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Thursday, December 30, 2021

World War II casualties of the Soviet Union

Dead Soviet civilians near Minsk, Belarus, 1943
 
Kiev, 23 June 1941
 
A victim of starvation in besieged Leningrad suffering from muscle atrophy in 1941

World War II losses of the Soviet Union from all related causes were about 27,000,000 both civilian and military, although exact figures are disputed. A figure of 20 million was considered official during the Soviet era. The post-Soviet government of Russia puts the Soviet war losses at 26.6 million, on the basis of the 1993 study by the Russian Academy of Sciences, including people dying as a result of effects of the war. This includes 8,668,400 military deaths as calculated by the Russian Ministry of Defence.

The figures published by the Ministry of Defence have been accepted by most historians outside Russia. However, the official figure of 8.7 million military deaths has been disputed by Russian scholars who believe that the number of dead and missing POWs is not correct and new research is necessary to determine actual losses. Officials at the Russian Central Defense Ministry Archive (CDMA) maintain that their database lists the names of roughly 14 million dead and missing service personnel. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev stated in 2009 that "data about our losses haven't been revealed yet...We must determine the historical truth." He added that more than 2.4 million people are still officially considered missing in action, of the 9.5 million persons buried in mass graves, six million are unidentified. Some Russian scholars put the total number of losses in the war, both civilian and military, at over 40 million. In 2020 Mikhail Meltyukhov, who works with the Russian Federal archival project, stated that 15.9-17.4 million civilians were killed on Soviet territory by the Nazis during the war.

Summary of Russian sources

The war related deaths detailed in Russian sources are as follows.

  • The Krivosheev study listed 8,668,400 irreplaceable losses (from listed strength): 5,226,800 killed in action, 1,102,800 died of wounds in field hospitals, 555,500 non combat deaths, POW deaths and missing were 4,559,000. Deductions were 939,700 who "were encircled or missing in action in occupied areas who were reconscripted once areas liberated" and 1,836,000 POWs returned from captivity.
  • The Krivosheev study listed 500,000 reservists captured by the enemy after being conscripted but before being taken on strength.
  • Russian sources report 2,164,000 deaths as civilian "forced labor in Germany". Viktor Zemskov believed that these were actually military deaths not included in the Krivosheev report. Zemskov put the military death toll at 11.5 million.
  • Convicts and deserters listed in the Krivosheev study. 994,300 were sentenced by court martial and 212,400 were reported as deserters. They are not included with the 8,668,000 irreplaceable losses listed by Krivosheev.
  • Russian sources list 7.420 million civilians killed in the war, including the siege of Leningrad. Sources cited for this figure are from the Soviet period. The figure of 7.4 million has been disputed by Viktor Zemskov who believed that the actual civilian death toll was at least 4.5 million. He maintained that the official figures included POWs, persons who emigrated from the country, persons evacuated during the war counted as missing as well as militia and partisan fighters.
  • Russian sources maintain that there were 4.1 million famine deaths in the regions occupied by Germany.
  • Gulag prisoners. According to Viktor Zemskov "due to general difficulties in 1941–1945 in the camps, the GULAG and prisons about 1.0 million prisoners died. Anne Applebaum cites Russian sources that put the Gulag death toll from 1941 to 1945 at 932,000.
  • Deportation of ethnic minorities. Russian sources put the death toll at 309,000.
  • War-related deaths of those born during war – according to Andreev, Darski and Kharkova (ADK), there was an increase in infant mortality of 1.3 million.

Military losses

Krivosheev's analysis

1993 Russian Ministry of Defense report authored by a group headed by General G. F. Krivosheev detailed military casualties. Their sources were Soviet reports from the field and other archive documents that were secret during the Soviet era, including a secret Soviet General Staff report from 1966 to 1968. Krivosheev's study puts Soviet military dead and missing at 8.7 million and is often cited by historians. Krivosheev maintained that the figure of 8.668 million is correct because it excludes called up reservists that were never inducted, men who were duplicated as conscripts because they were conscripted again into the Soviet army and Navy during the war as territories were being liberated and non-combat related causes. The statistic of 8.668 million military dead includes only the combat related deaths of the forces in the field units of the Army and Navy and does not include civilian support forces in rear areas, conscripted reservists killed before being listed on active strength, militia units, and Soviet partisan dead, Krivosheev maintained that they should be included with civilian war losses.

Soviet World War II military casualties 1939–45 by period

Dead and missing Wounded and sick
Battle of Khalkhin Gol 1939 9,703 15,952
Invasion of Poland 1939 1,475 2,383
Winter War 1939–40 126,875 264,908
World War II 1941–45 8,668,400 22,326,905
(including 14,685,593 wounded and 7,641,312 sick)
Total 8,806,453 22,610,148

The schedule below summarizes Soviet casualties from 1941 to 1945.

Starting attack in Leningrad battlefront
 
Military dead and missing (1941–45) by cause
Cause Estimate
KIA or died of wounds 6,329,600
Missing in action 500,000
Noncombat deaths of units at the front
(sickness, accidents, etc.)
555,500
Died or killed while POW 1,283,200
Total irrecoverable losses (from listed strength) 8,668,400

Soviet prisoners of war
 
Reconciliation of missing
Missing in action 500,000
Missing later re-conscripted 940,000
POW deaths 1,283,000 
POW returned to USSR 1,836,000
Total reported missing 4,559,000

Krivosheev's analysis shows that 4,559,000 were reported missing (including 3,396,400 per field reports and an additional 1,162,600 estimated based on German documents), out of which 500,000 were missing and presumed dead, 939,700 were re-conscripted during the war as territories were liberated, 1,836,000 returned to the U.S.S.R. after the war, while the balance of 1,283,300 died in German captivity as POWs or did not return to the USSR. Krivoshhev wrote, "According to German sources 673,000 died in captivity. Of the remaining 1,110,300, Soviet sources indicate that over half also died in captivity". Sources published outside of Russia put total POW dead at 3.0 million. Krivosheev maintains that this figure based on German sources includes civilian personnel that were not included in the reports of the Army and Navy field forces. In a 1999 article Krivosheev noted that after the war 180,000 liberated POWs did not return to the USSR and most likely settled in other countries, Krivosheev did not mention this in the English language translation of his study. According to declassified documents from the Soviet archives 960,039 surviving Soviet military POW were turned over to the Soviet authorities by the Western powers and 865,735 were released by the Soviet forces in territory they occupied.

Soviet conscripts 1941
 
Reconciliation of Soviet forces 1941–1945
Description Balance
Army & Navy strength – June 1941 4,902,000
Drafted during war 29,575,000
Discharged during war (9,693,000)
Army & Navy strength in June 1945 (12,840,000)
Losses of conscripted reservists 1941 not officially inducted (500,000)
Subtotal: operational losses 11,444,000
Missing later re-conscripted (940,000)
Liberated POW returned to USSR (1,836,000)
Total losses 8,668,000
  • Discharged during war of 9,693,000 includes 3,798,200 sent on sick leave; 3,614,600 transferred to work in industry, anti-aircraft defense and armed guards; 1,174,600 sent to NKVD troops and organs; 250,400 transferred to Polish, Czechoslovak and Romanian armies; 436,600 imprisoned; 206,000 discharged; and 212,400 not found after deserting, detached from troop convoy or missing in military districts in the interior.
  • During the war 422,700 men were sent to penal units at the front and not discharged.

The June 1945 force strength of 12,840,000 included 11,390,600 on active service; 1,046,000 in hospital; and 403,200 in civilian departments.

Carrying a wounded soldier on the Leningrad Front
 
Naked Soviet POWs in Mauthausen concentration camp
 
Numbers of wounded & sick by category
according to Military Medical Service

Wounded Sick Total
Total 14,685,593 7,641,312 22,326,905
Of these:


Discharged (3,050,733) (747,425) (3,798,158)
Returned to duty (10,530,750) (6,626,493) (17,157,243)
Died (also included in irrecoverable losses) (1,104,110) (267,394) (1,371,504)
 
Casualties 1941–1945 According to Field Reports
Description Irrecoverable losses Wounded & sick Total losses
1941 3rd Q 2,129,677 687,626 2,817,303
1941 4th Q 1,007,996 648,521 1,656,517
1942 1st Q 675,315 1,179,457 1,854,772
1942 2nd Q 842,898 706,647 1,549,545
1942 3rd Q 1,224,495 1,283,062 2,507,557
1942 4th Q 515,508 941,896 1,457,404
1943 1st Q 726,714 1,425,692 2,152,406
1943 2nd Q 191,904 490,637 682,541
1943 3rd Q 803,856 2,060,805 2,864,661
1943 4th Q 589,955 1,567,940 2,157,895
1944 1st Q 570,761 1,572,742 2,143,503
1944 2nd Q 344,258 965,208 1,309,466
1944 3rd Q 510,790 1,545,442 2,056,232
1944 4th Q 338,082 1,031,358 1,369,440
1945 1st Q 557,521 1,594,635 2,152,156
1945 2nd Q 243,296 618,055 861,351
Campaign in Far East 12,031 24,425 36,456
Subtotal operational losses: Army & Navy 11,285,057 18,344,148 29,629,205
Add: losses border/internal service troops 159,100

Subtotal: operational losses 11,444,100

Less: missing later re-conscripted (939,700)

Less: liberated POW returned to USSR (1,836,000)

Total irrecoverable losses8,668,400

Krivosheev's group estimated losses for the early part of the war, because from 1941 to 1942 no surrounded or defeated divisions reported their casualties.

Total wounded and sick includes 15,205,592 wounded, 3,047,675 sick and 90,881 frostbite cases. Included in the total of 11.444 million irrecoverable losses are 1,100,327 died of wounds in hospital.

Field reports stated the number of wounded and sick as 18,344,148, while the records of the military medical service show a total of 22,326,905. According to Krivosheev the difference can be explained by the fact that the medical service included sick personnel who did not take part in the fighting.

Monument in Israel to Jewish war dead in the Soviet Army
 
Total losses by age group
Age group Total losses % of total losses
Under 20 years 1,560,000 18.0
21–25 1,907,000 22.0
26–30 1,517,000 17.5
31–35 1,430,200 16.5
36–40 1,040,200 12
41–45 693,500 8
46–50 433,400 5
over 50 years 86,700 1
All age groups 8,668,400 100

Criticism of Krivosheev

Krivosheev's analysis has been disputed by independent scholars in Russia. His critics maintain that he underestimated the number of missing in action and POW deaths and deaths of service personnel in rear area hospitals. Makhmut Gareev, former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, maintains that the published information on Soviet casualties is the work of the individual authors and not based on official data. According to Gareev the Russian government has not disclosed the actual losses in the war.

  • The data listed in the Krivosheev study has been disputed, S. N. Mikhalev put the losses of the combat forces at 10,922,000 Historian Viktor Zemskov estimated total military dead at 11.5 million. In his book Christian Hartmann puts the total at 11.4 million. Some researchers in Russia put the total demographic losses of the military at nearly 14.0 million. S. N. Mikahlev put total losses at 13.7 million S.A.Il'Enkov at the Russian military archives believes total losses were 13.850 million.
  • Krivosheev's critics maintain that he underestimated the numbers of missing and POWs. According to Viktor Zemskov total POW dead were 2.3 million and the number missing in action 1.5 million, 2.2 million more than Krivosheev. He noted that the figure includes military prisoners as well as militias, guerrillas, special units of various civil departments. S.N. Mikhalev maintained that Krivosheev understated irrecoverable losses by 2.254 million Data published in Russia indicate Soviet POW losses of 2,543,000 (5,734,000 were captured, 821,000 released into German service with the German military and 2,371,000 liberated)
  • 1,046,000 sent to hospital were deducted from the total strength at the end of the war. In Krivosheev's figures 3,798,000 personnel were discharged for medical reasons of whom 2,576,000 became invalids. Kiriosheev does not include the balance of 1,222,000 with the war dead. S. A. Il'Enkov, an official at the Russian Military Archives, maintained that the "complex military situation at the front did not always allow for the conduct of a full accounting of losses, especially in the first years of the war". He pointed out that the reports from the field units did not include deaths in rear area hospitals of wounded and sick personnel. S.N Mikhalev put total losses at 13.7 million, based on his analysis of Ministry of Defense documents that a total of 2.6 million service personnel died of sickness or wounds in hospitals, 1.5 million more than the figure in the Krivosheev study.
  • 994,300 Personnel convicted of offenses, according to Krivosheev 422,700, were sent to "penal sub-units at the front". S.N. Mikhalev maintained that the penal sub-units are not included with the casualties reported by the forces in the field. According to S.N. Mikhalev 135,000 service personnel were executed after being convicted, he believed that they are not included with the non-combat losses of the frontal units. Krivosheev maintains that those executed are included with non-combat losses of the field forces. Krivosheev lists an additional 436,600 personnel as being "imprisoned" during the war and were deducted from the total on active duty at the end of the war. However S.N. Mikhalev includes those imprisoned with irrecoverable losses.

POW deaths

Western scholars estimate 3.3 million dead out of 5.7 million total Soviet POW captured. According to German figures 5,734,000 Soviet POWs were taken Between 22 June 1941 and the end of the war, roughly 5.7 million members of the Red Army fell into German hands. In January 1945, 930,000 were still in German camps. A million at most had been released, most of whom were so-called ‘volunteers’ (Hilfswillige) for (often compulsory) auxiliary service in the Wehrmacht. Another 500,000, as estimated by the Army High Command, had either fled or been liberated. The remaining 3,300,000 (57.5 percent of the total) had perished.". However, according to Krivosheev the Germans claimed to have captured up to 5.750 million POWs, he maintains that the figures in Nazi propaganda included civilians and military reservists that were caught up in the German encirclement's. Krivosheev puts the number of Soviet military POW that actually were sent to the camps at 4,059,000. Krivosheev maintained that the figure of 3.0 million POW dead reported in western sources included partisans, militia and civilian men of military age taken as POWs in the early stages of the war in 1941. In addition to the German-held POW Romania captured 82,090 Soviet POWs, 5,221 died, 3,331 escaped, and 13,682 were released  Finland captured 64,188 Soviet POWs, at least 18,318 were documented to have died in Finnish prisoner of war camps.

Analysis of S. N. Mikhalev

In 2000 S. N. Mikhalev published a study of Soviet casualties. From 1989 to 1996 he was an associate of the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defence. Mikhalev disputed Krivosheev's figure of 8.7 million military war dead, he put Soviet military dead at more than 10.9 million persons based on his analysis of those conscripted. He maintained that the official figures could not be reconciled to the total men drafted and that POW deaths were understated. Mikhalev put the total irreplaceable losses at 13.7 million; he believed that the official figures understated POW and missing losses, that the deaths of service personnel convicted of offenses were not included with the overall losses and that the number who died of wounds was understated.

Reconciliation of conscripted persons
Description Krivosheev Mikhalev Difference
Army & Navy – June 1941 4,902,000 4,704,000 [KMDiff 1] (198,000)
Drafted during war[KMDiff 2] 29,575,000 29,575,000
0
Discharged during war[KMDiff 3] (9,693,000) (9,693,000)
0
Army & Navy – June 1945 (12,840,000) (11,999,000) [KMDiff 4] 841,000
Conscripted reservists (500,000) 0 [KMDiff 5] 500,000
Subtotal: operational losses 11,444,000 12,587,000
1,143,000
MIA re-conscripted[KMDiff 6] (940,000) 0
940,000
Liberated POW returned to USSR (1,836,000) (1,836,000)
0
Losses of NKVD & border troops[KMDiff 7] 0 159,000
159,000
Losses in the Far East August 1945 0 12,000 [KMDiff 8] 12,000
Total irrecoverable losses 8,668,000 10,922,000 [KMDiff 9] 2,254,000

Notes:


  1. In addition Mikhalev believed that an additional 1.8 million deaths in hospital of wounded and sick personnel and 1.0 million convicted of offenses should be added to the total irreplaceable losses

Convicted of offences by Soviet military

S. N. Mikhalev included in his figure irrecoverable losses the deaths of 994,300 Soviet military personnel that were convicted of offences during the course of the war (422,700 sent to penal battalions, 135,000 executed and 436,600 imprisoned)

Russian Military Archives database

An alternative method is to determine losses from the Russian Military Archives database of individual war dead. S. A. Il'Enkov, an official at the Russian Military Archives, maintained that the "complex military situation at the front did not always allow for the conduct of a full accounting of losses, especially in the first years of the war" He pointed out that in the reports from the field units did not include deaths in rear area hospitals of wounded personnel. Il'Enkov maintained that the information in the Russian Military Archives alphabetical card-indexes "is a priceless treasure of history, which can assist in resolving the problems of the price of Soviet victory" Il'Enkov maintained it could provide an accurate accounting of war losses. He concluded by stating, "We established the number of irreplaceable losses of our Armed Forces at the time of the Great Patriotic War of about 13,850,000. Krivosheev maintained that the database of individual war dead is unreliable because some personnel records are duplicated and others omitted.

Critics

Critics of the official figures by the Russian Ministry of Defense base their arguments on self analyses of documents in the Soviet archives and demographic models of the Soviet population during the Stalin era.

  • In 2020, Doctor of History Mikhail Meltyukhov who works with the Russian Federal archival project stated that 15.9-17.4 million civilians were killed on Soviet territory by the Nazis during the Great Patriotic War.
  • On 14 February 2017 at a hearing of the Russian State Duma a presentation by legislator Nikolai Zemtsov, a member of the non-governmental organization Immortal regiment of Russia, maintained that documents of the now defunct Soviet Gosplan indicated that Soviet war dead were almost 42 million (19 million military and 23 million civilians). However scholars believe that these figures are without serious foundation.
  • Viktor Zemskov–Zemskov maintained that the population loss due to the war was 20 million, including 16 million direct losses and 4 million deaths due to the deterioration in living conditions. He maintains that the Russian Academy of Science figure of 26.6 million total war dead includes about 7 million deaths due to natural causes based on the mortality rate that prevailed before the war. Zemskov maintains that military dead numbered 11.5 million, including nearly 4 million POWs. He maintains that the figure of 6.8 million civilian deaths in occupied regions was overstated because it included persons who were evacuated to the rear areas. He submitted an estimate of 4.5 million civilians who were Nazi victims or were killed in the occupied zone. Zemskov maintains that the government figure of 2.1 million civilian deaths due to forced labor in Germany was inflated compared to German wartime records that put the deaths of forced workers at 200,000.
  • Mark Solonin–Solonin maintains that Krivosheev covered up casualties that were three to four times greater than Germany's. Solonin claimed that Russian official sources that list deaths of 13.7 million civilians due to the German occupation include victims of Stalinist repression. He points out that the current figures for civilian war dead are taken from Soviet era sources. Solonin estimates total losses as somewhat under 20 million. Military dead numbered at least 10.7 million, excluding 2.18 million soldiers who are unaccounted for, half of whom he assumed died. He asserted that some deserted or emigrated and that a higher death toll is possible. Solonin's estimate is that 5–6 million civilians were killed by the invaders (including 2.83 million Jews) and over 1 million civilians perished in the Siege of Leningrad and in Stalingrad. He claimed that 6–9 million Soviets fell to Stalin's repressions, although in contemporary Russian official sources they are included with civilian war dead.
  • In 2017 the Russian historian Igor Ivlev put Soviet war dead at 42 million people (19.4 million military and 22.6 million civilians). According to Ivlev, Soviet State Planning Committee documents put the Soviet population at 205 million in June 1941 and 169.8 million for June 1945. Taking into account the 17.6 million births and 10.3 million natural deaths, leaving almost 42 million in war-related losses according to his research. The details of Ivlev's calculations were first announced at a parliamentary readings about the number of losses of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Ivlev's figures are endorsed by the Russian civic organization Immortal Regiment and have been discussed in the Russian media recently. Ivlev has published a summary of his arguments on the Russian website Demoscope Weekly. According to Ivlev's calculations based on the number of Soviet Communist party and Komsomol members conscripted, military dead and missing were 17.8 million.
  • Lev Lopukhovsky/Boris Kavalerchik–Lopukhovsky and Kavalerchik label Krivosheev's transfer of military casualties to civilian losses as "ingratitude and blasphemy over their cherished memory". They demanded that the Russian government reinvestigate the matter. They state that Krivosheev's group understated losses in the crucial period of 1941–1942.
  • Boris Sokolov – In 1996 Sokolov published a study that estimated total war dead at 43.3 million including 26.4 million in the military. Sokolov's calculations claimed that official population figures in 1941 were understated by 12.7 million and the population in 1946 overstated by 4.0 million, yielding 16.7 million additional war dead, bringing the total to 43.3 million.
  • V. E. Korol–Korol estimated overall Soviet war dead at 46 million including military dead of 23 million. He claimed that the official figure of 8.7 million military dead was "groundless", based on battle accounts from across the Eastern Front. Korol held that the official figures of Krivosheev were an attempt to cover up the disregard for human life by the military leaders under Stalin. Korol cited Soviet authors writing during the Glasnost era that put wartime losses much higher than the official figures; In 1990 General I. A. Gerasimov published information from the Russian Military Archives database that put losses at 16.2 million enlisted men and 1.2 million officers. Korol also cited historian-archivist Iu. Geller who put losses at 46 million, including military dead of 23 million. and A.N. Mertsalov's estimate of 14 million military dead based on documents in the Russian Military Archives.
  • Hypothetical population loss for children unborn due to the war– Some Russian writers have argued that war losses should also include the hypothetical population loss for children unborn due to the war; using this methodology total losses would be about 46 million.
  • A compilation made in March 2008 of the individuals listed in the card files put total dead and missing at 14,241,000 (13,271,269 enlisted men and 970,000 officers)

Male war dead

Andreev, Darski and Karkova (ADK) put total losses at 26.6 million. The authors did not dispute Krivoshev's report of 8.7 million military dead. Their demographic study estimated the total war dead of 26.6 million included 20.0 million males and 6.6 million females. In mid-1941 the USSR hosted 8.3 million more females; by 1946 this gap had grown to 22.8 million, an increase of 13.5 million.

Civilian losses

Executed partisan, Minsk
 

A 1995 paper published by the M.V. Philimoshin, an associate of the Russian Defense Ministry, put the civilian death toll in the regions occupied by Germany at 13.7 million. Philimoshin cited sources from Soviet era to support his figures and used the terms "genocide" and "premeditated extermination" when referring to deaths of 7.4 million civilians caused by direct, intentional violence. Civilians killed in reprisals during the Soviet partisan war account for a major portion. Philimoshin estimated that civilian forced laborer deaths in Germany totaled 2.1 million. Germany had a policy of forced confiscation of food that resulted in famine deaths of an estimated 6% of the population, or 4.1 million. Russian government sources currently cite these civilian casualty figures in their official statements.

Russian Academy of Science estimate
Deaths caused by the result of direct, intentional actions of violence 7,420,135
Deaths of forced laborers in Germany 2,164,313
Deaths due to famine and disease in the occupied regions 4,100,000
Total 13,684,448
  • The sources cited for these figures are from the Soviet period. The Statistic of 7.420 million civilian war dead has been disputed by Viktor Zemskov who believed that the actual civilian death toll was at least 4.5 million. He maintained that the official figures included POWs, persons who emigrated from the country and militia/partisan fighters. According to his analysis the forced laborer death figure of 2.164 million includes the balance of losses not reported in Krivosheev's figure of 8.668 million military war dead, including POWs.
  • Civilian losses include 57,000 killed in bombing raids (40,000 Stalingrad and 17,000 Leningrad).
  • Russian sources include Jewish Holocaust deaths among total civilian dead. Gilbert put Jewish losses at one million within 1939 borders; Holocaust deaths in the annexed territories numbered an additional 1.5 million, bringing total Jewish losses to 2.5 million.
  • Civilian losses include deaths in the siege of Leningrad. According to David Glantz the 1945 Soviet estimate presented at the Nuremberg Trials was 642,000 civilian deaths. He noted that Soviet era source from 1965 put the number of dead in the Siege of Leningrad at "greater than 800,000" and that a Russian source from 2000 put the number of dead at 1,000,000. Other Russian historians put the Leningrad death toll at between 1.4 and 2.0 million.
  • Russian sources maintain that there were 4.1 million famine deaths in the regions occupied by Germany. Russian sources also report 2.5 to 3.2 million Soviet civilians who died due to famine and disease in non-occupied territory of the USSR, which was caused by wartime shortages in the rear areas.
  • These casualties are for 1941–1945 within the 1946–1991 borders of the USSR. Included with civilian losses are deaths in the territories annexed by the USSR in 1939–1940 including 600,000 in the Baltic states and 1,500,000 in Eastern Poland (500,000 ethnic Poles and 1 million Jews).
  • Documents from the Soviet archives number the total deaths of prisoners in the Gulag from 1941 to 1945 at 621,637. In a 1995 report Viktor Zemskov noted "due to general difficulties in 1941–1945 in the camps, the GULAG, and prisons, about 1.0 million prisoners died.

Total population losses

Volkovo cemetery, Leningrad 1942
 
Men hanged as partisans somewhere in the Soviet Union

Demographic studies of the population losses

Studies by Andreev, Darski and Kharkova

E.M. Andreev, L.E. Darski and T. L. Kharkova ("ADK") authored The Population of the Soviet Union 1922–1991, which was published by the Russian Academy of Science in 1993. Andreev worked in the Department of Demography Research Institute of the Central Statistical Bureau (now the Research Institute of Statistics of Federal State Statistical Service of Russia). The study estimated total Soviet war losses of 26.6 million. As of 2015, this was the official Russian government figure for total losses. These losses are a demographic estimate rather than an exact accounting.

Total Soviet losses by demographic balance (1941–45) per (ADK)
Population in June 1941 196,700,000
Births during war 12,300,000
Death by natural causes during war of those alive before war (11,900,000)
War related deaths of those alive before war (25,300,000)
War related deaths of those born during war (1,300,000)
Total population 1 January 1946 170,500,000

Notes:

  • According to Andreev, Darski and Kharkova (ADK) the total population loss due to the war was 26.6 million (1941–1945). They maintain that between 9-10 million of the total Soviet war dead were due to the worsening of life conditions in the entire USSR, including the region that was not occupied. The total loss of 26.6 million is based on the assumptions that the wartime increase in infant mortality was 1.3 million and that persons dying of natural causes declined during the war. Overall the annual Mortality rate (persons dying of natural causes) declined from 2.17% in 1940 to 1.58% in 1946 The decline in persons dying of natural causes during the war was due to the fact that a disproportionate number of adults, especially men were killed during the war, than those persons under 18 and women who survived. The figure for births during the war is based on a post war survey of the Total fertility rate which put the number of births during the war at about one half of the prewar level. The main areas of uncertainty were the estimated figures for the population in the territories annexed from 1939 to 1945 and the loss of population due to emigration during and after the war. The figures include victims of Soviet repression and the deaths of Soviet citizens in German military service. Michael Haynes noted, "We do not know the total number of deaths as a result of the war and related policies". We do know that the demographic estimate of excess deaths was 26.6 million plus an additional 11.9 million natural deaths of persons born before the war and 4.2 million children born during the war that would have occurred in peacetime, bringing the total dead to 42.7 million. At this time the actual total number of deaths caused by the war is unknown since among the 16.1 million "natural deaths" some would have died peacefully and others as a result of the war.
  • Civilian deaths were detailed in the Russian study - Human Losses of the USSR in the Period of WWII: Civilian deaths by intentional actions of violence 7,420,000; Deaths of forced laborers 2,164,000; Deaths due to famine and disease 8,500,000 (including 4.1 million in the occupied territories).
  • The official total military dead per the analysis of Krivosheev is 8,668,000. The Russian Ministry of Defense maintains that their figure of 8.668 million is correct based on a reconciliation of those conscripted. The official toll of 2,164,000 forced laborers dead could include POWs considered civilians by the military. Critics of Krivosheev maintain that the war dead should include an additional 2.9 million persons, according to their analysis the number of POWs and missing was understated in the official figures. Viktor Zemskov puts total military dead (1941–45) at 11.5 million. A recent academic study put Soviet military dead at 11.4 million.
  • In addition to the war dead there were 622,000 persons who remained abroad after the war.
  • Births and natural deaths during war are rough estimates since vital statistics were inaccurate.
  • Figures do not include an estimated 20 million children not born because the war depressed fertility/birth rates.
  • ADK pointed out that the beginning population in 1941 and the ending population at 1 January 1946 are rough estimates since figures for the territories annexed in 1939–1940 and emigration from the USSR during the war are based on fragmentary information.
Total War Deaths by Age Group and Gender
Age Group Mid 1941–Males (millions) 1941–45 Male War Deaths (millions) % Age Group Mid 1941–Females (millions) 1941–45 Female War Deaths (millions) % Age Group Mid 1941–Total Population (millions) 1941–45 Total War Deaths (millions) % Age Group Excess Male Deaths (Millions)
0–14 27.879 1.425 5.1% 27.984 1.398 5.0% 55.863 2.823 5.1% .027
15–19 11.092 1.064 9.6% 11.220 0.340 3.0% 22.312 1.404 6.3% .723
20–34 24.948 9.005 36.1% 26.330 2.663 10.1% 51.278 11.668 22.8% 6.342
35–49 18.497 6.139 33.2% 20.236 781 3.9% 38.733 6.920 17.9% 5.358
Over 49 11.999 2.418 20.2% 16.976 1.380 8.1% 28.975 3.798 13.1% 1.038
All Age Groups 94.415 20.051 21.2% 102.746 6.562 6.4% 197.161 26.613 13.5% 13.489

Remarks:

  • 0–14–The deaths of 2.8 million children was due primarily to famine and disease caused by the war.
  • 15–19–The excess deaths of 724,000 males compared to females was due primarily to military losses. The wartime draft age was 18.
  • 20–34–The excess deaths of 6,342,000 males compared to females was due primarily to military losses. The deaths of 2,663,000 women is an indication that they were involved in the partisan war and became victims of Nazi reprisals.
  • 35–49–The excess deaths of 5,358,000 males compared to females was due primarily to military losses.
  • Over 49–The excess deaths of 1,038,000 males compared to females was due primarily to military losses. Some served in the Armed Forces. Others were involved in the partisan war and became victims of Nazi reprisals.
  • All Ages–The excess deaths of 13,489,000 males compared to females was due primarily to military losses with regular forces as well partisan forces. The figures are a clear indication that many Soviet civilians died in the war from reprisals, famine and disease.

Voters lists in 1946 election

Another study, The Demographic History of Russia 1927–1959, analyzed voters in the February 1946 Soviet election to estimate the surviving population over the age of 18 at the end of the war. The population under 18 was estimated based on the 1959 census. Official records listed 101.7 million registered voters and 94.0 million actual voters, 7.7 million less than the expected figure. ADK maintained that the official results of the 1946 election are not a good source for estimating the population. They believe that the total of expected voters should be increased by 10.5 million because the roll of voters excluded those deprived of their rights, in prison or in exile. ADK maintained that many young military men did not participate in the election, and an overestimation of women in rural areas without internal passports who sought to avoid compulsory heavy labor. Included in the voter total were 29.9 million "excess" women. However number of expected voters estimated by ADK the gap between males and females was 21.4 million, which approximates the 20.7 million gap revealed by the 1959 census. The prewar population of 1939 (including the annexed territories) had an excess of 7.9 million females. The ADK analysis found that the gap had increased by about 13.5 million.

Alternative sources of demographic losses

Russian demographer Rybakovsky found a wide range of estimates for total war dead. He estimated the actual population in 1941 at 196.7 million and losses at 27–28 million. He cited figures that range from 21.7 to 46 million. Rybakovsky acknowledged that the components used to compute losses are uncertain and disputed.

Population estimates for mid-1941 range from 191.8 to 200.1 million, while the population at the end of 1945 range from 167.0 million up to 170.6 million. Based on the pre-war birth rate, the population shortfall was about 20 million births in 1946. Some were born and died during the war, while the balance was never born. Only rough estimates are available for each group. Estimates for the population of the territories annexed from 1939 to 1945 range from 17 to 23 million persons.

Rybakovsky provided a list of the various estimates of Soviet war losses by Russian scholars since 1988.

Casualty estimates
Analyst Deaths (in millions)
A. Kvasha (1988) 26–27
A. Samsonov (1988) 26–27
Yu. Polyakov (1989) 26–27
L.L. Rybakovsky (1989) 27–28
I. Kurganov (1990) 44
S. Ivanov (1990) 46
E. M. Andreev (1990) 26.6[f]
A. Samsonov (1991) 26–27
A. Shevyakov (1991) 27.7
A. Shevyakov (1992) 29.5
V. Eliseev, S. Mikhalev (1992) 21.8
A. Sokolov (1995) 21.7–23.7
Boris Sokolov (1998) 43.3

Estimates of losses by individual Republics

Former Soviet republics

Khatyn Memorial in Belarus, commemorating the loss of life in the Khatyn massacre of 1943 during World War II.

The contemporary nations that were formerly Soviet Republics dispute Krivosheev's analysis. In a live broadcast of 16 December 2010 "A Conversation with Vladimir Putin", he maintained that the Russian Federation had suffered the greatest proportional losses in World War II—70 percent of the total. Official estimates by the former republics of the USSR claim military casualties exceeding those of Krivosheev's report by 3.5 times. It is claimed by the website sovsekretno.ru that there are no Memory Books published in the USSR, Russia and the other contemporary republics in the 80s and 90s listing casualties of 25 percent of the draft or less, but there are many Memory Books with 50 per cent and more with some telling us of a 70, 75, 76 and up to 79 per cent mortality rate among the conscripted.

(A) The Ukrainian authorities and historians ardently dispute these figures. They put the military casualties alone may be estimated as exceeding 7 million, according to the final volume of the Ukrainian book "In the memory of posterity" and research of V. E. Korol, writes an American (former Soviet) Doctor of History Vilen Lyulechnik. Former President of Ukraine Victor Yanukovych maintains that Ukraine has lost more than 10 million lives during the Second World War.

(B) According to a Belorussian military historian, Doctor of History, professor V. Lemeshonok, the Belorussian military casualties, including partisans and underground group members, exceed 682,291.

(C) The Memory Book of Tatarstan Government contains names of about 350,000 inhabitants of the republic, mostly Tatars.

(D) Israeli historian Yitzhak Arad maintains that about 200,000 Soviet Jews or 40 per cent of all draft were killed in battles or captivity — the highest percentage of all nations of the USSR.

(E) Kazakhstan estimates its military casualties at 601,029.

(F) Armenians estimate their military casualties at over 300,000.

(G) Georgians also estimate their military casualties at over 300,000.

(I) Among the others Azerbaijanis claim military casualties of 300,000, Bashkirs of about 300,000, Mordvas of 130,000 and Chuvashes of 106,470. But one of the most tragic figures comes from a Far Eastern republic of Yakutia and its small nation. 37,965 citizens, mostly Yakuts, or 60.74 per cent of 62,509 drafted have not returned home with 7,000 regarded missing. About 69,000 died of severe famine in the republic. This nation could not restore its population even under 1959 census. The record breaking estimates of 700,000 military casualties out of a total 1,25 million Turkmenian citizens (with slightly less than 60 per cent being Turkmens) are attributed to the late President of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov. Historians do not regard them as being trustworthy.

Estimated losses for each Soviet Republic

Russian historian Vadim Erlikman pegs total war deaths at 10.7 million, exceeding Krivosheev's 8.7 million by an extra two million. This extra two million would presumably include Soviet POWs that died in Nazi captivity, partisans, and militia.

Deaths by Soviet republic
Soviet Republic Population 1940 Military Dead Civilian Dead Total Deaths as
 % 1940 Pop.
Armenian SSR 1,320,000 150,000 30,000 180,000 13.6%
Azerbaijan SSR 3,270,000 210,000 90,000 300,000 9.1%
Byelorussian SSR 9,050,000 620,000 1,670,000 2,290,000 25.3%
Estonian SSR 1,050,000 30,000 50,000 80,000 7.6%
Georgian SSR 3,610,000 190,000 110,000 300,000 8.3%
Kazakh SSR 6,150,000 310,000 350,000 660,000 10.7%
Kirghiz SSR 1,530,000 70,000 50,000 120,000 7.8%
Latvian SSR 1,890,000 30,000 230,000 260,000 13.7%
Lithuanian SSR 2,930,000 25,000 350,000 375,000 12.7%
Moldavian SSR 2,470,000 50,000 120,000 170,000 6.9%
Russian SFSR 110,100,000 6,750,000 7,200,000 13,950,000 12.7% (A)
Tajik SSR 1,530,000 50,000 70,000 120,000 7.8%
Turkmen SSR 1,300,000 70,000 30,000 100,000 7.7%
Uzbek SSR 6,550,000 330,000 220,000 550,000 8.4%
Ukrainian SSR 41,340,000 1,650,000 5,200,000 6,850,000 16.3% (B)
Unidentified - 165,000 130,000 295,000
Total USSR 194,090,000 10,700,000 15,900,000 26,600,000 13.7%
  • The source of the figures on the table is Vadim Erlikman. Poteri narodonaseleniia v XX veke : spravochnik. Moscow 2004. ISBN 5-93165-107-1 pp. 23–35 Erlikman notes that these figures are his estimates. This table includes civilian losses in Transcaucasian and Central Asian republics due to famine and disease caused by wartime shortfalls estimated by Vadim Erlikman.

OBD Memorial database

Tomb of the unknown soldier in Moscow

The names of Soviet war dead are presented at the OBD (Central Data Bank) Memorial database online.

Causes

Soviet prisoners of war held in German camp
 
Citizens of Leningrad leaving their houses destroyed by German bombing

The Red Army suffered catastrophic losses of men and equipment during the first months of the German invasion. In the spring of 1941 Stalin ignored the warnings of his intelligence services of a planned German invasion and refused to put the Armed forces on alert. The bulk of the Soviet combat units were deployed in the border regions in a lower state of readiness. In the face of the German onslaught the Soviet forces were caught by surprise. Large numbers of Soviet soldiers were captured and many perished due to the brutal mistreatment of POWs by the Nazis. Earl F. Ziemke maintained high Soviet losses can be attributed to 'less efficient medical services and the Soviet tactics, which throughout the war tended to be expensive in terms of human life"

Russian scholars attribute the high civilian death toll to the Nazi Generalplan Ost which treated Soviet peoples as "subhumans", they use the terms "genocide" and "premeditated extermination" when referring to civilian losses in the occupied USSR. German occupation policies implemented under the Hunger Plan resulted in the confiscation of food stocks which resulted in famine in the occupied regions. During the Soviet era the partisan campaign behind the lines was portrayed as the struggle of the local population against the German occupation. To suppress the partisan units the Nazi occupation forces engaged in a campaign of brutal reprisals against innocent civilians. The extensive fighting destroyed agricultural land, infrastructure, and whole towns, leaving much of the population homeless and without food. During the war Soviet civilians were taken to Germany as forced laborers under inhumane conditions.

Summary of the estimates and their sources

Estimates for Soviet losses in the Second World War range from 7 million to over 43 million. During the Communist era in the Soviet Union historical writing about World War II was subject to censorship and only official approved statistical data was published. In the USSR during the Glasnost period under Gorbachev and in post communist Russia the casualties in World War II were re-evaluated and the official figures revised.

1946 to 1987

Joseph Stalin in March 1946 stated that Soviet war losses were 7 million dead. This was to be the official figure until the Khrushchev era. In November 1961 Nikita Khrushchev stated that Soviet war losses were 20 million; this was to be the official figure until the Gorbachev era of Glasnost. Leonid Brezhnev in 1965 put the Soviet death toll in the war at "more than 20 million" Ivan Konev in a May 1965 Soviet Ministry of Defense press conference stated that Soviet military dead in World War II were 10 million. In 1971 the Soviet demographer Boris Urlanis put losses at 20 million including 6,074,000 civilians and 3,912,000 prisoners of war killed by Nazi Germany, military dead were put at 10 million.

Documents from the Extraordinary State Commission prepared in March 1946 not but published until the 1990s listed 6,074,857 civilians killed, 3,912,283 prisoner of war dead, 3,999,796 deaths during German forced labor and 641,803 civilian famine deaths during Siege of Leningrad. The Soviet general staff put losses at 8,668,000 dead and missing, however the General Staffs figures were not published until 1993. Also 688,772 Soviet citizens who remained in western countries after the war were included with the war losses.

1988 to 1992

During the period of Glasnost, the official figure of 20 million war dead was challenged by Soviet scholars. In 1988–1989 estimates of 26 to 28 million total war dead appeared in the Soviet press. The Russian scholar Dmitri Volkogonov, writing at this, time estimated total war deaths at 26–27,000,000, including 10,000,000 in the military. In March 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev established a committee to investigate Soviet war losses. In a May 1990 speech, Gorbachev gave the figure for total Soviet losses at "almost 27 million". This revised figure was the result of research by the committee set up by Gorbachev that estimated total war dead at between 26 and 27 million. In January 1990, M.A. Moiseev, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, disclosed for the first time in an interview that Soviet military war dead totaled 8,668,400. In 1991, the Russian scholar A.A. Shevyakov published an article with summary of civilian losses based on his analysis of the archival records of the Soviet Extraordinary State Commission, civilian dead were given as 17.7 million. In a second article in 1992, A.A. Shevyakov gave a figure of 20.8 million civilian dead; no explanation for the difference was given.

Russians published in the West 1950–83

In 1949, Soviet Colonel Kalinov defected to the west, where he published a book claiming that Soviet records indicated the military loss of 13.6 million men, including 2.6 million POW dead. Sergei Maksudov, a Russian demographer living in the west, estimated Soviet war losses at between 24.5 and 27.4 million, including 7.5 million military dead. The Soviet mathematician Iosif G. Dyadkin published a study in the United States that estimated the total Soviet population losses from 1939 to 1945, due to the war and political repression, at 30 million. Dyadkin was imprisoned for publishing this study in the west.

Western scholars

Historians writing outside of the Soviet Union and Russia have evaluated the various Russian language sources and have offered their estimates of Soviet war dead. Here is a listing of estimates by recognized scholars published in the West [[DJS -- see Wiki article for table --]].

  • David Glantz maintains that "the war with Nazi Germany cost the Soviet Union at least 29 million military casualties" (dead, wounded and sick) "The exact numbers can never be established, and some revisionists have attempted to put the number as high as 50 million"
  • Richard Overy believes the "figures for military dead published in 1993... give the fullest account yet available, but they omit three operations that were clear failures. The official figures themselves must be viewed critically, given the difficulty of knowing in the chaos of 1941 and 1942 exactly who had been killed, wounded or even conscripted" Regarding military dead Richard Overy believes that "for the present the figure of 8.6 million must be regarded as the most reliable"
  • The authors of the Cambridge History of Russia have provided an analysis of Soviet wartime casualties. Overall losses were about 25 million persons plus or minus 1 million. Red Army records indicate 8.7 million military deaths, "this figure is actually the lower limit". The official figures understate POW losses and armed partisan deaths. Excess civilian deaths in the Nazi occupied USSR were 13.7 million persons including 2 million Jews. There were an additional 2.6 million deaths in the interior regions of the Soviet Union. The authors maintain "scope for error in this number is very wide". At least 1 million perished in the wartime GULAG camps or in deportations. Other deaths occurred in the wartime evacuations and due to war related malnutrition and disease in the interior. The authors maintain that both Stalin and Hitler "were both responsible but in different ways" for these deaths.
    The authors of the Cambridge History of Russia believe that "In short the general picture of Soviet wartime losses suggests a jigsaw puzzle. The general outline is clear: people died in colossal numbers but in many different miserable and terrible circumstances. But individual pieces of the puzzle do not fit well; some overlap and others are yet to be found"
  • Steven Rosefielde puts the war related demographic losses of the USSR from 1941 to 1945 at 22.0 to 26.0 million persons (7.8 million military and 14.2 to 18.2 million civilians). The actual wartime losses are higher because some persons who would have died peacefully actually perished as a result of the war. Rosefielde estimated the actual military dead at 8.7 million men and 17.7 to 20.3 million civilians killed by the Nazis in the war (exterminated, shot, gassed burned 6.4 or 11.3 million; famine and disease 8.5 or 6.5 million; forced laborer in Germany 2.8 or 3.0 million and 500,000 who did not return to USSR after war.) In addition to these war deaths Rosefielde also estimated the excess deaths attributed to the "total potential crimes against humanity" due to Soviet repression at 2.183 million persons in 1939–40 and 5.458 million from 1941 to 1945. The figures for losses due to Soviet repression do not include 1 million military deaths of men drafted from the Gulag into penal suicide battalions.
  • According to historian Timothy Snyder "More inhabitants of Soviet Ukraine died in the Second World War than inhabitants of Soviet Russia as calculated by Russian historians." These remarks were presented at the conference "Germany's Historical Responsibility towards Ukraine" ("Deutschen Historischen Verantwortung für die Ukraine"), German Bundestag, Berlin, Germany, 20 June 2017.
  • Mikhalev excludes Construction troops whose casualties were not included in the field reports.

  • Excludes those drafted twice.

  • Krivosheev includes those sent on sick leave, those sent to industry, NKVD or foreign units and 436,600 imprisoned after sentencing. Mikhalev maintains that this figure includes personnel who died in hospital of wounds and sickness and the deaths of those convicted of offenses.

  • Mikhalev excludes 403,000 Construction troops whose casualties were not included in the field reports and 437,000 imprisoned after sentencing already deducted in number of discharged

  • Mikhalev maintains that they were military operational losses that should be included with total casualties

  • MIA Re-conscripted were men conscripted back into the Soviet army during the war as territories were being liberated. Mikhalev maintains that they should not be deducted because were included in the Red Army strength in June 1945 and that the number conscripted excludes those drafted twice.

  • NKVD & Border Troops -Mikhalev adds these losses to the total because they were not part of the Red Army balance in June 1945.

  • Mikhalev adds these losses to the total because they were not part of the Red Army balance in June 1945

  • Schools of economic thought

    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

    In the history of economic thought, a school of economic thought is a group of economic thinkers who share or shared a common perspective on the way economies work. While economists do not always fit into particular schools, particularly in modern times, classifying economists into schools of thought is common. Economic thought may be roughly divided into three phases: premodern (Greco-Roman, Indian, Persian, Islamic, and Imperial Chinese), early modern (mercantilist, physiocrats) and modern (beginning with Adam Smith and classical economics in the late 18th century, and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels' Marxian economics in the mid 19th century). Systematic economic theory has been developed mainly since the beginning of what is termed the modern era.

    Currently, the great majority of economists follow an approach referred to as mainstream economics (sometimes called 'orthodox economics'). Economists generally specialize into either macroeconomics, broadly on the general scope of the economy as a whole, and microeconomics, on specific markets or actors.

    Within the macroeconomic mainstream in the United States, distinctions can be made between saltwater economists and the more laissez-faire ideas of freshwater economists. However, there is broad agreement on the importance of general equilibrium, the methodology related to models used for certain purposes (e.g. statistical models for forecasting, structural models for counterfactual analysis, etc.), and the importance of partial equilibrium models for analyzing specific factors important to the economy (e.g. banking).

    Some influential approaches of the past, such as the historical school of economics and institutional economics, have become defunct or have declined in influence, and are now considered heterodox approaches. Other longstanding heterodox schools of economic thought include Austrian economics and Marxian economics. Some more recent developments in economic thought such as feminist economics and ecological economics adapt and critique mainstream approaches with an emphasis on particular issues rather than developing as independent schools.

    Contemporary economic thought

    Mainstream economics

    Mainstream economics is distinguished in general economics from heterodox approaches and schools within economics. It begins with the premise that resources are scarce and that it is necessary to choose between competing alternatives. That is, economics deals with tradeoffs. With scarcity, choosing one alternative implies forgoing another alternative—the opportunity cost. The opportunity cost expresses an implicit relationship between competing alternatives. Such costs, considered as prices in a market economy, are used for analysis of economic efficiency or for predicting responses to disturbances in a market. In a planned economy comparable shadow price relations must be satisfied for the efficient use of resources, as first demonstrated by the Italian economist Enrico Barone.

    Economists believe that incentives and costs play a pervasive role in shaping decision making. An immediate example of this is the consumer theory of individual demand, which isolates how prices (as costs) and income affect quantity demanded. Modern mainstream economics has foundations in neoclassical economics, which began to develop in the late 19th century. Mainstream economics also acknowledges the existence of market failure and insights from Keynesian economics, most contemporaneously in the macroeconomic new neoclassical synthesis. It uses models of economic growth for analyzing long-run variables affecting national income. It employs game theory for modeling market or non-market behavior. Some important insights on collective behavior (for example, emergence of organizations) have been incorporated through the new institutional economics. A definition that captures much of modern economics is that of Lionel Robbins in a 1932 essay: "the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses." Scarcity means that available resources are insufficient to satisfy all wants and needs. Absent scarcity and alternative uses of available resources, there is no economic problem. The subject thus defined involves the study of choice, as affected by incentives and resources.

    Mainstream economics encompasses a wide (but not unbounded) range of views. Politically, most mainstream economists hold views ranging from laissez-faire to modern liberalism. There are also differing views on certain empirical claims within macroeconomics, such as the effectiveness of expansionary fiscal policy under certain conditions.

    Disputes within mainstream macroeconomics tend to be characterised by disagreement over the convincingness of individual empirical claims (such as the predictive power of a specific model) and in this respect differ from the more fundamental conflicts over methodology that characterised previous periods (like those between Monetarists and Neo-Keynesians), in which economists of differing schools would disagree on whether a given work was even a legitimate contribution to the field.

    Contemporary heterodox economics

    In the late 19th century, a number of heterodox schools contended with the neoclassical school that arose following the marginal revolution. Most survive to the present day as self-consciously dissident schools, but with greatly diminished size and influence relative to mainstream economics. The most significant are Institutional economics, Marxian economics and the Austrian School.

    The development of Keynesian economics was a substantial challenge to the dominant neoclassical school of economics. Keynesian views entered the mainstream as a result of the neoclassical synthesis developed by John Hicks. The rise of Keynesianism, and its incorporation into mainstream economics, reduced the appeal of heterodox schools. However, advocates of a more fundamental critique of neoclassical economics formed a school of post-Keynesian economics.

    Heterodox approaches often embody criticisms of perceived "mainstream" approaches. For instance:

    • feminist economics criticizes the valuation of labor and argues female labor is systemically undervalued;
    • green economics criticizes instances of externalized and intangible ecosystems and argues for them to be brought into the tangible capital asset model as natural capital; and
    • post-keynesian economics disagrees with the notion of the long-term neutrality of demand, arguing that there is no natural tendency for a competitive market economy to reach full employment.

    Other viewpoints on economic issues from outside mainstream economics include dependency theory and world systems theory in the study of international relations.

    Historical economic thought

    Modern macro- and microeconomics are young sciences. But many in the past have thought on topics ranging from value to production relations. These forays into economic thought contribute to the modern understanding, ranging from ancient Greek conceptions of the role of the household and its choices to mercantilism and its emphasis on the hoarding of precious metals.

    Ancient economic thought

    Islamic economics

    Islamic economics is the practice of economics in accordance with Islamic law. The origins can be traced back to the Caliphate, where an early market economy and some of the earliest forms of merchant capitalism took root between the 8th–12th centuries, which some refer to as "Islamic capitalism".

    Islamic economics seeks to enforce Islamic regulations not only on personal issues, but to implement broader economic goals and policies of an Islamic society, based on uplifting the deprived masses. It was founded on free and unhindered circulation of wealth so as to handsomely reach even the lowest echelons of society. One distinguishing feature is the tax on wealth (in the form of both Zakat and Jizya), and bans levying taxes on all kinds of trade and transactions (Income/Sales/Excise/Import/Export duties etc.). Another distinguishing feature is prohibition of interest in the form of excess charged while trading in money. Its pronouncement on use of paper currency also stands out. Though promissory notes are recognized, they must be fully backed by reserves. Fractional-reserve banking is disallowed as a form of breach of trust.

    It saw innovations such as trading companies, big businesses, contracts, bills of exchange, long-distance international trade, the first forms of partnership (mufawada) such as limited partnerships (mudaraba), and the earliest forms of credit, debt, profit, loss, capital (al-mal), capital accumulation (nama al-mal), circulating capital, capital expenditure, revenue, cheques, promissory notes, trusts (see Waqf), startup companies, savings accounts, transactional accounts, pawning, loaning, exchange rates, bankers, money changers, ledgers, deposits, assignments, the double-entry bookkeeping system, lawsuits, and agency institution.

    This school has seen a revived interest in development and understanding since the later part of the 20th century.

    Scholasticism

    Mercantilism

    Economic policy in Europe during the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance treated economic activity as a good which was to be taxed to raise revenues for the nobility and the church. Economic exchanges were regulated by feudal rights, such as the right to collect a toll or hold a fair, as well as guild restrictions and religious restrictions on lending. Economic policy, such as it was, was designed to encourage trade through a particular area. Because of the importance of social class, sumptuary laws were enacted, regulating dress and housing, including allowable styles, materials and frequency of purchase for different classes. Niccolò Machiavelli in his book The Prince was one of the first authors to theorize economic policy in the form of advice. He did so by stating that princes and republics should limit their expenditures and prevent either the wealthy or the populace from despoiling the other. In this way a state would be seen as "generous" because it was not a heavy burden on its citizens.

    Physiocrats

    The Physiocrats were 18th century French economists who emphasized the importance of productive work, and particularly agriculture, to an economy's wealth. Their early support of free trade and deregulation influenced Adam Smith and the classical economists.

    Classical political economy

    Classical economics, also called classical political economy, was the original form of mainstream economics of the 18th and 19th centuries. Classical economics focuses on the tendency of markets to move to equilibrium and on objective theories of value. Neo-classical economics differs from classical economics primarily in being utilitarian in its value theory and using marginal theory as the basis of its models and equations. Marxian economics also descends from classical theory. Anders Chydenius (1729–1803) was the leading classical liberal of Nordic history. Chydenius, who was a Finnish priest and member of parliament, published a book called The National Gain in 1765, in which he proposes ideas of freedom of trade and industry and explores the relationship between economy and society and lays out the principles of liberalism, all of this eleven years before Adam Smith published a similar and more comprehensive book, The Wealth of Nations. According to Chydenius, democracy, equality and a respect for human rights were the only way towards progress and happiness for the whole of society.

    American School

    The American School owes its origin to the writings and economic policies of Alexander Hamilton, the first Treasury Secretary of the United States. It emphasized high tariffs on imports to help develop the fledgling American manufacturing base and to finance infrastructure projects, as well as National Banking, Public Credit, and government investment into advanced scientific and technological research and development. Friedrich List, one of the most famous proponents of the economic system, named it the National System, and was the main impetus behind the development of the German Zollverein and the economic policies of Germany under Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck beginning in 1879.

    French Liberal School

    The French Liberal School (also called the "Optimist School" or "Orthodox School") is a 19th-century school of economic thought that was centered on the Collège de France and the Institut de France. The Journal des Économistes was instrumental in promulgating the ideas of the School. The School voraciously defended free trade and laissez-faire capitalism. They were primary opponents of collectivist, interventionist and protectionist ideas. This made the French School a forerunner of the modern Austrian School.

    Historical school

    The historical school of economics was an approach to academic economics and to public administration that emerged in the 19th century in Germany, and held sway there until well into the 20th century. The Historical school held that history was the key source of knowledge about human actions and economic matters, since economics was culture-specific, and hence not generalizable over space and time. The School rejected the universal validity of economic theorems. They saw economics as resulting from careful empirical and historical analysis instead of from logic and mathematics. The School preferred historical, political, and social studies to self-referential mathematical modelling. Most members of the school were also Kathedersozialisten, i.e. concerned with social reform and improved conditions for the common man during a period of heavy industrialization. The Historical School can be divided into three tendencies: the Older, led by Wilhelm Roscher, Karl Knies, and Bruno Hildebrand; the Younger, led by Gustav von Schmoller, and also including Étienne Laspeyres, Karl Bücher, Adolph Wagner, and to some extent Lujo Brentano; the Youngest, led by Werner Sombart and including, to a very large extent, Max Weber.

    Predecessors included Friedrich List. The Historical school largely controlled appointments to Chairs of Economics in German universities, as many of the advisors of Friedrich Althoff, head of the university department in the Prussian Ministry of Education 1882-1907, had studied under members of the School. Moreover, Prussia was the intellectual powerhouse of Germany and so dominated academia, not only in central Europe, but also in the United States until about 1900, because the American economics profession was led by holders of German Ph.Ds. The Historical school was involved in the Methodenstreit ("strife over method") with the Austrian School, whose orientation was more theoretical and a prioristic. In English speaking countries, the Historical school is perhaps the least known and least understood approach to the study of economics, because it differs radically from the now-dominant Anglo-American analytical point of view. Yet the Historical school forms the basis—both in theory and in practice—of the social market economy, for many decades the dominant economic paradigm in most countries of continental Europe. The Historical school is also a source of Joseph Schumpeter's dynamic, change-oriented, and innovation-based economics. Although his writings could be critical of the School, Schumpeter's work on the role of innovation and entrepreneurship can be seen as a continuation of ideas originated by the Historical School, especially the work of von Schmoller and Sombart.

    English historical school

    Although not nearly as famous as its German counterpart, there was also an English Historical School, whose figures included William Whewell, Richard Jones, Thomas Edward Cliffe Leslie, Walter Bagehot, Thorold Rogers, Arnold Toynbee, William Cunningham, and William Ashley. It was this school that heavily critiqued the deductive approach of the classical economists, especially the writings of David Ricardo. This school revered the inductive process and called for the merging of historical fact with those of the present period.

    French historical school

    Utopian economics

    Georgist economics

    Georgism or geoism is an economic philosophy proposing that both individual and national economic outcomes would be improved by the utilization of economic rent resulting from control over land and natural resources through levies such as a land value tax.

    Ricardian socialism

    Ricardian socialism is a branch of early 19th century classical economic thought based on the theory that labor is the source of all wealth and exchange value, and rent, profit and interest represent distortions to a free market. The pre-Marxian theories of capitalist exploitation they developed are widely regarded as having been heavily influenced by the works of David Ricardo, and favoured collective ownership of the means of production.

    Marxian economics

    Marxian economics descended from the work of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. This school focuses on the labor theory of value and what Marx considered to be the exploitation of labour by capital. Thus, in Marxian economics, the labour theory of value is a method for measuring the exploitation of labour in a capitalist society rather than simply a theory of price.

    Neo-Marxian economics

    State socialism

    Anarchist economics

    Anarchist economics comprises a set of theories which seek to outline modes of production and exchange not governed by coercive social institutions:

    Thinkers associated with anarchist economics include:

    Distributism

    Distributism is an economic philosophy that was originally formulated in the late 19th century and early 20th century by Catholic thinkers to reflect the teachings of Pope Leo XIII's encyclical Rerum Novarum and Pope Pius's XI encyclical Quadragesimo Anno. It seeks to pursue a third way between capitalism and socialism, desiring to order society according to Christian principles of justice while still preserving private property.

    Institutional economics

    Institutional economics focuses on understanding the role of the evolutionary process and the role of institutions in shaping economic behaviour. Its original focus lay in Thorstein Veblen's instinct-oriented dichotomy between technology on the one side and the "ceremonial" sphere of society on the other. Its name and core elements trace back to a 1919 American Economic Review article by Walton H. Hamilton.

    Neoclassical economics

    Neoclassical economics is the dominant form of economics used today and has the highest amount of adherents among economists. It is often referred to by its critics as Orthodox Economics. The more specific definition this approach implies was captured by Lionel Robbins in a 1932 essay: "the science which studies human behavior as a relation between scarce means having alternative uses." The definition of scarcity is that available resources are insufficient to satisfy all wants and needs; if there is no scarcity and no alternative uses of available resources, then there is no economic problem.

    Lausanne School

    The Lausanne School of economics is an extension of the neoclassical school of economic thought, named after the University of Lausanne in Switzerland. The school is primarily associated with Léon Walras and Vilfredo Pareto, both of whom held successive professorships in political economy at the university, in the latter half of the 19th century. Beginning with Walras, the school is credited with playing a central role in the development of mathematical economics. For this reason, the school has also been referred to as the Mathematical School. A notable work of the Lausanne School is Walras’ development of the general equilibrium theory as a holistic means of analysing the economy, in contrast to partial equilibrium theory, which only analyses single markets in isolation. The theory shows how a general equilibrium is reached through the interaction between demand and supply in an economy consisting of multiple markets operating simultaneously.

    The Lausanne School is also largely credited with the foundation of welfare economics, through which Pareto sought to measure the welfare of an economy. Contrary to utilitarianism, Pareto found that the welfare of an economy cannot be measured by aggregating the individual utilities of its inhabitants. Since individual utilities are subjective, their measurements may not be directly comparable. This led Pareto to conclude that if at least one person’s utility increased, while nobody else was any worse off, then the welfare of the economy would increase. Conversely, if a majority of people experienced an increase in utility while at least one person was worse off, there could be no definitive conclusion about the welfare of the economy. These observations formed the basis of Pareto efficiency, which describes a situation or outcome in which nobody can be made better off without also making someone else worse off. Pareto efficiency is still widely used in contemporary welfare economics as well as game theory.

    Austrian School

    Austrian economists advocate methodological individualism in interpreting economic developments, the subjective theory of value, that money is non-neutral, and emphasize the organizing power of the price mechanism (see Economic calculation debate) and a laissez faire approach to the economy.

    Stockholm School

    The Stockholm School is a school of economic thought. It refers to a loosely organized group of Swedish economists that worked together, in Stockholm, Sweden primarily in the 1930s.

    The Stockholm School had—like John Maynard Keynes—come to the same conclusions in macroeconomics and the theories of demand and supply. Like Keynes, they were inspired by the works of Knut Wicksell, a Swedish economist active in the early years of the twentieth century.

    Keynesian economics

    Keynesian economics has developed from the work of John Maynard Keynes and focused on macroeconomics in the short-run, particularly the rigidities caused when prices are fixed. It has two successors. Post-Keynesian economics is an alternative school—one of the successors to the Keynesian tradition with a focus on macroeconomics. They concentrate on macroeconomic rigidities and adjustment processes, and research micro foundations for their models based on real-life practices rather than simple optimizing models. Generally associated with Cambridge, England and the work of Joan Robinson (see Post-Keynesian economics). New-Keynesian economics is the other school associated with developments in the Keynesian fashion. These researchers tend to share with other Neoclassical economists the emphasis on models based on micro foundations and optimizing behavior, but focus more narrowly on standard Keynesian themes such as price and wage rigidity. These are usually made to be endogenous features of these models, rather than simply assumed as in older style Keynesian ones (see New-Keynesian economics).

    Chicago school

    The Chicago School is a neoclassical school of economic thought associated with the work of the faculty at the University of Chicago, notable particularly in macroeconomics for developing monetarism as an alternative to Keynesianism and its influence on the use of rational expectations in macroeconomic modelling.

    Carnegie School

    Neo-Ricardianism

    New institutional economics

    New institutional economics is a perspective that attempts to extend economics by focusing on the social and legal norms and rules (which are institutions) that underlie economic activity and with analysis beyond earlier institutional economics and neoclassical economics. It can be seen as a broadening step to include aspects excluded in neoclassical economics. It rediscovers aspects of classical political economy.

    20th century schools

    Notable schools or trends of thought in economics in the 20th century were as follows. These were advocated by well-defined groups of academics that became widely known:

    In the late 20th century, areas of study that produced change in economic thinking were: risk-based (rather than price-based models), imperfect economic actors, and treating economics as a biological science (based on evolutionary norms rather than abstract exchange).

    The study of risk was influential, in viewing variations in price over time as more important than actual price. This applied particularly to financial economics, where risk/return tradeoffs were the crucial decisions to be made.

    An important area of growth was the study of information and decision. Examples of this school included the work of Joseph Stiglitz. Problems of asymmetric information and moral hazard, both based around information economics, profoundly affected modern economic dilemmas like executive stock options, insurance markets, and Third-World debt relief.

    Finally, there were a series of economic ideas rooted in the conception of economics as a branch of biology, including the idea that energy relationships, rather than price relationships, determine economic structure. The use of fractal geometry to create economic models (see Energy Economics). In its infancy the application of non-linear dynamics to economic theory, as well as the application of evolutionary psychology explored the processes of valuation and the persistence of non-equilibrium conditions. The most visible work was in the area of applying fractals to market analysis, particularly arbitrage (see Complexity economics). Another infant branch of economics was neuroeconomics. The latter combines neuroscience, economics, and psychology to study how we make choices.

    Emic and etic

    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emic_and_etic In anthropology , folk...