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Wednesday, November 30, 2022

United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada
  • United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (American English)
  • Canada–United States–Mexico Agreement (Canadian English)
  • Tratado entre México, Estados Unidos y Canadá (T-MEC) (Spanish)
  • Accord Canada–États-Unis–Mexique (ACEUM) (French)
North American Agreement (orthographic projection).svg
TypeFree trade agreement
Drafted30 September 2018
Signed30 November 2018
10 December 2019
(revised version)
LocationMexico City, Mexico
Effective1 July 2020
Condition3 months after notification of each state that all internal procedures have been completed
ExpirationUpon end of 16-year term (renewable)
Ratifiers
Languages

The Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada (USMCA) is a free trade agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the United States. It replaced the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) implemented in 1994, and is sometimes characterized as "NAFTA 2.0", or "New NAFTA", since it largely maintains or updates the provisions of its predecessor. USMCA created one of the world's largest free trade zones, spanning roughly 500 million people and totaling over $26 trillion in GDP (PPP).

USMCA resulted from renegotiations between the NAFTA member states beginning in 2017; characterized as "tumultuous", these centered primarily on "auto exports, steel and aluminum tariffs, and the dairy, egg, and poultry markets". All sides came to a formal agreement on October 1, 2018, and U.S. President Donald Trump proposed USMCA during the G20 Summit the following month, where it was signed by himself, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto, and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. A revised version reflecting additional consultations was signed on December 10, 2019 and ratified by all three countries, with Canada being the last to ratify on March 13, 2020. Following notification by all three governments that the provisions were ready for domestic implementation, the agreement came into effect on July 1, 2020.

USMCA is primarily a modernization of the 25-year-old NAFTA, namely with respect to intellectual property and digital trade, and borrows language from the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), of which Canada and Mexico are signatories. Key changes from its predecessor include increased environmental and working regulations; greater incentives for automobile production in the U.S. (with quotas for Canadian and Mexican automotive production); more access to Canada's dairy market; and an increased duty-free limit for Canadians who buy U.S. goods online.

Background and nomenclature

The United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement is based substantially on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which came into effect on January 1, 1994. The present agreement was the result of more than a year of negotiations including possible tariffs by the United States against Canada in addition to the possibility of separate bilateral deals instead.

During the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Donald Trump's campaign included the promise to renegotiate NAFTA, or cancel it if re-negotiations were to fail. Upon election, Trump proceeded to make a number of changes affecting trade relations with other countries. Withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, ceasing to be part of negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and significantly increasing tariffs with China were some of the steps he implemented, reinforcing that he was serious about seeking changes to NAFTA. Much of the debate surrounding the virtues and faults of the USMCA is similar to that surrounding all free trade agreements (FTAs), for instance, the nature of FTA's as public goods, potential infringements of national sovereignty, and the role of business, labor, environmental, and consumer interests in shaping the language of trade deals.

The agreement is referred to differently by each signatory—in the United States, it is called the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA); in Canada, it is officially known as the Canada–United States–Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) in English and the Accord Canada–États-Unis–Mexique (ACEUM) in French; and in Mexico, it is called Tratado entre México, Estados Unidos y Canadá (T-MEC). The agreement is sometimes referred to as "New NAFTA" in reference to the previous trilateral agreement it is meant to supersede, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Negotiations

A visualization of the timeline for the USMCA ratification process in the US, as prescribed by Trade Promotion Authority

The formal negotiation process began on May 18, 2017, when the US Trade Representative (USTR), Robert Lighthizer, notified Congress that he intended to renegotiate NAFTA starting in 90 days. In accordance with Trade Promotion Authority statutes, the USTR released its key negotiating objectives document on July 7, 2017. Negotiations began on August 16, 2017, and continued with eight formal rounds of talks until April 8, 2018. Lacking any resolution, Lighthizer stated on May 2, 2018, that if by the end of the month no deal was reached, negotiations would be halted until 2019. This statement was motivated by the pending change of government in Mexico, in which the then-incoming president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, disagreed with much of the negotiated language and might be unwilling to sign the deal.

Separately, on May 11, 2018, Speaker of the House Paul Ryan set May 17 as a deadline for Congressional action. This deadline was disregarded, and the deal with Mexico was not reached until August 27, 2018. At this time Canada had not agreed to the presented deal. Because Mexico's outgoing president, Enrique Peña Nieto, left office on December 1, 2018, and 60 days are required as a review period, the deadline for providing the agreed text was the end of September 30, 2018, which was reached precisely on September 30. Negotiators worked around the clock and completed the agreement less than an hour before midnight of that date on a draft text. The next day on October 1, 2018, the USMCA text was published as an agreed-to document. Lighthizer credited Jared Kushner with architecting the deal and rescuing it several times from collapse.

The agreed text of the agreement was signed by leaders of all three countries on November 30, 2018, as a side event to the 2018 G20 summit in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The English, the Spanish, and French versions will be equally authentic, and the agreement will take effect after ratification from all three states through the passage of enabling legislation.

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau greets U.S. Ambassador Kelly Craft in 2019.

U.S. Ambassador to Canada Kelly Craft played a leadership role in trade negotiations between the US and Canada, resulting in the signing of the new trade agreement. Her work in hammering out the tri-lateral agreement raised her stock with the Trump administration. It was later revealed in a memoir published by Stephen Schwarzman, the CEO and founder of American LBO specialist The Blackstone Group, that he had incited Justin Trudeau to concede the protected dairy market in the USMCA negotiations. According to Schwarzman, Trudeau feared that a recession would impact his government's prospects during the 2019 Canadian federal election. The executive, who had been retained by Trump, also was invited in January 2017 to address the Liberal Cabinet at a Calgary retreat when the Cabinet would be unprotected by its Privy Council Office civil servants. Then, as the negotiations reached their end come 1 October 2018, at a last-minute behind-the-scenes meeting at the United Nations in New York City, Trudeau sacrificed the dairy industry to save the media industry and the automotive exemption. Chrystia Freeland, the Foreign Affairs minister from Trinity-Spadina riding in downtown Toronto whose constituents include many staff of the CBC and The Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star and the Toronto Sun, maps "Canadian culture" directly onto the media industry. Robert Fife in an election cycle article failed to obtain any comment from other than the Liberal party.

Fox News reported on December 9, 2019, that negotiators from the three countries reached an agreement on enforcement, paving the way for a final deal within 24 hours and ratification by all three parties before the end of the year. Mexico agreed to the enforcement of a minimum wage of US$16/hour for Mexican automotive workers by a "neutral" third party. Mexico, which imports all of its aluminum, also expressed opposition to provisions regarding American steel and aluminum contents in automobile components.

Provisions

Provisions of the agreement cover a wide range, including agricultural produce, homelessness, manufactured products, labor conditions, digital trade, among others. Some of the more prominent aspects of the agreement include giving US dairy farmers greater access to the Canadian market, guidelines to have a higher proportion of automobiles manufactured amongst the three nations rather than imported from elsewhere, and retention of the dispute resolution system similar to that included in NAFTA.

Dairy

The dairy provisions give the U.S. tariff-free access to 3.6%, up from 3.25% under the never-ratified Trans-Pacific Partnership, of the $15.2 billion (as of 2016) Canadian dairy market. Canada agreed to eliminate Class 7 pricing provisions on certain dairy products, while Canada's domestic supply management system remains in place. Canada agreed to raise the duty-free limit on purchases from the U.S. to $150 from the previous $20 level, allowing Canadian consumers to have greater duty-free access to the U.S market.

Automobiles

Automobile rules of origin (ROO) requirements mandate that a certain portion of an automobile's value must come from within the governed region. In NAFTA, the required portion was 62.5 percent. The USMCA increases this requirement by 12.5 percentage points, to 75 percent of the automobile's value. The initial proposal from the Trump administration was an increase to 85 percent, and an added stipulation that 50 percent of the automotive content be made by United States auto manufacturers. While the deal's text did not include the more demanding version of this provision, there is concern that the increased domestic sourcing, aimed at promoting US employment, will come with higher input costs and disruptions to existing supply chains.

De Minimis

To facilitate greater cross-border trade, the United States has reached an agreement with Mexico and Canada to raise its de minimis shipment value levels. Canada will raise its de minimis level for the first time in decades, from C$20 (US$16) to C$40 (US$32) for taxes. Canada will also provide for duty-free shipments up to C$150 (US$120). Mexico will continue to provide US$50 tax-free de minimis and also provide duty-free shipments up to the equivalent level of US$117. Shipment values up to these levels would enter with minimal formal entry procedures, making it easier for more businesses, especially small- and medium-sized ones, to be a part of cross-border trade. Canada will also allow 90 days after entry for the importer to make payment of taxes.

Labor

US Vice President Mike Pence speaks about the USMCA at a Uline distribution center in Pleasant Prairie, Wisconsin in October 2019

USMCA Annex 23-A requires Mexico to pass legislation that improves the collective bargaining capabilities of labor unions. The specific standards Mexico is required to comply with are detailed in the International Labour Organization's Convention 98 on freedom of association and collective bargaining. The administration of Mexico's president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, introduced legislation in late 2018 which pursues compliance with these international standards.

Other labor-related measures include a minimum wage requirement in the automotive industry. Specifically, 40 to 45 percent of the automobiles manufactured in North America must be made in a factory that pays a minimum of $16 per hour. This measure will be phased in during the first five years after USMCA ratification.

Intellectual Property

The USMCA will extend the copyright length in Canada to life plus 70 years, and 75 years for sound recordings. This extension mirrors the same IP policy captured in the text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, paragraph 18.63. Furthermore, biotechnological firms would have at least 10 years exclusivity period for agricultural chemicals (double the current 5), and industrial designs' period would "jump" from current 10 to 15 years. Compared to NAFTA, USMCA would require criminal penalties and civil remedies be available for both satellite and cable theft, reaffirm the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, contain the strongest due process and transparency requirements for Geographic Indicator protection systems in any FTA, require criminal procedures and penalties for recording copyrighted movies in movie theaters, and require ex officio authority for customs officials to stop suspected counterfeit goods.

Pharmaceuticals

USMCA provides for a patent term extension where there is an “unreasonable curtailment” of a pharmaceutical's patent term stemming from delays in the regulatory or marketing approval process.

USMCA accounts for data exclusivity of new pharmaceutical products. New pharmaceutical products are those which do not contain a chemical entity that has been previously approved in that Party. Generic manufacturers are prohibited from relying on the innovator's previously undisclosed safety / efficacy testing for at least five years from the date marketing approval was first granted. Mexico agreed to extend its data protection of new pharmaceutical products. Canada's data protection regime already offered an eight-year exclusivity period for innovative drugs and thus was not required to make changes.

Initially, the parties contemplated creating an exclusivity period for new products containing biologics for at least ten years from the approval date. Biologics are defined as a product that is “produced using biotechnology processes and that is, or, alternatively, contains, a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, protein, or analogous product, for use in human beings for the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition.” This period would have been longer than the exclusivity periods of both Canada and Mexico, but shorter than that of the United States. This provision was heavily criticized for its potential to limit access to biologic medications and make them unaffordable. Thus, biologics were covered in the definition of “new pharmaceutical products” and are instead eligible for a minimum five-year protection period.

Elimination of Foreign Office and Local Presence requirements

The USMCA sunset clause would eliminate the need for companies to establish headquarters in any other USMCA country. It will encourage cross-border business by excluding US companies from the need to localize data, open a Canadian or Mexican HQ. For example, McDonald's Canada or Apple Canada could both cease to exist and the surviving entities would be a North American McDonald's or Apple.

Dispute Settlement Mechanisms

There are three primary dispute settlement mechanisms contained in NAFTA. Chapter 20 is the country-to-country resolution mechanism. It is often regarded as the least contentious of the three mechanisms, and it was sustained in its original NAFTA form in USMCA. Such cases would involve complaints between USMCA member states that a term of the agreement had been violated. Chapter 19 disputes manage the justifications of anti-dumping or countervailing duties. Without Chapter 19, the legal recourse for managing these policies would be through the domestic legal system. Chapter 19 specifies that a USMCA Panel will hear the case and act as an International Trade Court in arbitrating the dispute. The Trump administration attempted to remove Chapter 19 from the new USMCA text, though it has thus far endured in the agreement.

Chapter 11 is the third mechanism, known as investor-state dispute settlement, wherein multinational corporations are enabled to sue participating governments over allegedly discriminatory policies. Chapter 11 is broadly considered the most controversial of the settlement mechanisms. The Canadian negotiators effectively removed themselves from Chapter 11 in the USMCA version of this measure, Chapter 14. Canada will have a full exemption from ISDS three years after NAFTA has been terminated.

Beyond The Border Accord

In addition to building on the existing NAFTA fused with elements from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the USMCA also incorporates elements from the "Beyond the Border" accord signed by Prime Minister Stephen Harper and former president Barack Obama, most notably the "single window" initiative and folding the "Regulatory Cooperation Council" into the "Good Regulatory Governance" chapter 28 of the new accord.

Sunset clause

Additionally, there is a stipulation that the agreement itself must be reviewed by the three nations every six years, with a 16-year sunset clause. The agreement can be extended for additional 16-year terms during the six-year reviews. The introduction of the sunset clause places more control in shaping the future of the USMCA in the hands of domestic governments. However, there is concern that this can create greater uncertainty. Sectors such as automotive manufacturing require significant investment in cross-border supply chains. Given the dominance of the United States consumer market, this will likely pressure firms to locate more production in the US, with a greater likelihood of increased production costs for those vehicles.

Currency

A new addition in the USMCA is the inclusion of Chapter 33 which covers Macroeconomic Policies and Exchange Rate Matters. This is considered significant because it could set a precedent for future trade agreements. Chapter 33 establishes requirements for currency and macroeconomic transparency which, if violated, would constitute grounds for a Chapter 20 dispute appeal. The US, Canada, and Mexico are all currently in compliance with these transparency requirements in addition to the substantive policy requirements which align with the International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement.

Clause 32.10

The USMCA will impact how member countries negotiate future free trade deals. Article 32.10 requires USMCA countries to notify USMCA members three months in advance if they intend to begin free trade negotiations with non-market economies. Article 32.10 permits USMCA countries the ability to review any new free trade deals members agree to go forward. Article 32.10 is widely speculated to be targeting China in intent. In fact, a senior White House official said in connection to the USMCA deal that "We have been very concerned about the efforts of China to essentially undermine the US position by entering into arrangements with others."

Against exchange rate manipulation

The USMCA countries are to abide IMF standards aimed to prevent the manipulation of exchange rates. The agreement calls for public disclosure of market interventions. The IMF can be summoned to act as a referee if the parties dispute.

Against State-Owned Enterprises

State-owned enterprises, which are favored by China as levers for exercising its dominance, are prevented from receiving unfair subsidies when compared to private enterprise.

Status

Outgoing Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto, U.S. President Donald Trump, and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau sign the agreement during the G20 summit in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on November 30, 2018.

The USMCA was signed on November 30, 2018, by all three parties at the G20 summit in Buenos Aires, as had been planned the preceding months. However, continue disputes over labor rights, steel, and aluminum prevented ratification of this version of the agreement. Consequently, Canadian Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lightizer and Mexican Undersecretary for North America Jesus Seade formally signed a revised agreement on December 10, 2019, which was ratified by all three countries by March 13, 2020.

United States

United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Implementation Act
Great Seal of the United States
Long titleTo implement the Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada attached as an Annex to the Protocol Replacing the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Acronyms (colloquial)USMCA
Enacted bythe 116th United States Congress
Citations
Public lawPub.L. 116–113 (text) (PDF)
Legislative history

Domestic procedures for ratification of the agreement are governed by the Trade Promotion Authority legislation, otherwise known as "fast track" authority.

Growing objections within the member states about U.S. trade policy and various aspects of the USMCA affected the signing and ratification process. Mexico stated they would not sign the USMCA if steel and aluminum tariffs remained. There was speculation after the results of the November 6, 2018 U.S. midterm elections that the Democrats' increased power in the House of Representatives might interfere with the passage of the USMCA agreement. Senior Democrat Bill Pascrell argued for changes to the USMCA to enable it to pass Congress. Republicans opposed USMCA provisions requiring labor rights for LGBTQ and pregnant workers. Forty Congressional Republicans urged Trump against signing a deal that contained "the unprecedented inclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity language"; as a result, Trump ultimately signed a revised version that committed each nation only to "policies that it considers appropriate to protect workers against employment discrimination" and clarified that the United States would not be required to introduce any additional nondiscrimination laws. The Canadian government expressed concern about the changes evolving within the USMCA agreement.

On December 2, 2018, Trump announced he would begin the six-month process to withdraw from NAFTA, adding that Congress needed either to ratify the USMCA or else revert to pre-NAFTA trading rules. Academics had debated whether the president can unilaterally withdraw from the pact without Congressional approval.

On March 1, 2019, organizations representing the U.S. agricultural sector announced their support for the USMCA and urged Congress to ratify the agreement. They also urged the Trump administration to continue upholding NAFTA until the new trade agreement is ratified. However, on March 4, House Ways and Means Chairman Richard Neal predicted a "very hard" path through Congress for the deal. Starting March 7, senior White House officials met with House Ways and Means members, as well as moderate caucuses from both parties, such as the Problem Solvers Caucus, the Tuesday Group, and the Blue Dog Coalition in their efforts to gain support for ratification. The Trump administration has also backed down from the threat of withdrawing from NAFTA as the negotiations with Congress continued.

On May 30, USTR Lighthizer submitted to Congress a draft statement on administrative measures concerning the implementation of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA and the new NAFTA) in accordance with the Presidential Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Act 2015 (Statement of Administrative Action). The draft will allow USMCA implementation legislation to be submitted to Congress after 30 days, on or after June 29. In a letter sent to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Kevin McCarthy, the House Minority Leader, Republicans, Lighthizer said that the USMCA is the gold standard in U.S. trade policy, modernizing U.S. competitive digital trade, intellectual property, and services provisions and creating a level playing field for U.S. companies, workers and farmers, an agreement that represents a fundamental rebalancing of trade relations between Mexico and Canada.

With the draft statement on administrative measures submitted, Speaker Pelosi issued a statement, that U.S. Trade Representative Lighthizer should confirm that the draft wording of the USMCA would benefit U.S. workers and farmers and that although she agreed on the need to revise NAFTA, stricter enforcement of labor and environmental protection standards was needed.

Former U.S. President Donald Trump warned on 25 September that an impeachment inquiry against him could derail congressional approval of USMCA, dragging down Mexico's peso and stock market as investors fled riskier assets.

The U.S. House of Representatives was proceeding with work on USMCA, U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi said on 26 September.

Bloomberg News reported on October 29, 2019, that the Trump administration planned to include in the legislation approving the pact a provision that would allow the USTR to directly control how and where cars and parts are made by global automakers.

On December 19, 2019, the United States House of Representatives passed the USMCA with bipartisan support by a vote of 385 (Democratic 193, Republican 192) to 41 (Democratic 38, Republican 2, Independent 1). On January 16, 2020, the United States Senate passed the trade agreement by a vote of 89 (Democratic 38, Republican 51) to 10 (Democratic 8, Republican 1, Independent 1) and the bill was forwarded to the White House for Donald Trump's signature. On January 29, 2020, Trump signed the agreement into law (Public Law No: 116–113). It officially amended NAFTA but not the 1989 Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement which is only "suspended," so in case parties fail to extend or renew it in 6 years, FTA would become the law.

On April 24, 2020, Lighthizer gave official notice to Congress that the new trade deal is set to come to force on July 1, 2020, and notified Canada and Mexico to that effect. On June 1, 2020, the USTR released the "Uniform Regulations", which help interpret the different chapters of the USMCA, primarily chapters 4–7, paving the way for the Agreement to take effect domestically; NAFTA was consequently replaced the following month, on July 1, 2020.

Mexico

Treaty between Mexico, the United States and Canada
Coat of arms of Mexico.svg
Congress of the Union

  • Modifying Protocol to the Agreement between the United Mexican States, the United States of America, and Canada, an instrument that modifies the Protocol that replaces the North American Free Trade Agreement with the Agreement between the United Mexican States, the United States of America and Canada.
Enacted bySenate of the Republic
Passed12 December 2019 (107-1)
Legislative history
Bill published on10 December 2019
Introduced byFederal Executive Power
Status: In force

On November 27, 2018, the government of Mexico said it would give to Jared Kushner its highest civilian honor, the Order of the Aztec Eagle, for his work in negotiating the USMCA.

On June 19, 2019, the Senate of Mexico passed the treaty's ratification bill on first reading in a 114–4 vote, with three abstentions. The treaty was passed on its second and final reading by the Senate on December 12, 2019, by a vote of 107–1.

On April 3, 2020, Mexico announced it was ready to implement the agreement, joining Canada, though it requested that its automotive industry be given extra time to comply.

Manufacturing in Mexico accounts for 17% of GDP. However, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the Mexican president believes that this trade deal will be a net positive for the Mexican economy by growing foreign investments, creating jobs, and expanding trade.

Canada

Canada–United States–Mexico Agreement Implementation Act
Parliament-Ottawa.jpg
Parliament of Canada

  • An Act to implement the Agreement between Canada, the United States of America and the United Mexican States
Enacted byHouse of Commons
Passed13 March 2020
Enacted bySenate
Passed13 March 2020
Royal assent13 March 2020
Legislative history
First chamber: House of Commons
Bill titleC-4
Introduced byChrystia Freeland, Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs
Status: In force

On May 29, 2019, prime minister Justin Trudeau introduced a CUSMA implementation bill in the House of Commons. On June 20, it passed second reading in the House of Commons and was referred to the Standing Committee on International Trade.

Governor General of Canada Julie Payette declared the dissolution of the 42nd Canadian Parliament on September 11, 2019, and formally issued the writs of election for the 2019 Canadian federal election. All pending legislation is scrapped upon any dissolution of Parliament, meaning that the CUSMA implementation bill needed to be re-introduced in the 43rd Canadian Parliament which began on December 5, 2019.

On December 10, 2019, a revised CUSMA agreement was reached by the three countries. On January 29, 2020, deputy prime minister and Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs Chrystia Freeland introduced CUSMA implementation bill C-4 in the House of Commons and it passed first reading without a recorded vote. On February 6, the bill passed second reading in the House of Commons on a vote of 275 to 28, with the Bloc Québécois voting against and all other parties voting in favor, and it was referred to the Standing Committee on International Trade. On February 27, 2020, the committee voted to send the bill to the full House for third reading, without amendments.

On March 13, 2020, the House of Commons passed bill C-4 to implement CUSMA before suspending itself for 6 weeks due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Due to the "extraordinary circumstances", the third and final reading of the bill was deemed to be approved without a recorded vote, as part of an omnibus adjournment motion unanimously approved by all members present. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau was not present, since he was in self-isolation at home after his wife Sophie Grégoire Trudeau tested positive for COVID-19 infection. On the same day, the Senate passed first, second, and third readings of the bill without recorded votes, and Governor General Julie Payette granted it the Royal Assent and it became law, thus completing Canada's ratification of the legislation.

On April 3, 2020, Canada notified the United States and Mexico that it completed its domestic ratification process of the agreement.

Impact and analysis

U.S. Vice President Mike Pence speaks in support of the USMCA in 2019

Similarities to NAFTA

During his 2016 election campaign and presidency, Trump was highly critical of NAFTA (oftentimes describing it as "perhaps the worst trade deal ever made") while extolling USMCA as "a terrific deal for all of us." The USMCA is very similar to NAFTA, carrying over many of the same provisions and making only modest, mostly cosmetic changes, and is expected to make only a minor economic impact. Former U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, who oversaw the signing of NAFTA during the Bill Clinton administration, said, "It's really the original NAFTA."

Response

Representatives from the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL–CIO) have criticized the labor standards in the USMCA as unenforceable and toothless. Senator Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts said "the new rules will make it harder to bring down drug prices for seniors and anyone else who needs access to life-saving medicine", reflecting on the measure that expands the patent length for biological substances to 10 years, limiting access for new generic drugs to enter the market.

The Trump administration's Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has proposed the USMCA, citing new digital trade measures, the strengthening of protection for trade secrets, and the automobile rules-of-origin adjustments, as some of the benefits of the trade agreement.

In 2018 Jim Balsillie, former chair of once-dominant handheld telephone firm Research In Motion, wrote that the "colonial supplicant attitude" of Canadian politicians was a wrong-headed approach to the data and IP provisions of the USMCA.

A report published in summer 2018 was that the National Research Council of Canada feared that domestic firms run the risk of becoming "data cows" of foreign big data under the provisions of the USMCA.

Economic impact

USMCA is projected to have a very small effect on the economy. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) working paper issued in late March 2019 found that the agreement would have "negligible" effects on the broad economy. The IMF study projected that the USMCA "would adversely affect trade in the automotive, textiles and apparel sectors, while generating modest aggregate gains in terms of welfare, mostly driven by improved goods market access, with a negligible effect on real GDP." The IMF study noted that the USMCA's economic benefits would be greatly enhanced if there were an end to the Trump trade war (i.e., if the U.S. eliminated tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Canada and Mexico, and Canada and Mexico dropped retaliatory tariffs on imports from the U.S.)

An April 2019 International Trade Commission analysis on the likely impact of the USMCA estimated that the agreement, when fully implemented (six years following ratification) would increase U.S. real GDP by 0.35% and would increase U.S. total employment by 0.12% (176,000 jobs). The analysis cited by another study from the Congressional Research Service found the agreement would not have a measurable effect on jobs, wages, or overall economic growth. In the summer of 2019, Trump's top economic advisor Larry Kudlow (the director of the National Economic Council in the Trump White House) made unsupported claims regarding the likely economic impact of the agreement, overstating projections related to jobs and GDP growth.

In December 2019, Thea M. Lee and Robert E. Scott of the Economic Policy Institute criticized USMCA as "weak tea, at best" because it would have "virtually no measurable impacts on wages or incomes for U.S. workers," noting that "The benefits are tiny, and it's highly uncertain whether the deal will be a net winner or loser, in the end."

In June 2020, the Nikkei Asian Review reported that Japanese auto companies are opting to "triple Mexican pay rather than move to US" in order to avoid tariffs on automotive parts.

Wildcat strike action

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

A wildcat strike action, often referred to as a wildcat strike, is a strike action undertaken by unionised workers without union leadership's authorisation, support, or approval; this is sometimes termed an unofficial industrial action. The legality of wildcat strikes varies between countries and over time, although they are not typically criminal offenses.

By country

Canada

In 1965, Canada Post workers illegally walked out for two weeks and won the right to collective bargaining for all public sector employees. This resulted in them throwing out the leadership of the company union and forming the Canadian Union of Postal Workers.

On March 23, 2012, Air Canada ground employees suddenly walked off the job at Toronto Pearson International Airport, resulting in many flight delays, after three workers were suspended for heckling Canadian Labour Minister Lisa Raitt. This followed months of fighting between Air Canada and its other unions.

Hundreds of members of the Alberta Union of Provincial Employees walked out from their jobs on the morning of October 26, 2020 at healthcare centres across the province, resulting in some delays in care. This was in protest of an announcement made 2 weeks prior by Health Minister Tyler Shandro and Alberta Health Services CEO, Verna Yiu that between 9,700 and 11,000 AHS employees, namely laboratory, linen, cleaning and food services staff, will be laid-off in efforts to outsource the work to private companies, potentially saving the province $600 million annually. The Alberta Labour Relations Board issued a decision on the evening of October 26 for the employees on strike to return to work.

Germany

Wildcats strikes are seen as illegal in Germany, as they are not endorsed by a union as a party capable of entering into a collective agreement. Participating in a wildcat strike is considered a refusal to work and can be met by repercussions such as a warning or the termination of one's contract by the employer on an individual level. A union can however retroactively endorse a wildcat strike, therefore making it legal ex tunc.

France

Wildcat strikes were the key pressure tactic used during the May 1968 protests in France.

United States

Background

The motivation for wildcat strikes in the United States changed from the Depression era to the Postwar era in response to a variety of factors relating to businesses, the federal government, and unions.

Union coordination with working class interests
In 1939, the Special Committee to Investigate the National Labor Relations Board (often called the Smith Committee) was established by Republicans with the intention of weakening and eventually dissolving the NLRB. These intentions would attempt to be made law with the Smith Bill in 1940.

During the Depression, and prior to the bureaucratization of unions, leaders of different political philosophies tended to agree on the necessity and unique capabilities of local strike actions. Regardless of the organizational structure and direction, unions had no difficulty retaining these kinds of tactics within their toolkit. With the ascent of the Roosevelt administration, labor found a powerful ally in the struggle for workers' rights. With the changing role of the National Labor Relations Board, as determined by the New Deal National Labor Relations Act (shortened to NLRA, and also referred to as the Wagner Act) of 1935, a specific government entity began arbitrating grievances between workers, their unions, and employers. This represented a significant shift in governmental intervention in labor struggles.

Changes in union objectives

The United States' entry into World War II marked a critical shift in the role of unions in strike actions. The alliance between unions and Roosevelt's federal government meant that major unions like the Congress of Industrial Organization and the American Federation of Labor made an oath against striking for the war’s duration in order to prevent disruption of wartime production, a show of labor's willingness to patriotically cooperate. However, both support and anxiety around this decision could be found within union leadership. Operating without a weapon to use when issues might go unresolved, and knowing that unions had voluntarily surrendered the weapon, posed a major threat to organizing labor during the war. Another concern that union leadership had was with its Communist members and other firebrands, as potentially inviting harsh repercussions from unity-minded politicians could underscore the inadequate strength of the labor movement to follow through on endangering production. Additionally, the political climate of wartime America and post-war America favored a bureaucratic union culture that adhered to an orthodoxy of institutional reform around relatively narrow objectives. Of increasing importance to union leadership was an alliance with the Democratic establishment, which demanded stricter control over union members and actions in exchange for some degree of political support in institutionalizing unions. Part of this emergent anti-radical platform was an easy embrace of the Taft-Hartley Act’s anti-communist agenda, resulting in virtually all Communists losing their union positions in only a couple years.

After the strikes of 1941, the War Labor Board held a hearing over the Little Steel companies' working conditions in 1942.

An early example of the tension between the substantially changing unions and their members can be seen in the wildcat strikes against Little Steel companies in 1941. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Republic Steel, Youngstown Sheet & Tube, and US Steel (collectively referred to as "Little Steel") experienced a series of these strikes during the spring of 1941 in spite of strides in union-employer relations made under the oversight of NLRB and with the support of federal wartime programs. Little Steel had found that the benefits of federal profit guarantees made submitting to labor demands more viable. However, many of these springtime strikers held grievances with their own unions for an over-cooperative wartime attitude that placed greater value on New Deal institutions and programs than on disruptive actions to secure local concessions. A critical point of contention lay in the “no-strike pledge” that unions committed their membership to in response to wartime nationalism. As the war progressed, the emphasis on union-NLRB relations led to frequent and dispersed wildcat strikes in the steel industry; the new paradigm empowered union leaders over common members such that workers felt they had to take matters into their own hands, even if it meant risking expulsion from the union.

Taft-Hartley Act of 1947
The Taft-Hartley bill garnered serious opposition from labor and labor allies, though they were unsuccessful in defeating its passage.

After a challenge by the American Liberty League, the National Labor Relations Act’s Supreme Court confirmation in 1937 became a point around which corporate interests could rally in defense of business, with the ultimate goal of limiting the degree to which the act, and other legislation, could extend power to workers. The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act emerged partially as a consequence of the Little Steel Strike of 1937 and as a means to re-tool the NLRA away from labor protections and towards business protections. The earlier (and failed) Smith Bill of 1940 was used as a basis for reducing the culpability of companies in slow or non-resolving conflicts with labor, delegitimizing labor’s right to strike without risking employment, and for placing greater responsibility on unions for the actions of their members. Taft-Hartley also included many clauses built to disempower unions, whether by guaranteeing workers the ability to work in union workplaces without membership, exclude a large number of employment statuses from inclusion in unions, or widening who qualified as a manager (notably, foremen and supervisors, who could no longer join unions as a result of this same act). The act helped to disunify unions across different industries, and even within industries, while supporting the development of a managerial class within workplaces to protect employers from union action. It also set off a wave of state-level anti-unionism that popularized the notion of union-free zones, providing a potent weapon to businesses facing union demands: the threat of relocation.

Postwar disillusionment with unions

During the postwar boom, union achievement of benefits for only some employees succeeded in removing pressure from their membership as a whole and demotivated radical action from those who had gained the most. With solidarity and sympathy striking effectively broken, unions had failed to bring universal benefits to their members and had certainly failed to benefit workers’ rights for non-unionized workers.

Legality

Wildcat strikes have been considered illegal in the United States since 1935. The 1932 Norris-La Guardia Act provided that clauses in labor contracts barring employees from joining unions were not enforceable, thus granting employees the right to unionize regardless of their workplace situation. Unions have the power to bargain collectively on behalf of their members and to call for strikes demanding concessions from employers. Under the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), federal courts have held that wildcat strikes are illegal and that employers may fire workers participating in them.

Nevertheless, US workers can formally request that the National Labor Relations Board end their association with their labor union if they feel that the union is not adequately representing their interests. At this point, any strike action taken by the workers may be termed a wildcat strike, but there is no illegality involved, as there is no longer a conflict between sections 7 and 9(a) of the NLRA.

Some strikes that begin as wildcat actions, such as the Memphis sanitation strike and Baltimore municipal strike of 1974, are later supported by their respective unions' leadership.

Contemporary instances

In 2018, West Virginia teachers went on strike to demand higher wages and affordable health coverage. Without the sustained sanction of union leadership, this strike became a wildcat strike. In 2018, similar wildcat strikes by teachers demanding better pay and school funding also occurred in Oklahoma, Kentucky, Colorado, and Arizona.

In 2020, UC Santa Cruz graduate students went on strike to demand a cost of living adjustment (COLA) due to the high rent burden in Santa Cruz county. Later in 2020, the NBA, WNBA, MLB, MLS, and NHL all saw wildcat strikes in protest of police brutality after the shooting of Jacob Blake.

Vietnam

In Vietnam, all workers are required to join a union connected to the Vietnam General Confederation of Labor. Due to workers' distrust of this agency, nearly all strikes in the country are wildcat strikes.

Notable wildcat strikes

There are some cases where union recognition of a strike is complicated. For example, during the year-long British miners' strike of 1984-5, the national executive supported the strike but many area councils regarded the strike as unofficial, as most ballots at area level had produced majority votes against the strike and no ballot was ever taken at the national level.

Tuesday, November 29, 2022

Working poor

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Poor women working on a railway track

The working poor are working people whose incomes fall below a given poverty line due to low-income jobs and low familial household income. These are people who spend at least 27 weeks in a year working or looking for employment, but remain under the poverty threshold.

In the US, the official measurement of the working poor is controversial. Many social scientists argue that the official measurements used do not provide a comprehensive overview of the number of working poor. One recent study proposed over 100 ways to measure this and came up with a figure that ranged between 2% and 19% of the total US population.

There is also controversy surrounding ways that the working poor can be helped. Arguments range from increasing welfare to the poor on one end of the spectrum to encouraging the poor to achieve greater self-sufficiency on the other end, with most arguing varying degrees of both.

Measurement

Absolute

According to the US Department of Labor, the working poor "are persons who spent at least 27 weeks [in the past year] in the labor force (that is, working or looking for work), but whose incomes fell below the official poverty level." In other words, if someone spent more than half of the past year in the labor force without earning more than the official poverty threshold, the US Department of Labor would classify them as "working poor". (Note: The official poverty threshold, which is set by the US Census Bureau, varies depending on the size of a family and the age of the family members.) As of 2018, the poverty threshold for a family of four people is $25,701 and for a single person $12,784. The official poverty threshold is calculated by using the Consumer Price Index for goods, multiplying the cost of a minimum food diet in 1963 by three, a family's gross income (before tax), and the number of family members. In 2017, there were 6.9 million individuals defined as working poor. Because there has been, and still is, debate on how accurate using this metric is, the US Census Bureau began publishing a Supplemental Poverty Measure in 2011. The main difference using this metric is that a person's poverty status is determined after subtracting taxes, food, clothing, shelter, utilities, childcare and work-related expenses, and including government benefits and people living in the home that do not fit the "family" definition (such as an unmarried couple, or dependent foster children). Using the SPM, the poverty rate overall increases, particularly the rate of the working poor. In 2018, the official rate was 5.1% vs the SPM's measure of 7.2%.

Relative

In Europe and other non-US, high-income countries, poverty and working poverty are defined in relative terms. A relative measure of poverty is based on a country's income distribution rather than an absolute amount of money. Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, classifies a household as poor if its income is less than 60 percent of the country's median household income. According to Eurostat, a relative measure of poverty is appropriate because "minimal acceptable standards usually differ between societies according to their general level of prosperity: someone regarded as poor in a rich developed country might be regarded as rich in a poor developing country."

According to the latest data the UK's working poor rate is 10%, with the median income being £507 per week in 2018.

A profile of the working poor in the US

According to a 2017 report from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics 4.5% of all people working or looking for work for at least 27 weeks in the previous year had incomes below the poverty level. 10.9% of those were employed part-time, and 2.9% were employed full-time. The occupations that have the highest poverty rate are agricultural jobs, such as farming, service sector jobs, such as fast food or retail, and the construction industry, at 9.7%, 9.0% and 7.1% respectively. The largest ethnicity groups of the working poor are African-American and Hispanics or Latinos, both at 7.9%, with whites at 3.9% and Asian at 2.9%. Women are far more likely than men to be working and in poverty, 10% vs 5.6%. While the majority of the working poor have a high school diploma or less, 5% have some college education, 3.2% have an associate degree, and 1.5% have a bachelor's degree or higher. Families with children are four times as likely as a single person to live in poverty, with families headed by single women making up 16% of all working poor families.

Prevalence and trends

In 2018, according to the US Census Bureau's official definition of poverty, 38.1 million US citizens were below the poverty line (11.8% of the population). However this number includes children under 18 years of age, elders over 65, and people with disabilities who cannot work. The poverty rate of people between the ages of 18 to 64 was 10.7%, or 21.1 million people. Of these, nearly half, 5.1%, were working at least part-time.

Using the US Census Bureau's definition of poverty, the working poverty rate seems to have remained relatively stable since 1978. There is quite a bit of controversy around this measurement, namely how the dollar amounts that make up the poverty threshold are calculated. In 1961, the Department of Agriculture came out with an "economy food plan" to be used as a temporarily during an emergency or when a family is in need. This plan did not account for any food consumption outside of the home, and while it was considered nutritious, it was limited in variety and monotonous, thus the temporary designation. The US government took this number and—because the average family at the time spent one-third of their income on food—multiplied it by three. This has remained the standard way to set the poverty thresholds. The food plan has not changed, it has only been adjusted for inflation. One argument is that this is no longer an accurate way to measure poverty because the average lifestyle has changed dramatically since the 1960s

US compared to Europe

Other high-income countries have also experienced declining manufacturing sectors over the past four decades, but most of them have not experienced as much labor market polarization as the United States. Labor market polarization has been the most severe in liberal market economies like the US, Britain, and Australia. Countries like Denmark and France have been subject to the same economic pressures, but due to their more "inclusive" (or "egalitarian") labor market institutions, such as centralized and solidaristic collective bargaining and strong minimum wage laws, they have experienced less polarization.

Cross-national studies have found that European countries' working poverty rates are much lower than the US's. Most of this difference can be explained by the fact that European countries' welfare states are more generous than the US's. The relationship between generous welfare states and low rates of working poverty is elaborated upon in the "Risk factors" and "Anti-poverty policies" sections.

The following graph uses data from Brady, Fullerton, and Cross (2010) to show the working poverty rates for a small sample of countries. Brady, Fullerton, and Cross (2010) accessed this data through the Luxembourg Income Study. This graph measures household, rather than person-level, poverty rates. A household is coded as "poor" if its income is less than 50% of its country's median income. This is a relative, rather than absolute, measure of poverty. A household is classified as "working" if at least one member of the household was employed at the time of the survey. The most important insight contained in this graph is that the US has strikingly higher working poverty rates than European countries.

Pov crossnatl.jpeg

Risk factors

Race

Minorities in the US are disproportionately affected by poverty. Blacks and Hispanics are twice as likely to be part of the working poor than Whites. In 2017, the rate for Blacks and Hispanics was 7.9%, and 3.9% for Whites, 2.9% for Asians.

Education

Higher levels of education generally leads to lower levels of poverty. However, higher education is not a guarantee of escaping poverty. 5.0% of the working poor have some college experience, 3.2% have an associate degree, and 1.5% have a bachelor's degree or higher. Using the Supplemental Poverty Report and looking at everyone in poverty, not just those working, these percentages actually rise to 14.9% with a high school diploma, 9.7% with some college, and 6.2% with a bachelor's degree of higher. Blacks and Hispanics have higher rates of poverty than Whites and Asians at every education level. Student loan debt in the USA can also contribute to poverty due to capitalized interest if the borrower does not earn enough wages keep up with the loan payments.

Families

Married and cohabiting partners are less likely to experience poverty than individuals and single parents. The percentage of married and cohabiting partners living in poverty in 2018 was 7.7% and 13.9% versus 21.9% for individuals. Single mothers are more likely than single fathers to experience poverty, 25% and 15.1% respectively.

Age

Older workers are less likely to be working and poor than their younger counterparts. The age group with the highest rate of poverty at 8.5% is 20 to 24 year olds, and 16 to 19 year olds at 8.4%. As workers age, the rate of poverty decreases to 5.7% for 25 to 34 year olds and 5% for 35 to 44 year olds. Workers ages 45 to 50, 55 to 64 and 65+ had much lower working poor rates, 3.1%, 2.6% and 1.5%, respectively.

Gender

Women of all races are more likely than men to be classified as working poor, especially if they are single mothers. The overall rate for women in 2017 was 5.3%, compared to 3.8% for men. The rate for Black women and Hispanic women was significantly higher than their male counterparts, at 10% and 9.1%, compared to Black men at 5.6% and Hispanic men at 7.0%. The rate for White women was closer to White males, at 4.5% and 3.5%, respectively. Only Asian women had a lower rate of working poverty than Asian males, at 2.5% and 3.2%, respectively.

Transgender persons are more likely than cisgender men or women to be classified as working poor. In the United States, transgender people are three times more likely than the average population have a household income between $1 and $9,999, and nearly twice as likely to have a household income between $10,000 and $24,999.

Obstacles to uplift

The working poor face many of the same daily life struggles as the nonworking poor, but they also face some unique obstacles. Some studies, many of them qualitative, provide detailed insights into the obstacles that hinder workers' ability to find jobs, keep jobs, and make ends meet. Some of the most common struggles faced by the working poor are finding affordable housing, arranging transportation to and from work, buying basic necessities, arranging childcare, having unpredictable work schedules, juggling two or more jobs, and coping with low-status work.

Housing
Working poor people who do not have friends or relatives with whom they can live often find themselves unable to rent an apartment of their own. Although the working poor are employed at least some of the time, they often find it difficult to save enough money for a deposit on a rental property. As a result, many working poor people end up in living situations that are actually more costly than a month-to-month rental. For instance, many working poor people, especially those who are in some kind of transitional phase, rent rooms in week-to-week motels. These motel rooms tend to cost much more than a traditional rental, but they are accessible to the working poor because they do not require a large deposit. If someone is unable or unwilling to pay for a room in a motel, they might live in their car, in a homeless shelter, or on the street. This is not a marginal phenomenon; in fact, according to the 2008 US Conference of Mayors, one in five homeless people are currently employed.

Some working poor people are able to access housing subsidies (such as a Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher) to help cover their housing expenses. However, these housing subsidies are not available to everyone who meets the Section 8 income specifications. In fact, less than 25% of people who qualify for a housing subsidy receive one.

Education
The issue with education starts many times with the working poor from childhood and follows them into their struggle for a substantial income. Children growing up in families of the working poor are not provided the same educational opportunities as their middle-class counterpart. In many cases the low income community is filled with schools that are lacking necessities and support needed to form a solid education. This follows students as they continue in education. In many cases this hinders the possibility for America's youth to continue on to higher education. The grades and credits just are not attained in many cases, and the lack of guidance in the schools leaves the children of the working poor with no degree. Also, the lack of funds for continuing education causes these children to fall behind. In many cases, their parents did not continue on into higher education and because of this have a difficult time finding jobs with salaries that can support a family. Today a college degree is a requirement for many jobs, and it is the low skill jobs that usually only require a high school degree or GED. The inequality in available education continues the vicious cycle of families entering into the working poor.

Transportation
Given the fact that many working poor people do not own a car or cannot afford to drive their car, where they live can significantly limit where they are able to work, and vice versa. Given the fact that public transportation in many US cities is sparse, expensive, or non-existent, this is a particularly salient obstacle. Some working poor people are able to use their social networks—if they have them—to meet their transportation needs. In a study on low-income single mothers, Edin and Lein found that single mothers who had someone to drive them to and from work were much more likely to be able to support themselves without relying on government aid.

Basic necessities
Like the unemployed poor, the working poor struggle to pay for basic necessities like food, clothing, housing, and transportation. In some cases, however, the working poor's basic expenses can be higher than the unemployed poor's. For instance, the working poor's clothing expenses may be higher than the unemployed poor's because they must purchase specific clothes or uniforms for their jobs. Also, because the working poor are spending much of their time at work, they may not have the time to prepare their own food. In this case, they may frequently resort to eating fast food, which is less healthful and more expensive than home-prepared food.

Childcare
Working poor parents with young children, especially single parents, face significantly more childcare-related obstacles than other people. Often, childcare costs can exceed a low-wage earners' income, making work, especially in a job with no potential for advancement, an economically illogical activity. However, some single parents are able to rely on their social networks to provide free or below-market-cost childcare. There are also some free childcare options provided by the government, such as the Head Start Program. However, these free options are only available during certain hours, which may limit parents' ability to take jobs that require late-night shifts. The U.S. "average" seems to suggest that for one toddler, in full-time day care, on weekdays, the cost is approximately $600.00 per month. But, that figure can rise to well over $1000.00 per month in major metro areas, and fall to less than $350 in rural areas. The average cost of center-based daycare in the United States is $11,666 per year ($972 a month), but prices range from $3,582 to $18,773 a year ($300 to $1,564 monthly), according to the National Association of Child Care Resource & Referral Agencies.

Work schedules
Many low-wage jobs force workers to accept irregular schedules. In fact, some employers will not hire someone unless they have "open availability," which means being available to work any time, any day. This makes it difficult for workers to arrange for childcare and to take on a second job. In addition, working poor people's working hours can fluctuate wildly from one week to the next, making it difficult for them to budget effectively and save up money.

Multiple jobs
Many low-wage workers have to work multiple jobs in order to make ends meet. In 1996, 6.2 percent of the workforce held two or more full- or part-time jobs. Most of these people held two part-time jobs or one part-time job and one full-time job, but 4% of men and 2% of women held two full-time jobs at the same time. This can be physically exhausting and can often lead to short and long-term health problems.

Low-Status Work
Many low-wage service sector jobs require a great deal of customer service work. Although not all customer service jobs are low-wage or low-status, many of them are. Some argue that the low status nature of some jobs can have negative psychological effects on workers, but others argue that low status workers come up with coping mechanisms that allow them to maintain a strong sense of self-worth. One of these coping mechanisms is called boundary work. Boundary work happens when one group of people valorize their own social position by comparing themselves to another group, who they perceive to be inferior in some way. For example, Newman (1999) found that fast food workers in New York City cope with the low-status nature of their job by comparing themselves to the unemployed, who they perceive to be even lower-status than themselves. Thus, although the low-status nature of working poor people's jobs may have some negative psychological effects, some, but probably not all, of these negative effects can be counteracted through coping mechanisms such as boundary work.

Anti-poverty policies

Scholars, policymakers, and others have come up with a variety of proposals for how to reduce or eliminate working poverty. Most of these proposals are directed toward the United States, but they might also be relevant to other countries. The remainder of the section outlines the pros and cons of some of the most commonly proposed solutions.

Welfare state generosity

Cross-national studies like Lohmann (2009) and Brady, Fullerton, and Cross (2010) clearly show that countries with generous welfare states have lower levels of working poverty than countries with less-generous welfare states, even when factors like demography, economic performance, and labor market institutions are taken into account. Having a generous welfare state does two key things to reduce working poverty: it raises the minimum level of wages that people are willing to accept, and it pulls a large portion of low-wage workers out of poverty by providing them with an array of cash and non-cash government benefits. Many think that increasing the United States' welfare state generosity would lower the working poverty rate. A common critique of this proposal is that a generous welfare state would not work because it would stagnate the economy, raise unemployment, and degrade people's work ethic. However, as of 2011, most European countries have a lower unemployment rate than the US. Furthermore, although Western European economies' growth rates can be lower than the US's from time to time, their growth rates tend to be more stable, whereas the US's tends to fluctuate relatively severely. Individual states offer financial assistance for child care, but the aid varies widely. Most assistance is administered through the Child Care and Development Block Grants. Many subsidies have strict income guidelines and are generally for families with children under 13 (the age limit is often extended if the child has a disability). Many subsidies permit home-based care, but some only accept a day care center, so check the requirements. However, in an academic research, half of the respondents linked aspirations to their tax refunds for financial support, even though they did not ask for specific governmental aid.

Some states distribute funds through social or health departments or agencies (like this one in Washington State). For example, the Children's Cabinet in Nevada can refer families to providers, help them apply for subsidies and can even help families who want to pay a relative for care. North Carolina's Smart Start is a public/private partnership that offers funding for child care. Check the National Women's Law Center for each state's child care assistance policy.

Wages and benefits

In the conclusion of her book, Nickel and Dimed (2001), Barbara Ehrenreich argues that Americans need to pressure employers to improve worker compensation. Generally speaking, this implies a need to strengthen the labor movement. Cross-national statistical studies on working poverty suggest that generous welfare states have a larger impact on working poverty than strong labor movements. The labor movements in various countries have accomplished this through political parties of their own (labor parties) or strategic alliances with non-labor parties, for instance, when striving to put a meaningful minimum wage in place. The federal government offers a Flexible Spending Account (FSA) that's administered through workplaces.

If a job offers an FSA (also known as a Dependent Care Account), one can put aside up to $5,000 in pre-tax dollars to pay for child care expenses. If both you and your spouse have an FSA, the family limit is $5,000—but you could get as much as $2,000 in tax savings if your combined contributions reach the maximum.

Education and training

Some argue that more vocational training and active labour market policies, especially in growth industries like healthcare and renewable energy, is the solution to working poverty. To be sure, wider availability of vocational training could pull some people out of working poverty, but the fact remains that the low-wage service sector is a rapidly growing part of the US economy. Even if more nursing and clean energy jobs were added to the economy, there would still be a huge portion of the workforce in low-wage service sector jobs like retail, food service, and cleaning. Therefore, it seems clear that any significant reduction in the working poverty rate will have to come from offering higher wages and more benefits to the current, and future, population of service sector workers.

Child support assurance

Given the fact that such a large proportion of working poor households are headed by a single mother, one clear way to reduce working poverty would be to make sure that children's fathers share the cost of child rearing. In cases where the father cannot provide child support, scholars like Irwin Garfinkel advocate for the implementation of a child support guarantee, whereby the government pays childcare costs if the father cannot. Child support is not always a guarantee if the father or mother does not work. For example, if the parent without custody is not working then the parent with custody does not receive any child support unless the non working parent is employed at their job longer than 90 days, excluding if the non begins to work for its a city or government. Also, the government does not pay for childcare cost if you make more than the cut off range (your gross, per county or state.)

Marriage

Households with two wage-earners have a significantly lower rate of working poverty than households with only one wage-earner. Also, households with two adults, but only one wage-earner, have lower working poverty rates than households with only one adult. Therefore, it seems clear that having two adults in a household, especially if there are children present, is more likely to keep a household out of poverty than having just one adult in a household. Many scholars and policymakers have used this fact to argue that encouraging people to get married and stay married is an effective way to reduce working poverty (and poverty in general). However, this is easier said than done. Research has shown that low-income people marry less often than higher-income people because they have a more difficult time finding a partner who is employed, which is often seen as a prerequisite for marriage. Therefore, unless the employment opportunity structure is improved, simply increasing the number of marriages among low-income people would be unlikely to lower working poverty rates.

Ultimately, effective solutions to working poverty are multifaceted. Each of the aforementioned proposals could help reduce working poverty in the United States, but they might have a greater impact if at least a few of them were pursued simultaneously.

Neurophilosophy

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neurophilosophy ...