The creative industries
refers to a range of economic activities which are concerned with the
generation or exploitation of knowledge and information. They may
variously also be referred to as the cultural industries (especially in Europe (Hesmondhalgh 2002, p. 14) or the creative economy (Howkins 2001), and most recently they have been denominated as the Orange Economy in Latin America and the Caribbean (Buitrago & Duque 2013).
The creative industries have been seen to become increasingly important to economic well-being, proponents suggesting that "human creativity is the ultimate economic resource" (Florida 2002,
p. xiii), and that "the industries of the twenty-first century will
depend increasingly on the generation of knowledge through creativity
and innovation" (Landry & Bianchini 1995, p. 4).
Definitions
Various commentators have provided varying suggestions on what activities to include in the concept of "creative industries" (DCMS 2001, p. 04) (Hesmondhalgh 2 002, p. 12)(Howkins 2001, pp. 88–117)(UNCTAD 2008,
pp. 11–12), and the name itself has become a contested issue – with
significant differences and overlap between the terms "creative
industries", "cultural industries" and "creative economy" (Hesmondhalgh 2002, pp. 11–14)(UNCTAD 2008, p. 12).
Lash and Urry suggest that each of the creative industries has an
"irreducible core" concerned with "the exchange of finance for rights
in intellectual property", (Lash & Urry 1994, p. 117). This echoes the UK Government Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) definition which describes the creative industries as:
"those industries which have their origin in individual
creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and
job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual
property" (DCMS 2001, p. 04)
As of 2015 the DCMS definition recognizes nine creative sectors, namely:
The various fields of engineering
do not appear on this list, that emerged from the DCMS reports. This
was due, probably, to the fact that engineers occupy relevant positions
in "non-cultural" corporations, performing activities of project,
management, operation, maintenance, risk analysis and supervision, among
others. However, historically and presently, several tasks of engineers
can be regarded as highly creative, inventive and innovative. The
contribution of engineering is represented by new products, processes
and services.
Hesmondhalgh reduces the list to what he terms "the core cultural industries" of advertising and marketing, broadcasting, film, internet and music industries, print and electronic publishing, and video and computer games.
His definition only includes those industries that create "texts"' or
"cultural artefacts" and which engage in some form of industrial
reproduction (Hesmondhalgh 2002, pp. 12–14).
The DCMS list has proven influential, and many other nations have formally adopted it. It has also been criticised. It has been argued that the division into sectors obscures a divide between lifestyle business,
non-profits, and larger businesses, and between those who receive state
subsidies (e.g., film) and those who do not (e.g., computer games). The
inclusion of the antiques trade often comes into question, since it
does not generally involve production (except of reproductions and
fakes). The inclusion of all computer services has also been questioned (Hesmondhalgh 2002, p. 13).
Some areas, such as Hong Kong, have preferred to shape their policy around a tighter focus on copyright ownership in the value chain. They adopt the WIPO's
classifications, which divide up the creative industries according to
who owns the copyrights at various stages during the production and
distribution of creative content.
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has denominated them for Latin America and the Caribbean as the Orange Economy
which is defined as the "group of linked activities through which ideas
are transformed into cultural goods and services whose value is
determined by intellectual property."
Others
have suggested a distinction between those industries that are open to
mass production and distribution (film and video; videogames;
broadcasting; publishing), and those that are primarily craft-based and
are meant to be consumed in a particular place and moment (visual arts; performing arts; cultural heritage).
How creative workers are counted
The
DCMS classifies enterprises and occupations as creative according to
what the enterprise primarily produces, and what the worker primarily
does. Thus, a company which produces records would be classified as
belonging to the music industrial sector, and a worker who plays piano would be classified as a musician.
The primary purpose of this is to quantify – for example it can
be used to count the number of firms, and the number of workers,
creatively employed in any given location, and hence to identify places
with particularly high concentrations of creative activities.
It leads to some complications which are not immediately obvious.
For example, a security guard working for a music company would be
classified as a creative employee, although not as creatively occupied.
The total number of creative employees is then calculated as the sum of:
All workers employed in creative industries, whether or not
creatively occupied (e.g. all musicians, security guards, cleaners,
accountants, managers, etc. working for a record company)
All workers that are creatively occupied, and are not employed in
creative industries (for example, a piano teacher in a school). This
includes people whose second job is creative, for example somebody who
does weekend gigs, writes books, or produces artwork in their spare time
Properties or characteristics
A toy cat produced in a South-African township, made from used plastic bags and old wire
According to Caves (2000), creative industries are characterized by seven economic properties:
Nobody knows principle: Demand uncertainty exists because
the consumers' reaction to a product are neither known beforehand, nor
easily understood afterward.
Art for art's sake: Workers care about originality, technical
professional skill, harmony, etc. of creative goods and are willing to
settle for lower wages than offered by 'humdrum' jobs.
Motley crew principle: For relatively complex creative
products (e.g., films), the production requires diversely skilled
inputs. Each skilled input must be present and perform at some minimum
level to produce a valuable outcome.
Infinite variety: Products are differentiated by quality and
uniqueness; each product is a distinct combination of inputs leading to
infinite variety options (e.g., works of creative writing, whether
poetry, novel, screenplays or otherwise).
A list/B list: Skills are vertically differentiated. Artists
are ranked on their skills, originality, and proficiency in creative
processes and/or products. Small differences in skills and talent may
yield huge differences in (financial) success.
Time flies: When coordinating complex projects with diversely skilled inputs, time is of the essence.
Ars longa: Some creative products have durability aspects that invoke copyright protection, allowing a creator or performer to collect rents.
The properties described by Caves have been criticized for being too
rigid (Towse, 2000). Not all creative workers are purely driven by 'art
for art's sake'. The 'ars longa' property also holds for certain
noncreative products (i.e., licensed products). The 'time flies'
property also holds for large construction projects. Creative industries
are therefore not unique, but they score generally higher on these
properties relative to non-creative industries.
Difference from the 'cultural industries'
There is often a question about the boundaries between creative industries and the similar term of cultural industries.
Cultural industries are best described as an adjunct-sector of the
creative industries. Cultural industries include industries that focus
on cultural tourism and heritage, museums and libraries, sports and outdoor activities, and a variety of 'way of life' activities that arguably range from local pet shows to a host of hobbyist
concerns. Thus cultural industries are more concerned about delivering
other kinds of value—including cultural wealth and social wealth—rather
than primarily providing monetary value.
The creative class
Some authors, such as the American economistRichard Florida, argue for a wider focus on the products of knowledge workers, and judge the 'creative class' (his own term) to include nearly all those offering professional knowledge-based services.
The creative class and diversity
Florida's focus leads him to pay particular attention to the nature of the creative workforce.
In a study of why particular US cities such as San Francisco seem to
attract creative producers, Florida argues that a high proportion of
workers from the 'creative class'
provide a key input to creative production, which enterprises seek out.
He seeks to quantitatively establish the importance of diversity and multiculturalism
in the cities concerned, for example the existence of a significant
public gay community, ethnic and religious variety, and tolerance. (Florida 2002)
Economic contribution
Globally, Creative Industries excluding software and general scientific research and development
are said to have accounted for around 4% of the world's economic output
in 1999, which is the last year for which comprehensive figures are
currently available. Estimates of the output corresponding to scientific
Research and Development
suggest that an additional 4-9% might be attributable to the sector if
its definition is extended to include such activities, though the
figures vary significantly between different countries.
Taking the UK
as an example, in the context of other sectors, the creative industries
make a far more significant contribution to output than hospitality or utilities and deliver four times the output due to agriculture, fisheries and forestry.
In terms of employment and depending on the definition of activities
included, the sector is a major employer of between 4-6% of the UK's working population, though this is still significantly less than employment due to traditional areas of work such as retail and manufacturing.
Within the creative industries sector and again taking the UK as an example, the three largest sub-sectors are design, publishing, and television and radio. Together these account for around 75% of revenues and 50% of employment.
The complex supply chains in the creative industries sometimes make it challenging to calculate accurate figures for the gross value added by each sub-sector. This is particularly the case for the service-focused sub-sectors such as advertising, whereas it is more straightforward in product-focused sub-sectors such as crafts.
Not surprisingly, perhaps, competition in product-focused areas tends
to be more intense with a tendency to drive the production end of the
supply chain to become a commodity business.
There may be a tendency for publicly funded creative industries
development services to inaccurately estimate the number of creative
businesses during the mapping process. There is also imprecision in
nearly all tax code systems that determine a person's profession, since
many creative people operate simultaneously in multiple roles and jobs.
Both these factors mean that official statistics relating to the
Creative Industries should be treated with caution.
The creative industries in Europe make a significant contribution
to the EU economy, creating about 3% of EU GDP – corresponding to an
annual market value of €500 billion – and employing about 6 million
people. In addition, the sector plays a crucial role in fostering
innovation, in particular for devices and networks. The EU records the
second highest TV viewing figures globally, producing more films than
any other region in the world. In that respect, the newly proposed 'Creative Europe' program (July 2011)
will help preserve cultural heritage while increasing the circulation
of creative works inside and outside the EU. The programme will play a
consequential role in stimulating cross border co-operation, promoting
peer learning and making these sectors more professional. The Commission
will then propose a financial instrument run by the European Investment
Bank to provide debt and equity finance for cultural and creative
industries. The role of the non-state actors within the governance
regarding Medias will not be neglected anymore. Therefore, building a
new approach extolling the crucial importance of a European level
playing field industry may boost the adoption of policies aimed at
developing a conducive environment, enabling European companies as well
as citizens to use their imagination and creativity – both sources of
innovation -, and therefore of competitiveness and sustainability. It
supposes to tailor the regulatory and institutional frameworks in
supporting private-public collaboration, in particular in the Medias
sector.
The EU therefore plans to develop clusters, financing instruments as
well as foresight activities to support this sector. The European
Commission wishes to assist European creators and audiovisual
enterprises to develop new markets through the use of digital
technology, and asks how policy-making can best help achieve this. A
more entrepreneurial culture will have to take hold with a more positive
attitude towards risk-taking, and a capacity to innovate anticipating
future trends. Creativity plays an important role in human resource
management as artists and creative professionals can think laterally.
Moreover, new jobs requiring new skills created in the post-crisis
economy should be supported by labour mobility to ensure that people are
employed wherever their skills are needed.
In the US
In the introduction to a 2013 special issue of Work and Occupations
on artists in the US workforce, the guest editors argue that by
examining the work lives of artists, one can identify characteristics
and actions that help both individual workers and policy makers adapt to
changing economic conditions. Elizabeth Lingo and Steven Tepper cite
multiple sources to suggest artists' skill sets allow them to "work
beyond existing markets and create entirely new opportunities for
themselves and others".
Specifically, Lingo and Tepper suggest artistic workers are "catalysts
of change and innovation" because they "face special challenges managing
ambiguity, developing and sustaining a relative identity, and forming
community in the context of an individually based enterprise economy"
(2013). Because of these adaptive skills, the suggestion is that
"studying how artists cope with uncertainty and the factors that
influence their success should be relevant for understanding these
broader social and economic trends facing today's (and tomorrow's)
workforce."
This view of artist-as-change-agent changes the questions
researchers ask of creative economies. Old research questions would
focus on topics like "skills, work practices, contracts, wage
differentials, employment incentives, formal credentials, employment
pipelines, and labor flows of differentiated occupational categories".
Examples of new questions include:
How do artists both create changes in the labor market itself and the way cultural work is done?
What is their process of innovation and enterprise?
What is the nature of their work and the resources they draw upon?
How do different network structures produce different opportunity spaces?
How do artistic workers create and manage planned serendipity—the
spaces and exchanges that produce unexpected collaborations and
opportunities?
How do creative workers broker and synthesize across occupational,
genre, geographic, and industry boundaries to create new possibilities?
(Tepper & Lingo, 2013)
Wider role
As some first world countries struggle to compete in traditional markets such as manufacturing, many now see the creative industry as a key component in a new knowledge economy, capable perhaps of delivering urban regeneration, often through initiatives linked to exploitation of cultural heritage that leads to increased tourism. It is often argued that, in future, the ideas and imagination of countries like the United Kingdom will be their greatest asset; in support of this argument, a number of universities in the UK have started to offer creative entrepreneurship
as a specific area for study and research. Indeed, UK government
figures reveal that the UK's creative industries account for over a
million jobs and brought in £112.5 billion to the UK economy (DCMS Creative Industries Mapping Document 2001), although the data sets underlying these figures are open to question.
In recent years, creative industries have become 'increasingly attractive to governments outside the developed world'. In 2005, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) XI High Level Panel on Creative Industries and Development
commissioned several studies to identify challenges and opportunities
facing the growth and development of creative industries in developing
industries. As Cunningham et al. (2009) put it, 'the harnessing
of creativity brings with it the potential of new wealth creation, the
cultivation of local talent and the generation of creative capital, the
development of new export markets, significant multiplier effects
throughout the broader economy, the utilisation of information
communication technologies and enhanced competitiveness in an
increasingly global economy'. A key driver of interest in creative
industries and development is the acknowledgement that the value of
creative production resides in ideas and individual creativity, and
developing countries have rich cultural traditions and pools of creative
talent which lay a basic foundation for creative enterprises.
Reflecting the growing interest in the potential of creative industries
in developing countries, in October 2011 a Ministry of Tourism and
Creative Economy was created within the Indonesian government with
well-known economist Dr Mari Pangestu appointed as the first minister to hold the position.
A leap of faith, in its most commonly used meaning, is the act of believing in or accepting something outside the boundaries of reason.
Overview
The phrase is commonly attributed to Søren Kierkegaard; however, he never used the term, as he referred to a qualitative leap. A leap of faith according to Kierkegaard involves circularity insofar as the leap is made by faith. In his book Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
he describes the core part of the leap of faith: the leap. “Thinking
can turn toward itself in order to think about itself and skepticism
can emerge. But this thinking about itself never accomplishes
anything.” Kierkegaard says thinking should serve by thinking something.
Kierkegaard wants to stop "thinking's self-reflection" and that is the movement that constitutes a leap.
He is against people thinking about religion all day without ever doing
anything; but he is also against external shows and opinions about
religion. Instead, Kierkegaard is in favor of the internal movement of
faith. He says, "where Christianity wants to have inwardness, worldly Christendom wants outwardness, and where Christianity wants outwardness, worldly Christendom wants inwardness."
But, on the other hand, he also says: "The less externality, the more
inwardness if it is truly there; but it is also the case that the less
externality, the greater the possibility that the inwardness will
entirely fail to come. The externality is the watchman who awakens the
sleeper; the externality is the solicitous mother who calls one; the
externality is the roll call that brings the soldier to his feet; the
externality is the reveille that helps one to make the great effort; but
the absence of the externality can mean that the inwardness itself
calls inwardly to a person - alas - but it can also mean that the
inwardness will fail to come." The "most dreadful thing of all is a personal existence that cannot coalesce in a conclusion," according to Kierkegaard. He asked his contemporaries if any of them had reached a conclusion about anything or did every new premise change their convictions.
David F. Swenson described the leap in his 1916 article The Anti-Intellectualism of Kierkegaard using some of Kierkegaard's ideas.
H2
plus O becomes water, and water becomes ice, by a leap. The change from
motion to rest, or vice versa, is a transition which cannot be
logically construed; this is the basic principle of Zeno's dialectic,
and is also expressed in Newton's laws of motion, since the external
force by which such change is effected is not a consequence of the law,
but is premised as external to the system with which we start. It is
therefore transcendent and non-rational, and its coming into existence
can only be apprehended as a leap. In the same manner, every causal
system presupposes an external environment as the condition of change.
Every transition from the detail of an empirical induction to the
ideality and universality of law, is a leap. In the actual process of
thinking, we have the leap by which we arrive at the understanding of an
idea or an author. The Anti-Intellectualism of Kierkegaard, by David
F. Swenson, The Philosophical Review V. XXV 1916 p. 577-578
This is how the leap was described in 1950 and then in 1960.
Kierkegaard
agreed with Lessing, a German dynamist, that truth lies in the search
for an object, not in the object sought. It is another case of “act
accomplishing itself.” If God held truth in one hand and the eternal
pursuit of it in the other, He would choose the second hand according to
Lessing. Religious truth concerns the individual and the individual
alone, and it is the personal mode of appropriation, the process of
realization, the subjective dynamism that counts. Of Lessing,
Kierkegaard writes approvingly. But if we are constantly occupied in the
immanent striving of our own subjectivity, how are we to ascend to
knowledge of a transcendent God whom traditional thought declares to be
known even by reason. Lessing and Kierkegaard declare in typical fashion
that there is no bridge between historical, finite knowledge and God’s
existence and nature. This gap can only be crossed by a “leap.” Faith is
a completely irrational experience, and yet it is, paradoxically, the
highest duty of a Christian. Though as Thomte observes, it is not a
spontaneous belief, faith is nevertheless something blind, immediate,
and decisive. It has the character of an “act of resignation.” It is
unmediated and a-intellectual, much like Kant’s proof for the existence
of God. Nature makes no leaps, according to the maxim of Leibniz. But
faith, according to Kierkegaard must do so in a radical way. Idea-Men of Today by Vincent Edward Smith 1950 p. 254-255
Like Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, who
plays an important role in the spiritual struggle for meaning on the
part of the modern writer, cast off the bondage of logic and the tyranny
of science. By means of the dialectic of "the leap," he attempted to
transcend both the aesthetic and the ethical stages. Completely alone,
cut off from his fellow-men, the individual realizes his own nothingness
as the preliminary condition for embracing the truth of God. Only when
man becomes aware of his own non-entity — an experience that is purely
subjective and incommunicable — does he recover his real self and stand
in the presence of God. This is the mystique which has been rediscovered
by twentieth-century man, the leap from outwardness to inwardness, from
rationalism to subjectivity, the revelation, that is ineffable, of the
reality of the Absolute. Literature and Religion: a Study in Conflict 1960 by Charles Irving Glicksberg p. 12
The leap into sin and into faith
Kierkegaard describes "the leap" using the famous story of Adam and Eve, particularly Adam's qualitative leap
into sin. Adam's leap signifies a change from one quality to another,
mainly the quality of possessing no sin to the quality of possessing
sin. Kierkegaard maintains that the transition from one quality to
another can take place only by a "leap" (Thomte 232). When the
transition happens, one moves directly from one state to the other,
never possessing both qualities. "The moment is related to the
transition of the one to the many, of the many to the one, of likeness
to unlikeness, and that it is the moment in which there is neither one
nor many, neither a being determined nor a being combined."(Thomte Note
82-85). "In the Moment man becomes conscious that he is born; for his
antecedent state, to which he may not cling, was one of non-being. In
the Moment man also becomes conscious of the new birth, for his
antecedent state was one of non-being."
Kierkegaard felt that a leap of faith was vital in accepting Christianity due to the paradoxes that exist in Christianity. In his books, Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
Kierkegaard delves deeply into the paradoxes that Christianity
presents. Moses Mendelssohn did the same thing when Johann Kaspar
Lavater demanded he discuss why he didn't want to become a Christian.
Both Kierkegaard and Mendelssohn knew the difficulties involved when
discussing religious topics:
"As I so sedulously
sought to avoid an explanation in my own apartment amidst a small number
of worthy men, of whose good intentions I had every reason to be
persuaded, it might have been reasonably inferred that a public one
would be extremely repugnant to my disposition; and that I must have
inevitably become the more embarrassed when the voice demanding it
happened to be entitled to an answer at any rate." Moses Mendelssohn,
Letter to J. C. Lavater, December 12, 1769
Kierkegaard's use of the term "leap" was in response to "Lessing's Ditch" which was discussed by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781) in his theological writings.
Kierkegaard was indebted to Lessing's writings in many ways. Lessing
tried to battle rational Christianity directly and, when that failed, he
battled it indirectly through, what Kierkegaard called, "imaginary
constructions". Both may be indebted to Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
Rousseau used the idea in his 1762 book Emile like this:
If
I relate the plain and simple tale of their innocent affections you
will accuse me of frivolity, but you will be mistaken. Sufficient
attention is not given to the effect which the first connection between
man and woman is bound to produce on the future life of both. People do
not see that a first impression so vivid as that of love, or the liking
which takes the place of love, produces lasting effects whose influence
continues till death. Works on education are crammed with wordy and
unnecessary accounts of the imaginary duties of children; but there is
not a word about the most important and most difficult part of their
education, the crisis which forms the bridge between the child and the
man. If any part of this work is really useful, it will be because I
have dwelt at great length on this matter, so essential in itself and so
neglected by other authors, and because I have not allowed myself to be
discouraged either by false delicacy or by the difficulties of
expression. The story of human nature is a fair romance. Am I to blame
if it is not found elsewhere? I am trying to write the history of
mankind. If my book is a romance, the fault lies with those who deprave
mankind.
This is supported by another reason; we are not dealing with a
youth given over from childhood to fear, greed, envy, pride, and all
those passions which are the common tools of the schoolmaster; we have
to do with a youth who is not only in love for the first time, but with
one who is also experiencing his first passion of any kind; very likely
it will be the only strong passion he will ever know, and upon it
depends the final formation of his character. His mode of thought, his
feelings, his tastes, determined by a lasting passion, are about to
become so fixed that they will be incapable of further change.
Emile by Jean Jacques Rousseau, Foxley translation
Dogmas
and formulas, these mechanical tools designed for reasonable use--or
rather abuse--of his natural gifts, are the fetters of an everlasting nonage.
The man who casts them off would make an uncertain leap over the
narrowest ditch, because he is not used to such free movement. That is
why there are only a few men who walk firmly, and who have emerged from
nonage by cultivating their own minds. It is more nearly possible,
however, for the public to enlighten
itself; indeed, if it is only given freedom, enlightenment is almost
inevitable. There will always be a few independent thinkers, even among
the self-appointed guardians of the multitude. Once such men have thrown
off the yoke of nonage, they will spread about them the spirit of a
reasonable appreciation of man's value and of his duty to think for
himself.
Lessing said, "accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason." Kierkegaard points out that he also said, "contingent truths of history can never become the demonstrations of necessary truths of reason."
Kierkegaard liked Lessing because he "had a most uncommon gift of
explaining what he himself had understood. With that he stopped; in our
day people go further and explain more than they themselves have
understood."
We
all believe that an Alexander lived who in a short time conquered
almost all Asia. But who, on the basis of this belief, would risk
anything of great permanent worth, the loss of which would be
irreparable? Who, in consequence of this belief, would forswear for ever
all knowledge that conflicted with this belief? Certainly not I. Now I
have no objection to raise against Alexander and his victory: but it
might still be possible that the story was founded on a mere poem of Choerilus just as the twenty year siege of Troy depends on no better authority
than Homer's poetry. If on historical grounds I have no objection to
the statement that Christ raised to life a dead man; must I therefore
accept it as true that God has a Son who is the same essence as himself?
On The Proof of the Spirit and of Power, Lessing's Theological Writings, Chadwick p. 51-56.
Lessing opposes
what I would call quantifying oneself into a qualitative decision; he
contests the direct transition from historical reliability to a decision
on an eternal happiness. He does not deny that what is said in the
Scriptures about miracles and prophecies is just as reliable as other
historical reports, in fact, is as reliable as historical reports in
general can be. But now, if they are only as reliable as this why are
they treated as if they were infinitely more reliable-precisely because
one wants to base on them the acceptance of a doctrine that is the
condition for an eternal happiness, that is, to base an eternal
happiness on them. Like everyone else, Lessing is willing to believe
that an Alexander who subjugated all of Asia did live once, but who, on
the basis of this belief, would risk anything of great, permanent worth,
the loss of which would be irreparable? Søren Kierkegaard Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Hong p. 96, 130-131
Kierkegaard has Don Juan in Either/Or
escort young girls "all in the dangerous age of being neither grown-up
nor children" to "the other side of the ditch of life" as he, himself,
"dances over the abyss" only to "instantly sink down into the depths."
He has Don Juan "preach the gospel of pleasure" to Elvira and seduces
her from the convent and wonders if there is a priest who can "preach
the gospel of repentance and remorse" with the same power as Don Juan
preached his gospel. Both Lessing and Kierkegaard are discussing the agency one might use to base one's faith upon. Does history provide all the proofs necessary to cross that "ugly, broad ditch"? Or is there "no direct and immediate transition to Christianity". Does one become a Christian "in the fulness of time" as Kierkegaard puts it or is "there only one proof
of spirit and that is the spirit’s proof within oneself. Whoever
demands something else may get proofs in superabundance, but he is
already characterized at spiritless."
If naked dialectical deliberation shows that there is no approximation, that wanting to quantify
oneself into faith along this path is a misunderstanding, a delusion,
that wanting to concern oneself with such deliberations is a temptation
for the believer, a temptation that he, keeping himself in the passion
of faith, must resist with all his strength, lest it end with his
succeeding in changing faith into something else, into another kind of
certainty, in substituting probabilities and guarantees, which were
rejected when he, himself beginning, made the qualitative
transition of the leap from unbeliever to believer - if this is so,
then everyone who, not entirely unfamiliar with learned scientificity
and not bereft of willingness to learn, has understood it this way must
also have felt his hard-pressed position when he in admiration learned
to think meanly of his own insignificance in the face of those
distinguished by learning and acumen and deserved renown, so that,
seeking the fault in himself, he time and again returned to them, and
when in despondency he had to admit that he himself was in the right.
.... When someone is to leap he must certainly do it alone and also be
alone in properly understanding that it is an impossibility. … the leap
is the decision. .... I am charging the individual in question with not willing to stop the infinity of reflection. Am I requiring something of him, then? But on the other hand, in a genuinely speculative
way, I assume that reflection stops of its own accord. Why, then, do I
require something of him? And what do I require of him? I require a resolution. And in that I am right, for only in that way can reflection be stopped. But, on the other hand, it is never right for a philosopher
to make sport of people and at one moment have reflection stop of its
own accord in the absolute beginning, and at the next moment taunt
someone who has only one flaw, that he is obtuse enough to believe the
first, taunts him so as to help him in this fashion to the absolute
beginning, which then occurs two ways. But if a resolution is required,
presuppositionlessness is abandoned. The beginning can occur only when
reflection is stopped, and reflection can be stopped only by something
else, and this something else is something altogether different from the
logical, since it is a resolution. Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, Hong p. 11-12, 102, 113
The implication of taking a leap of faith
can, depending on the context, carry positive or negative connotations,
as some feel it is a virtue to be able to believe in something without
evidence while others feel it is foolishness. It is a hotly contested theological and philosophical concept. For instance, the association between "blind faith" and religion is disputed by those with deistic
principles who argue that reason and logic, rather than revelation or
tradition, should be the basis of the belief "that God has existed in
human form, was born and grew up". Jesus is the "paradox", the "absolute paradox". When Christianity becomes a scholarly enterprise one tends to "reflect
oneself into Christianity" but Kierkegaard says, one should "reflect
oneself out of something else and become, more and more simply, a
Christian."
Kierkegaard was concerned that individuals would spend all their lives
trying to define Christianity, love, God, the Trinity, sin, et cetera,
and never get to the business of "actually" making a decision in time to
become a Christian who could then act on the basis of that decision. He
discussed the inner and the outer relationship existing in belief.
"Compared with the Hegelian notion that the outer is the inner and the
inner the outer, it certainly is extremely original. But it would be
even more original if the Hegelian axiom were not only admired by the
present age but also had retroactive power to abolish, backward
historically, the distinction between the visible and invisible Church.
The invisible Church is not a historical phenomenon; as such it cannot
be observed objectively at all, because it is only in subjectivity."
There has to be a balance between objective and subjective knowledge.
Hegel went to the extreme objective side so Kierkegaard decided to go to
the extreme subjective side.
The
decision rests in the subject; the appropriation is the paradoxical
inwardness that is specifically different from all other inwardness.
Being a Christian is defined not by the “what” of Christianity but by
the “how” of the Christian. This “how” can fit only one thing, the
absolute paradox. Therefore there is no vague talk that being a
Christian means to accept and accept, and accept altogether differently,
to appropriate, to have faith, to appropriate in faith altogether
differently (nothing but rhetorical and sham definitions); but to have
faith is specifically qualified differently from all other appropriation
and inwardness. Faith is the objective uncertainty with the repulsion
of the absurd, held fast in the passion of inwardness, which is the
relation of inwardness intensified to its highest. This formula fits
only the one who has faith, no one else, not even a lover, or an
enthusiast, or a thinker, but solely and only the one who has faith, who
relates himself to the absolute paradox. Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Vol I Hong p. 610-611
Even some theistic realms of thought do not agree with the implications that this phrase carries. For instance, C. S. Lewis
argues against the idea that Christianity requires a "leap of faith,"
(as the term is most commonly understood). One of Lewis' arguments is
that supernaturalism, a basic tenet of Christianity, can be logically inferred based on a teleological
argument regarding the source of human reason. Nonetheless, some
Christians are less critical of the term and do accept that religion
requires a "leap of faith".
What is often missed is that Kierkegaard himself was an orthodox, Scandinavian Lutheran in conflict with the liberal theological establishment of his day. His works built on one another and culminated with the orthodox Lutheran
conception of a God that unconditionally accepts man, faith itself
being a gift from God, and that the highest moral position is reached
when a person realizes this and, no longer depending upon her or
himself, takes the leap of faith into the arms of a loving God. In a
Lutheran context, the leap of faith becomes much clearer.
Suppose that Jacobi
himself has made the leap; suppose that with the aid of eloquence he
manages to persuade a learner to want to do it. Then the learner has a
direct relation to Jacobi and consequently does not himself come to make
the leap. The direct relation between one human being and another is
naturally much easier and gratifies one’s sympathies and one’s own need
much more quickly and ostensibly more reliable. It is understood
directly, and there is no need of that dialectic of the infinite to keep
oneself infinitely resigned and infinitely enthusiastic in the sympathy
of the infinite, whose secret is the renunciation of the fancy that in
his God-relationship one human being is not the equal of another, which
makes the presumed teacher a learner who attends to himself and makes
all teaching a divine jest, because every human being is essentially
taught solely by God. Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Vol I Hong p. 610-611
Jacobi, Hegel, and C.S. Lewis wrote about Christianity in accordance
with their understanding but Kierkegaard didn't want to do that. He felt
that it was too dangerous to put in writing what was most holy to
himself. He said, "Not even what I am writing here is my innermost
meaning. I cannot entrust myself to paper in that way, even though I see
it in what is written. Think what could happen! The paper could
disappear; there could be a fire where I live and I could live in
uncertainty about whether it was burned or still existed; I could die
and thus leave it behind me; I could lose my mind and my innermost being
could be in alien hands; I could go blind and not be able to find it
myself, not know whether I stood with it in my hands without asking
someone else, not know whether he lied, whether he was reading what was
written there or something else in order to sound me out." Kierkegaard
was of the opinion that faith is something different from other things:
unexplainable and inexplicable. The more a person tries to explain
personal faith to another, the more entangled that person becomes in
language and semantics but "recollection" is "das Zugleich, the all-at-once," that always brings him back to himself.
The world has perhaps always had a lack of what could be called authentic individualities, decisive subjectivities, those artistically permeated with reflection, the independent thinkers
who differ from the bellowers and the didacticizers. The more objective
the world and individual subjectivities become, the more difficult it
becomes with the religious categories, which are precisely in the sphere
of subjectivity. That is why it is almost an irreligious exaggeration
to want to be world-historical, scholarly-scientific, and objective with
regard to the religious. But I have not summoned Lessing in order to
have someone to appeal to, because even wanting to be subjective enough
to appeal to another subjectivity is already an attempt to become
objective, is a first step toward getting the majority vote on one’s
side and one’s God-relationship transformed into a speculative
enterprise on the basis of probability and partnership and fellow
shareholders is the first step toward becoming objective. Concluding Unscientific Postscript p. 66
The appropriation of faith
Kierkegaard stuck to his concept of Christianity as an inner struggle
where the single individual stands before God rather than before others.
Because standing before God is where the decisive struggle occurs for
each single individual. Each single individual who has an "interest" in
becoming a Christian has a God-relationship which is different from any
other individual. The more we look to "others" for our God-relationship,
the more we have a simulated, mediated relationship with an idea. The
idea, or ideal, isn't the highest. But getting the idea off the paper or the drawing board and putting it to use in life is the absolute for the Christian. In Works of Love (1847) he wrote, "Love for the neighbor does not want to be sung about, it wants to be accomplished."
Christ didn't say one should think about loving the neighbor, he said,
"You shall love your neighbor as yourself." (Matthew 22.39) He put it
this way in Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions (1845) in Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846) in Sickness Unto Death (1849) and again in Works of Love (1847).
Ah,
it is much easier to look to the right and to the left than to look
into oneself, much easier to haggle and bargain just as it is also much
easier to underbid than to be silent-but the more difficult is still the
one thing needful. Even in daily life everyone experiences that it is
more difficult to stand directly before the person of distinction,
directly before his royal majesty, than to move in the crowd; to stand
alone and silent directly before the sharp expert is more difficult than
to speak in a common harmony of equals-to say nothing of being alone
directly before the Holy One and being silent. Søren Kierkegaard, Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions p. 31
Where is the boundary for the single individual in his concrete
existence between what is lack of will and what is lack of ability; what
is indolence and earthly selfishness and what is the limitation of
finitude? For an existing person, when is the period of preparation
over, when this question will not arise again in all its initial,
troubled severity; when is the time in existence that is indeed a
preparation? Let all the dialecticians convene-they will not be able to decide this for a particular individual in concreto. Søren Kierkegaard Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Hong p. 490
The lowest form of offense, humanly speaking
the most innocent, is to leave the whole issue of Christ undecided, to
pronounce in effect: 'I don't presume to judge the matter; I do not
believe, but I pass no judgement." ..... The next form of offense is the
negative, but passive form. Certainly it feels it cannot take no notice
of Christ, leaving this business of Christ in abeyance and carrying on a
busy life is something it is incapable of. But believing is something
it cannot do either; so it stays staring at one and the same point, at
the paradox. .... The final stage of offense is the positive form. It
declares Christianity to be untruth and a lie. It denies Christ (that he
has existed and that he is the one he claims to be) either Docetically or rationalistically,
so that either Christ does not become a particular human being, but
only appears to do so, or he becomes only a particular human being.
Søren Kierkegaard The Sickness Unto Death, Hannay p. 163-165
But
when it is a duty to love, then no test is needed and no insulting
foolhardiness of wanting to test, then love is higher than any test; it
has already more than stood the test in the same sense as faith “more
than conquers.” Testing is always related to possibility; it is always
possible that what is being tested would not stand the test. Therefore,
if someone wanted to test whether he has faith, or try to attain faith,
this really means he will prevent himself from attaining faith; he will
bring himself into the restlessness of craving where faith is never won,
for “You shall believe.” Works of Love, p. 33
Suppose that there were two men: a double-minded
man, who believes he has gained faith in a loving Providence, because
he had himself experienced having been helped, even though he had
hardheartedly sent away a sufferer whom he could have helped; and
another man whose life, by devoted love, was an instrument in the hand
of Providence,
so that he helped many suffering ones, although the help he himself had
wished continued to be denied him from year to year. Which of these two
was in truth convinced that there is a loving Providence that cares for
the suffering ones? Is it not a fair and a convincing conclusion: He
that planted the ear, shall he not hear.(Psalms 94:9).[30]
But turn it around, and is the conclusion not equally fair and
convincing: He whose life is sacrificing love shall he not trust that
God is love? Yet in the press of busyness there is neither time nor
quiet for the calm transparency which teaches equality, which teaches
the willingness to pull in the same yoke with other men, that noble
simplicity, that is in inner understanding with every man. There is
neither time nor quiet to win such a conviction. Therefore, in the press
of busyness even faith and hope and love and willing the Good become
only loose words and double-mindedness. Or is it not double-mindedness
to live without any conviction, or more rightly, to live in the
constantly and continually changing fantasy that one has and that one
has not a conviction!
In this fashion
feeling deceives the busy one into double-mindedness. Perhaps after the
flaming up of the contrition of repentance, if this turns into
emptiness, he had a conviction, at least so he believed, that there is a
mercy that forgives sins. But even in the forgiveness he strongly
denied any implication that he had been guilty of anything. Hence he
had, so he thought, believed in a conviction that such a mercy exists,
and yet in practice he denied its existence; in practice his attitude
seemed designed to prove that it did not exist. Suppose that there were
two men, that double-minded one, and then another man who would gladly
forgive his debtor, if he himself might only find mercy. Which of these
two was in truth convinced that such a mercy exists? The latter had
indeed this proof that it exists, that he himself practices it, the
former has no proof at all for himself, and only meets the contrary
proof which he himself presents. Or the double-minded one perhaps had a
feeling for right and wrong. It blazed strongly in him, especially if
someone would describe in a poetical manner the zealous men, who by
self-sacrifice in the service of truth, maintained righteousness and
justice. Then some wrong happened to this man himself. And then it
seemed to him as if there must appear some sign in heaven and upon earth
since the world order could no more sleep than he until this wrong was
put right again. And this was not self-love that inflamed him, but it was a feeling for justice, so he thought. And when he obtained his rights,
no matter how much wrong it had cost those around him, then once again
he praised the perfection of the world. Feeling had indeed carried him
away, but also it had so enraptured him that he had forgotten the most
important of all: to support righteousness and justice with
self-sacrifice in the service of the truth. For which of these two is
really convinced that justice exists in the world: the one that suffers
wrong for doing the right, or the one that does wrong in order to obtain
his right? Søren Kierkegaard, (1846) Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing, Steere p. 111-113
Kierkegaard, Goethe, Marx, and Tolstoy
Kierkegaard
questioned how a person changes. Some, like Hegel and Goethe, believed
that an external event was required for a new epoch to begin.
Kierkegaard disagreed because something might never happen in an
external way that would cause a person to change and a possibility for a
better life might be lost. Marx followed after Hegel and Goethe but
Tolstoy agreed more with Kierkegaard in his "view of life".
Goethe may have been mocking the idea that the birth of Christ
was what made him important or he may have seriously thought that his,
Goethe's, own birth made him important. Kierkegaard didn't believe that
Christ had this "upside-downness that wanted to reap before it sowed or
this kind of cowardliness that wanted to have certainty before it
began." Goethe began his autobiography with the certainty that his life was going to have a great effect on the world stage.
Within the first twenty pages of his autobiography Goethe had pointed to the 1755 Lisbon earthquake as another great life changing event in his life. Goethe's book was translated Truth and Poetry but was also translated Truth and Fiction.
Both authors seemed to be against having a fictional existence. Goethe
believed the existence of Christ was being fictionalized while
Kierkegaard believed the existence Goethe wrote about in his own
autobiography was fictional – and much of it was.
On the 28th of August, 1749, at mid-day, as the clock struck twelve, I came into the world, at Frankfort-on-the-Maine.
My horoscope was propitious: the sun stood in the sign of the Virgin,
and had culminated for the day; Jupiter and Venus looked on him with a
friendly eye, and Mercury not adversely; while Saturn and Mars kept
themselves indifferent; the Moon alone, just full, exerted the power of
her reflection all the more, as he had then reached her planetary hour.
She opposed herself, therefore, to my birth, which could not be
accomplished until this hour was passed. These good aspects, which the
astrologers managed subsequently to reckon very auspicious for me, may
have been the causes of my preservation; for, through the unskillfulness
[sic] of the midwife, I came into the world as dead, and only after
various efforts was I enabled to see the light. This event, which had
put our household into straights, turned to the advantage of my
fellow-citizens, inasmuch as my grandfather, the Schultheiss (judge), John Wolfgang Textor, took occasion from it to have an accoucheur established, and to introduce or revive the tuition of midwives, which may have done some good to those who were born after me.
Count Leo Tolstoy said he found out "there was no God" in 1838 when he was 12 years old.
He had to work through this idea for the next 38 years until he could
come away with a method by which he could believe, not only in God but
in Christ.
Kierkegaard heard the same from Hegelian philosophers and worked
through his doubt to belief but he opposed that method. His thought was
to start with faith and proceed forward making positive steps rather
than always falling back to start over after doubt had prevailed. He
said, "False doubt doubts everything except itself; with the help of
faith, the doubt that saves doubts only itself."
Kierkegaard didn't want to argue about his faith any more than he wanted
to argue about why he may or may not get married or become a professor.
He just wanted to make the movement from "possibility to actuality" and knew that he would just be wasting time if he tried to explain himself.
I
think that, just as a Christian always ought to be able to explain his
faith, so also a married man ought to be able to explain his marriage,
not simply to anyone who deigns to ask, but to anyone he thinks worthy
of it, or even if, as in this case, unworthy, he finds it propitious to
do so. Either/Or Part II, p. 88-89, Hong
Tolstoy
tried to explain the method he used to come to grips with the Christian
religion. He acted on his beliefs by freeing his serfs,
writing books to help them learn to read and giving them land to farm
and live on. He didn't argue and reason with his neighbors; he just did
what he set out to do.
Karl Marx complained about Hegelian philosophers in Theses on Feuerbach in this way, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways: the point, however, is to change it." Walter Kaufmann changed the quote to reflect the Kierkegaardian difference in his 1959 book, From Shakespeare to Existentialism:
His
[Kierkegaard's] relation to philosophy is best expressed by changing
one small word in Marx's famous dictum: "The philosophers have only
interpreted the world, in various ways: the point, however, is to
change"-not "it," as Marx said, but ourselves." p. 202
Only in changing oneself is one equal with another, according to
Kierkegaard because, in Christianity, all are equal before God. The
world is too abstract to change; but the single individual, you
yourself: that is something concrete. Kierkegaard put it this way in his Upbuilding Discourses of 1843-1844 and in his Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits of 1847:
The idea so frequently stressed in Holy Scripture for the purpose of
elevating the lowly and humbling the mighty, the idea that God does not
respect the status of persons, this idea the apostle wants to bring to
life in the single individual for application in his life. [...] In the
hallowed places, in every upbuilding view of life, the thought arises in
a person’s soul that help him to fight the good fight with flesh and
blood, with principalities and powers, and in the fight to free himself
for equality before God, whether this battle is more a war of aggression
against the differences that want to encumber him with worldly
favoritism or a defensive war against the differences that want to make
him anxious in worldly perdition. Only in this way is equality the
divine law, only in this way is the struggle the truth, only in this way
does the victory have validity- only when the single individual fights
for himself with himself within himself and does not unseasonably
presume to help the whole world to obtain external equality, which is of
very little benefit, all the less so because it never existed, if for
no other reason than that everyone would come to thank him and become
unequal before him, only in this way is equality the divine law.
Are you now living in such a way
that you are aware as a single individual, that in every relationship in
which you relate yourself outwardly you are aware that you are also
relating yourself to yourself as a single individual, that even in the
relationship we human beings so beautifully call the most intimate
(marriage) you recollect that you have an even more intimate
relationship, the relationship in which you as a single individual
relate yourself to yourself before God?
The idea behind world history and constant quantification dehumanizes
the quality known as the single individual and can produce "soul rot
due to the monotony of self-concern and self-preoccupation" with anxiety
about where you fit within the system. Language comes to the aid with
copious quantities of words to explain everything. But Kierkegaard says:
"the pathos of the ethical is to act."
The observer stares numbly into the
immense forest of the generations, and like someone who cannot see the
forest for the trees, he sees only the forest, not a single tree. He
hangs up curtains systematically and uses people and nations for that
purpose - individual human beings are nothing to him; even eternity
itself is draped with systematic surveys and ethical meaninglessness.
Poetry squanders poetically, but, far from fasting itself, it does not
dare to presuppose the divine frugality of the infinite that
ethically-psychologically does not need many human beings but needs the
idea all the more. No wonder, then, that one even admires the observer
when he is noble, heroic, or perhaps more correctly, absentminded enough
to forget that he, too, is a human being, an existing individual human
being! By steadily staring into that world-historical drama, he dies and
departs; nothing of him remains, or he himself remains like a ticket
the usher holds in his hands as a sign that now the spectator has gone.
If, however, becoming subjective is the highest task assigned to a human
being, then everything turns out beautifully. From this it first
follows that he no longer has anything to do with world history but in
that respect leaves everything to the royal poet. Second, there is not
squandering, for even though individuals are as innumerable as the sands
of the sea, the task of becoming subjective is indeed assigned to every
person. Finally, this does not deny the reality of the
world-historical development, which, reserved for God and eternity, has
both its time and its place.
As a rule repentance is identified
by one thing, that it acts. In our day, it perhaps is less subject to
being misunderstood in this way. I believe that neither Young nor Talleyrand
nor a more recent author was right in what they said about language,
why it exists, for I believe that it exists to strengthen and assist
people in abstaining from action. What to me is nonsense will perhaps
have a great effect and perhaps most of my acquaintances, if they were
to read these letters, would say: “Well, now we have understood him.”
You are the one
The
difference between Kierkegaard and Marx is that one applied everything
to himself while the other applied everything to someone else or to the
whole world. Appropriating information or a life-view
is difficult and it's more difficult the less one relies on the
opinions of others. Abraham just heard God's promises and they were
unreasonable but he had faith. This idea that the world has to be
reasonable or respond to human reason is one that omits the world of the
spirit. The world is abstract, the church is abstract, the world of the
spirit is abstract but the single individual is concrete if one wills
to be that. And the single individual relates himself or herself to the
world, the church, the world of the spirit, the environment, the
established order, the educational facilities in a unique way according
to Kierkegaard. The leap means to stop relating yourself to a crowd or a
race and then to the world, the church, the world of the spirit, the
environment, etc. Once the individual chooses to do that, the leap is
made, resolutions become possibilities and one's personality can be
developed in freedom.
Kierkegaard started out, in Either/Or
Part 1, by saying, "“You know how the prophet Nathan dealt with King
David when he presumed to understand the parable the prophet had told
him but was unwilling to understand that it applied to him. Then to make
sure, Nathan added: You are the man, O King. In the same way I also
have continually tried to remind you that you are the one who is being
discussed and you are the one who is spoken to.” He discussed this again in another way in Either/Or Part II where he begins: "The esthetic view also considers the personality
in relation to the surrounding world, and the expression for this is in
its recurrence in the personality of enjoyment. But the esthetic
expression for enjoyment in its relation to the personality is mood.
That is, the personality is present in the mood, but it is dimly
present. ... The mood of the person who lives ethically
is centralized. He is not in the mood, and he is not mood, but he has
mood and has the mood within himself. What he works for is continuity,
and this is always the master of mood. His life does not lack
mood-indeed, it has a total mood. But this is acquired; it is what would
be called aequale tempermentum [even disposition]. But this is no esthetic mood, and no person has it by nature or immediately." Later, in 1845, he repeated the same point in Stages on Life's Way with a story about an individual with an addiction to gambling and another individual who was a gambler but wasn't in despair because of it:
A gambler
comes to a standstill, repentance seizes him, he renounces all
gambling. Although he has been standing on the brink of the abyss,
repentance nevertheless hangs on to him, and it seems to be successful.
Living withdrawn as he does now, possibly saved, he one day sees the
body of a man drawn out on the Seine:
a suicide, and this was a gambler just as he himself had been, and he
knew that this gambler had struggled, had fought a desperate battle to
resist his craving. My gambler had loved this man, not because he was a
gambler, but because he was better than he was. What then? It is
unnecessary to consult romances and novels, but even a religious speaker
would very likely break off my story a little earlier and have it end
with my gambler, shocked by the sight, going home and thanking God for
his rescue. Stop. First of all we should have a little explanation, a
judgment pronounced on the other gambler; every life that is not
thoughtless eo ipso indirectly passes judgment. If the other
gambler had been callous, then he could certainly conclude: He did not
want to be saved. But this was not the case. No, my gambler is a man who
has understood the old saying de te narratur fabula [ the tale
is told to you]; he is no modern fool who believes that everyone should
court the colossal task of being able to rattle off something that
applies to the whole human race but not to himself. So what judgment shall he pass, and he cannot keep from doing it, for this de te is for him the most sacred law of life, because, it is the covenant of humanity. Søren Kierkegaard Stages on Life's Way p. 477-478 Hong
The visible
Church has suffered so broad an expansion that all the original
relationships have been reversed. Just as it once required energy and
determination to become a Christian, so now, though the renunciation be
not praiseworthy, it requires courage and energy to renounce the
Christian religion, while it needs only thoughtlessness to remain a
nominal Christian. The baptism of children may nevertheless be
defensible; no new custom needs to be introduced. But since the
circumstances are so radically changed, the clergy should themselves be
able to perceive that if it was once their duty, when only a very few
were Christians, to win men for Christianity, their present task must
rather be to win men by deterring them-for their misfortune is that they
are already Christians of a sort. Everyone knows that the most
difficult leap, even in the physical realm, is when a man leaps into the
air from a standing position and comes down again on the same spot. The
leap becomes easier in the degree to which some distance intervenes
between the initial position and the place where the leap takes off. And
so it is also with respect to a decisive movement in the realm of the
spirit. The most difficult decisive action is not that in which the
individual is far removed from the decision (as when a non-Christian is
about to decide to become one), but when it is as if the matter were
already decided. What is baptism without personal appropriation? It is
an expression for the possibility that the baptized child may become a
Christian, neither more nor less.
Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 326-327 (Problem of the Fragments) 1846, Swenson and Lowrie translation, 1941 Princeton University Press
Throughout his writings Kierkegaard reiterated his emphasis on the
single individual learning how to make a resolution. One example is the
following prayer from his April 26, 1848 book Christian Discourses.
Father in heaven, Thy grace and
mercy change not with the changing times, they grow not older with the
course of years, as if, like a man, Thou wert more gracious one day than
another, more gracious at first than at the last; Thy grace remains
unchanged as Thou are unchangeable, it is ever the same, eternally
young, new every day-for every day Thou sayest, ‘yet today’ (Hebrews 3:13).
Oh, but when one givest heed to this word, is impressed by it, and with
a serious, holy resolution says to himself, ‘yet today’-then for him
this means that this very day he desires to be changed, desires that
this very day might become important to him above all other days,
important because of renewed confirmation in the good he once chose, or
perhaps even because of his first choosing of the good. It is an
expression of Thy grace and mercy that every day Thou dost say, ‘yet
today’, but it would be to forfeit Thy grace and mercy and the season of
grace if a man were to say unchangeably from day to day, ‘yet today’;
for it is Thou that bestowest the season of grace ‘yet today’, but it is
man that must grasp the season of grace ‘yet today’. Thus it is we talk
with Thee, O God; between us there is a difference of language, and yet
we strive to make ourselves understood of Thee, and Thou doest not
blush to be called our God. That word which when Thou, O God, dost utter
it is the eternal expression of Thy unchangeable grace, that same word
when a man repeats it with due understanding is the strongest expression
of the deepest change and decision-yea, as if all were lost if this
change and decision did not come to pass ‘yet today’. So do Thou grant
to them that today are here assembled, to them that without external
prompting, and hence the more inwardly, have resolved ‘yet today’ to
seek reconciliation with Thee by the confession of their sins, to them
do Thou grant that this day may be truly blessed to them, that they may
hear His voice whom Thou didst send to the world, the voice of the Good
Shepherd, that He may know them, and that they may follow Him.
Soren Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses April 26, 1848 Lowrie 1961 Oxford University Press p. 275-276
