Child abandonment is the practice of relinquishing interests
and claims over one's offspring in an illegal way, with the intent of
never resuming or reasserting guardianship.
The phrase is typically used to describe the physical abandonment of a
child. Still, it can also include severe cases of neglect and emotional
abandonment, such as when parents fail to provide financial and
emotional support for children over an extended period (sometimes
referred to as "throwaway" children). An abandoned child is referred to as a foundling (as opposed to a runaway or an orphan). Baby dumping
refers to parents leaving a child younger than 12 months in a public or
private place with the intent of terminating their care for the child. It is also known as rehoming when adoptive parents use illegal means, such as the internet, to find new homes for their children. In the case where child abandonment is anonymous within the first 12 months, it may be referred to as secret child abandonment.
In the United States and many other countries, child abandonment is usually treated as a subset of the broader category of child abuse. (However, states have laws allowing a parent to permanently surrender a child at a designated safe haven "where they will not be prosecuted.") In the United States it is punishable as a class 4 felony, and a second or subsequent offense after a prior conviction is a class 3 felony (see classes of felonies) with different state judicial systems treating it with varying severities and classifications. Child abandonment may lead to the permanent loss of parental rights of the parents.
Some states allow for reinstatement of the parental rights, with about
half of the states in the US having had laws for this purpose.Perpetrators can also be charged with reckless abandonment if victims die as a result of their actions or neglect.
Official statistics on child abandonment do not exist in most countries. In Denmark, an estimate of child abandonment prevalence was 1.7 infants per 100,000 births, with another source suggesting higher prevalence in Central and Eastern European countries such as Slovakia with data suggesting 4.9 per 1,000 live births.
Causes
Poverty and homelessness are often causes of child abandonment. People living in countries with poor social welfare systems (i.e. China, Myanmar, Mexico, the United States,
and other countries) who are not financially capable of taking care of a
child are more likely to abandon their children because of a lack of
resources. In some cases the parents already have a child or children, but are unable to take care of another child at that time.
In societies where young women and young men are looked down upon for being teenage or single mothers and single fathers, child abandonment is more common.
Children born out of the confines of marriage may be abandoned in a family's attempt to prevent being shamed by their community.
Children who are born with congenital disorders
or other health complications may be abandoned if their parents feel
unequipped to provide them with the level of care that their condition
requires.
In cultures where the sex of the child is of utmost importance, parents are more likely to abandon a baby of the undesired sex. Similarly, people may choose to pursue the often controversial option of sex-selective abortion.
Political conditions, such as war and displacement of a family, also cause parents to abandon their children.
Additionally, a parent being incarcerated or deported can result in the involuntary abandonment of a child, even if the parent(s) did not voluntarily relinquish their parental role.
Disownment
of a child is a form of abandonment that entails ending contact with
and support for one's dependent. Disownment tends to occur later in a
child's life, generally due to a conflict between the parent(s) and the
child, but can also occur when children are still young. Reasons
include: divorce of parents, discovering the true paternity of a child,
and a child's actions bringing shame to a family; most commonly,
breaking the law, teenage pregnancy, major religious or ideological
differences, and identifying as LGBT.
Effects on survivors
Possibility of experiencing abuse and neglect in institutionalized care
Low self-esteem stemming from feelings of guilt about being at fault for being abandoned
Separation anxiety: feelings of anxiety about being separated from parents or caregivers
Attachment issues: difficulty becoming emotionally attached to and trusting other people, especially caregivers
For children who are abandoned in dangerous places, such as
dumpsters, doorsteps, and other public areas, exposure to the elements
and physical injury are distinct possibilities.
Financial cost
In 2015, the United States' government spent over $9 billion to support 427,910 children who were in foster care.
Child abandonment laws
Child
abandonment is illegal in most of the world, and depending upon the
facts of the case and laws of the state in which it occurs could be
prosecuted as a misdemeanor or felony criminal offense.
Prevention
Providing access to sex education and to family planning
resources, like contraception, and abortion can help prevent people who
cannot take care of, or do not want to raise, children from becoming
pregnant in the first place.
Evidence has shown that, when bans on abortion are lifted, the
number of abandoned, abused, and neglected children goes down in
response.
However, access is an issue. In the United States, 87% of all counties,
and 97% of all rural counties, do not have any access to abortion
services.
Governmental assistance can be provided in the form of parental
counseling, post-natal services, mental health services, and other
community support services for parents who are at a higher risk of
abandoning their children because of age, support, physical ability,
mental illness, or poverty.
History
Historically, many cultures practiced abandonment of infants, often called "infant exposure."
Children were left on hillsides, in the wilderness, near churches, and
in other public places. If taken up by others, the children might join
another family either as slaves or as free family members. Roman
societies, in particular, chose slaves to raise their children rather
than family members, who were often indifferent towards their children. Although being found by others would allow children who were abandoned to often survive, exposure is sometimes compared to infanticide—as described by Tertullian in his Apology:
"it is certainly the more cruel way to kill... by exposure to cold and
hunger and dogs." Despite the comparison, other sources report that
infanticide and exposure were viewed as morally different in ancient
times.
In the Early Middle Ages,
parents who did not want to raise their children gave them to
monasteries with a small fee, an act known as oblation, and in times of
social stress, monasteries often received large numbers of children. By
the high Middle Ages, oblation was less common and more often arranged
privately between the monastery and the parents of the child. Sometimes,
medieval hospitals cared for abandoned children at the community's
expense. Still, some refused to do so because being willing to accept
abandoned children would increase abandonment rates. Medieval laws in Europe governing child abandonment, as the Visigothic Code, often prescribed that the person who had taken up the child was entitled to the child's service as a slave.
Conscripting or enslaving children into armies and labor pools often
occurred as a consequence of war or pestilence when many children were
left parentless. Abandoned children then became the wards of the state,
military organization, or religious group. When this practice happened
en masse, it had the advantage of ensuring the strength and continuity
of cultural and religious practices in medieval society.
Early Modern
Europe saw the rise of foundling homes and increased abandonment of
children to these homes. These numbers continued to rise and peaked when
5% of all births resulted in abandonment in France around 1830. The
national reaction to this was to limit the resources provided by
foundling homes and switch to foster homes instead such that fewer
children would die within overcrowded foundling homes during infancy. As
access to contraception increased and economic conditions improved in
Europe towards the end of the 19th century, the number of children being
abandoned declined.
Abandonment increased towards the end of the 19th century,
particularly in the United States. The largest migration of abandoned
children in history occurred in the United States between 1853 and 1929.
Over one hundred and twenty thousand orphans (not all of whom were
intentionally abandoned) were shipped west on railroad cars, where
families agreed to foster the children in exchange for their use as
farmhands, household workers, etc. Orphan trains
were highly popular as a source of free labor. The sheer size of the
displacement and the complications and exploitation that occurred gave
rise to new agencies and a series of laws that promoted adoption rather
than indenture.
By 1945, adoption was formulated as a legal act with consideration of
the child's best interests. The origin of the move toward secrecy and
the sealing of all adoption and birth records began when Charles Loring Brace introduced the concept to prevent children from the orphan trains from returning to or being reclaimed by their parents.
Notable contemporary instances of child abandonment include
homicidal neglect by confinement of infants or children, such as in the
affair of the Osaka child abandonment case or the affair of two abandoned children in Calgary, Alberta, Canada by their mother Rie Fujii.
Current situation
Today, abandonment of a child is considered to be a serious crime in many jurisdictions because it can be considered malum in se (wrong in itself) due to the direct harm to the child, and because of welfare concerns (in that the child often becomes a ward of the state). For example, in the U.S. state of Georgia, it is a misdemeanor to willfully and voluntarily abandon a child, and a felony to abandon one's child and leave the state. In 1981, this distinction was upheld as constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court against a parent's argument that it denied parents the right to travel and thereby denied parents the equal protection of the laws. 'Rehoming' is still legal in Arkansas where, in 2015, state legislator Justin Harris made national headlines by rehoming two young adopted children.
Many jurisdictions have exceptions to abandonment laws in the form of safe haven laws, which apply to babies left in designated places such as hospitals (see, for example, baby hatch).
In the UK abandoning a child under the age of two years is a criminal offence. In 2004 49 babies were abandoned nationwide with slightly more boys than girls being abandoned.
Abandonment is rife in Malaysia,
where between 2005 and 2011, 517 babies were dumped. Of those 517
children, 287 were found dead. In 2012, there were 31 cases, including
at least one instance of a child being tossed from a window of a high
rise apartment.
Persons in cultures with poor social welfare systems who are not
financially capable of taking care of a child are more likely to abandon
them. Several American states are moving towards passing legislation to
prevent rehoming of children post adoption. However, national
legislation may be needed to protect children from being rehomed in all
states.
State programs for facilitating anonymous child abandonment
Anonymous birthing
allows pregnant mothers to give birth to their child without revealing
their identity or claiming any ownership over or legal obligation to the
child. Different countries wait varying lengths of time from 2–8 weeks
before putting the child up for adoption to allow mothers to return to
the hospital and reclaim the child. Anonymous birthing is most often
implemented as measure to prevent neonaticide and has been successful in
multiple countries.
Police in Austria report a 57% drop in neonaticides after the country
passed a law allowing for anonymous birthing and free delivery in 2001.
Anonymous birthing provides the opportunity for mothers to disclose
relevant health history to later be shared with the child and adoptive
family, as well as access to hospital care to reduce risk during birth.
In some states, France for example, mothers who choose anonymous
birthing undergo counselling and are informed of available support
structures to help them keep the child. Mothers who are seeking to
anonymously abandon their child at birth may avoid anonymous birthing
due to increased interaction with hospital staff and the possibility of
undergoing counselling.
Baby boxes
provide a safe and anonymous way to abandon children, typically
newborns, rather than resorting to infant exposure or neonaticide. Baby
boxes can be found in Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, South
Korea, and the United States. Advantages of baby boxes include a greater
degree of anonymity for parents abandoning their children and a
guarantee that the child will be found and attended to. However,
children are sometimes placed in baby boxes with existing issue or
injury and baby boxes are under-utilized and costly to operate. It is
also debated if baby boxes are an accessible option for rural mothers
who may not be willing to travel to abandon their children.
Safe haven laws
allow parents of a child, typically a newborn child but age can vary,
to abandon the child at a place of local authority such as a hospital,
fire station, or police station with no further question. Some states
allow the parent to reclaim the child within a certain timeframe. Safe
Haven Laws passed in the United States in 1999 and have since been
adopted in Canada, Japan, France, and Slovakia. It is debated if safe
haven laws prevent child abandonment or neonaticide. As with baby boxes,
one study suggests that mothers in rural areas are not willing to
travel to abandon their children and would not be willing to travel to a
hospital to do so. As of 2017, 3,317 babies have been surrendered via safe haven laws in the United States.
National law and effects on child abandonment
China's One Child Policy:
In 1979 China introduced its one-child policy which set up penalties for families that chose to have more than one child. Women were compelled to undergo a surgical implantation of an IUD following the birth of their first child and tubal ligation if they were to have another child.
Families that disobeyed the law were levied a fine and lost their right
to many government services, including access to health and educational
services. Nevertheless, transgressions of the law most certainly occurred.
Consequently, over the course of over three decades, hundreds of
thousands of children, the majority of which were girls, were abandoned
and required caretaking.
Non-governmental organizations stepped in to assist with the re-housing
of these girls, leading to the international adoption of over 120,000
Chinese children.
Today, China's fertility rate has not quite returned to the rate of
replacement (the birth rate that will maintain population size under
conditions of zero net immigration/emigration). In fact, in the years
since the relinquishing of the policy, China's fertility rate has only
risen .04 per family.
Vietnam War:
During and following the Vietnam War, it is estimated that roughly 50,000 babies were born of American fathers and Vietnamese mothers.
A large contingent of these children were either unwanted due to the
circumstances of their conception or unable to be cared for due to the
lack of available resources and assistance in the war-torn country. Locally, these children were known as "children of the dust." Operation Babylift
was established by the US government in an effort to bring over 3,300
children, many but not all of whom were abandoned, orphaned, or
mixed-race, leading to fears of their exploitation, to Western countries
to be adopted, with varying degrees of success. Non-governmental
organizations attempted to alleviate the problem by setting up
international adoptions and other rehoming methods but were largely
ineffective. To this day, attempts are being made to link American
veterans to children that they may have fathered during their time in
Vietnam as well as children to their families in Vietnam.
Romania under Nicolae Ceaușescu:
During the rule of Communist politician Nicolae Ceaușescu,
Romania underwent drastic changes to its populace. Ceaușescu, in an
attempt to form a robust and young population, outlawed methods of
contraception and encouraged the creation of large families with many
children.
Much like during the Fascist period of Italian history, incentives and
cultural praise were offered to parents who produced many children.
Ceaușescu established Decree 770 which outlawed abortion and
contraception for all women, except those who were over 40, had already
borne 4–5 children, had life-threatening complications during pregnancy,
or who became pregnant through rape or incest. In the following years, Romania's birth rate nearly doubled.
However, due to a lack of resources necessary to care for the abundance
of children, thousands were abandoned or left to die. Other women
resorted to unsafe forms of abortion carried out by people without
medical training.
The problem persisted until the coup that overthrew Ceaușescu in 1989.
Following the coup, Romania's birthrate steadily declined for the
following decades. Today, the birth rate has dropped to 1.52 births per woman, under the rate of replacement.
In literature
Foundlings, who may be orphans,
can combine many advantages to a plot: mysterious antecedents, leading
to plots to discover them; high birth and lowly upbringing. Foundlings
have appeared in literature in some of the oldest known tales. The most common reasons for abandoning children in literature are oracles
that the child will cause harm; the mother's desire to conceal her
illegitimate child, often after rape by a god; or spite on the part of
people other than the parents, such as sisters and mothers-in-law in
such fairy tales as The Dancing Water, the Singing Apple, and the Speaking Bird. In some chivalric romances, such as Le Fresne and the Swan-Children, in the variant Beatrix,
some children of a multiple birth are abandoned after the heroine has
taunted another woman with a claim that such a birth is proof of
adultery and then suffered such a birth of her own.
Poverty usually features as a cause only with the case of older
children, who can survive on their own. Indeed, most such individuals
are of royal or noble birth; their abandonment means they grow up in
ignorance of their true social status.
Abandonment
One of the earliest surviving examples of child abandonment in literature is that of Oedipus,
who is left to die as a baby in the hills by a herdsman ordered to kill
the baby, but is found and grows up to unwittingly marry his biological mother.
In a common variant on the abandonment and rediscovery of an infant, the biblical story of Moses
describes how the Jewish infant is abandoned by his mother and set to
float in the Nile in a reed basket, in hopes that he will be found and
nurtured; as planned, the child is discovered
and adopted by the queen of Egypt, thus gaining a higher social status
and better education, as well as a more powerful position than his birth
family could have given him. A similar story is told of other heroes
who eventually learn about their true origins only as adults, when they
find they are able to save their original parents or family by wielding
power from their adoptive status, while making use of an education that
sets them apart from their peers. The theme is also carried through in
the case of many modern superheroes, most famously Superman (see Modern
Media below). Mark Twain tweaks the traditional "upgrading" of the
foundling's social status by having the child's twin, who is powerful by
birth, experience the "downgrading " of his position in a switch
planned by the two children, in "The Prince and the Pauper".
In many tales, such as Snow White, the child is actually abandoned by a servant who had been given orders to put the child to death. Other tales such as Hansel and Gretel has children reluctantly abandoned in the forest by their parents since they were no longer able to feed them.
Children are often abandoned with birth tokens, which act as plot devices to ensure that the child can be identified. This theme is a main element in Angelo F. Coniglio's historical fiction novella The Lady of the Wheel,
in which the title refers to a "receiver of foundlings" who were placed
in a device called a "foundling wheel", in the wall of a church or
hospital.
In Shakespeare's The Winter's Tale, a recognition scene in the final act reveals by these that Perdita is a king's daughter rather than a shepherdess, and so suitable for her prince lover. Similarly, when the heroine of Le Fresne
reveals the brocade and the ring she was abandoned with, her mother and
sister recognize her; this makes her a suitable bride for the man whose
mistress she had been.
From Oedipus onward, Greek and Roman tales are filled with exposed
children who escaped death to be reunited with their families—usually,
as in Longus' Daphnis and Chloe,
more happily than in Oedipus' case. Grown children, having been taken
up by strangers, were usually recognized by tokens that had been left
with the exposed baby: In Euripides's Ion,Creüsa is about to kill Ion,
believing him to be her husband's illegitimate child, when a priestess
reveals the birth-tokens that show that Ion is her own, abandoned
infant.
This may reflect the widespread practice of child abandonment in
their cultures. On the other hand, the motif is continued through
literature where the practice is not widespread. William Shakespeare used the abandonment and discovery of Perdita in The Winter's Tale, as noted above, and Edmund Spenser reveals in the last Canto of Book 6 of The Faerie Queene that the character Pastorella, raised by shepherds, is in fact of noble birth. Henry Fielding, in one of the first novels recognized as such, recounted The History of Tom Jones, a Foundling. In the case of Quasimodo, the eponymous character in Victor Hugo's The Hunchback of Notre-Dame,
the disfigured child is abandoned at the cathedral's foundling's bed,
made available for the leaving of unwanted infants. Ruth Benedict, in
studying the Zuni, found that the practice of child abandonment was
unknown, but featured heavily in their folktales.
Still, even cultures that do not practice it may reflect older customs; in medieval literature, such as Sir Degaré and Le Fresne,
the child is abandoned immediately after birth, which may reflect
pre-Christian practices, both Scandavian and Roman, that the newborn
would not be raised without the father's decision to do so.
Upbringing
The strangers who take up the child are often shepherds or other herdsmen. This befell not only Oedipus, but also Cyrus IIof Persia, Amphion and Zethus and several of the characters listed above. Romulus and Remus
were suckled by a wolf in the wilderness, but afterward, again found by
a shepherd. This ties this motif in with the genre of the pastoral.
This can imply or outright state that the child benefits by this pure
upbringing by unspoiled people, as opposed to the corruption that
surrounded his birth family.
Often, the child is aided by animals before being found; Artemis sent a bear to nurse the abandoned Atalanta, and Paris was also nursed by a bear before being found. In some cases, the child is depicted as being raised by animals; however, in actuality, feral children have proven to be incapable of speech.
The pattern of a child remaining with its adoptive parents is less common than the reverse, but it occurs. In the Indian epic Mahabharata,Karna is never reconciled with his mother, and dies in battle with her legitimate son. In the Grimm fairy tale Foundling-Bird, Foundling Bird never learns of, least of all reunites with, his parents. George Eliot depicted the abandonment of the character Eppie in Silas Marner; despite learning her true father at the end of the book, she refuses to leave Silas Marner, who had actually reared her.
When the cause of the abandonment is a prophecy, the abandonment
is usually instrumental in causing the prophecy to be fulfilled. Besides
Oedipus, Greek legends also included Telephus,
who was prophesied to kill his uncle; his ignorance of his parentage,
stemming from his abandonment, caused his uncle to jeer at him and him
to kill the uncle in anger.
Older children
When older children are abandoned in fairy tales, while poverty may be cited as a cause, as in Hop o' My Thumb, also called Thumbelina, the most common effect is when poverty is combined with a stepmother's malice, as in Hansel and Gretel (or sometimes, a mother's malice). The stepmother's wishes may be the sole cause, as in Father Frost. In these stories, the children seldom find adoptive parents, but malicious monsters, such as ogres and witches;
outwitting them, they find treasure enough to solve their poverty. The
stepmother may die coincidentally, or be driven out by the father when
he hears, so that the reunited family can live happily in her absence.
In a grimmer variation, the tale Babes in the Wood
features a wicked uncle in the role of the wicked stepmother, who gives
an order for the children to be killed. However, although the servants
scruple to obey him, and the children are abandoned in the woods, the
tale ends tragically: the children die, and their bodies are covered
with leaves by robins.
In modern media
Foundlings still appear in modern literature; this is a partial list of examples:
In George Bernard Shaw's stage play Major Barbara, industrialist Andrew Undershaft, a foundling himself, intently searches for a foundling to assume the family business.
Superman
may be seen as a continuation of the foundling tradition, the lone
survivor of an advanced (but almost-completely extinct) civilization who
is found and raised by Kansas farmers in a pastoral setting, and later discovers his alien origins and uses his powers for good.
Charlie Chaplin's movie The Kid revolves about the Tramp's efforts to raise an abandoned child.
In the graphic novel Aqua Leung, the main protagonist is a
prince who is whisked out of a castle under attack in a basket-like
device and then found by a couple and raised on land so that his
father's enemies do not find him. He returns to the seas to fulfill the
prophecy thought to be his father's but that was actually his.
Elora Danan, in the film Willow, and Lir, in the novel The Last Unicorn,
both continue the tradition of foundlings abandoned because of
prophecies, and who fulfil the prophecies because of their abandonment.
In the last book of The Chronicles of Prydain,Dallben reveals to the hero Taran that he is a foundling; in a story set in the same world, "The Foundling," Dallben himself proves to be a foundling as well.
The protagonist Thorby of Robert A. Heinlein's 1957 novel Citizen of the Galaxy
is a foundling sold as a slave on a remote planet. He is bought and
freed by a beggar who educates and inspires him, then learns from
multiple kind foster families. He later discovers that his parents were
killed for opposing slavery in the galactic conglomerate that they
owned and that he inherits, and he carries on their work.
The character Leela from Futurama
was a foundling, given to the Ophanarium and a note in an alien
language to make people believe that she was an alien rather than a
mutant; she would have been forced, in the latter case, to live in the
sewers with the other mutants.
Several foundlings appear in Terry Pratchett'sDiscworld: most notably Captain Carrot Ironfoundersson,
who was found, as a toddler, among the ruins of a caravan party that
had been attacked by bandits, and was then surrounded by the bodies of
the adults.
The character of Mozzie, from White Collar, is a foundling, left in a basket with only a bear.
In some cartoons, wily characters may disguise themselves as
foundlings. This may be accomplished by the character dressing as a baby
and lying in a bassinet or basket on a doorstep, perhaps with a note
adding to the ruse. This was parodied in the 2006 movie Little Man.
In The Flintstones,Bamm-Bamm was abandoned on the Rubbles's doorstep and eventually adopted by them.
Founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002, the group was led by Abubakar Shekau from 2009 until his death in 2021, although it splintered into other groups after Yusuf's death and also in 2015. When the group was first formed, their main goal was to "purify", meaning to spread Sunni Islam, and destroy Shia Islam in northern Nigeria, believing jihad should be delayed until the group was strong enough to overthrow the Nigerian government. The group formerly aligned itself with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. The group has been known for its brutality, and since the insurgency started in 2009, Boko Haram has killed tens of thousands of people, in frequent attacks against the police, armed forces and civilians. It has resulted in the deaths of more than 300,000 children and has displaced 2.3 million from their homes. Boko Haram has contributed to regional food crises and famines.
After its founding in 2002, Boko Haram's increasing radicalisation led to the suppression operation by the Nigerian military and the killing of its leader Mohammed Yusuf in July 2009. Its unexpected resurgence, following a mass prison breakin September 2010 in Bauchi, was accompanied by increasingly sophisticated attacks, initially against soft targets, but progressing in 2011 to include suicide bombingsof police buildingsand the United Nations office in Abuja. The government's establishment of a state of emergency
at the beginning of 2012, extended in the following year to cover the
entire northeast of Nigeria, led to an increase in both security force
abuses and militant attacks.
In mid-2014, the militants gained control of swaths of territory in and around their home state of Borno, estimated at 50,000 square kilometres (20,000 sq mi) in January 2015, but did not capture the state capital, Maiduguri, where the group was originally based. On 7 March 2015, Boko Haram's leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. According to the BBC, due to internal disputes
between the two groups, hundreds of terrorists left Boko Haram and
formed their own organization, named "Islamic State's West Africa
Province".
In September 2015, the director of information at the Defence
Headquarters of Nigeria announced that all Boko Haram camps had been
destroyed but attacks from the group continue. In 2019, the president of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari, claimed that Boko Haram was "technically defeated". Shekau was killed and confirmed to be dead in May 2021.
Name
The organization's name has always been Group of the People of Sunnah for Dawa and Jihad (Arabic: جماعة أهل السنة للدعوة والجهاد, romanized: Jamā'atu Ahli is-Sunnah lid-Da'wati wal-Jihād). It was also known as the West African Province (Wilayat Garb Ifrqiya), and, after pledging allegiance to Islamic State
in 2015, was briefly called Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) or
Islamic State's West African Province (ISWAP). The group fractured in
2016, however, and ISWAP and Boko Haram are now separate groups.
The name Boko Haram is usually translated as "Western education is forbidden". "Haram" is from the Arabic حَرَام (ḥarām, "forbidden") and the Hausa word boko (the first vowel is long, the second pronounced in a low tone), meaning "fake", which is used to refer to secular Western education.
In a 2009 statement they denounced that translation as the work of the
"infidel media", claiming the true translation is "Western Civilization
is forbidden", and that they are not "opposed to formal education
coming from the West" but "believe in the supremacy of Islamic culture
(not education)". Other translations in English include "Western influence is a sin", and "Westernization is sacrilege". Until the death of its founder Mohammed Yusuf, the group was also reportedly known as Yusifiyya. Northern Nigerians have commonly dismissed Western education as ilimin boko ("fake education") and secular schools as makaranta boko ("fake school").
Causes, ideology, and takfir
Causes/contributors
Economic
Some analysts have emphasized economic causes as a factor in Boko Haram's success. Wealth in Nigeria has been concentrated among members of a small political elite.Nigeria is Africa's biggest economy, but 60% of its population of 173 million (as of 2013) live on less than $1 a day.
Religious
The sharia law imposed by local authorities, beginning with Zamfara in January 2000 and covering 12 northern states by late 2002, may have promoted links between Boko Haram and political leaders, but was considered by the group to have been corrupted.
Extant resentment of colonialism
Academic
Atta Barkindo explains the group's "baffling" ability to "maintain
momentum" in part by the "accumulated and unaddressed grievances"
against colonialism in the region, including the colonial boundaries (of Nigeria, Ghana, etc.) established by Europeans that bear no resemblance to "pre-colonial empires, ethnic or cultural territories", and by the group's use of the "historical narrative" of the Islamic Kanem–Bornu Empire.
Mohammad Yusuf preached that, "our land was an Islamic state before it
was turned into a land of kafir (infidel); the current system is
contrary to true Muslim beliefs".
Political advantage
The
political interests and bias of the Nigerian elite is believed to play a
major role in the thriving of the activities of the organization: the
political leadership requires that the press refer to the group as
bandits rather than terrorists, which downplays the threat they pose.
Illiteracy/lack of education
In a discussion organized by the Woodrow Wilson Center, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo,
a former president of Nigeria, highlighted the low level of literacy
and education in the Northern parts of the country as contributing to
the perpetuation of Boko Haram. According to Obasanjo, illiterate and
uneducated children are more likely to be drawn into the ranks of the
terrorist organization.
Ideology
The founder of Boko Haram, Muhammad Yusuf, was reportedly inspired by the controversial Islamic preacher Mohammed Marwa (Maitatsine), who condemned the reading of any books other than the Quran. Yusuf, himself, in one 2009 interview, expressed his opposition not only to Western education, but to the theory of evolution, a spherical
(not flat) Earth, and to the idea that rain comes from "evaporation
caused by the sun" rather than being created and sent down directly by
God.
Boko Haram opposes the Westernization of Nigerian society, which it blames for "Nigeria's culture of corruption", and demands the establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria. It developed into a jihadist group in 2009. As SunniSalafi Jihadis, the group strives to re-establish the Islamic caliphate and bring all peoples under its domain, doing away with modern states and patriotic
feeling towards them. After Boko Haram declared its allegiance to the
Islamic State, an IS statement proclaimed "It was the rejection of
nationalism that drove the mujahidin (jihad fighters) in Nigeria to give bay'ah (fealty) to the Islamic State and wage war against the Nigerian murtaddin (apostates) fighting for the Nigerian taghut (idolatrous tyrant)". The movement is diffuse, and fighters who are associated with it follow the Salafi doctrine.
Takfir
Members' beliefs tend to be centered on strict adherence to Wahhabism, which is an extremely strict form of Sunni Islam that sees many other forms of Islam as idolatrous.
The group has denounced the members of the Sufi and the Shiite sects as infidels, and also mainstream Sunni Muslims who fail to support their jihad. This willingness to takfir – i.e. accuse self-professed Muslims of being apostates from Islam and thus subject to execution – is a departure from mainstream Islam but not Salafi jihadism.
An insurgent aiming to overthrow a Muslim government faces a
challenge due to mainstream Islamic doctrine, which forbids the killing
or enslaving of fellow Muslims, including government officials, military
personnel, or ordinary Muslims who don't support the insurgency.
However, by using **takfir**—declaring opponents as apostates—the
insurgents not only bypass this prohibition but also turn the killing of
these Muslims into a "religious duty." In a 18 December 2016 speech to
his commanders, Shekau proclaimed that 'even if a woman is praying and
fasting, once she engages in democracy I can capture her in a battle'.
According to researchers Jacob Zenna and Zacharias Pier,
after
2010… Shekau, believed that jihad was obligatory and that not actively
joining his jihad was tantamount to apostasy. This did not mean Shekau
actively killed anyone after he announced jihad and renamed the group
"JAS" in 2010. Rather, there was a "priority scale" with Christians, the
government and publicly anti-JAS Muslim preachers targeted first. This
also meant any Muslims killed collaterally were not a concern since they
were "guilty" for not having joined his jihad. …[by] October 2010,
…assassinations targeting Muslim religious leaders, especially Salafists
who opposed JAS's religious interpretation, as well as civil servants,
became an almost weekly occurrence in northeastern Nigeria. In addition
to this, prisons, banks, mosques, churches and beer halls also were
common targets of attack.
Before it was colonized and subsequently incorporated into the British Empire as Colonial Nigeria in 1900, the Bornu Empire ruled the territory where Boko Haram is currently active. It was a sovereignsultanate run according to the principles of the Constitution of Medina, with a majority Kanuri Muslim population. In 1903, both the Borno Emirate and Sokoto Caliphate had come under British rule. At this time, Christianmissionaries spread the Christian message in the region and converted a large segment of the Nigerian populace. British rule ended when Nigeria was granted independence in 1960.Except for a brief period of civilian rule between 1979 and 1983,
Nigeria was governed by a series of military dictatorships from 1966
until the advent of democracy in 1999.
According to the Borno SufiImamSheik Fatahi, Yusuf was trained by the KanoSalafiIzala Sheik Ja'afar Mahmud Adamu, who called him the "leader of young people"; the two split some time in 2002–2004. They both preached in Maiduguri's Indimi Mosque, which was attended by the deputy governor of Borno. Many of the group were reportedly inspired by Mohammed Marwa, known as Maitatsine ("He who curses others"), a self-proclaimed prophet (annabi, a Hausa word usually used only to describe the founder of Islam) born in Northern Cameroon who condemned the reading of books other than the Quran. In a 2009 BBC interview, Yusuf, expressed similarly pre-modern ideas on evolution, a flat earth, and rain sent directly from God rather than evaporation. Followers of Maitatsine "wreaked havoc" in northern cities of Nigeria "off and on" from 1980 to 1985.
Ethnic militancy is thought to have been one of the causes of the 1967–1970 civil war; religious violence reached a new height in 1980 in Kano, the largest city in the north of the country, where the Muslim fundamentalist sect Yan Tatsine ("followers of Maitatsine") instigated riots
that resulted in four or five thousand deaths.
In the ensuing military crackdown, Maitatsine was killed, fuelling a
backlash of increased violence that spread across other northern cities
over the next twenty years. Social inequality and poverty contributed both to the Maitatsine and Boko Haram uprisings.
In the decades since the end of British rule, politicians and
academics from the mainly Islamic North have expressed their fundamental
opposition to Western education. Political ethno-religious interest
groups, whose membership includes influential political, military and
religious leaders, have thrived in Nigeria, though they were largely
suppressed under military rule. Their paramilitary
wings, formed since the country's return to civilian rule, have been
implicated in much of the sectarian violence in the years following. The
Arewa People's Congress, the militia wing of the Arewa Consultative Forum,
the main political group representing the interests of northern
Nigeria, is a well-funded group with military and intelligence expertise
and is considered capable of engaging in military action, including
covert bombing.
Founding
Mohammed Yusuf
founded the sect that became known as Boko Haram in 2002 in Maiduguri,
the capital of the north-eastern state of Borno. He established a
religious complex and school that attracted poor Muslim families from
across Nigeria and neighbouring countries. The center had the political
goal of creating an Islamic state, and became a recruiting ground for jihadis. By denouncing the police and state corruption, Yusuf attracted followers from unemployed youth. He is reported to have used the existing infrastructure of the Izala Society
(Jama'at Izalatil Bidiawa Iqamatus Sunnah), a popular conservative
Islamic sect, to recruit members, before breaking away to form his own
faction. The Izala were originally welcomed into government, along with
people sympathetic to Yusuf. Boko Haram conducted its operations more or
less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence,
withdrawing from society into remote north-eastern areas, believing it
was important to develop strength before waging jihad. The government repeatedly ignored warnings about the increasingly militant character of the organization. The Council of Ulama advised the government and the Nigerian Television Authority
not to broadcast Yusuf's preaching, but their warnings were ignored.
Yusuf's arrest elevated him to hero status. Stephen Davis, a former
Anglican clergyman who has negotiated with Boko Haram many times blames
local Nigerian politicians who support local bandits like Boko Haram in
order for them to make life difficult for their political opponents. In
particular Davis has blamed the former governor of Borno State Ali Modu Sheriff,
who initially supported Boko Haram, but no longer needed them after the
2007 elections and stopped funding them. Sheriff denies the
accusations.
Rivalry with ISIL
Boko
Haram and ISIL were initially allies. However, the two groups became
enemies due to territorial disputes, because ISIL tried to conquer the
zones which were under Boko Haram's control.
In July 2014, Shekau released a 16-minute video in which he voiced his support for ISIL's leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, al-Qaeda's leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and the Afghan Taliban's leader Mullah Omar. In March 2015, Shekau pledged allegiance to ISIS self-styled caliphAbu Bakr Al-Baghdadi and became "West African Province" (Wilayat Garb Ifriqiyah),
i.e. the West African province of the Islamic State. However, in August
2016, Al-Baghdadi replaced Shekau with Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the son of
the Boko Haram's previous leader Muhammad Yusuf, their motivation (at
least according to one source) being to trim back Shekau's tendency to
apply takfir (accusations of apostasy) to "all mainstream Muslims".
Shortly before Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIL, the Nigerian government launched the 2015 West African offensive
during which Boko Haram lost most of the territory which it had
occupied over time. Following this offensive, the group retreated to the
Sambisa Forest and commenced its guerilla warfare tactics.
In August 2016, ISIL attempted to remove Shekau from his leadership role and replace him with Abu Musab al-Barnawi. ISIL attempted to remove Shekau because he had disobeyed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's
order to cease targeting Muslim civilians. Shekau rejected the move,
leading to a split between the groups. As of 2017, there were three
factions which were all Boko Haram in origin, all rejecting "democracy,
secularism and Western influence", and seeking to establish an Islamic
state implementing sharia. These were the "West African Province" which is part of ISIL; "Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād" (Boko Haram), under Shekau's control; and "Ansaru" which is loyal to al-Qaeda
and rejected the caliphate of al-Bagdadi, though it shares his
disapproval of the "wide-reaching interpretation of takfir" of Shekau.
Since 2018, there has been a major spike in attacks by Boko Haram, (concentrated in Borno State),
which sought to prove Boko Haram to be the prevalent terror group in
the country. Attacks by Boko Haram resulted in over 1700 fatalities in
the first half of 2019, including casualties of its own members. When climate change-induced poverty and violence struck the Lake Chad basin, the terrorist organization was able to recruit in large numbers by offering small loans and promising big rewards. It also continues to kidnap and force young boys to join them.
Boko Haram is better equipped with drones, weapons and vehicles
captured from and sometimes abandoned by Nigerian military during
ambush.
To better fortify itself, Nigerian military has concentrated the rural
population in its garrison towns. This has allowed Boko Haram to operate
freely in the countryside. In 2019 they were believed to be back in
control of 4 out of 10 zones of Borno State.
For at least four years since the split happened, the two groups
were not enemies and sometimes co-operated in some terror attacks.
However, Boko Haram and ISWAP later became enemies since 2021 or even a
year before. ISWAP gunmen targeted Shekau in an attack carried out on
May 20, 2021. Several Boko Haram members were killed in the operation,
while Shekau blew himself up, or tried to do so, in order to avoid a
capture. It was the first major clash between the two groups. His death was confirmed by his loyalists led by Bakura Sa'alaba in June.
Boko Haram's attacks consist of suicide bombings as well as
conventional armed assaults on both civilian and military targets.
Following the Chibok kidnapping in 2014, the majority of Boko Haram's
suicide bombers are female; many are teenagers and the youngest was
seven. Boko Haram jihadists rely on stealth, blending into local
communities or hiding in the vast countryside. Critics accuse the
Nigerian military of not properly equipping its soldiers to fight Boko
Haram.
In 2009, police began an investigation into the group, code-named Operation Flush.
On 26 July, security forces arrested nine Boko Haram members and
confiscated weapons and bomb-making equipment. Either this or a clash
with police during a funeral procession led to revenge attacks on police
and widespread rioting in Bauchi, Maiduguri, Potiskum in Yobe State and Wudil in Kano State. A joint military task force operation was launched in response. By 30 July, more than 700 people had been killed; police stations, prisons, government offices, schools and churches had been destroyed.
Yusuf was arrested, and died in custody "while trying to escape". As
had been the case decades earlier in the wake of the 1980 Kano riots,
the killing of the leader of an extremist group would have unintended
consequences. He was succeeded by Abubakar Shekau, formerly his second-in-command.
On 7 September, having regrouped under their new leader, Boko Haram
broke 105 of its members out of prison in Bauchi along with over 600
other prisoners. The group went on to intensify their insurgency,
launching many attacks in Nigeria, mostly in the north of the country.
Under Shekau's leadership, the group continuously improved its operational capabilities. It launched a string of IED attacks against soft targets and its first vehicle-borne IED attack on 16 June 2011, killing six at Abuja's police headquarters. On 26 August, Boko Haram bombed the United Nations
(UN) headquarters in Abuja, the first time they had struck a Western
target. A spokesman claiming responsibility for the attack, in which 11
UN staff members died as well as 12 others, with more than 100 injured,
warned of future planned attacks on U.S. and Nigerian government
interests. Speaking soon after the U.S. embassy's announcement of the
arrival in the country of the FBI,
he went on to announce Boko Haram's terms for negotiation, i.e. the
release of all imprisoned members. The increased sophistication of the
group led observers to speculate that Boko Haram was affiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which was active in Niger.
Boko Haram has maintained a steady rate of attacks since 2011,
striking a wide range of targets, multiple times per week. They have
attacked politicians, religious leaders, security forces and civilian
targets. The tactic of suicide bombing,
used in the two attacks in the capital – on the police and UN
headquarters – was new to Nigeria. In Africa as a whole, it had only
been used by al-Shabaab in Somalia and to a lesser extent AQIM.
Within hours of Goodluck Jonathan's presidential inauguration on 29 May 2011, Boko Haram carried out a series of bombings in Bauchi, Zaria
and Abuja. The most successful of these was the attack on the army
barracks in Bauchi. A spokesman for the group told BBC Hausa that the
attack had been carried out, as a test of loyalty, by serving members of
the military hoping to join the group. This charge was later refuted by
an army spokesman who claimed: "This is not a banana republic".
However, on 8 January 2012 the president said that Boko Haram had
infiltrated both the army and the police, as well as the executive,
parliamentary and legislative branches of government. Boko Haram's
spokesman also claimed responsibility for the killing outside his home
in Maiduguri of the politician Abba Anas Ibn Umar Garbai, the younger
brother of the Shehu of Borno, who was the second most prominent Muslim
in the country after the Sultan of Sokoto.
He added: "We are doing what we are doing to fight injustice, if they
stop their satanic ways of doing things and the injustices, we would
stop what we are doing".
This was one of several political and religious assassinations
Boko Haram carried out that year, with the presumed intention of
correcting what they say are injustices in the group's home state of
Borno. Meanwhile, the trail of massacres
continued relentlessly, apparently leading the country towards civil
war. By the end of 2011, these conflicting strategies led observers to
question the group's cohesion; comparisons were drawn with the diverse
motivations of the militant factions of the oil-rich Niger Delta. Adding to the confusion, in November the State Security Service announced that four criminal syndicates were operating under the name Boko Haram.
The common theme throughout the northeast was the targeting of police, who were regularly killed at work or in drive-by shootings
at their homes, either in revenge for the killing of Yusuf, or as
representatives of the state apparatus, or for no particular reason.
Five officers were arrested for Yusuf's murder, which had no noticeable
effect on the level of unrest. Opportunities for criminal enterprise
flourished. Hundreds of police were dead and more than 60 police
stations had been attacked by mid-2012. The government's response to
this self-reinforcing trend towards insecurity was to invest heavily in
security equipment, spending $5.5 billion, 20 per cent of their overall
budget, on bomb detection units, communications and transport; and
$470 million on a ChineseCCTV system for Abuja, which has failed in its purpose of detecting or deterring acts of terror.
The election defeat of former military dictator Muhammadu Buhari
increased ethno-religious political tensions, as it broke the terms of a
tacit agreement that the presidency would alternate after two terms of
office between candidates from the Christian south and Muslim north of
the country. Sectarian riots engulfed the twelve northern states of the
country during the three days following the election, leaving more than
800 dead and 65,000 displaced.
The subsequent campaign of violence by Boko Haram culminated in a
string of bombings across the country on Christmas Day. In the outskirts
of Abuja, 37 died in a church that had its roof blown off. One resident
commented, "Cars were in flames and bodies littered everywhere", a
phrase commonly repeated in international press reports about the
bombings. Similar Christmas events had been reported in previous years.
Jonathan declared a state of emergency on New Year's Eve in local government areas of Jos, Borno, Yobe and Niger and closed the international border in the north-east.
2012
State of emergency
Three days later they began a series of mostly small-scale attacks on Christians and members of the Igbo
ethnic group, causing hundreds to flee. In Kano, on 20 January, they
carried out by far their most deadly action yet, an assault on police
buildings, killing 190. One of the victims was a TV reporter. The
attacks included a combined use of car bombs, suicide bombers and IEDs,
supported by uniformed gunmen.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
published reports in 2012 that were widely quoted by government
agencies and the media, based on research conducted over the course of
the conflict in the worst affected areas of the country. The NGOs
were critical of both security forces and Boko Haram. HRW stated "Boko
Haram should immediately cease all attacks, and threats of attacks, that
cause loss of life, injury, and destruction of property. The Nigerian
government should take urgent measures to address the human rights
abuses that have helped fuel the violent militancy". According to the
2012 US Department of StateCountry Report on Human Rights Practices:
[S]erious human rights problems included extrajudicial killings by security forces, including summary executions; security force torture, rape, and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of prisoners, detainees, and criminal suspects; harsh and life-threatening prison and detention center conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention;
prolonged pretrial detention; denial of fair public trial; executive
influence on the judiciary; infringements on citizens' privacy rights;
restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion, and
movement.
On 9 October, witnesses in Maiduguri claimed members of the JTF "Restore Order" [a vigilante group], based in Maiduguri, went on a killing spree
after a suspected Boko Haram bomb killed an officer. Media reported the
JTF killed 20 to 45 civilians and razed 50 to 100 houses in the
neighborhood. The JTF commander in Maiduguri denied the allegations. On 2
November, witnesses claimed the JTF shot and killed up to 40 people
during raids in Maiduguri. The army claimed it dismissed some officers
from the military as a result of alleged abuses committed in Maiduguri,
but there were no known formal prosecutions in Maiduguri by year's end.
Credible reports also indicated ... uniformed military personnel and paramilitarymobile police carried out summary executions, assaults, torture, and other abuses throughout Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Kaduna, Plateau, and Yobe states ... The national police, army, and other security forces committed extrajudicial killings and used lethal and excessive force
to apprehend criminals and suspects, as well as to disperse protesters.
Authorities generally did not hold police accountable for the use of
excessive or deadly force or for the deaths of persons in custody. Security forces generally operated with impunity in the illegal apprehension, detention, and sometimes extrajudicialexecution of criminal suspects. The reports of state or federal panels of inquiry investigating suspicious deaths remained unpublished.
There were no new developments in the case of five police
officers accused of executing Muhammad Yusuf in 2009 at a state police
headquarters. In July 2011, authorities arraigned five police officers
in the federal high court in Abuja for the murder of Yusuf. The court granted bail to four of the officers, while one remained in custody.
Police use of excessive force, including use of live ammunition,
to disperse demonstrators resulted in numerous killings during the year.
For example, although the January fuel subsidy demonstrations generally
remained peaceful, security forces reportedly fired on protesters in
various states across the country during those demonstrations, resulting
in 10 to 15 deaths and an unknown number of wounded.
Despite some improvements resulting from the closure of police
checkpoints in many parts of the country, states with an increased
security presence due to the activities of Boko Haram experienced a rise
in violence and lethal force at police and military roadblocks.
Continuing abductions of civilians by criminal groups occurred in the Niger Delta and Southeast ... Police and other security forces were often implicated in the kidnapping schemes.
Although the constitution and law prohibit such practices and provide
for punishment of such abuses, torture is not criminalized, and security
service personnel, including police, military, and State Security
Service (SSS) officers, regularly tortured, beat, and abused
demonstrators, criminal suspects, detainees, and convicted prisoners.
Police mistreated
civilians to extort money. The law prohibits the introduction into
trials of evidence and confessions obtained through torture; however,
police often used torture to extract confessions.
2013
Nigeria's Borno State, where Boko Haram is based, adjoins Lake Chad as do Niger, Cameroon and the country of Chad. The conflict and refugees spilled over the national borders to involve all four countries.
In 2013, Boko Haram increased operations in Northern Cameroon,
and were involved in skirmishes along the borders of Chad and Niger.
They were linked to a number of kidnappings, often reportedly in
association with the splinter group Ansaru, drawing towards them a higher level of international attention.
In February 2013, Boko Haram was
responsible for kidnapping seven French tourists in the far north of
Cameroon. In November 2013, Boko Haram members kidnapped a French priest
in Cameroon. In December 2013, Boko Haram gunmen reportedly attacked
civilians in several areas of northern Cameroon. Security forces from
Chad and Niger also reportedly partook in skirmishes against suspected
Boko Haram members along Nigeria's borders. In 2013, the group also
kidnapped eight French citizens in northern Cameroon and obtained ransom
payments for their release.
Boko Haram has often managed to evade the Nigerian Army by retreating
into the hills around the border with Cameroon, whose army is
apparently unwilling to confront them. Nigeria, Chad and Niger had
formed a Multinational Joint Task Force in 1998. In February 2012,
Cameroon signed an agreement with Nigeria to establish a Joint
Trans-Border Security Committee, which was inaugurated in November 2013,
when Cameroon announced plans to conduct "coordinated but separate"
border patrols in 2014. It convened again in July 2014 to further
improve cooperation between the two countries.
In late 2013, Amnesty International received 'credible'
information that over 950 inmates had died in custody, mostly in
detention centres in Maiduguri and Damaturu, within the first half of the year. Official state corruption was also documented in December 2013 by the UK Home Office:
The NPF [Nigeria Police Force],
SSS, and military report to civilian authorities; however, these
security services periodically act outside of civilian control. The
government lack effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and
corruption. The NPF remain susceptible to corruption, commit human
rights abuses, and generally operate with impunity in the apprehension,
illegal detention, and sometimes execution of criminal suspects. The SSS
also commit human rights abuses, particularly in restricting freedom of
speech and press. In some cases private citizens or the government
brought charges against perpetrators of human rights abuses in these
units. However, most cases lingered in court or went unresolved after an
initial investigation.
The state of emergency was extended in May 2013 to cover the whole of the three north-eastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe,
raising tensions in the region. In the 12 months following the
announcement, 250,000 fled the three states, followed by a further
180,000 between May and August 2014. A further 210,000 fled from
bordering states, bringing the total displaced by the conflict to
650,000. Many thousands left the country. An August 2014 Amnesty
International video showed Army and allied militia executing people,
including by slitting their throats, and dumping their corpses in mass
graves. According to Human Rights Watch, more than 130 villages and towns were attacked or controlled by the group.
Kano shootings
On 8 February, at least nine polio vaccinators were killed in shootings at two clinics in Kano.
On 16 and 17 April, a massacre of dozens of civilians as well as the
destruction of hundreds of homes and businesses occurred in Baga, Borno, during a battle between Boko Haram and the Nigerian Army.
On 25 February, Boko Haram killed at least 59 males at the Federal
Government College in Buni Yadi, Yobe. The school was attended by
children aged 11 to 18.
Some boys were burned alive in their dormitories while those who
managed to escape the fire were shot or knifed to death. Some female
students were abducted while others were threatened with death if they
did not quit school and get married. All of the school's buildings were
burned to the ground.
On 14–15 April, Boko Haram kidnapped 276 schoolgirls from Chibok, Borno. Shekau announced his intention of selling them into slavery.
More than 50 escaped. The incident brought Boko Haram extended global
media attention, much of it focused on the pronouncements of the U.S. Former First LadyMichelle Obama.
Faced with condemnation for his perceived incompetence, as well as
allegations from Amnesty International of state collusion, President
Jonathan responded by hiring a Washington PR firm.
Parents of the missing girls and those who had escaped were kept
waiting until July to meet with the president, which caused them
concern. In October, the government announced the girls' imminent
release, but the information proved unreliable. The announcement to the
media of a peace agreement and the imminent release of all the missing
girls was followed days later by a video message in which Shekau stated
that no such meeting had taken place and that the girls had been
"married off". The announcement to the media, unaccompanied by any
evidence of the reality of the agreement, was thought by analysts to
have been a political ploy by the president to raise his popularity
before his confirmation of his candidacy in the 2015 general election.
Earlier in the year, the girls' plight had featured on
"#BringBackOurGirls" political campaign posters in the streets of the
capital, which the president denied knowledge of and soon took down
after news of criticism surfaced. These posters, which were interpreted,
to the dismay of campaigners for the girls' recapture, as being
designed to benefit from the fame of the kidnapping, had also been part
of Jonathan's "pre-presidential campaign". In September,
"#BringBackGoodluck2015" campaign posters again drew criticism. The official announcement of the president's candidacy was made before cheering crowds in Abuja on 11 November.
In February 2016, the organizations International Alert and UNICEF
published a study revealing that girls and women released from Boko
Haram captivity often face rejection upon returning to their communities
and families, in part due to a culture of stigma around sexual
violence.
On 28 November, 120 people were killed at the central mosque in Kano during Friday prayers.
Northern Cameroon
Boko Haram continued to increase its presence in northern Cameroon.
On 16 May, ten Chinese workers were abducted in a raid on a construction
company camp in Waza, near the Nigerian border. Vehicles and explosives
were also taken in the raid, and one Cameroonian soldier was killed.
Cameroon's anti-terrorist Rapid Intervention Battalion attempted to
intervene but were vastly outnumbered.
In July, the deputy prime minister's home village was attacked by
around 200 militants; his wife was kidnapped, along with the Sultan of Kolofata
and his family. At least 15 people, including soldiers and police, were
killed in the raid. The deputy prime minister's wife was subsequently
released in October, along with 26 others including the ten Chinese
construction workers who had been captured in May; authorities made no
comment about any ransom, which the Cameroon government had previously
claimed it never pays.
In a separate attack, nine bus passengers and a soldier were shot dead
and the son of a local chief was kidnapped. Hundreds of local youths are
suspected to have been recruited. In August, the remote Nigerian border
town of Gwoza
was overrun and held by the group. In response to the increased
militant activity, the Cameroonian president sacked two senior military
officers and sent his army chief with 1000 reinforcements to the
northern border region.
Between May and July 2014, 8,000 Nigerian refugees arrived in the
country, up to 25 per cent suffering from acute malnutrition. Cameroon,
which ranked 150 out of 186 on the 2012 UNDPHDI, hosted as of August 2014 107,000 refugees fleeing unrest in the CAR, a number that was expected to increase to 180,000 by the end of the year. A further 11,000 Nigerian refugees crossed the border into Cameroon and Chad during August.
In the second half of December, the focus of activity switched to the Far North Region
of Cameroon, beginning on the morning of 17 December when an army
convoy was attacked with an IED and ambushed by hundreds of militants
near the border town of Amchide, 60 kilometres (40 mi) north of the state capital Maroua.
One soldier was confirmed dead, and an estimated 116 militants were
killed in the attack, which was followed by another attack overnight
with unknown casualties.
On 22 December, the Rapid Intervention Battalion followed up with an
attack on a Boko Haram training camp near Guirdivig, arresting 45
militants and seizing 84 children aged 7–15 who were undergoing
training, according to a statement from Cameroon's Ministry of Defense. The militants fled in pick-up trucks carrying an unknown number of their dead; no information on army casualties was released.
On 27–28 December, five villages were simultaneously attacked, and for
the first time the Cameroon military launched air attacks when Boko
Haram briefly occupied an army camp. Casualty figures were not released.
According to Information Minister Issa Tchiroma:
Units
of the group attacked Makari, Amchide, Limani and Achigachia in a
change of strategy which consists of distracting Cameroonian troops on
different fronts, making them more vulnerable in the face of the
mobility and unpredictability of their attacks.
Expansion of occupied territory
The attack on Gwoza signalled a change in strategy for Boko Haram, as
the group continued to capture territory in north-eastern and eastern
areas of Borno, as well as in Adamawa and Yobe. Attacks across the
border were repelled by the Cameroon military. The territorial gains were officially denied by the Nigerian military. In a video obtained by the news agency AFP on 24 August, Shekau announced that Gwoza was now part of an Islamic caliphate. The town of Bama,
70 kilometres (45 mi) from the state capital Maiduguri, was reported to
have been captured at the beginning of September, resulting in
thousands of residents fleeing to Maiduguri, even as residents there
were themselves attempting to flee.
The military continued to deny Boko Haram's territorial gains, which
were, however, confirmed by local vigilantes who had managed to escape.
The militants were reportedly killing men and teenage boys in the town
of over 250,000 inhabitants. Soldiers refused orders to advance on the
occupied town; hundreds fled across the border into Cameroon, but were
promptly repatriated. Fifty-four deserters were later sentenced to death by firing squad.
On 17 October, the Chief of the Defence Staff
announced that a ceasefire had been brokered, stating: "I have
accordingly directed the service chiefs to ensure immediate compliance
with this development in the field". Despite a lack of confirmation from
the militants, the announcement was publicised in newspaper headlines
worldwide. However, within 48 hours the same publications were reporting
that Boko Haram attacks had continued unabated. It was reported that
factionalisation would make such a deal particularly difficult to
achieve.
On 29 October, Mubi,
a town of 200,000 in Adamawa, fell to the militants, further
undermining confidence in the peace talks. Thousands fled south to
Adamawa's capital city, Yola.
Amid media speculation that the ceasefire announcement had been part of
President Jonathan's re-election campaign, a video statement released
by Boko Haram through the normal communication channels via AFP on 31
October stated that no negotiations had in fact taken place.
Mubi was said to have been recaptured by the army on 13 November. On
the same day, Boko Haram seized Chibok, but two days later the army
recaptured the largely deserted town. As of 16 November it was estimated
that more than twenty towns and villages had been taken control of by
the militants. There were 27 Boko Haram attacks during the November, killing at least 786.
On 3 December, it was reported that several towns in North
Adamawa had been recovered by the Nigerian military with the help of
local vigilantes and Bala Nggilari, the governor of Adamawa state, said that the military were aiming to recruit 4,000 vigilantes.
On 13 December, Boko Haram attacked the village of Gumsuri in Borno,
killing over 30 and kidnapping over 100 women and children.
On 3 January, Boko Haram attacked Baga,
seizing it and the multinational joint task force military base. As the
militants advanced the army fled. Some residents managed to escape to
Chad. Although the death toll of the massacre was earlier estimated by Western media to be upwards of 2000, the Defence Ministry dismissed these claims as "speculation and conjecture", estimating the figure to be closer to 150. On 25 January, the militants advanced to Monguno, capturing the town and a nearby military base. Their advance on Maiduguri and Konduga, 40 km to the southeast, was repelled. After retaking Monguno, the army expelled the militants from Baga on 21 February.
The Baga massacre was one of the Nigerian Army's biggest defeats
in terms of loss of equipment and civilian casualties. Several officers
were court-martialed. In October, General Enitan Ransome-Kuti
was dismissed from the army and sentenced to six months imprisonment.
It was determined that he had failed in his duty to launch a
counter-attack after retreating from the town.
Starting on 23 January, a coalition of military forces from Nigeria,
Chad, Cameroon, and Niger began a campaign against Boko Haram. On 4 February, the Chadian Army killed over 200 Boko Haram militants. Soon afterwards, Boko Haram carried out a massacre in the town of Fotokol in Far North, Cameroon, killing 81 civilians, 13 Chadian soldiers and 6 Cameroonian soldiers. On 2 March, the Nigerian military defeated Boko Haram in the Battle of Konduga.
On 7 March, Boko Haram's leader Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to ISIL via an audio message posted on the organisation's Twitter account. Nigerian army spokesperson Sami Usman Kukasheka said the pledge was a
sign of weakness and that Shekau was like a "drowning man". On 12 March 2015, ISIL's spokesman Abu Mohammad al-Adnani
released an audiotape in which he welcomed the pledge of allegiance,
and described it as an expansion of the group's caliphate to West
Africa.
On 24 March, residents of Damasak, Borno State, said that Boko Haram had taken more than 400 women and children from the town as they fled from coalition forces who retook itand discovered a mass grave of Boko Haram victims. On 27 March, the Nigerian Army captured Gwoza, which was believed to be the location of Boko Haram headquarters.
On election day 28 March 2015, Boko Haram extremists killed 41 people,
including a legislator, to discourage hundreds from voting.
In March, Boko Haram lost control of the Northern Nigerian towns of Bama and Gwoza
to the Nigerian army. The Nigerian authorities said that they had taken
back 11 of the 14 districts previously controlled by Boko Haram. In April, four Boko Haram camps in the Sambisa Forest were overrun by the Nigerian military who freed nearly 300 females. Boko Haram forces were believed to have retreated to the Mandara Mountains, along the Nigeria-Cameroon border.
In late February, suicide bombers killed about 50 people in Damaturu, Potiskum and Kano.
Attrition of Catholic diocese of Maiduguri
A
report by the Catholic diocese of Maiduguri estimated that as of May
2015 over 5,000 Nigerian Catholics had been killed by Boko Haram. The
diocese also reported 7,000 widows and 10,000 orphans among its laity.
Furthermore, Boko Haram militants had taken over several parish centres
within the diocese.
On 15 June, two suicide bombings of police sites in N'Djamena, the capital and largest city of Chad, killed 38 people. Boko Haram later claimed responsibility for these attacks. On 27 June, suicide bombers killed six members of their own cell and five police officers during a police raid.
On 11 July, a male suicide bomber disguised in a woman's burqa
detonated his explosives belt in the main market of N'Djamena, next to
the main mosque, killing 15 people and injuring 80.
Several days after the bombing, Boko Haram claimed responsibility via
Twitter, signing as "Islamic State, West Africa province".
Boko Haram militants attacked multiple mosques on 1 and 2 July.
Forty-eight men and boys were killed on the 1st at one mosque in Kukawa.
Seventeen were wounded in the attack. Ninety-seven others, mostly men,
were killed in numerous mosques on the 2nd with a number of women and
young girls killed in their homes. An unknown number were wounded.
On 12 July, two female suicide bombers wearing burqas killed 13
people in Fotokol. In response, the governor of Far North banned the
garments to prevent further similar attacks.
Claims of defeat
The March 2015 general election was won by Buhari, who had vowed to remove inefficiency and corruption in the military.
On 9 September 2015, the director of information at the Defence
Headquarters, Colonel Rabe Abubakar announced that all known Boko Haram
camps and cells had been destroyed, and that the group was so weakened
that they could no longer hold any territory:
These terrorists have been subdued,
even if they are adopting other means and as they are re-strategising,
we are also doing the same and pre-empting them. We have coordinated the
air and ground assaults to make sure that these terrorists' hideouts
are completely decimated. As I am speaking to you, all the terrorists'
camps have completely been wiped out. So right now they are completely
in disarray, have no command and control of where to plan. We have even
taken over their camps that most of them abandoned and are attempting to
blend into towns and communities. We have also apprehended some of them
and very soon innocent Nigerians can move back to their communities. We
are making a lot of headway, so people should know that Boko Haram is
no longer strong enough to hold grounds. Very soon this issue of whether
they are in control of any territory in Nigeria or not will come to the
open. I am assuring you that they will never again recapture the
territory taken from them because what is happening right now with the
deployment of troops, equipment and morale will ensure that.
Buhari later reiterated in December that Boko Haram was "technically defeated" and declared in December 2016 that the group had been entirely ousted from its last stronghold of Sambisa Forest.
On 20 September, a series of bombings occurred in Maiduguri and Monguno
and the attacks followed an announcement by Shekau refuting the army's
claims of defeat. A military spokesman stated that the event showed the
"high level of desperation" of Boko Haram. The Arewa Consultative Forum released a statement condemning the bombings and commending the military offensive:
The
ACF condemns in strong terms the continued use of suicide bombers by
Boko Haram terrorists to kill innocent people in the name of a religious
war, as no religion condones such cruel and barbaric act. The ACF
wishes to commend the military and other security agencies for the
continued onslaught on the terrorists' enclaves and hideouts, thereby
dislodging them from their strong holds. The ACF urges the military not
to be deterred by the cowardly act of the Boko Haram terrorists, as
their renewed effort and determination will soon end the insurgency. The
ACF also appeals to the military to intensify its synergy of sharing
intelligence with the community.
On 21 October in Nganzai,
Borno, according to a civilian vigilante, fleeing militants shot at
four cars, killing the passengers, and burnt and looted the nearby
village.
On 23 October, a suicide bombing occurred in a pre dawn attack at a
mosque in Maiduguri. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) put
the death toll at 6 while hospital sources reported 19 deaths and a
vigilante claimed to have counted 28 corpses and two suicide bombers.
On the following day, four female suicide bombers claimed one victim
after they were intercepted by the JTF in Maiduguri, according to a NEMA
spokesman.
On 27 October, a military operation freed 192 children and 138 women being held captive in two camps in the Sambisa forest and 30 militants were killed, according to a social media statement from the Defense HQ. None of the captives were those taken in Chibok in April 2014.
On 25 December, gunmen set fire to the village of Kimba, killing at least 14, according to vigilantes. On 27 December, gunmen armed with RPGs
battled with troops for two hours in Aldawari village in the outskirts
of Maiduguri, according to NEMA. On the following morning, a bombing at a
nearby mosque killed around 20, according to NEMA.
Federal Capital Territory/Nasarawa
Two bombings on 2 October that killed 18 and wounded 41, one in Nyanya in Nasarawa and the other in Kuje, FCT were also claimed by Boko Haram.
Adamawa
On
1 October, villagers in Kirchinga, Adamawa complained of a lack of
security personnel after 5 residents had their throats slit during an
unchallenged early morning attack. The village borders Cameroon and the
Sambisa forest. On 18 October the village of Dar, Adamawe was attacked. Maina Ularamu, a former chairman of Madagali
Local Government Area, stated: "A large number of gunmen invaded the
village, forcing residents to flee to a nearby bush. Two female suicide
bombers disguised as fleeing villagers detonated explosives in the bush
where many people were hiding, killing 12 persons".
On 20 October, there were reports of a military ambush in Madagali,
assisted by vigilantes, in which over 30 militants were killed.
On 21 October, according to vigilante reports a joint operation in
Madagali and Gwoza killed 150 militants and rescued 36 captives. On 23 October, a suicide bomb at a crowded mosque killed 27 in Yola, Adamawa's capital. On 17 November, an explosion at a food market in Yola killed 32, in the first Nigerian bombing since 23 October attacks in Maiduguri and Yola.
On the morning of 28 December, two female suicide bombers detonated
their explosives at a crowded market in Madagali. According to a local
resident, at least 28 were killed.
Yobe
On 7 October in Damaturu, Yobe at least 15 people were killed by 3 suicide bombers.
In Goniri, Yobe, seven soldiers and over 100 militants were killed, and
a large arms cache was found, according to an army spokesman, who said
that the recent apparent rise in suicide bombings was an indication of
the success of military operations.
Kano
Boko
Haram claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on a procession of
Shi'ite Muslims killing at least 21, on 30 November, near the village of
Dakozoye. A week earlier two bombers had killed at least 14 in Kano
city.
On 12 January, Boko Haram attacked a Cameroonian military base in Kolofata, a commune in the Far North region. Government forces report killing 143 militants, while one Cameroonian soldier was killed.
On 18 January, Boko Haram raided two Tourou Cameroon area villages,
torching houses, killing some residents and kidnapping between 60 and 80
people including an estimated 50 young children between the ages of 10
and 15.
On 11 October, in the far north region of Cameroon two female
suicide bombers killed nine people in the town of Mora. On 18 October,
10 militants were killed when they attacked a Cameroon military
anti-terrorist division convoy close to the border, after a military
vehicle became stuck in mud. One army commander later died of his
wounds.
On 12 October, the first 90 of a proposed deployment of 300 US troops
arrived in the region to assist with training, reconnaissance and
airborne intelligence using Predator drones. On 16 October, more than six security vehicles were transferred to the Cameroon military. An AFRICOM
spokesman said that increased cooperation had led them "to study the
viability of ISR flights from a temporary location in Cameroon". The
deployment is "totally separate and distinct" from operations in Chad
and Niger, where 250 and 85 personnel, respectively, are conducting
missions including ISR and training.
On 23 October, Boko Haram fighters were driven out of Kerawa, a
village of 50,000 in Kolofata. They had briefly occupied the village
until the arrival of security forces. Reports of civilian casualties
ranged from eight to eleven. An army spokesman claimed the militants
suffered heavy casualties. The village's military base had previously
been targeted by suicide bombers on 3 September, when 30 were killed.
On 9 November, two female suicide bombers killed three Nigerians during a security check in a truck full of Nigerian refugees. On 21 November, a suicide attack in a suburb of Fotokol
town killed four. An anonymous military official said: "The first
kamikaze detonated his bomb in the house of the traditional chief of
Leymarie. Five people died including the bomber. Several minutes later,
three female bombers exploded their bombs close to the initial site but
they didn't kill anyone else because they acted too quickly".
On 28 November, two suicide bombers killed six near the military
base in Dabanga, and in an attack in Gouzoudou five people were killed,
according to a military spokesman.
On 1 December, two suicide bombers killed three, and a third bomber was
killed before detonating explosives. On 2 December, Cameroon's Defense
Minister claimed that, at the end of November, 100 Boko Haram members
had been killed and 900 hostages freed, and that a large stockpile of
arms and munitions, and black-and-white ISIL flags had been seized.
Information Minister Issa Tchiroma Bakari said that "[t]he people that
were freed are just villagers. The [Chibok] schoolgirls who are missing
are not amongst the group".
On 6 October, the Chadian Army reported an attack in the border
region of Lake Chad. 11 soldiers were killed and 14 wounded in the
pre-dawn cross-border infiltration, and 17 militants were also killed,
according to an army spokesman. On 10 October, 5 suicide bombers killed 33 people in the market in Baga Sola, a camp for Nigerian refugees.
On 1 November, two dawn attacks on army posts occurred. Eleven
militants and two soldiers were killed at Kaika, and in an attempted
suicide bombing at Bougouma, "Two members of Boko Haram were neutralised
and a third blew himself up, wounding 11 civilians", according to a
government statement. A state of emergency was imposed in the western Lake Chad region on 9
November, initially for 12 days, but extended by Chad's national
assembly on 18 November to four months.
On 6 February, Boko Haram assaulted Bosso and Diffa.
On 25 September, at least 15 civilians were massacred and stores were
looted in a cross-border raid on a Niger village, according to anonymous
military sources. On 2 October two soldiers died and four were wounded in a Boko Haram attack on a village near the Nigerian border in Niger's Diffa
province. The militants also looted stores, according to Niger army
officers. On 4 October, according to an aid worker, a policeman and five
civilians were killed by 4 suicide bombers near the Nigerian border. On
6 October, three suspected Boko Haram militants accidentally blew
themselves up while transporting explosives to Bosso
town in Diffa. On 21 October, near Diffa town, two soldiers were killed
by explosives while intercepting an attack. Diffa region hosts over
150,000 Nigerian refugees. It is under a state of emergency. On 14
October a curfew and movement restrictions were imposed.
At least 57 attacks occurred there from February to October. More than
1,100 Boko Haram suspects were arrested in Niger during 2015.
On 11 November, two Niger military officials described an attack
on a village in Bosso district in which five civilians and 20 militants
were killed. A senior government official later denied that the attack
had occurred, according to Reuters.
On 26 November, Boko Haram launched a cross-border night raid on Wogom
village in Diffa province. A government spokesman, Justice Minister
Marou Amadou stated: "Eighteen villagers were killed, including the
chief imam for the village whose throat was slit by his own nephew".
On 13 March 2018, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons (IDP), Cecilia Jimenez-Damary said "Since the first attacks in Niger by Boko Haram in 2015, the Diffa
region, in the south-eastern part of the country, has been confronted
with a continuing security crisis which has uprooted more than 129,000
internally from their homes, in addition to the arrival of 108,000
refugees from Nigeria, and has triggered a humanitarian crisis.
He said that IDPs in Niger are posing huge challenges to the country
and require a strong and comprehensive response. He also said situation
in the regions bordering Mali has led to the displacement of some 1,540 persons.
On 30 January, at least 86 people were killed and at least 62 more
injured in an attack by Boko Haram militants on Dalori Village which is
located in Borno State, 4 kilometers from Maiduguri.[289] The Nigerian Army was unable to fight the militants until reinforcements arrived, causing Boko Haram to retreat.[290]
On 16 March, two female suicide bombers killed 22 people in
Maiduguri. On 29 October, two female suicide bombers killed seven people
in the same city.
Weakening and split
Johns Hopkins University figures indicated that Boko Haram killed 244 people in the second quarter – the lowest quarterly figure for five years.
In early August, ISIL announced that it had appointed Abu-Musab al-Barnawi as the new leader of the group.
In a video released a few days later, Shekau refused to accept
al-Barnawi's appointment as leader and vowed to fight him while stating
that he was still loyal to ISIL's leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
The group has since split into pro-Barnawi and pro-Shekau factions, with reports of armed clashes breaking out between them.
Shekau has released videos since the split in which he refers to his
group by its previous name of Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah
wa'l-Jihād.
On 23 August, the Nigerian Army announced it conducted an
overnight air-operation that was 'very successful' in killing the
leadership of Boko Haram. Among those presumed killed was Abubakar Shekau,
he died in an aerial bombardment in Taye village. The Nigerian Army
claims that the disputed Boko Haram leader died from injuries to his
shoulders while he was performing prayer.
On 28 August, the Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari, retracted the military's statement and claimed that the Boko Haram leader was 'wounded' but not killed in the air-strike.
On 31 August, Major General Lucky Irabor stated that the militants now only controlled a few villages and towns near Lake Chad and in Sambisa Forest. He further stated that the military expected recapturing the final strongholds of the group within weeks.
On 17 January, the Nigerian Air Force carried out an airstrike on an IDP camp in Rann, Borno. They had mistaken it for a Boko Haram camp; the bombing killed dozens of civilians.
Increase in the number of child suicide bombings
UNICEF
reported an increase in the number of child suicide bombers with 27
incidents occurring in the first three months of 2017 in Nigeria, Niger,
Cameroon and Chad, compared to 30 in the entire previous year, 56 in
2015 and 4 in 2014. Kidnapped children who escape from Boko Haram are
often held in custody or ostracized by their communities or families.
Patrick Rose, a UNICEF regional coordinator, stated: "They are held in
military barracks, separated from their parents, without medical
follow-up, without psychological support, without education, under
conditions and for durations that are unknown". According to the NGO:
"Society's rejection of these children, and their sense of isolation and
desperation, could be making them more vulnerable to promises of
martyrdom through acceptance of dangerous and deadly missions".In addition to child suicide bombers and despite having been routed from
key areas and significantly downgraded in their capacities, throughout
2016 and into 2017, Boko Haram in Nigeria continued to wage attacks
against Nigerian security forces, the community-based Civilian Joint
Task Forces (CJTF), and regular citizens, using improvised explosives
devices (IEDs) and other crude weaponry. These were often deployed with
suicide bombers; an increasing number of whom were women and girls
recruited to attack markets, transportation depots, mosques, and IDP
camps.
On 6 December, Boko Haram attacked Nigerian and American soldiers in Diffa Region, Niger.
2018
Dapchi kidnapping
Boko Haram kidnapped 110 schoolgirls from the Government Technical Girls College in Dapchi,
Yobe State, on 19 February 2018, killing five of them on the same day.
They released all but one of the surviving girls on 21 March, having
been paid a large ransom by the Nigerian government to do so.
Maiduguri attack
On
2 April, a Boko Haram attack on the outskirts of Maiduguri resulted in
the death of 18 people and another 84 wounded. This attack came just
days after the government of Nigeria claimed there was a ceasefire with
Boko Haram. The attack happened in the villages of Bale Shuwa and Bale
Kura, close to both Maiduguri and the city's military camp.
Operation Lafiya Dole
On
18 May, the Nigerian Army killed 15 Boko Haram insurgents and rescued
49 persons in separate encounters between Boko Haram and Nigerian troops
throughout the Southern Lake Chad Basin. The Nigerian troops killed 11
of the insurgents during a battle in Gamoran Village, while the
remaining insurgents were killed trying to escape from the Army's
efforts in Northern Borno. The Nigerian troops rescued 4 men, 33 women,
and 16 children from the insurgent's hideouts in the area.
Attacks in north-east Nigeria
In
December, Boko Haram launched a series of attacks in north-east
Nigeria. Militants from Islamic State West Africa Province took over the
town of Baga and seized the Multinational Joint Task Force base. The attacks took place two months prior to the presidential elections in Nigeria.
2019
Attack near Nigerian Army chief of staff's family home
On
17 January, 6 Nigerian soldiers were killed and 14 injured by the Boko
Haram jihadists during a raid at a village near the army chief's family
home. Four military vehicles were also seized by the jihadists and two
were completely destroyed.
Attack against Chadian security forces
On
22 March, Boko Haram militants killed at least 23 Chadian soldiers
overnight, two Chadian security sources said on that day, in what
appeared to be the deadliest ever such attack inside Chad by the
Islamist militants. The raid occurred in the town of Dangdala, near the banks of Lake Chad. One of security sources added that the assailants were believed to have crossed the border from neighboring Niger.
Konduga bombings
On 16 June, a triple suicide bombing occurred outside a television-viewing hall in Konduga, Borno.
Nganzai funeral attack
On 27 July, civilians were massacred as they returned from a funeral in Nganzai, Borno.
Attack against a Nigerian military base
On
15 August, Nigerian soldiers were killed during a gun battle with
Islamist militants in a village on the outskirts of Borno capital
Maiduguri.
Attack against a Burkina Faso military base
On
20 September, Boko Haram said that its fighters carried out an August
attack in Koutougou in northern Burkina Faso that killed 24 soldiers.
On 23 March, Boko Haram fighters attacked soldiers in Boma, Chad,
killing 92 and destroying 24 army vehicles. It marked the deadliest ever
attack by Boko Haram on the country's military forces, and a serious
escalation of conflict.
In its eight-day counter-operation "Operation Bohoma Anger", Chadian
army claims to have killed around one thousand Boko Haram fighters while
incurring 52 casualties of its own troops. Of 58 suspected Boko Haram members, who had been captured during the operation, 44 died in a prison in N'Djamena mid-April 2020. The Minister of Justice Djimet Arabi stated that the men died as a result of poisoning.
Goneri ambush
On
23 March, at least 50 Nigerian soldiers were killed in an ambush by
Boko Haram fighters near Goneri village in Borno. The army stated that
all Boko Haram fighters were killed, although the number was not stated.
Amchide bombing
On 5 April, two Boko Haram suicide bombers killed seven civilians and themselves in Amchide, Far North Region, Cameroon.
Gajigana attack
On 18 May, Just as people were preparing to break their Ramadan
fast after sundown, the sect attacked the Nigerian village of Gajigana,
Borno, 29 miles north of the state capital Maiduguri, killing at least
20 people and injuring 25 others. Their rebellion has now claimed more
than 20,000 lives and left more than 7 million people in need of
humanitarian assistance.
On December 11, more than 330 students were abducted from the Government Science Secondary School in Kankara, Katsina State, after gunmen with assault rifles attacked their school. Boko Haram later claimed responsibility for this.
On 24 December, Boko Haram killed at least 11 people, burnt a church
and kidnapped a priest in the predominantly Christian village of Pemi in
Borno. On 26 December, Turkey condemned the terrorist attack, describing it as "heinous". The Turkish ministry extended its sincere condolences to the families of those who died.
Wulgo forest kidnapping
On
24 December, 40 loggers were seized by Boko Haram jihadists, while 3
others were killed in the Wulgo forest near the town of Gamboru in
Borno. Bodies of three loggers were found in the forest by a militia
leader, and the rest were presumed kidnapped.
On 20 May, Nigerian intelligence officials said that Boko Haram
leader Abubakar Shekau died after he detonated a suicide vest in order
to avoid being captured during a battle with rival Islamist militants
aligned with ISIS. Internal intelligence memos backing this claim were afterwards shown to the Wall Street Journal.
Five Nigerian officials, mediators, as well as phone calls intercepted
by a West African spy agency backed the report of Shekau's death.
2022
In
March, Catholic Church sources in Cameroon, near the border with
Nigeria, claimed that they had been attacked regularly by Boko Haram
militants since September 2021. In one attack "they managed to reach Oupaï
by coming through Douval. They killed two people, burned the houses and
carried off clothing and small animals. Since mid-February four of the
seven areas of the parish have been paralysed. We thought they wouldn't
be able to reach Oupaï because it is right on top of a mountain, but we
were wrong!" According to an anonymous priest, the attacks seemed to be
mostly focused on obtaining supplies. "In the past they entered
villages, ostentatiously yelling war cries, but recently they have come
discretely, taking advantage of the full moon, to surprise people in
their sleep. They kill the fathers of the family and the teenagers,
especially the boys. Then they pillage the family's property and destroy
everything they can't carry off."
On 11 August, 5 soldiers were killed during a terrorist attack in Bwari, Abuja. The soldiers were serving with the 7 Guards Battalion, Lungi Barracks, Maitama and 176 Guards Battalion, Gwagwalada in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja Organisation.
2023
2023 Yobe State attacks
in October, Boko Haram lead one of its most horrific attack for last
years. Terrorist group has killed 20 mourners returning from the burial
of victims of an earlier attack by the terrorists in north-eastern
Nigeria, police say. This earlier attack happened in village Gurokayeya
which claimed the life of 17 individuals. According to the local police
villagers have been killed after refusing paying the illegal "harvest
tax" which claimed by terrorist. This massacre become one of the major
attacks of terrorist organization for last year in Yobe region.
Organisation
Leader
Boko
Haram was founded by Mohammed Yusuf who led the group from 2002 until
his death in 2009. After his death, his deputy, Abubakar Shekau took
control of the group and led it until his suicide at the culmination of
the Battle of Sambisa Forest in 2021.
Although Boko Haram is organized in a hierarchical structure with one overall leader, the group also operates as a clandestine cell system using a network structure, with units having between 300 and 500 fighters each. Estimates of the total number of fighters range between 500 and 9,000.
Financing
Kidnapping for ransom
Boko Haram is said to have raised substantial sums of money by kidnapping people for ransom. In 2013, Boko Haram kidnapped a family of seven French tourists
while they were on vacation in Cameroon and two months later, Boko
Haram released the hostages along with 16 others in exchange for a
ransom of $3.15 million.
Extortion
In addition to extortion
from local residents, Boko Haram has claimed to extort money from local
state governments. A spokesman of Boko Haram claimed that Kano State
governor Ibrahim Shekarau and Bauchi State governor Isa Yuguda had paid them monthly.
Relationship with other militant groups
It has long been alleged that Boko Haram had a relationship with al-Qaeda. In 2011, letters from Boko Haram were reportedly found in Osama bin Laden's compound.
Three weeks after the 2009 Boko Haram uprising began, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb expressed sympathy for Boko Haram. Speaking by phone to reporters in November 2012, group spokesman Abu Qaqa
said: "We are together with al-Qaeda, they are promoting the cause of
Islam, just as we are doing. Therefore they help us in our struggle and
we help them, too." The 2012 Reuters special report details how fighters
have trained with al-Qaeda affiliates in small groups over at least 6
years.
According to the UN Security Council listing of Boko Haram under the al-Qaeda sanctions regime in May 2014, the group "has maintained a relationship with AQIM
for training and material support purposes", and "gained valuable
knowledge on the construction of improvised explosive devices from
AQIM". The UN found that a "number of Boko Haram members fought
alongside al Qaeda affiliated groups in Mali in 2012 and 2013 before
returning to Nigeria with terrorist expertise". AQIM is one of
al-Qaeda's regional branches, whose leader, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, has sworn an oath of allegiance to al-Qaeda's senior leadership.
Despite its historic ties with Boko Haram, al-Qaeda central has
never officially accepted Boko Haram as an affiliate. The issues which
divide AQ and Boko Haram are related to the extremism of Abubakar Shekau
with respect to his declaration that the entire Muslim population of
Nigeria is non-Muslim. Shekau argued that it was legitimate to kill
Muslim civilians based on his belief that apostasy
was widespread among the general population of Nigerian Muslims because
they voted in elections. Al-Qaeda believes that the general Muslim
population of Nigeria should be considered Muslim and based on
al-Qaeda's point of view, the killing of civilians is unacceptable.
Boko Haram has engaged in battle with IS W Africa.
Response of Nigerian authorities
Until the 1990s, the Nigerian military was seen as a force for stability across the region. But by 2014, it was short of basic equipment, including radios and armoured vehicles.
Morale was said to be low. Senior officers were allegedly skimming
military procurement and budget funds which were intended to pay for the
standard issue equipment which is supposed to be provided to soldiers.
The country's defense budget accounted for more than a third of the
country's security budget of $5.8 billion, but only 10 per cent of this
money was allocated to cover capital spending. A 2016 United States Department of Defense
assessment stated that the Nigerian administration's response to the
Boko Haram crisis was marred by "high-level corruption" but that the
morale in the military had improved after several former senior
government officials were arrested on corruption charges.
In the summer of 2013, the Nigerian military shut down mobile
phone coverage in three north-eastern Nigerian states in order to
disrupt Boko Haram's communication and ability to detonate IEDs.
Accounts by military insiders and data of Boko Haram incidences
before, during, and after the mobile phone blackout all suggest that
the shut down was 'successful' from a military- tactical point of view.
However, it angered citizens who lived in the region (owing to the
negative social and economic consequences of the mobile shutdown) and
engendered negative opinions of the state and its new emergency
policies. While citizens and organizations developed various coping and
circumventing strategies, Boko Haram evolved from an open network model
of insurgency to a closed centralized system, shifting the center of its
operations to the Sambisa Forest. As a consequence, Boko Haram's
changing strategies fundamentally changed the dynamics of the conflict.
In July 2014, Nigeria was estimated to have suffered the highest number
of terrorist killings in the world over the past year, 3477, killed in
146 attacks. The governor of Borno, Kashim Shettima, of the opposition ANPP, said in February 2014:
Boko
Haram are better armed and are better motivated than our own troops.
Given the present state of affairs, it is absolutely impossible for us
to defeat Boko Haram.
In April 2018, the President of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari,
approved a release of $1bn for the procurement of security equipment to
fight insurgency and revolt in the country. This announcement came days
after an attack by Boko Haram that left 18 dead in northern Nigeria.
In September 2021, Brigadier General Bernard Onyeuko of the Nigerian Armed Forces announced the surrender of close to 6,000 Boko Haram insurgents.
On 15th February, 2024, the Borno Government says it has cleared
500 suspects of involvement in terrorism and had them released from the
Nigerian Army detention facility at Giwa Barracks, Maiduguri.
After a series of meetings over many months,
Cameroon's foreign minister announced on 30 November 2014 that a
coalition force to fight terrorism, including Boko Haram, would soon be
operational. The force would include 3,500 soldiers from Benin, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria.Discussions between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) about a broader based military force were held in January 2015.
In early February 2015, an agreement to provide 7,500 African
Union troops from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger was tentatively reached.
On 2 February 2015, the Nigerian Army said it had recaptured Gamboru from Boko Haram, along with the nearby towns of Mafa, Mallam Fatori, Abadam, and Marte following a joint weekend offensive by Nigerian, Chadian and Cameroonian forces.
By 6 February 2015, Chadian and Nigerian warplanes and ground troops
had forced Boko Haram forces to abandon about a dozen towns and
villages. On 17 February 2015, the Nigerian military retook Monguno
in a coordinated air and ground assault. On 6 March 2015, the African
Union endorsed the creation of a regional force of more than 8,000
troops to combat Boko Haram.
Chinese assistance
In May 2014, China offered Nigeria assistance that included satellite data, and possibly military equipment.
Colombian assistance
In October 2015, Colombia sent a delegation of security experts to assist the Nigerian authorities and share expertise on security and counter terrorism. In January 2016, a delegation led by Lieutenant General Tukur Yusuf Buratai also visited Colombia to exchange information in regards to the war against Boko Haram.
South African and post-Soviet states assistance
In March 2015, it was reported that Nigeria had employed hundreds of mercenaries from South Africa and the former Soviet Union to assist it in its effort to make gains against Boko Haram before the 28 March election.
France and the United Kingdom,
in coordination with the United States, have sent trainers and material
assistance to Nigeria to assist in the fight against Boko Haram. France planned to use 3,000 troops in the region for counter-terrorism operations. Israel and Canada also pledged support.
In 2017, the United Kingdom enforced an emergency assistance
package worth $259 million. The United Kingdom has also aided Nigeria
through military support and counter-terrorism training. The British government
has provided training to 28,000 Nigerian military troops to aid the
fight against Boko Haram. More than 40 British soldiers have also been
sent on a long-term deployment to Nigeria.
On 28 August 2018, the British government produced a press
release describing the details the newly launched partnership between
the United Kingdom and Nigeria which was formed to attempt to reduce the
threat posed by Boko Haram to the citizens of the two nations. The
press release gives an insight into the multiple methods (including
community engagement and direct intervention by the Nigerian government)
of preventing and reducing the impacts of attacks carried out by Boko
Haram in Nigeria.
Specific details of the cooperation between the British and Nigerian governments include:
A £13
million programme to educate 100,000 children living in the conflict
zone and;
implementing a Nigerian crisis response mechanism to help the government
respond to incidents like terror attacks and;
cutting the number of new recruits joining Boko Haram by tackling the
false information spread by the group to recruit new members.
United States responses
In 2012, the U.S. Department of State had an internal debate on whether to place Boko Haram on its list of FTOs (Foreign Terrorist Organizations). The Bureau of Counterterrorism leaned towards designation while the Bureau of African Affairs urged caution. Officials from the Justice Department, the FBI, the CIA, and a number of members of Congress urged the State Department to designate Boko Haram as an FTO.
The Nigerian government voiced its opposition to an FTO designation,
citing concerns that it would raise Boko Haram's stature and have
implications for humanitarian aid in the region where Boko Haram
operated.
Twenty academic experts on Nigeria signed a letter to the State
Department urging it not to designate Boko Haram as an FTO, saying that
it would hinder NGO efforts in the region and might legitimize the
Nigerian Army's human rights abuses in its efforts to fight Boko Haram.
The U.S. State Department designated Boko Haram and its offshoot Ansaru
as terrorist organizations in November 2013, citing Boko Haram's links
with AQIM and its responsibility for "thousands of deaths in northeast
and central Nigeria over the last several years including targeted
killings of civilians". The State Department also cited Ansaru's 2013 kidnapping and execution of seven international construction workers.
In the statement it was noted, however, "These designations are an
important and appropriate step, but only one tool in what must be a
comprehensive approach by the Nigerian government to counter these
groups through a combination of law enforcement, political, and
development efforts." The State Department had resisted earlier calls to designate Boko Haram as a terrorist group after the 2011 Abuja United Nations bombing.
The U.S. government does not believe Boko Haram is currently (2014)
affiliated with al Qaeda Central, despite periodic pledges of support
and solidarity from its leadership for al-Qaeda, but is particularly
concerned about ties between Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) (including "likely sharing funds, training, and explosive
materials").
Efforts to cooperate in freeing the Chibok schoolgirls had
faltered, largely due to mutual distrust; the infiltration of the
military by Boko Haram meant that U.S. officials were wary of sharing
raw intelligence data, and the Nigerian military had failed to supply
information that might have aided U.S. drone flights in locating the
kidnapped girls. The Nigerian government claims that Boko Haram is "the
West Africa branch of the world-wide Al-Qaeda movement" with connections
to al-Shabaab in Somalia
and AQIM in Mali. The Nigerian government denies having committed human
rights abuses in the conflict, and therefore oppose U.S. restrictions
on arms sales, which they see as being based on the U.S. mis-application
of the Leahy Law due to concerns over human rights in Nigeria. The U.S. had supplied the Nigerian army with trucks and equipment but had blocked the sale of Cobra helicopters.
In November 2014 the U.S. State department again refused to supply
Cobras, citing concerns over the Nigerian military's ability to maintain
and use them without endangering civilians.
On 1 December 2014, the U.S. embassy in Abuja announced that the
U.S. had discontinued training a Nigerian battalion at the request of
the Nigerian government. A spokesman for the U.S. state department said:
"We regret premature termination of this training, as it was to be the
first in a larger planned project that would have trained additional
units with the goal of helping the Nigerian Army build capacity to
counter Boko Haram. The U.S. government will continue other aspects of
the extensive bilateral security relationship, as well as all other
assistance programs, with Nigeria. The U.S. government is committed to
the long tradition of partnership with Nigeria and will continue to
engage future requests for cooperation and training".
On 24 September 2015, the White House announced a military aid
package for African allies fighting Boko Haram. The package included up
to $45 million for training and other support for Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. On 14 October 2015, the White House released a statement, in accordance with the War Powers Resolution,
announcing the deployment of 300 troops to Cameroon to conduct airborne
ISR: "These forces are equipped with weapons for the purpose of
providing their own force protection and security, and they will remain
in Cameroon until their support is no longer needed."
In October 2015, General David M. Rodriguez, the head of the United States Africa Command,
reported that Boko Haram has lost territory, directly contradicting
statements which were made by Boko Haram. U.S. efforts to train and
share intelligence with regional military forces is credited with
helping to push back against Boko Haram, but officials warn that the
group remains a grave threat.
United Nations responses
In
January 2019, when thousands of refugees from northeastern Nigeria were
forced to return from Cameroon, despite the continuous threat to
civilian lives by Boko Haram jihadists, the United Nations was "extremely alarmed". "This action was totally unexpected and puts lives of thousands of refugees at risk," the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi said. The UNHCR appealed to Cameroon "to continue its open door and hospitable policy" and stop any more returns.
In March 2021, the UN announced it was launching a $1 billion appeal in
Abuja, with the goal of providing assistance to an estimated nine
million northern Nigerians in need of humanitarian aid because of Boko Haram's 11-year insurgency.