The territorial peace theory finds that the stability of a
country's borders has a large influence on the political climate of the
country. Peace and stable borders foster a democratic and tolerant
climate, while territorial conflicts with neighbor countries have far-reaching consequences for both individual-level attitudes, government policies, conflict escalation, arms races, and war.
In particular, the territorial peace theory seeks to explain why countries with stable borders are likely to develop democracy while countries with insecure borders tend to be autocratic.
The connection between peace and democracy has long been recognized, but theorists disagree about the direction of causality. The democratic peace theory posits that democracy causes peace, while the territorial peace theory makes the opposite claim that peace causes democracy.
Since the early 2000s, there has been increasing scientific
support for the territorial peace theory and criticism of the democratic
peace theory.
The territorial peace theory is addressing several weaknesses of the
democratic peace theory. In particular, the democratic peace theory is
contradicted by the historical observation that countries generally
become democratic only after they have established peace with their
neighbor countries. Furthermore, the democratic peace theory has
difficulties explaining why democratic countries are just as likely to
engage in war with non-democracies, as non-democracies are to engage in
war with each other.
The causal connection between peace and democracy is a subject of
continued debate. Does peace cause democracy or does democracy cause
peace? Is the causality going both ways in a self-amplifying cycle? Or is some third factor causing both peace and democracy?
Historical studies show that countries become democratic only
after their borders have been settled. It is very rare that democracy is
established before territorial borders have been stabilized, and the
few historical cases of democracy before peace have not been stable.
This is strong evidence that a causal arrow goes from peace to
democracy.
In fact, statistical studies show that democracy cannot account for
peace between neighbor countries, but peace can account for joint
democracy.
Territorial conflicts have a remarkable effect on the attitudes and values of the population. Threats against the territorial borders of a country are observed to provoke a rallying effect
in support of the leader and to foster a range of attitudes and
behaviors that are antithetical to key democratic values, such as nationalism, authoritarianism, intolerance, and decreased political trust. Such reactions are likely to prevent democratization in countries with unstable borders.
Another indication that the direction of causality goes from
peace to democracy is obtained by the use of environment features as an instrumental variable. A rugged terrain is known to increase the likelihood of civil conflict. An observed positive correlation
between rugged terrain, intolerance, and lack of democratic values is
interpreted as an indication that conflict impedes democracy because the
reverse causation from autocracy to rugged terrain can be excluded.
One reason why democratic countries handle disputes with their
neighbors more peacefully than non-democratic countries is that they
have dispensed with the disputes most likely to involve the use of
military force prior to becoming democratic, rather than because of
their institutions or norms as the democratic peace theory supposes. In 75% of the country dyads
examined in a study, border settlement occurred at least 35 years
before that dyad became jointly democratic for the first time.
A possible causality in the opposite direction, from democracy to peace, can be established if we make a distinction between negative peace
and positive peace. Negative peace is the absence of war between
neighbor countries. Positive peace is an active mutual recognition and
cooperation and absence of threats. Positive peace results from
high-quality democracy. Transitions from negative peace to positive
peace often occur when new governments come to power, and more commonly
in democratic states.
Some theorists argue that the correlation between peace and democracy can be explained by a third factor causing both peace and democracy. The capitalist peace theory argues that economic development and markets and interdependence are the true causes of peace, and that democracy is uncorrelated with peace when these factors are accounted for.
Another factor during the Cold war was the dominance of the USA that fostered peace between democracies in the so-called Pax Americana.
Another possibility is a circular causation so that peace, economic interdependence, democracy, and international organization all mutually reinforce each other in a positive feedback loop.
Peace and democracy tend to spread regionally so that clusters of
democracies at peace with each other form in areas where borders have
been settled and where countries have no reason to threaten each other's
borders.
Theoretical explanations
There are several theories seeking to explain why peace comes before democracy. These theories may all supplement each other.
Military explanation. A country with unstable borders needs to build up a large military capability in order to defend its territory against possible attacks from neighbor countries. A large standing army can not only be used for defense against external enemies but also for suppressing internal dissidents. This will enable the leaders to augment their position and repress any rebellion or demands for redistribution of wealth and democratization.
Defense explanation. Individuals in a country with unstable borders will fear displacement from their territory. They depend on a strong state leadership to provide for their protection and security. This creates a rallying effect and support for a strong and authoritarian leader. It has been observed that the citizens in this situation often pay lip service to the ideology of democracy while in fact they support an authoritarian leader.
Psychological explanation.
Several psychological studies show that territorial conflicts lead to increased nationalism and intolerance of outgroups, while other kinds of threats have little or no such effect.
This intolerance is connected with a less democratic attitude, less support for negotiatedcompromise with the enemy, less concern about government corruption, and also less tolerance towards other outgroups unrelated to the conflict.
This effect is increasing with the degree of attachment to the contested territory.
Evolutionary explanation.
The psychological effects of territorial threats have an evolutionary explanation according to regality theory. Humans have evolved a psychological flexibility that make them desire a strong leader, strict discipline, intolerance, xenophobia, and a hierarchical
social organization if their social group is threatened by conflict
with another group. The opposite tendencies are seen in case of peace
and collective security where people desire an egalitarian,
democratic, and tolerant society. The construction of a hierarchical
society with a strong leader in case of conflicts with neighbor groups
benefits the citizens by increasing the social cohesion, suppressing free riding, and improving the capacity for collective action
in war and violent conflict. This evolved response pattern explains why
territorial conflicts, war, and terror have stronger psychological
effects than other kinds of conflict, and why such conflicts lead to
authoritarian attitudes and disregard for democracy.
Reversal to autocracy
While the late 20'th century has seen large waves of democratization in many parts of the world, we have also seen trends of backlash and decrease in democratic freedoms, especially in the early 2000s.
Historical studies of countries that have become less democratic show
that these countries are often led by popular leaders who consolidate
their power with general support by the population. While the population
still supported democracy in principle, they actually desired a more
powerful leader and voted for an authoritarian populist.
This situation is typically preceded by some external threat – real or
imagined – against the country. This observation fits with the theories,
explained above, that territorial threats lead to increased
authoritarianism and decreased support for democracy.
The threat that makes the population accept a centralization of
power and a less democratic system is sometimes deliberately fabricated.
There are many historical examples of political leaders who engage in psychological manipulation of their own population through fearmongering, exaggeration of dangers, or even creation of false flag attacks in order to augment their own power. In other cases, the threats are fabricated by foreign powers who engage in psychological warfare and a strategy of tension in order to facilitate an authoritarian coup.
Criticism
Proponents of the democratic peace theory – the theory that democracy causes peace – argue that democracies are likely to use mediation or binding arbitration
rather than military force to resolve interstate disputes. Democracies
are less likely than autocracies to initiate wars that they are not
certain of winning. Studies show that the popularity of the government
is decreasing if war casualties are high, as the democratic peace theory predicts.
Another study found that the risk of violent conflicts is decreasing when the degree of accountability of a government is increasing.
Furthermore, citizens of democracies are significantly less likely to support the use of force against democracies than against autocracies.
Critics further argue that if the territorial peace theory
assumes that leaders suppress democracy because they believe that
democracy impedes the ability of their state to fight wars, then this in
fact confirms that democracies are more peaceful.
Some researchers have even argued that war may lead to a regime change which may pave the way for democratization.
Democratic peace researchers have found that the statistical correlation between peace and democracy remains significant when the correlation is controlled for the effect of border stability,
while a rebuttal argues that this applies to non-neighbor states, while
the statistics still supports the territorial peace theory for states
with shared borders.
Time series analyses show that rivalizing states which are both democratic are less likely to escalate
a rivalry to violent conflict. The pacifying effect of joint democracy
is increasing over time after both states have transitioned to
democracy.
These effects of democracy extend beyond war. Democratic dyads are also
less likely than non-democratic dyads to threaten, display, or use force
against one another.
Synthesis of democratic peace and territorial peace theories
The
territorial peace peace theory refers to neighbor countries because
they have a shared border that they may fight over. Statistical studies
support territorial peace rather than democratic peace when studying
only country pairs with shared borders. Joint democracy does not
significantly increase peace between neighbor countries until after they
have settled their borders.
The situation is different for countries with no shared border.
Borders will rarely be an issue between non-neighbor countries. But
democracy may improve peaceful relations between countries even if they
have no shared border. Democratic countries are more likely to engage in
peaceful negotiations and less likely to use threats or force against
each other because of shared norms and because voters will often replace
warmaking politicians.
This effect of democracy works also for neighbor countries after
they have settled their borders. Joint democracy for countries that are
already at peace with each other decreases the likelihood of new
conflicts, and reduces the severity of militarized disputes and crises
if they occur.
Therefore, the democratic peace theory is useful for conflicts between
countries with no shared border and for countries that are already at
peace with each other, while the territorial peace theory is the most
relevant theory for neighbor countries with unstable borders. The
appearance of joint democracy has no significant pacifying effect in the
absence of settled borders.
Democratic leaders are less likely than autocrats to initiate a
violent conflict, but after a military confrontation has started, there
is little difference between the actions of democratic and autocratic
leaders. The peaceful effect of democracy is to some extent offset by
the observation that democratic leaders are less likely to retreat in
case of military crisis because their popularity will decrease when they
lose face.
Political applications
The territorial peace theory has important implications for international relations, global politics, and peace building. If peace and stable borders are preconditions for democracy, then any interventionist
peace policy should focus first and foremost on the settlement of
territorial conflicts rather than trying to impose democracy on
conflict-filled countries.
There have been many attempts to impose democracy on troubled
countries with explicit reference to the democratic peace theory. The
stated purpose of such interventions was to create peace through
democracy.
For example, the involvement of the US in World War I, World War II, as well as the Iraq War, were all based on the belief that democracy causes peace.
Interventionist attempts to install democracy by military means have almost invariably failed.
The territorial peace theory predicts that military interventions are
likely to lead to less democracy, not more, even if the interventions
aim at establishing democracy.
In several cases, the democratic peace theory has been used as a
justification for initiating a war, rather than the true motive. See the
chapter on justification for initiating war under democratic peace theory.
While UNmandates
that call for democratic elections after a civil war may be normatively
appealing, they are unlikely to be successful. In fact, it has been
argued that early elections after civil wars are increasing the
likelihood of future conflict because they may lead to suppression of
the interests of minority groups.
Peacekeeping
is conductive to democracy promotion and building in developing world.
Here, facilitator and former MICAH Police Commissioner Yves Bouchard
shares mission experience with a group attending a course. The
Planification Avancée des Missions Intégrées (APIM), or advanced mission
planning course, was held at Bamako's Ecole de maintien de la paix and
trained senior military and police officials in mission management.
Participants in the Pearson Centre course were trained in order to
contribute to African Union peacekeeping missions.
Democracy promotion, which can also be referred to as democracy assistance, democracy support, or democracy building, is a strand of foreign policy adopted by governments and international organizations that seek to support the spread of democracy as a political regime
around the world. Among the reasons for supporting democracy include
the belief that countries with a democratic system of governance are
less likely to go to war, are likely to be economically better off and
socially more harmonious. In democracy building, the process includes the building and strengthening of democracy, in particular the consolidation of democratic institutions, including courts of law, police forces, and constitutions. Some critics have argued that the United States has used democracy promotion to justify military intervention abroad.
Much experience has been gained in the last twenty years. After the Revolutions of 1989 resulted in the fall of the Iron Curtain, there was a wave of democratic transitions in former Communist states, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. According to Freedom House, the number of democracies increased from 41 of 150 existing states in 1974 to 123 of 192 states in 2006.
The pace of transition slowed considerably since the beginning of the
twenty-first century, which encouraged discussion of whether democracy
was under threat. In the early twenty-first century, a democratic deficit was noticed in countries where democratic systems already existed, including Britain, the US and the European Union. In the financial sense, democracy promotion grew from 2% of aid in 1990 to nearly 20% in 2005.
An open question for democracy promotion around the world, both
in countries where it is already at the core of the system of governance
and in those where it is not, is defining the terminology of promoting,
supporting or assisting democracy in the post-Cold War situation.
Definitions
The
precise definition of democracy promotion has been debated for more
than twenty-five years. The multiplicity of terms used is a
manifestation of the plurality of opinions and approaches by
international actors, be they governments, NGOs
or other third parties. For example, the term 'promotion' itself can be
seen by some as too intrusive, or implying outside interference, whilst
'support' can be seen by some as more benign but, by others, as
insufficiently assertive.
In the early twenty-first century, the differences tended to divide
into two main camps: those who see it as a political process versus
those who see it as a developmental process (see international relations and development aid for context).
This basic division between the political and developmental
approaches has existed inchoately in the field of democracy support for
many years. It has come into sharper relief during this decade, as
democracy-aid providers face a world increasingly populated by countries
not conforming
to clear or coherent political transitional paths. [...] Some adherents
of the developmental approach criticize the political approach as too
easily turning confrontational vis-à-vis "host" governments and
producing unhelpful counterreactions. Some adherents of the political
approach, meanwhile, fault the developmental approach for being too
vague and unassertive in a world where many leaders have learned to play
a reform game with the international community, absorbing significant
amounts of external political aid while avoiding genuine
democratization.
At least part of the problem lies in the absence of a consensus on what democracy constitutes. W. B. Gallie argued that it is impossible to find a consensus definition, and instead included democracy in a list of 'essentially contested concepts'.
To date, the disagreement over definitions has seen some actors focus
on supporting technical systems of democratic governance (elections,
government structures and the like), while others take the bottom-up
approach of promoting citizen participation and building strong civil
and political society to prepare the ground on which systems of
government can then be planted.
The European Partnership for Democracy
defines 'democracy support' as the political or financial "efforts to
reinforce or create democratic development or to halt autocratisation",
while 'democracy assistance' refers to financial flows "in the spirit of
‘international assistance". EPD further acknowledges that 'democracy
promotion' is the term widespreadly used by academics but has a more
active and often coercive connotation compared to ‘democracy support’.
Support is something given to existing internal efforts for
democratisation while promotion does not require any such internal
(national) desire".
Another definition of democracy support can be drawn from the
OECD Development Assistance Committee's aid flow database. The
classification makes the distinction between different types of aid
flows relevant for democracy assistance, such as democratic
participation and civil society, elections, legislatures and political
parties, media and free flow of information, human rights, women's
rights organisations and movement and government, decentralisation and
support to subnational government institutions, and anti-corruption
organisations and institutions.
The types and objectives of democracy assistance aid delivered by
international donors depend on the history of their own country with
democracy, and may explain the diversity of democracy promotion
contexts. If historically Western countries championed democracy
promotion worldwide, new non-Western actors have emerged in the last
decades with particular goals and geographical reaches, participating in
the construction of a broad definition of democracy promotion.
Types
Democracy promotion has two main patterns that depend on the type of democratization a state is dealing with: external intervention and as a solution to civil war,
or supporting an internal push for reform. Democracy promotion
advocates are divided on which pattern tends to be most successful for
the resources that democracy promotion programs invest; they are
similarly divided on which components and factors of the democratization
process are most important to the success of democratic consolidation.
Post-civil war democratization
Civil
wars cause a number of problems for democratization. Laura Armey and
Robert McNab found that the longer a civil war lasts, and the more
casualties it produces, the more hostile the warring factions become to
each other; this hostility in turn makes stabilization along terms of
peaceful competition, required in a democratic regime,
more difficult. Problematically for democracy promotion, the same study
found that quick, decisive victories for one faction—even an ostensibly
pro-democratic rebellion—similarly discourage peaceful, electoral
competition for control of a government after the conflict is over.
Leonard Wantchekon has suggested that one of the most reliable forces
of democratization is a stalemated civil war, in which the original
motivation for the conflict becomes irrelevant as the costs mount; this
impels the factions to turn to a combination of internal and external
arbitrators to forge a power-sharing agreement: elections and outside,
neutral institutions to guarantee that every faction participates in the
new democracy fairly.
External intervention
External
interventions see different levels of democratization success depending
on the type of intervener, type of intervention, and level of elite
cooperation prior to the intervention. The level of neutrality and
geopolitical disinterest the intervener possesses is important, as is
the severity of the intervention's infringement on sovereignty. The
differences can be highlighted with three examples: a neutral, mostly
unobtrusive monitor missions like UN election observers in Nicaragua in 1989; the multilateralNATO IFOR mission in Yugoslavia to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1031 in 1995; and the unilateral, destabilizing intervention represented by the American invasion of Iraq
in 2003. All three missions aimed on some level to promote democracy,
with varying degrees of success. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis
have found that the peacekeeping
missions most successful at producing fledgling democracies have strong
mandates backing them up, but tend not to revolve around military
enforcement. Successful democratizing interventions consist of
monitoring factions' adherence to their negotiated settlement, while the most successful ones include extensive state-building (such as improving government efficiency and professionalism, or classical infrastructure assistance).
Problems with external intervention
Interventions
that fail to expend resources on state-building can sometimes be
counter-productive to democracy promotion because, as McBride, Milante,
and Skaperdas have proposed, a negotiated settlement to a civil war is
based on individual factions' faith in the state's unbiased distribution of the benefits of stability; an external intervention shakes that faith by implying that such faith was misplaced to begin with.
An additional problem raised by Marina Ottaway is that interventions
too often rush to implement formal democratic institutions, such as
elections, without allowing time for competing elites to separate
responsibly; because of the short timeframe, they either unite into a
new authoritarian arrangement or rely on overly divisive party platforms, such as identity, which precludes “permanent fragmentation” of the elite within a cooperative regime framework.
A final concern raised with external interventions, particularly
unilateral or narrowly multilateral ones, is the perception or
actualization of imperialism or neo-imperialism in the name of human rights or democracy by an interested party, which, she theorizes, spawns counter-productive nationalist
backlash; however, even neutral monitors must be careful that their
reports do not invite a unilateral intervention, as the Council of
Freely-Elected Heads of Government's 1989 report on Panamanianelection fraud did for the United States.
Gradual reformism and the four-player game
Another
school of thought on how democratization most successfully occurs
involves an authoritarian regime transitioning to a democratic one as a
result of gradual reforms over time. The basic mechanism for this is a
four-player game theoretical
set-up in which (1) moderate regime and (2) moderate opposition figures
form a pro-democratic reform coalition to sideline (3) core regime
members and (4) opposition calling for radical pro-democratic changes,
with the aim of making the state more democratic while preserving its
stability. Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz argue that this model requires both a highly institutionalized regime and public sphere. The regime must not be sultanistic
(based entirely around one central ruler's desires) in order that
different members retain some degree of autonomy and have different
interests; meanwhile, in the public sphere, there must be a strong civil society
that can both maintain pressure on the authoritarian regime while also
providing support for the reform pact and the moderates who formulated
it. According to Ray Salvatore Jennings, during the second half of the twentieth century, the success of democratic transitions depended substantially on the ability of civil society organizations
(CSOs) to disseminate dissident information to counter authoritarian
regimes' narratives, as well as their mobilizing high voter turnout and
monitoring the first elections to prevent interference by hardliner
members of the regime.
Further, many scholars partial to the gradual reformism perspective on
democratization agree with Francis Fukuyama, who asserts that the role
of CSOs in directing the part of individuals' lives not under the liberal democratic state's control makes CSOs critical to sustaining the social capital and self-advocacy important for liberal democracy.
Conflict over support for internal reform
Even
beyond the question of what and whether external intervention is an
effective democracy support strategy, a number of issues continue to
divide the proponents of a democracy support-based international policy.
Carles Boix and Susan Stokes
advocate economic development aid, contending that the more advanced an
economy, the less willing factions will be to break the peace; others,
however, contend that this strategy is only useful at defending
democratic consolidation, and not at encouraging democratization of
regimes where one faction already dominates. Still others fall in Freytag and Heckelman's camp, advocating the long-game, positing that although USAID
programs have so far had little net effect on democratization, they
have demonstrably improved basic democratic features, including civil
society and the electoral process, in countries receiving aid.
Not all CSOs will be helpful in promoting democracy—if the
organization is too large to inspire its members, or its constituents'
identity is too narrowly defined, the organization will fail to support four-player democratic transition pacts, and may even encourage divisiveness and civil war.
There is also some concern that the international community may be
propping up NGOs to the point that they themselves become an
unrepresentative elite.
Democratization, or democratisation, is the transition to a more democratic political regime, including substantive political changes moving in a democratic direction. It may be the transition from an authoritarian regime to a full democracy, a transition from an authoritarian political system to a semi-democracy or transition from a semi-authoritarian political system to a democratic political system.
The outcome may be consolidated (as it was for example in the United Kingdom) or democratization may face frequent reversals (as happened in Chile).
Different patterns of democratization are often used to explain other
political phenomena, such as whether a country goes to a war or whether
its economy grows.
Whether and to what extent democratization occurs has been
attributed to various factors, including economic development,
historical legacies, civil society, and international processes. Some
accounts of democratization emphasize how elites drove democratization,
whereas other accounts emphasize grassroots bottom-up processes.
Since 1900, the number of countries democratizing (yellow) has been higher than those autocratizing (blue), except in the late 1920s through 1940s and since 2010
Map showing democratization of countries after the Cold War.
Theories of democratization seek to explain a large macro-level
change, the change in a political regime from dictatorship or
authoritarianism to democracy. Some disagreements among scholars concern
the concept of democracy. Other differences concern how to measure democracy - and what democracy index should be used.
Measures of democratization
Some common measures used in this literature are those provided by Freedom House, Polity, and the V-Dem Institute.
Freedom House produces one of the most comprehensive "freedom
measures" nationally and internationally and by extension a measure of
democratization. Freedom House categorizes all countries of the world
according to a seven-point value system with over 200 questions on the
survey and multiple survey representatives in various parts of every
nation. The total raw points of every country places the country in one
of three categories: Free, Partly Free, or not Free.
Waves of democratization
One way to summarize the outcome theories of democratization seek to account is with the idea of waves of democratization
The three waves of democracy identified by Samuel P. Huntington
A wave of democratization refers to a major surge of democracy in history. And Samuel P. Huntington identified three waves of democratization that have taken place in history.
The first one brought democracy to Western Europe and Northern America
in the 19th century. It was followed by a rise of dictatorships during
the Interwar period. The second wave began after World War II, but lost steam between 1962 and the mid-1970s. The latest wave began in 1974 and is still ongoing. Democratization of Latin America and the former Eastern Bloc is part of this third wave.
Waves of democratization can be followed by waves of
de-democratization. Thus, Huntington, in 1991, offered the following
depiction.
• First wave of democratization, 1828-1926
• First wave of de-democratization, 1922-42
• Second wave of democratization, 1943-62
• Second wave of de-democratization, 1958-75
• Third wave of democratization, 1974-
The idea of waves of democratization has also been used and scrutinized by many other authors, including Renske Doorenspleet, John Markoff, Seva Gunitsky, and Svend-Erik Skaaning.
According to Seva Gunitsky, from the 18th century to the Arab Spring (2011–2012), 13 democratic waves can be identified.
Historical cases
The history of democracy shows that democractic development has often been slow, violent, and marked by frequent reversals.
Magna Carta in the British Library. The document was described as "the chief cause of Democracy in England".
Great Britain
In Great Britain, there was renewed interest in Magna Carta in the 17th century. The Parliament of England enacted the Petition of Right in 1628 which established certain liberties for subjects. The English Civil War (1642–1651) was fought between the King and an oligarchic but elected Parliament, during which the idea of a political party took form with groups debating rights to political representation during the Putney Debates of 1647. Subsequently, the Protectorate (1653–59) and the English Restoration (1660) restored more autocratic rule although Parliament passed the Habeas Corpus Act in 1679, which strengthened the convention that forbade detention lacking sufficient cause or evidence. The Glorious Revolution in 1688 established a strong Parliament that passed the Bill of Rights 1689, which codified certain rights and liberties for individuals.
It set out the requirement for regular parliaments, free elections,
rules for freedom of speech in Parliament and limited the power of the
monarch, ensuring that, unlike much of the rest of Europe, royal absolutism would not prevail. Only with the Representation of the People Act 1884 did a majority of the males get the vote.
United States of America
The American Revolution (1775–1783) created the United States. The new Constitution established a relatively strong federal national government that included an executive, a national judiciary, and a bicameral Congress that represented states in the Senate and the population in the House of Representatives. In many fields, it was a success ideologically in the sense that a
relatively true republic was established that never had a single
dictator, but voting rights were initially restricted to white male property owners (about 6% of the population). Slavery was not abolished in the southern states until the constitutional Amendments of the Reconstruction era following the American Civil War (1861–1865) and the Civil Rights given to African-Americans were only achieved in the 1960s.
In Japan, limited democratic reforms were introduced during the Meiji period (when the industrial modernization of Japan began), the Taishō period (1912–1926), and the early Shōwa period. Despite pro-democracy movements such as the Freedom and People's Rights Movement
(1870s and 1880s) and some proto-democratic institutions, Japanese
society remained constrained by a highly conservative society and
bureaucracy. Historian Kent E. Calder
notes that writers that "Meiji leadership embraced constitutional
government with some pluralist features for essentially tactical
reasons" and that pre-World war II Japanese society was dominated by a
"loose coalition" of "landed rural elites, big business, and the
military" that was averse to pluralism and reformism. While the Imperial Diet survived the impacts of Japanese militarism, the Great Depression, and the Pacific War, other pluralistic institutions, such as political parties, did not. After World War II, during the Allied occupation, Japan adopted a much more vigorous, pluralistic democracy.
Voting in Valparaíso, Chile, in 1888.
Latin America
Countries in Latin America
became independent between 1810 and 1825, and soon had some early
expriences with representative government and elections. All Latin
American countries established representative institutions soon after
independence, the early cases being those of Colombia in 1810, Paraguay and Venezuela in 1811, and Chile in 1818. Adam Przeworski shows that some experiments with representative institutions in Latin America occurred earlier than in most European countries. Mass democracy, in which the working class had the right to vote, become common only in the 1930s and 1940s.
Causes
There is
considerable debate about the factors which affect (e.g., promote or
limit) democratization. Economic, cultural, and historical factors have
been cited as impacting on the process. So too have historical and
international factors. Moreover, some arguments are more structural in
nature, while others focus on leadership and agency. It is useful to
order the various arguments under different headings.
Economic factors
Economic development and modernization theory
Industrialization was seen by many theorists as a driver of democratization.
Scholars such as Seymour Martin Lipset; Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens, and John Stephens argue that economic development increases the likelihood of democratization. Initially argued by Lipset in 1959, this subsequently been referred to as modernization theory.
According to Daniel Treisman, there is "a strong and consistent
relationship between higher income and both democratization and
democratic survival in the medium term (10–20 years), but not
necessarily in shorter time windows." Robert Dahl argued that market economies provided favorable conditions for democratic institutions.
A higher GDP/capita correlates with democracy and some claim the wealthiest democracies have never been observed to fall into authoritarianism.
The rise of Hitler and of the Nazis in Weimar Germany can be seen as an
obvious counter-example, but although in early 1930s Germany was
already an advanced economy, by that time, the country was also living
in a state of economic crisis virtually since the first World War (in
the 1910s), a crisis which was eventually worsened by the effects of the
Great Depression. There is also the general observation that democracy
was very rare before the industrial revolution. Empirical research thus
led many to believe that economic development either increases chances
for a transition to democracy, or helps newly established democracies
consolidate.
One study finds that economic development prompts democratization but
only in the medium run (10–20 years). This is because development may
entrench the incumbent leader but make it more difficult for him deliver
the state to a son or trusted aide when he exits.
However, the debate about whether democracy is a consequence of wealth,
a cause of it, or both processes are unrelated, is far from conclusive. Another study suggests that economic development depends on the political stability of a country to promote democracy. Clark, Robert and Golder, in their reformulation of Albert Hirschman's model of Exit, Voice and Loyalty, explain how it is not the increase of wealth in a country per se
which influences a democratization process, but rather the changes in
the socio-economic structures that come together with the increase of
wealth. They explain how these structure changes have been called out to
be one of the main reasons several European countries became
democratic. When their socioeconomic structures shifted because
modernization made the agriculture sector more efficient, bigger
investments of time and resources were used for the manufacture and
service sectors. In England, for example, members of the gentry began
investing more on commercial activities that allowed them to become
economically more important for the state. This new kind of productive
activities came with new economic power were assets became more
difficult for the state to count and hence more difficult to tax.
Because of this, predation was no longer possible and the state had to
negotiate with the new economic elites to extract revenue. A sustainable
bargain had to be reached because the state became more dependent of
its citizens remaining loyal and, with this, citizens had now leverage
to be taken into account in the decision making process for the country.
Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi
argue that while economic development makes democracies less likely to
turn authoritarian, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that
development causes democratization (turning an authoritarian state into a
democracy). Economic development can boost public support for authoritarian regimes in the short-to-medium term. Andrew J. Nathan argues that China is a problematic case for the thesis that economic development causes democratization.
Michael Miller finds that development increases the likelihood of
"democratization in regimes that are fragile and unstable, but makes
this fragility less likely to begin with."
There is research to suggest that greater urbanization, through various pathways, contributes to democratization.
A 2016 study found that preferential trade agreements "encourage the
democratization of a country, in particular if the PTA partners are
themselves democracies."
Liberalization in autocracies was more likely to succeed in
countries that had the advantage of a better starting point concerning
political institutions, GDP,
and education. These more privileged countries could also carry out key
reforms more rapidly, and were able to do so even in areas in which
they had no initial advantage. This indicates the presence of a "Matthew effect" in political science: to countries that already have, more is given.
Numerous scholars and political thinkers have linked a large middle class to the emergence and sustenance of democracy, whereas others have challenged this relationship.
In "Non-Modernization" (2022), Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson
argue that modernization theory cannot account for various paths of
political development "because it posits a link between economics and
politics that is not conditional on institutions and culture and that
presumes a definite endpoint—for example, an 'end of history'."
A meta-analysis by Gerardo L. Munck
of research on Lipset's argument shows that a majority of studies do
not support the thesis that higher levels of economic development leads
to more democracy.
Classes, cleavages and alliances
Theorists
such as Barrington Moore Jr. argued that the roots of democratization
could be found in the relationship between lords and peasants in
agrarian societies.
Sociologist Barrington Moore Jr., in his influential Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
(1966), argues that the distribution of power among classes – the
peasantry, the bourgeoise and the landed aristocracy – and the nature of
alliances between classes determined whether democratic, authoritarian
or communist revolutions occurred.
Moore also argued there were at least "three routes to the modern
world" - the liberal democratic, the fascist, and the communist - each
deriving from the timing of industrialization and the social structure
at the time of transition. Thus, Moore challenged modernization theory,
by stressing that there was not one path to the modern world and that
economic development did not always bring about democracy.
Many authors have questioned parts of Moore's arguments. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Stephens, and John D. Stephens, in Capitalist Development and Democracy (1992), raise questions about Moore's analysis of the role of the bourgeoisie in democratization.
Eva Bellin argues that under certain circumstances, the bourgeoise and
labor are more likely to favor democratization, but less so under other
circumstances. Samuel Valenzuela argues that, counter to Moore's view, the landed elite supported democratization in Chile.
A comprehensive assessment conducted by James Mahoney concludes that
"Moore's specific hypotheses about democracy and authoritarianism
receive only limited and highly conditional support."
A 2020 study linked democratization to the mechanization of agriculture: as landed elites became less reliant on the repression of agricultural workers, they became less hostile to democracy.
According to political scientist David Stasavage, representative government is "more likely to occur when a society is divided across multiple political cleavages."
A 2021 study found that constitutions that emerge through pluralism
(reflecting distinct segments of society) are more likely to induce
liberal democracy (at least, in the short term).
Political-economic factors
Rulers' need for taxation
Robert Bates
and Donald Lien, as well as David Stasavage, have argued that rulers'
need for taxes gave asset-owning elites the bargaining power to demand a
say on public policy, thus giving rise to democratic institutions. Montesquieu
argued that the mobility of commerce meant that rulers had to bargain
with merchants in order to tax them, otherwise they would lead the
country or hide their commercial activities.
Stasavage argues that the small size and backwardness of European
states, as well as the weakness of European rulers, after the fall of
the Roman Empire meant that European rulers had to obtain consent from
their population to govern effectively.
According to Clark, Golder, and Golder, an application of Albert O. Hirschman's
exit, voice, and loyalty model is that if individuals have plausible
exit options, then a government may be more likely to democratize. James C. Scott argues that governments may find it difficult to claim a sovereignty over a population when that population is in motion.
Scott additionally asserts that exit may not solely include physical
exit from the territory of a coercive state, but can include a number of
adaptive responses to coercion that make it more difficult for states
to claim sovereignty over a population. These responses can include
planting crops that are more difficult for states to count, or tending
livestock that are more mobile. In fact, the entire political
arrangement of a state is a result of individuals adapting to the
environment, and making a choice as to whether or not to stay in a
territory.
If people are free to move, then the exit, voice, and loyalty model
predicts that a state will have to be of that population representative,
and appease the populous in order to prevent them from leaving.
If individuals have plausible exit options then they are better able to
constrain a government's arbitrary behaviour through threat of exit.
Inequality and democracy
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson argued that the relationship between social equality and democratic transition is complicated: People have less incentive to revolt in an egalitarian society (for example, Singapore), so the likelihood of democratization is lower. In a highly unequal society (for example, South Africa under Apartheid),
the redistribution of wealth and power in a democracy would be so
harmful to elites that these would do everything to prevent
democratization. Democratization is more likely to emerge somewhere in
the middle, in the countries, whose elites offer concessions because (1)
they consider the threat of a revolution credible and (2) the cost of
the concessions is not too high. This expectation is in line with the empirical research showing that democracy is more stable in egalitarian societies.
In their 2019 book The Narrow Corridor and a 2022 study in the American Political Science Review,
Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the nature of the relationship between
elites and society determine whether stable democracy emerges. When
elites are overly dominant, despotic states emerge. When society is
overly dominant, weak states emerge. When elites and society are evenly
balance, inclusive states emerge.
Natural resources
The abundance of oil is sometimes seen as a curse.
Research shows that oil wealth lowers levels of democracy and strengthens autocratic rule.According to Michael Ross, petroleum
is the sole resource that has "been consistently correlated with less
democracy and worse institutions" and is the "key variable in the vast
majority of the studies" identifying some type of resource curse effect. A 2014 meta-analysis confirms the negative impact of oil wealth on democratization.
Thad Dunning proposes a plausible explanation for Ecuador's
return to democracy that contradicts the conventional wisdom that
natural resource rents encourage authoritarian governments. Dunning
proposes that there are situations where natural resource rents, such as
those acquired through oil, reduce the risk of distributive or social
policies to the elite because the state has other sources of revenue to
finance this kind of policies that is not the elite wealth or income.
And in countries plagued with high inequality, which was the case of
Ecuador in the 1970s, the result would be a higher likelihood of
democratization.
In 1972, the military coup had overthrown the government in large part
because of the fears of elites that redistribution would take place. That same year oil became an increasing financial source for the country.
Although the rents were used to finance the military, the eventual
second oil boom of 1979 ran parallel to the country's
re-democratization.
Ecuador's re-democratization can then be attributed, as argued by
Dunning, to the large increase of oil rents, which enabled not only a
surge in public spending but placated the fears of redistribution that
had grappled the elite circles.
The exploitation of Ecuador's resource rent enabled the government to
implement price and wage policies that benefited citizens at no cost to
the elite and allowed for a smooth transition and growth of democratic
institutions.
The thesis that oil and other natural resources have a negative impact on democracy has been challenged by historian Stephen Haber and political scientist Victor Menaldo in a widely cited article in the American Political Science Review
(2011). Haber and Menaldo argue that "natural resource reliance is not
an exogenous variable" and find that when tests of the relationship
between natural resources and democracy take this point into account
"increases in resource reliance are not associated with
authoritarianism."
Cultural factors
Values and religion
It
is claimed by some that certain cultures are simply more conducive to
democratic values than others. This view is likely to be ethnocentric. Typically, it is Western culture
which is cited as "best suited" to democracy, with other cultures
portrayed as containing values which make democracy difficult or
undesirable. This argument is sometimes used by undemocratic regimes to
justify their failure to implement democratic reforms. Today, however,
there are many non-Western democracies. Examples include: India, Japan,
Indonesia, Namibia, Botswana, Taiwan, and South Korea. Research finds
that "Western-educated leaders significantly and substantively improve a
country's democratization prospects".
Huntington presented an influential, but also controversial
arguments about Confucianism and Islam. Huntington held that that "In
practice Confucian or Confucian-influenced societies have been
inhospitable to democracy."
He also held that "Islamic doctrine ... contains elements that may be
both congenial and uncongenial to democracy," but generally thought that
Islam was an obstacle to democratization. In contrast, Alfred Stepan was more optimistic about the compatibility of different religions and democracy.
The
compatibility of Islam and democracy continues to the a focus of
discussion; the image depicts a mosque in Medina, Saudi Arabia.
Steven Fish and Robert Barro have linked Islam to undemocratic outcomes. However, Michael Ross argues that the lack of democracies in some parts
of the Muslim world has more to do with the adverse effects of the
resource curse than Islam. Lisa Blaydes and Eric Chaney have linked the democratic divergence between the West and the Middle-East to the reliance on mamluks
(slave soldiers) by Muslim rulers whereas European rulers had to rely
on local elites for military forces, thus giving those elites bargaining
power to push for representative government.
Robert Dahl argued, in On Democracy, that countries with a "democratic political culture" were more prone for democratization and democratic survival. He also argued that cultural homogeneity and smallness contribute to democratic survival. Other scholars have however challenged the notion that small states and homogeneity strengthen democracy.
A 2012 study found that areas in Africa with Protestant missionaries were more likely to become stable democracies. A 2020 study failed to replicate those findings.
Sirianne Dahlum and Carl Henrik Knutsen offer a test of the
Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel revised version of modernization
theory, which focuses on cultural traits triggered by economic
development that are presummed to be conducive to democratization.
They find "no empirical support" for the Inglehart and Welzel thesis
and conclude that "self-expression values do not enhance democracy
levels or democratization chances, and neither do they stabilize
existing democracies."
Education
It has long been theorized that education promotes stable and democratic societies.
Research shows that education leads to greater political tolerance,
increases the likelihood of political participation and reduces
inequality.
One study finds "that increases in levels of education improve levels
of democracy and that the democratizing effect of education is more
intense in poor countries".
It is commonly claimed that democracy and democratization were
important drivers of the expansion of primary education around the
world. However, new evidence from historical education trends challenges
this assertion. An analysis of historical student enrollment rates for
109 countries from 1820 to 2010 finds no support for the claim that
democratization increased access to primary education around the world.
It is true that transitions to democracy often coincided with an
acceleration in the expansion of primary education, but the same
acceleration was observed in countries that remained non-democratic.
Robert Putnam
argues that certain characteristics make societies more likely to have
cultures of civic engagement that lead to more participatory
democracies. Putnam argues that communities with denser horizontal
networks of civic association
are able to better build the "norms of trust, reciprocity, and civic
engagement" that lead to democratization and well-functioning
participatory democracies. Putnam contrasts communities with dense
horizontal networks to communities with vertical networks and patron-client relations, and asserts that the latter are unlikely to build the culture of civic engagement necessary for democratization.
Sheri Berman
has rebutted Putnam's theory that civil society contributes to
democratization, writing that in the case of the Weimar Republic, civil
society facilitated the rise of the Nazi Party. Subsequent empirical research has lent support for Berman's argument.
Yale University political scientist Daniel Mattingly argues civil
society in China helps the authoritarian regime in China to cement
control.
Research indicates that democracy protests are associated with
democratization. According to a study by Freedom House, in 67 countries
where dictatorships have fallen since 1972, nonviolent civic resistance
was a strong influence over 70 percent of the time. In these
transitions, changes were catalyzed not through foreign invasion, and
only rarely through armed revolt or voluntary elite-driven reforms, but
overwhelmingly by democratic civil society organizations utilizing
nonviolent action and other forms of civil resistance, such as strikes,
boycotts, civil disobedience, and mass protests. A 2016 study found that about a quarter of all cases of democracy protests between 1989 and 2011 lead to democratization.
Theories based on political agents and choices
Elite-opposition negotiations and contingency
Scholars such as Dankwart A. Rustow, and Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter in their classic Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (1986),
argued against the notion that there are structural "big" causes of
democratization. These scholars instead emphasize how the
democratization process occurs in a more contingent manner that depends
on the characteristics and circumstances of the elites who ultimately
oversee the shift from authoritarianism to democracy.
O'Donnell and Schmitter proposed a strategic choice approach to
transitions to democracy that highlighted how they were driven by the
decisions of different actors in response to a core set of dilemmas. The
analysis centered on the interaction among four actors: the hard-liners
and soft-liners who belonged to the incumbent authoritarian regime, and
the moderate and radical oppositions against the regime. This book not
only became the point of reference for a burgeoning academic literature
on democratic transitions, it was also read widely by political activists engaged in actual struggles to achieve democracy.
Adam Przeworski, in Democracy and the Market (1991),
offered the first analysis of the interaction between rulers and
opposition in transitions to democracy using rudimentary game theory. and he emphasizes the interdependence of political and economic transformations.
Elite-driven democratization
Scholars
have argued that processes of democratization may be elite-driven or
driven by the authoritarian incumbents as a way for those elites to
retain power amid popular demands for representative government.
If the costs of repression are higher than the costs of giving away
power, authoritarians may opt for democratization and inclusive
institutions.
According to a 2020 study, authoritarian-led democratization is more
likely to lead to lasting democracy in cases when the party strength of
the authoritarian incumbent is high.
However, Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo argue that democratizing
rules implemented by outgoing authoritarians may distort democracy in
favor of the outgoing authoritarian regime and its supporters, resulting
in "bad" institutions that are hard to get rid of.
According to Michael K. Miller, elite-driven democratization is
particularly likely in the wake of major violent shocks (either domestic
or international) which provide openings to opposition actors to the
authoritarian regime.
Dan Slater and Joseph Wrong argue that dictators in Asia chose to
implement democratic reforms when they were in positions of strength in
order to retain and revitalize their power.
According to a study by political scientist Daniel Treisman,
influential theories of democratization posit that autocrats
"deliberately choose to share or surrender power. They do so to prevent
revolution, motivate citizens to fight wars, incentivize governments to
provide public goods,
outbid elite rivals, or limit factional violence." His study shows that
in many cases, "democratization occurred not because incumbent elites
chose it but because, in trying to prevent it, they made mistakes that
weakened their hold on power. Common mistakes include: calling elections
or starting military conflicts, only to lose them; ignoring popular
unrest and being overthrown; initiating limited reforms that get out of
hand; and selecting a covert democrat as leader. These mistakes reflect
well-known cognitive biases such as overconfidence and the illusion of control."
Sharun Mukand and Dani Rodrik
dispute that elite-driven democratization produce liberal democracy.
They argue that low levels of inequality and weak identity cleavages are
necessary for liberal democracy to emerge.
A 2020 study by several political scientists from German universities
found that democratization through bottom-up peaceful protests led to
higher levels of democracy and democratic stability than democratization
prompted by elites.
The three dictatorship types, monarchy, civilian and military
have different approaches to democratization as a result of their
individual goals. Monarchic and civilian dictatorships seek to remain in
power indefinitely through hereditary rule in the case of monarchs or
through oppression in the case of civilian dictators. A military
dictatorship seizes power to act as a caretaker government to replace
what they consider a flawed civilian government. Military dictatorships
are more likely to transition to democracy because at the onset, they
are meant to be stop-gap solutions while a new acceptable government
forms.
Research suggests that the threat of civil conflict encourages
regimes to make democratic concessions. A 2016 study found that
drought-induced riots in Sub-Saharan Africa lead regimes, fearing
conflict, to make democratic concessions.
Scrambled constituencies
Mancur Olson
theorizes that the process of democratization occurs when elites are
unable to reconstitute an autocracy. Olson suggests that this occurs
when constituencies or identity groups are mixed within a geographic
region. He asserts that this mixed geographic constituencies requires
elites to for democratic and representative institutions to control the
region, and to limit the power of competing elite groups.
Death or ouster of dictator
One
analysis found that "Compared with other forms of leadership turnover
in autocracies—such as coups, elections, or term limits—which lead to
regime collapse about half of the time, the death of a dictator is
remarkably inconsequential. ... of the 79 dictators who have died in
office (1946–2014)... in the vast majority (92%) of cases, the regime
persists after the autocrat's death."
International factors
War and national security
Jeffrey Herbst,
in his paper "War and the State in Africa" (1990), explains how
democratization in European states was achieved through political
development fostered by war-making and these "lessons from the case of
Europe show that war is an important cause of state formation that is missing in Africa today."
Herbst writes that war and the threat of invasion by neighbors caused
European state to more efficiently collect revenue, forced leaders to
improve administrative capabilities, and fostered state unification and a
sense of national identity (a common, powerful association between the
state and its citizens).
Herbst writes that in Africa and elsewhere in the non-European world
"states are developing in a fundamentally new environment" because they
mostly "gained Independence without having to resort to combat and have
not faced a security threat since independence." Herbst notes that the strongest non-European states, South Korea and Taiwan, are "largely 'warfare' states that have been molded, in part, by the near constant threat of external aggression."
Elizabeth Kier has challenged claims that total war prompts
democratization, showing in the cases of the UK and Italy during World
War I that the policies adopted by the Italian government during World
War I prompted a fascist backlash whereas UK government policies towards
labor undermined broader democratization.
The link between war and democratization has been a focus on some theories.
Wars may contribute to the state-building that precedes a transition to democracy, but war is mainly a serious obstacle to democratization. While adherents of the democratic peace theory believe that democracy causes peace, the territorial peace theory makes the opposite claim that peace causes democracy. In fact, war and territorial threats to a country are likely to increase authoritarianism
and lead to autocracy.
This is supported by historical evidence showing that in almost all
cases, peace has come before democracy. A number of scholars have argued
that there is little support for the hypothesis that democracy causes
peace, but strong evidence for the opposite hypothesis that peace leads
to democracy.
Christian Welzel'shuman empowerment theory posits that existential security leads to emancipative cultural values and support for a democratic political organization. This is in agreement with theories based on evolutionary psychology. The so-called regality theory finds that people develop a psychological preference for a strong leader and an authoritarian form of government in situations of war or perceived collective danger. On the other hand, people will support egalitarian
values and a preference for democracy in situations of peace and
safety. The consequence of this is that a society will develop in the
direction of autocracy
and an authoritarian government when people perceive collective danger,
while the development in the democratic direction requires collective
safety.
International institutions
A number of studies have found that institutional institutions have helped facilitate democratization. Thomas Risse wrote in 2009, "there is a consensus in the literature on Eastern Europe that the EU membership perspective had a huge anchoring effects for the new democracies." Scholars have also linked NATO expansion with playing a role in democratization.
international forces can significantly affect democratization. Global
forces like the diffusion of democratic ideas and pressure from
international financial institutions to democratize have led o
democratization.
The European Union has contributed to the spread of democracy, in
particular by encouraging democratic reforms in aspiring member states. Thomas Risse
wrote in 2009, "there is a consensus in the literature on Eastern
Europe that the EU membership perspective had a huge anchoring effects
for the new democracies."
Steven Levitsky
and Lucan Way have argued that close ties to the West increased the
likelihood of democratization after the end of the Cold War, whereas
states with weak ties to the West adopted competitive authoritarian regimes.
A 2002 study found that membership in regional organizations "is correlated with transitions to democracy during the period from 1950 to 1992."
A 2004 study found no evidence that foreign aid led to democratization.
Democracies have often been imposed by military intervention, for example in Japan and Germanyafter World War II. In other cases, decolonization
sometimes facilitated the establishment of democracies that were soon
replaced by authoritarian regimes. For example, Syria, after gaining
independence from French mandatory control at the beginning of the Cold War, failed to consolidate its democracy, so it eventually collapsed and was replaced by a Ba'athist dictatorship.
Robert Dahl argued in On Democracy that foreign
interventions contributed to democratic failures, citing Soviet
interventions in Central and Eastern Europe and U.S. interventions in
Latin America.
However, the delegitimization of empires contributed to the emergence
of democracy as former colonies gained independence and implemented
democracy.
Geographic factors
Some
scholars link the emergence and sustenance of democracies to areas with
access to the sea, which tends to increase the mobility of people,
goods, capital, and ideas.
Historical factors
Historical legacies
In seeking to explain why North America developed stable democracies and Latin America did not, Seymour Martin Lipset, in The Democratic Century
(2004), holds that the reason is that the initial patterns of
colonization, the subsequent process of economic incorporation of the
new colonies, and the wars of independence varies. The divergent
histories of Britain and Iberia are seen as creating different cultural
legacies that affected the prospects of democracy. A related argument is presented by James A. Robinson in "Critical Junctures and Developmental Paths" (2022).
Sequencing
Scholars
have discussed whether the order in which things happen help or hinder
the process of democratization. An early discussion occurred in the
1960s and 1970s. Dankwart Rustow argued that "'the most effective
sequence' is the pursuit of national unity, government authority, and
political equality, in that order."
Eric Nordlinger and Samuel Huntington stressed "the importance of
developing effective governmental institutions before the emergence of
mass participation in politics." Robert Dahl, in Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition
(1971), held that the "commonest sequence among the older and more
stable polyarchies has been some approximation of the ... path [in
which] competitive politics preceded expansion in participation."
In the 2010s, the discusion focused on the impact of the sequencing between state building and democratization. Francis Fukuyama, in Political Order and Political Decay
(2014), echoes Huntington's "state-first" argument and holds that those
"countries in which democracy preceded modern state-building have had
much greater problems achieving high-quality governance." This view has been supported by Sheri Berman,
who offers a sweeping overview of European history and concludes that
"sequencing matters" and that "without strong states .. liberal
democracy is difficult if not impossible to achieve."
However, this state-first thesis has been challenged. Relying on a
comparison of Denmark and Greece, and quantitative research on 180
countries across 1789–2019, Haakon Gjerløw, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore
Wig, and Matthew C. Wilson, in One Road to Riches? (2022), "find little evidence to support the stateness-first argument." Based on a comparison of European and Latin American countries, Sebastián Mazzuca and Gerardo Munck, in A Middle-Quality Institutional Trap
(2021), argue that counter to the state-first thesis, the "starting
point of political developments is less important than whether the
State–democracy relationship is a virtuous cycle, triggering causal
mechanisms that reinforce each."
Critiques related to gender and race
Gender and waves of democratization
One of the critiques of Huntington's periodization is that it "ignores the requirement of universal suffrage."
Relatedly, as Pamela Paxton showed, "when women are included in
measures of democracy, the notion of waves of democracy (Huntington
1991) is no longer strongly supported."
Paxton shows that once women's suffrage is taken into account, the data
reveal "a long, continuous democratization period from 1893-1958, with
only war-related reversals."
Gender and race in theories of democratization
Two broad problems have been identified in theories of democratization. Georgina Waylen has argued that the lack of a gendered approach has been a glaring problem. Michael Hanchard, in The Spectre of Race
(2018), provides a thorough review of the literature and holds that
theories have not adequately acknowledged how ethno-national and racial
hierarchies shape the process and prospects of democratization.
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