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Saturday, May 27, 2023

Wars of national liberation

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Flag of Mozambique; independent from Portugal since 1975, after the Carnation Revolution in Lisbon, with the Kalashnikov as symbol of the armed struggle against the Portuguese empire, the book as symbol of instruction and a farming implement as symbol of economic growth.

Wars of national liberation, also called wars of independence, are conflicts fought by nations to gain independence. The term is used in conjunction with wars against foreign powers (or at least those perceived as foreign) to establish separate sovereign states for the rebelling nationality. From a different point of view, such wars are called insurgencies, rebellions. Guerrilla warfare or asymmetric warfare is often utilized by groups labeled as national liberation movements, often with support from other states.

The term "wars of national liberation" is most commonly used for those fought during the decolonization movement. Since these were primarily in the third world against Western powers and their economic influence and a major aspect of the Cold War, the phrase itself has often been viewed as biased or pejorative. Some of these wars were either vocally or materially supported by the Soviet Union, which stated itself to be an anti-imperialist power, supporting the replacement of western-backed governments with local communist or other non pro-western parties. However, this did not always guarantee Soviet influence in those countries. In addition to and increasingly in competition to the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China presented themselves as models of independent nationalist development outside of Western influence, particularly as such posturing and other longterm hostility meant they were regarded as a threat to Western power and regarded themselves as such, using their resources to politically, economically and militarily assist movements such as in Vietnam. In January 1961 Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev pledged support for "wars of national liberation" throughout the world.

When the nation is defined in ethnic terms, wars fought to liberate it have often entailed ethnic cleansing or genocide in order to rid the claimed territory of other population groups.

Legal issues

International law generally holds that a people with a legal right to self-determination are entitled to wage wars of national liberation. While Western states tend to view these wars as civil wars, Third World and communist states tend to view them as international wars. This difference in classification leads to varying perceptions of which laws of war apply in such situations. However, there is general agreement among all states today in principle that the use of force to frustrate a people's legal right to self-determination is unlawful.

Strategies and tactics

Wars of national liberation are usually fought using guerrilla warfare. The main purpose of these tactics is to increase the cost of the anti-guerrilla forces past the point where such forces are willing to bear. Wars of national liberation generally depend on widespread public support, with ordinary civilians providing crucial support. Finally, wars of national liberation are often embedded in a larger context of great power politics and are often proxy wars.

These strategies explain why they are quite successful against foreign regimes and quite unsuccessful against indigenous regimes. Foreign regimes usually have a threshold beyond which they would prefer to go home rather than to fight the war. By contrast, an indigenous regime has no place to which they can retreat, and will fight much harder because of the lack of alternatives. Moreover, foreign regimes usually have fewer active supporters in the theater, and those that exist can often be easily identified, making it possible for guerrilla armies to identify their targets. By contrast, indigenous regimes often have much more popular support, and their supporters are often not easily recognized as such, making it much harder to conduct operations against them without also causing harm to neutral parties.

History

Decolonization period

The Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) can be considered to be one of the first wars of national liberation. It pitted self-liberated slaves against Imperial France, coming about during a period in history where interconnected movements such as the American and French Revolutions had caused a rise of national consciousness in the Atlantic world. At the same time during the Spanish American wars of independence (1808-1833), the patriots launched a series of complex wars of independence against the royalists, which resulted in the formation of new Latin American states. The Siege of Patras (1821) led to the Greek War of Independence, ending Ottoman domination in the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece. The Easter Rising (1916) in Dublin eventually led to the Irish War of Independence (1919-1921), ending in the establishment of the Irish Free State. In the aftermath of World War I and the 1917 Russian Revolution the Bolsheviks unsuccessfully fought a number of independence movements until Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland gained independence. Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish National Movement fought a series of campaigns in the war of independence (1919-1922), which resulted in the subsequent withdrawal of Allied forces and establishment of the Republic of Turkey. The Indonesian War of Independence (1945-1949) followed with the Liberation of Irian Jaya (1960-1962), the First Indochina War (1946–54), Vietnam War (1959–75), Bangladesh Liberation War (1971) and the Algerian War (1954–62) were all considered national liberation wars by the rebelling sides of the conflicts. The African National Congress (ANC)'s struggle against the apartheid regime is also another example. Most of these rebellions were in part supported by the Soviet Union, which was an anti-imperialist power. Since the 1917 October Revolution and the subsequent Russian Civil War, the revolutionary objectives of communism were shared by many anticolonialist leaders, thus explaining the objective alliance between anticolonialist forces and Marxism. The concept of "imperialism" itself had been which had theorized in Lenin's 1916 book, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. For example, Ho Chi Minh — who founded the Viet-Minh in 1941 and declared the independence of Vietnam on September 2, 1945, following the 1945 August Revolution — was a founding member of the French Communist Party (PCF) in 1921. In January 1961, over three years before the Gulf of Tonkin incident which would mark the United States government's increased involvement in the Vietnam War, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev would pledge support for "wars of national liberation" throughout the world. In the same decade, Cuba, led by Fidel Castro, would support national liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique. The Portuguese colonial wars finally led to the recognition of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau as independent states in 1975, following the April Carnation Revolution. The breakup of Yugoslavia led to fewer wars of independence in part of the Yugoslav Wars, including the Ten-Day War and the Croatian War of Independence.

Ongoing wars defined as national liberation conflicts

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is a national liberation movement, meaning that it holds official recognition of its legal status as such. Other national liberation movements in the OAU at that time included the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC). It is the only non-African national liberation movement to hold observer status in the OAU, and was one of the first national liberation movements granted permanent observer status by the United Nations General Assembly pursuant to a 1974 resolution. The PLO also participates in UN Security Council debates; since 1988, it has represented the Palestinian people at the UN under the name "Palestine".

The following current conflicts have sometimes also been characterized as wars or struggles of national liberation (such a designation is often subject to controversy):

Conflicts

Estonian artillery preparing for a battle during the 1918–1920 Estonian War of Independence

Conflicts which have been described as national liberation struggles:

War of aggression

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

A war of aggression, sometimes also war of conquest, is a military conflict waged without the justification of self-defense, usually for territorial gain and subjugation.

Wars without international legality (i.e. not out of self-defense nor sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council) can be considered wars of aggression; however, this alone usually does not constitute the definition of a war of aggression; certain wars may be unlawful but not aggressive (a war to settle a boundary dispute where the initiator has a reasonable claim, and limited aims, is one example).

In the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, which followed World War II, "War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the belligerent states alone, but affect the whole world. To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole." Article 39 of the United Nations Charter provides that the UN Security Council shall determine the existence of any act of aggression and "shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security".

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court refers to the crime of aggression as one of the "most serious crimes of concern to the international community", and provides that the crime falls within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, the Rome Statute stipulates that the ICC may not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until such time as the states parties agree on a definition of the crime and set out the conditions under which it may be prosecuted. At the Kampala Review Conference on 11 June 2010, a total of 111 State Parties to the Court agreed by consensus to adopt a resolution accepting the definition of the crime and the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction over this crime. The relevant amendments to the Statute entered into force on July 17, 2018 after being ratified by 35 States Parties.

Possibly the first trial for waging aggressive war is that of the Sicilian king Conradin in 1268.

Definitions

The origin of the concept, the author Peter Maguire argues, emerged from the debate on Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919: "Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." Maguire argues:

Originally President Wilson resisted the effort to brand Germany with war guilt, but French and British leaders forced him to compromise. Naming Germany an 'aggressor' introduced the concept into positive international law.

The Convention for the Definition of Aggression

Two Conventions for the Definition of Aggression were signed in London on 3 and 4 July 1933. The first was signed by Czechoslovakia, Romania, the Soviet Union, Turkey and Yugoslavia, and came into effect on 17 February 1934, when it was ratified by all of them but Turkey. The second was signed by Afghanistan (ratified 20 October 1933), Estonia (4 December), Latvia (4 December), Persia (16 November), Poland (16 October), Romania (16 October), the Soviet Union (16 October) and Turkey, which ratified both treaties on 23 March 1934. Finland acceded to the second convention on 31 January 1934. The second convention was the first to be registered with the League of Nations Treaty Series on 29 March 1934, while the first was registered on 26 April. As Lithuania refused to sign any treaty including Poland, it signed the definition of aggression in a separate pact with the Soviet Union on 5 July 1933, also in London, and exchanged ratifications on 14 December. It was registered in the Treaty Series on 16 April 1934.

The signatories of both treaties were also signatories of the Kellogg–Briand Pact prohibiting aggression, and were seeking an agreed definition of the latter. Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia were members of the Little Entente, and their signatures alarmed Bulgaria, since the definition of aggression clearly covered its support of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. Both treaties base their definition on the "Politis Report" of the Committee of Security Questions made 24 March 1933 to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, in answer to a proposal of the Soviet delegation. The Greek politician Nikolaos Politis was behind the inclusion of "support for armed bands" as a form of aggression. Ratifications for both treaties were deposited in Moscow, as the convention was primarily the work of Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet signatory. The convention defined an act of aggression as follows:

  • Declaration of war upon another State.
  • Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State.
  • Attack by its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State.
  • Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State.
  • Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded State, to take, in its own territory, all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.

The League prerogative under that convention to expel a League member found guilty of aggression was used by the League Assembly only once, against the Soviet government itself, on December 14, 1939, following the Soviet invasion of Finland.

The Nuremberg Principles

In 1945, the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal defined three categories of crimes, including crimes against peace. This definition was first used by Finland to prosecute the political leadership in the war-responsibility trials in Finland. The principles were later known as the Nuremberg Principles.

In 1950, the Nuremberg Tribunal defined Crimes against Peace, in Principle VI, specifically Principle VI(a), submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, as:

  1. Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances;
  2. Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i).

See: Nuremberg Trials: "The legal basis for the jurisdiction of the court was that defined by the Instrument of Surrender of Germany, political authority for Germany had been transferred to the Allied Control Council, which having sovereign power over Germany could choose to punish violations of international law and the laws of war. Because the court was limited to violations of the laws of war, it did not have jurisdiction over crimes that took place before the outbreak of war on September 1, 1939."

For committing this crime, the Nuremberg Tribunal sentenced a number of persons responsible for starting World War II. One consequence of this is that nations who are starting an armed conflict must now argue that they are either exercising the right of self-defense, the right of collective defense, or – it seems – the enforcement of the criminal law of jus cogens. It has made formal declaration of war uncommon after 1945.

Reading the Tribunal's final judgment in court, British alternate judge Norman Birkett said:

The charges in the Indictment that the defendants planned and waged aggressive wars are charges of the utmost gravity. War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the belligerent states alone, but affect the whole world. To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.

Associate Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas charged that the Allies were guilty of "substituting power for principle" at Nuremberg: "I thought at the time and still think that the Nuremberg trials were unprincipled. Law was created ex post facto to suit the passion and clamor of the time."

The United Nations Charter

The relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations mentioned in the RSICC article 5.2 were framed to include the Nuremberg Principles. The specific principle is Principle VI.a "Crimes against peace", which was based on the provisions of the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal that was issued in 1945 and formed the basis for the post World War II war crime trials. The Charter's provisions based on the Nuremberg Principle VI.a are:

  • Article 1:
    • The Purposes of the United Nations are:
      1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
      2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
  • Article 2, paragraph 4
    • All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
  • Article 33
    • The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
    • The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.
  • Article 39
    • The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact)

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed in Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947, included a clear definition of aggression. Article 9 stated:

In addition to other acts which the Organ of Consultation may characterize as aggression, the following shall be considered as such:

  1. Unprovoked armed attack by a State against the territory, the people, or the land, sea or air forces of another State;
  2. Invasion, by the armed forces of a State, of the territory of an American State, through the trespassing of boundaries demarcated in accordance with a treaty, judicial decision, or arbitral award, or, in the absence of frontiers thus demarcated, invasion affecting a region which is under the effective jurisdiction of another State.

Further discussions on defining aggression

The discussions on definition of aggression under the UN began in 1950, following the outbreak of the Korean War. As the western governments, headed by Washington, were in favor of defining the governments of North Korea and the People's Republic of China as aggressor states, the Soviet government proposed to formulate a new UN resolution defining aggression and based on the 1933 convention. As a result, on November 17, 1950, the General Assembly passed resolution 378, which referred the issue to be defined by the International Law Commission. The commission deliberated over this issue in its 1951 session and due to large disagreements among its members, decided "that the only practical course was to aim at a general and abstract definition (of aggression)". However, a tentative definition of aggression was adopted by the commission on June 4, 1951, which stated:

Aggression is the use of force by a State or Government against another State or Government, in any manner, whatever the weapons used and whether openly or otherwise, for any reason or for any purpose other than individual or collective self-defence or in pursuance of a decision or recommendation by a competent organ of the United Nations.

General Assembly Resolution 3314

On December 14, 1974, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 3314, which defined the crime of aggression. This definition is not binding as such under international law, though it may reflect customary international law.

This definition makes a distinction between aggression (which "gives rise to international responsibility") and war of aggression (which is "a crime against international peace"). Acts of aggression are defined as armed invasions or attacks, bombardments, blockades, armed violations of territory, permitting other states to use one's own territory to perpetrate acts of aggression and the employment of armed irregulars or mercenaries to carry out acts of aggression. A war of aggression is a series of acts committed with a sustained intent. The definition's distinction between an act of aggression and a war of aggression make it clear that not every act of aggression would constitute a crime against peace; only war of aggression does. States would nonetheless be held responsible for acts of aggression.

The wording of the definition has been criticised by many commentators. Its clauses on the use of armed irregulars are notably vague, as it is unclear what level of "involvement" would entail state responsibility. It is also highly state-centric, in that it deems states to be the only actors liable for acts of aggression. Domestic or transnational insurgent groups, such as those that took part in the Sierra Leone Civil War and the Yugoslav Wars, were key players in their respective conflicts despite being non-state parties; they would not have come within the scope of the definition.

The Definition of Aggression also does not cover acts by international organisations. The two key military alliances at the time of the definition's adoption, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, were non-state parties and thus were outside the scope of the definition. Moreover, the definition does not deal with the responsibilities of individuals for acts of aggression. It is widely perceived as an insufficient basis on which to ground individual criminal prosecutions.

While this Definition of Aggression has often been cited by opponents of conflicts such as the 1999 Kosovo War and the 2003 Iraq War, it has no binding force in international law. The doctrine of Nulla poena sine lege means that, in the absence of binding international law on the subject of aggression, no penalty exists for committing acts in contravention of the definition. It is only recently that heads of state have been indicted over acts committed in wartime, in the cases of Slobodan Milošević of Serbia and Charles Taylor of Liberia. However, both were charged with war crimes, i.e., violations of the laws of war, rather than with the broader offence of "a crime against international peace" as envisaged by the Definition of Aggression.

The definition is not binding on the Security Council. The United Nations Charter empowers the General Assembly to make recommendations to the United Nations Security Council but the Assembly may not dictate to the Council. The resolution accompanying the definition states that it is intended to provide guidance to the Security Council to aid it "in determining, in accordance with the Charter, the existence of an act of aggression". The Security Council may apply or disregard this guidance as it sees fit. Legal commentators argue that the Definition of Aggression has had "no visible impact" on the deliberations of the Security Council.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court lists the crime of aggression as one of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community, and provides that the crime falls within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, Article 5.2 of the Rome Statute states that "The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations." The Assembly of States Parties of the ICC adopted such a definition in 2010 at the Review Conference in Kampala, Uganda.

Preemptive war

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preemptive_war

A preemptive war is a war that is commenced in an attempt to repel or defeat a perceived imminent offensive or invasion, or to gain a strategic advantage in an impending (allegedly unavoidable) war shortly before that attack materializes. It is a war that preemptively 'breaks the peace'.

The term 'preemptive war' is sometimes confused with the term 'preventive war'. The difference is that a preventive war is launched to destroy the potential threat of the targeted party, when an attack by that party is not imminent or known to be planned. A preemptive war is launched in anticipation of immediate aggression by another party. Most contemporary scholarship equates preventive war with aggression, and therefore argues that it is illegitimate. The waging of a preemptive war has less stigma attached than does the waging of a preventive war.

The initiation of armed conflict: that is being the first to 'break the peace' when no 'armed attack' has yet occurred, is not permitted by the UN Charter, unless authorized by the UN Security Council as an enforcement action. Some authors have claimed that when a presumed adversary first appears to be beginning confirmable preparations for a possible future attack, but has not yet actually attacked, that the attack has in fact 'already begun', however this opinion has not been upheld by the UN.

Theory and practice

Prior to World War I

As early as 1625, Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius characterized a state's right of self-defense to include the right to forestall an attack forcibly. In 1685, the Scottish government conducted a preemptive military strike against Clan Campbell. In 1837, a certain legal precedent regarding preemptive wars was established in the Caroline affair, during which an Anglo-Canadian force from Upper Canada crossed the Niagara River into the United States and captured and burnt the Caroline, a ship owned by Reformist rebels. During the affair, shots were exchanged and an American citizen was killed by a Canadian sheriff. The United States rejected the legal ground of the Caroline case. In 1842, US Secretary of State Daniel Webster said that the necessity for forcible reaction must be "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." That formulation is part of the Caroline test, which "is broadly cited as enshrining the appropriate customary law standard."

World War I (1914–1918)

The Austro-Hungarian Chief of the General Staff, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, argued for a preemptive war against Serbia in 1913. Serbia had the image of an aggressive and expansionist power and was seen as a threat to Austria-Hungary in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (June 1914) was used as an excuse for Austria-Hungary to attack Serbia, leading to World War I.

During the course of the destructive and costly World War I, for the first time in history, the concept of "the war to end war" began to be seriously considered. As a further expression of that hope, upon the conclusion of the war, the League of Nations was formed. Its primary aim was to prevent war, as all signatories to the League of Nations Covenant were required to agree to desist from the initiation of all wars, preemptive or otherwise. All of the victorious nations emerging out of World War I eventually signed the agreement, with the notable exception of the United States.

League of Nations period (1919–1939)

Japanese experts inspect the scene of the "railway sabotage" at Mukden of the South Manchurian Railway.

In the 1920s, the League peaceably settled numerous international disputes and was generally perceived as succeeding in its primary purpose. It was only in the 1930s that its effectiveness in preventing wars began to come into question. Such questions began to arise when it first became apparent in 1931 that it was incapable of halting aggression by Imperial Japan in Manchuria. In the Mukden Incident, Japan claimed to be fighting a "defensive war" in Manchuria, attempting to "preempt" supposedly-aggressive Chinese intentions towards the Japanese. According to the Japanese, the Republic of China had started the war by blowing up a South Manchurian Railway line near Mukden and that since the Chinese were the aggressors, the Japanese were merely "defending themselves."' A predominance of evidence has since indicated that the railway had actually been blown up by Japanese operatives.

Gliwice Radio Tower today. It was the scene of the Gleiwitz incident in September 1939

In 1933, the impotency of the League became more pronounced when notices were provided by Japan and Nazi Germany that they would be terminating their memberships in the League. Fascist Italy shortly followed suit by exiting the League in 1937. Soon, Italy and Germany also began engaging in militaristic campaigns designed to either enlarge their borders or to expand their sphere of military control, and the League was shown to be powerless to stop them. The perceived impotency of the League was a contributing factor to the full outbreak of World War II in 1939. The start of World War II is generally dated from the event of Germany's invasion of Poland. It is noteworthy that Germany claimed at the time that its invasion of Poland was in fact a "defensive war," as it had allegedly been invaded by a group of Polish saboteurs, signaling a potentially-larger invasion of Germany by Poland that was soon to be under way. Thus, Germany was left with no option but to preemptive invade Poland to halt the alleged Polish plans to invade Germany. It was later discovered that Germany had fabricated the evidence for the alleged Polish saboteurs as a part of the Gleiwitz incident.

World War II period (1939–1945)

Once again, during the course of the even more widespread and lethal World War II, the hope of somehow definitively ending all war, including preemptive war, was seriously discussed. That dialogue ultimately resulted in the establishment of the successor organization to the League, the United Nations (UN). As with the League, the primary aim and hope of the UN was to prevent all wars, including preemptive wars. Unlike the League, the UN had the United States as a member.

In analyzing the many components of World War II, which one might consider as separate individual wars, the various attacks on previously-neutral countries, and the attacks against Iran and Norway might be considered to have been preemptive wars.

As for the 1940 German invasion of Norway, during the 1946 Nuremberg trials, the German defense argued that Germany had been "compelled to attack Norway by the need to forestall an Allied invasion and that her action was therefore preemptive." The German defence referred to Plan R 4 and its predecessors. Norway was vital to Germany as a transport route for iron ore from Sweden, a supply that Britain was determined to stop. One adopted British plan was to go through Norway and occupy cities in Sweden. An Allied invasion was ordered on March 12, and the Germans intercepted radio traffic setting March 14 as deadline for the preparation. Peace in Finland interrupted the Allied plans, but Hitler became rightly convinced that the Allies would try again and ordered Operation Weseruebung.

The new Allied plans were Wilfred and Plan R 4 to provoke a German reaction by laying mines in Norwegian waters, and once Germany showed signs of taking action, Allied forces would occupy Narvik, Trondheim and Bergen and launch a raid on Stavanger to destroy Sola airfield. However, "the mines were not laid until the morning of 8 April, by which time the German ships were advancing up the Norwegian coast." However, the Nuremberg trials determined that no Allied invasion was imminent and therefore rejected Germany's argument of being entitled to attack Norway.

In the case of Iran, in which Soviet and British forces preemptively invaded this country, see Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran.

1967 Arab–Israeli War (Six Day War)

Israeli Air Force personnel inspect the wreckage of an Egyptian aircraft shot down over Sinai during the Six-Day War.

Israel incorporates preemptive war in its strategic doctrine to maintain a credible deterrent posture, based on its lack of strategic depth. The Six-Day War, which began when Israel launched a successful attack on Egypt on June 5, 1967, has been widely described as a preemptive war and is, according to the United States State Department, "perhaps the most cited example [of preemption]." Others have alternatively referred to it as a preventive war. Some have referred to the war as an act of "interceptive self-defense." According to that view, no single Egyptian step may have qualified as an armed attack, but Egypt's collective actions made it clear that it was bent on armed attack against Israel. One academic has claimed that Israel's attack was not permissible under the Caroline test; he claims that there was no overwhelming threat to Israel's survival.

2003 U.S.-Iraq War

The doctrine of preemption gained renewed interest following the US invasion of Iraq. The George W. Bush administration claimed that it was necessary to intervene to prevent Saddam Hussein from deploying weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At the time, US decision-makers claimed that Saddam's weapons of mass destruction might be given to terrorist groups and that the nation's security was at a great risk. Congress passed its joint resolution in October 2002, authorizing the US president to use military force against Saddam's regime. However, The Iraq Intelligence Commission confirmed in its 2005 report that no nuclear weapons or biological weapons capability existed. Many critics have questioned the true intention of the administration for invading Iraq, based on possibility of retaliation on the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.

Arguments for preemptive war during Bush administration

Sofaer's four elements

The scholar Abraham David Sofaer identified four key elements for justification of preemption:

  1. The nature and magnitude of the threat involved;
  2. The likelihood that the threat will be realized unless preemptive action is taken;
  3. The availability and exhaustion of alternatives to using force;
  4. Whether using preemptive force is consistent with the terms and purposes of the UN Charter and other applicable international agreements.
Walzer's three elements

Professor Mark R. Amstutz, citing Michael Walzer, adopted a similar but slightly-varied set of criteria and noted three factors to evaluate the justification of a preemptive strike.

  1. The existence of an intention to injure;
  2. The undertaking of military preparations that increase the level of danger; and
  3. The need to act immediately because of a higher degree of risk.
Counter proliferation self-help paradigm
Israeli Air Force F-16A Netz 107 with 6.5 aerial victory marks and Osirak bombing mark

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by rogue nations gave rise to a certain argument by scholars on preemption. They argued that the threat need not be "imminent" in the classic sense and that the illicit acquisition of the weapons, with their capacity to unleash massive destruction, by rogue states, created the requisite threat to peace and stability as to have justified the use of preemptive force. NATO's Deputy Assistant Secretary General for WMD, Guy Roberts, cited the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1998 US attack on a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant, (identified by US intelligence to have been a chemical weapons facility) and the 1981 Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear facility at Osirak as examples of the counterproliferation self-help paradigm. Regarding the Osirak attack, Roberts noted that at the time, few legal scholars argued in support of the Israeli attack, but he noted further that "subsequent events demonstrated the perspicacity of the Israelis, and some scholars have re-visited that attack arguing that it was justified under anticipatory self-defense." After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, US forces captured a number of documents detailing conversations that Saddam had with his inner sanctum. The archive of documents and recorded meetings confirm that Saddam Hussein was indeed aiming to strike at Israel. In a 1982 conversation Hussein stated, "Once Iraq walks out victorious, there will not be any Israel." Of Israel's anti-Iraqi endeavors he noted, "Technically, they [the Israelis] are right in all of their attempts to harm Iraq."

Post–Bush administration period (2009–present)

After the departure of the Bush administration, the Obama administration adopted and continued many policies of the Bush Doctrine.

Intention

The intention with a preemptive strike is to gain the advantage of initiative and to harm the enemy at a moment of minimal protection, for instance, while vulnerable during transport or mobilization.

In his "Rationalist Explanations for War," James Fearon attributes the use of preemptive strikes by rational states to both offensive advantages and commitment problems between states. When a nation possesses a first strike advantage and believes itself to have a high probability of winning a war, there is a narrower de facto bargaining range between it and an opposing country for peaceful settlements. In extreme cases, if the probability of winning minus the probable costs of war is high enough, no self-enforcing peaceful outcome exists. In his discussion of preventative war arising from a commitment problem, Fearon builds an infinite-horizon model expected payoffs from period t on are (pt/(l - δ)) - Ca for state A and ((1 -pt)/(l - δ)) - Cb for state B, where Ca and Cb are costs incurred the respective states and δ is the state discount of the future period payoffs.

The model shows that a peaceful settlement can be reached at any period that both states prefer, but strategic issues arise when there is no credible third-party guaranteer of the two states committing to a peaceful foreign policy. If there is going to be a shift in the military power between states in the future, and no credible restraint is placed on the rising military power not to exploit its future advantage, it is rational for the state with declining military power to use a preventative attack while it has a higher chance of winning the war. Fearon points out that the declining state attacks are caused not by fear of a future attack but because the future peace settlement would be worse for it than in the current period. The lack of trust that leads to a declining power's preemptive strike stems not from uncertainty about intentions of different nations but from "the situation, the structure of preferences and opportunities, that gives one party incentive to renege" on its peaceful cooperation and exploit its increased military potential in the future to win a more profitable peace settlement for itself. Thus, Fearon shows that preemptive military action is taken by nations when there is an unfavorable shift in military potential in the future that leads to a shrinking bargain range for a peaceful settlement in the current period but with no credible commitment by the other party to avoid exploiting its improved military potential in the future.

Legality

Article 2, Section 4 of the UN Charter is generally considered to be jus cogens (literally "compelling law" but in practice "higher international law") and prohibits all UN members from exercising "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state". However, in the modern framework of the UN Charter, it is the phrase "armed attack occurs" in Article 51 that draws the line between legitimate and illegitimate military force. Some scholars believe it is reasonable to assume that if no armed attack has yet occurred that no automatic justification for preemptive 'self-defense' has yet been made 'legal' under the UN Charter. In order to be justified as an act of self-defense, two conditions must be fulfilled which are widely regarded as necessary for its justification. The first of these is that actor must have believed that the threat is real, as opposed to (merely) perceived. The second condition is that the force used in self-defense must be proportional to the harm which the actor is threatened.

Entropy (information theory)

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