Karo's Shulchan Aruch together with the Mappah of Isserles, which is too brief", that particularly stresses the customs and practices of the Jews of Eastern Europe. The Levush was exceptional among the codes, in that it treated certain Halakhot from a Kabbalistic standpoint.
The Shulchan Aruch HaRav of Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi (c. 1800) was an attempt to re-codify the law as it stood at that time – incorporating commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch, and subsequent responsa – and thus stating the decided halakha,
as well as the underlying reasoning. The work was written partly so
that laymen would be able to study Jewish law. Unfortunately, most of
the work was lost in a fire prior to publication. It is the basis of
practice for Chabad-Lubavitch and other Hasidic groups and is quoted as authoritative by many subsequent works, Hasidic and non-Hasidic alike.
Works structured directly on the Shulchan Aruch, providing analysis in light of Acharonic material and codes:
The Mishnah Berurah of Rabbi Yisroel Meir ha-Kohen, (the "Chofetz Chaim", Poland, 1838–1933) is a commentary on the "Orach Chayim" section of the Shulchan Aruch, discussing the application of each halakha in light of all subsequent Acharonic decisions. It has become the authoritative halakhic guide for much of Orthodox Ashkenazic Jewry in the postwar period.
Aruch HaShulchan by Rabbi Yechiel Michel Epstein (1829–1888) is a scholarly analysis of halakha through the perspective of the major Rishonim. The work follows the structure of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch; rules dealing with vows, agriculture, and ritual purity, are discussed in a second work known as Aruch HaShulchan he'Atid.
Yalkut Yosef, by Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef, is a voluminous, widely cited and contemporary work of halakha, based on the rulings of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef (1920–2013).
Thesouro dos Dinim ("Treasury of religious rules") by Menasseh Ben Israel (1604–1657) is a reconstituted version of the Shulkhan Arukh, written in Portuguese with the explicit purpose of helping conversos from Iberia reintergrate into halakhic Judaism.
The Kitzur Shulchan Aruch of Rabbi Shlomo Ganzfried (Hungary 1804–1886), a "digest", covering applicable Halakha from all four sections of Shulchan Aruch,
and reflecting the very strict Hungarian customs of the 19th century.
It became immensely popular after its publication due to its simplicity,
and is still popular in Orthodox Judaism
as a framework for study, if not always for practice. This work is not
considered binding in the same way as the Mishneh Torah or Shulchan Aruch.
Chayei Adam and Chochmat Adam by Avraham Danzig (Poland, 1748–1820) are similar Ashkenazi works; the first covers Orach Chaim, the second in large Yoreh De'ah, as well as laws from Even Ha'ezer and Choshen Mishpat pertinent to everyday life.
The Ben Ish Chai by Yosef Chaim (Baghdad, 1832–1909) is a collection of the laws on everyday life – parallel in scope to the Kitzur Shulchan Aruch – interspersed with mystical insights and customs, addressed to the masses and arranged by the weekly Torah portion. Its wide circulation and coverage has seen it become a standard reference work in Sephardi Halakha.
Contemporary "series":
Peninei Halakha by Rabbi Eliezer Melamed.
15 volumes thus far, covering a wide range of subjects, from Shabbat to
organ donations, and in addition to clearly posing the practical law –
reflecting the customs of various communities – also discusses the
spiritual foundations of the Halakhot. It is widely studied in the Religious Zionist community.
Tzurba M’Rabanan by Rabbi Benzion Algazi. Six volumes covering 300 topics from all areas of the Shulchan Aruch,
"from the Talmudic source through modern-day halachic application",
similarly studied in the Religious Zionist community (and outside
Israel, through Mizrachi in numerous Modern Orthodox communities; 15 bilingual translated volumes).
Nitei Gavriel by Rabbi Gavriel Zinner. 30 volumes on the entire spectrum of topics in halachah, known for addressing situations not commonly brought in other works, and for delineating the varying approaches amongst the Hasidic branches; for both reasons they are often reprinted.
Collective responsibility or collective guilt, is the responsibility of organizations, groups and societies. Collective responsibility in the form of collective punishment is often used as a disciplinary measure in closed institutions, e.g. boarding schools
(punishing a whole class for the actions of one known or unknown
pupil), military units, prisons (juvenile and adult), psychiatric
facilities, etc. The effectiveness and severity of this measure may vary
greatly, but it often breeds distrust and isolation among their
members. Historically, collective punishment is a sign of authoritarian tendencies in the institution or its home society.
In ethics, both methodological individualists and normative individualists question the validity of collective responsibility.[5]
Normally, only the individual actor can accrue culpability for actions
that they freely cause. The notion of collective culpability seems to
deny individual moral responsibility. Contemporary systems of criminal law accept the principle that guilt shall only be personal. According to genocide scholarA. Dirk Moses, "The collective guilt
accusation is unacceptable in scholarship, let alone in normal
discourse and is, I think, one of the key ingredients in genocidal
thinking."
As the business practices known as corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability
mature and converge with the responsibilities of governments and
citizens, the term "collective responsibility" is beginning to be more
widely used.
Collective responsibility is widely applied in corporations,
where the entire workforce is held responsible for failure to achieve
corporate targets (for example, profit targets), irrespective of the
performance of individuals or teams which may have achieved or
overachieved within their area. Collective punishment,
even including measures that actually further harm the prospect of
achieving targets, is applied as a measure to 'teach' the workforce.
In culture
The concept of collective responsibility is present in literature, most notably in Samuel Taylor Coleridge's "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner", a poem telling the tale of a ship's crew who died of thirst after they approved of one crew member's killing of an albatross.
1959's Ben-Hur and 1983's prison crime dramaBad Boys
depict collective responsibility and punishment.
The play 'An Inspector Calls' by J.B Priestley also features the theme
of collective responsibility throughout the investigation process.
In some countries with parliamentary systems, there is a convention that all members of a cabinet
must publicly support all government decisions, even if they do not
agree with them. Members of the cabinet that wish to dissent or object
publicly must resign from their positions or be sacked.
As a result of collective responsibility, the entire government cabinet must resign if a vote of no confidence is passed in parliament.
The Jewish faith recognizes two kinds of sin, offenses against other people, and offenses against God. An offense against God may be understood as a violation of a contract (the Covenant between God and the Children of Israel). Ezra, a priest and a scribe, was the leader of a large group of exiles. On his return to Jerusalem, where he was required to teach the Jews to obey the laws of God, he discovered that the Jews had been marrying non-Jews. He tore his garments in despair and confessed the sins of Israel before God, before he went on to purify the community. The Book of Jeremiah
(Yirmiyahu [ירמיהו]) can be organized into five sub-sections. One part,
Jeremiah 2-24, displays scorn for the sins of Israel. The poem in
2:1–3:5 shows the evidence of a broken covenant against Israel.
This concept is found in the Old Testament (or the Tanakh), some examples of it are the account of the Flood, the Tower of Babel, Sodom and Gomorrah and in some interpretations, the Book of Joshua's Achan.
In those records, entire communities were punished for the actions of
the vast majority of their members. This was accomplished in as much as
it is impossible to state whether there were no other righteous people,
or that there were children who were too young to be responsible for
their deeds.
Through this framework of inductive reasoning,
both the account of the Flood and Sodom and Gomorrah do identify
righteous people who happen to be the immediate or prospective family
members of a prophet or prophet's nephew, along with them. These sequences of events are reconciled for the former example afterwards as the etiological basis for the reader's presumed good fortunes in the Noahic covenant with all living creatures, in which God promises never again to destroy all life on Earth (a category implicitly broader than the unrighteous) by flood and creates the rainbow as the sign of this "everlasting covenant between God and every living creature of all flesh that is on the earth",
and for the latter example pre-empted with an explicitly stated
numerical target of 9 other community members' lives to be put in peril
(and to have an ostensibly lower number of homes destroyed, being
located in Sodom) due to a hypothetical 10th's evaluation as unrighteous.
The practice of blaming the Jews for Jesus' death
is the longest-lasting example of collective responsibility. In this
case, the blame was not only cast upon the Jews of Jesus's time, it was
also cast upon successive generations of Jews. This practice is
documented in Matthew 27:25-66 New International Version (NIV) 25: "All
the people answered, 'His blood is on us and on our children!'"
The announcement of the execution of 100 Polishroundup (Pol: łapanka) hostages as revenge for the assassination of five German policemen and one SS man by Armia Krajowa's
guerrilla fighters (referred to in the text as: a Polish "terrorist
organization in British service"). Warsaw, 2 October 1943.
Collective responsibility in the form of collective punishment is
often used as a disciplinary measure in closed institutions, e.g. boarding schools
(punishing a whole class for the actions of one known or unknown
pupil), military units, prisons (juvenile and adult), psychiatric
facilities, etc. The effectiveness and severity of this measure may vary
greatly, but it often breeds distrust and isolation among their
members. Historically, collective punishment is a sign of authoritarian and/or totalitarian tendencies in the institution and/or its home society. For example, in the Soviet Gulags, all members of a brigada (work unit) were punished for bad performance of any of its members.
Collective punishment is also practiced in the situation of war, economic sanctions, etc., presupposing the existence of collective guilt. Collective guilt, or guilt by association,
is the controversial collectivist idea that individuals who are
identified as a member of a certain group carry the responsibility for
an act or behavior that members of that group have demonstrated, even if
they themselves were not involved. Contemporary systems of criminal law accept the principle that guilt shall only be personal.
During the occupation of Poland by Nazi Germany,
the Germans applied collective responsibility: any kind of help which
was given to a person of Jewish faith or origin was punished with death,
and not only the rescuer, but his/her family was also executed.This was widely publicized by the Germans.During the occupation, for every German killed by a Pole, 100-400 Poles were shot in retribution.
Communities were held collectively responsible for the purported Polish
counter-attacks against the invading German troops. Mass executions of łapanka hostages were conducted every single day during the Wehrmacht advance across Poland in September 1939 and thereafter.
Entitativity is the perception of groups as being entities in themselves (an entitative group), independent of any of the group's members.
Ethics
In ethics, individualists question the idea of collective responsibility.
Methodological individualists challenge the very possibility of
associating moral agency with groups, as distinct from their individual
members, and normative individualists argue that collective
responsibility violates principles of both individual responsibility and
fairness. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Normally, only the individual actor can accrue culpability for
actions that they freely cause. The notion of collective culpability
seems to deny individual moral responsibility. Does collective
responsibility make sense? History is filled with examples of a wronged
man who tried to avenge himself, not only on the person who has wronged
him, but on other members of the wrongdoer's family, tribe, ethnic
group, religion, or nation.
According to A. Dirk Moses, "The collective guilt
accusation is unacceptable in scholarship, let alone in normal
discourse and is, I think, one of the key ingredients in genocidal
thinking.
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