In psychology, the false-consensus effect or false-consensus bias is an attributional type of cognitive bias whereby people tend to overestimate the extent to which their opinions, beliefs, preferences, values, and habits are normal and typical of those of others (i.e., that others also think the same way that they do). This cognitive bias tends to lead to the perception of a consensus that does not exist, a "false consensus".
This false consensus is significant because it increases self-esteem (overconfidence effect).
It can be derived from a desire to conform and be liked by others in a
social environment. This bias is especially prevalent in group settings
where one thinks the collective opinion of their own group matches that
of the larger population. Since the members of a group reach a consensus
and rarely encounter those who dispute it, they tend to believe that
everybody thinks the same way. The false-consensus effect is not
restricted to cases where people believe that their values are shared by
the majority, but it still manifests as an overestimate of the extent
of their belief.
Additionally, when confronted with evidence that a consensus does not exist, people often assume that those who do not agree with them are defective in some way. There is no single cause for this cognitive bias; the availability heuristic, self-serving bias, and naïve realism have been suggested as at least partial underlying factors. Maintenance of this cognitive bias may be related to the tendency to make decisions with relatively little information. When faced with uncertainty and a limited sample from which to make decisions, people often "project" themselves onto the situation. When this personal knowledge is used as input to make generalizations, it often results in the false sense of being part of the majority.
The false-consensus effect can be contrasted with pluralistic ignorance, an error in which people privately disapprove but publicly support what seems to be the majority view (see below).
Additionally, when confronted with evidence that a consensus does not exist, people often assume that those who do not agree with them are defective in some way. There is no single cause for this cognitive bias; the availability heuristic, self-serving bias, and naïve realism have been suggested as at least partial underlying factors. Maintenance of this cognitive bias may be related to the tendency to make decisions with relatively little information. When faced with uncertainty and a limited sample from which to make decisions, people often "project" themselves onto the situation. When this personal knowledge is used as input to make generalizations, it often results in the false sense of being part of the majority.
The false-consensus effect can be contrasted with pluralistic ignorance, an error in which people privately disapprove but publicly support what seems to be the majority view (see below).
Contrasted with pluralistic ignorance
The false-consensus effect can be contrasted with pluralistic ignorance,
an error in which people privately disapprove but publicly support what
seems to be the majority view (regarding a norm or belief), when the
majority in fact shares their (private) disapproval. While the
false-consensus effect leads people to wrongly believe that the majority
agrees with them (when the majority, in fact, openly disagrees with
them), the pluralistic ignorance effect leads people to wrongly believe
that they disagree with the majority (when the majority, in fact,
covertly agrees with them). Pluralistic ignorance might, for example,
lead a student to engage in binge drinking because of the mistaken
belief that most other students approve of it, while in reality most
other students disapprove, but behave in the same way because they share
the same mistaken (but collectively self-sustaining) belief. In a
parallel example of the false-consensus effect, a student who likes
binge drinking would believe that a majority also likes it, while in
reality most others dislike it and openly say so.
Major theoretical approaches
The false-consensus effect can be traced back to two parallel theories of social perception, "the study of how we form impressions of and make inferences about other people". The first is the idea of social comparison. The principal claim of Leon Festinger's (1954) social comparison theory was that individuals evaluate their thoughts and attitudes based on other people.
This may be motivated by a desire for confirmation and the need to feel
good about oneself. As an extension of this theory, people may use
others as sources of information to define social reality and guide
behavior. This is called informational social influence.
The problem, though, is that people are often unable to accurately
perceive the social norm and the actual attitudes of others. In other
words, research has shown that people are surprisingly poor "intuitive
psychologists" and that our social judgments are often inaccurate.
This finding helped to lay the groundwork for an understanding of
biased processing and inaccurate social perception. The false-consensus
effect is just one example of such an inaccuracy.
The second influential theory is projection,
the idea that people project their own attitudes and beliefs onto
others. This idea of projection is not a new concept. In fact, it can be
found in Sigmund Freud's work on the defense mechanism of projection, D.S. Holmes' work on "attributive projection" (1968), and Gustav Ichheisser's work on social perception (1970).
D.S. Holmes, for example, described social projection as the process by
which people "attempt to validate their beliefs by projecting their own
characteristics onto other individuals".
Here a connection can be made between the two stated theories of
social comparison and projection. First, as social comparison theory
explains, individuals constantly look to peers as a reference group and
are motivated to do so in order to seek confirmation for their own
attitudes and beliefs.
In order to guarantee confirmation and a higher self-esteem, though, an
individual might unconsciously project their own beliefs onto the
others (the targets of their comparisons). This final outcome is the
false-consensus effect. To summarize, the false-consensus effect can be
seen as stemming from both social comparison theory and the concept of
projection.
The false-consensus effect, as defined by Ross,
Greene, and House in 1977, came to be the culmination of the many
related theories that preceded it. In their well-known series of four
studies, Ross and associates hypothesized and then demonstrated that
people tend to overestimate the popularity of their own beliefs and
preferences.
In each of the studies, subjects or "raters" were asked to choose one
of a few mutually-exclusive responses. They would then predict the
popularity of each of their choices among other participants, referred
to as "actors". To take this a step further, Ross and associates also
proposed and tested a related bias in social inferences: they found that
raters in an experiment estimated their own response to be not only
common, but also not very revealing of the actors' "distinguishing
personal dispositions".
On the other hand, alternative or opposite responses were perceived as
much more revealing of the actors as people. In general, the raters made
more "extreme predictions" about the personalities of the actors that
did not share the raters' own preference. In fact, the raters may have
even thought that there was something wrong with the people expressing
the alternative response.
In the ten years after the influential Ross et al. study, close
to 50 papers were published with data on the false-consensus effect.
Theoretical approaches were also expanded. The theoretical perspectives
of this era can be divided into four categories: (a) selective exposure
and cognitive availability, (b) salience and focus of attention, (c)
logical information processing, and (d) motivational processes.
In general, the researchers and designers of these theories believe
that there is not a single right answer. Instead, they admit that there
is overlap among the theories and that the false-consensus effect is
most likely due to a combination of these factors.
Selective exposure and cognitive availability
This
theory is closely tied to the availability heuristic, which suggests
that perceptions of similarity (or difference) are affected by how
easily those characteristics can be recalled from memory.
And as one might expect, similarities between oneself and others are
more easily recalled than differences. This is in part because people
usually associate with those who are similar to themselves. This
selected exposure to similar people may bias or restrict the "sample of
information about the true diversity of opinion in the larger social
environment".
As a result of the selective exposure and availability heuristic, it is
natural for the similarities to prevail in one's thoughts.
Botvin et al. (1992)
did a popular study on the effects of the false-consensus effect among a
specific adolescent community in an effort to determine whether
students show a higher level of false-consensus effect among their
direct peers as opposed to society at large.
The participants of this experiment were 203 college students ranging
in age from 18 to 25 (with an average age of 18.5). The participants
were given a questionnaire and asked to answer questions regarding a
variety of social topics. For each social topic, they were asked to
answer how they felt about the topic and to estimate the percentage of
their peers who would agree with them. The results determined that the
false-consensus effect was extremely prevalent when participants were
describing the rest of their college community; out of twenty topics
considered, sixteen of them prominently demonstrated the false-consensus
effect. The high levels of false-consensus effect seen in this study
can be attributed to the group studied; because the participants were
asked to compare themselves to a group of peers that they are constantly
around (and view as very similar to themselves), the levels of
false-consensus effect increased.
Salience and focus of attention
This
theory suggests that when an individual focuses solely on their own
preferred position, they are more likely to overestimate its popularity,
thus falling victim to the false-consensus effect.
This is because that position is the only one in their immediate
consciousness. Performing an action that promotes the position will make
it more salient and may increase the false-consensus effect. If,
however, more positions are presented to the individual, the degree of
the false-consensus effect might decrease significantly.
Logical information processing
This theory assumes that active and seemingly rational thinking underlies an individual's estimates of similarity among others.
This is manifested in one's causal attributions. For instance, if an
individual makes an external attribution for their belief, the
individual will likely view his or her experience of the thing in
question as merely a matter of objective experience. For example, a few
movie-goers may falsely assume that the quality of the film is a purely
objective entity. To explain their dissatisfaction with it, the viewers
may say that it was simply a bad movie (an external attribution). Based
on this (perhaps erroneous) assumption of objectivity, it seems rational
or "logical" to assume that everyone else will have the same
experience; consensus should be high. On the other hand, someone in the
same situation who makes an internal attribution (perhaps a film
aficionado who is well-aware of his or her especially high standards)
will realize the subjectivity of the experience and will be drawn to the
opposite conclusion; their estimation of consensus with their
experience will be much lower. Although they result in two opposite
outcomes, both paths of attribution rely on an initial assumption which
then leads to a "logical" conclusion. By this logic, then, it can be
said that the false-consensus effect is really a reflection of the fundamental attribution error
(specifically the actor-observer bias), in which people prefer
external/situational attributions over internal/dispositional ones to
justify their own behaviors.
In a study done by Fox, Yinon, and Mayraz, researchers were
attempting to determine whether or not the levels of the false-consensus
effect changed in different age groups. In order to come to a
conclusion, it was necessary for the researchers to split their
participants into four different age groups. Two hundred participants
were used, and gender was not considered to be a factor. Just as in the
previous study mentioned, this study used a questionnaire as its main
source of information. The results showed that the false-consensus
effect was extremely prevalent in all groups, but was the most prevalent
in the oldest age group (the participants who were labeled as "old-age
home residents"). They showed the false-consensus effect in all 12 areas
that they were questioned about. The increase in false-consensus effect
seen in the oldest age group can be accredited to their high level of
"logical" reasoning behind their decisions; the oldest age group has
obviously lived the longest, and therefore feels that they can project
their beliefs onto all age groups due to their (seemingly objective)
past experiences and wisdom. The younger age groups cannot logically
relate to those older to them because they have not had that experience
and do not pretend to know these objective truths. These results
demonstrate a tendency for older people to rely more heavily on
situational attributions (life experience) as opposed to internal
attributions.
Motivational processes
This
theory stresses the benefits of the false-consensus effect: namely, the
perception of increased social validation, social support, and
self-esteem. It may also be useful to exaggerate similarities in social
situations in order to increase liking. It is possible that these benefits serve as positive reinforcement for false-consensus thinking.
Relation to personality psychology
Within the realm of personality psychology,
the false-consensus effect does not have significant effects. This is
because the false-consensus effect relies heavily on the social
environment and how a person interprets this environment. Instead of
looking at situational attributions, personality psychology evaluates a
person with dispositional attributions, making the false-consensus
effect relatively irrelevant in that domain. Therefore, a person's
personality potentially could affect the degree to which the person relies on false-consensus effect, but not the existence
of such a trait. This should not, however, be interpreted as an
individual being the sole product of the social environment. In order
for the trait to "exist" in an organism's mind, there must be a
biological structure that underpins it. For an organism to visibly see
ultraviolet light, they must have genes (which then give rise to the
biological structure) that allows them to see the external environment.
Since the brain is a biological system, there must be an underlying
biological disposition that similarly allows an individual to register
and interpret the social environment, thus generating the
false-consensus effect. The brain's purpose is, after all, to extract
information from the environment and accordingly generate behaviour and
regulate physiology. There is no distinction between "innate" or
"learned", or "nature" versus "nurture" as the interaction of both are
needed; it does not sit along a dimension nor is it to be distinguished
from each other. Social and personality psychology are not separate
fields, but necessarily complementary fields, as demonstrated by the person-situation debate.
Belief in a favorable future
The concept of false consensus effect can also be extended to predictions about future others. Belief in a favorable future is the belief that future others will change their preferences and beliefs in alignment with one's own.
Belief in a favorable future suggests that people overestimate the
extent to which other people will come to agree with their preferences
and beliefs over time.
Rogers, Moore, and Norton (2017) find that belief in a favorable future is greater in magnitude than the false-consensus effect for two reasons:
- It is based in future others whose beliefs are not directly observable, and
- It is focused on future beliefs, which gives these future others time to “discover” the truth and change their beliefs.
Applications
The false-consensus effect is an important attribution bias to take
into consideration when conducting business and in everyday social
interactions. Essentially, people are inclined to believe that the
general population agrees with their opinions and judgments. Whether
this belief is accurate, it gives them a feeling of more assurance and
security in their decisions. This could be an important phenomenon to
either exploit or avoid in business dealings.
For example, if a man doubted whether he wanted to buy a new
tool, breaking down his notion that others agree with his doubt would be
an important step in persuading him to purchase it. By convincing the
customer that other people in fact do want to buy the appliance, the
seller could perhaps make a sale that he would not have made otherwise.
In this way, the false-consensus effect is closely related to conformity,
the effect in which an individual is influenced to match the beliefs or
behaviors of a group. There are two differences between the
false-consensus effect and conformity: most importantly, conformity is
matching the behaviors, beliefs, or attitudes of a real group, while the
false-consensus effect is perceiving that others share your behaviors,
beliefs, or attitudes, whether or not they really do. Making the
customer feel like the opinion of others (society) is to buy the
appliance will make the customer feel more confident about his purchase
and will make him believe that other people would have made the same
decision.
Similarly, any elements of society affected by public
opinion—e.g., elections, advertising, publicity—are very much influenced
by the false-consensus effect. This is partially because the way in
which people develop their perceptions involves "differential processes
of awareness".
That is to say, while some people are motivated to reach correct
conclusions, others may be motivated to reach preferred conclusions.
Members of the latter category will more often experience the
false-consensus effect, because the subject is likely to search actively
for like-minded supporters and may discount or ignore the opposition.
Uncertainties
There
is ambiguity about several facets of the false-consensus effect and of
its study. First of all, it is unclear exactly which factors play the
largest role in the strength and prevalence of the false-consensus
effect in individuals. For example, two individuals in the same group
and with very similar social standing could have very different levels
of false-consensus effect, but it is unclear what social, personality,
or perceptual differences between them play the largest role in causing
this disparity.
Additionally, it can be difficult to obtain accurate survey data
about the false-consensus effect (as well as other psychological biases)
because the search for consistent, reliable groups to be surveyed
(often over an extended period of time) often leads to groups that might
have dynamics slightly different from those of the "real world". For
example, many of the referenced studies in this article examined college
students, who might have an especially high level of false-consensus
effect both because they are surrounded by their peers (and perhaps
experience the availability heuristic) and because they often assume
that they are similar to their peers. This may result in distorted data
from some studies of the false-consensus effect.