From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Causality (also referred to as
causation, or
cause and effect) is what connects one process (the
cause) with another process or state (the
effect),
where the first is partly responsible for the second, and the second is
partly dependent on the first. In general, a process has many causes,
which are said to be causal
factors for it, and all lie in its
past. An effect can in turn be a cause of, or causal factor for, many other effects, which all lie in its
future. Causality is
metaphysically prior to notions of
time and space.
Causality is an
abstraction
that indicates how the world progresses, so basic a concept that it is
more apt as an explanation of other concepts of progression than as
something to be explained by others more basic. The concept is like
those of agency and efficacy. For this reason, a leap of
intuition may be needed to grasp it.
[5] Accordingly, causality is implicit in the logic and structure of ordinary language.
[6]
Aristotelian philosophy uses the word "cause" to mean "explanation" or "answer to a why question", including
Aristotle's material, formal, efficient, and final "causes"; then the "cause" is the
explanans for the
explanandum. In this case, failure to recognize that different kinds of "cause" are being considered can lead to futile debate. Of
Aristotle's four explanatory modes, the one nearest to the concerns of the present article is the "efficient" one.
The topic of causality remains a staple in
contemporary philosophy.
Concept
Metaphysics
The nature of cause and effect is a concern of the subject known as
metaphysics.
Ontology
A
general metaphysical question about cause and effect is what kind of
entity can be a cause, and what kind of entity can be an effect.
One viewpoint on this question is that cause and effect are of
one and the same kind of entity, with causality an asymmetric relation
between them. That is to say, it would make good sense grammatically to
say either "
A is the cause and
B the effect" or "
B is the cause and
A
the effect", though only one of those two can be actually true. In this
view, one opinion, proposed as a metaphysical principle in
process philosophy, is that every cause and every effect is respectively some process, event, becoming, or happening.
[7]
An example is 'his tripping over the step was the cause, and his
breaking his ankle the effect'. Another view is that causes and effects
are 'states of affairs', with the exact natures of those entities being
less restrictively defined than in process philosophy.
[8]
Another viewpoint on the question is the more classical one, that
a cause and its effect can be of different kinds of entity. For
example, in Aristotle's efficient causal explanation, an action can be a
cause while an
enduring
object is its effect. For example, the generative actions of his
parents can be regarded as the efficient cause, with Socrates being the
effect, Socrates being regarded as an enduring object, in philosophical
tradition called a 'substance', as distinct from an action.
Epistemology
Since
causality is a subtle metaphysical notion, considerable effort is
needed to establish knowledge of it in particular empirical
circumstances.
Geometrical significance
Causality has the properties of antecedence and contiguity.
[9][10] These are topological, and are ingredients for space-time geometry. As developed by
Alfred Robb, these properties allow the derivation of the notions of time and space.
[11] Max Jammer
writes "the Einstein postulate ... opens the way to a straightforward
construction of the causal topology ... of Minkowski space."
[12] Causal efficacy propagates no faster than light.
[13]
Thus, the notion of causality is metaphysically prior to the
notions of time and space. In practical terms, this is because use of
the relation of causality is necessary for the interpretation of
empirical experiments. Interpretation of experiments is needed to
establish the physical and geometrical notions of time and space.
Necessary and sufficient causes
Causes may sometimes be distinguished into two types: necessary and sufficient.
[14]
A third type of causation, which requires neither necessity nor
sufficiency in and of itself, but which contributes to the effect, is
called a "contributory cause."
- Necessary causes
- If x is a necessary cause of y, then the presence of y necessarily implies the prior occurrence of x. The presence of x, however, does not imply that y will occur.[15]
- Sufficient causes
- If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of x necessarily implies the subsequent occurrence of y. However, another cause z may alternatively cause y. Thus the presence of y does not imply the prior occurrence of x.[15]
- Contributory causes
- For some specific effect, in a singular case, a factor that is a
contributory cause is one amongst several co-occurrent causes. It is
implicit that all of them are contributory. For the specific effect, in
general, there is no implication that a contributory cause is necessary,
though it may be so. In general, a factor that is a contributory cause
is not sufficient, because it is by definition accompanied by other
causes, which would not count as causes if it were sufficient. For the
specific effect, a factor that is on some occasions a contributory cause
might on some other occasions be sufficient, but on those other
occasions it would not be merely contributory.[16]
J. L. Mackie argues that usual talk of "cause" in fact refers to
INUS conditions (
insufficient but
non-redundant parts of a condition which is itself
unnecessary but
sufficient for the occurrence of the effect).
[17]
An example is a short circuit as a cause for a house burning down.
Consider the collection of events: the short circuit, the proximity of
flammable material, and the absence of firefighters. Together these are
unnecessary but sufficient to the house's burning down (since many other
collections of events certainly could have led to the house burning
down, for example shooting the house with a flamethrower in the presence
of oxygen and so forth). Within this collection, the short circuit is
an insufficient (since the short circuit by itself would not have caused
the fire) but non-redundant (because the fire would not have happened
without it, everything else being equal) part of a condition which is
itself unnecessary but sufficient for the occurrence of the effect. So,
the short circuit is an INUS condition for the occurrence of the house
burning down.
Contrasted with conditionals
Conditional statements are
not
statements of causality. An important distinction is that statements of
causality require the antecedent to precede or coincide with the
consequent in time, whereas conditional statements do not require this
temporal order. Confusion commonly arises since many different
statements in English may be presented using "If ..., then ..." form
(and, arguably, because this form is far more commonly used to make a
statement of causality). The two types of statements are distinct,
however.
For example, all of the following statements are true when interpreting "If ..., then ..." as the material conditional:
- If Barack Obama is president of the United States in 2011, then Germany is in Europe.
- If George Washington is president of the United States in 2011, then .
The first is true since both the
antecedent and the
consequent are true. The second is true in
sentential logic and indeterminate in natural language, regardless of the consequent statement that follows, because the antecedent is false.
The ordinary
indicative conditional
has somewhat more structure than the material conditional. For
instance, although the first is the closest, neither of the preceding
two statements seems true as an ordinary indicative reading. But the
sentence:
- If Shakespeare of Stratford-on-Avon did not write Macbeth, then someone else did.
intuitively seems to be true, even though there is no straightforward
causal relation in this hypothetical situation between Shakespeare's
not writing Macbeth and someone else's actually writing it.
Another sort of conditional, the
counterfactual conditional,
has a stronger connection with causality, yet even counterfactual
statements are not all examples of causality. Consider the following two
statements:
- If A were a triangle, then A would have three sides.
- If switch S were thrown, then bulb B would light.
In the first case, it would not be correct to say that A's being a triangle
caused
it to have three sides, since the relationship between triangularity
and three-sidedness is that of definition. The property of having three
sides actually determines A's state as a triangle. Nonetheless, even
when interpreted counterfactually, the first statement is true. An early
version of Aristotle's "four cause" theory is described as recognizing
"essential cause". In this version of the theory, that the closed
polygon has three sides is said to be the "essential cause" of its being
a triangle.
[18]
This use of the word 'cause' is of course now far obsolete.
Nevertheless, it is within the scope of ordinary language to say that it
is essential to a triangle that it has three sides.
A full grasp of the concept of conditionals is important to
understanding the literature on causality. In everyday language, loose
conditional statements are often enough made, and need to be interpreted
carefully.
Questionable cause
Fallacies of questionable cause, also known as causal fallacies,
non-causa pro causa (Latin for "non-cause for cause"), or false cause, are
informal fallacies where a cause is incorrectly identified.
Theories
Counterfactual theories
Subjunctive conditionals are familiar from ordinary language. They are of the form, if A
were the case, then B
would be the case, or if A
had been the case, then B
would have been
the case. Counterfactual conditionals are specifically subjunctive
conditionals whose antecedents are in fact false, hence the name.
However the term used technically may apply to conditionals with true
antecedents as well.
Psychological research shows that people's thoughts about the
causal relationships between events influences their judgments of the
plausibility of counterfactual alternatives, and conversely, their
counterfactual thinking
about how a situation could have turned out differently changes their
judgments of the causal role of events and agents. Nonetheless, their
identification of the cause of an event, and their counterfactual
thought about how the event could have turned out differently do not
always coincide.
[19] People distinguish between various sorts of causes, e.g., strong and weak causes.
[20] Research in the
psychology of reasoning
shows that people make different sorts of inferences from different
sorts of causes, as found in the fields of cognitive linguistics
[21] and accident analysis
[22][23] for example.
In the philosophical literature, the suggestion that causation is
to be defined in terms of a counterfactual relation is made by the 18th
Century Scottish philosopher
David Hume.
Hume remarks that we may define the relation of cause and effect such
that "where, if the first object had not been, the second never had
existed."
[24]
More full-fledged analysis of causation in terms of
counterfactual conditionals only came in the 20th Century after
development of the possible world semantics for the evaluation of
counterfactual conditionals. In his 1973 paper "Causation,"
David Lewis proposed the following definition of the notion of
causal dependence:
[25]
- An event E causally depends on C if, and only if, (i) if C
had occurred, then E would have occurred, and (ii) if C had not
occurred, then E would not have occurred.
Causation is then defined as a chain of causal dependence. That is, C
causes E if and only if there exists a sequence of events C, D
1, D
2, ... D
k, E such that each event in the sequence depends on the previous.
Note that the analysis does not purport to explain how we make
causal judgements or how we reason about causation, but rather to give a
metaphysical account of what it is for there to be a causal relation
between some pair of events. If correct, the analysis has the power to
explain certain features of causation. Knowing that causation is a
matter of counterfactual dependence, we may reflect on the nature of
counterfactual dependence to account for the nature of causation. For
example, in his paper "Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow,"
Lewis sought to account for the time-directedness of counterfactual
dependence in terms of the semantics of the counterfactual conditional.
[26]
If correct, this theory can serve to explain a fundamental part of our
experience, which is that we can only causally affect the future but not
the past.
Probabilistic causation
Interpreting causation as a
deterministic relation means that if
A causes
B, then
A must
always be followed by
B. In this sense, war does not cause deaths, nor does
smoking cause
cancer or
emphysema. As a result, many turn to a notion of probabilistic causation. Informally,
A ("The person is a smoker") probabilistically causes
B ("The person has now or will have cancer at some time in the future"), if the information that
A occurred increases the likelihood of
Bs occurrence. Formally, P{
B|
A}≥ P{
B} where P{
B|
A} is the conditional probability that
B will occur given the information that
A occurred, and P{
B}is the probability that
B will occur having no knowledge whether
A
did or did not occur. This intuitive condition is not adequate as a
definition for probabilistic causation because of its being too general
and thus not meeting our intuitive notion of cause and effect. For
example, if
A denotes the event "The person is a smoker,"
B denotes the event "The person now has or will have cancer at some time in the future" and
C
denotes the event "The person now has or will have emphysema some time
in the future," then the following three relationships hold: P{
B|
A} ≥ P{
B}, P{
C|
A} ≥ P{
C} and P{
B|
C} ≥ P{
B}.
The last relationship states that knowing that the person has
emphysema increases the likelihood that he will have cancer. The reason
for this is that having the information that the person has emphysema
increases the likelihood that the person is a smoker, thus indirectly
increasing the likelihood that the person will have cancer. However, we
would not want to conclude that having emphysema causes cancer. Thus,
we need additional conditions such as temporal relationship of
A to
B
and a rational explanation as to the mechanism of action. It is hard to
quantify this last requirement and thus different authors prefer
somewhat different definitions.
Causal calculus
When
experimental interventions are infeasible or illegal, the derivation of
cause effect relationship from observational studies must rest on some
qualitative theoretical assumptions, for example, that symptoms do not
cause diseases, usually expressed in the form of missing arrows in
causal graphs such as
Bayesian networks or
path diagrams. The theory underlying these derivations relies on the distinction between
conditional probabilities, as in

, and
interventional probabilities, as in

.
The former reads: "the probability of finding cancer in a person known
to smoke, having started, unforced by the experimenter, to do so at an
unspecified time in the past", while the latter reads: "the probability
of finding cancer in a person forced by the experimenter to smoke at a
specified time in the past". The former is a statistical notion that can
be estimated by observation with negligible intervention by the
experimenter, while the latter is a causal notion which is estimated in
an experiment with an important controlled randomized intervention. It
is specifically characteristic of
quantal phenomena
that observations defined by incompatible variables always involve
important intervention by the experimenter, as described quantitatively
by the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle.
[vague] In classical
thermodynamics,
processes are initiated by interventions called
thermodynamic operations. In other branches of science, for example
astronomy, the experimenter can often observe with negligible intervention.
The theory of "causal calculus"
[27] permits one to infer interventional probabilities from conditional probabilities in causal
Bayesian networks with unmeasured variables. One very practical result of this theory is the characterization of
confounding variables,
namely, a sufficient set of variables that, if adjusted for, would
yield the correct causal effect between variables of interest. It can be
shown that a sufficient set for estimating the causal effect of

on

is any set of non-descendants of

that

-separate

from

after removing all arrows emanating from

.
This criterion, called "backdoor", provides a mathematical definition
of "confounding" and helps researchers identify accessible sets of
variables worthy of measurement.
Structure learning
While
derivations in causal calculus rely on the structure of the causal
graph, parts of the causal structure can, under certain assumptions, be
learned from statistical data. The basic idea goes back to
Sewall Wright's 1921 work
[28] on
path analysis. A "recovery" algorithm was developed by Rebane and Pearl (1987)
[29] which rests on Wright's distinction between the three possible types of causal substructures allowed in a
directed acyclic graph (DAG):



Type 1 and type 2 represent the same statistical dependencies (i.e.,

and

are independent given

) and are, therefore, indistinguishable within purely
cross-sectional data. Type 3, however, can be uniquely identified, since

and

are marginally independent and all other pairs are dependent. Thus, while the
skeletons
(the graphs stripped of arrows) of these three triplets are identical,
the directionality of the arrows is partially identifiable. The same
distinction applies when

and

have common ancestors, except that one must first condition on those
ancestors. Algorithms have been developed to systematically determine
the skeleton of the underlying graph and, then, orient all arrows whose
directionality is dictated by the conditional independencies observed.
Alternative methods of structure learning search through the
many possible causal structures among the variables, and remove ones which are strongly incompatible with the observed
correlations.
In general this leaves a set of possible causal relations, which should
then be tested by analyzing time series data or, preferably, designing
appropriately controlled
experiments. In contrast with Bayesian Networks,
path analysis (and its generalization,
structural equation modeling), serve better to estimate a known causal effect or to test a causal model than to generate causal hypotheses.
For nonexperimental data, causal direction can often be inferred
if information about time is available. This is because (according to
many, though not all, theories) causes must precede their effects
temporally. This can be determined by statistical
time series models, for instance, or with a statistical test based on the idea of
Granger causality,
or by direct experimental manipulation. The use of temporal data can
permit statistical tests of a pre-existing theory of causal direction.
For instance, our degree of confidence in the direction and nature of
causality is much greater when supported by
cross-correlations,
ARIMA models, or
cross-spectral analysis using vector time series data than by
cross-sectional data.
Derivation theories
Nobel Prize laureate
Herbert A. Simon and philosopher
Nicholas Rescher[33]
claim that the asymmetry of the causal relation is unrelated to the
asymmetry of any mode of implication that contraposes. Rather, a causal
relation is not a relation between values of variables, but a function
of one variable (the cause) on to another (the effect). So, given a
system of equations, and a set of variables appearing in these
equations, we can introduce an asymmetric relation among individual
equations and variables that corresponds perfectly to our commonsense
notion of a causal ordering. The system of equations must have certain
properties, most importantly, if some values are chosen arbitrarily, the
remaining values will be determined uniquely through a path of serial
discovery that is perfectly causal. They postulate the inherent
serialization of such a system of equations may correctly capture
causation in all empirical fields, including physics and economics.
Manipulation theories
Some theorists have equated causality with manipulability. Under these theories,
x causes
y only in the case that one can change
x in order to change
y.
This coincides with commonsense notions of causations, since often we
ask causal questions in order to change some feature of the world. For
instance, we are interested in knowing the causes of crime so that we
might find ways of reducing it.
These theories have been criticized on two primary grounds. First, theorists complain that these accounts are
circular.
Attempting to reduce causal claims to manipulation requires that
manipulation is more basic than causal interaction. But describing
manipulations in non-causal terms has provided a substantial difficulty.
The second criticism centers around concerns of
anthropocentrism.
It seems to many people that causality is some existing relationship in
the world that we can harness for our desires. If causality is
identified with our manipulation, then this intuition is lost. In this
sense, it makes humans overly central to interactions in the world.
Some attempts to defend manipulability theories are recent
accounts that don't claim to reduce causality to manipulation. These
accounts use manipulation as a sign or feature in causation without
claiming that manipulation is more fundamental than causation.
[27][38]
Process theories
Some theorists are interested in distinguishing between causal processes and non-causal processes (Russell 1948; Salmon 1984).
[39][40] These theorists often want to distinguish between a process and a
pseudo-process.
As an example, a ball moving through the air (a process) is contrasted
with the motion of a shadow (a pseudo-process). The former is causal in
nature while the latter is not.
Salmon (1984)
[39]
claims that causal processes can be identified by their ability to
transmit an alteration over space and time. An alteration of the ball (a
mark by a pen, perhaps) is carried with it as the ball goes through the
air. On the other hand, an alteration of the shadow (insofar as it is
possible) will not be transmitted by the shadow as it moves along.
These theorists claim that the important concept for
understanding causality is not causal relationships or causal
interactions, but rather identifying causal processes. The former
notions can then be defined in terms of causal processes.
Fields
Science
For
the scientific investigation of efficient causality, the cause and
effect are each best conceived of as temporally transient processes.
Within the conceptual frame of the
scientific method, an investigator sets up several distinct and contrasting temporally transient material processes that have the structure of
experiments, and records candidate material responses, normally intending to determine causality in the physical world.
[41] For instance, one may want to
know whether a high intake of
carrots causes humans to develop the
bubonic plague.
The quantity of carrot intake is a process that is varied from occasion
to occasion. The occurrence or non-occurrence of subsequent bubonic
plague is recorded. To establish causality, the experiment must fulfill
certain criteria, only one example of which is mentioned here. (There
are other criteria not mentioned here.) For example, instances of the
hypothesized cause must be set up to occur at a time when the
hypothesized effect is relatively unlikely in the absence of the
hypothesized cause; such unlikelihood is to be established by empirical
evidence. A mere observation of a
correlation
is not nearly adequate to establish causality. In nearly all cases,
establishment of causality relies on repetition of experiments and
probabilistic reasoning. Hardly ever is causality established more
firmly than as more or less probable. It is often most convenient for
establishment of causality if the contrasting material states of affairs
are fully comparable, and differ through only one variable factor,
perhaps measured by a real number. Otherwise, experiments are usually
difficult or impossible to interpret.
In some sciences, it is very difficult or nearly impossible to
set up material states of affairs that closely test hypotheses of
causality. Such sciences can in some sense be regarded as "softer".
Physics
One has to be careful in the use of the word cause in physics.
Properly speaking, the hypothesized cause and the hypothesized effect
are each temporally transient processes. For example, force is a useful
concept for the explanation of acceleration, but force is not by itself a
cause. More is needed. For example, a temporally transient process
might be characterized by a definite change of force at a definite time.
Such a process can be regarded as a cause. Causality is not inherently
implied in
equations of motion, but postulated as an additional
constraint that needs to be satisfied (i.e. a cause always precedes its effect). This constraint has mathematical implications
[42] such as the
Kramers-Kronig relations.
Causality is one of the most fundamental and essential notions of physics.
[43] Causal efficacy cannot propagate faster than light. Otherwise, reference coordinate systems could be constructed (using the
Lorentz transform of
special relativity) in which an observer would see an effect precede its cause (i.e. the postulate of causality would be violated).
Causal notions appear in the context of the flow of mass-energy.
For example, it is commonplace to argue that causal efficacy can be
propagated by waves (such as electromagnetic waves) only if they
propagate no faster than light. Wave packets have
group velocity and
phase velocity.
For waves that propagate causal efficacy, both of these must travel no
faster than light. Thus light waves often propagate causal efficacy but
de Broglie waves often have phase velocity faster than light and consequently cannot be propagating causal efficacy.
Causal notions are important in general relativity to the extent
that the existence of an arrow of time demands that the universe's
semi-Riemannian manifold be orientable, so that "future" and "past" are
globally definable quantities.
Engineering
A
causal system is a
system with output and internal states that depends only on the current and previous input values. A system that has
some dependence on input values from the future (in addition to possible past or current input values) is termed an
acausal system, and a system that depends
solely on future input values is an
anticausal system.
Acausal filters, for example, can only exist as postprocessing filters,
because these filters can extract future values from a memory buffer or
a file.
Biology, medicine and epidemiology
Austin Bradford Hill built upon the work of
Hume and
Popper
and suggested in his paper "The Environment and Disease: Association or
Causation?" that aspects of an association such as strength,
consistency, specificity and temporality be considered in attempting to
distinguish causal from noncausal associations in the epidemiological
situation. (See
Bradford-Hill criteria.)
He did not note however, that temporality is the only necessary
criterion among those aspects. Directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) are
increasingly used in epidemiology to help enlighten causal thinking.
[44]
Psychology
Psychologists take an empirical approach to causality, investigating
how people and non-human animals detect or infer causation from sensory
information, prior experience and
innate knowledge.
- Attribution
Attribution theory is the
theory concerning how people explain individual occurrences of causation.
Attribution
can be external (assigning causality to an outside agent or
force—claiming that some outside thing motivated the event) or internal
(assigning causality to factors within the person—taking personal
responsibility or
accountability
for one's actions and claiming that the person was directly responsible
for the event). Taking causation one step further, the type of
attribution a person provides influences their future behavior.
The intention behind the cause or the effect can be covered by the subject of
action. See also
accident;
blame;
intent; and responsibility.
- Causal powers
Whereas
David Hume argued that causes are inferred from non-causal observations,
Immanuel Kant claimed that people have innate assumptions about causes. Within psychology,
Patricia Cheng (1997)
[45]
attempted to reconcile the Humean and Kantian views. According to her
power PC theory, people filter observations of events through a basic
belief that causes have the power to generate (or prevent) their
effects, thereby inferring specific cause-effect relations.
- Causation and salience
Our view of causation depends on what we consider to be the relevant
events. Another way to view the statement, "Lightning causes thunder" is
to see both lightning and thunder as two perceptions of the same event,
viz., an electric discharge that we perceive first visually and then
aurally.
- Naming and causality
David Sobel and Alison Gopnik from the Psychology Department of UC Berkeley designed a device known as
the blicket detector
which would turn on when an object was placed on it. Their research
suggests that "even young children will easily and swiftly learn about a
new causal power of an object and spontaneously use that information in
classifying and naming the object."
[46]
- Perception of launching events
Some researchers such as Anjan Chatterjee at the University of
Pennsylvania and Jonathan Fugelsang at the University of Waterloo are
using neuroscience techniques to investigate the neural and
psychological underpinnings of causal launching events in which one
object causes another object to move. Both temporal and spatial factors
can be manipulated.
[47]
Statistics and economics
Statistics and
economics
usually employ pre-existing data or experimental data to infer
causality by regression methods. The body of statistical techniques
involves substantial use of
regression analysis. Typically a linear relationship such as

is postulated, in which

is the
ith observation of the dependent variable (hypothesized to be the caused variable),

for
j=1,...,
k is the
ith observation on the
jth independent variable (hypothesized to be a causative variable), and

is the error term for the
ith
observation (containing the combined effects of all other causative
variables, which must be uncorrelated with the included independent
variables). If there is reason to believe that none of the

s is caused by
y, then estimates of the coefficients

are obtained. If the null hypothesis that

is rejected, then the alternative hypothesis that

and equivalently that

causes
y cannot be rejected. On the other hand, if the null hypothesis that

cannot be rejected, then equivalently the hypothesis of no causal effect of

on
y cannot be rejected. Here the notion of causality is one of contributory causality as discussed
above: If the true value

, then a change in

will result in a change in
y unless
some other causative variable(s), either included in the regression or
implicit in the error term, change in such a way as to exactly offset
its effect; thus a change in

is
not sufficient to change
y. Likewise, a change in

is
not necessary to change
y, because a change in
y
could be caused by something implicit in the error term (or by some
other causative explanatory variable included in the model).
The above way of testing for causality requires belief that there is no reverse causation, in which
y would cause

. This belief can be established in one of several ways. First, the variable

may be a non-economic variable: for example, if rainfall amount

is hypothesized to affect the futures price
y
of some agricultural commodity, it is impossible that in fact the
futures price affects rainfall amount (provided that cloud seeding is
never attempted). Second, the
instrumental variables
technique may be employed to remove any reverse causation by
introducing a role for other variables (instruments) that are known to
be unaffected by the dependent variable. Third, the principle that
effects cannot precede causes can be invoked, by including on the right
side of the regression only variables that precede in time the dependent
variable; this principle is invoked, for example, in testing for
Granger causality and in its multivariate analog,
vector autoregression,
both of which control for lagged values of the dependent variable while
testing for causal effects of lagged independent variables.
Regression analysis controls for other relevant variables by
including them as regressors (explanatory variables). This helps to
avoid false inferences of causality due to the presence of a third,
underlying, variable that influences both the potentially causative
variable and the potentially caused variable: its effect on the
potentially caused variable is captured by directly including it in the
regression, so that effect will not be picked up as an indirect effect
through the potentially causative variable of interest.
Given the above procedures, coincidental (as opposed to causal)
correlation can be probabilistically rejected if data samples are large
and if regression results pass
cross validation tests showing that the correlations hold even for data that were not used in the regression.
Metaphysics
The
deterministic world-view holds that the history of the
universe can be exhaustively represented as a
progression of events following one after as cause and effect.
[10] The
incompatibilist version of this holds that there is no such thing as "
free will".
Compatibilism, on the other hand, holds that determinism is compatible with, or even necessary for, free will.
[48]
Management
Used in management and engineering, an
Ishikawa diagram shows the factors that cause the effect. Smaller arrows connect the sub-causes to major causes.
For quality control in manufacturing in the 1960s,
Kaoru Ishikawa developed a cause and effect diagram, known as an
Ishikawa diagram
or fishbone diagram. The diagram categorizes causes, such as into the
six main categories shown here. These categories are then sub-divided.
Ishikawa's method identifies "causes" in brainstorming sessions
conducted among various groups involved in the manufacturing process.
These groups can then be labeled as categories in the diagrams. The use
of these diagrams has now spread beyond quality control, and they are
used in other areas of management and in design and engineering.
Ishikawa diagrams have been criticized for failing to make the
distinction between necessary conditions and sufficient conditions. It
seems that Ishikawa was not even aware of this distinction.
[49]
Humanities
History
In
the discussion of history, events are sometimes considered as if in
some way being agents that can then bring about other historical events.
Thus, the combination of poor harvests, the hardships of the peasants,
high taxes, lack of representation of the people, and kingly ineptitude
are among the
causes of the
French Revolution. This is a somewhat
Platonic and
Hegelian view that
reifies causes as
ontological entities. In Aristotelian terminology, this use approximates to the case of the
efficient cause.
Some philosophers of history such as Arthur Danto have claimed
that "explanations in history and elsewhere" describe "not simply an
event—something that happens—but a change".
[50]
Like many practicing historians, they treat causes as intersecting
actions and sets of actions which bring about "larger changes", in
Danto’s words: to decide "what are the elements which persist through a
change" is "rather simple" when treating an individual’s "shift in
attitude", but "it is considerably more complex and metaphysically
challenging when we are interested in such a change as, say, the
break-up of feudalism or the emergence of nationalism".
[51]
Much of the historical debate about causes has focused on the
relationship between communicative and other actions, between singular
and repeated ones, and between actions, structures of action or group
and institutional contexts and wider sets of conditions.
[52]
John Gaddis has distinguished between exceptional and general causes
(following Marc Bloch) and between "routine" and "distinctive links" in
causal relationships: "in accounting for what happened at Hiroshima on
August 6, 1945, we attach greater importance to the fact that President
Truman ordered the dropping of an atomic bomb than to the decision of
the Army Air Force to carry out his orders."
[53] He has also pointed to the difference between immediate, intermediate and distant causes.
[54]
For his part, Christopher Lloyd puts forward four "general concepts of
causation" used in history: the "metaphysical idealist concept, which
asserts that the phenomena of the universe are products of or emanations
from an omnipotent being or such final cause"; "the empiricist (or
Humean) regularity concept, which is based on the idea of causation
being a matter of constant conjunctions of events"; "the
functional/teleological/consequential concept", which is "goal-directed,
so that goals are causes"; and the "realist, structurist and
dispositional approach, which sees relational structures and internal
dispositions as the causes of phenomena".
[55]
Law
According to
law and
jurisprudence,
legal cause must be demonstrated to hold a
defendant liable for a
crime or a
tort
(i.e. a civil wrong such as negligence or trespass). It must be proven
that causality, or a "sufficient causal link" relates the defendant's
actions to the criminal event or damage in question. Causation is also
an essential legal element that must be proven to qualify for remedy
measures under international trade law.
[56]
Theology
Note the concept of omnicausality in
Abrahamic
theology, which is the belief that God has set in motion all events at
the dawn of time; he is the determiner and the cause of all things. It
is therefore an attempt to rectify the apparent
incompatibility between determinism and the existence of an
omnipotent god.
[57]
History
Hindu philosophy
Vedic period (c. 1750–500 BCE) literature has karma's Eastern origins.
[58] Karma is the belief held by
Sanathana Dharma and major religions that a person's actions cause certain effects in the current life and/or in future
life, positively or negatively. The various philosophical schools (
darsanas) provide different accounts of the subject. The doctrine of
satkaryavada
affirms that the effect inheres in the cause in some way. The effect is
thus either a real or apparent modification of the cause. The doctrine
of
asatkaryavada affirms that the effect does not inhere in the cause, but is a new arising.
Bhagavad-gītā 18.14
identifies five causes for any action (knowing which it can be
perfected): the body, the individual soul, the senses, the efforts and
the supersoul.
According to
Monier-Williams, in the
Nyāya causation theory from Sutra I.2.I,2 in the
Vaisheshika
philosophy, from causal non-existence is effectual non-existence; but,
not effectual non-existence from causal non-existence. A cause precedes
an effect. With a threads and cloth metaphors, three causes are:
- Co-inherence cause: resulting from substantial contact,
'substantial causes', threads are substantial to cloth, corresponding to
Aristotle's material cause.
- Non-substantial cause: Methods putting threads into cloth, corresponding to Aristotle's formal cause.
- Instrumental cause: Tools to make the cloth, corresponding to Aristotle's efficient cause.
Monier-Williams also proposed that Aristotle's and the Nyaya's
causality are considered conditional aggregates necessary to man's
productive work.
[60]
Buddhist philosophy
The general or universal definition of pratityasamutpada (or
"dependent origination" or "dependent arising" or "interdependent
co-arising") is that everything arises in dependence upon multiple
causes and conditions; nothing exists as a singular, independent entity.
A traditional example in Buddhist texts is of three sticks standing
upright and leaning against each other and supporting each other. If one
stick is taken away, the other two will fall to the ground.
Causality in the
Chittamatrin buddhist school approach,
Asanga's
(c. 400 CE) mind-only Buddhist school, asserts that objects cause
consciousness in the mind's image. Because causes precede effects, which
must be different entities, then subject and object are different. For
this school, there are no objects which are entities external to a
perceiving consciousness. The Chittamatrin and the
Yogachara Svatantrika schools accept that there are no objects external to the observer's causality. This largely follows the
Nikayas approach.
[61][62][63][64]
The
Abhidharmakośakārikā approach is
Vasubandhu's
Abhidharma commentary text in the
Sarvāstivāda
school (c. 500 CE). It has four intricate causal conditioning
constructions with the: 1) root cause, 2) immediate antecedent, 3)
object support, and 4) predominance. Then, the six causes are: 1)
instrumentality (kāraṇahetu), deemed the primary factor in result
production; 2) simultaneity or coexistence, which connects phenomena
that arise simultaneously; 3) homogeneity, explaining the homogenous
flow that evokes phenomena continuity; 4) association, which operates
only between mental factors and explains why consciousness appears as
assemblages to mental factors; 5) dominance, which forms one's habitual
cognitive and behaviorist dispositions; and 6) fruition, referring to
whatever is the actively wholesome or unwholesome result. The four
conditions and six causes interact with each other in explaining
phenomenal experience: for instance, each conscious moment acts both as
the homogenous cause, as well as the immediate antecedent consciousness
condition rise, and its concomitants, in a subsequent moment.
[citation needed]
The
Vaibhashika (c. 500 CE) is an
early buddhist school
which favors direct object contact and accepts simultaneous cause and
effects. This is based in the consciousness example which says,
intentions and feelings are mutually accompanying mental factors that
support each other like poles in tripod. In contrast, simultaneous
cause and effect rejectors say that if the effect already exists, then
it cannot effect the same way again. How past, present and future are
accepted is a basis for various Buddhist school's causality view points.
[65][66][67]
All the classic Buddhist schools teach karma. "The law of karma
is a special instance of the law of cause and effect, according to which
all our actions of body, speech, and mind are causes and all our
experiences are their effects."
[68]
The Baha'i concept of causation has been a unifying force for
this young religion. The belief in a common biological and ideological
ancestry has made it possible for Baha'is to recognize Buddha, Moses,
Jesus and Muhammad. Unfortunately, this has led to the systematic
persecution of Baha'is by many caliphates.
[69]
Western philosophy
Aristotelian
Aristotle
identified four kinds of answer or explanatory mode to various "Why?"
questions. He thought that, for any given topic, all four kinds of
explanatory mode were important, each in its own right. As a result of
traditional specialized philosophical peculiarities of language, with
translations between ancient Greek, Latin, and English, the word 'cause'
is nowadays in specialized philosophical writings used to label
Aristotle's four kinds.
[18][70]
In ordinary language, there are various meanings of the word cause, the
commonest referring to efficient cause, the topic of the present
article.
- Material cause,
the material whence a thing has come or that which persists while it
changes, as for example, one's mother or the bronze of a statue (see
also substance theory).[71]
- Formal cause, whereby a thing's dynamic form or static shape
determines the thing's properties and function, as a human differs from
a statue of a human or as a statue differs from a lump of bronze.[72]
- Efficient cause, which imparts the first relevant movement, as a human lifts a rock or raises a statue. This is the main topic of the present article.
- Final cause, the criterion of completion, or the end;
it may refer to an action or to an inanimate process. Examples:
Socrates takes a walk after dinner for the sake of his health; earth
falls to the lowest level because that is its nature.
Of Aristotle's four kinds or explanatory modes, only one, the
'efficient cause' is a cause as defined in the leading paragraph of this
present article. The other three explanatory modes might be rendered
material composition, structure and dynamics, and, again, criterion of
completion. The word that Aristotle used was
αἰτία.
For the present purpose, that Greek word would be better translated as
"explanation" than as "cause" as those words are most often used in
current English. Another translation of Aristotle is that he meant "the
four Becauses" as four kinds of answer to "why" questions.
[18]
Aristotle assumed efficient causality as referring to a basic
fact of experience, not explicable by, or reducible to, anything more
fundamental or basic.
In some works of Aristotle, the four causes are listed as (1) the
essential cause, (2) the logical ground, (3) the moving cause, and (4)
the final cause. In this listing, a statement of essential cause is a
demonstration that an indicated object conforms to a definition of the
word that refers to it. A statement of logical ground is an argument as
to why an object statement is true. These are further examples of the
idea that a "cause" in general in the context of Aristotle's usage is an
"explanation".
[18]
The word "efficient" used here can also be translated from Aristotle as "moving" or "initiating".
[18]
Efficient causation was connected with
Aristotelian physics, which recognized the
four elements (earth, air, fire, water), and added the
fifth element (aether). Water and earth by their intrinsic property
gravitas or heaviness intrinsically fall toward, whereas air and fire by their intrinsic property
levitas
or lightness intrinsically rise away from, Earth's center—the
motionless center of the universe—in a straight line while accelerating
during the substance's approach to its natural place.
As air remained on Earth, however, and did not escape Earth while
eventually achieving infinite speed—an absurdity—Aristotle inferred
that the universe is finite in size and contains an invisible substance
that held planet Earth and its atmosphere, the
sublunary sphere,
centered in the universe. And since celestial bodies exhibit perpetual,
unaccelerated motion orbiting planet Earth in unchanging relations,
Aristotle inferred that the fifth element,
aither, that fills
space and composes celestial bodies intrinsically moves in perpetual
circles, the only constant motion between two points. (An object
traveling a straight line from point
A to
B and back must stop at either point before returning to the other.)
Left to itself, a thing exhibits
natural motion, but can—according to
Aristotelian metaphysics—exhibit
enforced motion
imparted by an efficient cause. The form of plants endows plants with
the processes nutrition and reproduction, the form of animals adds
locomotion, and the form of humankind adds reason atop these. A rock
normally exhibits
natural motion—explained by the rock's material cause of being composed of the element earth—but a living thing can lift the rock, an
enforced motion
diverting the rock from its natural place and natural motion. As a
further kind of explanation, Aristotle identified the final cause,
specifying a purpose or criterion of completion in light of which
something should be understood.
Aristotle himself explained,
Cause means
(a) in one sense, that as the result of whose presence something
comes into being—e.g., the bronze of a statue and the silver of a cup,
and the classes which contain these [i.e., the material cause];
(b) in another sense, the form or pattern; that is, the essential
formula and the classes which contain it—e.g. the ratio 2:1 and number
in general is the cause of the octave—and the parts of the formula
[i.e., the formal cause].
(c) The source of the first beginning of change or rest; e.g. the
man who plans is a cause, and the father is the cause of the child, and
in general that which produces is the cause of that which is produced,
and that which changes of that which is changed [i.e., the efficient cause].
(d) The same as "end"; i.e. the final cause; e.g., as the "end"
of walking is health. For why does a man walk? "To be healthy", we say,
and by saying this we consider that we have supplied the cause [the final cause].
(e) All those means towards the end which arise at the instigation of
something else, as, e.g., fat-reducing, purging, drugs and instruments
are causes of health; for they all have the end as their object,
although they differ from each other as being some instruments, others
actions [i.e., necessary conditions].
—
Metaphysics, Book 5, section 1013a, translated by Hugh Tredennick[73]
Aristotle further discerned two modes of causation: proper (prior)
causation and accidental (chance) causation. All causes, proper and
accidental, can be spoken as potential or as actual, particular or
generic. The same language refers to the effects of causes, so that
generic effects are assigned to generic causes, particular effects to
particular causes, and actual effects to operating causes.
Averting
infinite regress, Aristotle inferred the first mover—an
unmoved mover.
The first mover's motion, too, must have been caused, but, being an
unmoved mover, must have moved only toward a particular goal or desire.
Middle Ages
In line with Aristotelian cosmology,
Thomas Aquinas posed a hierarchy prioritizing Aristotle's four causes: "final > efficient > material > formal".
[74] Aquinas sought to identify the first efficient cause—now simply
first cause—as everyone would agree, said Aquinas, to call it
God.
Later in the Middle Ages, many scholars conceded that the first cause
was God, but explained that many earthly events occur within God's
design or plan, and thereby scholars sought freedom to investigate the
numerous
secondary causes.
After the Middle Ages
For
Aristotelian philosophy before Aquinas, the word cause had a broad
meaning. It meant 'answer to a why question' or 'explanation', and
Aristotelian scholars recognized four kinds of such answers. With the
end of the
Middle Ages,
in many philosophical usages, the meaning of the word 'cause' narrowed.
It often lost that broad meaning, and was restricted to just one of the
four kinds. For authors such as
Niccolò Machiavelli, in the field of political thinking, and
Francis Bacon, concerning
science
more generally, Aristotle's moving cause was the focus of their
interest. A widely used modern definition of causality in this newly
narrowed sense was assumed by
David Hume.
[74]
He undertook an epistemological and metaphysical investigation of the
notion of moving cause. He denied that we can ever perceive cause and
effect, except by developing a habit or custom of mind where we come to
associate two types of object or event, always contiguous and occurring
one after the other.
[75] In Part III, section XV of his book
A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume expanded this to a list of eight ways of judging whether two things might be cause and effect. The first three:
- 1. "The cause and effect must be contiguous in space and time."
- 2. "The cause must be prior to the effect."
- 3. "There must be a constant union betwixt the cause and effect. 'Tis chiefly this quality, that constitutes the relation."
And then additionally there are three connected criteria which come
from our experience and which are "the source of most of our
philosophical reasonings":
- 4. "The same cause always produces the same effect, and the same
effect never arises but from the same cause. This principle we derive
from experience, and is the source of most of our philosophical
reasonings."
- 5. Hanging upon the above, Hume says that "where several different
objects produce the same effect, it must be by means of some quality,
which we discover to be common amongst them."
- 6. And "founded on the same reason": "The difference in the effects
of two resembling objects must proceed from that particular, in which
they differ."
And then two more:
- 7. "When any object increases or diminishes with the increase or
diminution of its cause, 'tis to be regarded as a compounded effect,
deriv'd from the union of the several different effects, which arise
from the several different parts of the cause."
- 8. An "object, which exists for any time in its full perfection
without any effect, is not the sole cause of that effect, but requires
to be assisted by some other principle, which may forward its influence
and operation."
In 1949, physicist
Max Born
distinguished determination from causality. For him, determination
meant that actual events are so linked by laws of nature that certainly
reliable predictions and retrodictions can be made from sufficient
present data about them. For him, there are two kinds of causation,
which we may here call nomic or generic causation, and singular
causation. Nomic causality means that cause and effect are linked by
more or less certain or probabilistic general laws covering many
possible or potential instances; we may recognize this as a probabilized
version of criterion 3. of Hume mentioned just above. An occasion of
singular causation is a particular occurrence of a definite complex of
events that are physically linked by antecedence and contiguity, which
we may here recognize as criteria 1. and 2. of Hume mentioned just
above.
[9]