Technological transitions

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

Technological innovations have occurred throughout history and rapidly increased over the modern age. New technologies are developed and co-exist with the old before supplanting them. Transport offers several examples; from sailing to steam ships to automobiles replacing horse-based transportation. Technological transitions (TT) describe how these technological innovations occur and are incorporated into society. Alongside the technological developments TT considers wider societal changes such as “user practices, regulation, industrial networks (supply, production, distribution), infrastructure, and symbolic meaning or culture”. For a technology to have use, it must be linked to social structures human agency and organisations to fulfil a specific need. Hughes refers to the ‘seamless web’ where physical artefacts, organisations, scientific communities, and social practices combine. A technological system includes technical and non-technical aspects, and it a major shift in the socio-technical configurations (involving at least one new technology) is when a technological transition occurs.

Origins

Work on technological transitions draws on a number of fields including history of science, technology studies, and evolutionary economics.^[2] The focus of evolutionary economics is on economic change, but as a driver of this technological change has been considered in the literature.^[5] Joseph Schumpeter, in his classic Theory of Economic Development^[6] placed the emphasis on non-economic forces as the driver for growth. The human actor, the entrepreneur is seen as the cause of economic development which occurs as a cyclical process. Schumpeter proposed that radical innovations were the catalyst for Kondratiev cycles.

Long wave theory

The Russian economist Kondratiev^[7] proposed that economic growth operated in boom and bust cycles of approximately 50 year periods. These cycles were characterised by periods of expansion, stagnation and recession. The period of expansion is associated with the introduction of a new technology, e.g. steam power or the microprocessor. At the time of publication, Kondratiev had considered that two cycles had occurred in the nineteenth century and third was beginning at the turn of the twentieth. Modern writers, such as Freeman and Perez^[8] outlined five cycles in the modern age:

• The Industrial Revolution (1770–1830)
• Victorian Prosperity: Age of steam and Rail (1830–1880)
• The Age of Steel (1880–1930)
• Oil, Mass Production and the Consumer Society (1930–1980)
• The Information Age (1980-?)

Freeman and Perez^[8] proposed that each cycle consists of pervasive technologies, their production and economic structures that support them. Termed ‘techno-economic paradigms’, they suggest that the shift from one paradigm to another is the result of emergent new technologies.

Following the recent economic crisis, authors such as Moody and Nogrady^[9] have suggested that a new cycle is emerging from the old, centred on the use of sustainable technologies in a resource depleted world.

Technological paradigms, trajectories and regimes

Thomas Kuhn^[10] described how a paradigm shift is a wholesale shift in the basic understanding of a scientific theory. Examples in science include the change of thought from miasma to germ theory as a cause of disease. Building on this work, Giovanni Dosi^[11] developed the concept of ’technical paradigms’ and ‘technological trajectories’. In considering how engineers work, the technical paradigm is an outlook on the technological problem, a definition of what the problems and solutions are. It charts the idea of specific progress. By identifying the problems to be solved the paradigm exerts an influence on technological change. The pattern of problem solving activity and the direction of progress is the technological trajectory. In similar fashion, Nelson and Winter (,^[12][13])defined the concept of the ‘technological regime’ which directs technological change through the beliefs of engineers of what problems to solve. The work of the actors and organisations is the result of organisational and cognitive routines which determines search behaviour. This places boundaries and also trajectories (direction) to those boundaries.

Multi-level perspective on technological transitions

In analysing (historic) cases of technological transitions researchers from the systems in transition branch of transitions research have used a multi-level perspective (MLP) as a heuristic model to understand changes in socio-technical systems. (^[2][14][15]) Innovation system approaches traditionally focus on the production side. A socio-technical approach combines the science and technology in devising a production, with the application of the technology in fulfilling a societal function.^[16] Linking the two domains are the distribution, infrastructure and markets of the product. This approach considers a transition to be multi-dimensional as technology is only one aspect.

The MLP proposes three analytical levels: the niche, regime and landscape.

Niche (Micro-level) Radical innovations occur at the niche level. These act as ‘safe havens’ for fledgling technologies to develop, largely free from market pressures which occur at the regime level. The US Military has acted as niche for major twentieth century technologies such as the aircraft, radio and the internet. More recently, California’s Silicon Valley has provided an arena for ICT focused technologies to emerge. Some innovations will challenge the existing regime while others fail.

Regime (Meso-level) The socio-technical regime, as defined by Geels,^[2] includes a web of inter-linking actors across different social groups and communities following a set of rules. In effect, the established practices of a given system. Seven dimensions have been identified in the socio-technical regime: technology, user practices and application, the symbolic meaning of technology, infrastructure, policy and techno-scientific knowledge.^[2] Change does occur at the regime level but it is normally slow and incremental unlike the radical change at the niche level. The actors who constitute the existing regime are set to gain from perpetuating the incumbent technology at the expense of the new. This is known as ‘lock-in’.^[1]

Landscape (Macro-level) Exogenous to the previous levels is the socio-technical landscape.^[2] A broad range of factors are contained here, such as economic pressures, cultural values, social trends, wars and environmental issues. Change occurs at an even slower rate than at the regime level.

A transition is said to happen when a regime shift has occurred. This is the result of the interplay between the three levels. Regimes are relatively inert and resistant to change being structured to incremental innovation following established trajectories.^[17] As such, transitions are difficult to achieve. The current regime is typically suffering internal issues. Pressure from the landscape level may cause ‘cracks’ or ‘windows of opportunity’ through which innovations at the niche level may initially co-exist with the established technology before achieving ascendency. Once the technology has fully embedded into society the transition is said to be completed.^[18]

Case study

The MLP has been used in describing a range of historic transitions in socio-technical regimes for mobility, sanitation, food, lighting and so on.^[19] While early research focused on historical transitions, a second strand of research was more focused on transitions to sustainable technologies in key sectors such as transport, energy and housing.^[19]

Geels ^[2][5] presented three historical transitions on system innovation relating to modes of transportation. The technological transition from sailing ships to steamships in the UK will be summarised and shown in the context of a wider system innovation.

Great Britain was the world’s leading naval power in the nineteenth century, and led the way in the transition from sail to steam. At first, the introduction of steam technology co-existed with the current regime. Steam tugs assisted sail ships into port and hybrid steam / sail ships appeared. Landscape developments create the necessity for improvements in the technology. A demand for trans-Atlantic emigration was prompted by the Irish potato famine, European political instability and the lure of gold in California. The requirement for such arduous journeys had prompted a wealth of innovations at the niche level in steamship-development. From the late 1880s, as steamship technology improved and costs dropped, the new technology was widely diffused and a new regime established. The changes go beyond a technological transition as it involved new ship management and fleet management practices, new supporting infrastructures and new functionalities.

Transition paths

The nature of transitions varies and the differing qualities result in multiple pathways occurring. Geels and Schot ^[20] defined five transition paths:

• Reproduction: Ongoing change occurring in the regime level.
• Transformation: A socio-technical regime that changes without the emergence of a monopolising technology.
• Technological substitution: An incumbent technology is replaced by a radical innovation resulting in a new socio-technical regime.
• De-alignment and Re-alignment: Weaknesses in the regime sees the advent of competing new technologies leading to a dominant model. (E.g. the automobile replacing the horse as the primary means of land transport).
• Re-configuration: When multiple, interlinked technologies are replaced by a similarly linked alternative set.

Characteristics of technological transitions

Six characteristics of technological transitions have been identified.,^[1][21]

Transitions are co-evolutionary and multi-dimensional Technological developments occur intertwined with societal needs, wants and uses. A technology is adopted and diffused based on this interplay between innovation and societal requirements. Co-evolution has different aspects. As well as the co-evolution of technology and society, aspects between science, technology, users and culture have been considered.^[5]

Multi-actors are involved Scientific and engineering communities are central to the development of a technology, but a wide range of actors are involved in a transition. This can include organisations, policy-makers, government, NGOs, special interest groups and others.

Transitions occur at multiple levels As shown in the MLP transitions occur through the interplay of processes at different levels.

Transitions are a long-term process Complete system-change takes time and can be decades in the making. Case studies show them to be between 40 and 90 years.^[18]

Transitions are radical For a true transition to occur the technology has to be a radical innovation.

Change is Non-linear The rate of change will vary over time. For example, the pace of change may be slow at the gestation period (at the niche level) but much more rapid when a breakthrough is occurring.

Diffusion: transition phases

Diffusion of an innovation is the concept of how it is picked up by society, at what rate and why. Everett (1962).The diffusion of a technological innovation into society can be considered in distinct phases.^[22] Pre-development is the gestation period where the new technology has yet to make an impact. Take-off is when the process of a system shift is beginning. A breakthrough is occurring when fundamental changes are occurring in existing structures through the interplay of economic, social and cultural forces. Once the rate of change has decreased and a new balance is achieved, stabilization is said to have occurred. A full transition involves an overhaul of existing rules and change of beliefs which takes time, typically spanning at least a generation.^[22] This process can be speeded-up through seismic, unforeseen events such as war or economic strife.

Geels^[5] proposed a similar four phased approach which draws on the multi-level perspective (MLP) developed by Dutch scholars. Phases one sees the emergence of a novelty, born from the existing regime. Development then occurs in the niche level at phase two. As before, breakthrough then occurs at phase three. In the parlance of the MLP the new technology, having been developed at the niche level, is in competition with the established regime. To breakthrough and achieve wide diffusion, external factors – ‘windows of opportunity’ are required.

Windows of opportunity

A number of possible circumstances can act as windows of opportunity for the diffusion of new technologies:

• Internal technical problems in the existing regime. Those that cannot be solved by refinement of existing technologies act as a driver for the new.
• Problems external to the system. Such ‘problems’ are often determined by pressure groups and require wider societal or political backing. An example is environmental concerns.
• Changing user preferences. Opportunities are presented if existing technologies cannot meet user needs.
• Strategic advantage. Competition with rivals may necessitate innovation
• Complimentary technology. The availability of which may enable a breakthrough

Alongside external influences, internal drivers catalyse diffusion.^[5] These include economic factors such as the price performance ration. Socio-technical perspectives focus on the links between disparate social and technological elements.^[14] Following the breakthrough, the final phases see the new technology supersede the old.

Societal relevance

The study of technological transitions has an impact beyond academic interest. The transitions referred to in the literature may relate to historic processes, such as the transportation transitions studied by Geels, but system changes are required to achieve a safe transition to a low carbon-economy. (^[1][5]). Current structural problems are apparent in a range of sectors.^[5] Dependency on oil is problematic in the energy sector due to availability, access and contribution to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Transportation is a major user of energy causing significant emission of GHGs. Food production will need to keep pace with an ever-growing world population while overcoming challenges presented by global warming and transportation issues. Incremental change has provided some improvements but a more radical transition is required to achieve a more sustainable future.

Developed from the work on technological transitions is the field of transition management. Within this is an attempt to shape the direction of change complex socio-technical systems to more sustainable patterns.^[1] Whereas work on technological transitions is largely based on historic processes, proponents of transition management seek to actively steer transitions in progress.

Criticisms

Genus and Coles^[18] outlined a number of criticisms against the analysis of technological transitions, in particular when using the MLP. Empirical research on technological transitions occurring now has been limited, with the focus on historic transitions. Depending on the perspective on transition case studies they could be presented as having occurred on a different transition path to what was shown. For example, the bicycle could be considered an intermediate transport technology between the horse and the car. Judged from shorter different time-frame this could appear a transition in its own right. Determining the nature of a transition is problematic; when it started and ended, or whether one occurred in the sense of a radical innovation displacing an existing socio-technical regime. The perception of time casts doubt on whether a transition has occurred. If viewed over a long enough period even inert regimes may demonstrate radical change in the end. The MLP has also been criticised by scholars studying sustainability transitions using Social Practice Theories.^[23]

Synergy

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Synergy is the creation of a whole that is greater than the simple sum of its parts. The term synergy comes from the Attic Greek word συνεργία synergia^[1] from synergos, συνεργός, meaning "working together".

History

The words "synergy" and "synergetic" have been used in the field of physiology since at least the middle of the 19th century:

SYN'ERGY, Synergi'a, Synenergi'a, (F.) Synergie; from συν, 'with,' and εργον, 'work.' A correlation or concourse of action between different organs in health; and, according to some, in disease.

—Dunglison, Robley Medical Lexicon Blanchard and Lea, 1853

In 1896, Henri Mazel applied the term "synergy" to social psychology by writing La synergie sociale, in which he argued that Darwinian theory failed to account for "social synergy" or "social love", a collective evolutionary drive. The highest civilizations were the work not only of the elite but of the masses too; those masses must be led, however, because the crowd, a feminine and unconscious force, cannot distinguish between good and evil.^[2]

In 1909, Lester Frank Ward defined synergy as the universal constructive principle of nature:

I have characterized the social struggle as centrifugal and social solidarity as centripetal. Either alone is productive of evil consequences. Struggle is essentially destructive of the social order, while communism removes individual initiative. The one leads to disorder, the other to degeneracy. What is not seen—the truth that has no expounders—is that the wholesome, constructive movement consists in the properly ordered combination and interaction of both these principles. This is social synergy, which is a form of cosmic synergy, the universal constructive principle of nature.

—Ward, Lester F. Glimpses of the Cosmos, volume VI (1897–1912) G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1918, p. 358

Descriptions and usages

In the natural world, synergistic phenomena are ubiquitous, ranging from physics (for example, the different combinations of quarks that produce protons and neutrons) to chemistry (a popular example is water, a compound of hydrogen and oxygen), to the cooperative interactions among the genes in genomes, the division of labor in bacterial colonies, the synergies of scale in multi-cellular organisms, as well as the many different kinds of synergies produced by socially-organized groups, from honeybee colonies to wolf packs and human societies: compare stigmergy, a mechanism of indirect coordination between agents or actions that results in the self-assembly of complex systems. Even the tools and technologies that are widespread in the natural world represent important sources of synergistic effects. The tools that enabled early hominins to become systematic big-game hunters is a primordial human example.^[3]

In the context of organizational behavior, following the view that a cohesive group is more than the sum of its parts, synergy is the ability of a group to outperform even its best individual member. These conclusions are derived from the studies conducted by Jay Hall on a number of laboratory-based group ranking and prediction tasks. He found that effective groups actively looked for the points in which they disagreed and in consequence encouraged conflicts amongst the participants in the early stages of the discussion. In contrast, the ineffective groups felt a need to establish a common view quickly, used simple decision making methods such as averaging, and focused on completing the task rather than on finding solutions they could agree on.^[4] In a technical context, its meaning is a construct or collection of different elements working together to produce results not obtainable by any of the elements alone. The elements, or parts, can include people, hardware, software, facilities, policies, documents: all things required to produce system-level results. The value added by the system as a whole, beyond that contributed independently by the parts, is created primarily by the relationship among the parts, that is, how they are interconnected. In essence, a system constitutes a set of interrelated components working together with a common objective: fulfilling some designated need.^[5]

If used in a business application, synergy means that teamwork will produce an overall better result than if each person within the group were working toward the same goal individually. However, the concept of group cohesion needs to be considered. Group cohesion is that property that is inferred from the number and strength of mutual positive attitudes among members of the group. As the group becomes more cohesive, its functioning is affected in a number of ways. First, the interactions and communication between members increase. Common goals, interests and small size all contribute to this. In addition, group member satisfaction increases as the group provides friendship and support against outside threats.^[6]

There are negative aspects of group cohesion that have an effect on group decision-making and hence on group effectiveness. There are two issues arising. The risky shift phenomenon is the tendency of a group to make decisions that are riskier than those that the group would have recommended individually. Group Polarisation is when individuals in a group begin by taking a moderate stance on an issue regarding a common value and, after having discussed it, end up taking a more extreme stance.^[7]

A second, potential negative consequence of group cohesion is group think. Group think is a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in cohesive group, when the members' striving for unanimity overrides their motivation to appraise realistically the alternative courses of action. Studying the events of several American policy "disasters" such as the failure to anticipate the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (1941) and the Bay of Pigs Invasion fiasco (1961), Irving Janis argued that they were due to the cohesive nature of the committees that made the relevant decisions.^[8]

That decisions made by committees lead to failure in a simple system is noted by Dr. Chris Elliot. His case study looked at IEEE-488, an international standard set by the leading US standards body; it led to a failure of small automation systems using the IEEE-488 standard (which codified a proprietary communications standard HP-IB). But the external devices used for communication were made by two different companies, and the incompatibility between the external devices led to a financial loss for the company. He argues that systems will be safe only if they are designed, not if they emerge by chance.^[9]

The idea of a systemic approach is endorsed by the United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive. The successful performance of the health and safety management depends upon the analyzing the causes of incidents and accidents and learning correct lessons from them. The idea is that all events (not just those causing injuries) represent failures in control, and present an opportunity for learning and improvement.^[10] UK Health and Safety Executive, Successful health and safety management (1997): this book describes the principles and management practices, which provide the basis of effective health and safety management. It sets out the issues that need to be addressed, and can be used for developing improvement programs, self-audit, or self-assessment. Its message is that organizations must manage health and safety with the same degree of expertise and to the same standards as other core business activities, if they are to effectively control risks and prevent harm to people.

The term synergy was refined by R. Buckminster Fuller, who analyzed some of its implications more fully^[11] and coined the term synergetics.^[12]

• A dynamic state in which combined action is favored over the difference of individual component actions.
• Behavior of whole systems unpredicted by the behavior of their parts taken separately, known as emergent behavior.
• The cooperative action of two or more stimuli (or drugs), resulting in a different or greater response than that of the individual stimuli.

Biological sciences

Synergy of various kinds has been advanced by Peter Corning as a causal agency that can explain the progressive evolution of complexity in living systems over the course of time. According to the Synergism Hypothesis, synergistic effects have been the drivers of cooperative relationships of all kinds and at all levels in living systems. The thesis, in a nutshell, is that synergistic effects have often provided functional advantages (economic benefits) in relation to survival and reproduction that have been favored by natural selection. The cooperating parts, elements, or individuals become, in effect, functional “units” of selection in evolutionary change.^[13] Similarly, environmental systems may react in a non-linear way to perturbations, such as climate change, so that the outcome may be greater than the sum of the individual component alterations. Synergistic responses are a complicating factor in environmental modeling.^[14]

Pest synergy

Pest synergy would occur in a biological host organism population, where, for example, the introduction of parasite A may cause 10% fatalities, and parasite B may also cause 10% loss. When both parasites are present, the losses would normally be expected to total less than 20%, yet, in some cases, losses are significantly greater. In such cases, it is said that the parasites in combination have a synergistic effect.

Drug synergy

Mechanisms that may be involved in the development of synergistic effects include:

• Effect on the same cellular system (e.g. two different antibiotics like a penicillin and an aminoglycoside; penicillins damage the cell wall of gram-positive bacteria and improve the penetration of aminoglycosides).^[15]
• Prevention or delay of degradation in the body (e.g. the antibiotic Ciprofloxacin inhibits the metabolism of Theophylline).^[16]
• Slowdown of excretion (e.g. Probenecid delays the renal excretion of Penicillin and thus prolongs its effect).^[16]
• Anticounteractive action: for example, the effect of oxaliplatin and irinotecan. Oxaliplatin intercalates DNA, thereby preventing the cell from replicating DNA. Irinotecan inhibits topoisomerase 1, consequently the cytostatic effect is increased.^[17]
• Effect on the same receptor but different sites (e.g. the coadministration of benzodiazepines and barbiturates, both act by enhancing the action of GABA on GABA_A receptors, but benzodiazepines increase the frequency of channel opening, whilst barbiturates increase the channel closing time, making these two drugs dramatically enhance GABAergic neurotransmission).^{[citation needed]}

More mechanisms are described in an exhaustive 2009 review.^[17]

Toxicological synergy

Toxicological synergy is of concern to the public and regulatory agencies because chemicals individually considered safe might pose unacceptable health or ecological risk in combination. Articles in scientific and lay journals include many definitions of chemical or toxicological synergy, often vague or in conflict with each other. Because toxic interactions are defined relative to the expectation under "no interaction", a determination of synergy (or antagonism) depends on what is meant by "no interaction".^[18] The United States Environmental Protection Agency has one of the more detailed and precise definitions of toxic interaction, designed to facilitate risk assessment.^[19] In their guidance documents, the no-interaction default assumption is dose addition, so synergy means a mixture response that exceeds that predicted from dose addition. The EPA emphasizes that synergy does not always make a mixture dangerous, nor does antagonism always make the mixture safe; each depends on the predicted risk under dose addition.

For example, a consequence of pesticide use is the risk of health effects. During the registration of pesticides in the United States exhaustive tests are performed to discern health effects on humans at various exposure levels. A regulatory upper limit of presence in foods is then placed on this pesticide. As long as residues in the food stay below this regulatory level, health effects are deemed highly unlikely and the food is considered safe to consume.

However, in normal agricultural practice, it is rare to use only a single pesticide. During the production of a crop, several different materials may be used. Each of them has had determined a regulatory level at which they would be considered individually safe. In many cases, a commercial pesticide is itself a combination of several chemical agents, and thus the safe levels actually represent levels of the mixture. In contrast, a combination created by the end user, such as a farmer, has rarely been tested in that combination. The potential for synergy is then unknown or estimated from data on similar combinations. This lack of information also applies to many of the chemical combinations to which humans are exposed, including residues in food, indoor air contaminants, and occupational exposures to chemicals. Some groups think that the rising rates of cancer, asthma, and other health problems may be caused by these combination exposures; others have alternative explanations. This question will likely be answered only after years of exposure by the population in general and research on chemical toxicity, usually performed on animals. Examples of pesticide synergists include Piperonyl butoxide and MGK 264.^[20]

Human synergy

Human synergy relates to human interaction and teamwork. For example, say person A alone is too short to reach an apple on a tree and person B is too short as well. Once person B sits on the shoulders of person A, they are tall enough to reach the apple. In this example, the product of their synergy would be one apple. Another case would be two politicians. If each is able to gather one million votes on their own, but together they were able to appeal to 2.5 million voters, their synergy would have produced 500,000 more votes than had they each worked independently. A song is also a good example of human synergy, taking more than one musical part and putting them together to create a song that has a much more dramatic effect than each of the parts when played individually.

A third form of human synergy is when one person is able to complete two separate tasks by doing one action, for example, if a person were asked by a teacher and his boss at work to write an essay on how he could improve his work. A more visual example of this synergy is a drummer using four separate rhythms to create one drum beat.

Synergy usually arises when two persons with different complementary skills cooperate. In business, cooperation of people with organizational and technical skills happens very often. In general, the most common reason why people cooperate is that it brings a synergy. On the other hand, people tend to specialize just to be able to form groups with high synergy (see also division of labor and teamwork).

Example: Two teams in System Administration working together to combine technical and organizational skills in order to better the client experience, thus creating synergy. Counter-examples can be found in books like The Mythical Man-Month, in which the addition of additional team members is shown to have negative effects on productivity.

Organismic computing is an approach to improving group efficacy by increasing synergy in human groups via technological means.

When synergy occurs in the work place, the individuals involved get to work in a positive and supportive working environment. When individuals get to work in environments such as these, the company reaps the benefits. The authors of Creating the Best Workplace on Earth Rob Goffee and Gareth Jones, state that "highly engaged employees are, on average, 50% more likely to exceed expectations that the least-engaged workers. And companies with highly engaged people outperform firms with the most disengaged folks- by 54% in employee retention, by 89% in customer satisfaction, and by fourfold in revenue growth (Goffee & Jones, pg. 100)." Also, those that are able to be open about their views on the company, and have confidence that they will be heard, are likely to be a more organized employee who helps his/ her fellow team members succeed.^[21]

Corporate synergy

Corporate synergy occurs when corporations interact congruently. A corporate synergy refers to a financial benefit that a corporation expects to realize when it merges with or acquires another corporation. This type of synergy is a nearly ubiquitous feature of a corporate acquisition and is a negotiating point between the buyer and seller that impacts the final price both parties agree to. There are distinct types of corporate synergies, as follows.

Marketing

A marketing synergy refers to the use of information campaigns, studies, and scientific discovery or experimentation for research or development. This promotes the sale of products for varied use or off-market sales as well as development of marketing tools and in several cases exaggeration of effects. It is also often a meaningless buzzword used by corporate leaders.^[22][23]

Revenue

A revenue synergy refers to the opportunity of a combined corporate entity to generate more revenue than its two predecessor stand-alone companies would be able to generate. For example, if company A sells product X through its sales force, company B sells product Y, and company A decides to buy company B then the new company could use each sales person to sell products X and Y, thereby increasing the revenue that each sales person generates for the company.

In media revenue, synergy is the promotion and sale of a product throughout the various subsidiaries of a media conglomerate, e.g. films, soundtracks, or video games.

Financial

Financial synergy gained by the combined firm is a result of number of benefits which flow to the entity as a consequence of acquisition and merger. These benefits may be:

Cash slack

This is when a firm having number of cash extensive projects acquires a firm which is cash-rich, thus enabling the new combined firm to enjoy the profits from investing the cash of one firm in the projects of the other.

Debt capacity

If two firms have no or little capacity to carry debt before individually, it is possible for them to join and gain the capacity to carry the debt through decreased gearing (leverage). This creates value for the firm, as debt is thought to be a cheaper source of finance.

Tax benefits

It is possible for one firm to have unused tax benefits which might be offset against the profits of another after combination, thus resulting in less tax being paid. However this greatly depends on the tax law of the country.

Management

Synergy in management and in relation to teamwork refers to the combined effort of individuals as participants of the team.^[24] The condition that exists when the organization's parts interact to produce a joint effect that is greater than the sum of the parts acting alone. Positive or negative synergies can exist. In these cases, positive synergy has positive effects such as improved efficiency in operations, greater exploitation of opportunities, and improved utilization of resources. Negative synergy on the other hand has negative effects such as: reduced efficiency of operations, decrease in quality, underutilization of resources and disequilibrium with the external environment.

Cost

A cost synergy refers to the opportunity of a combined corporate entity to reduce or eliminate expenses associated with running a business. Cost synergies are realized by eliminating positions that are viewed as duplicate within the merged entity.^[25] Examples include the headquarters office of one of the predecessor companies, certain executives, the human resources department, or other employees of the predecessor companies. This is related to the economic concept of economies of scale.

Synergistic action in economy

The synergistic action of the economic players lies within the economic phenomenon's profundity. The synergistic action gives different dimensions to competitiveness, strategy and network identity becoming an unconventional "weapon" which belongs to those who exploit the economic systems’ potential in depth.^[26]

Synergistic determinants

The synergistic gravity equation (SYNGEq), according to its complex “title”, represents a synthesis of the endogenous and exogenous factors which determine the private and non-private economic decision makers to call to actions of synergistic exploitation of the economic network in which they operate. That is to say, SYNGEq constitutes a big picture of the factors/motivations which determine the entrepreneurs to contour an active synergistic network. SYNGEq includes both factors which character is changing over time (such as the competitive conditions), as well as classics factors, such as the imperative of the access to resources of the collaboration and the quick answers. The synergistic gravity equation (SINGEq) comes to be represented by the formula:^[27]

∑SYN.Act = ∑R-*I(CRed+COOP++A^Unimit.)*V(Cust.+Info.)*cc

where:

• ∑SYN.Act = the sum of the synergistic actions adopted (by the economic actor)
• ∑ R- = the amount of unpurchased but necessary resources
• ICRed = the imperative for cost reductions
• ICOOP+ = the imperative for deep cooperation (functional interdependence)
• IA^Unimit. = the imperative for purchasing unimitable competitive advantages (for the economic actor)
• VCust = the necessity of customer value in purchasing future profits and competitive advantages VInfo = the necessity of informational value in purchasing future profits and competitive advantages
• cc = the specific competitive conditions in which the economic actor operates

Synergistic networks and systems

The synergistic network represents an integrated part of the economic system which, through the coordination and control functions (of the undertaken economic actions), agrees synergies. The networks which promote synergistic actions can be divided in horizontal synergistic networks and vertical synergistic networks.^[28]

Synergy effects

The synergy effects are difficult (even impossible) to imitate by competitors and difficult to reproduce by their authors because these effects depend on the combination of factors with time-varying characteristics. The synergy effects are often called "synergistic benefits", representing the direct and implied result of the developed/adopted synergistic actions.^[29]

Computers

Synergy can also be defined as the combination of human strengths and computer strengths, such as advanced chess. Computers can process data much more quickly than humans, but lack the ability to respond meaningfully to arbitrary stimuli.

Synergy in literature

Etymologically, the "synergy" term was first used around 1600, deriving from the Greek word “synergos”, which means “to work together” or “to cooperate”. If during this period the synergy concept was mainly used in the theological field (describing “the cooperation of human effort with divine will”), in the 19th and 20th centuries, "synergy" was promoted in physics and biochemistry, being implemented in the study of the open economic systems only in the 1960 and 1970s.^[30]
In 1938, J. R. R. Tolkien wrote an essay titled On Fairy Stores, delivered at an Andrew Lang Lecture, and reprinted in his book, The Tolkien Reader, published in 1966. In it, he made two references to synergy, although he did not use that term. He wrote:

Faerie cannot be caught in a net of words; for it is one of its qualities to be indescribable, though not imperceptible. It has many ingredients, but analysis will not necessarily discover the secret of the whole.

And more succinctly, in a footnote, about the "part of producing the web of an intricate story", he wrote:

It is indeed easier to unravel a single thread — an incident, a name, a motive — than to trace the history of any picture defined by many threads. For with the picture in the tapestry a new element has come in: the picture is greater than, and not explained by, the sum of the component threads.

Synergy in the media

The informational synergies which can be applied also in media involve a compression of transmission, access and use of information’s time, the flows, circuits and means of handling information being based on a complementary, integrated, transparent and coordinated use of knowledge.^[31]

In media economics, synergy is the promotion and sale of a product (and all its versions) throughout the various subsidiaries of a media conglomerate,^[32] e.g. films, soundtracks or video games. Walt Disney pioneered synergistic marketing techniques in the 1930s by granting dozens of firms the right to use his Mickey Mouse character in products and ads, and continued to market Disney media through licensing arrangements. These products can help advertise the film itself and thus help to increase the film's sales. For example, the Spider-Man films had toys of webshooters and figures of the characters made, as well as posters and games.^[33] The NBC sitcom 30 Rock often shows the power of synergy, while also poking fun at the use of the term in the corporate world.^[34] There are also different forms of synergy in popular card games like Yu-Gi-Oh!, Cardfight!! Vanguard, and Future Card Buddyfight.

Information theory

When multiple sources of information taken together provide more information than the sum of the information provided by each source alone, there is said to be a synergy in the sources. This in contrast to the case in which the sources provide less information, in which case there is said to be a redundancy in the sources.

The Evolution of Cooperation

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Evolution of Cooperation

Author	Robert Axelrod
Country	United States
Language	English
Genre	Philosophy, sociology
Publisher	Basic Books
Publication date	December 5, 2006
Media type	Hardback, paperback, audiobook
Pages	241
ISBN	0-465-00564-0
OCLC	76963800
Dewey Decimal	302 14
LC Class	HM131.A89 1984

The evolution of cooperation can refer to:

• the study of how cooperation can emerge and persist (also known as cooperation theory) as elucidated by the application of game theory,
• a 1981 paper by political scientist Robert Axelrod and evolutionary biologist W. D. Hamilton (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981) in the scientific literature, or
• a 1984 book by Axelrod (Axelrod 1984)^[1] that expanded the paper and popularized the study.

Cooperation theory

Operations research

The idea that human behavior can be usefully analyzed mathematically gained great credibility following the application of operations research in World War II to improve military operations. One famous example involved how the Royal Air Force hunted submarines in the Bay of Biscay.^[2] It had seemed to make sense to patrol the areas where submarines were most frequently seen. Then it was pointed out that "seeing the most submarines" depended not only on the number of submarines present, but also on the number of eyes looking; i.e., patrol density. Making an allowance for patrol density showed that patrols were more efficient – that is, found more submarines per patrol – in other areas. Making appropriate adjustments increased the overall effectiveness.

Game theory

Accounts of the success of operations research during the war, publication in 1944 of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944) on the use of game theory for developing and analyzing optimal strategies for military and other uses, and publication of John William's The Compleat Strategyst, a popular exposition of game theory,^[3] led to a greater appreciation of mathematical analysis of human behavior.^[4]

But game theory had a little crisis: it could not find a strategy for a simple game called "The Prisoner's Dilemma" (PD) where two players have the option to cooperate for mutual gain, but each also takes a risk of being suckered.

Prisoner's dilemma

The prisoner's dilemma game^[5] (invented around 1950 by Merrill M. Flood and Melvin Dresher^[6]) takes its name from the following scenario: you and a criminal associate have been busted. Fortunately for you, most of the evidence was shredded, so you are facing only a year in prison. But the prosecutor wants to nail someone, so he offers you a deal: if you squeal on your associate – which will result in his getting a five-year stretch – the prosecutor will see that six months is taken off of your sentence. Which sounds good, until you learn your associate is being offered the same deal – which would get you five years.

So what do you do? The best that you and your associate can do together is to not squeal: that is, to cooperate (with each other, not the prosecutor!) in a mutual bond of silence, and do your year. But wait: if your associate cooperates (that sucker!), can you do better by squealing ("defecting") to get that six month reduction? It's tempting, but then he's also tempted. And if you both squeal, oh, no, it's four and half years each. So perhaps you should cooperate – but wait, that's being a sucker yourself, as your associate will undoubtedly defect, and you won't even get the six months off. So what is the best strategy to minimize your incarceration (aside from going straight in the first place)?

To cooperate, or not cooperate? This simple question (and the implicit question of whether to trust, or not), expressed in an extremely simple game, is a crucial issue across a broad range of life. Why shouldn't a shark eat the little fish that has just cleaned it of parasites: in any given exchange who would know? Fig wasps collectively limit the eggs they lay in fig trees (otherwise, the trees would suffer). But why shouldn't any one fig wasp cheat and leave a few more eggs than her rivals? At the level of human society, why shouldn't each of the villagers that share a common but finite resource try to exploit it more than the others?^[7] At the core of these and myriad other examples is a conflict formally equivalent to the Prisoner's Dilemma. Yet sharks, fig wasps, and villagers all cooperate. It has been a vexatious problem in evolutionary studies to explain how such cooperation should evolve, let alone persist, in a world of self-maximizing egoists.

Darwinian context

Charles Darwin's theory of how evolution works ("By Means of Natural Selection"^[8]) is explicitly competitive ("survival of the fittest"), Malthusian ("struggle for existence"), even gladiatorial ("nature, red in tooth and claw"). Species are pitted against species for shared resources, similar species with similar needs and niches even more so, and individuals within species most of all.^[9] All this comes down to one factor: out-competing all rivals and predators in producing progeny.

Darwin's explanation of how preferential survival of the slightest benefits can lead to advanced forms is the most important explanatory principle in biology, and extremely powerful in many other fields. Such success has reinforced notions that life is in all respects a war of each against all, where every individual has to look out for himself, that your gain is my loss.

In such a struggle for existence altruism (voluntarily yielding a benefit to a non-relative) and even cooperation (working with another for a mutual benefit) seem so antithetical to self-interest as to be the very kind of behavior that should be selected against. Yet cooperation and seemingly even altruism have evolved and persist, including even interspecific cooperation and naturalists have been hard pressed to explain why.

Social Darwinism

The popularity of the evolution of cooperation – the reason it is not an obscure technical issue of interest to only a small number of specialists – is in part because it mirrors a larger issue where the realms of political philosophy, ethics, and biology intersect: the ancient issue of individual interests versus group interests. On one hand, the so-called "Social Darwinians" (roughly, those who would use the "survival of the fittest" of Darwinian evolution to justify the cutthroat competitiveness of laissez-faire capitalism^[10]) declaim that the world is an inherently competitive "dog eat dog" jungle, where every individual has to look out for himself. The writer Ayn Rand damned "altruism" and declared selfishness a virtue.^[11] The Social Darwinists' view is derived from Charles Darwin's interpretation of evolution by natural selection, which is explicitly competitive ("survival of the fittest"), Malthusian ("struggle for existence"), even gladiatorial ("red in tooth and claw"), and permeated by the Victorian laissez-faire ethos of Darwin and his disciples (such as T. H. Huxley and Herbert Spencer). What they read into the theory was then read out by Social Darwinians as scientific justification for their social and economic views (such as poverty being a natural condition and social reform an unnatural meddling).^[12]

Such views of evolution, competition, and the survival of the fittest are explicit in the ethos of modern capitalism, as epitomized by industrialist Andrew Carnegie in The Gospel of Wealth:

[W]hile the law [of competition] may be sometimes hard for the individual, it is best for the race, because it ensures the survival of the fittest in every department. We accept and welcome, therefore, as conditions to which we must accommodate ourselves, great inequality of environment; the concentration of business, industrial and commercial, in the hands of the few; and the law of competition between these, as being not only beneficial, but essential to the future progress of the race. (Carnegie 1900)

While the validity of extrapolating moral and political views from science is questionable, the significance of such views in modern society is undoubtable.

The social contract and morality

On the other hand, other philosophers have long observed that cooperation in the form of a "social contract" is necessary for human society, but saw no way of attaining that short of a coercive authority.

As Thomas Hobbes wrote in Leviathan:

[T]here must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant.... (Hobbes 1651, p. 120)

[C]ovenants without the sword are but words.... (Hobbes 1651, p. 1139)

And Jean Jacques Rousseau in The Social Contract:

[The social contract] can arise only where several persons come together: but, as the force and liberty of each man are the chief instruments of his self-preservation, how can he pledge them without harming his own interests, and neglecting the care he owes himself? (Rousseau 1762, p. 13)

In order then that the social contract may not be an empty formula, it tacitly includes the undertaking, which alone can give force to the rest, that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free.... (Rousseau 1762, p. 18)

Even Herman Melville, in Moby-Dick, has the cannibal harpooner Queequeg explain why he has saved the life of someone who had been jeering him as so:

"It's a mutual, joint-stock world, in all meridians. We cannibals must help these Christians." (Melville 1851, p. 96)

The original role of government is to provide the coercive power to enforce the social contract (and in commercial societies, contracts and covenants generally). Where government does not exist or cannot reach it is often deemed the role of religion to promote prosocial and moral behavior, but this tends to depend on threats of hell-fire (what Hobbes called "the terror of some power"); such inducements seem more mystical than rational, and philosophers have been hard-pressed to explain why self-interest should yield to morality, why there should be any duty to be "good".^[13]

Yet cooperation, and even altruism and morality, are prevalent, even in the absence of coercion, even though it seems that a properly self-regarding individual should reject all such social strictures and limitations. As early as 1890 the Russian naturalist Petr Kropotkin observed that the species that survived were where the individuals cooperated, that "mutual aid" (cooperation) was found at all levels of existence.^[14] By the 1960s biologists and zoologists were noting many instances in the real "jungle" where real animals – presumably unfettered by conscience and not corrupted by altruistic liberals – and even microbes (see microbial cooperation) were cooperating.^[15]

Darwin's theory of natural selection is a profoundly powerful explanation of how evolution works; its undoubted success strongly suggests an inherently antagonistic relationship between unrelated individuals. Yet cooperation is prevalent, seems beneficial, and even seems to be essential to human society. Explaining this seeming contradiction, and accommodating cooperation, and even altruism, within Darwinian theory is a central issue in the theory of cooperation.

Modern developments

Darwin's explanation of how evolution works is quite simple, but the implications of how it might explain complex phenomena are not at all obvious; it has taken over a century to elaborate (see modern synthesis).^[16] Explaining how altruism – which by definition reduces personal fitness – can arise by natural selection is a particular problem, and the central theoretical problem of sociobiology.^[17]

A possible explanation of altruism is provided by the theory of group selection (first suggested by Darwin himself while grappling with issue of social insects^[18]) which argues that natural selection can act on groups: groups that are more successful – for any reason, including learned behaviors – will benefit the individuals of the group, even if they are not related. It has had a powerful appeal, but has not been fully persuasive, in part because of difficulties regarding cheaters that participate in the group without contributing.^[19]

Another explanation is provided by the genetic kinship theory of William D. Hamilton:^[20] if a gene causes an individual to help other individuals that carry copies of that gene, then the gene has a net benefit even with the sacrifice of a few individuals. The classic example is the social insects, where the workers – which are sterile, and therefore incapable of passing on their genes – benefit the queen, who is essentially passing on copies of "their" genes. This is further elaborated in the "selfish gene" theory of Richard Dawkins, that the unit of evolution is not the individual organism, but the gene.^[21] (As stated by Wilson: "the organism is only DNA's way of making more DNA."^[22]) However, kinship selection works only where the individuals involved are closely related; it fails to explain the presence of altruism and cooperation between unrelated individuals, particularly across species.

In a 1971 paper^[23] Robert Trivers demonstrated how reciprocal altruism can evolve between unrelated individuals, even between individuals of entirely different species. And the relationship of the individuals involved is exactly analogous to the situation in a certain form of the Prisoner's Dilemma.^[24] The key is that in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, or IPD, both parties can benefit from the exchange of many seemingly altruistic acts. As Trivers says, it "take[s] the altruism out of altruism."^[25] The Randian premise that self-interest is paramount is largely unchallenged, but turned on its head by recognition of a broader, more profound view of what constitutes self-interest.
It does not matter why the individuals cooperate. The individuals may be prompted to the exchange of "altruistic" acts by entirely different genes, or no genes in particular, but both individuals (and their genomes) can benefit simply on the basis of a shared exchange. In particular, "the benefits of human altruism are to be seen as coming directly from reciprocity – not indirectly through non-altruistic group benefits".^[26]

Trivers' theory is very powerful. Not only can it replace group selection, it also predicts various observed behavior, including moralistic aggression,^[27] gratitude and sympathy, guilt and reparative altruism,^[28] and development of abilities to detect and discriminate against subtle cheaters.
The benefits of such reciprocal altruism was dramatically demonstrated by a pair of tournaments held by Robert Axelrod around 1980.

Axelrod's tournaments

Axelrod initially solicited strategies from other game theorists to compete in the first tournament. Each strategy was paired with each other strategy for 200 iterations of a Prisoner's Dilemma game, and scored on the total points accumulated through the tournament. The winner was a very simple strategy submitted by Anatol Rapoport called "TIT FOR TAT" (TFT) that cooperates on the first move, and subsequently echoes (reciprocates) what the other player did on the previous move. The results of the first tournament were analyzed and published, and a second tournament held to see if anyone could find a better strategy. TIT FOR TAT won again. Axelrod analyzed the results, and made some interesting discoveries about the nature of cooperation, which he describes in his book^[29]

In both actual tournaments and various replays the best performing strategies were nice:^[30] that is, they were never the first to defect. Many of the competitors went to great lengths to gain an advantage over the "nice" (and usually simpler) strategies, but to no avail: tricky strategies fighting for a few points generally could not do as well as nice strategies working together. TFT (and other "nice" strategies generally) "won, not by doing better than the other player, but by eliciting cooperation [and] by promoting the mutual interest rather than by exploiting the other's weakness."^[31]

Being "nice" can be beneficial, but it can also lead to being suckered. To obtain the benefit – or avoid exploitation – it is necessary to be provocable to both retaliation and forgiveness. When the other player defects, a nice strategy must immediately be provoked into retaliatory defection.^[32] The same goes for forgiveness: return to cooperation as soon as the other player does. Overdoing the punishment risks escalation, and can lead to an "unending echo of alternating defections" that depresses the scores of both players.^[33]

Most of the games that game theory had heretofore investigated are "zero-sum" – that is, the total rewards are fixed, and a player does well only at the expense of other players. But real life is not zero-sum. Our best prospects are usually in cooperative efforts. In fact, TFT cannot score higher than its partner; at best it can only do "as good as". Yet it won the tournaments by consistently scoring a strong second-place with a variety of partners.^[34] Axelrod summarizes this as don't be envious;^[35] in other words, don't strive for a payoff greater than the other player's.^[36]

In any IPD game there is a certain maximum score each player can get by always cooperating. But some strategies try to find ways of getting a little more with an occasional defection (exploitation). This can work against some strategies that are less provocable or more forgiving than TIT FOR TAT, but generally they do poorly. "A common problem with these rules is that they used complex methods of making inferences about the other player [strategy] – and these inferences were wrong."^[37] Against TFT one can do no better than to simply cooperate.^[38] Axelrod calls this clarity. Or: don't be too clever.^[39]

The success of any strategy depends on the nature of the particular strategies it encounters, which depends on the composition of the overall population. To better model the effects of reproductive success Axelrod also did an "ecological" tournament, where the prevalence of each type of strategy in each round was determined by that strategy's success in the previous round. The competition in each round becomes stronger as weaker performers are reduced and eliminated. The results were amazing: a handful of strategies – all "nice" – came to dominate the field.^[40] In a sea of non-nice strategies the "nice" strategies – provided they were also provokable – did well enough with each other to offset the occasional exploitation. As cooperation became general the non-provocable strategies were exploited and eventually eliminated, whereupon the exploitive (non-cooperating) strategies were out-performed by the cooperative strategies.

In summary, success in an evolutionary "game" correlated with the following characteristics:

• Be nice: cooperate, never be the first to defect.
• Be provocable: return defection for defection, cooperation for cooperation.
• Don't be envious: focus on maximizing your own 'score', as opposed to ensuring your score is higher than your 'partner's'.
• Don't be too clever: or, don't try to be tricky. Clarity is essential for others to cooperate with you.

Foundation of reciprocal cooperation

The lessons described above apply in environments that support cooperation, but whether cooperation is supported at all depends crucially on the probability (called ω [omega]) that the players will meet again,^[41] also called the discount parameter or, poetically, the shadow of the future. When ω is low – that is, the players have a negligible chance of meeting again – each interaction is effectively a single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game, and one might as well defect in all cases (a strategy called "ALL D"), because even if one cooperates there is no way to keep the other player from exploiting that. But in the iterated PD the value of repeated cooperative interactions can become greater than the benefit/risk of a single exploitation (which is all that a strategy like TFT will tolerate).

Curiously, rationality and deliberate choice are not necessary, nor trust nor even consciousness,^[42] as long as there is a pattern that benefits both players (e.g., increases fitness), and some probability of future interaction. Often the initial mutual cooperation is not even intentional, but having "discovered" a beneficial pattern both parties respond to it by continuing the conditions that maintain it.

This implies two requirements for the players, aside from whatever strategy they may adopt. First, they must be able to recognize other players, to avoid exploitation by cheaters. Second, they must be able to track their previous history with any given player, in order to be responsive to that player's strategy.^[43]

Even when the discount parameter ω is high enough to permit reciprocal cooperation there is still a question of whether and how cooperation might start. One of Axelrod's findings is that when the existing population never offers cooperation nor reciprocates it – the case of ALL D – then no nice strategy can get established by isolated individuals; cooperation is strictly a sucker bet. (The "futility of isolated revolt".^[44]) But another finding of great significance is that clusters of nice strategies can get established. Even a small group of individuals with nice strategies with infrequent interactions can yet do so well on those interactions to make up for the low level of exploitation from non-nice strategies.^[45]

Subsequent work

In 1984 Axelrod estimated that there were "hundreds of articles on the Prisoner's Dilemma cited in Psychological Abstracts",^[46] and estimated that citations to The Evolution of Cooperation alone were "growing at the rate of over 300 per year".^[47] To fully review this literature is infeasible. What follows are therefore only a few selected highlights.

Axelrod has a subsequent book, The Complexity of Cooperation,^[48] which he considers a sequel to The Evolution of Cooperation. Other work on the evolution of cooperation has expanded to cover prosocial behavior generally,^[49] and in religion,^[50] other mechanisms for generating cooperation,^[51] the IPD under different conditions and assumptions,^[52] and the use of other games such as the Public Goods and Ultimatum games to explore deep-seated notions of fairness and fair play.^[53] It has also been used to challenge the rational and self-regarding "economic man" model of economics,^[54] and as a basis for replacing Darwinian sexual selection theory with a theory of social selection.^[55]

Nice strategies are better able to invade if they have social structures or other means of increasing their interactions. Axelrod discusses this in chapter 8; in a later paper he and Rick Riolo and Michael Cohen^[56] use computer simulations to show cooperation rising among agents who have negligible chance of future encounters but can recognize similarity of an arbitrary characteristic (such as a green beard). Whereas other studies ^[57] have shown that the only Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma strategies that resist invasion in a well-mixed evolving population are generous strategies.

When an IPD tournament introduces noise (errors or misunderstandings) TFT strategies can get trapped into a long string of retaliatory defections, thereby depressing their score. TFT also tolerates "ALL C" (always cooperate) strategies, which then give an opening to exploiters.^[58] In 1992 Martin Nowak and Karl Sigmund demonstrated a strategy called Pavlov (or "win–stay, lose–shift") that does better in these circumstances.^[59] Pavlov looks at its own prior move as well as the other player's move. If the payoff was R or P (see "Prisoner's Dilemma", above) it cooperates; if S or T it defects.

In a 2006 paper Nowak listed five mechanisms by which natural selection can lead to cooperation.^[60] In addition to kin selection and direct reciprocity, he shows that:

• Indirect reciprocity is based on knowing the other player's reputation, which is the player's history with other players. Cooperation depends on a reliable history being projected from past partners to future partners.
• Network reciprocity relies on geographical or social factors to increase the interactions with nearer neighbors; it is essentially a virtual group.
• Group selection^[61] assumes that groups with cooperators (even altruists) will be more successful as a whole, and this will tend to benefit all members.

The payoffs in the Prisoner's Dilemma game are fixed, but in real life defectors are often punished by cooperators. Where punishment is costly there is a second-order dilemma amongst cooperators between those who pay the cost of enforcement and those who do not.^[62] Other work has shown that while individuals given a choice between joining a group that punishes free-riders and one that does not initially prefer the sanction-free group, yet after several rounds they will join the sanctioning group, seeing that sanctions secure a better payoff.^[63]

In small populations or groups there is the possibility that indirect reciprocity (reputation) can interact with direct reciprocity (e.g. tit for tat) with neither strategy dominating the other.^[64] The interactions between these strategies can give rise to dynamic social networks which exhibit some of the properties observed in empirical networks ^[65] If network structure and choices in the Prisoner's dilemma co-evolve, then cooperation can survive. In the resulting networks cooperators will be more centrally located than defectors who will tend to be in the periphery of the network.^[66]

And there is the very intriguing paper "The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism and War" by Jung-Kyoo Choi and Samuel Bowles. From their summary:

Altruism—benefiting fellow group members at a cost to oneself —and parochialism—hostility towards individuals not of one's own ethnic, racial, or other group—are common human behaviors. The intersection of the two—which we term "parochial altruism"—is puzzling from an evolutionary perspective because altruistic or parochial behavior reduces one's payoffs by comparison to what one would gain from eschewing these behaviors. But parochial altruism could have evolved if parochialism promoted intergroup hostilities and the combination of altruism and parochialism contributed to success in these conflicts.... [Neither] would have been viable singly, but by promoting group conflict they could have evolved jointly.^[67]

They do not claim that humans have actually evolved in this way, but that computer simulations show how war could be promoted by the interaction of these behaviors. A crucial open research question, thus, is how realistic the assumptions are which these simulation models are based on.^[68]

Conclusion

When Richard Dawkins set out to "examine the biology of selfishness and altruism" in The Selfish Gene, he reinterpreted the basis of evolution, and therefore of altruism. He was "not advocating a morality based on evolution",^[69] and even felt that "we must teach our children altruism, for we cannot expect it to be part of their biological nature."^[70] But John Maynard Smith^[71] was showing that behavior could be subject to evolution, Robert Trivers had shown that reciprocal altruism is strongly favored by natural selection to lead to complex systems of altruistic behavior (supporting Kropotkin's argument that cooperation is as much a factor of evolution as competition^[72]), and Axelrod's dramatic results showed that in a very simple game the conditions for survival (be "nice", be provocable, promote the mutual interest) seem to be the essence of morality. While this does not yet amount to a science of morality, the game theoretic approach has clarified the conditions required for the evolution and persistence of cooperation, and shown how Darwinian natural selection can lead to complex behavior, including notions of morality, fairness, and justice. It is shown that the nature of self-interest is more profound than previously considered, and that behavior that seems altruistic may, in a broader view, be individually beneficial. Extensions of this work to morality^[73] and the social contract^[74] may yet resolve the old issue of individual interests versus group interests.