Search This Blog

Monday, October 31, 2022

Energy poverty

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Homes without reliable access to energy such as electricity, heating, cooling, etc.

Energy poverty is lack of access to modern energy services. It refers to the situation of large numbers of people in developing countries and some people in developed countries whose well-being is negatively affected by very low consumption of energy, use of dirty or polluting fuels, and excessive time spent collecting fuel to meet basic needs. Today, 759 million people lack access to consistent electricity and 2.6 billion people use dangerous and inefficient cooking systems. It is inversely related to access to modern energy services, although improving access is only one factor in efforts to reduce energy poverty. Energy poverty is distinct from fuel poverty, which primarily focuses solely on the issue of affordability.

The term “energy poverty” came into emergence through the publication of Brenda Boardman’s book, Fuel Poverty: From Cold Homes to Affordable Warmth (1991). Naming the intersection of energy and poverty as “energy poverty” motivated the need to develop public policy to address energy poverty and also study its causes, symptoms, and effects in society. When energy poverty was first introduced in Boardman's book, energy poverty was described as not having enough power to heat and cool homes. Today, energy poverty is understood to be the result of complex systemic inequalities which create barriers to access modern energy at an affordable price. Energy poverty is challenging to measure and thus analyze because it is privately experienced within households, specific to cultural contexts, and dynamically changes depending on the time and space.

According to the Energy Poverty Action initiative of the World Economic Forum, "Access to energy is fundamental to improving quality of life and is a key imperative for economic development. In the developing world, energy poverty is still rife." As a result of this situation, the United Nations (UN) launched the Sustainable Energy for All Initiative and designated 2012 as the International Year for Sustainable Energy for All, which had a major focus on reducing energy poverty. The UN further recognizes the importance of energy poverty through Goal 7 of its Sustainable Development Goals to "ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all."

Causes

Energy sources

Women gathering firewood for fuel.

Rural areas are predominant in mostly developing countries, and the rural areas in the countries do not have modern energy infrastructure. They have heavily relied on traditional biomass such as wood fuel, charcoal, crop residual, wood pellets and the like. Because lack of modern energy infrastructure like power plants, transmission lines, underground pipelines to deliver energy resources such as natural gas, petroleum that need high or cutting-edge technologies and extremely high upfront costs, which are beyond their financial and technological capacity. Although some developing countries like BRIC have reached close to the energy-related technological level of developed countries and have financial power, still most developing countries are dominated by traditional biomass. According to the International Energy Agency IEA, "use of traditional biomass will decrease in many countries, but is likely to increase in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa alongside population growth."

Energy poverty projects involving renewable sources can also make a positive contribution to low-carbon development strategies.

Energy price increases and poverty

Energy tariff increases are often important for environmental and fiscal reasons – though they can at times increase levels of household poverty. A 2016 study assesses the expected poverty and distributional effects of an energy price reform – in the context of Armenia; it estimates that a large natural gas tariff increase of about 40% contributed to an estimated 8% of households to substitute natural gas mainly with wood as their source of heating - and it also pushed an estimated 2.8% of households into poverty - i.e. below the national poverty line. This study also outlines the methodological and statistical assumptions and constraints that arise in estimating causal effects of energy reforms on household poverty, and also discusses possible effects of such reforms on non-monetary human welfare that is more difficult to measure statistically. A study 'High Energy', by Oldham.Jules,(2011) Scottish Council for Single Homeless, showed the difference between a new tenancy succeeding or failing when people moved on from homelessness, as a result of the new tenant having a) utilities in place before moving in, b) an understanding of payment options and meter types, and c) accessing the correct tariff to suit their budget and financial needs.

Energy Ladder

The ‘Energy Ladder’: What energy sources do people on different incomes rely on?

An energy ladder shows the improvement of energy use corresponding to an increase in the household income. Basically, as income increases, the energy types used by households would be cleaner and more efficient, but more expensive as moving from traditional biomass to electricity. "Households at lower levels of income and development tend to be at the bottom of the energy ladder, using fuel that is cheap and locally available but not very clean nor efficient. According to the World Health Organization, over three billion people worldwide are at these lower rungs, depending on biomass fuels—crop waste, dung, wood, leaves, etc.—and coal to meet their energy needs. A disproportionate number of these individuals reside in Asia and Africa: 95% of the population in Afghanistan uses these fuels, 95% in Chad, 87% in Ghana, 82% in India, 80% in China, and so forth. As incomes rise, we would expect that households would substitute to higher quality fuel choices. However, this process has been quite slow. In fact, the World Bank reports that the use of biomass for all energy sources had remained constant at about 25% since 1975."

Units of Analysis

Domestic energy poverty

Domestic energy poverty refers to a situation where a household does not have access or cannot afford to have the basic energy or energy services to achieve day to day living requirements. These requirements can change from country to country and region to region. The most common needs are lighting, cooking energy, domestic heating or cooling.

Lack of access to electricity is one indicator of energy poverty.

Other authors consider different categories of energy needs from "fundamental energy needs" associated to human survival and extremely poor situations. "Basic energy needs" required for attaining basic living standards, which includes all the functions in the previous (cooking, heating and lighting) and, in addition energy to provide basic services linked to health, education and communications. "Energy needs for productive uses" when additionally basic energy needs the user requires energy to make a living; and finally "Energy for recreation", when the user has fulfilled the previous categories and needs energy for enjoyment." Until recently energy poverty definitions took only the minimum energy quantity required into consideration when defining energy poverty, but a different school of thought is that not only energy quantity but the quality and cleanliness of the energy used should be taken into consideration when defining energy poverty.

One such definition reads as:

"A person is in 'energy poverty' if they do not have access to at least:
(a) the equivalent of 35 kg LPG for cooking per capita per year from liquid and/or gas fuels or from improved supply of solid fuel sources and improved (efficient and clean) cook stoves
and
(b) 120kWh electricity per capita per year for lighting, access to most basic services (drinking water, communication, improved health services, education improved services and others) plus some added value to local production

An 'improved energy source' for cooking is one which requires less than 4 hours person per week per household to collect fuel, meets the recommendations WHO for air quality (maximum concentration of CO of 30 mg/M3 for 24 hours periods and less than 10 mg/ M3 for periods 8 hours of exposure), and the overall conversion efficiency is higher than 25%. "

Challenges to defining and measuring energy poverty

Energy poverty is challenging to define and measure because energy services cannot be measured concretely and there are no universal standards of what are considered basic energy services. Energy services are different ways people use energy like lighting, cooking, space heating, refrigeration, etc.

Composite Indices

Energy Development Index (EDI)

First introduced in 2004 by the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Energy Development Index (EDI) aims to measure a country’s transition to modern fuels. It is calculated as the weighted average of four indicators: “1) Per capita commercial energy consumption as an indicator of the overall economic development of a country; 2) Per capita consumption of electricity in the residential sector as a metric of electricity reliability and customers׳ ability to financially access it; 3) Share of modern fuels in total residential energy sector consumption to indicate access to modern cooking fuels; 4) Share of population with access to electricity.”  (The EDI was modeled after the Human Development Index (HDI).) Because the EDI is calculated as the average of indicators which measure the quality and quantity of energy services at a national level, the EDI provides a metric that provides an understanding of the national level of energy development. At the same time, this means that the EDI is not well-equipped to describe energy poverty at a household level.

Multidimensional Energy Poverty Index (MEPI)

Measures whether an individual is energy poor or rich based on how intensely they experience energy deprivation. Energy deprivation is categorized by seven indicators: “access to light, modern cooking fuel, fresh air, refrigeration, recreation, communication, and space cooling.” An individual is considered energy poor if they experience a predetermined number of energy deprivations. The MEPI is calculated by multiplying the ratio of people identified as energy poor to the total sample size and the average intensity of energy deprivation of the energy poor. Some strengths of the MEPI is that it takes into account the number of energy poor along with the intensity of their energy poverty. On the other hand, because it collects data at a household or individual level, it is harder to understand the broader national context.

Energy Poverty Index (EPI)

Developed by Mirza and Szirmai in their 2010 study to measure energy poverty in Pakistan, the Energy Poverty Index (EPI) is calculated by averaging the energy shortfall and energy inconvenience of a household. Energy inconvenience is measured through indicators such as: “Frequency of buying or collecting a source of energy; Distance from household traveled; Means of transport used; Household member’s involvement in energy acquisition; Time spent on energy collection per week; Household health; Children’s involvement in energy collection.” Energy shortfall is measured as the lack of sufficient energy to meet basic household needs. This index weighs more heavily the impact of the usability of energy services rather than its access. Similar to the MEPI, the EPI collects data at a micro-level which lends to greater understanding of energy poverty at the household level.

Intersectional issues

Like other economic justice issues, energy poverty often exacerbates existing vulnerabilities amongst already vulnerable communities.

Children gathering firewood.

Gender

In developing countries, women and girls health, educational, and career opportunities are significantly affected by energy because they are usually responsible for providing the primary energy for households. Women and girls spend significant amount of time looking for fuel sources like wood, paraffin, dung, etc. leaving them less time to pursue education, leisure, and their careers. Additionally, using biomass as fuel for heating and cooking disproportionately affects women and children as they are the primary family members responsible for cooking and other domestic activities within the home. Being more vulnerable to indoor air pollution from burning biomass, 85% of the 2 million deaths from indoor air pollution are attributed to women and children. In developed countries, women are more vulnerable to experiencing energy poverty because of their relatively low income compared to the high cost of energy services. For example, women-headed households made up 38% of the 5.6 million French households who were unable to adequately heat their homes. Older women are particularly more vulnerable to experiencing energy poverty because of structural gender inequalities in financial resources and ability to invest in energy saving strategies.

Education

With many dimensions of poverty, education is a very powerful agent for mitigating the effects of energy poverty. Limited electricity access affects students’ quality of education because it can limit the amount of time students can study by not having reliable energy access to study after sunset. Additionally, having consistent access to energy means that girl children, who are usually responsible for collecting fuel for their household, have more time to focus on their studies and attend school.

90 percent of children in sub-Saharan Africa go to primary schools that lack electricity. In Burundi and Guinea only 2% of schools are electrified, while in DR Congo there is only 8% school electrification for a population of 75.5 million (43% of whom are under 14 years). In the DRC alone, by these statistics, there are almost 30 million children attending school without power.

Education is a key component in growing human capital which in turn facilitates economic growth by enabling people to be more productive workers in the economy. As developing nations accumulate more capital, they can invest in building modern energy services while households gain more options to pursue modern energy sources and alleviate energy poverty.

Health

Due to traditional gender roles, women are generally responsible to gathering traditional biomass for energy. Women also spend much time cooking in a kitchen. Spending significant time harvesting energy resources means women have less time to devote to other activities, and the physically straining labor brings chronic fatigue to women. Moreover, women and children, who stick around their mothers to help with domestic chores, respectively, are in danger of long-term exposure to indoor air pollution caused by burning traditional biomass fuels. During combustion, carbon monoxide, particulates, benzene, and the likes threaten their health. As a result, many women and children suffer from acute respiratory infections, lung cancer, asthma, and other diseases. "The health consequences of using biomass in an unsustainable way are staggering. According to the World Health Organization, exposure to indoor air pollution is responsible for the nearly two million excess deaths, primarily women and children, from cancer, respiratory infections and lung diseases and for four percent of the global burden of disease. In relative terms, deaths related to biomass pollution kill more people than malaria (1.2 million) and tuberculosis (1.6 million) each year around the world."

Another connection between energy poverty and health is that households who are energy poor are more likely to use traditional biomass such as wood and cow dung to fulfill their energy needs. However, burning wood and cow dung leads to incomplete combustion and releases black carbon into the atmosphere. Black carbon may be a health hazard.

Development

"Energy provides services to meet many basic human needs, particularly heat, motive power (e.g. water pumps and transport) and light. Business, industry, commerce and public services such as modern healthcare, education and communication are highly dependent on access to energy services. Indeed, there is a direct relationship between the absence of adequate energy services and many poverty indicators such as infant mortality, illiteracy, life expectancy and total fertility rate. Inadequate access to energy also exacerbates rapid urbanization in developing countries, by driving people to seek better living conditions. Increasing energy consumption has long been tied directly to economic growth and improvement in human welfare. However it is unclear whether increasing energy consumption is a necessary precondition for economic growth, or vice versa. Although developed countries are now beginning to decouple their energy consumption from economic growth (through structural changes and increases in energy efficiency), there remains a strong direct relationship between energy consumption and economic development in developing countries."

Climate Change

In 2018, 70% of greenhouse gas emissions were a result of energy production and use. With more countries aiming to transition to modern energy services and provide energy accessibility to more people, there is a risk that greenhouse gas emissions will increase proportionally. Historically, 5% of countries account for 67.74% of total emissions and 50% of the lowest-emitting countries produce only 0.74% of total historic greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, the distribution, production, and consumption of energy services is highly unequal and reflects the greater systemic barriers that prevent people from accessing and using energy services. Additionally, there is a greater emphasis on developing countries to invest in renewable sources of energy rather than following the energy development patterns of developed nations.

Regional Analysis

Energy poverty is a complex issue that is sensitive to the nuances of the culture, time, and space of a region. Thus, the terms “Global North/South” are generalizations and not always sufficient to describe the nuances of energy poverty, although there are broad trends in how energy poverty is experienced and mitigated between the Global North and South.

Global North

Energy poverty is most commonly discussed as “fuel poverty” in the Global North where discourse is focused on households' access to energy sources to heat, cool, and power their homes. Fuel poverty is driven by high energy costs, low household incomes, and inefficient appliances. (a global perspective) Additionally, older people are more vulnerable to experiencing fuel poverty because of their income status and lack of access to energy-saving technologies. According to the European Fuel Poverty and Energy Efficiency (EPEE), approximately 50-125 million people live in fuel poverty. Like energy poverty, fuel poverty is hard to define and measure because of its many nuances. The United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland, are one of the few countries which have defined fuel poverty to be if 10% of a household's income is spent on heating/cooling. Another EPEE project found that 1 in 7 households in Europe were on the margins of fuel poverty by using three indicators of checking for leaky roofs, arrears on utility bills, ability to pay for adequate heating, mold in windows. High energy prices, insufficient insulation in dwellings, and low incomes contribute to increased vulnerability to fuel poverty. Climate change adds more pressure as weather events become more cold and hot, thereby increasing demand for fuel to cool and heat the home. The ability to provide adequate heating during cold weather has implications for people’s health as cold weather can be an antagonistic factor to cardiovascular and respiratory illness.

Global South

Energy poverty in the Global South is largely driven by a lack of access to modern energy sources because of poor energy infrastructure, weak energy service markets, and insufficient household incomes to afford energy services. However, recent research suggests that alleviating energy poverty requires more than building better power grids because there is a complex web of political, economic, and cultural factors that influence a region’s ability to transition to modern energy sources. Energy poverty is strongly linked to many sustainable development goals because greater energy access enables people to exercise more of their capabilities. For example: greater access to clean energy for cooking improves the health of women by reducing the indoor air pollution associated with burning traditional biomasses for cooking; farmers can find better prices for their crops using telecommunication networks; people have more time to pursue leisure and other activities which can increase household income from the time saved from looking for firewood and other traditional biomasses, etc. Because of the impact of energy poverty in sustainable development, energy poverty is largely seen through the lens of another avenue in which to promote sustainable development in regions within the Global South.

Africa

One of Africa’s unique challenges with energy poverty is its rapid urbanization and booming urban centers. Based on urbanization trends in Asia, there has been precedent that urbanization led to broader transitions to modern energy services. However, access to modern energy services in cities is predicated by an increase in income, which is difficult to find in the economies of many African cities. This has led to only 25% of the Africans living in urban centers to have electricity access. Furthermore, as Africa’s population increases access to energy has not increased proportionally. Between 1970-1990, only 50 million people gained access to electricity against a population gain of 150 million. The largest barriers people in urban centers face in accessing energy is the huge cost compared to their relatively low incomes. The urban poor spend 10-30% of their income on energy, whereas the non-poor spend only 5-7% of their income.

Addressing energy poverty

Energy is important for not only economic development but also public health. In developing countries, governments should make efforts on reducing energy poverty that have negative impacts on economic development and public health. The number of people who currently use modern energy should increase as the developing world governments take actions to reduce social costs and to increase social benefits by gradually spreading modern energy to their people in rural areas. However, the developing world governments have been experiencing difficulties in promoting the distributions of modern energy like electricity. In order to build energy infrastructure that generate and deliver electricity to each household, astronomical amount of money are first invested. And lack of high technologies needed for modern energy development have kept the developing countries from accessing modern energy. Such circumstances are huge hurdles; as a result, it is difficult that the developing countries governments participate in effective development of energy without external aids. International cooperation is necessary for framing developing countries' stable future energy infrastructure and institutions. Although their energy situation have not been improved much over the past decades, current international aids are playing an important role in reducing the gap between developing and developed countries associated with the use of modern energy. With the international aids, it will take less time to reduce the gap when comparing to nonexistence of international cooperation.

The World Bank says that financial help should not be general fossil fuel subsidies, but should instead be targeted to those in need.

International efforts

China and India which account for about one third of the global population have booming economies, and other developing nations show similar trends in rapid economic and population growth. As a result of modernization and industrialization, energy demand for modern energy sources also grows. One challenge for developing nations is to support the growing energy needs of their growing populations by expanding their energy infrastructure. Without intentional policy-making and action, more people in developing countries will face extreme difficulties in accessing modern energy services.

International development agencies intervention methods have not been entirely successful. "International cooperation needs to be shaped around a small number of key elements that are all familiar to energy policy, such as institutional support, capacity development, support for national and local energy plans, and strong links to utility/public sector leadership. Africa has all the human and material resources to end poverty but is poor in using those resources for the benefit of its people. This includes national and international institutions as well as the ability to deploy technologies, absorb and disseminate financing, provide transparent regulation, introduce systems of peer review, and share and monitor relevant information and data."

European Union

There is an increasing focus on energy poverty in the European Union, where in 2013 its European Economic and Social Committee formed an official opinion on the matter recommending Europe focus on energy poverty indicators, analysis of energy poverty, considering an energy solidarity fund, analyzing member states' energy policy in economic terms, and a consumer energy information campaign. In 2016, it was reported how several million people in Spain live in conditions of energy poverty. These conditions have led to a few deaths and public anger at the electricity suppliers' artificial and "absurd pricing structure" to increase their profits. In 2017, poor households of Cyprus were found to live in low indoor thermal quality, i.e. their average indoor air temperatures were outside the accepted limits of the comfort zone for the island, and their heating energy consumption was found to be lower than the country's average for the clusters characterized by high and partial deprivation. This is because low income households cannot afford to use the required energy to achieve and maintain the indoor thermal requirements.

Global Environmental Facility

"In 1991, the World Bank Group, international financial institution that provides loans to developing countries for capital programs, established the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) to address global environmental issues in partnership with international institutions, private sector, etc., especially by providing funds to developing countries’ all kinds of projects. The GEF provides grants to developing countries and countries with economies in transition for projects related to biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land degradation, the ozone layer, and persistent organic pollutants. These projects benefit the global environment, linking local, national, and global environmental challenges and promoting sustainable livelihoods. GEF has allocated $10 billion, supplemented by more than $47 billion in cofinancing, for more than 2,800 projects in more than 168 developing countries and countries with economies in transition. Through its Small Grants Programme (SGP), the GEF has also made more than 13,000 small grants directly to civil society and community-based organizations, totalling $634 million. The GEF partnership includes 10 agencies: the UN Development Programme; the UN Environment Programme; the World Bank; the UN Food and Agriculture Organization; the UN Industrial Development Organization; the African Development Bank; the Asian Development Bank; the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; the Inter-American Development Bank; and the International Fund for Agricultural Development. The Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel provides technical and scientific advice on the GEF's policies and projects."

Climate Investment Funds

"The Climate Investment Funds (CIF) comprises two Trust Funds, each with a specific scope and objective and its own governance structure: the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF). The CTF promotes investments to initiate a shift towards clean technologies. The CTF seeks to fill a gap in the international architecture for development finance available at more concessional rates than standard terms used by the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and at a scale necessary to help provide incentives to developing countries to integrate nationally appropriate mitigation actions into sustainable development plans and investment decisions. The SCF serves as an overarching fund to support targeted programs with dedicated funding to pilot new approaches with potential for scaled-up, transformational action aimed at a specific climate change challenge or sectoral response. One of SCF target programs is the Program for Scaling-Up Renewable Energy in Low Income Countries (SREP), approved in May 2009, and is aimed at demonstrating the economic, social and environmental viability of low carbon development pathways in the energy sector by creating new economic opportunities and increasing energy access through the use of renewable energy."

Pentaquark

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pentaquark

Two models of a generic pentaquark
A five-quark "bag"
A "meson-baryon molecule"
A q indicates a quark and a q an antiquark. Gluons (wavy lines) mediate strong interactions between quarks. Red, green, and blue colour charges must each be present, while the remaining quark and antiquark must share a colour and its anticolour, in this example blue and antiblue (shown as yellow).

A pentaquark is a human-made subatomic particle, consisting of four quarks and one antiquark bound together; they are not known to occur naturally, or exist outside of experiments specifically carried out to create them.

As quarks have a baryon number of ++1/3, and antiquarks of +1/3, the pentaquark would have a total baryon number of 1, and thus would be a baryon. Further, because it has five quarks instead of the usual three found in regular baryons (a.k.a. 'triquarks'), it is classified as an exotic baryon. The name pentaquark was coined by Claude Gignoux et al. (1987) and Harry J. Lipkin in 1987; however, the possibility of five-quark particles was identified as early as 1964 when Murray Gell-Mann first postulated the existence of quarks. Although predicted for decades, pentaquarks proved surprisingly difficult to discover and some physicists were beginning to suspect that an unknown law of nature prevented their production.

The first claim of pentaquark discovery was recorded at LEPS in Japan in 2003, and several experiments in the mid-2000s also reported discoveries of other pentaquark states. However, other researchers were not able to replicate the LEPS results, and the other pentaquark discoveries were not accepted because of poor data and statistical analysis. On 13 July 2015, the LHCb collaboration at CERN reported results consistent with pentaquark states in the decay of bottom Lambda baryons (Λ0
b
). On 26 March 2019, the LHCb collaboration announced the discovery of a new pentaquark that had not been previously observed. On 5 July 2022, the LHCb collaboration announced the discovery of the PΛ
ψs
(4338)0
pentaquark.

Outside of particle research laboratories, pentaquarks might be produced naturally in the processes that result in the formation of neutron stars.

Background

A quark is a type of elementary particle that has mass, electric charge, and colour charge, as well as an additional property called flavour, which describes what type of quark it is (up, down, strange, charm, top, or bottom). Due to an effect known as colour confinement, quarks are never seen on their own. Instead, they form composite particles known as hadrons so that their colour charges cancel out. Hadrons made of one quark and one antiquark are known as mesons, while those made of three quarks are known as baryons. These 'regular' hadrons are well documented and characterized; however, there is nothing in theory to prevent quarks from forming 'exotic' hadrons such as tetraquarks with two quarks and two antiquarks, or pentaquarks with four quarks and one antiquark.

Structure

five circles arranged clockwise: blue circle marked "c", yellow (antiblue) circle marked "c" with an overscore, green circle marked "u", blue circle marked "d", and red circle marked "u".
A diagram of the P+
c
type pentaquark possibly discovered in July 2015, showing the flavours of each quark and one possible colour configuration.

A wide variety of pentaquarks are possible, with different quark combinations producing different particles. To identify which quarks compose a given pentaquark, physicists use the notation qqqqq, where q and q respectively refer to any of the six flavours of quarks and antiquarks. The symbols u, d, s, c, b, and t stand for the up, down, strange, charm, bottom, and top quarks respectively, with the symbols of u, d, s, c, b, t corresponding to the respective antiquarks. For instance a pentaquark made of two up quarks, one down quark, one charm quark, and one charm antiquark would be denoted uudcc.

The quarks are bound together by the strong force, which acts in such a way as to cancel the colour charges within the particle. In a meson, this means a quark is partnered with an antiquark with an opposite colour charge – blue and antiblue, for example – while in a baryon, the three quarks have between them all three colour charges – red, blue, and green. In a pentaquark, the colours also need to cancel out, and the only feasible combination is to have one quark with one colour (e.g. red), one quark with a second colour (e.g. green), two quarks with the third colour (e.g. blue), and one antiquark to counteract the surplus colour (e.g. antiblue).

The binding mechanism for pentaquarks is not yet clear. They may consist of five quarks tightly bound together, but it is also possible that they are more loosely bound and consist of a three-quark baryon and a two-quark meson interacting relatively weakly with each other via pion exchange (the same force that binds atomic nuclei) in a "meson-baryon molecule".

History

Mid-2000s

The requirement to include an antiquark means that many classes of pentaquark are hard to identify experimentally – if the flavour of the antiquark matches the flavour of any other quark in the quintuplet, it will cancel out and the particle will resemble its three-quark hadron cousin. For this reason, early pentaquark searches looked for particles where the antiquark did not cancel. In the mid-2000s, several experiments claimed to reveal pentaquark states. In particular, a resonance with a mass of 1540 MeV/c2 (4.6 σ) was reported by LEPS in 2003, the
Θ+
. This coincided with a pentaquark state with a mass of 1530 MeV/c2 predicted in 1997.

The proposed state was composed of two up quarks, two down quarks, and one strange antiquark (uudds). Following this announcement, nine other independent experiments reported seeing narrow peaks from
n

K+
and
p

K0
, with masses between 1522 MeV/c2 and 1555 MeV/c2, all above 4 σ. While concerns existed about the validity of these states, the Particle Data Group gave the
Θ+
a 3-star rating (out of 4) in the 2004 Review of Particle Physics. Two other pentaquark states were reported albeit with low statistical significance—the
Φ−−
(ddssu), with a mass of 1860 MeV/c2 and the
Θ0
c
(uuddc), with a mass of 3099 MeV/c2. Both were later found to be statistical effects rather than true resonances.

Ten experiments then looked for the
Θ+
, but came out empty-handed. Two in particular (one at BELLE, and the other at CLAS) had nearly the same conditions as other experiments which claimed to have detected the
Θ+
(DIANA and SAPHIR respectively). The 2006 Review of Particle Physics concluded:

[T]here has not been a high-statistics confirmation of any of the original experiments that claimed to see the
Θ+
; there have been two high-statistics repeats from Jefferson Lab that have clearly shown the original positive claims in those two cases to be wrong; there have been a number of other high-statistics experiments, none of which have found any evidence for the
Θ+
; and all attempts to confirm the two other claimed pentaquark states have led to negative results. The conclusion that pentaquarks in general, and the
Θ+
, in particular, do not exist, appears compelling.

The 2008 Review of Particle Physics went even further:

There are two or three recent experiments that find weak evidence for signals near the nominal masses, but there is simply no point in tabulating them in view of the overwhelming evidence that the claimed pentaquarks do not exist... The whole story—the discoveries themselves, the tidal wave of papers by theorists and phenomenologists that followed, and the eventual "undiscovery"—is a curious episode in the history of science.

Despite these null results, LEPS results continued to show the existence of a narrow state with a mass of 1524±MeV/c2, with a statistical significance of 5.1 σ.

However this 'discovery' was later revealed to be due to flawed methodology (https://www.osti.gov/biblio/21513283-critical-view-claimed-theta-sup-pentaquark).

2015 LHCb results

Feynman diagram representing the decay of a lambda baryon Λ0
b
into a kaon K
and a pentaquark P+
c
.

In July 2015, the LHCb collaboration at CERN identified pentaquarks in the Λ0
b
→J/ψK
p
channel, which represents the decay of the bottom lambda baryon 0
b
)
into a J/ψ meson (J/ψ), a kaon (K
)
and a proton (p). The results showed that sometimes, instead of decaying via intermediate lambda states, the Λ0
b
decayed via intermediate pentaquark states. The two states, named P+
c
(4380)
and P+
c
(4450)
, had individual statistical significances of 9 σ and 12 σ, respectively, and a combined significance of 15 σ – enough to claim a formal discovery. The analysis ruled out the possibility that the effect was caused by conventional particles. The two pentaquark states were both observed decaying strongly to J/ψp, hence must have a valence quark content of two up quarks, a down quark, a charm quark, and an anti-charm quark (
u

u

d

c

c
), making them charmonium-pentaquarks.

The search for pentaquarks was not an objective of the LHCb experiment (which is primarily designed to investigate matter-antimatter asymmetry) and the apparent discovery of pentaquarks was described as an "accident" and "something we've stumbled across" by the Physics Coordinator for the experiment.

Studies of pentaquarks in other experiments

A fit to the J/ψp invariant mass spectrum for the Λ0
b
→J/ψK
p
decay, with each fit component shown individually. The contribution of the pentaquarks are shown by hatched histograms.

The production of pentaquarks from electroweak decays of Λ0
b
baryons has extremely small cross-section and yields very limited information about internal structure of pentaquarks. For this reason, there are several ongoing and proposed initiatives to study pentaquark production in other channels.

It is expected that pentaquarks will be studied in electron-proton collisions in hall B E2-16-007 and hall C E12-12-001A experiments at JLab. The major challenge in these studies is a heavy mass of the pentaquark, which will be produced at the tail of photon-proton spectrum in JLab kinematics. For this reason, the currently unknown branching fractions of pentaquark should be sufficiently large to allow pentaquark detection in JLab kinematics. The proposed Electron Ion Collider which has higher energies is much better suited for this problem.

An interesting channel to study pentaquarks in proton-nuclear collisions was suggested by Schmidt & Siddikov (2016). This process has a large cross-section due to lack of electroweak intermediaries and gives access to pentaquark wave function. In the fixed-target experiments pentaquarks will be produced with small rapidities in laboratory frame and will be easily detected. Besides, if there are neutral pentaquarks, as suggested in several models based on flavour symmetry, these might be also produced in this mechanism. This process might be studied at future high-luminosity experiments like After@LHC and NICA.

2019 LHCb results

On 26 March 2019, the LHCb collaboration announced the discovery of a new pentaquark, based on observations that passed the 5-sigma threshold, using a dataset that was many times larger than the 2015 dataset.

Designated Pc(4312)+ (Pc+ identifies a charmonium-pentaquark while the number between parenthesis indicates a mass of about 4312 MeV), the pentaquark decays to a proton and a J/ψ meson. The analyses revealed additionally that the earlier reported observations of the Pc(4450)+ pentaquark actually were the average of two different resonances, designated Pc(4440)+ and Pc(4457)+. Understanding this will require further study.

Applications

Colour flux tubes produced by five static quark and antiquark charges, computed in lattice QCD. Confinement in quantum chromodynamics leads to the production of flux tubes connecting colour charges. The flux tubes act as attractive QCD string-like potentials.

The discovery of pentaquarks will allow physicists to study the strong force in greater detail and aid understanding of quantum chromodynamics. In addition, current theories suggest that some very large stars produce pentaquarks as they collapse. The study of pentaquarks might help shed light on the physics of neutron stars.

White demographic decline

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

White demographic decline is a decrease in the White populace as a percentage of the total population in a city, state, subregion, or nation. It has been recorded in a number of countries and smaller jurisdictions. For example, according to their national censuses, White Americans, White Canadians, White Brazilians, and White people in the United Kingdom are in demographic decline in the United States, Canada, Brazil, and United Kingdom, respectively.

Scholars have attempted to address subfactors and anticipated results of White demographic decline in relevant societies. The term majority minority has been used to designate an area where a decline, of what are nationally defined as Whites, has resulted in a former majority becoming a minority. Examples of this include parts of the United States and Brazil. Other notable concepts include demographer Eric Kaufmann's theory of "Whiteshift", which predicts transforming classifications of Whiteness as mixed-race majorities emerge, and social psychologist Jennifer Richeson's research into racial shift conditions, which outline how White people's hostility to other racial groups increases in proportion to their awareness of a drop in White population share.

Experts in extremism and terrorism have shown national demography in relation to white people to be subject to exploitation by both radical and political right-wing groups, including adherence to conspiracy theories. This has also manifested as anti-abortion, and anti-immigrant sentiment despite academic evidence that immigration significantly contributes to the maintenance of economies, civic institutions, and population-levels of places affected by White demographic decline, such as in the Southern United States.

Overview

Definition

White demographic decline has been statistically observed by academics in relation to countries which conduct a national census and include a white racial or ethnic category. Notable experts and scholars of a multitude of fields of study have observed the demographic phenomenon of falling white demography. These include anthropologists Leo Chavez, Arizona State University's Luis Plascencia, Rich Benjamin, and University of Louisville's Steven Gardiner. Demographers such as William H. Frey, Eric Kaufmann, Rogelio Sáenz, Dudley L. Poston Jr., Ann Morning, and David Coleman.

Social geographers such as Loughborough University's Marco Antonsich, and Syracuse University's Jamie Winders, and political scientists Elliot Jager, and Robert Pape, have studied white demographic decline as a measurable and observable process. Historians Trevor Burnard, and Mark Sedgwick have published works defining the demographic process in various jurisdictions. While they suggest that the white population share is falling in the United States, sociologist Richard Alba and demographer Dowell Myers have stated that this decline is divisive and exaggerated somewhat by the census format. Nonetheless, many academics, such as Nicholas Lemann, suggest the decline will affect national election results in the US.

Demography in national censuses

Various national demographic analyses measured a demographic decline of white populations, as defined by their local nation-based censuses. Research conducted at the University of Minnesota has observed the phenomenon of a decrease in white population share within jurisdictions in Europe, North America and Oceania:

According to the most recent U.S. census, the non-Hispanic White population is shrinking (US Census Bureau, 2018). This trend has been observed in other White-majority countries including Canada (Statistics Canada, 2017), the UK (Coleman, 2016), and New Zealand (Stats New Zealand, 2004).

Regarding white populations internationally, and particularly in the Western world, demographer Eric Kaufmann has suggested that "In an era of unprecedented white demographic decline it is absolutely vital for it to have a democratic outlet." While sociologist Richard Alba believes this decline is exaggerated by the racial classification system used in the United States Census, regarding the 2020 census, demographer William H. Frey has written:

The Census Bureau was not projecting white population losses to occur until after 2024. This makes any national population growth even more reliant on other race and ethnic groups. The white demographic decline is largely attributable to its older age structure when compared to other race and ethnic groups. This leads to fewer births and more deaths relative to its population size.

Statistical terms

Majority minority

As well as referencing ethno-cultural, linguistic, and religious demography, the term 'majority minority' has consistently been used in racial contexts in media and academia, and specifically to identify the demographic decline of white populations. In 2010, it was reported by the BBC how "America's two largest states - California and Texas - became "majority-minority" states (with an overall minority population outnumbering the white majority)" between 1998 and 2004.

Demographers Rogelio Sáenz and Dudley L. Poston Jr. have studied existing states which have gained white minorities in the 21st century, and how, from 2017 onwards, an ongoing falling white population-share predicts further US states to follow this trend: "nonwhites account for more than half of the populations of Hawaii, the District of Columbia, California, New Mexico, Texas and Nevada. In the next 10 to 15 years, these half-dozen 'majority-minority' states will likely be joined by as many as eight other states where whites now make up less than 60 percent of the population." From their research, Sáenz and Poston Jr expect the United States to have progressed to overall white minority demography by 2044. Regarding various projected majority minority scenarios across the Western world, in a 2018 article for the London School of Economics, academics Eric Kaufmann and Matthew Goodwin wrote:

The ethnic make-up of many western countries is changing, and in countries previously seen as having 'white' majorities that past predominance is declining. In the United States, Canada and New Zealand, the 'majority-minority' point will arrive around 2050, while in western Europe it is projected to occur towards the end of the century. Some commentators have asked if this change may lead to a growing reaction or 'white backlash'. All else being equal, we suggest that the answer may be yes.

An example from the developing world includes Brazil which, due to a long-term demographic decline of white Brazilians, has been designated as a majority-minority country in relation to the South American nation's racial classification of whiteness.

Racial shift condition

In their widely cited research, professors Jennifer Richeson and Maureen Craig produced a 2014 study on white racial shift conditions. White people who were informed of their diminishing demographic share of the population displayed more racial hostility to perceived external racial groups. Pacific Standard described the research as how "the coming racial shift evokes higher levels of both explicit and implicit racism on the part of white Americans". In analysis of the study, sociologist Mary C. Waters concurred that the portrayal in media of falling white demography was linked with subsequent discrimination against non-whites.

Whiteshift

Demographer Eric Kaufmann's theory of whiteshift predicts that as white demographic decline gradually results in white majorities becoming minorities (sometimes called a majority minority scenario) that a broader and more inclusive classification of white people will occur. A professor of politics at Birkbeck College, he suggests that, given the appropriate societal conditions, both conservatives and cosmopolitans may be able to observe whiteshift as a positive factor. In this regard, political analyst Michael Barone believes there may be "cautious optimism" that the social phenomenon can progress in a politically stable form.

Analysing Kaufmann's thesis, historian Michael Burleigh has used examples of whiteshift such as Western politicians Iain Duncan Smith, Geert Wilders and Ted Cruz, who have some degree of what might be considered non-white or ethnic minority ancestry in their respective countries. Demographer Dowell Myers has also referenced Cruz and Megan Markle as examples, claiming that "whites are indeed in numerical decline" in the United States, when judged upon a criterion of exclusively European ancestry.

Demography by regions

Europe

United Kingdom

White British proportion of the population from 2001 to 2011

In 2013, Demos published research analyzing the 2011 United Kingdom census. The UK-based think tank detailed how "departing White British are replaced by immigration or by the natural growth of the minority population. Over time, the end result of this process is a spiral of White British demographic decline".

Academic David Coleman has produced research which demonstrates that the cities of Leicester and Birmingham will join London in their majority minority status during the 2020s, with regards to the demographic decline of White people in Britain. Coleman, a University of Oxford demography professor since 1980, estimates that by 2056, the trend of a declining share of the white populace will result in the United Kingdom having an overall white minority.

North America

Canada

White/European Canadians from 2001 to 2016

In 2018, scholars Eric Kaufmann and Matthew Goodwin wrote that the demographic process would result in White Canadians being in the minority by around 2050.

United States

White Americans of one race (or alone) from 1960 to 2020

While under 18 non-Hispanic White Americans in the US. are already a minority as of 2020, it is projected that non-Hispanic Whites overall will become a minority within the US by 2045.

Political impact

The political right has been reported to be most inclined to reference white demographic decline in a political context, with 2022 communication-research outlining how fears of white-related demography are often weaponised. Max Hui Bai, a scholar working within Stanford University's Polarization and Social Change Lab, has explored "how people react to the numerical decline of white populations" across the Western world.

Sociologist and demographer Ann Morning has suggested that representations of female multiraciality have been used in media to show evidence of "racial progress" and "bridging racial divides", while also providing a function which "serves to soften the blow of White demographic decline". Professor Trevor Burnard has discussed how "white demographic decline" occurred in the population of the colony of Jamaica between 1655 and 1780, stating that his research "presents hard data on white mortality in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Jamaica" and its political implications. In modern times, journalist Sabrina Tavernise has reported that since the 2020 US Census, regarding white demography, social scientists have pointed out that the "declining share of white people as a part of the population has become a part of American politics — as a worry on the right and a cause for optimism on the left."

Africa

South Africa

Scholars Hermann Giliomee and Lawrence Schlemmer have credited, among other factors, international pressure on the apartheid government and "a white demographic decline" for facilitating the process of negotiations to end apartheid in South Africa.

Europe

Adela Fofiu of Babeș-Bolyai University has noted how right-wing organizations and outlets in Romania politicize white demographic decline, attempting to associate it with concepts such as the "Islamization of Europe" or "Gypsifcation" of the country, the latter of which refers to the Romani people in Romania. In 2018 analysis, the Southern Poverty Law Center explored how right-wing extremism in Europe attempts to utilize the continents demographic decline and the rise of immigration from Arab and or Middle Eastern countries for political gain. A professor at Loughborough University, Marco Antonsich's research in Italy suggests that "demographic change and the decline of white majorities" provides space for immigrant communities to" justify their national belonging and to rewrite the nation".

United Kingdom

In 2018, Eric Kaufmann wrote a piece for the New Statesman on the demographic decline of White British people within the United Kingdom, stating that "Three-quarters of people in Britain in 2150 will, like myself, be mixed-race." and highlighted political consequences of such a transformation taking place:

When whites can't express their sense of ethnic loss, they turn to the seemingly more "respectable" alternatives of demonising Muslims, criticising immigrants who live in minority neighbourhoods, or voting for Brexit (a result of diverting concerns over ethnic change into hatred of the acceptably "white" EU). Few things have contributed more to today's populist blowback than the demographic blind spot in Western political thought.

In 2020, Nick Timothy, a former Downing Street Chief of Staff, addressed societal consequences of the ongoing demographic decline of white people in the United Kingdom:

This is a difficult issue to understand and address, but the anxiety is real. White people are as attached to their ethnic and cultural identity as any other group and, faced with the reality of rapid demographic decline, many feel a sense of loss.

North America

Canada

Writing in 2019, journalist Margaret Wente has suggested that "nations upended by right-wing populism all have one thing in common. They are all facing white demographic decline. And that is the breeding ground for populist revolts." Wente argues that with significant projected decline of the white share of the population in Canada, the country will have to address reactionary populist politics.

United States

In 1998 research, Fordham University professor Tanya K. Hernandez outlined the potential for multiracial Americans to have their representative US census category "co-opted by the larger society as a mechanism for constructing a buffer class to maintain White privilege, in the midst of a growing concern with the demographic decline of White U.S. residents". Samuel P. Huntington's 2004 book Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity addressed the emerging population change in the United States. In an analysis on Huntington's treatise, political demographer Eric Kaufmann wrote:

Finally, Huntington considers the possibility of a white nationalist response to the changes taking place. He says that white nativism is a "plausible" response to white demographic decline, the cosmopolitan defection of the white elite and the fading power of the Anglo-Protestant core.

By 2010, the Southern Poverty Law Center's 1,000 organizations listed within their "hate" and "nativist" archives predominantly involved politics referencing white demography. Arizona State University anthropologist Luis Plascencia wrote that "a common thread in many of these groups is the concern with the demographic decline of 'white' individuals". In 2009, Stanford University professor Eamonn Callan observed that:

The slow but inexorable demographic decline of white Americans to the status of one minority among others has begun to register in popular consciousness, making it harder for anyone to suppose that American identity could still be white identity.

In the mid-2010s, white people's demographic decline became increasing associated with politics in relation to the 2016 presidential election. Donald Trump's policy positions and rhetoric were seen by some scholars as giving an outlet to anxiety based upon this changing white demography. Journalist Christopher Caldwell argued that perceived cultural celebration of the process had contributed to the political energies supporting candidate Trump. Caldwell wrote that "At the same time, white demographic decline has been accompanied in many quarters with official exultation. The promise is not to enrich white America with new ethnicities but to replace it." Research has predicted a rise in rhetoric regarding issues such as protectionism among white Americans, and particularly white evangelicals, in proportion with the ongoing percentage-share reduction of whites. This demographic decline has also been utilized by extremist commentators, such as explicit supporters of the "alt-right" or white supremacist movements.

In this regard, research in historian Mark Sedgwick's Key Thinkers of the Radical Right indicated that elements of the extremist right-wing believed that Trump's proposed policies, such as the Trump travel ban or the wall, would "slow white demographic decline". Similarly, Aurora University professor Faith Agostinone-Wilson's On the Question of Truth in the Era of Trump describes these types of political aspirations as "an Americanized version of salvation, where White demographic decline is halted and the country is purged of the Other". Anthropologist Rich Benjamin has suggested that the "Trump administration has aimed its rhetoric at a slice of aggrieved white Americans who are panicked about their demographic decline", while political scientist Elliot Jager has written:

Trump directs his appeal at disenfranchised working-class Americans by telling them that he'll "make America great again", intimating that he'll reverse the demographic decline of whites by "humanely" deporting 11 million mostly Hispanic, illegal aliens; will protect the homeland by banning Muslims from entering, and will build an impenetrable barrier on the Mexican border.

After the inauguration of President Trump, a March 2017 New Republic article examined Chief Strategist Steve Bannon's advocacy for the 1973 book The Camp of the Saints, which it described as "an explicitly racist novel, saturated in deep fear at the prospect of white demographic decline".

In the 2020s, study of American politics increasingly factored in the demographic reduction in analysing the Republican Party's electoral success and future strategy. For example, in analysis of the 2020 presidential election results, University of Melbourne professor Timothy J. Lynch suggests "white demographic decline need not spell disaster for the GOP. Despite his dog-whistle racism, Trump performed better than expected among Black voters." In relation to the party's future direction, UCLA's political scientist Gary Segura notes that "Republicans nationally receive 85 percent of their votes from white voters by capturing between 55 and 60 percent of their ballots in each election", adding that "with the demographic decline of white voters, even 60 percent of that cohort will be a poor start when it comprises just two-thirds of the electorate in 2024". Professor Nicholas Lemann also argues that high motivation and corresponding turnout from the Republican Party's supporter base would be required to offset the ongoing demographic decline of whites by the 2024 election.

Interviewed by Jeffrey Goldberg in 2020, the director of the documentary film White Noise proposed that the decline of whites had become the most significant driving force in the politics of the US. Daniel Lombroso stated "There is a deep-seated fear of white demographic decline in this country, and obviously in Europe. And I think that is now the defining fault line in American politics". Brittany Farr, a Sharswood Fellow at Penn Law, suggests that reporting on US Census results (regarding falling white demography) by journalistic outlets, such as the New York Times and Wall Street Journal, are communicating "a sense of inevitability with respect to white demographic decline".

Academic study on reactions

In the United States, responses to the demographic decline of white people have been studied with regard to its affect on the political ideologies of white populations, including recording individual reactions to specific issues, such as welfare, terrorism or ethnic group preference. Sociologists Bart Bonikowski and Yueran Zhang note that:

One major source of perceived racial threat is demographic change. Experimental studies have shown that when exposed to information about white demographic decline or increased racial diversity, white respondents express more negative attitudes towards other racial groups (Craig and Richeson 2014b; Enos 2014; Outten et al. 2012)

A March 2020 research article found that whites in the US were more likely to expand classification of whiteness to include white Latin Americans "when their privileged social status is threatened, for example, by the prospect of numeric decline". July 2020 research showed that white Americans who are informed of the projected minority status of whites in the United States are more likely to support the torture of terrorist suspects.

2021 United States Capitol attack

In 2021, political scientist Robert Pape identified that of the 716 people charged or arrested for storming the Capitol Building in Washington, D.C., they had travelled predominantly "from counties where the white share of the population is declining fastest". In the aftermath of the attack, Tech Against Terrorism published evidence that white demographic decline was being used as a statistical example by the far right to radicalize Trump supporters.

Extremist exploitation of demography

Anti-abortion movement

In Katha Pollitt's 2015 book Pro, the essayist links anxiety with the demographic trend of whites and correlating support for the anti-abortion movement. Hampshire College professor Marlene Fried's research suggests Pollitt exposed the "underlying agenda of the antiabortion movement", recognizing that it was associated with white demographic decline and its subsequent effects on sections of the populace.

Anti-immigration politics

University of Louisville's anthropology professor Steven Gardiner has proposed how:

The decline in white fertility, however, is only a small part of the story. The narrative of white demographic decline is being written, primarily, in the language of immigration. It is only since Congress passed the Immigration and Naturalization Act Amendments of 1965 that American racial and ethnic demographics have taken the turn sketched above (Office of Immigration Statistics 2004, 5). Passed during the Johnson Administration, during the height of the Civil Rights era, the 1965 Act repealed the most blatantly racist aspects of the Immigration Act of 1924. It abolished the national origins quotas which had, quite intentionally, limited non-white and non-European immigration to the United States.

Based on the effect of immigration on white demography, academic Jamie Winders has written how anti-immigrant sentiment is "grounded more in rhetoric than logic and often operates outside the boundaries of what actual research shows." Winders, a professor of geography at Syracuse University, notes that, for example: "In rural communities in the South, immigration often keeps smaller towns afloat, maintaining local schools, populations, and economies in the face of white demographic decline." In 2020, research from University of Guadalajara's Alejandro Canales confirmed similar findings in the southern US. Canales, an expert on migration and population, wrote:

The current case of California, Texas, Florida, Arizona, New Mexico and Nevada are a clear indication of what we are affirming. In all of these states the traditional demographic supremacy of non-Hispanic white people practically has been diluted by the influence of Mexican and Latin-American immigration.

Conspiracy theories

Scholars have studied how the demographic decline of white people, as well as its portrayal within different types of media, have contributed towards adherence to racist and disproven conspiracy theories. Harvard University fellow José Pedro Zúquete has observed that:

For many years in the American extreme right subculture a putative Jewish conspiracy - reified by the notion of ZOG or Zionist Occupation Government - was often invoked to explain the demographic decline of whites in America.

In 2019, scholar Monica Toft expanded on the emergence of nativist politics and conspiracy theory advocacy in relation to the demographic phenomenon, stating that "The 'why now' of white nativism is due to decades of demographic decline for white Americans combined with a serious decline in public education standards that leads to unwarranted nostalgia and openness to conspiracy theories." Academic Robert Pape has suggested that one of the conspiracy theories which weaponizes falling white population-share is The Great Replacement.

Terrorism

The Combating Terrorism Center, which is an academic institution within the United States Military Academy, has published research which recognizes anxiety regarding white demographic decline as an ongoing contributing motivation to terrorism in the Western world. An example of this was observed in the Christchurch mosque attacks in New Zealand. Mark Durie argues that the Christchurch terrorist intended to frame the demographic decline of white people as a "crisis" which would "incite conflict so that whites will be compelled to awaken, radicalise and grow strong." Durie, a linguistics and theology scholar, wrote: "We need to understand this ideology, not to give it a platform, but to learn and to equip ourselves to stand against such hatred." In August 2019, a man arrested for threatening to attack people at a Jewish community center in Ohio had been found to have appeared in a documentary speaking about white demographic decline in the United States and Europe.

Education

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education Education is the transmissio...