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Friday, May 28, 2021

Charter of the United Nations

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Uncharter.pdf
UN Charter
Drafted14 August 1941
Signed26 June 1945
LocationSan Francisco, California, United States
Effective24 October 1945
ConditionRatification by China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States and by a majority of the other signatory states.
Parties193
DepositaryUnited States
LanguagesArabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish

The United Nations Office at Geneva (Switzerland) is the second biggest UN centre, after the United Nations Headquarters (New York City).

The Charter of the United Nations (also known as the UN Charter) is the foundational treaty of the United Nations, an intergovernmental organization. It establishes the purposes, governing structure, and overall framework of the UN system, including its six principal organs: the Secretariat, the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Trusteeship Council.

The UN Charter mandates the UN and its member states to maintain international peace and security, uphold international law, achieve "higher standards of living" for their citizens, address "economic, social, health, and related problems", and promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." As a charter and constituent treaty, its rules and obligations are binding on all members and supersede those of other treaties.

During the Second World War, the Allied powers—known formally as the United Nationsagreed to establish a new postwar international organization. Pursuant to this goal, the UN Charter was discussed, prepared, and drafted during the San Francisco Conference that began 25 April 1945, which involved most of the world's sovereign nations. Following two-thirds approval of each part, the final text was unanimously adopted by delegates and opened for signature on 26 June 1945; it was signed in San Francisco, United States, by 50 of the 51 original member countries.

The Charter entered into force on 24 October 1945, following ratification by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security CouncilChina, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and a majority of the other signatories; this is considered the official starting date of the United Nations, with the first session of the General Assembly, representing all 51 initial members, opening in London the following January. The General Assembly formally recognized 24 October as United Nations Day in 1947, and declared it an official international holiday in 1971. With 193 parties, most countries have now ratified the Charter.

Summary

Insignia appeared in the frontispiece of the charter, prototype of the current logo of the United Nations.

The Charter consists of a preamble and 111 articles grouped into 19 chapters.

The preamble consists of two principal parts. The first part contains a general call for the maintenance of peace and international security and respect for human rights. The second part of the preamble is a declaration in a contractual style that the governments of the peoples of the United Nations have agreed to the Charter and it is the first international document regarding human rights.

The following chapters deal with the enforcement powers of UN bodies:

History

Background

The principles and conceptual framework of the United Nations were formulated incrementally through a series of conferences by the Allied nations during the Second World War. The Declaration of St James's Palace, issued in London on 12 June 1941, was the first joint statement of the goals and principles of the Allies, and the first to express a vision for a postwar world order. The Declaration called for the "willing cooperation of free peoples" so that "all may enjoy economic and social security".

Roughly two months later, the United States and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement elaborating these goals, known as the Atlantic Charter. It called for no territorial changes made against the wishes of the people, the right to self-determination for all peoples, restoration of self-government to those deprived of it, reduction of trade barriers, global cooperation to secure better economic and social conditions for the world, freedom from fear and want, freedom of the seas, and abandonment of the use of force, including mutual disarmament after the war. Many of these principles would inspire or form part of the UN Charter.

The following year, on 1 January 1942, representatives of thirty nations formally at war with the Axis powers—led by the "Big Four" powers of China, the Soviet Union, the U.K., and the U.S.—signed the Declaration by United Nations, which formalized the anti-Axis alliance and reaffirmed the purposes and principles of the Atlantic Charter. The following day, representatives of twenty-two other nations added their signatures. The term "United Nations" became synonymous with the Allies for the duration of the war, and was considered the formal name under which they were fighting. The Declaration by United Nations formed the basis of the United Nations Charter; virtually all nations that acceded to it would be invited to take part in the 1945 San Francisco Conference to discuss and prepare the Charter.

On 30 October 1943, the Declaration of the Four Nations, one of the four Moscow Declarations, was signed by the foreign ministers of the Big Four, calling for the establishment of a "general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

This was the first formal announcement that a new international organization was being contemplated to replace the moribund League of Nations.

Pursuant to the Moscow Declarations, from 21 August 1944 to 7 October 1944, the U.S. hosted the Dumbarton Oaks Conference to develop a blueprint for what would become the United Nations. Many of the rules, principles, and provisions of the UN Charter were discussed proposed during the conference, including the structure of the UN system; the creation of a "Security Council" to prevent future war and conflict; and the establishment of other "organs" of the organization, such as the General Assembly, International Court of Justice, and Secretariat. The conference was led by the Big Four, with delegates from other nation participating in the consideration and formulation of these principles.

The subsequent Yalta Conference in February 1945 between the U.S., U.K., and Soviet Union resolved the lingering debate regarding the voting structure of the proposed Security Council, calling for a "Conference of United Nations" in San Francisco on 25 April 1945 to "prepare the charter of such an organization, along the lines proposed in the formal conversations of Dumbarton Oaks.”

Drafting and adoption

The San Francisco Conference, formally the United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), began as scheduled on 25 April 1945 with the goal of drafting a charter that would create a new international organization. The Big Four, which sponsored the event, invited all forty-six signatories to the Declaration by United Nations. Conference delegates invited four more nations: Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, recently liberated Denmark and Argentina.

The conference was perhaps the largest international gathering up to that point, with 850 delegates, along with advisers and organizers, for a total of 3,500 participants. An additional 2,500 representatives from media and various civil society groups were also in attendance. Plenary meetings involving all delegates were chaired on a rotational basis by the lead delegates of the Big Four. Several committees were formed to facilitate and address different aspects of the drafting process, with over 400 meetings convened in the subsequent weeks. Following multiple reviews, debates, and revisions, a final full meeting was held on 25 June 1945 with the final proposed draft posed to attendees. Following unanimous approval, the Charter was signed by delegates the following day in Veterans' Memorial Hall.

Charter Provisions

Preamble

World War II poster from the United States on the UNITED NATIONS – PREAMBLE TO THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The Preamble to the treaty reads as follows:

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED
  • to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
  • to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
  • to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
  • to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
AND FOR THESE ENDS
  • to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and
  • to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
  • to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
  • to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,
HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS.

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

"WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS"

Although the Preamble is an integral part of the Charter, it does not set out any of the rights or obligations of member states; its purpose is to serve as an interpretative guide for the provisions of the Charter through the highlighting of some of the core motives of the founders of the organization.

Chapter I: Purposes And Principles

Article 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are

  1. To maintain international peace and security, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
  2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
  3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
  4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles:

  1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
  2. All Members, in order to ensure, to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
  3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
  4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
  5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
  6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
  7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

Chapter II: Membership

Chapter II of the United Nations Charter deals with membership of the United Nations organization

Chapter III: Organs

  1. There are established as principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.
  2. Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the present Charter.

Chapter IV: The General Assembly

Chapter V: The Security Council

COMPOSITION

Article 23

1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

FUNCTIONS and POWERS

Article 24

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.

3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

Article 26

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

VOTING

Article 27

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

PROCEDURE

Article 28

1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization.

2. The Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires, be represented by a member of the government or by some other specially designated representative.

3. The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work.

Article 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 30

The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its president.

Article 31

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.

Article 32

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.

Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes

Chapter VII: Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression

Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements

Chapter IX: International Economic and Social Co-operation

Chapter X: The Economic and Social Council

Chapter XI: Declaration regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories

Chapter XII: International Trusteeship System

Chapter XIII: The Trusteeship Council

Chapter XIV: The International Court of Justice

Chapter XV: The Secretariat

  • It comprises the Secretary-General and such other staff as the organization may require.
  • It provides services to the other organs of the United Nations, such as the General Assembly, the S.C, the ECOSOC, and the trusteeship council, as well as their subsidiary bodies.
  • The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of security council.
  • The staff of the secretariat is appointed by the Secretary-General according to the regulations laid down by the General Assembly.
  • The secretariat is located at the headquarters of the U.N in New York.
  • The secretariat also includes the regional commission secretariat at Baghdad, Bangkok, Geneva and Santiago.

Functions of the Secretariat

  1. preparation of report and other documents containing information, analysis, historical background research finding, policy suggestions and so forth, to facilitate deliberations and decision making by other organs.
  2. to facilitate legislative organs and their subsidiary bodies.
  3. provision of meeting services for the General Assembly and other organs
  4. provision of editorial, translation and document reproduction services for the issuance of UN documents in different language.
  5. conduct of studies and provision of information to various member states in meeting challenge in various fields
  6. preparation of statistical publication, information bulletin and analytical work which the General Assembly has decided
  7. organization of conferences experts group meetings and seminar on topics of concern to the international community
  8. provision of technical assistance to develop countries.
  9. understanding of service mission to countries, areas or location as authorized by the General Assembly or the security

Chapter XVI: Miscellaneous Provisions

Chapter XVII: Transitional Security Arrangements

Chapter XVIII: Amendments

The General Assembly has the power to amend the UN Charter. Amendments adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the Assembly need to ratified by two-thirds of the Member-States, including all the Permanent Members of the Security Council.

Chapter XIX: Ratification and Signature

Provided that the Charter would enter into force once ratified by the Permanent Five members of the United Nations Security Council and a majority of the other signatory states, and set forth related procedures, such as providing certified copies to ratifying governments.

Natural justice

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

A tondo of an allegory of justice (1508) by Raphael in the Stanza della Segnatura (Room of the Apostolic Signatura) of the Apostolic Palace, Vatican City

In English law, natural justice is technical terminology for the rule against bias (nemo iudex in causa sua) and the right to a fair hearing (audi alteram partem). While the term natural justice is often retained as a general concept, it has largely been replaced and extended by the general "duty to act fairly".

The basis for the rule against bias is the need to maintain public confidence in the legal system. Bias can take the form of actual bias, imputed bias or apparent bias. Actual bias is very difficult to prove in practice while imputed bias, once shown, will result in a decision being void without the need for any investigation into the likelihood or suspicion of bias. Cases from different jurisdictions currently apply two tests for apparent bias: the "reasonable suspicion of bias" test and the "real likelihood of bias" test. One view that has been taken is that the differences between these two tests are largely semantic and that they operate similarly.

The right to a fair hearing requires that individuals should not be penalized by decisions affecting their rights or legitimate expectations unless they have been given prior notice of the case, a fair opportunity to answer it, and the opportunity to present their own case. The mere fact that a decision affects rights or interests is sufficient to subject the decision to the procedures required by natural justice. In Europe, the right to a fair hearing is guaranteed by Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is said to complement the common law rather than replace it.

Background

The courtroom of the Supreme Court of Canada in Ottawa, Ontario. In 1999, the Court ruled in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) that the requirements of natural justice vary according to the context of the matter arising.

Natural justice is a term of art that denotes specific procedural rights in the English legal system and the systems of other nations based on it. It is similar to the American concepts of fair procedure and procedural due process, the latter having roots that to some degree parallel the origins of natural justice.

Although natural justice has an impressive ancestry and is said to express the close relationship between the common law and moral principles, the use of the term today is not to be confused with the "natural law" of the Canonists, the mediaeval philosophers' visions of an "ideal pattern of society" or the "natural rights" philosophy of the 18th century. Whilst the term natural justice is often retained as a general concept, in jurisdictions such as Australia, and the United Kingdom, it has largely been replaced and extended by the more general "duty to act fairly". Natural justice is identified with the two constituents of a fair hearing, which are the rule against bias (nemo iudex in causa sua, or "no man a judge in his own cause"), and the right to a fair hearing (audi alteram partem, or "hear the other side").

The requirements of natural justice or a duty to act fairly depend on the context. In Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999), the Supreme Court of Canada set out a list of non-exhaustive factors that would influence the content of the duty of fairness, including the nature of the decision being made and the process followed in making it, the statutory scheme under which the decision-maker operates, the importance of the decision to the person challenging it, the person's legitimate expectations, and the choice of procedure made by the decision-maker. Earlier, in Knight v Indian Head School Division No 19 (1990), the Supreme Court held that public authorities which make decisions of a legislative and general nature do not have a duty to act fairly, while those that carry out acts of a more administrative and specific nature do. Furthermore, preliminary decisions will generally not trigger the duty to act fairly, but decisions of a more final nature may have such an effect. In addition, whether a duty to act fairly applies depends on the relationship between the public authority and the individual. No duty exists where the relationship is one of master and servant, or where the individual holds office at the pleasure of the authority. On the other hand, a duty to act fairly exists where the individual cannot be removed from office except for cause. Finally, a right to procedural fairness only exists when an authority's decision is significant and has an important impact on the individual.

Rule against bias

In general

A person is barred from deciding any case in which he or she may be, or may fairly be suspected to be, biased. This principle embodies the basic concept of impartiality, and applies to courts of law, tribunals, arbitrators and all those having the duty to act judicially. A public authority has a duty to act judicially whenever it makes decisions that affect people's rights or interests, and not only when it applies some judicial-type procedure in arriving at decisions.

The basis on which impartiality operates is the need to maintain public confidence in the legal system. The erosion of public confidence undermines the nobility of the legal system and leads to ensuing chaos. The essence of the need for impartiality was observed by Lord Denning, the Master of the Rolls, in Metropolitan Properties Co (FGC) Ltd v Lannon (1968): "Justice must be rooted in confidence and confidence is destroyed when right-minded people go away thinking: 'The judge was biased.'"

Public confidence as the basis for the rule against bias is also embodied in the often-quoted words of Lord Hewart, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, that "[i]t is not merely of some importance, but of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly be seen to be done".

Forms of bias

Actual and imputed bias

A portrait of the Lord Chancellor, Lord Cottenham (Charles Pepys, 1st Earl of Cottenham, 1781–1851), by Charles Robert Leslie. In Dimes v Grand Junction Canal (1852), his Lordship was disqualified from hearing a case as he had a pecuniary interest in the outcome.

Bias may be actual, imputed or apparent. Actual bias is established where it is actually established that a decision-maker was prejudiced in favour of or against a party. However, in practice, the making of such an allegation is rare as it is very hard to prove.

One form of imputed bias is based on the decision-maker being a party to a suit, or having a pecuniary or proprietary interest in the outcome of the decision. Once this fact has been established, the bias is irrebuttable and disqualification is automatic—the decision-maker will be barred from adjudicating the matter without the need for any investigation into the likelihood or suspicion of bias. A classic case is Dimes v Grand Junction Canal (1852), which involved an action between Dimes, a local landowner, and the proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal, in which the Lord Chancellor, Lord Cottenham, had affirmed decrees made to the proprietors. However, it was discovered by Dimes that Lord Cottenham, in fact, owned several pounds' worth of shares in the Grand Junction Canal. This eventually led to the judge being disqualified from deciding the case. There was no inquiry as to whether a reasonable person would consider Lord Cottenham to be biased, or as to the circumstances which led Lord Cottenham to hear the case.

In certain limited situations, bias can also be imputed when the decision-maker's interest in the decision is not pecuniary but personal. This was established in the unprecedented case of R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.2) (1999). In an appeal to the House of Lords, the Crown Prosecution Service sought to overturn a quashing order made by the Divisional Court regarding extradition warrants made against the ex-Chilean dictator, Senator Augusto Pinochet. Amnesty International (AI) was given leave to intervene in the proceedings. However, one of the judges of the case, Lord Hoffmann, was a director and chairperson of Amnesty International Charity Ltd. (AICL), a company under the control of AI. He was eventually disqualified from the case and the outcome of the proceedings set aside. The House of Lords held that the close connection between AICL and AI presented Lord Hoffmann with an interest in the outcome of the litigation. Even though it was non-pecuniary, the Law Lords took the view that the interest was sufficient to warrant Lord Hoffmann's automatic disqualification from hearing the case. In Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd (1999), the Court of Appeal warned against any further extension of the automatic disqualification rule, "unless plainly required to give effect to the important underlying principles upon which the rule is based".

Apparent bias

Apparent bias is present where a judge or other decision-maker is not a party to a matter and does not have an interest in its outcome, but through his or her conduct or behaviour gives rise to a suspicion that he or she is not impartial. An issue that has arisen is the degree of suspicion which would provide the grounds on which a decision should be set aside for apparent bias. Currently, cases from various jurisdictions apply two different tests: "real likelihood of bias" and "reasonable suspicion of bias".

The real likelihood test centres on whether the facts, as assessed by the court, give rise to a real likelihood of bias. In R v Gough (1993), the House of Lords chose to state the test in terms of a "real danger of bias", and emphasized that the test was concerned with the possibility, not probability, of bias. Lord Goff of Chievely also stated that "the court should look at the matter through the eyes of a reasonable man, because the court in cases such as these personifies the reasonable man". However, the test in Gough has been disapproved of in some Commonwealth jurisdictions. One criticism is that the emphasis on the court's view of the facts gives insufficient emphasis to the perception of the public. These criticisms were addressed by the House of Lords in Porter v Magill (2001). The Court adjusted the Gough test by stating it to be "whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased". This case therefore established the current test in the UK to be one of a "real possibility of bias".

On the other hand, the reasonable suspicion test asks whether a reasonable and fair-minded person sitting in court and knowing all the relevant facts would have a reasonable suspicion that a fair trial for the litigant is not possible. Although not currently adopted in the UK, this test has been endorsed by the Singapore courts.

It has been suggested that the differences between the two tests are largely semantic and that the two tests operate similarly. In Locabail, the judges stated that in a large proportion of the cases, application of the two tests would lead to the same outcome. It was also held that "[p]rovided that the court, personifying the reasonable man, takes an approach which is based on broad common sense, and without inappropriate reliance on special knowledge, the minutiae of court procedure or other matters outside the ken of the ordinary, reasonably well-informed members of the public, there should be no risk that the courts will not ensure both that justice is done and that it is perceived by the public to be done". In the Singapore High Court decision Tang Kin Hwa v. Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners Board (2005), Judicial Commissioner Andrew Phang observed that the real likelihood test is in reality similar to that of reasonable suspicion. First, likelihood is in fact "possibility", as opposed to the higher standard of proof centring on "probability". Secondly, he suggested that real in real likelihood cannot be taken to mean "actual", as this test relates to apparent and not actual bias. He also observed that both the court's and the public's perspectives are "integral parts of a holistic process" with no need to draw a sharp distinction between them.

In contrast, in Re Shankar Alan s/o Anant Kulkarni (2006), Judicial Commissioner Sundaresh Menon thought that there was a real difference between the reasonable suspicion and real likelihood tests. In his opinion, suspicion suggests a belief that something that may not be provable could still be possible. Reasonable suggests that the belief cannot be fanciful. Here the issue is whether it is reasonable for the one to harbour the suspicions in the circumstances even though the suspicious behaviour could be innocent. On the other hand, likelihood points towards something being likely, and real suggests that this must be substantial rather than imagined. Here, then, the inquiry is directed more towards the actor than the observer. The issue is the degree to which a particular event is not likely or possible Menon J.C. also disagreed with both Lord Goff in Gough and Phang J.C. in Tang Kin Hwa in that he thought the shift of the inquiry from how the matter might appear to a reasonable man to whether the judge thinks there is a sufficient possibility of bias was "a very significant point of departure". The real likelihood test is met as long as the court is satisfied that there is a sufficient degree of possibility of bias. Although this a lower standard than satisfaction on a balance of probabilities, this is actually directed at mitigating the sheer difficulty of proving actual bias, especially given its insidious and often subconscious nature. The reasonable suspicion test, however, is met if the court is satisfied that a reasonable member of the public could harbour a reasonable suspicion of bias even though the court itself thought there was no real danger of this on the facts. The difference is that the driver behind this test is the strong public interest in ensuring public confidence in the administration of justice. As of September 2011, the Court of Appeal of Singapore had not yet expressed a view as to whether the position taken in Tang Kin Hwa or Shankar Alan is preferable.

Exceptions to the rule against bias

Necessity

There are cases in which a disqualified adjudicator cannot be replaced, as no one else is authorized to act. It has been observed that "disqualification of an adjudicator will not be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with power to act". In such cases, natural justice has to give way to necessity in order to maintain the integrity of judicial and administrative systems.

This issue regarding necessity was raised in Dimes. The Lord Chancellor had to sign an order for enrolment in order to allow the appeal to proceed from the Vice-Chancellor to the House of Lords. It was held that his shareholding in the canal company which barred him from sitting in the appeal did not affect his power to enroll, as no one but him had the authority to do so. It was mentioned this was allowed "for this [was] a case of necessity, and where that occurs the objection of interest cannot prevail".

Waiver

The court normally requests that an objection be taken as soon as the prejudiced party has knowledge of the bias. If an objection is not raised and proceedings are allowed to continue without disapproval, it will be held that the party has waived its right to do so.

Effect of a finding of bias

In Dimes, the judges advised the House of Lords that Lord Cottenham's pecuniary interest made his judgment not void, but voidable. This advice is not wrong in the context of a judicial act under review, where the judgment will be held valid unless reversed on appeal.

However, in the cases of administrative acts or decisions under judicial review, the court can only intervene on the grounds of ultra vires, hence making the judgment void. Lord Esher said in Allison v General Council of Medical Education and Registration (1894) that the participation of a disqualified person "certainly rendered the decision wholly void".

Right to a fair hearing

In general

A hearing of the International Court of Justice in 2006 presided over by its president, Her Excellency Dame Rosalyn Higgins. A fundamental aspect of natural justice is that before a decision is made, all parties should be heard on the matter.

It has been suggested that the rule requiring a fair hearing is broad enough to include the rule against bias since a fair hearing must be an unbiased hearing. However, the rules are often treated separately. It is fundamental to fair procedure that both sides should be heard. The right to a fair hearing requires that individuals are not penalized by decisions affecting their rights or legitimate expectations unless they have been given prior notice of the cases against them, a fair opportunity to answer them, and the opportunity to present their own cases.

Besides promoting an individual's liberties, the right to a fair hearing has also been used by courts as a base on which to build up fair administrative procedures. It is now well established that it is not the character of the public authority that matters but the character of the power exercised. However, in the United Kingdom prior to Ridge v Baldwin (1963), the scope of the right to a fair hearing was severely restricted by case law following Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works (1863). In R v Electricity Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co. (1920), Ltd. (1923), Lord Atkin observed that the right only applied where decision-makers had "the duty to act judicially". In natural justice cases this dictum was generally understood to mean that a duty to act judicially was not to be inferred merely from the impact of a decision on the rights of subjects; such a duty would arise only if there was a "superadded" express obligation to follow a judicial-type procedure in arriving at the decision.

In Ridge v Baldwin, Lord Reid reviewed the authorities extensively and attacked the problem at its root by demonstrating how the term judicial had been misinterpreted as requiring some additional characteristic over and above the characteristic that the power affected some person's rights. In his view, the mere fact that the power affects rights or interests is what makes it "judicial" and so subject to the procedures required by natural justice. This removal of the earlier misconception as to the meaning of judicial is thought to have given the judiciary the flexibility it needed to intervene in cases of judicial review.

The mere fact that a decision-maker is conferred wide discretion by law is not reason enough for a weakening of the requirements of natural justice. In the United Kingdom context, this is demonstrated by Ahmed v H.M. Treasury (No. 1) (2010). The Treasury had exercised powers to freeze the appellants' financial assets and economic resources on the ground that it reasonably suspected the appellants were or might be persons who had committed, attempted to commit, participated in or facilitated the commission of terrorism, pursuant to the Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2006 and the Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2006 made under the United Nations Act 1946. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom held that since the Al-Qaida Order made no provision for basic procedural fairness, it effectively deprived people designated under the order the fundamental right of access to a judicial remedy and hence was ultra vires the power conferred by the United Nations Act 1946 for the making of the Order.

Article 6 of the European Convention

The right to a fair hearing is also referred to in Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which states:

In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ...

Article 6 does not, however, replace the common law duty to ensure a fair hearing. It has been suggested that Article 6 alone is not enough to protect procedural due process, and only with the development of a more sophisticated common law will the protection of procedural due process extend further into the administrative machine. Nonetheless, Article 6 supplements the common law. For example, the common law does not impose a general duty to give reasons for a decision, but under Article 6(1) a decision-maker must give a reasoned judgment so as to enable an affected individual to decide whether to appeal.

Aspects of a fair hearing

Prior notice of hearing

Natural justice allows a person to claim the right to adequate notification of the date, time, place of the hearing as well as detailed notification of the case to be met. This information allows the person adequate time to effectively prepare his or her own case and to answer the case against him or her. In Cooper v Wandsworth, Chief Justice William Erle went so far as to state that the lack of notice and hearing afforded to Cooper could be said to be a form of abuse, as he had been treated as if he did not matter. As Lord Mustill famously held in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p Doody (1993): "Since the person affected usually cannot make worthwhile representations without knowing what factors may weigh against his interests fairness will very often require that he is informed of the gist of the case which he has to answer."

It has been suggested that the requirement of prior notice serves three important purposes:

  • The interest in good outcomes – giving prior notice increases the value of the proceedings as it is only when the interested person knows the issues and the relevant information that he or she can make a useful contribution.
  • The duty of respect – the affected person has the right to know what is at stake, and it is not enough to simply inform him or her that there will be a hearing.
  • The rule of law – notice of issues and disclosure of information opens up the operations of the public authority to public scrutiny.

The British courts have held it is not enough for an affected person to merely be informed of a hearing. He or she must also be told what is at stake; in other words, the gist of the case.

Opportunity to be heard

Every person has the right to have a hearing and be allowed to present his or her own case. Should a person not attend the hearing, even with adequate notice given, the adjudicator has the discretion to decide if the hearing should proceed. In Ridge v Baldwin, a chief constable succeeded in having his dismissal from service declared void as he had not been given the opportunity to make a defence. In another case, Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans (1982), a chief constable required a police probationer to resign on account of allegations about his private life which he was given no fair opportunity to rebut. The House of Lords found the dismissal to be unlawful. Likewise in Surinder Singh Kanda v Federation of Malaya (1962), a public servant facing disciplinary proceedings was not supplied with a copy of a prejudicial report by a board of inquiry which the adjudicating officer had access to before the hearing. The Privy Council held that the proceedings had failed to provide him a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

However, this requirement does not necessarily mean the decision-maker has to meet the complainant face to face—"Natural justice does not generally demand orality". It has been suggested that an oral hearing will almost be as good as useless if the affected person has no prior knowledge of the case. In Lloyd v McMahon (1987), an oral hearing did not make a difference to the facts on which the case was based. Giving judgment in the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, Lord Justice Harry Woolf held that an oral hearing may not always be the "very pith of the administration of natural justice". It has also been suggested that an oral hearing is only required if issues concerning deprivations of legal rights or legally protected interests arise.

Conduct of the hearing

When deciding how the hearing should be conducted, the adjudicator has to ask whether the person charged has a proper opportunity to consider, challenge or contradict any evidence, and whether the person is also fully aware of the nature of the allegations against him or her so as to have a proper opportunity to present his or her own case. In Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (2009), Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers said:

The best way of producing a fair trial is to ensure that a party to it has the fullest information of both the allegations that are made against him and the evidence relied upon in support of those allegations. Where the evidence is documentary, he should have access to the documents. Where the evidence consists of oral testimony, then he should be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses who give that testimony, whose identities should be disclosed.

However, when a hearing requires the balancing of multiple polycentric issues such as natural justice and the protection of confidential information for national security reasons, both the concerns of public security and the right to a fair trial must be adequately met. It was held by the House of Lords in AF, applying the decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights A v United Kingdom (2009), that a person accused of terrorism against whom a control order has been issued must be given sufficient information about the allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions to his special advocate. If this requirement is satisfied, a fair hearing can be conducted without detailed disclosure of confidential information that might compromise national security. On the facts of the case, a special advocate was not permitted further contact with an applicant or his ordinary legal representatives except with permission of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) after viewing confidential (or "closed") materials. The House of Lords recognized that although a special advocate's usefulness is stymied somewhat from having no further instructions after viewing such materials, if the SIAC decides to issue a control order predominantly on the basis of non-confidential (or "open") materials, an applicant cannot be regarded as having been denied an opportunity to challenge the reasonableness of the government's beliefs and suspicions about him. If the evidence against the applicant is largely closed but allegations contained in open material are sufficiently specific, an applicant should be able to provide his legal representatives and special advocate with information to refute it (such as an alibi, if the open material alleges he was at a certain place during a certain period) without having to know the detail or sources of the closed evidence. However, if the evidence revealed to the person consists only of general assertions and the case against him is based solely or to a substantive extent on undisclosed adverse evidence, the fair hearing rule under natural justice will not be satisfied.

In such cases, there are strong policy considerations supporting the principle that a trial procedure can never be considered fair if a person is kept in ignorance of the case against him or her. First, since the grounds for a reasonable suspicion that a person is involved in terrorist activity can span from incontrovertible evidence to an innocent misinterpretation of facts which can be explained away by the person, in many cases it is impossible for courts to be sure that the disclosure of the evidence will make no difference to the applicant. Secondly, resentment will be felt by the person and his family and friends if sanctions are imposed without any proper explanation of the grounds and when, due to the non-disclosure of information, the person is put in a position where he is unable to properly defend himself. As Lord Phillips put it, "if the wider public are to have confidence in the justice system, they need to be able to see that justice is done rather than being asked to take it on trust".

The right to be heard in answer to charges before an unbiased tribunal is illustrated in the Singapore case Tan Boon Chee David v. Medical Council of Singapore (1980). During a disciplinary hearing, council members were either not conscientious about their attendance or did not attend the whole course of proceedings. This meant they did not hear all the oral evidence and submissions. The High Court held that this had substantially prejudiced the appellant and constituted a fundamental breach of natural justice. On the other hand, mere absence from a hearing does not necessarily lead to undue prejudice. It was held in Re Teo Choo Hong (1995) that the function of a lay member of a lawyers' disciplinary committee was to observe and not cast a vote or make a judgment. Thus, the appellant had not suffered undue prejudice.

On the basis of reciprocity, if one side is allowed to cross-examine his legal opponent at a hearing, the other party must also be given the same opportunity. In addition, when a tribunal decides a case on a basis not raised or contemplated by the parties, or decides it without regarding the submissions and arguments made by the parties on the issues, this will amount to a breach of natural justice. However, a genuine bona fide mistake by an adjudicator in omitting to state reasons for not considering a submission is not enough to be a breach of natural justice. This may occur when the submissions were accidentally omitted, or were so unconvincing that it was not necessary to explicitly state the adjudicator's findings.

Right to legal representation

There is no inherent common law right to legal representation before a domestic tribunal. A tribunal has the discretion to admit either a legally qualified or unqualified counsel to assist the person appearing before it, based on the facts of the case. When assessing whether a party should be offered legal assistance, the adjudicator should first ask whether the right to be heard applies, and, secondly, whether counsel's assistance is needed for an effective hearing given the subject matter, bearing in mind the consequences of such a denial.

In R v Secretary of State for Home Department, ex parte Tarrant (1983), Webster J. set out six factors to be considered when deciding whether to allow representation by counsel, namely:

  • the seriousness of the charge and the potential penalty;
  • whether any points of law are likely to arise.;
  • whether the prisoner is capable of presenting his own case;
  • whether there are any procedural difficulties faced by prisoners in conducting their own defence;
  • whether there is reasonable speed in making the adjudication; and
  • whether there is a need for fairness between prisoners or between prisoners and prison officers.

It has also been suggested that where a tribunal hearing concerns the individual's reputation or right to livelihood, there is a greater need for allowing legal representation as this vindicates the idea of equality before the law.

When one refuses legal representation, one cannot expect to receive a higher "standard" of natural justice. This was enunciated in Singapore in Ho Paul v. Singapore Medical Council (2008). Dr. Ho, who had been charged with professional misconduct, chose to appear before the council in person and declined to cross-examine the council's key witness. Subsequently, he argued that he should have been warned of the legal implications of not being legally represented. The High Court rejected this argument and held he had suffered no prejudice. Dr. Ho had been given a fair opportunity of presenting his own case and, most importantly, had not been deprived of his right to cross-examine the witnesses.

It is also not a court's obligation to provide assistance when a party presents his or her case without legal representation. In Rajeevan Edakalavan v. Public Prosecutor (1998), the accused had appeared in person before a magistrate and had entered a plea of guilt. He later petitioned the High Court for criminal revision, arguing that as the magistrate had not informed him of the defences available to him, his plea had been equivocal. The Court held:

The onus [of informing the accused of his defence options or what could be more advantageous to his case] does not shift to the judge (or the Prosecution, for that matter) simply because the accused is unrepresented. That will be placing too onerous a burden on the judge. Furthermore, the judge will be performing two completely incompatible and irreconcilable roles—one as the adjudicator, the other as the de facto defence counsel.

In Singapore, the right to legal representation is contingent on the nature of the inquiry. However, since Article 12 of the Constitution of Singapore guarantees equal protection under the law, it has been suggested that greater weightage should be accorded to this procedural right when balancing it against the competing demand of efficiency.

The decision and reasons for it

Currently, the principles of natural justice in the United Kingdom and certain other jurisdictions do not include a general rule that reasons should be given for decisions. In R v Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shaw (1951), Denning L.J. stated: "I think the record must contain at least the document which initiates the proceedings; the pleadings, if any; and the adjudication; but not the evidence, nor the reasons, unless the tribunal chooses to incorporate them. If the tribunal does state its reasons, and those reasons are wrong in law, certiorari lies to quash the decision." It has been stated that "no single factor has inhibited the development of English administrative law as seriously as the absence of any general obligation upon public authorities to give reasons for their decisions".

Historically, uncontrolled public decisions have led to poor outcomes and disrespect for the decision-makers. Such decisions also lacked the regularity and transparency that distinguish them from the mere say-so of public authorities. On such grounds, there are obvious benefits for the disclosure of reasons for decisions. First, procedural participation by people affected by a decision promotes the rule of law by making it more difficult for the public authority to act arbitrarily. Requiring the giving of reasons helps ensure that decisions are carefully thought through, which in turn aids in the control of administrative discretion. Secondly, accountability makes it necessary for the public authority to face up to the people affected by a decision. When a public authority acts on all the relevant considerations, this increases the probability of better decision outcomes and, as such, is beneficial to public interests. Another important benefit is that respect for decision-makers is fostered, which increases their integrity in the public's eyes.

 

Nuremberg principles

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuremberg_principles

The Nuremberg principles are a set of guidelines for determining what constitutes a war crime. The document was created by the International Law Commission of the United Nations to codify the legal principles underlying the Nuremberg Trials of Nazi party members following World War II.

The principles

Principle I

Any person who commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to punishment.

Principle II

The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty for an act which constitutes a crime under international law does not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility under international law.

Principle III

The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under international law, acted as Head of State or responsible government official, does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.

Principle IV

The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.

This principle could be paraphrased as follows: "It is not an acceptable excuse to say 'I was just following my superior's orders'".

Previous to the time of the Nuremberg Trials, this excuse was known in common parlance as "superior orders". After the prominent, high-profile event of the Nuremberg Trials, that excuse is now referred to by many as the "Nuremberg Defense". In recent times, a third term, "lawful orders" has become common parlance for some people. All three terms are in use today, and they all have slightly different nuances of meaning, depending on the context in which they are used.

Nuremberg Principle IV is legally supported by the jurisprudence found in certain articles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which deal indirectly with conscientious objection. It is also supported by the principles found in paragraph 171 of the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status which was issued by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Those principles deal with the conditions under which conscientious objectors can apply for refugee status in another country if they face persecution in their own country for refusing to participate in an illegal war.

Principle V

Any person charged with a crime under international law has the right to a fair trial on the facts and law.

Principle VI

The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes under international law:

(a) Crimes against peace:
(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances;
(ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i).
(b) War crimes:
Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the Seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.
(c) Crimes against humanity:
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime against peace or any war crime.
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.

Principle VII

Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under international law.

The Principles' power or lack of power

In the period just prior to the June 26, 1945 signing of the Charter of the United Nations, the governments participating in its drafting were opposed to conferring on the United Nations legislative power to enact binding rules of international law. As a corollary, they also rejected proposals to confer on the General Assembly the power to impose certain general conventions on states by some form of majority vote. There was, however, strong support for conferring on the General Assembly the more limited powers of study and recommendation, which led to the adoption of Article 13 in Chapter IV of the Charter. It obliges the United Nations General Assembly to initiate studies and to make recommendations that encourage the progressive development of international law and its codification. The Nuremberg Principles were developed by UN organs under that limited mandate.

Unlike treaty law, customary international law is not written. To prove that a certain rule is customary one has to show that it is reflected in state practice and that there exists a conviction in the international community that such practice is required as a matter of law. (For example, the Nuremberg Trials were a "practice" of the "international law" of the Nuremberg Principles; and that "practice" was supported by the international community.) In this context, "practice" relates to official state practice and therefore includes formal statements by states. A contrary practice by some states is possible. If this contrary practice is condemned by other states then the rule is confirmed.

In 1947, under UN General Assembly Resolution 177 (II), paragraph (a), the International Law Commission was directed to "formulate the principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the judgment of the Tribunal." In the course of the consideration of this subject, the question arose as to whether or not the Commission should ascertain to what extent the principles contained in the Charter and judgment constituted principles of international law. The conclusion was that since the Nuremberg Principles had been affirmed by the General Assembly, the task entrusted to the Commission was not to express any appreciation of these principles as principles of international law but merely to formulate them. The text above was adopted by the Commission at its second session. The Report of the Commission also contains commentaries on the principles (see Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1950, Vol. II, pp. 374–378).

Examples of the principles supported and not supported

The 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Concerning Nuremberg Principle IV, and its reference to an individual's responsibility, it could be argued that a version of the Superior Orders defense can be found as a defense to international crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. (The Rome Statute was agreed upon in 1998 as the foundational document of the International Criminal Court, established to try those individuals accused of serious international crimes.) Article 33, titled "Superior Orders and prescription of law," states:

1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless:

  • (a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or the superior in question;
  • (b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and
  • (c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.

2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful.

There are two interpretations of this Article:

  • This formulation, especially (1)(a), whilst effectively prohibiting the use of the Nuremberg Defense in relation to charges of genocide and crimes against humanity, does however, appear to allow the Nuremberg Defense to be used as a protection against charges of war crimes, provided the relevant criteria are met.
  • Nevertheless, this interpretation of ICC Article 33 is open to debate: For example, Article 33 (1)(c) protects the defendant only if "the order was not manifestly unlawful." The "order" could be considered "unlawful" if we consider Nuremberg Principle IV to be the applicable "law" in this case. If so, then the defendant is not protected. Discussion as to whether or not Nuremberg Principle IV is the applicable law in this case is found in a discussion of the Nuremberg Principles' power or lack of power.

Canada

Nuremberg Principle IV, and its reference to an individual's responsibility, was also at issue in Canada in the case of Hinzman v. Canada. Jeremy Hinzman was a U.S. Army deserter who claimed refugee status in Canada as a conscientious objector, one of many Iraq War resisters. Hinzman's lawyer, Jeffry House, had previously raised the issue of the legality of the Iraq War as having a bearing on their case. The Federal Court ruling was released on March 31, 2006, and denied the refugee status claim. In the decision, Justice Anne L. Mactavish addressed the issue of personal responsibility:

An individual must be involved at the policy-making level to be culpable for a crime against peace ... the ordinary foot soldier is not expected to make his or her own personal assessment as to the legality of a conflict. Similarly, such an individual cannot be held criminally responsible for fighting in support of an illegal war, assuming that his or her personal war-time conduct is otherwise proper.

On Nov 15, 2007, a quorum of the Supreme Court of Canada consisting of Justices Michel Bastarache, Rosalie Abella, and Louise Charron refused an application to have the Court hear the case on appeal, without giving reasons.

 

Lie point symmetry

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lie_point_symmetry     ...