African philosophy

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_philosophy

African philosophy is the philosophical discourse produced in Africa or by indigenous Africans. African philosophers are found in the various academic fields of present philosophy, such as metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy, and political philosophy.

One particular subject that several modern African philosophers have written about is on the subject of freedom and what it means to be free or to experience wholeness.

The term "Africana philosophy" covers the philosophy made by thinkers of African descent and others whose work deals with the subject matter of the African diaspora.

Philosophy in Africa has a rich and varied history, some of which has been lost over time. Some of the world's oldest philosophical texts have been produced in Ancient Egypt, written in Hieratic and on papyrus, c. 2200–1000 BCE. One of the earliest known African philosophers was Ptahhotep, an ancient Egyptian philosopher.

In general, the ancient Greeks acknowledged their Egyptian forebears, and in the fifth century BCE, the philosopher Isocrates declared that the earliest Greek thinkers traveled to Egypt to seek knowledge; one of them Pythagoras of Samos, who "was first to bring to the Greeks all philosophy".

In the 21st century, research by Egyptologists has indicated that the word philosopher itself seems to stem from Egypt: "the founding Greek word philosophos, lover of wisdom, is itself a borrowing from and translation of the Egyptian concept mer-rekh (mr-rḫ) which literally means 'lover of wisdom,' or knowledge."

In the early and mid-twentieth century, anti-colonial movements had a tremendous effect on the development of a distinct modern African political philosophy that had resonance on both the continent and in the African diaspora. One well-known example of the economic philosophical works emerging from this period was the African socialist philosophy of Ujamaa propounded in Tanzania and other parts of Southeast Africa. These African political and economic philosophical developments also had a notable impact on the anti-colonial movements of many non-African peoples around the world.

Definition

There is some debate in defining the ethnophilosophical parameters of African philosophy and identifying what differentiates it from other philosophical traditions. One of the implicit assumptions of ethnophilosophy is that a specific culture can have a philosophy that is not applicable and accessible to all peoples and cultures in the world. In A Discourse on African Philosophy: A New Perspective on Ubuntu and Transitional Justice in South Africa, Christian B. N. Gade argues that the ethnophilosophical approach to African philosophy as a static group property is highly problematic. His research on ubuntu presents an alternative collective discourse on African philosophy that takes differences, historical developments, and social contexts seriously. According to Edwin Etieyibo and Jonathon O. Chimakonam in their article “African Philosophy: Past, Present, and Future”, historical context plays an important role in African philosophy. History provides the framework in which we can inspect philosophical problems. In terms of African philosophy, one must look at the whole picture through the lens of African history.  “There are no facts without history."

African philosophy can be formally defined as a critical thinking by Africans on their experiences of reality. Nigerian born Philosopher K.C. Anyanwu defined African philosophy as "that which concerns itself with the way in which African people of the past and present make sense of their destiny and of the world in which they live.

Nigerian philosopher Joseph I. Omoregbe broadly defines a philosopher as one who attempts to understand the world's phenomena, the purpose of human existence, the nature of the world, and the place of human beings in that world. This form of natural philosophy is identifiable in Africa even before individual African philosophers can be distinguished in the sources. Like Western philosophy, African philosophy contemplates the perceptions of time, personhood, space and other subjects.

History

There is a rich and written history of ancient African philosophy - for example from ancient Egypt, Ethiopia, and Mali (Timbuktutu, Djenne). When it comes to the modern era and the 20th century, a new beginning is linked to the 1920s, when African individuals who had studied in the United States and Europe ("Western" locations) returned to Africa and reflected on the racial discrimination experienced abroad. Their arrival back in Africa instigated a feeling of onuma, which is an interpretation of "frustration." The onuma was felt in response to legacies of colonialism on a global scale. The renaissance of African philosophy in the 20th century is important because onuma inspired some who had traveled and returned to formulate a "systematic beginning" of philosophizing the African identity, the space of African people in history, and African contribution to humanity.

Criteria

According to some, two conflicting components are deemed integral to a work for it to be considered African philosophy. First, the piece must have a racial focus. This facet is valued by Traditionalist groups, who posit that African philosophy should be an expression of the world experienced by African individuals. African philosophy must be produced by African authors. In contrast, Universalist groups suggest that African philosophy should be analyses and critical engagement of and between individual African thinkers. A work is African philosophy based on a focal point of tradition. African philosophy must pull from African cultural backgrounds or thought processes, but it should be independent from racial considerations and use "African" only as a term of solidarity.

Methods

Communitarian method

The communitarian method of African philosophy emphasizes mutualism in thought. It is most commonly used by researchers following ubuntu. The common expression of ubuntu is that "a person is a person through a person." Leonhard Praeg, Mogobe Ramose, and Fainos Mangera implement the communitarian method.

Complementary method

The complementary method focuses on the prospect of a missing link. All variables are important in consideration of histories and identities, and no variable should be overlooked or under-considered. Additionally, all variables affect one another, so the relationship between them and their affects on other variables should be scrutinized. Mesembe Edet implements the complementary method.

Conversational method

The conversational method creates thought by assessing a relationship between oppositional works. The defender or proponent is named "nwa-swa," and the nwa swa is questioned and doubted by a disagreeing party, known as "nwa nju." The conversational method emphasizes the interconnectedness of networks within reality; the more accurate a thought should be, the more specific a location should be. This method is endorsed by the Conventional School of Psychology, and it is used by Victor Nweke and Msembe Edet.

Types

Pre-modern

North Africa

In North Africa, arguably central to the development of the ancient Egyptian philosophical tradition of Egypt and Sudan was the conception of ma'at, which roughly translated refers to 'justice', 'truth', or simply 'that which is right'. One of the earliest works of political philosophy was The Maxims of Ptahhotep, which were taught to Egyptian schoolboys for centuries.

Ancient Egypt have several philosophical texts that have been treated by scholars in recent years. In the 2018 podcast "Africana Philosophy", the philosophers Peter Adamson and Chike Jeffers devoted the first eight episodes to Egyptian philosophy. The American Philosophical Association (APA) has published a text on the classical text The Immortality of Writers ("Be a Writer"), ca. 1200 BCE. The Blog of the APA article also covers The Dispute Between a Man and His Ba from the 19th century BCE; The Teaching of Ani, 13th century BCE, which gives advice to the ordinary man; The Satire of the Trades by Khety; and the text of Amennakht (active in 1170–1140 BCE) from Deir el-Medina, whose teaching states that "it is good to finish school, better than the smell of lotus blossoms in summer".

Ancient Egyptian and other African philosophers also made important contributions to Hellenistic philosophy and Christian philosophy. According to Busiris by the ancient Greek philosopher Isocrates, who was born before Plato, "all men agree the Egyptians are the healthiest and most long of life among men; and then for the soul they introduced philosophy's training [...]". In the Hellenistic tradition, the influential philosophical school of Neoplatonism was founded by the Egyptian philosopher Plotinus in the third century CE. The Church Father and philosopher Augustine of Hippo (born in Thagaste, today's Algeria, in 354) had a Christian mother, Saint Monica, who was an Amazigh (Berber), and Augustine defined himself as an African (or Punic, of Phoenician descent).

West Africa

The most prominent of West Africa's pre-modern philosophical traditions has been identified as that of the Yoruba philosophical tradition and the distinctive worldview that emerged from it over the thousands of years of its development. Philosophical concepts such as Ifá, Omoluabi, Ashè and Emi Omo Eso were integral to this system, and the totality of its elements are contained in what is known amongst the Yoruba as the Itan. The cosmologies and philosophies of the Akan, Dogon, Serer and Dahomey were also significant.

In pre-colonial Senegambia (modern Gambia and Senegal), the 17th-century philosopher Kocc Barma Fall (b. 1586) stood out as one of the renowned philosophers in Senegambian history. His proverbs are still recited by Senegalese and Gambians alike, including in Senegambian popular culture - for example in Ousmane Sembene's films such as Guelwaar Other notable philosophical thinkers include the Gambian historian Alieu Ebrima Cham Joof, and the Malian ethnologist Amadou Hampâté Bâ.

One of the foremost scholars of Timbuktu was Ahmed Baba (1556–1627), who argued against what he called "racial slavery". One of the leading women philosophers and writers of the Sokoto Caliphate, in present-day Nigeria, was the princess Nana Asma'u (1793-1864).

Horn of Africa

In the Horn of Africa, there are a number of sources documenting the development of a distinct Ethiopian philosophy from the first millennium onwards. Among the most notable examples from this tradition emerge from the work of the 17th-century philosopher Zera Yacob, and that of his disciple Walda Heywat. Yacob in his writings discusses religion, morality, and existence. He comes to the belief that every person will believe their faith to be the right one and that all men are created equal.

Southern Africa

In Southern Africa and Southeast Africa the development of a distinctive Bantu philosophy addressing the nature of existence, the cosmos and humankind's relation to the world following the Bantu migration has had the most significant impact on the philosophical developments of the said regions, with the development of the philosophy of Ubuntu as one notable example emerging from this worldview.

Central & East Africa

Many Central African philosophical traditions before the Bantu migration into southern Central Africa have been identified as a uniting characteristic of many Nilotic and Sudanic peoples, ultimately giving rise to the distinctive worldviews identified in the conceptions of time, the creation of the world, human nature, and the proper relationship between mankind and nature prevalent in Dinka mythology, Maasai mythology and similar traditions.

African diaspora

Some pre-modern African diasporic philosophical traditions have also been identified, mostly produced by descendants of Africans in Europe and the Americas. One notable pre-modern diasporic African philosopher was Anthony William Amo in the 18th century, who was taken as a slave from Awukenu in what is now Ghana, and was brought up and educated in Europe where he gained doctorates in medicine and philosophy, and subsequently became a professor of philosophy at the universities of Halle and Jena in Germany.

Modern

Kenyan philosopher Henry Odera Oruka has distinguished what he calls four trends in modern African philosophy: ethnophilosophy, philosophical sagacity, nationalistic–ideological philosophy, and professional philosophy. In fact it would be more realistic to call them candidates for the position of African philosophy, with the understanding that more than one of them might fit the bill. (Oruka later added two additional categories: literary/artistic philosophy, such as the work of literary figures such as Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, Wole Soyinka, Chinua Achebe, Okot p'Bitek, and Taban Lo Liyong, and hermeneutic philosophy, the analysis of African languages in order to find philosophical content.) In the African diaspora, American philosopher Maulana Karenga has also been notable in presenting varied definitions for understanding modern African philosophy, especially as it relates to its earliest sources.

Achille Mbembe, a modern African philosopher

One notable contributor to professional philosophy is Achille Mbembe. He interacts with a multitude of modern subjects, including thoughts on statehood, death, capital, racism, and colonialism. He invokes attention to moral and political arguments through a tone of morality in his works. Many recent pieces from Mbembe, including Critique of Black Reason, suggest that understanding Europe as a force not at the center of the universe is a point from which philosophy and society should view the world. Mbembe asserts that he positions himself in multiple worlds of existence at one time. This method creates an empathetic point from which the world can be viewed.

Ethnophilosophy and philosophical sagacity

Henry Odera Oruka of Kenya came up with Sage Philosophy and philosophic sagacity is attributed to him. Ethnophilosophy has been used to record the beliefs found in African cultures. Such an approach treats African philosophy as consisting in a set of shared beliefs, values, categories, and assumptions that are implicit in the language, practices, and beliefs of African cultures; in short, the uniquely African worldview. As such, it is seen as an item of communal property rather than an activity for the individual.

One proponent of this form, Placide Tempels, argued in Bantu Philosophy that the metaphysical categories of the Bantu people are reflected in their linguistic categories. According to this view, African philosophy can be best understood as springing from the fundamental assumptions about reality reflected in the languages of Africa.

Another example of this sort of approach is the work of Ebiegberi Joe Alagoa of the University of Port Harcourt in Nigeria, who argues for the existence of an African philosophy of history stemming from traditional proverbs from the Niger Delta in his paper "An African Philosophy of History in the Oral Tradition." Alagoa argues that in African philosophy, age is seen as an important factor in gaining wisdom and interpreting the past. In support of this view, he cites proverbs such as "More days, more wisdom", and "What an old man sees seated, a youth does not see standing." Truth is seen as eternal and unchanging ("Truth never rots"), but people are subject to error ("Even a four-legged horse stumbles and falls"). It is dangerous to judge by appearances ("A large eye does not mean keen vision"), but first-hand observation can be trusted ("He who sees does not err"). The past is not seen as fundamentally different from the present, but all history is contemporary history ("A storyteller does not tell of a different season"). The future remains beyond knowledge ("Even a bird with a long neck cannot see the future"). Nevertheless, it is said, "God will outlive eternity." History is seen as vitally important ("One ignorant of his origin is nonhuman"), and historians (known as "sons of the soil") are highly revered ("The son of the soil has the python's keen eyes"). However, these arguments must be taken with a grain of cultural relativism, as the span of culture in Africa is incredibly vast, with patriarchies, matriarchies, monotheists and traditional religionists among the population, and as such the attitudes of groups of the Niger Delta cannot be applied to the whole of Africa.

Another more controversial application of this approach is embodied in the concept of Negritude. Leopold Senghor, a proponent of Negritude, argued that the distinctly African approach to reality is based on emotion rather than logic, works itself out in participation rather than analysis, and manifests itself through the arts rather than the sciences. Cheikh Anta Diop and Mubabinge Bilolo, on the other hand, while agreeing that African culture is unique, challenged the view of Africans as essentially emotional and artistic, arguing that Egypt was an African culture whose achievements in science, mathematics, architecture, and philosophy were pre-eminent. This philosophy may also be maligned as overly reductionist due to the obvious scientific and scholarly triumphs of not only ancient Egypt, but also Nubia, Meroe, as well as the great library of Timbuktu, the extensive trade networks and kingdoms of North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, the Horn of Africa and Great Zimbabwe and the other major empires of Southern, Southeast and Central Africa.

Critics of this approach argue that the actual philosophical work in producing a coherent philosophical position is being done by the academic philosopher (such as Alagoa), and that the sayings of the same culture can be selected from and organised in many different ways in order to produce very different, often contradictory systems of thought.

Philosophical sagacity is a sort of individualist version of ethnophilosophy, in which one records the beliefs of certain special members of a community. The premise here is that, although most societies demand some degree of conformity of belief and behaviour from their members, a certain few of those members reach a particularly high level of knowledge and understanding of their cultures' worldviews; such people are sages. In some cases, the sage goes beyond mere knowledge and understanding to reflection and questioning—these become the targets of philosophical sagacity.

Critics of this approach note that not all reflection and questioning is philosophical; besides, if African philosophy were to be defined purely in terms of philosophic sagacity, then the thoughts of the sages could not be African philosophy, for they did not record them from other sages. Also, on this view the only difference between non-African anthropology or ethnology and African philosophy seems to be the nationality of the researcher.

Critics argue further that the problem with both ethnophilosophy and philosophical sagacity is that there is surely an important distinction between philosophy and the history of ideas, although other philosophers consider the two topics to be remarkably similar. The argument is that no matter how interesting the beliefs of a people such as the Akan or the Yoruba may be to the philosopher, they remain beliefs, not philosophy. To call them philosophy is to use a secondary sense of that term, as in "my philosophy is live and let live."

Professional philosophy

Professional philosophy is usually identified as that produced by African philosophers trained in the Western philosophical tradition, that embraces a universal view of the methods and concerns of philosophy. Those philosophers identified in this category often explicitly reject the assumptions of ethnophilosophy and adopt a universalist worldview of philosophy that requires all philosophy to be accessible and applicable to all peoples and cultures in the world. This is even if the specific philosophical questions prioritized by individual national or regional philosophies may differ. Some African philosophers classified in this category are Odera Oruka, Paulin Hountondji, Peter Bodunrin, Kwasi Wiredu, Tsenay Serequeberhan, Marcien Towa and Lansana Keita.

Nationalist and ideological philosophy

Further information: African nationalism

Nationalist and ideological philosophy might be considered a special case of philosophic sagacity, in which not sages but ideologues are the subjects. Alternatively, it has been considered as a subcategory of professional political philosophy. In either case, the same sort of problem arises with retaining a distinction between ideology and philosophy, and also between sets of ideas and a special way of reasoning. Examples include African socialism, Nkrumaism, Harambee and Authenticité.

African ethics

Although Africa is extremely diverse, there appear to be some shared moral ideas across many ethnic groups. In a number of African cultures, ethics is centered on a person's character, and saying "he has no morals" translates as something like "he has no character". A person's character reflects the accumulation of their deeds and their habits of conduct; hence, it can be changed over a person's life. In some African cultures, "personhood" refers to an adult human who exhibits moral virtues, and one who behaves badly is not considered a person, even if he is considered a human.

While many traditional African societies are highly religious, their religions are not revealed, and hence, ethics does not center around divine commands. Instead, ethics is humanistic and utilitarian: it focuses on improving social functioning and human flourishing. On the other hand, social welfare is not a mere aggregate of individual welfare; rather, there is a collective "social good" embodying values that everyone wants, like peace and stability. In general, African ethics is social or collectivistic rather than individualistic and united in ideology. Cooperation and altruism are considered crucial. African ethics places more weight on duties of prosocial behaviour than on rights per se, in contrast to most of Western ethics.

Africana philosophy

Main article: Africana philosophy

Africana philosophy is the work of philosophers of African descent and others whose work deals with the subject matter of the African diaspora. This is a relatively new (since the 1980s) and developing name given to African thought, and it is given credible attention by professional organizations, including the American Philosophical Association.

Africana philosophy includes the philosophical ideas, arguments and theories of particular concern to people of African descent. Some of the topics explored by Africana philosophy include: pre-Socratic African philosophy and modern day debates discussing the early history of Western philosophy, post-colonial writing in Africa and the Americas, black resistance to oppression, black existentialism in the United States, and the meaning of "blackness" in the modern world.

Africanfuturism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Africanfuturism

Africanfuturism is a cultural aesthetic and philosophy of science that centers on the fusion of African culture, history, mythology, point of view, with technology based in Africa and not limiting to the diaspora. It was coined by Nigerian American writer Nnedi Okorafor in 2019 in a blog post as a single word. Nnedi Okorafor defines Africanfuturism as a sub-category of science fiction that is "directly rooted in African culture, history, mythology and point-of-view..and...does not privilege or center the West," is centered with optimistic "visions in the future," and is written by (and centered on) "people of African descent" while rooted in the African continent. As such its center is African, often does extend upon the continent of Africa, and includes the Black diaspora, including fantasy that is set in the future, making a narrative "more science fiction than fantasy" and typically has mystical elements. It is different from Afrofuturism, which focuses mainly on the African diaspora, particularly the United States. Works of Africanfuturism include science fiction, fantasy, alternate history, horror and magic realism.

Writers of Africanfuturism include Nnedi Okorafor, Tochi Onyebuchi, Oghenechovwe Donald Ekpeki, Tade Thompson, Namwali Serpell, Sofia Samatar, Wole Talabi, Suyi Davies Okungbowa and Dandy Jackson Chukwudi.

History

Early beginnings

Works of Africanfuturism have long existed and have been assigned to Afrofuturism. Themes of Africanfuturism can be traced back to Buchi Emecheta's 1983 novel The Rape Of Shavi and Ben Okri's 1991 novel The Famished Road.

21st century

Nnedi Okorafor, author credited for coining the word "Africanfuturism"

In 2019 and 2020, African writers began to reject the term Afrofuturism because of the differences between both genres with Africanfuturism focusing more on African point of view, culture, themes and history as opposed to Afrofuturism which covers African diaspora history, culture and themes. The speculative fiction magazine Omenana and the Nommo Awards presented by The African Speculative Fiction Society launched in 2017 helped to widen the content of the genre.

In August 2020, Hope Wabuke, a writer and assistant professor at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln of English and Creative Writing, noted that Afrofuturism, coined by Mark Dery, a White critic, in 1993, treats African-American themes and concerns in the "context of twentieth-century technoculture," which was later expanded by Alondra Nelson, arguing that Dery's conception of Blackness began in 1619 and "is marked solely by the ensuing 400 years of violation by whiteness" that he portrayed as "potentially irreparable." Critical of this definition, saying it lacks the qualities of the "Black American diasporic imagination" and ability to conceive of "Blackness outside of the Black American diaspora" or independent from Whiteness, she noted that "Africanfuturism" is different because it is, according to Nnedi Okorafor, more deeply rooted in "African culture, history, mythology and point-of-view as it then branches into the Black diaspora, and it does not privilege or center the West," while explaining Africanjujuism as a subcategory of fantasy. Wabuke further explains how Africanfuturism is more specific and rids itself of the "othering of the white gaze and the de facto colonial Western mindset," free from what she calls the "white Western gaze" and saying this is the main difference "between Afrofuturism and Africanfuturism." She adds that, in her view, Africanfuturism has a different outlook and perspective than "mainstream Western and American science fiction and fantasy" and even Afrofuturism which is "married to the white Western gaze." Wabuke goes on to explain Africanfuturist and Africanjujuist themes in Okorafor's Who Fears Death and Zahrah the Windseeker, Akwaeke Emezi's Pet, and Buchi Emecheta's The Rape of Shavi.

In February 2021, Aigner Loren Wilson of Tor.com explained the difficulty of finding books in the subgenre because many institutions "treat Africanfuturism and Afrofuturism like the same thing" even though the distinction between them is plain. She said that Africanfuturism is "centered in and about Africa and their people" while Afrofuturism is a sci-fi subcategory which is about "Black people within the diaspora," often including stories of those outside Africa, including in "colonized Western societies.". Another reviewer called Okorafor's Lagoon, which "recounts the story of the arrival of aliens in Nigeria," as an Africanfuturist work which requires a reader who is "actively engaged in co-creating the alternative future that the novel is constructing," meaning that the reader becomes part of the "creative conversation."

Literature and comics

Africanfuturism literature features speculative fiction which narrates events centered on Africa from an African point of view rather than a Western point of view. Works of Africanfuturism literature are still wrongly categorized as Afrofuturism.

Works of Nigerian American writer Nnedi Okorafor are often in the Africanfuturism genre with her works like Who Fears Death, Lagoon, Remote Control, The Book of Phoenix and Noor. She won a Hugo and Nebula award for her novella Binti, the first from the Binti trilogy which features a native Himba girl from Namibia in space. Tade Thompson won a Arthur C. Clarke award for his Africanfuturist novel Rosewater about an alien dome in Nigeria and Zambian writer Namwali Serpell's The Old Drift won the same award.

In 2020, Africanfuturism: An Anthology edited by Wole Talabi was published by Brittle Paper and as of the end of 2022 is currently still offered for free on its website in celebration of the 10th anniversary of this publisher which has been called "the village square of African literature". Gary K. Wolfe reviewed this anthology in February 2021. He credits Nnedi Okorafor for coining "Africanfuturism," noting its describes "more Africa-centered SF," although saying he is not sure whether her term "Africanjujuism," a parallel term for fantasy, will catch on. While saying that both are useful, he says that he does not like how they have to "do with the root, not the prefix," with "futurism" only describing a bit of science fiction and fantasy. He still calls the book a "solid anthology," saying it challenges the idea of viewing African science fiction as monolithic. Stories in the book include "Egoli" by T. L. Huchu, "Yat Madit" by Dilman Dila, "Behind Our Irises" by Tlotlo Tsamaase, "Fort Kwame" by Derek Lubangakene, "Rainmaker" by Mazi Nwonwu, "Fruit of the Calabash" by Rafeeat Aliyu, "Lekki Lekki" by Mame Bougouma Diene, and "Sunrise" by Nnedi Okorafor.

When Tor.com outlined a list of stories and books from the genre as of 2021, Tor also highlighted Africanfuturism: An Anthology (edited by Wole Talabi) along with the individual works of Namwali Serpell's The Old Drift, Nnedi Okorafor's Lagoon, Nicky Drayden's The Prey of Gods, Oghenechovwe Donald Ekpeki's Ife-Iyoku, the Tale of Imadeyunuagbon, and Tochi Onyebuchi's War Girls.

In comics, as of the end of 2022, so far a few Africanfuturism comics exist. Comic Republic Global Network, a Lagos-based publisher, is prominent in creating Africanfuturist superheroes like Guardian Prime. Laguardia, a comic book by Nnedi Okorafor, is associated with Africanfuturism.

Films and animation

Africanfuturism movies are often scarce; films like Black Panther have been criticized by some viewers, who say that their depiction of Africa "differs little from the colonial view". In recent times, Africanfuturist movies include Hello, Rain, Pumzi, and Ratnik. Several Africanfuturism novels have been optioned for live adaptation, including Binti and Who Fears Death. In 2020, Walt Disney Studios and Pan African company Kugali announced that they would be co-producing an africanfuturist animated science fiction series, Iwájú, inspired by the city of Lagos.

In July 5, 2023, Kizazi Moto: Generation Fire, an Africanfuturist animated anthology short film series premiered on Disney+, Peter Ramsey was picked as executive producer, while Tendayi Nyeke and Anthony Silverston were supervising producers, and Triggerfish was the primary studio, along with other animation studios in Africa. Each of the ten films is from an African perspective, on themes such as social media, duality, disability, self-reflection, shared humanity, and other topics, with stories which include time travel, extraterrestrials, and alternate universes.

Taxing and Spending Clause

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxing_and_Spending_Clause

 

The Taxing and Spending Clause (which contains provisions known as the General Welfare Clause and the Uniformity Clause), Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution, grants the federal government of the United States its power of taxation. While authorizing Congress to levy taxes, this clause permits the levying of taxes for two purposes only: to pay the debts of the United States, and to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States. Taken together, these purposes have traditionally been held to imply and to constitute the federal government's taxing and spending power.

Text

The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

Background

One of the most often claimed defects of the Articles of Confederation was its lack of a grant to the central government of the power to lay and collect taxes. Under the Articles, Congress was forced to rely on requisitions upon the governments of its member states. Without the power to independently raise its own revenues, the Articles left Congress vulnerable to the discretion of the several state governments—each state made its own decision as to whether it would pay the requisition or not. Some states were not giving Congress the funds for which it asked, either by paying only in part, or by altogether ignoring the request from Congress. Without the revenue to enforce its laws and treaties, or pay its debts, and without an enforcement mechanism to compel the states to pay, the Confederation was practically rendered impotent and was in danger of falling apart.

The Congress recognized this limitation and proposed amendments to the Articles in an effort to supersede it. However, nothing ever came of those proposals until the Philadelphia Convention.

Powers granted

The power to tax is a concurrent power of the federal government and the individual states. The taxation power has been perceived over time to be very broad, but has also, on occasion, been curtailed by the courts. United States v. Butler stated that the clause also granted "a substantive power... to appropriate", not subject to the limitations imposed by the other enumerated powers of Congress.

Power to tax

The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises

This power is considered by many to be essential to the effective administration of government. As argued under the Articles, the lack of a power to tax renders government impotent. Typically, the power is used to raise revenues for the general support of government. But, Congress has employed the taxing power in uses other than solely for the raising of revenue, such as:

• regulatory taxation – taxing to regulate commerce;
• prohibitive taxation – taxing to discourage, suppress, or even exterminate commerce;
• obligation taxation – encouraging participation in commerce via taxation on those not participating in interstate commerce; e.g. the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, "Chief Justice Roberts concluded in Part III–C that the individual mandate must be construed as imposing a tax on those who do not have health insurance";
• tariffs – taxing as a means of protectionism.

In 1922, the Supreme Court struck down a 1919 tax on child labor in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., commonly referred to as the "Child Labor Tax Case". The Court had previously held that Congress did not have the power to directly regulate labor, and found the law at issue to be an attempt to indirectly accomplish the same end. This ruling appeared to have been reinforced in United States v. Butler, in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the processing taxes instituted under the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act were an unconstitutional attempt to regulate state activity in violation of the Tenth Amendment. However, despite its outcome, Butler affirmed that Congress does have a broad power to tax, and to expend revenues within its discretion.

Implicit power to spend

With the power to tax implicitly comes the power to spend the revenues raised thereby in order to meet the objectives and goals of the government. To what extent this power ought to be utilized by the Congress has been the source of continued dispute and debate since the inception of the federal government, as will be explained below. However, interpretations recognizing an implicit power to spend arising specifically from this clause have been questioned, with the Necessary and Proper Clause being suggested as the actual source of Congress's spending power.

While recognizing that the federal government is one of limited and enumerated powers, the Supreme Court has held that Congress may incentivize state governments via appropriations of federal funds to adopt and enforce federal policy goals that otherwise would lay beyond the powers of the federal government directly to impose. In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court upheld a federal law withholding a portion of highway funds from states that did not raise their minimum legal drinking age to 21.

Limitations on taxing power

Several Constitutional provisions address the taxation and spending authority of Congress. These include both requirements for the apportionment of direct taxes and the uniformity of indirect taxes, the origination of revenue bills within the House of Representatives, the disallowal of taxes on exports, the General Welfare requirement, the limitation on the release of funds from the treasury except as provided by law, and the apportionment exemption of the Sixteenth Amendment. Additionally, Congress and the legislatures of the various states are prohibited from conditioning the right to vote in federal elections on payment of a poll tax or other types of tax by the Twenty-fourth Amendment.

Origination Clause

The Constitution provides in the Origination Clause that all bills for raising revenue must originate in the House of Representatives. The idea underlying the clause is that Representatives, being the most numerous branch of Congress, and most closely associated with the people, know best the economic conditions of the people they represent, and how to generate revenues for the support of government in the least burdensome manner. Additionally, Representatives are regarded the most accountable to the people, and thus are least likely to exercise the taxing power abusively or injudiciously.

General Welfare Clause

See also: General welfare clause

to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States;

Of all the limitations upon the power to tax and spend, the General Welfare Clause appears to have achieved notoriety as one of the most contentious. The dispute over the clause arises from two distinct disagreements. The first concerns whether the General Welfare Clause grants an independent spending power or is a restriction upon the taxing power. The second disagreement pertains to what exactly is meant by the phrase "general welfare."

The two primary authors of The Federalist Papers set forth two separate, conflicting interpretations:

• James Madison advocated the ratification of the Constitution in The Federalist and at the Virginia ratifying convention upon a narrow construction of the clause, asserting that spending must be at least tangentially tied to one of the other specifically enumerated powers, such as regulating interstate or foreign commerce, or providing for the military, as the General Welfare Clause is not a specific grant of power, but a statement of purpose qualifying the power to tax.
• Alexander Hamilton, only after the Constitution had been ratified, argued for a broad interpretation which viewed spending as an enumerated power Congress could exercise independently to benefit the general welfare, such as to assist national needs in agriculture or education, provided that the spending is general in nature and does not favor any specific section of the country over any other.

Although The Federalist was not reliably distributed outside of New York, the essays eventually became the dominant reference for interpreting the meaning of the Constitution as they provided the reasoning and justification behind the Framers' intent in setting up the federal government.

While Hamilton's view prevailed during the administrations of Presidents Washington and Adams, historians argue that his view of the General Welfare Clause was repudiated in the election of 1800, and helped establish the primacy of the Democratic-Republican Party for the subsequent 24 years. This assertion is based on the motivating factor which the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions played upon the electorate; the Kentucky Resolutions, authored by Thomas Jefferson, specifically criticized Hamilton's view. Further, Jefferson himself later described the distinction between the parties over this view as "almost the only landmark which now divides the federalists from the republicans...."

Associate Justice Joseph Story

Associate Justice Joseph Story relied heavily upon The Federalist as a source for his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States. In that work, Story excoriated both the Madisonian view and a previous, strongly nationalistic view of Hamilton's which was rejected at the Philadelphia Convention. Ultimately, Story concluded that Thomas Jefferson's view of the clause as a limitation on the power to tax, given in Jefferson's opinion to Washington on the constitutionality of the national bank, was the correct reading. However, Story also concluded that Hamilton's view on spending, articulated in his 1791 Report on Manufactures, is the correct reading of the spending power.

Prior to 1936, the United States Supreme Court had imposed a narrow interpretation of the Clause, as demonstrated by the holding in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., (1922) in which a tax on child labor was an impermissible attempt to regulate commerce beyond that Court's equally narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause. This narrow view was overturned in 1936 in United States v. Butler. There, the Court agreed with Justice Story's construction, holding the power to tax and spend is an independent power; that is, the General Welfare Clause gives Congress power it might not derive anywhere else. However, the Court did limit the power to spending for matters affecting only the national welfare. The Court wrote:

[T]he [General Welfare] clause confers a power separate and distinct from those later enumerated, is not restricted in meaning by the grant of them, and Congress consequently has a substantive power to tax and to appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare of the United States. … It results that the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution. … But the adoption of the broader construction leaves the power to spend subject to limitations. … [T]he powers of taxation and appropriation extend only to matters of national, as distinguished from local, welfare.

The tax imposed in Butler was nevertheless held unconstitutional as a violation of the Tenth Amendment reservation of power to the states.

Shortly after Butler, in Helvering v. Davis, the Supreme Court interpreted the clause even more expansively, disavowing almost entirely any role for judicial review of Congressional spending policies, thereby conferring upon Congress a plenary power to impose taxes and to spend money for the general welfare subject almost entirely to Congress's own discretion. In South Dakota v. Dole (1987) the Court held Congress possessed power to indirectly influence the states into adopting national standards by withholding, to a limited extent, federal funds where a state did not meet certain conditions required by Congress. Following that ruling, the Court later held by a 7–2 vote in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (2012) that Congress conditioning a state's receipt of the entirety of its federal Medicaid funds on whether said state elected to expand its Medicaid program in accordance with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was an unconstitutionally coercive use of Congress's spending power.

To date, the Hamiltonian view of the General Welfare Clause predominates in case law. Historically, however, the Anti-Federalists were wary of such an interpretation of this power during the ratification debates in the 1780s. Due to the objections raised by the Anti-Federalists, Madison was prompted to author his contributions to The Federalist Papers, attempting to quell the Anti-Federalists' fears of any such abuse by the proposed national government and to counter Anti-Federalist arguments against the Constitution.

Proponents of the Madisonian view also point to Hamilton's limited participation in the Constitutional Convention, particularly during the time frame in which this clause was crafted, as further evidence of his lack of constructive authority.

An additional view of the General Welfare Clause that is not as well known, but just as authoritative as the views of both Madison and Hamilton, can be found in the pre-Revolutionary writings of John Dickinson, who was also a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention. In his Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania (1767), Dickinson wrote of what he understood taxing for the general welfare entailed:

The parliament unquestionably possesses a legal authority to regulate the trade of Great Britain, and all her colonies. Such an authority is essential to the relation between a mother country and her colonies; and necessary for the common good of all. He who considers these provinces as states distinct from the British Empire, has very slender notions of justice, or of their interests. We are but parts of a whole; and therefore there must exist a power somewhere, to preside, and preserve the connection in due order. This power is lodged in the parliament; and we are as much dependent on Great Britain, as a perfectly free people can be on another. I have looked over every statute relating to these colonies, from their first settlement to this time; and I find every one of them founded on this principle, till the Stamp Act administration. All before, are calculated to regulate trade, and preserve or promote a mutually beneficial intercourse between the several constituent parts of the empire; and though many of them imposed duties on trade, yet those duties were always imposed with design to restrain the commerce of one part, that was injurious to another, and thus to promote the general welfare. The raising of a revenue thereby was never intended. – (emphasis in the original)

The idea Dickinson conveyed above, explains University of Montana Law Professor Jeffrey T. Renz, is that taxing for the general welfare is but taxation as a means of regulating commerce. Renz expands upon this point:

If we excise "general welfare" from the Tax Clause, we are presented with the claim that Congress may not levy duties for purposes other than paying the debts and providing for the common defense. Indeed, omitting the general welfare phrase would eliminate nearly all duties for regulatory purposes. A strong argument could be made that while Congress might have the power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce, the omission of "general welfare" from the Tax Clause was intended to deny it the power to regulate commerce by means of duties.

Comparative view

The narrow construction of the General Welfare Clause is unusual when compared to similar clauses in most state constitutions, and many constitutions of other countries. Virtually every state constitution has a general welfare clause which is interpreted as granting the state an independent power to regulate for the general welfare. An international example is provided with a report from the Supreme Court of Argentina:

In Ferrocarril Central Argentino c/ Provincia de Santa Fe, the Argentine Court held that the General Welfare clause of the Argentine Constitution offered the federal government a general source of authority for legislation affecting the provinces. The Court recognized that the United States utilized the clause only as a source of authority for federal taxation and spending, not for general legislation, but recognized differences in the two constitutions.

That argument is contrasted with an argument that the Federal Constitution was a constitution for limited government that extended to issues about which individual states were "incompetent", while state constitutions were free to govern all the remaining issues.

Uniformity Clause

The final phrase of the Taxing and Spending Clause stipulates:

but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.

Here, the requirement is that taxes must be geographically uniform throughout the United States. This means taxes affected by this provision must function "with the same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found." However, this clause does not require revenues raised by the tax from each state be equal.

Justice Story characterized this requirement in a light more relevant to practicality and fairness:

It was to cut off all undue preferences of one state over another in the regulation of subjects affecting their common interests. Unless duties, imposts, and excises were uniform, the grossest and most oppressive inequalities, vitally affecting the pursuits and employments of the people of different states, might exist.

In other words, it was another check placed on the legislature in order to keep a larger group of states from "ganging up" to levy taxes benefiting them at the expense of the remaining, smaller group of states.

A somewhat notable exception to this limitation has been upheld by the Supreme Court. In United States v. Ptasynski, the Court allowed a tax exemption which was quasi-geographical in nature. In the case, oil produced within a defined geographic region above the Arctic Circle was exempted from a federal excise tax on oil production. The basis for the holding was that Congress had determined the Alaskan oil to be of its own class and exempted it on those grounds, even though the classification of the Alaskan oil was a function of where it was geographically produced.

To understand the nuance of the Court's holding, consider this explanation: Congress decides to implement a uniform tax on all coal mining. The tax so implemented distinguishes between different grades of coal (e.g., anthracite versus bituminous versus lignite) and exempts one of the grades from taxation. Even though the exempted grade could potentially be defined by where it is geographically produced, the tax itself is still geographically uniform.

Apportionment of direct taxes

Language elsewhere in the Constitution also expressly limits the taxing power. Article I, Section 9 has more than one clause so addressed. Clause 4 states:

No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

Generally, a direct tax is subject to the apportionment rule, meaning taxes must be imposed among the states in proportion to each state's population in respect to that state's share of the whole national population. For example: As of the 2000 Census, nearly 34 million people populated California (CA). At the same time, the national population was 281.5 million people. This gave CA a 12 percent share of the national population, roughly. Were Congress to impose a direct tax in order to raise $1 trillion before the next census, the taxpayers of CA would be required to fund 12 percent of the total amount: $120 billion.

Apportionment and income taxes

Before 1895, direct taxes were understood to be limited to "capitation or poll taxes" (Hylton v. United States) and "taxes on lands and buildings, and general assessments, whether on the whole property of individuals or on their whole real or personal estate" (Springer v. United States). The decision in Springer went further in declaring that all income taxes were indirect taxes—or more specifically, "within the category of an excise or duty." However, in 1895 income taxes derived from property such as interest, dividends, and rent (imposed under an 1894 Act) were treated as direct taxes by the Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. and were ruled to be subject to the requirement of apportionment. As the income taxes imposed under the 1894 Act were not apportioned in such a manner, they were held unconstitutional. It was not the income tax per se, but the lack of a provision for its apportionment as a direct tax which made the tax unconstitutional.

The resulting case law prohibiting unapportioned taxes on incomes derived from property was later eliminated by the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913. The text of the amendment was clear in its aim:

The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on income, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.

Shortly after, in 1916, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad that under the Sixteenth Amendment income taxes were constitutional even though unapportioned, just as the amendment had provided. In subsequent cases, the courts have interpreted the Sixteenth Amendment and the Brushaber decision as standing for the rule that the amendment allows income taxes on "wages, salaries, commissions, etc. without apportionment."

No taxes on exports

Article I, Section 9, Clause 5 provides a further limitation:

No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.

This provision was an important protection for the southern states secured during the Constitutional Convention. With the grant of absolute power over foreign commerce given to the federal government, the states whose economies relied chiefly on exports realized that any tax laid by the new central government upon a single item of export would apply very unevenly amongst all the states and favor states which did not export that good.

In 1996, the Supreme Court held this provision prohibits Congress to tax any goods in export transit, and further forbids taxes on any services related to such export transit.

Shortly after, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this provision in United States v. United States Shoe Corp. in 1998. As part of the Water Resources Development Act of 1986, a harbor maintenance tax (26 U.S.C. § 4461) was imposed at the ad valorem (percentile) rate of 0.125% the value of the cargo instead of at a rate dependent entirely upon the cost of the service provided by the port. The Court unanimously affirmed the ruling of the lower Federal Circuit Court that a "user fee" imposed in such a manner is, in fact, a tax on exports and unconstitutional.

However, Congress may tax goods not in transit even though they are intended for export so long as the tax is not imposed solely for the reason that the good will be exported. For example, a tax imposed on all medical supplies would be constitutional even though there is a likelihood a portion of those supplies will be exported.

Restrictions on spending

The constraints placed upon the Taxing and Spending Clause and the subsequent powers derived therefrom do not stop at the Taxing Power.

Disguised regulations

While such holdings are rare and unlikely under contemporary jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has shown in the past its possible willingness to intervene on Congressional spending where its effects amount to a disguised regulation on private activity. The case illustrative of this is United States v. Butler.

In this case, the Court held that Congress had imposed a coercive federal regulatory scheme on farm production under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (AAA). By entering into contracts with farmers who reduced their output of selected crops, Congress had placed non-participating farmers at a distinct disadvantage to farmers who cooperated. As such, the program was not truly voluntary as it left the farmers no real choice; the options for the farmers were either cooperation or financial ruin. Under those circumstances, the regulatory scheme essentially required submission of farmers to a regulatory scheme Congress had no power to impose on its own.

The holding of the Butler case stemmed from the legal theory of that era, which held that regulation of production fell outside of Congress's commerce power. While the Court today is much more likely to defer to Congressional spending via the Commerce Clause, there are still circumstances where such spending may not be justifiable or validated by that power.

Unconstitutional conditions

While clearing the hurdle of regulatory spending may be easier today than in the past, another significant hurdle exists in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Under this principle, the government may not use its spending power to purchase the constitutional rights of the spending's beneficiaries. Furthermore, entitlements may not be denied on grounds that violate a constitutionally protected right.

The Court has typically held this spending limitation as only applying to First Amendment rights where the choice imposed is unreasonable or vague, or where the beneficiary essentially is put into a position where acceptance of the conditions becomes obligated.

Conditional spending and federalism

In 1987, the holding in South Dakota v. Dole reaffirmed the authority of Congress to attach conditional strings to the receipt of federal funds by state or municipal governments. In addition to the requirement that spending be for the general welfare, however, the Court devised more stringent criteria for determining the constitutionality of the conditions imposed:

• First, there can be no surprises; that is, the conditions for receipt must be stated clearly and the beneficiary must be aware of those conditions and their consequences.
• Second, the conditions imposed must be related to the spending in question.
• Last, the incentive must not be so significant as to turn cooperation into coercion.

At dispute in Dole was a condition placed on the receipt of federal highway funds: elevation of the drinking age. Any state in which persons less than 21 years of age could lawfully possess and consume alcohol would consequently lose five percent of the federal highway funds allocated by Congress. The Court found the second and third conditions met since the requirement for the funds was germane to highway safety. Additionally, the loss of only five percent of the amount was not found so substantial as to be coercive in the eyes of the Court (as opposed to losing half or all of the funds might be).

In 2012, the court held for the first time in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius that Congress had used its power under the spending clause in a way that was impermissibly coercive.

Power of the purse, generally

Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 imposes accountability on Congressional spending:

No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

The first half of this clause indicates that Congress must have appropriated by law the funds to be spent before the funds can be released from the Treasury. It serves as a powerful check of the legislature on the executive branch, as it further secures Congress's power of the purse. This provision, when also combined with the bicameral nature of Congress and the quorum requirements of both the Senate and the House of Representatives, serves as a constitutional check and balance on the legislature itself, preventing most spending that in effect does not implicitly have broad support with respect to both representational popular will in the House of Representatives and inter-regional approval in the Senate.

Congress attempted to limit appropriations logrolling via riders with the Line Item Veto Act of 1996. The U.S. Supreme Court later struck down the act on grounds that it violated the Presentment Clause.