Existence

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence

The existential quantifier ∃ is often used in logic to express existence.

Existence is the state of having being or reality in contrast to nonexistence and nonbeing. Existence is often contrasted with essence: the essence of an entity is its essential features or qualities, which can be understood even if one does not know whether the entity exists.

Ontology is the philosophical discipline studying the nature and types of existence. Singular existence is the existence of individual entities while general existence refers to the existence of concepts or universals. Entities present in space and time have concrete existence in contrast to abstract entities, like numbers and sets. Other distinctions are between possible, contingent, and necessary existence and between physical and mental existence. The common view is that an entity either exists or not with nothing in between, but some philosophers say that there are degrees of existence, meaning that some entities exist to a higher degree than others.

The orthodox position in ontology is that existence is a second-order property or a property of properties. For example, to say that lions exist means that the property of being a lion is possessed by an entity. A different view states that existence is a first-order property or a property of individuals. This means existence is similar to other properties of individuals, like color and shape. Alexius Meinong and his followers accept this idea and say that not all individuals have this property; they state that there are some individuals, such as Santa Claus, that do not exist. Universalists reject this view; they see existence as a universal property of every individual.

The concept of existence has been discussed throughout the history of philosophy and already played a role in ancient philosophy, including Presocratic philosophy in Ancient Greece, Hindu and Buddhist philosophy in Ancient India, and Daoist philosophy in ancient China. It is relevant to fields such as logic, mathematics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and existentialism.

Definition and related terms

Dictionaries define existence as the state of being real and to exist as having being or participating in reality. Existence sets real entities apart from imaginary ones, and can refer both to individual entities or to the totality of reality. The word "existence" entered the English language in the late 14th century from old French and has its roots in the medieval Latin term ex(s)istere, which means "to stand forth", "to appear", and "to arise". Existence is studied by the subdiscipline of metaphysics known as ontology.

The terms "being", "reality", and "actuality" are often used as synonyms of "existence", but the exact definition of existence and its connection to these terms is disputed. According to metaphysician Alexius Meinong (1853–1920), all entities have being but not all entities have existence. He argues merely possible objects like Santa Claus have being but lack existence. Ontologist Takashi Yagisawa (20th century–present) contrasts existence with reality; he sees "reality" as the more-fundamental term because it equally characterizes all entities and defines existence as a relative term that connects an entity to the world it inhabits. According to philosopher Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), actuality is narrower than existence because only actual entities can produce and undergo changes, in contrast to non-actual existing entities like numbers and sets. According to some philosophers, like Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), existence is an elementary concept, meaning it cannot be defined in other terms without involving circularity. This would imply characterizing existence or talking about its nature in a non-trivial manner may be difficult or impossible.

Disputes about the nature of existence are reflected in the distinction between thin and thick concepts of existence. Thin concepts of existence understand existence as a logical property that every existing thing shares; they do not include any substantial content about the metaphysical implications of having existence. According to one view, existence is the same as the logical property of self-identity. This view articulates a thin concept of existence because it merely states what exists is identical to itself without discussing any substantial characteristics of the nature of existence. Thick concepts of existence encompass a metaphysical analysis of what it means that something exists and what essential features existence implies. According to one proposal, to exist is to be present in space and time, and to have effects on other things. This definition is controversial because it implies abstract objects such as numbers do not exist. Philosopher George Berkeley (1685–1753) gave a different thick concept of existence; he stated: "to be is to be perceived", meaning all existence is mental.

Existence contrasts with nonexistence, a lack of reality. Whether objects can be divided into existent and nonexistent objects is a subject of controversy. This distinction is sometimes used to explain how it is possible to think of fictional objects like dragons and unicorns but the concept of nonexistent objects is not generally accepted; some philosophers say the concept is contradictory. Closely related contrasting terms are nothingness and nonbeing. Existence is commonly associated with mind-independent reality but this position is not universally accepted because there could also be forms of mind-dependent existence, such as the existence of an idea inside a person's mind. According to some idealists, this may apply to all of reality.

Another contrast is made between existence and essence. Essence refers to the intrinsic nature or defining qualities of an entity. The essence of something determines what kind of entity it is and how it differs from other kinds of entities. Essence corresponds to what an entity is, while existence corresponds to the fact that it is. For instance, it is possible to understand what an object is and grasp its nature even if one does not know whether this object exists. According to some philosophers, there is a difference between entities and the fundamental characteristics that make them the entities they are. Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) introduced this concept; he calls it the ontological difference and contrasts individual beings with being. According to his response to the question of being, being is not an entity but the background context that makes all individual entities intelligible.

Types of existing entities

Many discussions of the types of existing entities revolve around the definitions of different types, the existence or nonexistence of entities of a specific type, the way entities of different types are related to each other, and whether some types are more fundamental than others. Examples are the existence or nonexistence of souls; whether there are abstract, fictional, and universal entities; and the existence or nonexistence of possible worlds and objects besides the actual world. These discussions cover the topics of the basic stuff or constituents underlying all reality and the most general features of entities.

Singular and general

There is a distinction between singular existence and general existence. Singular existence is the existence of individual entities. For example, the sentence "Angela Merkel exists" expresses the existence of one particular person. General existence pertains to general concepts, properties, or universals. For instance, the sentence "politicians exist" states the general term "politician" has instances without referring to a particular politician.

Singular and general existence are closely related to each other, and some philosophers have tried to explain one as a special case of the other. For example, according to Frege, general existence is more basic than singular existence. One argument in favor of this position is that singular existence can be expressed in terms of general existence. For instance, the sentence "Angela Merkel exists" can be expressed as "entities that are identical to Angela Merkel exist", where the expression "being identical to Angela Merkel" is understood as a general term. Philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine (1908–2000) defends a different position by giving primacy to singular existence and arguing that general existence can be expressed in terms of singular existence.

A related question is whether there can be general existence without singular existence. According to philosopher Henry S. Leonard (1905–1967), a property only has general existence if there is at least one actual object that instantiates it. Philosopher Nicholas Rescher (1928–2024), by contrast, states that properties can exist if they have no actual instances, like the property of "being a unicorn". This question has a long philosophical tradition in relation to the existence of universals. According to Platonists, universals have general existence as Platonic forms independently of the particulars that exemplify them. According to this view, the universal of redness exists independently of the existence or nonexistence of red objects. Aristotelianism also accepts the existence of universals but says their existence depends on particulars that instantiate them and that they are unable to exist by themselves. According to this view, a universal that is not present in the space and time does not exist. According to nominalists, only particulars have existence and universals do not exist.

Concrete and abstract

There is an influential distinction in ontology between concrete and abstract objects. Many concrete objects, like rocks, plants, and other people, are encountered in everyday life. They exist in space and time. They have effects on each other, like when a rock falls on a plant and damages it, or a plant grows through rock and breaks it. Abstract objects, like numbers, sets, and types, have no location in space and time, and lack causal powers. The distinction between concrete objects and abstract objects is sometimes treated as the most-general division of being.

The existence of concrete objects is widely agreed upon but opinions about abstract objects are divided. Realists such as Plato accept the idea that abstract objects have independent existence. Some realists say abstract objects have the same mode of existence as concrete objects; according to others, they exist in a different way. Anti-realists state that abstract objects do not exist, a view that is often combined with the idea that existence requires a location in space and time or the ability to causally interact.

Possible, contingent, and necessary

A further distinction is between merely possible, contingent, and necessary existence. An entity has necessary existence if it must exist or could not fail to exist. This means that it is not possible to newly create or destroy necessary entities. Entities that exist but could fail to exist are contingent; merely possible entities do not exist but could exist.

Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas argued that God has necessary existence.

Most entities encountered in ordinary experience, like telephones, sticks, and flowers, have contingent existence. The contingent existence of telephones is reflected in the fact that they exist in the present but did not exist in the past, meaning that it is not necessary that they exist. It is an open question whether any entities have necessary existence. According to some nominalists, all concrete objects have contingent existence while all abstract objects have necessary existence.

According to some theorists, one or several necessary beings are required as the explanatory foundation of the cosmos. For instance, the philosophers Avicenna (980–1037) and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) say that God has necessary existence. A few philosophers, like Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), see God and the world as the same thing, and say that all entities have necessary existence to provide a unified and rational explanation of everything.

There are many academic debates about the existence of merely possible objects. According to actualism, only actual entities have being; this includes both contingent and necessary entities but excludes merely possible entities. Possibilists reject this view and state there are also merely possible objects besides actual objects. For example, metaphysician David Lewis (1941–2001) states that possible objects exist in the same way as actual objects so as to provide a robust explanation of why statements about what is possible and necessary are true. According to him, possible objects exist in possible worlds while actual objects exist in the actual world. Lewis says the only difference between possible worlds and the actual world is the location of the speaker; the term "actual" refers to the world of the speaker, similar to the way the terms "here" and "now" refer to the spatial and temporal location of the speaker.

The problem of contingent and necessary existence is closely related to the ontological question of why there is anything at all or why is there something rather than nothing. According to one view, the existence of something is a contingent fact, meaning the world could have been totally empty. This is not possible if there are necessary entities, which could not have failed to exist. In this case, global nothingness is impossible because the world needs to contain at least all necessary entities.

Physical and mental

Entities that exist on a physical level include objects encountered in everyday life, like stones, trees, and human bodies, as well as entities discussed in modern physics, like electrons and protons. Physical entities can be observed and measured; they possess mass and a location in space and time. Mental entities like perceptions, experiences of pleasure and pain as well as beliefs, desires, and emotions belong to the realm of the mind; they are primarily associated with conscious experiences but also include unconscious states like unconscious beliefs, desires, and memories.

The mind–body problem concerns the ontological status of and relation between physical and mental entities and is a frequent topic in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. According to materialists, only physical entities exist on the most-fundamental level. Materialists usually explain mental entities in terms of physical processes; for example, as brain states or as patterns of neural activation. Idealism, a minority view in contemporary philosophy, rejects matter as ultimate and views the mind as the most basic reality. Dualists like René Descartes (1596–1650) believe both physical and mental entities exist on the most-fundamental level. They state they are connected to one another in several ways but that one cannot be reduced to the other.

Other types

Fictional entities are entities that exist as inventions inside works of fiction. For example, Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character in Arthur Conan Doyle's book A Study in Scarlet and flying carpets are fictional objects in the folktales One Thousand and One Nights. According to anti-realism, fictional entities do not form part of reality in any substantive sense. Possibilists, by contrast, see fictional entities as a subclass of possible objects; creationists say that they are artifacts that depend for their existence on the authors who first conceived them.

Intentional inexistence is a similar phenomenon concerned with the existence of objects within mental states. This happens when a person perceives or thinks about an object. In some cases, the intentional object corresponds to a real object outside the mental state, like when accurately perceiving a tree in the garden. In other cases, the intentional object does not have a real counterpart, like when thinking about Bigfoot. The problem of intentional inexistence is the challenge of explaining how one can think about entities that do not exist since this seems to have the paradoxical implication that the thinker stands in a relation to a nonexisting object.

Modes and degrees of existence

Closely related to the problem of different types of entities is the question of whether their modes of existence also vary. This is the case according to ontological pluralism, which states entities belonging to different types differ in both their essential features and in the ways they exist. This position is sometimes found in theology; it states God is radically different from his creation and emphasizes his uniqueness by saying the difference affects both God's features and God's mode of existence.

Another form of ontological pluralism distinguishes the existence of material objects from the existence of space-time. According to this view, material objects have relative existence because they exist in space-time; the existence of space-time itself is not relative in this sense because it just exists without existing within another space-time.

The topic of degrees of existence is closely related to the problem of modes of existence. This topic is based on the idea that some entities exist to a higher degree or have more being than other entities, similar to the way some properties, such as heat and mass, have degrees. According to philosopher Plato (428/427–348/347 BCE), for example, unchangeable Platonic forms have a higher degree of existence than physical objects.

The view that there are different types of entities is common in metaphysics but the idea that they differ from each other in their modes or degrees of existence is often rejected, implying that a thing either exists or does not exist without in-between alternatives. Metaphysician Peter van Inwagen (1942–present) uses the idea that there is an intimate relationship between existence and quantification to argue against different modes of existence. Quantification is related to the counting of objects; according to Inwagen, if there were different modes of entities, people would need different types of numbers to count them. Because the same numbers can be used to count different types of entities, he concludes all entities have the same mode of existence.

Theories of the nature of existence

One of the topics covered by theories of the nature of existence concerns the ontological status of fictional objects like Pegasus.

Theories of the nature of existence aim to explain what it means for something to exist. A central dispute in the academic discourse about the nature of existence is whether existence is a property of individuals. An individual is a unique entity, like Socrates or a particular apple. A property is something that is attributed to an entity, like "being human" or "being red", and usually expresses a quality or feature of that entity. The two main theories of existence are first-order and second-order theories. First-order theories understand existence as a property of individuals while second-order theories say existence is a second-order property, that is, a property of properties.

A central challenge for theories of the nature of existence is an understanding of the possibility of coherently denying the existence of something, like the statement: "Santa Claus does not exist". One difficulty is explaining how the name "Santa Claus" can be meaningful even though there is no Santa Claus.

Second-order theories

Second-order theories understand existence as a second-order property rather than a first-order property. They are often seen as the orthodox position in ontology. For instance, the Empire State Building is an individual object and "being 443.2 meters (1,454 ft) tall" is a first-order property of it. "Being instantiated" is a property of "being 443.2 meters tall" and therefore a second-order property. According to second-order theories, to talk about existence is to talk about which properties have instances. For example, this view says that the sentence "God exists" means "Godhood is instantiated" rather than "God has the property of existing".

A key reason against characterizing existence as a property of individuals is that existence differs from regular properties. Regular properties, such as being a building and being 443.2 meters tall, express what an object is like but do not directly describe whether or not that building exists. According to this view, existence is more fundamental than regular properties because an object cannot have any properties if it does not exist.

According to second-order theorists, quantifiers rather than predicates express existence. Predicates are expressions that apply to and classify objects, usually by attributing features to them, such as "is a butterfly" and "is happy". Quantifiers are terms that talk about the quantity of objects that have certain properties. Existential quantifiers express that there is at least one object, like the expressions "some" and "there exists", as in "some cows eat grass" and "there exists an even prime number". In this regard, existence is closely related to counting because to assert that something exists is to assert that the corresponding concept has one or more instances.

Second-order views imply a sentence like "egg-laying mammals exist" is misleading because the word "exist" is used as a predicate in them. These views say the true logical form is better expressed in reformulations like "there exist entities that are egg-laying mammals". This way, "existence" has the role of a quantifier and "egg-laying mammals" is the predicate. Quantifier constructions can also be used to express negative existential statements; for instance, the sentence "talking tigers do not exist" can be expressed as "it is not the case that there exist talking tigers".

Bertrand Russell proposed his theory of descriptions to dissolve paradoxes surrounding negative existential statements.

Many ontologists accept that second-order theories provide a correct analysis of many types of existential sentences. It is, however, controversial whether it is correct for all cases. Some problems relate to assumptions associated with everyday language about sentences like "Ronald McDonald does not exist". This type of statement is called negative singular existential and the expression Ronald McDonald is a singular term that seems to refer to an individual. It is not clear how the expression can refer to an individual if, as the sentence asserts, this individual does not exist. According to a solution philosopher Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) proposed, singular terms do not refer to individuals but are descriptions of individuals. This theory states negative singular existentials deny an object matching the descriptions exists without referring to a nonexistent individual. Following this approach, the sentence "Ronald McDonald does not exist" expresses the idea: "it is not the case there is a unique happy hamburger clown".

First-order theories

According to first-order theories, existence is a property of individuals. These theories are less-widely accepted than second-order theories but also have some influential proponents. There are two types of first-order theories: Meinongianism and universalism.

Meinongianism

Meinongianism, which describes existence as a property of some but not all entities, was first formulated by Alexius Meinong. Its main assertion is that there are some entities that do not exist, meaning objecthood is independent of existence. Proposed examples of nonexistent objects are merely possible objects such as flying pigs, as well as fictional and mythical objects like Sherlock Holmes and Zeus. According to this view, these objects are real and have being, even though they do not exist. Meinong states there is an object for any combination of properties. For example, there is an object that only has the single property of "being a singer" with no other properties. This means neither the attribute of "wearing a dress" nor the absence of it applies to this object. Meinong also includes impossible objects like round squares in this classification.

According to Alexius Meinong, there are some entities that do not exist.

According to Meinongians, sentences describing Sherlock Holmes and Zeus refer to nonexisting objects. They are true or false depending on whether these objects have the properties ascribed to them. For instance, the sentence "Pegasus has wings" is true because having wings is a property of Pegasus, even though Pegasus lacks the property of existing.

One key motivation of Meinongianism is to explain how negative singular existentials like "Ronald McDonald does not exist" can be true. Meinongians accept the idea that singular terms like "Ronald McDonald" refer to individuals. For them, a negative singular existential is true if the individual it refers to does not exist.

Meinongianism has important implications for understandings of quantification. According to an influential view defended by Willard Van Orman Quine, the domain of quantification is restricted to existing objects. This view implies quantifiers carry ontological commitments about what exists and what does not exist. Meinongianism differs from this view by saying the widest domain of quantification includes both existing and nonexisting objects.

Some aspects of Meinongianism are controversial and have received substantial criticism. According to one objection, one cannot distinguish between being an object and being an existing object. A closely related criticism states objects cannot have properties if they do not exist. A further objection is that Meinongianism leads to an "overpopulated universe" because there is an object corresponding to any combination of properties. A more specific criticism rejects the idea that there are incomplete and impossible objects.

Universalism

Universalists agree with Meinongians that existence is a property of individuals but deny there are nonexistent entities. Instead, universalists state existence is a universal property; all entities have it, meaning everything exists. One approach is to say existence is the same as self-identity. According to the law of identity, every object is identical to itself or has the property of self-identity. This can be expressed in predicate logic as ${\displaystyle \mathrm{\forall }x(x=x)}$.

An influential argument in favor of universalism is that the denial of the existence of something is contradictory. This conclusion follows from the premises that one can only deny the existence of something by referring to that entity and that one can only refer to entities that exist.

Universalists have proposed different ways of interpreting negative singular existentials. According to one view, names of fictional entities like "Ronald McDonald" refer to abstract objects, which exist even though they do not exist in space and time. This means, when understood in a strict sense, all negative singular existentials are false, including the assertion that "Ronald McDonald does not exist". Universalists can interpret such sentences slightly differently in relation to the context. In everyday life, for example, people use sentences like "Ronald McDonald does not exist" to express the idea that Ronald McDonald does not exist as a concrete object, which is true. Another approach is to understand negative singular existentials as neither true nor false but meaningless because their singular terms do not refer to anything.

History

Western philosophy

Western philosophy originated with the Presocratic philosophers, who aimed to replace earlier mythological accounts of the universe by providing rational explanations based on foundational principles of all existence. Some, like Thales (c. 624–545 BCE) and Heraclitus (c. 540–480 BCE), suggested concrete principles like water and fire are the root of existence. Anaximander (c. 610–545 BCE) opposed this position; he believed the source must lie in an abstract principle that is beyond the world of human perception.

Plato and his student Aristotle disagreed on whether form and matter depend on one another for their existence.

Plato (428/427–348/347 BCE) argued that different types of entities have different degrees of existence and that shadows and images exist in a weaker sense than regular material objects. He said unchangeable Platonic forms have the highest type of existence, and saw material objects as imperfect and impermanent copies of Platonic forms.

Philosopher Aristotle (384–322 BCE) accepted Plato's idea that forms are different from matter, but he challenged the idea that forms have a higher type of existence. Instead, he believed forms cannot exist without matter. He stated: "being is said in many ways" and explored how different types of entities have different modes of existence. For example, he distinguished between substances and their accidents, and between potentiality and actuality.

Neoplatonists like Plotinus (204–270 CE) suggested reality has a hierarchical structure. They believed a transcendent entity, called "the One" or "the Good", is responsible for all existence. From it emerges the intellect, which in turn gives rise to the soul and the material world.

Anselm of Canterbury is known for his formulation of the ontological argument aiming to prove the existence of God.

In medieval philosophy, Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109 CE) formulated the influential ontological argument, which aims to deduce the existence of God from the concept of God. Anselm defined God as the greatest conceivable being. He reasoned that an entity that did not exist outside his mind would not be the greatest conceivable being, leading him to the conclusion God exists.

Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274 CE) distinguished between the essence of a thing and its existence. According to him, the essence of a thing constitutes its fundamental nature. He argued it is possible to understand what an object is and grasp its essence, even if one does not know whether the object exists. He concluded from this observation that existence is not part of the qualities of an object and should be understood as a separate property. Aquinas also considered the problem of creation from nothing and said only God has the power to truly bring new entities into existence. These ideas later inspired metaphysician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's (1646–1716) theory of creation; Leibniz said to create is to confer actual existence to possible objects.

The philosophers David Hume (1711–1776) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) rejected the idea that existence is a property. According to Hume, objects are bundles of qualities. He said existence is not a property because there is no impression of existence besides the bundled qualities. Kant came to a similar conclusion in his criticism of the ontological argument; according to him, this proof fails because one cannot deduce from the definition of a concept whether entities described by this concept exist. Kant said existence does not add anything to the concept of the object; it only indicates this concept is exemplified. According to philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), there is no pure being or pure nothing, only becoming.

Franz Brentano defended the idea that all judgments are existential judgments.

Philosopher and psychologist Franz Brentano (1838–1917) agreed with Kant's criticism and his position that existence is not a real predicate. Brentano used this idea to develop his theory of judgments, which states all judgments are existential judgments; they either affirm or deny the existence of something. He stated judgments like "some zebras are striped" have the logical form "there is a striped zebra" while judgments like "all zebras are striped" have the logical form "there is not a non-striped zebra".

Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) aimed to refine the idea of what it means that existence is not a regular property. They distinguished between regular first-order properties of individuals and second-order properties of other properties. According to their view, existence is the second-order property of "being instantiated". Russell further developed the idea that general sentences like "lions exist" are at their most fundamental form about individuals by stating that there is an individual that is a lion.

Willard Van Orman Quine (1908–2000) followed Frege and Russell in accepting existence as a second-order property. He drew a close link between existence and the role of quantification in formal logic. He applied this idea to scientific theories and stated a scientific theory is committed to the existence of an entity if the theory quantifies over this entity. For example, if a theory in biology asserts that "there are populations with genetic diversity", this theory has an ontological commitment to the existence of populations with genetic diversity. Alexius Meinong (1853–1920) was an influential critic of second-order theories and developed the alternative view that existence is a property of individuals and that not all individuals have this property.

Eastern philosophy

Main article: Eastern philosophy

Adi Shankara taught that only the divine exists on the most fundamental level.

Many schools of thought in Eastern philosophy discuss the problem of existence and its implications. For instance, the ancient Hindu school of Samkhya articulated a metaphysical dualism according to which the two types of existence are pure consciousness (Purusha) and matter (Prakriti). Samkhya explains the manifestation of the universe as the interaction between these two principles. The Vedic philosopher Adi Shankara (c. 700–750 CE) developed a different approach in his school of Advaita Vedanta. Shankara defended a metaphysical monism by defining the divine (Brahman) as the ultimate reality and the only existent. According to this view, the impression that there is a universe consisting of many distinct entities is an illusion (Maya). The essential features of ultimate reality are described as Sat Chit Ananda—meaning existence, consciousness, and bliss.

A central doctrine in Buddhist philosophy is called the "three marks of existence", which are aniccā (impermanence), anattā (absence of a permanent self), and dukkha (suffering). Aniccā is the doctrine that all of existence is subject to change, meaning everything changes at some point and nothing lasts forever. Anattā expresses a similar state in relation to persons by stating that people do not have a permanent identity or a separate self. Ignorance about aniccā and anattā is seen as the main cause of dukkha by leading people to form attachments that cause suffering.

Laozi saw dao as a fundamental principle that constitutes the root of all existence.

A central idea in many schools of Chinese philosophy, like Laozi's (6th century BCE) Daoism, is that a fundamental principle known as dao is the source of all existence. The term is often translated as "the way" and is understood as a cosmic force that governs the natural order of the world. Chinese metaphysicians debated whether dao is a form of being or whether, as the source of being, it belongs to non-being.

The concept of existence played a central role in Arabic-Persian philosophy. The Islamic philosophers Avicenna (980–1037 CE) and Al-Ghazali (1058–1111 CE) discussed the relationship between existence and essence, and said the essence of an entity is prior to its existence. The additional step of instantiating the essence is required for the entity to come into existence. Philosopher Mulla Sadra (1571–1636 CE) rejected this priority of essence over existence, and said essence is only a concept that is used by the mind to grasp existence. Existence, by contrast, encompasses the whole of reality, according to his view.

Other traditions

Indigenous American philosophies tend to emphasize the interconnectedness of all existence and the importance of maintaining balance and harmony with nature. This is often combined with an animist outlook that ascribes a spiritual essence to some or all entities, including plants, rocks, and places.

The interest in the relational aspect of existence is also found in African philosophy, which explores how all entities are causally linked to form an ordered world. African philosophy also examines the idea of an underlying and all-pervading life force responsible for animating entities and their influence on each other.

In various disciplines

Formal logic

Main article: Logic

Formal logic studies deductively valid arguments. In first-order logic, which is the most-commonly used system of formal logic, existence is expressed using the existential quantifier (${\displaystyle \mathrm{\exists }}$). For example, the formula ${\displaystyle \mathrm{\exists }x\text{Horse}(x)}$ can be used to state horses exist. The variable x ranges over all elements in the domain of quantification and the existential quantifier expresses that at least one element in this domain is a horse. In first-order logic, all singular terms like names refer to objects in the domain and imply the object exists. Because of this, one can deduce ${\displaystyle \mathrm{\exists }x\text{Honest}(x)}$ (someone is honest) from ${\displaystyle \text{Honest}(Bill)}$ (Bill is honest). If only one object matching the description exists, the unique existential quantifier ${\displaystyle \mathrm{\exists }!}$ can be used.

Many logical systems that are based on first-order logic also follow this idea. Free logic is an exception because it allows the presence of empty names that do not refer to an object in the domain. With this modification, it is possible to apply logical reasoning to fictional objects instead of limiting it to regular objects. In free logic one can express that Pegasus is a flying horse using the formula ${\displaystyle \text{Flyinghorse}(Pegasus)}$. As a consequence of this modification, one cannot infer from this type of statement that something exists. This means the inference from ${\displaystyle \text{Flyinghorse}(Pegasus)}$ to ${\displaystyle \mathrm{\exists }x\text{Flyinghorse}(x)}$ is invalid in free logic, even though it is valid in first-order logic. Free logic uses an additional existence predicate (${\displaystyle E!}$) to say a singular term refers to an existing object. For example, the formula ${\displaystyle E!(Homer)}$ can be used to say Homer exists while the formula ${\displaystyle \mathrm{\neg }E!(Pegasus)}$ states Pegasus does not exist.

Others

The disciplines of epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language deal with mental and linguistic representations in their attempt to understand the nature of knowledge, the mind, and language. This brings with it the problem of reference or how representations can refer to existing objects. Examples of such representations are beliefs, thoughts, perceptions, words, and sentences. For instance, in the sentence "Barack Obama is a Democrat", the name "Barack Obama" refers to a particular individual. The problem of reference also affects the epistemology of perception. In particular, this concerns the problem of whether perceptual impressions establish a direct contact with reality.

Closely related to the problem of reference is the relationship between true representations and existence. According to truthmaker theory, true representations require a truthmaker, i.e., an entity whose existence is responsible for the representation being true. For example, the sentence "kangaroos live in Australia" is true because there are kangaroos in Australia; the existence of these kangaroos is the truthmaker of the sentence. Truthmaker theory states there is a close relationship between truth and existence; there exists a truthmaker for every true representation.

Many of the individual sciences are concerned with the existence of particular types of entities and the laws governing them, such as physical things in physics and living entities in biology. The natural sciences employ a great variety of concepts to classify entities; these are known as natural kinds, and include categories like protons, gold, and elephants. According to scientific realists, these entities have mind-independent being; scientific anti-realists say the existence of these entities and categories is based on human perceptions, theories, and social constructs.

A similar problem concerns the existence of social kinds, which are basic concepts used in the social sciences, such as race, gender, disability, money, and nation state. Social kinds are often understood as social constructions that, while useful for describing the complexities of human social life, do not form part of objective reality on the most fundamental level. According to the controversial Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, the social institution of language influences or fully determines how people perceive and understand the world.

Existentialism is a school of thought that explores the nature of human existence. Among its key ideas is that existence precedes essence. This means that existence is more basic than essence. As a result, the nature and purpose of human beings are not pre-existing but develop in the process of living. According to this view, humans are thrown into a world that lacks pre-existing intrinsic meaning. They must determine for themselves their purpose and what meaning their life should have. Existentialists use this idea to explore the role of freedom and responsibility in actively shaping one's life. Feminist existentialists investigate the effects of gender on human existence, for example, on the experience of freedom. Influential existentialists include Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), and Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986). Existentialism has influenced reflections on the role of human existence in sociology. Existentialist sociology examines the ways humans experience the social world and construct reality. Existence theory is a relatively recent approach that focuses on the temporal aspect of existence in society. It explores how the existential milestones to which people aspire influence their lives.

Mathematicians are often interested in the existence of certain mathematical objects. For example, number theorists ask how many prime numbers exist within a certain interval. The statement that at least one mathematical object matching a certain description exists is called an existence theorem. Metaphysicians of mathematics investigate whether mathematical objects exist not only in relation to mathematical axioms but also as part of the fundamental structure of reality. This position is affirmed by Platonists, while nominalists believe mathematical objects lack a more-substantial form of existence, for instance, because they are merely useful fictions.

Many debates in theology revolve around the existence of the divine, and arguments have been presented for and against God's existence. Cosmological arguments state that God must exist as the first cause to explain facts about the existence and aspects of the universe. According to teleological arguments, the only way to explain the order and complexity of the universe and human life is by reference to God as the intelligent designer. An influential argument against the existence of God relies on the problem of evil since it is not clear how evil could exist if there was an all-powerful, all-knowing, and benevolent God. Another argument points to a lack of concrete evidence for God's existence.

Great Flood of 1862

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Flood_of_1862

 

Great Flood of 1862

Lithograph of K Street in the city of Sacramento, California, during the Great Flood of 1862

The Great Flood of 1862 was the largest flood in the recorded history of California, Oregon, and Nevada, inundating the western United States and portions of British Columbia and Mexico. It was preceded by weeks of continuous rains and snows that began in Oregon in November 1861 and continued into January 1862. This was followed by a record amount of rain from January 9–12, and contributed to a flood that extended from the Columbia River southward in western Oregon, and through California to San Diego, as well as extending as far inland as the Washington Territory (now Idaho), the Utah Territory (now Nevada and Utah), and the western New Mexico Territory (now Arizona).

The event dumped an equivalent of 10 feet (3.0 m) of water in California, in the form of rain and snow, over a period of 43 days. Immense snowfalls in the mountains of far western North America caused more flooding in Idaho, Arizona, New Mexico, as well as in Baja California and Sonora, Mexico the following spring and summer, as the snow melted.

The event was capped by an intense, warm storm that melted the heavy snow load that had accumulated during the earlier storms. The resulting snow-melt flooded valleys, inundated or swept away towns, mills, dams, flumes, houses, fences, and domestic animals, and ruined fields. It has been described as the worst disaster ever to strike California. The storms caused an estimated $100 million (1861 USD) in damage, roughly equal to $3 billion in 2021. The governor, state legislature, and state employees were not paid for a year and a half. At least 4,000 people were estimated to have been killed in the floods in California, which was roughly 1% of the state population at the time.

Background

The weather pattern that caused this flood was not from an El Niño–type event. From the existing Army and private weather records, it has been determined that the polar jet stream was to the north because the Pacific Northwest experienced a mild rainy pattern for the first half of December 1861. In 2012, hydrologists and meteorologists concluded that the precipitation was likely caused by a series of atmospheric rivers that hit the Western United States along the entire West Coast, from Oregon to Southern California.

An atmospheric river is a wind-borne, deep layer of water vapor with origins in the tropics, extending from the surface to high altitudes, often above 10,000 feet, and concentrated into a relatively narrow band, typically about 400 to 600 kilometres (250 to 370 mi) wide, usually running ahead of a frontal boundary, or merging into it. With the right dynamics in place to provide lift, an atmospheric river can produce astonishing amounts of precipitation, especially if it stalls over an area for any length of time.

The floods followed a 20-year-long drought. During November, prior to the flooding, Oregon had steady but heavier-than-normal rainfall, with heavier snow in the mountains. Researchers believe the jet stream had slipped south, accompanied by freezing conditions reported at Oregon stations by December 25. Heavy rainfall began falling in California as the longwave trough moved south over the state, remaining there until the end of January 1862, causing precipitation to fall everywhere in the state for nearly 40 days. Eventually, the trough moved even further south, causing snow to fall in the Central Valley and surrounding mountain ranges (15 feet of snow in the Sierra Nevada mountains).

Impact by region

Oregon

There was an excessive amount of precipitation in November 1861 over most of Oregon, less so in the extreme northwest. It was cold enough at the higher elevations that much snow fell in the Cascade Range, which, when later melted by the warm rains, produced a great quantity of water that flooded into the Willamette River and other streams in the Cascades. Tributaries of the Willamette originating in the Oregon Coast Range did not rise as high. A tropical depression that came in at the beginning of December produced strong, warm southerly winds in Oregon, with extremely heavy rain. Flooding was heaviest on rivers with tributaries arising from the snow-covered Cascade Range. The crest of the Willamette flood was reached at Salem on December 3; at Oregon City on the 4th; at Milwaukie, between Oregon City and Portland, on the 5th; at Albany on December 8. The crests at Albany and Salem were the highest ever known at any time. In Oregon, the flood was one of the largest in the recorded history of the Willamette Valley and the rest of Western Oregon.

An article in the December 14, 1861, Oregon City Argus, described the course of the flood at Oregon City:

During the month of November the rain had been falling almost continuously, and a vast amount of snow must have accumulated in the mountains...

Tuesday evening a gloom settled on a scene such as probably never was witnessed in our Valley before. The ceaseless roar of the stream made a fearful elemental music widely different from the ordinary monotone of the Falls; while the darkness was only made more visible by the glare of torches and hurrying lights, which with the shouts of people from the windows of houses surrounded by the water, all conspired to render the hour one of intense and painful excitement. The flood has covered the highest mark of January '53, and is still rapidly rising. As late as anything could be seen the mills were still standing, but the insatiate monster is still creeping up inch by inch, winding its swelling folds round the pillars and foundations of all the houses in its way, crushing and grinding them in the maw of destruction, and sweeping the broken fragments into a common vortex of ruin. All night as on the night previous, people whose homes were being invaded hurried to places of security, glad to escape even with the sacrifice of all their goods.

The light of Wednesday morning revealed a scene of desolation terrible in its extent no less than in its completeness. The Oregon City and Island Mills, Willamette Iron Works, Foundry and Machine Shop were all gone...

Flood waters were so high that at Oregon City at the flood's crest on December 5, the steamer St. Clair was able to run the falls, and steamers were able to visit points at some distance from the normal river channel. Although large amounts of wheat and flour were swept away, some was recovered when Oregon City's Island Mill was found on Sauvie Island downriver from Portland. The nearby town of Linn City was completely destroyed by flooding and was not rebuilt. The flood destroyed the historic towns of Champoeg, site of the first provisional government in Oregon, and Orleans, across the Willamette River from Corvallis. Neither was rebuilt.

The flooding was also severe in other parts of Oregon; to the south, the Umpqua River had the greatest flood known even to the oldest Native Americans, and water was 10 to 15 feet (3.0 to 4.6 m) higher than the 1853 flood. It rose from November 3 to December 3, subsided for two days, then rose again until the 9th. At Fort Umpqua, communication upriver was cut off above Scottsburg, and the river was full of floating houses, barns, rails and produce. The Coquille River swept away settlers' property, and there was also great damage on the Rogue River and on other small streams."

Economic losses from flood damage were severe, as the rivers in Oregon were the main routes of travel. The riverfront was the building site of mills, freight depots, and storehouses for grain and other foodstuffs. Business houses and many residences were near the landings. Farm buildings were mostly on sites convenient to the rivers and supplies of feed for livestock. Loss of so much wheat flour and the new demand coming since 1860 from the recently opened Idaho gold fields caused a spike in its price from $7 to $12 per barrel.

Idaho

In the interior of Washington Territory, in what is now Idaho, the storm creating the flood in Oregon dumped its precipitation as an unprecedented snowfall. Flooding on the Columbia River and the snow in the mountains closed off supplies to the new mining towns on the Salmon River, causing starvation among the miners of Florence, who were cut off from December until May 1862. By early July, as the heavy burden of snow in the mountains finally melted, the runoff caused great flooding. The Boise River flooded from extremely high runoff and is believed to have been four times larger than its largest recorded flood in 1943. Flood waters made the river expand to a couple of miles wide. It washed away or covered the original route of the Oregon Trail in the river valley.

California

California was hit by a combination of incessant rain, snow, and then unseasonably high temperatures. In Northern California, it snowed heavily during the later part of November and the first few days of December, until the temperature rose unusually high and it began to rain. In San Francisco, there were 35 inches of precipitation in December 1861–January 1862, and almost 50 for the season. There were four distinct rainy periods: The first occurred on December 9, 1861, the second on December 23–28, the third on January 9–12, and the fourth on January 15–17.

Native Americans knew that the Sacramento Valley could become an inland sea when the rains came. Their storytellers described water filling the valley from the Coast Range to the Sierra.

Northern California

Fort Ter-Waw, located in Klamath Glen, California, was destroyed by the flood in December 1861 and abandoned on June 10, 1862. Bridges were washed away in Trinity and Shasta counties. At Red Dog in Nevada County, William Begole reported that from December 23 to January 22 it rained a total of 25.5 inches (650 mm), and on January 10 and 11 alone, it rained over 11 inches (280 mm).

At Weaverville, John Carr was a witness to the sudden melt of snow by the heavy rain and onset of the flood in December 1861 on the Trinity River:

From November until the latter part of March there was a succession of storms and floods... The ground was covered with snow 1 foot [30 cm] deep, and on the mountains much deeper... The water in the river ... seemed like some mighty uncontrollable monster of destruction broken away from its bonds, rushing uncontrollably on, and everywhere carrying ruin and destruction in its course. When rising, the river seemed highest in the middle... From the head settlement to the mouth of the Trinity River, for a distance of one hundred and fifty miles, everything was swept to destruction. Not a bridge was left, or a mining-wheel or a sluce-box. Parts of ranches and miners cabins met the same fate. The labor of hundreds of men, and their savings of years, invested in bridges, mines and ranches, were all swept away. In forty-eight hours the valley of the Trinity was left desolate. The county never recovered from that disastrous flood. Many of the mining-wheels and bridges were never rebuilt.

Two years later William H. Brewer saw, near Crescent City, the debris of the flood:

The floods of two years ago brought down an immense amount of driftwood from all the rivers along the coast, and it was cast up along this part of the coast in quantities that stagger belief. It looked to me as if I saw enough in ten miles along the shore to make a million cords of wood.... One I measured was 210 feet [64 m] long and 3 1/2 feet [1.1 m] at the little end, without the bark.

Central Valley

The entire Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys were affected. An area about 300 miles (480 km) long, averaging 20 miles (32 km) in width, and covering 5,000 to 6,000 square miles (13,000 to 16,000 km²) was under water. The water flooding the Central Valley reached depths up to 30 feet (9.1 m), completely submerging telegraph poles that had just been installed between San Francisco and New York. Transportation, mail, and communications across the state were disrupted for a month. Water covered portions of the valley from December 1861, through the spring, and into the summer of 1862.

The rainy season commenced on the 8th of November, and for four weeks, with scarcely any intermission, the rain continued to fall very gently in San Francisco, but in heavy showers in the interior. According to the statement of a Grass Valley paper, nine inches of rain fell there in thirty-six hours on the 7th and 8th inst.... the next day the river-beds were full almost to the hilltops. The North Fork of the American River at Auburn rose thirty-five feet, and in many other mountain streams the rise was almost as great. On the 9th the flood reached the low land of the Sacramento Valley.

In Knights Ferry, in the foothills of the Sierra Nevada astride the Stanislaus River, about 40 miles (64 km) east of Modesto, the town's homes, its mill, and most of its businesses were ruined by the flood. The bridge spanning the river initially withstood the flood waters but was destroyed when the debris of the bridge at Two-Mile Bar, only a short distance up river, was torn from its foundation and crashed into the Knights Ferry Bridge, crushing the truss supports and knocking it from its rock foundation. All Sacramento excepting one street, part of Marysville, part of Santa Rosa, part of Auburn, part of Sonora, part of Nevada City, and part of Napa were under water. Some smaller towns like Empire City and Mokelumne City were entirely destroyed.

Sacramento

Sheet music cover depicting Sacramento flooding

Sacramento, sited at the junction of the Sacramento and American Rivers, was originally built at 16 feet (4.9 m) above low-water mark, and the river usually rose 17 to 18 feet (5.2 to 5.5 m) almost every year. The New York Times reported on January 21, 1862, that a trapper who had spent more than 20 years in California had frequently boated over the city's site, and in 1846, the water at the location was 7 feet (2.1 m) deep for sixty days. On 27 December 1861, the Sacramento River reached a flood level of 22 feet 7 inches (6.88 m) above the low water mark, after rising 10 feet (3.0 m) during the prior 24 hours.

By 1861, the Sacramento flood plain had quickly become inhabited by a growing population during the Gold Rush, and had begun to serve as the central hub for Valley commerce and trade and as the home of the California State Legislature. The landscape was recognized as a flood-prone landscape located at the confluence of the American and Sacramento River. John Muir noted the extent of seasonal flooding in Sacramento, "…The greatest floods occur in winter, when one could suppose all the wild waters would be muffled and chained in frost and snow…rare intervals warm rains and warm winds invade the mountains and push back the snow line from 2000 to 8,000 feet, or even higher, and then come the big floods."

However, the series of storms that led to the Great Flood of 1862 averaged precipitation levels that records show only occur once every 500 to 1,000 years. The geographical range of flooding in the state was noted by a traveling geologist from Yale University, William Brewer, who wrote that on January 19, 1862,

The great Central Valley of the state is under water—the Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys—a region 250 to 300 miles long and an average of at least 20 miles wide, a district of 5,000 or 6,000 square miles, or probably three to three and a half million acres! Although much of it is not cultivated, yet a part of it is the garden of the state. Thousands of farms are entirely under water—cattle starving and drowning.

From December to January 1862 the series of storms carrying high winds and heavy precipitation left city streets and sidewalks underwater. Photographs show canals in place of city streets and boats docked to storefronts.

On Inauguration Day, January 10, 1862, the state's eighth governor, Leland Stanford, traveled by rowboat to his inauguration building held at the State Legislature office. Much of Sacramento remained under water for 3 months after the storms passed. As a result of the flooding, from January 23, 1862, the state capital was moved temporarily from Sacramento to San Francisco.

Levee damage

The city of Sacramento suffered the worst damage due to its levee, which lay in a wide and flat valley at the junction of the American and Sacramento rivers. When the floodwaters entered from the higher ground on the east, the levee acted as a dam to keep the water in the city rather than let it flow out. Soon the water level was 10 feet (3.0 m) higher inside than the level of the Sacramento River on the outside.

John Carr wrote of his riverboat trip up the Sacramento River when it was at one of its highest stages of flood:

... I was a passenger on the old steamer Gem, from Sacramento to Red Bluff. The only way the pilot could tell where the channel of the river was, was by the cottonwood trees on each side of the river. The boat had to stop several times and take men out of the tops of trees and off the roofs of houses. In our trip up the river we met property of every description floating down—dead horses and cattle, sheep, hogs, houses, haystacks, household furniture, and everything imaginable was on its way for the ocean. Arriving at Red Bluff, there was water everywhere as far as the eye could reach, and what few bridges there had been in the country were all swept away.

Dozens of wood houses, some two stories high, were simply lifted up and carried off by the flood, as was "all the firewood, most of the fences and sheds, all the poultry, cats, rats and many of the cows and horses". The Chinese in their poorly built shantytowns were disproportionately affected.

A chain gang was sent to break open the levee, which, when it finally broke, allowed the waters to rush out of the city center and lowered the level of the flooding by 5–6 feet (1.5–1.8 m). Eventually the waters fell to a level on a par with the lowest part of the city.

City rebuilding

Politicians addressed the flood risk with an investment of more than $1.5 million in flood control and prevention through an improved levee system around Sacramento and the greater Sacramento area.

Sacramento put efforts into restructuring the city's foundation by re-channeling the American River, reinforcing the established levee system, and passing a two-decade project to raise the city above flood level. Due to the high costs associated with flood recovery, the city of Sacramento reached out to the aid of the Transcontinental Railroad Co., which was a major turning point in levee resilience and reconstruction. Prior to the great flood, levee breaks and failures caused much destruction from flooding. The Transcontinental Railroad had laid tracks across the Sierra Nevada and stationed its major repair and production line in Sacramento. The Chinese workforce of over 14,000 reconstructed levees under the guidance of Charles Crocker, the head contractor for Central Pacific Railroad.

In response to a weak levee system and seasonal flooding, flood plain architecture was incorporated in residential infrastructure, evident in Victorian buildings throughout Midtown to Downtown Sacramento. Flood design includes raised front porches with stairs leading down to the street. In addition, small hollow spaces are built into the basement level to allow for basement flooding and aeration.

Old Town Sacramento was raised 15 feet above flood level. Ruins of the old city remain underneath the streets as tunnels leading nowhere, with hollow sidewalks, filled in entrances, trap doors, and rubble where storefronts and walkways used to be. Large wooden beams and soil brought in from surrounding areas helped to stabilize and build a foundation on top of the once-flooded city.

Southern California

In Southern California, beginning on December 24, 1861, it rained for 28 days in Los Angeles. In the San Gabriel Mountains the mining town of Eldoradoville was washed away by flood waters. The flooding drowned thousands of cattle and washed away fruit trees and vineyards that grew along the Los Angeles River. No mail was received at Los Angeles for five weeks. The Los Angeles Star reported that:

The road from Tejon, we hear, has been almost washed away. The San Fernando mountain cannot be crossed except by the old trail ... over the top of the mountain. The plain has been cut up into gulches and arroyos, and streams are rushing down every declivity.

The plains of Los Angeles County, at the time a marshy area with many small lakes and several meandering streams from the mountains, were extensively flooded, and much of the agricultural development that lay along the rivers was ruined. In most of the lower areas, small settlements were submerged. These flooded areas formed into a large lake system with many small streams. A few more powerful currents cut channels across the plain and carried the runoff to the sea.

In Los Angeles County, (including what is now Orange County) the flooding Santa Ana River created an inland sea lasting about three weeks with water standing 4 feet (1.2 m) deep up to 4 miles (6 km) from the river. In February 1862, the Los Angeles, San Gabriel, and Santa Ana Rivers merged. Government surveys at the time indicated that a solid expanse of water covered the area from Signal Hill to Huntington Beach, a distance of approximately 18 miles (29 km).

At Santa Barbara County, the narrow coastal plains were flooded by the rivers coming out of the mountains. The San Buenaventura Mission Aqueduct that was still drawing water from a tributary of the Ventura River for the town of Ventura water system, was abandoned due to the damage in the area that became the separate Ventura County in 1873.

In San Bernardino County, all the fertile riverside fields and all but the church and one house of the New Mexican colony of Agua Mansa were swept away by the Santa Ana River, which overflowed its banks. A priest rang the church bell on the night of January 22, 1862, alerting the inhabitants to the approach of the flood, and all escaped.

In San Diego, a storm at sea backed up the flood water running into the bay from the San Diego River, resulting in a new river channel cut into San Diego Harbor. The continuous heavy downpour also changed the look of the land, the previously rounded hills were extensively cut by gulleys and canyons.

To the north, in the Owens Valley, similar snow and flooding conditions as those to the east in Aurora, Nevada (see below) led to the local Paiute suffering the loss of much of the game they depended on. Cattle, newly driven into the valley to feed the miners, competed with the native grazers and ate the native wild plant crops the Paiute depended on to survive. Starving, the Paiute began to kill the cattle and conflict with the cattlemen began, leading to the subsequent Owens Valley Indian War.

Economic impact

In March 1862, the Wool Growers Association reported that 100,000 sheep and 500,000 lambs were killed by the floods. Even oyster beds in San Francisco Bay near Oakland were reported to be dying from the effects of the immense amounts of freshwater entering the bay. Full of sediment, the silted water smothered the oyster beds. One-quarter of California's estimated 800,000 cattle were killed by the flood, accelerating the end of the cattle-based ranchero society. One-fourth to one-third of the state's property was destroyed, and one home in eight was carried away or ruined by the flood-waters. Mining equipment such as sluices, flumes, wheels and derricks were carried away across the state.

An early estimate of property damage was $10 million. However, later it was estimated that approximately one-quarter of the taxable real estate in the state of California was destroyed in the flood. The state almost had to declare bankruptcy due to the costs of the damage and the loss of tax revenue.

Nevada

The Carson River Basin of the eastern California and western Utah Territory (now Nevada), suffered from a similar pattern of flooding. Flooding began in December 1861 in Carson Valley from a series of storms in the upper Carson River basin. Two feet (61 cm) of wet heavy snow fell on December 20, 1861, accumulating on the valley floor. Snow was followed by a period of very cold temperatures which froze the snow, followed by a three-day rain starting on December 25, 1861. By January 2, 1862, the town of Dayton and the area surrounding it had been flooded.

In the vicinity of Aurora, there had been light snowfall in November, then mild weather until Christmas Eve, when there began a heavy and rapid snowfall for days. The temperature dropped below zero and the passes over the Sierra were closed. During the second week of January, it warmed slightly, and the snow became a torrential rain. Esmerelda and Willow gulches overflowed their banks and flooded Aurora. With water standing up to 3 inches (76 mm) deep in many buildings, adobe buildings turned to mud and collapsed. After a week, it cooled again, and snow began to fall again. Within a few days, the snow was deeper than it had been before the rains had begun to fall. Samuel Young of Aurora recorded in his diary that the snow and rain had fallen for 26 days out of 30 since December 24, 1861.

Utah

The early southwestern Utah settlements in Washington County: Fort Clara, St. George, Grafton, Duncans Retreat, Adventure, and Northrop were nearly destroyed by a flood on the Virgin and Santa Clara Rivers, that followed 44 days of rainfall in January and February 1862. Survivors of Fort Clara established the modern town of Santa Clara a mile east of the old fort on the Santa Clara River. Springdale and Rockville were founded in 1862 by settlers flooded out of Adventure, Northup and other places in the vicinity. Settlers were driven from Fort Harmony in Iron County when the fort had to be abandoned after most of its adobe walls were washed away. The settlements of New Harmony and Kanarraville were then created by refugees from this disaster.

Arizona

In western New Mexico Territory, heavy rains fell in late January, causing severe flooding of the Colorado River and Gila River. On January 20, 1862, the Colorado River began to rise, and on the afternoon of January 22 it rose suddenly in three hours from an already high stage nearly 6 feet (1.8 m), overflowing its banks and turned Fort Yuma in California into an island in the midst of the Colorado River. At 1 o’clock on the morning of January 23, the river reached its crest. Jaeger City a mile down river from Fort Yuma, and Colorado City, across the Colorado River from it were washed away. The river overflowed its banks to the extent that there was water 20 feet (6.1 m) deep on a ranch in the low-lying ground just above Arizona City where the Gila River joined the Colorado. The riverside home of steamboat entrepreneur George Alonzo Johnson and the nearby Hooper residence were the only places in the town unharmed because they were built on high ground. Colorado City had to be rebuilt on higher ground after the 1862 flood.

The Gila River also flooded, covering its whole valley at its mouth where it met the Colorado from the sand hills on the south to the foothills on the north. Twenty miles (32 km) to the east of Fort Yuma, it swept away most of the mining boomtown of Gila City along with a supply of hay being gathered there to supply the planned advance of the California Column into Confederate Arizona. Further east the road was flooded, buildings and vehicles swept away and traffic was disrupted for some time thereafter by the mud covering the road to Tucson. The great flood in the Gila and Colorado rivers, covered their bottom lands with mud. Much of the livestock along the rivers drowned and the crops of the Indians along the river were destroyed.

The overflow of the 1862 Colorado River spring flood waters reached the Salton Sink via the Alamo and New Rivers, filling it and creating a lake some 60 miles (97 km) long and 30 miles (48 km) wide.

New Mexico

The spring and summer thaw of the immense snowpack during the winter of 1861–1862 in the southern Rocky Mountains and other ranges flooded the Rio Grande, and changed the river's course in the Mesilla Valley. Mesilla, built on the west bank of the Rio Grande, was left by the movement of the river on its east bank where it remains today.

The flood impeded the Union Army's California Column as it pursued the retreating Confederate Army of New Mexico. On July 8, 1862, Lt. Col. Edward E. Eyre, First California Volunteer Cavalry wrote:

The Rio Grande has been unusually high this summer, almost the entire bottom between Fort Craig and Mesilla being still overflowed. It is impossible at this time to approach Mesilla on the west side of the river, a new channel having been washed out on that side of the town, through which the largest portion of the water flows; besides, the bottom for a long distance is overflowed, and, the soil being of a loose nature, animals mire down in attempting to get through it.

Instead of crossing at Mesilla, the high waters and shift of the river forced Eyre's detachment to cross the Rio Grande upriver at San Diego Crossing below Fort Thorn, after a week awaiting the water to go down, which enabled the Confederates' escape into Texas.

Sonora, Mexico

Until the Great Flood of 1862, what became Port Isabel Slough, in Sonora, Mexico, was a shallow tidewater slough, but the extreme flood waters of that year cut its channel much deeper, so that at low tide it still was three fathoms deep. The mouth of this slough was only 5 miles (8.0 km) from the mouth of the river and sheltered from the extremes of the tidal bore of the Colorado River and deep enough to prevent stranding on shoals or mud flats at low tide. This made it an ideal anchorage for maritime craft to load and unload their cargo and passengers from the steamboats that took them up and down river without the danger from the tides that they were having to risk in the estuary at Robinson's Landing.

In the month of March 1865, the schooner Isabel, from San Francisco, commanded by W. H. Pierson, found and entered this slough and discharged her cargo there for the first time. Subsequently, the steamers, sailing ships and later ocean-going steamships loaded and off-loaded their cargoes there, and the steamboat company established Port Isabel 2.5 miles (4.0 km) above the mouth of the slough. The port lasted until 1878. After the Southern Pacific Railroad reached Yuma, it was abandoned the following year, the shipyard there being removed to Yuma.

Current interest

A map of the flood area of the hypothetical ARkStorm event

The storm was not an unprecedented occurrence. Geologic evidence has been found that massive floods, of equal or greater magnitude to the 1861–1862 event, have occurred in California roughly every 100 to 200 years. The United States Geological Survey has developed a hypothetical scenario, known as the "ARkStorm" (named for an atmospheric river event that has the likelihood of occurring once per 1,000 years), that would occur should a similar event occur in modern-day California. If such a storm were to occur today, it would probably cause $725 billion to $1 trillion in damage. The likelihood of a massive flooding event is estimated to have been increased due to climate change.