Big stick ideology, big stick diplomacy, big stick philosophy, or big stick policy refers to an aphorism often said by the 26th president of the United States, Theodore Roosevelt; "speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far". The American press during his time, as well as many modern historians today, used the term "big stick" to describe the foreign policy
positions during his administration. Roosevelt described his style of
foreign policy as "the exercise of intelligent forethought and of
decisive action sufficiently far in advance of any likely crisis".
As practiced by Roosevelt, big stick diplomacy had five components.
First, it was essential to possess serious military capability that
would force the adversary to pay close attention. At the time that meant
a world-class navy; Roosevelt never had a large army at his disposal.
The other qualities were to act justly toward other nations, never to
bluff, to strike only when prepared to strike hard, and to be willing to
allow the adversary to save face in defeat.
The idea is negotiating peacefully but also having strength in
case things go wrong. Simultaneously threatening with the "big stick",
or the military, ties in heavily with the idea of Realpolitik, which implies a pursuit of political power that resembles Machiavellian ideals. It is comparable to gunboat diplomacy, as used in international politics by the powers.
Background
The letter in which Roosevelt first used his now-famous phrase (26 January 1900).
Roosevelt (then Governor of New York) to Henry L. Sprague, dated January 26, 1900. Roosevelt wrote, in a bout of happiness after forcing New York's Republican committee to pull support away from a corrupt financial adviser:
I have always been fond of the West African proverb: "Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far."
Roosevelt would go on to be elected Vice President later that year, and subsequently used the aphorism publicly in an address to the Minnesota State Fair, entitled "National Duties", on September 2, 1901:
A good many of you are probably acquainted with the old proverb: "Speak softly and carry a big stick—you will go far."
Usage
Although it
had been used before his presidency, Roosevelt used military muscle
several times throughout his two terms with a more subtle touch to
complement his diplomatic policies and enforcing the Monroe Doctrine throughout multiple interventions in Latin America. This included the Great White Fleet,
16 battleships which peacefully circumnavigated the globe as an
illustration of United States's rising yet neutral prestige under
Roosevelt's direction.
Latin America
Venezuelan Affair (1902) and the Roosevelt Corollary
Some American uses of the "big stick" in Middle America, circa 1900–1906.
In 1904, although he had mentioned the basis of his idea
beforehand in private letters, Roosevelt officially announced the
corollary, stating that he only wanted the "other republics on this
continent" to be "happy and prosperous". For that goal to be met, the
corollary required that they "maintain order within their borders and
behave with a just obligation toward outsiders".
Most historians, such as one of Roosevelt's many biographers Howard K. Beale,
have summarized that the corollary was influenced by Roosevelt's
personal beliefs as well as his connections to foreign bondholders.
The U.S. public was very "tense" during the two-month blockade;
Roosevelt asked Britain and Germany to pull out their forces from the
area. During the requests for the blockade's end, Roosevelt stationed
naval forces in Cuba, to ensure "the respect of Monroe doctrine" and the compliance of the parties in question.
The doctrine was never ratified by the senate or brought up for a vote
to the American public. Roosevelt's declaration was the first of many
presidential decrees in the 20th century that were never ratified.
Canal diplomacy
The U.S. used the "big stick" during "Canal Diplomacy", the diplomatic actions of the U.S. during the pursuit of a canal across Central America. Both Nicaragua and Panama featured canal related incidents of big stick diplomacy.
In 1901, Secretary of StateJohn Hay
pressed the Nicaraguan Government for approval of a canal. Nicaragua
would receive $1.5 million in ratification, $100,000 annually, and the
U.S. would "provide sovereignty, independence, and territorial
integrity".
Nicaragua then returned the contract draft with a change; they wished
to receive, instead of an annual $100,000, $6 million in ratification.
The U.S. accepted the deal, but, after Congress
approved the contract, a problem of court jurisdiction came up. The
U.S. did not have legal jurisdiction in the land of the future canal.
This problem was on the verge of correction until pro-Panama
representatives posed problems for Nicaragua; the current leader (General José Santos Zelaya) did not cause problems, from the outlook of U.S. interests.
In 1899, the Isthmian Canal Commission
was set up to determine which site would be best for the canal
(Nicaragua or Panama) and then to oversee construction of the canal.
After Nicaragua was ruled out, Panama was the obvious choice. A few
problems had arisen, however. With the U.S.'s solidified interests in
Panama (then a small portion of Colombia),
both Colombia and the French company that was to provide the
construction materials raised their prices. The U.S., refusing to pay
the higher-than-expected fees, "engineered a revolution" in Colombia. On November 3, 1903, Panama (with the support of the United States Navy)
revolted against Colombia. Panama became a new republic, receiving $10
million from the U.S. alone. Panama also gained an annual payment of
$250,000, and guarantees of independence. The U.S. gained the rights to the canal strip "in perpetuity". Roosevelt later said that he "took the Canal, and let Congress debate". After Colombia lost Panama, they tried to appeal to the U.S. by the reconsidering of treaties and even naming Panama City the capital of Colombia.
The U.S. after the Spanish–American War had many expansionists who wanted to annexCuba.
Many people felt that a foreign power (outside of the U.S.) would
control a portion of Cuba, thus the U.S. could not continue with its
interests in Cuba. Although many advocated annexation, this was prevented by the Teller Amendment,
which states "hereby disclaims any disposition of intention to exercise
sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for
pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is
accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its
people". When summarized, this could mean that the U.S. would not
interfere with Cuba and its peoples. The expansionists argued that the
Teller Amendment was created "ignorant of actual conditions", which
released the U.S. from its obligation. Following the debate surrounding the Teller Amendment, the Platt Amendment took effect. The Platt Amendment (the name is a misnomer; the Platt Amendment is actually a rider to the Army Appropriation Act of 1901) was accepted by Cuba in late 1901, after "strong pressure" from Washington. The Platt Amendment, summarized by Thomas A. Bailey in "Diplomatic History of the American People":
Cuba was not to make decisions impairing her independence or to
permit a foreign power [e.g., Germany] to secure lodgment in control
over the island.
Cuba pledged herself not to incur an indebtedness beyond her means [It might result in foreign intervention].
The United States was at liberty to intervene for the purpose of preserving order and maintaining Cuban independence.
Cuba would agree to an American-sponsored sanitation program [Aimed largely at yellow fever].
Cuba would agree to sell or lease to the United States sites for
naval or coaling stations [Guantánamo became the principal base].
With the Platt Amendment in place, Roosevelt pulled the troops out of Cuba. A year later, Roosevelt wrote:
Just at the moment I am so angry
with that infernal little Cuban republic that I would like to wipe its
people off the face of the earth. All that we wanted from them was that
they would behave themselves and be prosperous and happy so that we
would not have to interfere.
Under the Reagan Doctrine, the United States provided overt and covert aid to anti-communistguerrillas and resistance movements in an effort to "roll back"
Soviet-backed pro-communist governments in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. The doctrine was designed to diminish Soviet influence in these
regions as part of the administration's overall strategy to win the
Cold War.
Background
The
Reagan Doctrine followed in the tradition of U.S. presidents developing
foreign policy "doctrines", which were designed to reflect challenges
facing international relations, and to propose foreign policy solutions.
The practice began with the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, and continued with the Roosevelt Corollary, sometimes called the Roosevelt Doctrine, introduced by Theodore Roosevelt in 1904.
The post–World War II tradition of Presidential doctrines started with the Truman Doctrine in 1947, under which the US provided support to the governments of Greece and Turkey as part of a Cold War strategy to keep both nations out of the Soviet sphere of influence. It was followed by the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Kennedy Doctrine, the Johnson Doctrine, the Nixon Doctrine, and the Carter Doctrine,
all of which defined the foreign policy approaches of these respective
U.S. presidents on some of the largest global challenges of their
presidencies.
At least one component of the Reagan Doctrine technically pre-dated the Reagan Presidency. In Afghanistan, the Carter administration began providing limited covert military assistance to Afghanistan's mujahideen in an effort to drive the Soviets out of the nation, or at least raise the military and political cost of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
The policy of aiding the mujahideen in their war against the Soviet
occupation was originally proposed by Carter's national security adviser
Zbigniew Brzezinski and was implemented by U.S. intelligence services. It enjoyed broad bipartisan political support.
Democratic congressman Charlie Wilson
became obsessed with the Afghan cause, and was able to leverage his
position on the House Appropriations committees to encourage other
Democratic congressmen to vote for CIA Afghan war money, with the tacit
approval of Speaker of the HouseTip O'Neill,
even as the Democratic party lambasted Reagan for the CIA's secret war
in Central America. It was a complex web of relationships described in George Crile III's book Charlie Wilson's War.
Wilson teamed with CIA manager Gust Avrakotos and formed a team of a few dozen insiders who greatly enhanced the support for the Mujahideen, funneling it through Zia ul-Haq'sISI.
Avrakotos and Wilson charmed leaders from various anti-Soviet countries
including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and China to increase support
for the rebels. Avrakotos hired Michael G. Vickers,
a young Paramilitary Officer, to enhance the guerilla's odds by
revamping the tactics, weapons, logistics, and training used by the
Mujahideen. Michael Pillsbury, a Pentagon official, and Vincent Cannistraro pushed the CIA to supply the Stinger missile to the rebels. President Reagan's Covert Action program has been given credit for assisting in ending the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Origin and advocates
With the arrival of the Reagan administration, The Heritage Foundation
and other conservative foreign policy think tanks saw a political
opportunity to significantly expand Carter's Afghanistan policy into a
more global "doctrine", including U.S. support to anti-communist
resistance movements in Soviet-allied nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. According to political analysts Thomas Bodenheimer and Robert
Gould, "it was the Heritage Foundation that translated theory into
concrete policy. Heritage targeted nine nations for rollback: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Iran, Laos, Libya, Nicaragua, and Vietnam".
Throughout the 1980s, the Heritage Foundation's foreign policy expert on the Third World, Michael Johns,
the foundation's principal Reagan Doctrine advocate, visited with
resistance movements in Angola, Cambodia, Nicaragua, and other
Soviet-supported nations and urged the Reagan administration to initiate
or expand military and political support to them. Heritage Foundation
foreign policy experts also endorsed the Reagan Doctrine in two of their
Mandate for Leadership books, which provided comprehensive policy advice to Reagan administration officials.
The result was that, unlike in Afghanistan, the Reagan Doctrine
was rather quickly applied in Angola and Nicaragua, with the United
States providing military support to the UNITA movement in Angola and the "contras"
in Nicaragua, but without a declaration of war against either country.
Addressing the Heritage Foundation in October 1989, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi called the Heritage Foundation's efforts "a source of great support. No Angolan will forget your efforts. You have come to Jamba, and you have taken our message to Congress and the Administration". U.S. aid to UNITA began to flow overtly after Congress repealed the Clark Amendment, a long-standing legislative prohibition on military aid to UNITA.
Following these victories, Johns and the Heritage Foundation
urged further expanding the Reagan Doctrine to Ethiopia, where they
argued that the Ethiopian famine was a product of the military and agricultural policies of Ethiopia's Soviet-supported Mengistu Haile Mariam government. Johns and Heritage also argued that Mengistu's decision to permit a Soviet naval and air presence on the Red Sea ports of Eritrea represented a strategic challenge to U.S. security interests in the Middle East and North Africa.
The Heritage Foundation and the Reagan administration also sought
to apply the Reagan Doctrine in Cambodia. The largest resistance
movement fighting Cambodia's communist government was largely made up of
members of the former Khmer Rouge
regime, whose human rights record was among the worst of the 20th
century. Therefore, Reagan authorized the provision of aid to a smaller
Cambodian resistance movement, a coalition called the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, known as the KPNLF and then run by Son Sann; in an effort to force an end to the Vietnamese occupation.
While the Reagan Doctrine enjoyed strong support from the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute, the libertarian-oriented Cato Institute
opposed the Reagan Doctrine, arguing in 1986 that "most Third World
struggles take place in arenas and involve issues far removed from
legitimate American security needs. U.S. involvement in such conflicts
expands the republic's already overextended commitments without
achieving any significant prospective gains. Instead of draining Soviet
military and financial resources, we end up dissipating our own."
Even Cato, however, conceded that the Reagan Doctrine had "fired
the enthusiasm of the conservative movement in the United States as no
foreign policy issue has done in decades". While opposing the Reagan
Doctrine as an official governmental policy, Cato instead urged Congress
to remove the legal barriers prohibiting private organizations and
citizens from supporting these resistance movements.
Reagan himself was a vocal proponent of the policy. Seeking to expand Congressional support for the doctrine in the 1985 State of the Union Address
in February 1985, Reagan said: "We must not break faith with those who
are risking their lives ... on every continent, from Afghanistan to
Nicaragua ... to defy Soviet aggression and secure rights which have
been ours from birth. Support for freedom fighters is self-defense".
As part of his effort to gain Congressional support for the Nicaraguan contras, Reagan labeled the contras "the moral equivalent of our founding fathers", which was controversial because the contras had shown a disregard for human rights. There also were allegations that some members of the contra leadership were involved in cocaine trafficking.
Reagan and other conservative advocates of the Reagan Doctrine
advocates also argued that the doctrine served U.S. foreign policy and
strategic objectives and was a moral imperative against the former Soviet Union, which Reagan, his advisers, and supporters labeled an "evil empire".
Other advocates
Other early conservative advocates for the Reagan Doctrine included influential activist Grover Norquist, who ultimately became a registered UNITA lobbyist and an economic adviser to Savimbi's UNITA movement in Angola, and former Reagan speechwriter and former U.S. CongressmanDana Rohrabacher, who made several secret visits with the mujahideen in Afghanistan and returned with glowing reports of their bravery against the Soviet occupation. Rohrabacher was led to Afghanistan by his contact with the mujahideen, Jack Wheeler.
Phrase's origin
In 1985, as U.S. support was flowing to the Mujahideen, Savimbi's UNITA, and the Nicaraguan Contras, columnist Charles Krauthammer, in an essay for Time magazine, labeled the policy the "Reagan Doctrine," and the name stuck.
Krauthammer has said of his writing in support of the Reagan Doctrine,
I basically came to the conclusion
... the Soviets had overextended their empire, and they were getting
what the West had gotten with its overextended empire decades before a
reaction, they got a rebellion, they got resistance. And the Soviets
were now beginning to feel it, and the genius of Reagan, although I
don't think they had a plan in doing this is he instinctively realized
that one of the ways to go after the Soviets was indirect, and that is
you go after their proxies, you go after their allies, you go after
their clients, or even in Afghanistan you go after them directly. So
that's what I called the Reagan Doctrine, it was sort of the opposite of
the Brezhnev Doctrine, which was whatever we control we keep. And Reagan was saying, no you don't.
The Reagan Doctrine was especially significant because it represented
a substantial shift in the post–World War II foreign policy of the
United States. Prior to the Reagan Doctrine, U.S. foreign policy in the
Cold War was rooted in "containment", as originally defined by George F. Kennan, John Foster Dulles,
and other post–World War II U.S. foreign policy experts. In January
1977, four years prior to becoming president, Reagan bluntly stated, in a
conversation with Richard V. Allen,
his basic expectation in relation to the Cold War. "My idea of American
policy toward the Soviet Union is simple, and some would say
simplistic," he said. "It is this: We win and they lose. What do you
think of that?"
Although a similar policy of "rollback" had been considered on a
few occasions during the Cold War, the U.S. government, fearing an
escalation of the Cold War and possible nuclear conflict,
chose not to confront the Soviet Union directly. With the Reagan
Doctrine, those fears were set aside and the United States began to
openly confront Soviet-supported governments through support of rebel
movements in the doctrine's targeted countries.
One perceived benefit of the Reagan Doctrine was the relatively
low cost of supporting guerrilla forces compared to the Soviet Union's
expenses in propping up client states. Another benefit was the lack of
direct involvement of American troops, which allowed the United States
to confront Soviet allies without sustaining casualties. Especially
since the September 11 attacks,
some Reagan Doctrine critics have argued that, by facilitating the
transfer of large amounts of weapons to various areas of the world and
by training military leaders in these regions, the Reagan Doctrine
actually contributed to "blowback" by strengthening some political and military movements that ultimately developed hostility toward the United States, such as al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. However, no direct U.S. aid to Osama bin Laden or any of his affiliates has ever been established.
Historian Greg Grandin described a disjuncture between official
ideals preached by the United States and actual U.S. support for
terrorism. "Nicaragua, where the United States backed not a counter
insurgent state but anti-communist mercenaries,
likewise represented a disjuncture between the idealism used to justify
U.S. policy and its support for political terrorism. ... The corollary
to the idealism embraced by the Republicans in the realm of diplomatic
public policy debate was thus political terror. In the dirtiest of Latin
America's dirty wars, their faith in America's mission justified
atrocities in the name of liberty".
Grandin examined the behaviour of the U.S.-backed contras and found
evidence that it was particularly inhumane and vicious: "In Nicaragua,
the U.S.-backed Contras decapitated, castrated, and otherwise mutilated
civilians and foreign aid workers. Some earned a reputation for using
spoons to gouge their victims' eyes out. In one raid, Contras cut the
breasts of a civilian defender to pieces and ripped the flesh off the
bones of another."
Professor Frederick H. Gareau has written that the Contras
"attacked bridges, electric generators, but also state-owned
agricultural cooperatives, rural health clinics, villages, and non-combatants".
U.S. agents were directly involved in the fighting. "CIA commandos
launched a series of sabotage raids on Nicaraguan port facilities. They
mined the country's major ports and set fire to its largest oil storage
facilities." In 1984 the U.S. Congress ordered this intervention to be
stopped; however, it was later shown that the Reagan administration
illegally continued (See Iran–Contra affair). Gareau has characterized these acts as "wholesale terrorism" by the United States.
A CIA manual for training the Nicaraguan Contras in psychological operations, leaked to the media in 1984, entitled "Psychological Operations in Guerrilla War".
recommended "selective use of violence for propagandistic effects" and
to "neutralize" government officials. Nicaraguan Contras were taught to
lead:
... selective use of armed force
for PSYOP psychological operations effect. ... Carefully selected,
planned targets – judges, police officials, tax collectors, etc. – may
be removed for PSYOP effect in a UWOA unconventional warfare operations
area, but extensive precautions must insure that the people "concur" in
such an act by thorough explanatory canvassing among the affected
populace before and after conduct of the mission.
— James Bovard, Freedom Daily
Similarly, former diplomat Clara Nieto, in her book Masters of War,
charged that "the CIA launched a series of terrorist actions from the
"mothership" off Nicaragua's coast. In September 1983, she charged the
agency attacked Puerto Sandino with rockets. The following month, frogmen
blew up the underwater oil pipeline in the same port – the only one in
the country. In October there was an attack on Puerto Corinto,
Nicaragua's largest port, with mortars, rockets, and grenades blowing up
five large oil and gasoline storage tanks. More than a hundred people
were wounded, and the fierce fire, which could not be brought under
control for two days, forced the evacuation of 23,000 people."
The International Court of Justice, when judging the case of Nicaragua v. United States
in 1984, found that the United States was obligated to pay reparations
to Nicaragua, because it had violated international law by actively
supporting the Contras in their rebellion and by mining the Naval waters
of Nicaragua.
The United States refused to participate in the proceedings after the
Court rejected its argument that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear the
case. The U.S. later blocked the enforcement of the judgment by
exercising its veto power in the United Nations Security Council and so prevented Nicaragua from obtaining any actual compensation.
Covert implementation
As
the Reagan administration set about implementing The Heritage
Foundation plan in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua, it first
attempted to do so covertly, not as part of official policy. "The Reagan
government's initial implementation of the Heritage plan was done
covertly", according to the book Rollback, "following the
longstanding custom that containment can be overt but rollback should be
covert". Ultimately, however, the administration supported the policy
more openly.
Congressional votes
While
the doctrine benefited from strong support from the Reagan
administration, The Heritage Foundation and several influential Members
of Congress, many votes on critical funding for resistance movements,
especially the Nicaraguan contras, were extremely close, making the
Reagan Doctrine one of the more contentious American political issues of
the 1980s.
The Cold War's end
As
arms flowed to the contras, Savimbi's UNITA and the mujahideen, the
Reagan Doctrine's advocates argued that the doctrine was yielding
constructive results for U.S. interests and global democracy.
In Nicaragua, pressure from the Contras led the Sandinstas to end
the State of Emergency, and they subsequently lost the 1990 elections.
In Afghanistan, the mujahideen bled the Soviet Union's military and
paved the way for Soviet military defeat. In Angola, Savimbi's
resistance ultimately led to a decision by the Soviet Union and Cuba to bring their troops and military advisors home from Angola as part of a negotiated settlement.
All of these developments were Reagan Doctrine victories, the doctrine's advocates argue, laying the ground for the ultimate dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Michael Johns later argued that "the Reagan-led effort to support
freedom fighters resisting Soviet oppression led successfully to the
first major military defeat of the Soviet Union ... Sending the Red Army
packing from Afghanistan proved one of the single most important
contributing factors in one of history's most profoundly positive and
important developments".
Thatcher's view
Among others, Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
from 1979 to 1990, credited the Reagan Doctrine with aiding the end of
the Cold War. In December 1997, Thatcher said that the Reagan Doctrine
"proclaimed that the truce with communism was over. The West would
henceforth regard no area of the world as destined to forego its liberty
simply because the Soviets claimed it to be within their sphere of
influence. We would fight a battle of ideas against communism, and we
would give material support to those who fought to recover their nations
from tyranny".
Iran–Contra affair
U.S. funding for the Contras, who opposed the Sandinista
government of Nicaragua, was obtained from covert sources. The U.S.
Congress did not authorize sufficient funds for the Contras' efforts,
and the Boland Amendment barred further funding. In 1986, in an episode that became known as The Iran–Contra affair,
the Reagan administration illegally facilitated the sale of arms to
Iran, the subject of an arms embargo, in the hope that the arms sales
would secure the release of hostages and allow U.S. intelligence
agencies to fund the Nicaraguan Contras.
End
The Reagan Doctrine continued into the administration of Reagan's successor, George H. W. Bush, who won the U.S. presidency in November 1988. Bush's presidency featured the final years of the Cold War and the Gulf War, but the Reagan Doctrine soon faded from U.S. policy as the Cold War ended. Bush also noted a presumed peace dividend to the end of the Cold War with economic benefits of a decrease in defense spending. However, following the presidency of Bill Clinton, a change in United States foreign policy was introduced with the presidency of his son George W. Bush and the new Bush Doctrine, who increased military spending in response to the September 11th attacks.
In Nicaragua, the Contra War
ended after the Sandinista government, facing military and political
pressure, agreed to new elections, in which the contras' political wing
participated, in 1990. In Angola, an agreement in 1989 met Savimbi's
demand for the removal of Soviet, Cuban and other military troops and
advisers from Angola. Also in 1989, in relation to Afghanistan, Soviet
leader Mikhail Gorbachev labeled the war against the U.S.-supported mujahideen a "bleeding wound" and ended the Soviet occupation of the country.
In popular culture
Charlie Wilson's War, a Golden Globe Award and Oscar-nominated Universal Pictures
film released in December 2007, depicts early U.S. efforts to provide
military support to the Afghan mujahideen following the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan.
Miami, a 1987 book by Joan Didion covers U.S. efforts to overthrow communist governments, including that of Fidel Castro in Cuba.
Inaugural address: "Pay any price, bear any burden"
In his inaugural address
on January 20, 1961, President Kennedy presented the American public
with a blueprint upon which the future foreign policy initiatives of his
administration would later follow and come to represent. In this
Address, Kennedy warned "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us
well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any
hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the
survival and the success of liberty."
He also called upon the public to assist in "a struggle against the
common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself." It is in this address that one begins to see the Cold War.
This speech laid out clearly, a vision of peace through strength and
strength through international coalitions committed to the protection
and expansion of the American ideals of Peace, Liberty and Justice for
all.
Cold War containment
A dominant premise during the Kennedy years was the need to contain communism
at any cost. In this Cold War environment, Kennedy's "call for military
strength and unison in the struggle against communism were balanced
with... [hopes] for disarmament and global cooperation."
Another common theme in Kennedy's foreign policy was the belief that
the United States had the ability and power to influence events in the
international system for the better. Kennedy expressed this idea in his
address when he stated, "In the long history of the world only a few
generations have been granted the role of defending freedom from its
hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility – I
welcome it."
Historical background
The Kennedy Doctrine was essentially an expansion of the foreign policy prerogatives of the administrations of Dwight D. Eisenhower and Harry S. Truman.
The foreign policies of these presidents all revolved around the threat
of communism and the means by which the US would try containing the
spread of it.
The Truman Doctrine focused on the containment of communism by providing assistance to countries resisting communism in Europe.
The Eisenhower Doctrine
was focused upon providing both military and economic assistance to
nations resisting communism in the Middle East, and by increasing the
flow of trade from the US into Latin America. The Kennedy Doctrine was
based on these same objectives, but was more concerned with the spread
of communism and Soviet influence in Latin America following the Cuban Revolution that brought Fidel Castro to power under Eisenhower.
Alliance for Progress
In his inaugural address, Kennedy talks of an alliance for progress with countries in Latin America. In his Alliance for Progress
address for Latin American Diplomats and Members of Congress on March
13, 1961, he expanded on his promises from his inaugural speech. "I have
called on all the people of the hemisphere to join in a new Alliance
for Progress – alianza para el Progreso – a vast cooperative
effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy
the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land, health
and schools – techo, trabajo y tierra, salud y escuela."
In the address, Kennedy reaffirmed the United States' pledge of
coming to the defense of any nation whose independence was endangered,
promised to increase the food-for-peace emergency program and to provide
economic aid to nations in need. He requested that Latin American
countries promote social change within their borders and called upon all
American nations to move towards increased economic integration. "To
achieve this goal political freedom must accompany material progress.
Our Alliance for Progress is an alliance of free governments – and it
must work to eliminate tyranny from a hemisphere in which it has no
rightful place. Therefore let us express our special friendship to the
people of Cuba and the Dominican Republic – and the hope they will soon
rejoin the society of free men, uniting with us in our common effort."
Debate over international role of United States
Many
have questioned whether Kennedy's Inaugural Address, and the foreign
policy stemming from the vision he expressed in it "describes an
appropriate, rational, and prudent role for the United States in the
world; whether it is an outline for an era of negotiation and
accommodation and friendship; or whether it is a prescription for an
untenable globalism, leading inevitably to increased areas of conflict,
to a heightening of the arms race, and to American concern with and
involvement, to one degree or another, in the affairs of almost every
country in the world."
What remains clear is that Kennedy was deeply involved and
committed to every aspect of the foreign policy under his
administration. W. Averell Harriman
served in and on behalf of Kennedy's Administration in several
capacities, and noted, "President Kennedy was the first President, that I
know of, who was really his own secretary of state. He dealt with every
aspect of foreign policy, and he knew about everything that was going
on."
Derived events
Some
of the most notable events that stemmed from tenets of JFK's foreign
policy initiatives in regard to Latin America and the spread of
communism were:
Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any
outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be
regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of
America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary,
including military force.
Brzezinski modeled the wording on the Truman Doctrine,
and insisted the sentence to be included in the speech "to make it very
clear that the Soviets should stay away from the Persian Gulf."
In The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, author Daniel Yergin notes that the Carter Doctrine "bore striking similarities" to a 1903 British declaration in which British Foreign SecretaryLord Lansdowne
warned Russia and Germany that the British would "regard the
establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf
by any other power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we
should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal."
The Persian Gulf region was first proclaimed to be of national interest to the United States during World War II. Petroleum
is centrally important to modern armies. The United States, the world's
leading oil producer at the time, supplied most of the oil for the Allied
armies. Many American strategists were concerned that the war would
dangerously reduce the US's oil supply and so they sought to establish
good relations with Saudi Arabia, a kingdom with large oil reserves. On February 16, 1943, US President Franklin Roosevelt said, "the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States."
On February 14, 1945, while he was returning from the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt met with Saudi Arabian King Ibn Saud on the Great Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal, the first time a US president had visited the Persian Gulf region. During Operation Desert Shield in 1990, US Defense SecretaryDick Cheney
cited the landmark meeting between Roosevelt and Ibn Saud as one of the
justifications for sending troops to protect Saudi Arabia's border.
In World War II, Britain and the Soviet Union had jointly invaded and partitioned Iran in 1941 which was to end with the conclusion of the war. However, Soviet-aligned rebellions, the Azerbaijan People's Government and Republic of Mahabad, created a crisis in the Allied occupation zone, the Iran crisis of 1946,
which was one of the first struggles of the Cold War. U.S. pressure on
the Soviets to withdraw from Iran was one of the first postwar conflicts
between the two superpowers.
The Persian Gulf region was still regarded as an area of vital importance to the US during the Cold War. Three Cold War American presidential doctrines (the Truman, Eisenhower, and Nixon Doctrines)
played roles in forming the Carter Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine, which
stated that the US would send military aid to countries threatened by
Soviet communism, was used to strengthen both Iran
and Saudi Arabia's security. In October 1950, President Truman wrote to
Ibn Saud that "the United States is interested in the preservation of
the independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. No threat to
your Kingdom could occur which would not be a matter of immediate
concern to the United States."
The Eisenhower Doctrine called for US troops to be sent to the
Middle East to defend US allies against their Soviet-backed adversaries.
Ultimately, the Nixon Doctrine's application provided military aid to
Iran and Saudi Arabia so that US allies could ensure peace and stability
there. In 1979, the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan prompted the restatement of US interests in the region in the form of the Carter Doctrine. The Yemenite War of 1979, with Soviet support to South Yemen, may also have been a "smaller shock" contributing to the crisis of that year, and Carter's foreign policy shift. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski advised President Carter that the United States's "greatest vulnerability" lay on an arc "stretching from Chittagong through Islamabad to Aden." Henry Kissinger gave Carter similar advice.
In July 1979, responding to a national energy crisis
that resulted from the Iranian Revolution, President Carter delivered
his "Crisis of Confidence" speech, urging Americans to reduce their
energy use to help lessen American dependence on foreign oil supplies.
Recently, some scholars have claimed that Carter's energy plan, if it
had been fully enacted, would have prevented some of the current
economic difficulties caused by the American dependency on foreign oil.
The 1979 oil crisis also led to a vast surge in energy wealth for the oil-rich Soviet Union, which along the lines of resource curse literature, has been hypothesized to have caused the boldness of Soviet Politburo in the intervention in the first place. Previously, the Soviet Union's "Third World"
strategy combined largely cautious support of revolutions with covert
action. However, the invasion of Afghanistan indicated that Soviet
policy had become more direct and belligerent. This was seen to advance a
long-term Soviet geopolitical goal, the acquisition of strategic
presence on the Indian Ocean, closer to the realm of possibility. This caused previous critics of containment policy to become some of its major supporters.
Over the course of January 1980 in response to the Afghan intervention, Carter withdrew the SALT II treaty from consideration before the Senate, recalled the US Ambassador Thomas J. Watson from Moscow, curtailed grain sales to the Soviet Union, and suspended high-technology exports to the Soviet Union.
The doctrine
United States President Jimmy Carter
President Carter, in his State of the Union Address on January 23,
1980, after stating that Soviet troops in Afghanistan posed "a grave
threat to the free movement of Middle East oil," proclaimed:
The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in
Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: It contains more than
two-thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate
Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of
the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz,
a waterway through which most of the world's oil must flow. The Soviet
Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore,
that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.
This situation demands careful thought, steady nerves, and
resolute action, not only for this year but for many years to come. It
demands collective efforts to meet this new threat to security in the
Persian Gulf and in Southwest Asia. It demands the participation of all
those who rely on oil from the Middle East and who are concerned with
global peace and stability. And it demands consultation and close
cooperation with countries in the area which might be threatened.
Meeting this challenge will take national will, diplomatic and
political wisdom, economic sacrifice, and, of course, military
capability. We must call on the best that is in us to preserve the
security of this crucial region.
Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside
force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an
assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such
an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military
force.
Implementation
The Carter administration began to build up the Rapid Deployment Force, which would eventually become CENTCOM. In the interim, the administration asked Congress to restart Selective Service
registration, proposed a five percent increase in military spending for
each of the next five years, and expanded the US naval presence in the
Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.
A negative response came from retired strategist George F. Kennan. United States Senator Edward Kennedy
charged that Carter had overreacted, exaggerated the Soviet threat, and
failed to act diplomatically. Kennedy repeated these allegations during
his 1980 Democratic presidential primary bid, in which he was defeated.
Carter's successor, Ronald Reagan, extended the policy in October 1981 with what is sometimes called the "Reagan Corollary to the Carter Doctrine,"
which proclaimed that the United States would intervene to protect
Saudi Arabia, whose security was believed to be threatened during the Iran–Iraq War. Thus, while the Carter Doctrine warned away outside forces from the region, the Reagan Corollary pledged to secure internal stability. According to diplomat Howard Teicher, "with the enunciation of the Reagan Corollary, the policy groundwork was laid for Operation Desert Storm."
Among the exposés Anderson reported were the Nixon administration's investigation and harassment of John Lennon during its fight to deport Lennon; the continuing activities of fugitive Nazi officials in South America; and the savings and loan crisis. He revealed the history of a CIA plot to assassinate Fidel Castro and was credited for breaking the story of the Iran–Contra affair under President Reagan. He said that the scoop was "spiked" because the story had become too close to President Ronald Reagan.
Anderson's aptitude for journalism appeared at the early age of 12 when he began writing the Boy Scouts Column for The Deseret News. He published his first articles in his local newspaper, The Murray Eagle. He edited his high school newspaper, The Granitian. He joined The Salt Lake Tribune in 1940, where his muckraking exploits included infiltrating polygamous Mormon fundamentalist sects. In 1944, he joined the United States Merchant Marine and served on cargo ships that went to New Guinea and India. In the spring of 1945, he resigned from the Merchant Marine, and became a war correspondent stationed in Chungking, China. Shortly after World War II ended, he was drafted into the United States Army, and served until the fall of 1946 as an armed forces newsman and radio broadcaster. While in the Army, Anderson worked on the Shanghai edition of Stars and Stripes, produced by troops and XMHA, the Armed Forces' radio station. After his stint in the Army, Anderson was hired by Drew Pearson
for the staff of his column, the "Merry-Go-Round". When Pearson died in
1969, Anderson inherited responsibility for this column and gave his
own name to it – Washington Merry-go-Round.
In its heyday, Anderson's column was the most influential and widely
read in the U.S.; published in nearly a thousand newspapers, he reached
an audience of 40 million people. He co-founded Citizens Against Government Waste with J. Peter Grace in 1984.
Muckraker
Anderson feuded with FBI director J. Edgar Hoover in the 1950s, when he exposed the scope of the Mafia, a threat that Hoover had long downplayed. Hoover's retaliation and continual harassment lasted into the 1970s. Hoover once described Anderson as "lower than the regurgitated filth of vultures."
Anderson told his staff, "Let's do to Hoover what he does to others," and he instructed them to go through Hoover's garbage, a tactic the FBI used in its surveillance of political dissidents. Anderson's revelations about Hoover tipped the attitudes of the public and the press towards the FBI director.
Anderson grew close to Senator Joseph McCarthy, and the two exchanged information from sources. When Pearson
went after McCarthy, Anderson reluctantly followed at first, then
actively assisted with the eventual downfall of his onetime friend.
In the mid-1960s Anderson exposed the corruption of Senator Thomas J. Dodd and unearthed a memo by an ITT executive admitting the company made large donations to Richard Nixon's campaign to so that Nixon would stymie anti-trust prosecution. His reporting on Nixon-ITT corruption earned him a place on the Master list of Nixon's political opponents.
Anderson collaborated with Pearson on The Case Against Congress, published in 1968.
Other topics that Anderson covered included organized crime, the John F. Kennedy assassination, Ted Kennedy's role in the drowning death of a staffer at the Chappaquiddick incident, the Watergate scandal, the 1970 meeting between Elvis Presley and President Nixon, fugitive Nazis, the white supremacist organization the Liberty Lobby and other far-right organizations, the death of Howard Hughes, the ABSCAM public corruption investigation, the investigation into fugitive financier Robert Vesco, the Iran-Contra scandal, and the activities of numerous Washington agencies, elected officials, and bureaucrats.
Retractions
Anderson's
column occasionally published erroneous information for which he issued
retractions. During the 1972 presidential race, Anderson retracted a
story accusing Democratic vice-presidential nominee Thomas Eagleton of multiple drunk driving arrests. But Eagleton's campaign was already severely damaged, and he was dropped from the ticket.
Targeted for assassination
In 1972 Anderson was the target of an assassination plot conceived by senior White House staff. Two Nixon administration conspirators admitted under oath that they plotted to poison Anderson on orders from senior White House aide Charles Colson.
White House "plumbers" G. Gordon Liddy and E. Howard Hunt met with a CIA operative to discuss the possibilities, including drugging Anderson with LSD, poisoning his aspirin bottle, or staging a fatal mugging. The plot was aborted when the plotters were arrested for the Watergate break-in.
Nixon had long been angry with Anderson. He blamed the fallout from
Anderson's election-eve story about a secret loan from Howard Hughes to
Nixon's brother for Nixon's loss of the 1960 presidential election.
Project Mudhen
Beginning
in February 1972, Anderson was the subject of a CIA project called
Project Mudhen (also referred to as Operation Mudhen) aiming to find the
sources of his articles.
Over the course of three months, ending April 12, 1972, the CIA
actively spied on Anderson, whose code name in the project was "Brandy".
The CIA ended Mudhen after being unsuccessful at finding his sources
and believing that Anderson was beginning to suspect he was being spied
on by the CIA, which was able to collect a large file on his personal
movements, his family, and the fact that he drove too fast occasionally.
He later used documents he had been given about the project as part of a
lawsuit against Richard Nixon and other government officials in 1977
claiming "that the agencies and officials committed various illegal acts
and violated his constitutional rights to free speech and privacy".
Anderson has been credited as breaking to a nationwide audience in 1975 the story of the Glomar Explorer, a ship constructed under tight security by the CIA to recover the lost nuclear-armed Soviet submarine K-129. Rejecting a plea from the Director of Central IntelligenceWilliam Colby
to suppress the story, Anderson said he published the story because
"Navy experts have told us that the sunken sub contains no real secrets
and that the project, therefore, is a waste of the taxpayers' money."
JFK conspiracy allegations
In November 1988 Anderson hosted a two-hour prime-time television special entitled American Expose: Who Murdered JFK?The program asserted that the assassination of John F. Kennedy was a conspiracy involving an alliance between organized crime and the Cuban government, and that the Warren Commission did not publicly reveal the true findings. Anderson's theory was based on interviews with mobster John Roselli who – prior to his death 12 years earlier – said he learned of a conspiracy through mob sources. Anderson's conversations with Roselli were re-enacted with an actor portraying Roselli. According to Anderson, Cuban leader Fidel Castro wanted Kennedy killed in retaliation for CIA plots to kill Castro, and leaders of La Cosa Nostra in the United States opposed him due to his brother Robert F. Kennedy's efforts as US Attorney General against organized crime. He said that Santo Trafficante, Carlos Marcello, and Jimmy Hoffa had the "motive and means to kill the president", and reiterated reports connecting Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby to the mob.Anderson also alleged that President Lyndon B. Johnson covered up the conspiracy for fear that public knowledge of the CIA plots would trigger war with the Soviet Union.
According to Anderson's report, private photographic analysts
concluded that the shot that killed Kennedy came from the front, and
that E. Howard Hunt and James Earl Ray were depicted in photographs of the "three tramps". Hunt denied the charge on the program and said he had witnesses who could prove he was not in Dallas. An Associated Press (AP) writer described it as a "bizarre allegation," to which Anderson provided "no explanation of their alleged connection".
Chicago Tribune columnist Steve Daily
called the program "limp" and said Anderson's conclusion that organized
crime was responsible for the assassination was based "on
circumstantial evidence and the word of dead gangster Johnny Roselli." Howard Rosenberg of the Los Angeles Times wrote that it was "tawdry and strident" and said Anderson's "so-called evidence was unclear, unconvincing and untrustworthy." The Deseret News said Anderson was trying to "rewrite history".
Capitol security stunt
To demonstrate the weak security within the U.S. Capitol, in 1989, Anderson brought a gun to an interview in the office of Bob Dole, Senate minority leader. He was reprimanded and Congress passed a change of rules for reporters' access to the Capitol and politicians.
Legmen and alumni
Investigative reporter Les Whitten
shared the byline of Anderson's column in the 1970s. Anderson also used
a staff of "legmen" on his payroll, who earned little but gained
valuable reporting experience. Among Anderson's legmen—reporters who
went out into the field and gathered the information, forwarding it to
writers such as Anderson—was Brit Hume, later a television reporter for ABC News and Washington managing editor for the Fox News Channel.
Death and aftermath
Anderson was diagnosed with Parkinson's disease in 1986. In July 2004, at the age of 81, Anderson retired from his syndicated column, Washington Merry-Go-Round. He died of complications from Parkinson's disease on December 17, 2005.
In April 2006, Anderson's son Kevin said that some FBI agents had
approached his mother (Jack's widow), Olivia, earlier that year to gain
access to his father's files. This was purportedly in connection with
the Lawrence Franklin espionage scandal.
FBI spokesmen said that Anderson's archives contained classified
information and confirmed that they wanted to remove the papers before
they were made public. The agents claimed to be looking for documents pertaining to American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) as part of an espionage investigation. In November 2006, the FBI quietly gave up its pursuit of the archive. The Chronicle of Higher Education
reported that the archive contains Anderson's CIA file, along with
information he had compiled about prominent public figures such as
Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, Thomas Dodd, and J. Edgar Hoover.
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