Miscarriage of justice

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miscarriage_of_justice

The headstone of Timothy Evans, who was wrongfully convicted and executed for two murders that had been committed by his neighbour.

A miscarriage of justice occurs when an unfair outcome occurs in a criminal or civil proceeding, such as the conviction and punishment of a person for a crime they did not commit. Miscarriages are also known as wrongful convictions. Innocent people have sometimes ended up in prison for years before their conviction has eventually been overturned. They may be exonerated if new evidence comes to light or it is determined that the police or prosecutor committed some kind of misconduct at the original trial. In some jurisdictions this leads to the payment of compensation.

Academic studies have found that the main factors contributing to miscarriages of justice are: eyewitness misidentification; faulty forensic analysis; false confessions by vulnerable suspects; perjury and lies stated by witnesses; misconduct by police, prosecutors or judges; and/or ineffective assistance of counsel (e.g., inadequate defense strategies by the defendant's or respondent's legal team).

Some prosecutors' offices undertake conviction integrity reviews to prevent, identify, and correct wrongful convictions.

Prevalence

There are two main methods for estimating the prevalence of wrongful convictions.

Exoneration

The first is the number of exonerations where the guilty verdict has been vacated or annulled by a judge or higher court after new evidence has been brought forward proving the "guilty" person is, in fact, innocent. Since 1989, the Innocence Project has helped overturn 375 convictions of American prisoners with updated DNA evidence. However, DNA testing occurs in only 5 to 10% of all criminal cases, and exonerations achieved by the Innocence Project are limited to murder and rape cases. This raises the possibility that there may be many more wrongful convictions for which there is no evidence available to exonerate the defendant. Studies cited by the Innocence Project estimate that between 2.3% and 5% of all prisoners in the U.S. are innocent. However, a more recent study looking at convictions in the state of Virginia during the 1970s and 1980s and matching them to later DNA analysis estimates a rate of wrongful conviction at 11.6%.

A 2014 study published in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences made a conservative estimate that 4.1% of inmates awaiting execution on death row in the United States are innocent.

Self-report

The second method for estimating wrongful convictions involves self-report. Researchers ask prisoners whether they have ever confessed to a crime which they did not commit. Self-report allows examination of any and all crimes where wrongful conviction may have occurred, not just murder and rape cases where DNA is available. Two Icelandic studies based on self-report conducted ten years apart found the rates of false confession to be 12.2% and 24.4% respectively. These figures provide a proxy for miscarriages of justice because erroneous confessions are likely to lead to wrongful convictions. A more recent Scottish study found the rate of self-reported false confessions among a group of inmates in one prison was 33.4%.

Up to 10,000 people may be wrongfully convicted of serious crimes in the United States each year. According to Professor Boaz Sangero of the College of Law and Business in Ramat Gan, most wrongful convictions in Israel relate to less serious crimes than major felonies such as rape and murder, as judicial systems are less careful in dealing with those cases.

Contributing factors

Academics believe that six main factors contribute to miscarriages of justice. These include eyewitness misidentification, faulty forensic analysis, false confessions by vulnerable suspects, perjury and lies told by witnesses, misconduct by police, prosecutors or judges and inadequate defense strategies put forward by the defendant's legal team.

Unreliability of eyewitness testimony

Eyewitness identifications are notoriously unreliable, contributing to 70% of wrongful convictions. Starting in the 1970s, psychologists studying memory formation and retention found that the way police lineups are conducted can alter an eyewitness's memory of the suspect and this often leads to misidentification. Witnesses also have considerable difficulty making accurate identifications with suspects from different ethnic groups such that "the rate of mistaken identification is significantly higher than most people tend to believe". Elizabeth Loftus, a leading researcher in the field, says memory is so unreliable "the end result can be a highly confident witness testifying in a persuasive manner at trial about a detail that is completely false".

Forensic mistakes

Contamination

Wrongful convictions can also occur when items which become evidence at crime scenes become contaminated in the process of packaging, collection and transportation to a secured facility or laboratory. Contamination can be introduced unintentionally by material that was not present when the crime was committed by anyone entering the crime scene after the event - by uninvolved witnesses who may become suspects, and by emergency responders, fire fighters, police officers and crime scene investigators themselves. If proper protocols are not followed, evidence can also be contaminated when it is being analyzed or stored. A miscarriage of justice can occur when procedures to prevent contamination are not carried out carefully and accurately.

Faulty analysis

The Innocence Project says 44% of wrongful convictions are the result of faulty forensic analysis. This occurs when forensic experts inadvertently or deliberately misrepresent the significance, validity or reliability of scientific evidence. Over the years, misrepresentations have been made in the arenas of serological analysis, microscopic hair comparison, and the analysis of bite marks, shoe prints, soil, fiber, and fingerprints.

Overconfident experts

Overly confident testimony by expert witnesses can also lead to miscarriages of justice. The credibility of expert witnesses depends on numerous factors - in particular, their credentials, personal likability and self-confidence which all impact on how believable they are. The confidence with which experts present their evidence has also been noted to influence jurors, who tend to assume that a witness who is anxious or nervous is lying. The manner in which experts testify may have a greater impact on judges and lawyers who prefer experts who provide clear, unequivocal conclusions.

The credentials and reputation of the expert also have a significant impact on juries. For example, Charles Smith was head of the Ontario Pediatric Forensic Pathology Unit from 1982 and the most highly regarded specialist in his field. His testimony led to the convictions of thirteen women whose children died in unexplained circumstance before it came to light that he had "a thing against people who hurt children", and "was on a crusade and acted more like a prosecutor" than a pathologist. An inquiry into his conduct concluded in October 2008 that Smith "actively misled" his superiors, "made false and misleading statements" in court and exaggerated his expertise in trials.

False confessions

Further information: False confession

The possibility that innocent people would admit to a crime they did not commit seems unlikely - and yet this occurs so often, the Innocence Project found false confessions contribute to approximately 25% of wrongful convictions in murder and rape cases. Certain suspects are more vulnerable to making a false confession under police pressure. This includes individuals who are intellectually impaired, and those who suffer from mental illness. Saul Kassin, a leading expert on false confessions, says that young people are also particularly vulnerable to confessing, especially when stressed, tired, or traumatized.

Coercive interrogation techniques

Further information: Reid technique

Police often use coercive manipulation techniques when conducting interrogations in hopes of obtaining a confession. In the United States, one of these is known as the Reid Technique after the officer who developed it, John Reid. Introduced in the 1940s and 50s, the strategy relies on deception, coercion and aggressive confrontation to secure confessions. It became the leading interrogation method used by law enforcement throughout the United States and has led to many confessions by innocent people. As of 2014, this technique was still popular with police interrogators even though the strategy produces less information from suspects, provides fewer true confessions and more false confessions than less confrontational interviewing techniques.

Perjury and false accusations

Witnesses in police investigations may lie for a variety of reasons including: personal ill-will towards the defendant, the desire to be paid, the desire to get a deal from prosecutors or police, or an effort to deflect attention from a person's own involvement in a crime. An innocent person is more likely to be convicted when one or more witnesses have an incentive to testify, and those incentives are not disclosed to the jury. According to the National Registry of Exonerations, 57% of cases where the convicted person was eventually exonerated involves perjury or false accusations.

Prosecutorial misconduct

Further information: Prosecutorial misconduct

This occurs in numerous ways including the concealment or destruction of exculpatory evidence; the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defence; the failure to reveal that certain witnesses have been paid to testify; and the planting of incriminating evidence. An Innocence Project study found that 25% of DNA exonerations involved testimony that was known to be false by the police and another 11% involved the undisclosed use of coerced witness testimony. In other words, over one third of these wrongful convictions involved prosecutorial misconduct.

Role of bias and cognitive distortions

Confirmation bias is a psychological phenomenon whereby people tend to seek and interpret information in ways that support existing beliefs. Two inter-related mechanisms tend to operate: it begins with a biased interpretation of whatever information is available, followed by selectively searching for information which supports this interpretation. In police investigations, this comes into play when detectives identify a suspect early in an investigation, come to believe he or she is guilty, and then ignore or downplay other evidence that points to someone else or doesn't fit their hypothesis about what occurred.

A number of factors contribute to this process. First, police officers often have heavy workloads and, in high-profile cases, often come under considerable pressure to catch the perpetrator as soon as possible. This may encourage a rush to judgement - in a process described by psychologists as involving a high need for cognitive closure (NFC) - the desire for a clear-cut solution which avoids confusion and ambiguity.

Second, after spending considerable time and resources trying to build a case against a particular suspect, it becomes difficult for police to admit they may be going down the wrong track. The embarrassment and loss of prestige that follows from admitting erroneous decisions may motivate investigators to continue down a chosen path and disregard evidence that points in a different direction.

Third, criminal investigations are generally theory-driven activities. Investigators tend to evaluate evidence based on their preliminary theories or hypotheses about how, and by whom, a crime was committed. Because of the pressures described above, such hypotheses are sometimes based on the expectations and preconceptions of the investigators rather than on solid facts. A study in the Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling found that "criminal investigations which aim at generating evidence confirming an ill-founded hypothesis pose serious threats both to the security of innocent citizens and to the effectiveness of the law-enforcement system".

Noble cause corruption

Further information: Noble cause corruption

Police may become convinced a particular suspect is guilty but not have sufficient evidence to prove it. Sometimes they may plant evidence in order to secure a conviction because they believe it is in the public interest, or that there is a greater good, in convicting a particular person. In other words, they believe that the ends (or the outcome) justifies the means. This is known as noble cause corruption.

Plea bargaining

Further information: Plea bargain

Another technique used by police is plea bargaining whereby the prosecutor provides a concession to the defendant in exchange for a plea of guilt. This generally occurs when the defendant pleads guilty to a less serious charge, or to one of several charges, in return for the dismissal of the main charge; or it may mean that the defendant pleads guilty to the main charge in return for a more lenient sentence.

Compensation for wrongful conviction

Article 14(6) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that when a miscarriage of justice has occurred and the defendant's conviction has been reversed or they have been pardoned, "the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to law". The right to compensation is also authorized by Article 3 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 10 of the American Convention on Human Rights.

Four broad approaches allow for the payment of compensation following a miscarriage of justice: tort liability in common law; claims for a breach of constitutional or human rights; statutory relief where specific legislation exists to compensate individuals who are wrongfully convicted; and non-statutory relief by way of ex-gratia schemes based on the largesse of the government.

In a study of different approaches to the payment of compensation in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, only the US and the UK have statutory schemes in place. In the United States, the federal government, the District of Columbia, and 38 states have such legislation on their statutes. Twelve states have no laws requiring compensation to be paid. However, each state differs widely in regard to eligibility requirements, maximum payments, issues concerning factual innocence, the burden of proof, the behavior of the claimant which contributed to the (now overturned) conviction, and the claimant's prior criminal history. In some states, statutes of limitations also applies.

The significant benefits of statutory schemes is that they provide money and services in compensation to individuals who have been wrongfully convicted without regard to fault or blame; they do not require claimants to prove how the prosecution or police committed their mistakes. 

Implications

The concept of miscarriage of justice has important implications for standard of review, in that an appellate court will often only exercise its discretion to correct a plain error when a miscarriage of justice (or "manifest injustice") would otherwise occur.

The risk of miscarriages of justice is often cited as a cause to eliminate the death penalty. When condemned persons are executed before they are determined to have been wrongly convicted, the effect of that miscarriage of justice is irreversible. Wrongly executed people nevertheless occasionally receive posthumous pardons—which essentially void the conviction—or have their convictions quashed.

Even when a wrongly convicted person is not executed, years in prison can have a substantial, irreversible effect on the person and their family. The risk of miscarriage of justice is therefore also an argument against long sentences, like a life sentence, and cruel prison conditions.

Consequences

Wrongful convictions appear at first to be "rightful" arrests and subsequent convictions, and also include a public statement about a particular crime having occurred, as well as a particular individual or individuals having committed that crime. If the conviction turns out to be a miscarriage of justice, then one or both of these statements is ultimately deemed to be false. In cases where a large-scale audience is unknowingly witness to a miscarriage of justice, the news-consuming public may develop false beliefs about the nature of crime itself. It may also cause the public to falsely believe that certain types of crime exist, or that certain types of people tend to commit these crimes, or that certain crimes are more commonly prevalent than they actually are. Thus, wrongful convictions can ultimately mold a society's popular beliefs about crime. Because our understanding of crime is socially constructed, it has been shaped by many factors other than its actual occurrence.

Mass media may also be faulted for distorting the public perception of crime by over-representing certain races and genders as criminals and victims, and for highlighting more sensational and invigorating types of crimes as being more newsworthy. The way a media presents crime-related issues may have an influence not only on a society's fear of crime but also on its beliefs about the causes of criminal behavior and desirability of one or another approach to crime control. Ultimately, this may have a significant impact on critical public beliefs about emerging forms of crime such as cybercrime, global crime, and terrorism.

Some wrongfully sanctioned people join organizations like the Innocence Project and Witness to Innocence to publicly share their stories, as a way to counteract these media distortions and to advocate for various types of criminal justice reform.

There are unfavorable psychological effects to those who were wrongfully sanctioned, even in the absence of any public knowledge. In an experiment, participants significantly reduced their pro-social behavior after being wrongfully sanctioned. As a consequence there were negative effects for the entire group. The extent of wrongful sanctions varies between societies.

When a crime occurs and the wrong person is convicted for it, the actual perpetrator goes free and often goes on to commit additional crimes, including hundreds of cases of violent crime. A 2019 study estimated that "the wrong‐person wrongful convictions that occur annually [in the United States] may lead to more than 41,000 additional crimes".

By country

Canada

A series of miscarriages of justice in Canada have led to reforms of the country's criminal justice system. In 1972, Donald Marshall Jr., a Mi'kmaq man, was wrongly convicted of murder. Marshall spent 11 years in jail before being acquitted in 1983. The case led to questions about the fairness of the Canadian justice system, especially given that Marshall was an Aboriginal: as the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation put it, "The name Donald Marshall is almost synonymous with 'wrongful conviction' and the fight for native justice in Canada." Marshall received a lifetime pension of $1.5 million in compensation and his conviction resulted in changes to the Canada Evidence Act so that any evidence obtained by the prosecution must be presented to the defense on disclosure.

In 1992, Guy Paul Morin was convicted of the 1984 rape and murder of an 8-year-old girl and was sentenced to life imprisonment. In 1995, new testing of DNA evidence showed Morin could not have been the murderer, and the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned his conviction. The case has been described as "a compendium of official error—from inaccurate eyewitness testimony and police tunnel vision, to scientific bungling and the suppression of evidence." Morin received $1.25 million in compensation from the Ontario government.

China

A series of wrongful convictions were uncovered in the 2010s which had a large impact on the judicial system and undermined public trust in the Chinese justice system. Zhao Zuohai was one of the wrongful convictions, who had to serve 10 years in prison for a murder he did not commit. The alleged victim that he murdered had returned home and he was released from prison. While he was being released from prison he shared some chilling news. Zuohai shared with the police officers and officials that while he was being taken into custody he repeatedly experienced torture because they were trying to extract a confession from Zuohai.

Netherlands

In response to two overturned cases, the Schiedammerpark murder case and the Putten murder, the Netherlands created the "Posthumus I committee" which analyzed what had gone wrong in the Schiedammerpark murder case. The committee concluded that confirmation bias led the police to ignore and misinterpret scientific evidence, specifically DNA. Subsequently, the Posthumus II committee investigated whether injustice occurred in similar cases. The committee received 25 applications from concerned and involved scientists and selected three for further investigation: the Lucia de Berk case, the Ina Post case, and the Enschede incest case. In those three cases, independent researchers (professors Wagenaar, van Koppen, Israëls, Crombag, and Derksen) concluded that confirmation bias and misuse of complex scientific evidence led to miscarriages of justice.

Spain

The Constitution of Spain guarantees compensation in cases of miscarriage of justice. This includes those who have been acquitted of their charges or if their case has been dismissed.

United Kingdom

The Post Office scandal is "one of the greatest miscarriages of justice in our nation's history” Rishi Sunak said during Prime Minister's questions. “People who worked hard to serve their communities had their lives and their reputations destroyed".

In the United Kingdom a jailed person, whose conviction is quashed, might be paid compensation for the time they were incarcerated. This is currently limited by statute to a maximum sum of £1,000,000 for those who have been incarcerated for more than ten years and £500,000 for any other cases, Between 2007 and 2023 there could be deductions for the cost of food and accommodation during that time.

Richard Foster, the Chairman of the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC), reported in October 2018 that the single biggest cause of miscarriage of justice was the failure to disclose vital evidence.

A major factor leading to the abolition of capital punishment for murder in the United Kingdom was the case of Timothy Evans, who was executed in 1950 after being wrongfully convicted of a murder that had been committed by his neighbour.

England, Wales and Northern Ireland

Paddy Hill from the Birmingham Six in 2015. He is seen here addressing an audience as to his advocacy in fighting miscarriages of justice

Until 2005, the parole system assumed all convicted persons were guilty, and poorly handled those who were not. To be paroled, a convicted person had to sign a document in which, among other things, they confessed to the crime for which they were convicted. Someone who refused to sign this declaration spent longer in jail than someone who signed it. Some wrongly convicted people, such as the Birmingham Six, were refused parole for this reason. In 2005 the system changed, and began to parole prisoners who never admitted guilt.

English law has no official means of correcting a "perverse" verdict (conviction of a defendant on the basis of insufficient evidence). Appeals are based exclusively on new evidence or errors by the judge or prosecution (but not the defence), or jury irregularities. A reversal occurred, however, in the 1930s when William Herbert Wallace was exonerated of the murder of his wife. There is no right to a trial without jury (except during the troubles in Northern Ireland or in the case where there is a significant risk of jury-tampering, such as organised crime cases, when a judge or judges presided without a jury).

During the early 1990s, a series of high-profile cases turned out to be miscarriages of justice. Many resulted from police fabricating evidence to convict people they thought were guilty, or simply to get a high conviction rate. The West Midlands Serious Crime Squad became notorious for such practices, and was disbanded in 1989. In 1997 the Criminal Cases Review Commission was established specifically to examine possible miscarriages of justice. However, it still requires either strong new evidence of innocence, or new proof of a legal error by the judge or prosecution. For example, merely insisting on one's innocence, asserting the jury made an error, or stating there was not enough evidence to prove guilt, is not enough. It is not possible to question the jury's decision or query on what matters it was based. The waiting list for cases to be considered for review is at least two years on average.

In 2002, the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal made an exception to who could avail of the right to a fair trial in R v Walsh: "... if a defendant has been denied a fair trial it will almost be inevitable that the conviction will be regarded unsafe, the present case in our view constitutes an exception to the general rule. ... the conviction is to be regarded as safe, even if a breach of Article 6(1) were held to have occurred in the present case." (See Christy Walsh (Case).)

Scotland

The Criminal Appeal (Scotland) Act 1927 increased the jurisdiction of the Scottish Court of Criminal Appeal following the miscarriage of justice surrounding the Trial of Oscar Slater.

Reflecting Scotland's own legal system, which differs from that of the rest of the United Kingdom, the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) was established in April 1999. All cases accepted by the SCCRC are subjected to a robust and thoroughly impartial review before a decision on whether or not to refer to the High Court of Justiciary is taken.

United States

Gravestone of George Johnson who was unjustly hanged in Arizona.

In June 2012, the National Registry of Exonerations, a joint project of the University of Michigan Law School and Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, initially reported 873 individual exonerations in the U.S. from January 1989 through February 2012; the report called this number "tiny" in a country with 2.3 million people in prisons and jails, but asserted that there are far more false convictions than exonerations. By 2015, the number of individual exonerations was reported as 1,733, with 2015 having the highest annual number of exonerations since 1989. By 2019, the number had risen to 1,934 individuals. 20 individuals have been exonerated while on death row due to DNA evidence.

According to a 2020 report by the National Registry of Exonerations, official misconduct contributed to 54% of all wrong convictions. The study only counted misconduct when it directly contributed to the convictions, such as the generation of false evidence or concealment of evidence of innocence.

At least 21 states in the U.S. do not offer compensation for wrongful imprisonment.

The Innocence Project works to exonerate people in the United States who have been wrongfully convicted of crime. It has estimated that 1 percent of all U.S. prisoners are innocent. With the number of incarcerated Americans being approximately 2.4 million, by that estimate as many as 20,000 people may be incarcerated as a result of wrongful conviction.

Research into the issue of wrongful convictions have led to the use of methods to avoid wrongful convictions, such as double-blind eyewitness identification. Leading causes of wrongful convictions in the United States include snitches and unscientific forensics. Other causes include police and prosecutorial misconduct.

Race and systemic racism have been found to be a factor in wrongful convictions; a report by the National Registry of Exonerations found that, as of August 2022, African Americans make up 13.6% of the U.S. population, but 53% of exonerations, and that they were seven times more likely to be falsely convicted compared to White Americans.

In 2023, Glynn Simmons was released from prison after 48 years of prison. His imprisonment after wrongful conviction is believed to be the longest in American history.

Presumption of guilt

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presumption_of_guilt

A presumption of guilt is any presumption within the criminal justice system that a person is guilty of a crime, for example a presumption that a suspect is guilty unless or until proven to be innocent. Such a presumption may legitimately arise from a rule of law or a procedural rule of the court or other adjudicating body which determines how the facts in the case are to be proved, and may be either rebuttable or irrebuttable. An irrebuttable presumption of fact may not be challenged by the defense, and the presumed fact is taken as having been proved. A rebuttable presumption shifts the burden of proof onto the defense, who must collect and present evidence to prove the suspect's innocence, in order to obtain acquittal.

Rebuttable presumptions of fact, arising during the course of a trial as a result of specific factual situations (for example that the accused has taken flight), are common; an opening presumption of guilt based on the mere fact that the suspect has been charged is considered illegitimate in many countries, and contrary to international human rights standards. In the United States, an irrebuttable presumption of guilt is considered to be unconstitutional. Informal and legally illegitimate presumptions of guilt may also arise from the attitudes or prejudices of those such as judges, lawyers or police officers who administer the system. Such presumptions may result in suspects who are innocent being brought before a court to face criminal charges, with a risk of improperly being found guilty.

Definition

According to Herbert L. Packer, "It would be a mistake to think of the presumption of guilt as the opposite of the presumption of innocence that we are so used to thinking of as the polestar of the criminal process and which... occupies an important position in the Due Process Model."^[5] The presumption of guilt prioritizes speed and efficiency over reliability, and prevails when due process is absent.

In State v. Brady (1902) 91 NW 801, Weaver J said "'Presumptions of guilt' and 'prima facie' cases of guilt in the trial of a party charged with crime mean no more than that from the proof of certain facts the jury will be warranted in convicting the accused of the offense with which he is charged".

Human rights

In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Labavarde and Anor, Neerunjun C.J. said that article 11(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 6(2) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms would be infringed if "the whole burden is ... cast on the defence by the creation of a presumption of guilt on the mere preferment of the criminal charge".

Inquisitorial systems

It is sometimes said that in inquisitorial systems, a defendant is guilty until proven innocent. It has also been said that this is a myth, as well as a former "common conceit of English lawyers" who asserted this was the case in France.

A presumption of guilt is incompatible with the presumption of innocence and moves an accusational system of justice toward the inquisitional.

Common law presumptions

There have existed at least two types of presumption of guilt under the law of England, which arose from a rule of law or a procedural rule of the court or other adjudicating body and determined how the facts in the case were to be proven, and could be either rebuttable or irrebuttable. Those were:

• Presumption of guilt arising from the conduct of the party charged
• Presumption of guilt arising from the possession of provable stolen property

Consequences

Plea bargaining has been said to involve a presumption of guilt. The American Bar Association states that people with limited resources accused of a crime "find themselves trapped by a system that presumes their guilt."

Presumption of guilt on the part of investigators may result in false confessions. The circumstances of the trial of Steven Avery for the murder of Teresa Halbach were publicized in media at the time, and were later the subject of the American documentary television series Making a Murderer. The media publications largely concerned the postulation that such a presumption of guilt had resulted the wrongful conviction, by means of an induced false confession, of Avery's nephew, Brendan Dassey.

Preventive detention, detaining an individual for a crime they may commit, has been said to involve a presumption of guilt, or something very close to one.

A fixed penalty notice or on-the-spot fine are penalties issued by police for minor offences which are difficult and expensive to appeal.

Unconstitutional, illegitimate and informal presumptions

An irrebuttable presumption of guilt is unconstitutional in the United States. An arrest, however, often becomes synonymous or "fused" with guilt, postulates Anna Roberts, a United States law professor. In the minds of jurors, the person charged must have done something wrong.

In Japan the criminal justice system has been criticized for its wide use of detentions during which suspects are forced to make false confessions during interrogations. In 2020, Japan's Justice Minister Masako Mori tweeted regarding the need for someone to prove their innocence in a court of law. She later deleted the tweet and called it "verbal gaffe".

High Court judge Sir Richard Henriques has criticized UK police training and methods which allegedly assert that "only 0.1% of rape allegations are false", and in which all complainants are treated as "victims" from the start. It is difficult to assess the true prevalence of false rape allegations, but it is generally agreed that rape accusations are false at least 2% to 10% of the time, with a greater proportion of cases not being proven to be true or false.

The American actor and producer Jeremy Piven has spoken out against the Me Too movement, which he claims, "put lives in jeopardy without a hearing, due process or evidence". Writing about Piven's comment, journalist Brendan O'Neill, suggests that the presumption of innocence is being weakened.

An illegitimate presumption of guilt may be caused or motivated by factors such as racial prejudice, "media frenzy", cognitive bias, and others.

Plea bargain

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plea_bargain

A plea bargain (also plea agreement or plea deal) is an agreement in criminal law proceedings, whereby the prosecutor provides a concession to the defendant in exchange for a plea of guilt or nolo contendere. This may mean that the defendant will plead guilty to a less serious charge, or to one of the several charges, in return for the dismissal of other charges; or it may mean that the defendant will plead guilty to the original criminal charge in return for a more lenient sentence.

A plea bargain allows both parties to avoid a lengthy criminal trial and may allow criminal defendants to avoid the risk of conviction at trial on a more serious charge. For example, in the legal system of the United States, a criminal defendant charged with a felony theft charge, the conviction of which would require imprisonment in state prison, may be offered the opportunity to plead guilty to a misdemeanor theft charge, which may not carry a custodial sentence.

In cases such as an automobile collision when there is a potential for civil liability against the defendant, the defendant may agree to plead "no contest" or "guilty with a civil reservation", which essentially is a guilty plea without admitting civil liability.

Plea bargaining can present a dilemma to defense attorneys, in that they must choose between vigorously seeking a good deal for their present client, or maintaining a good relationship with the prosecutor for the sake of helping future clients. However, in the case of the US for example, defense attorneys are required by the ethics of the bar to defend the present client's interests over the interests of others. Violation of this rule may result in disciplinary sanctions being imposed against the defense attorney by the appropriate state's bar association.

In charge bargaining, defendants plead guilty to a less serious crime than the original charge that was filed against them. In count bargaining, they plead guilty to a subset of multiple original charges. In sentence bargaining, they plead guilty agreeing in advance what sentence will be given; however, this sentence can still be denied by the judge. In fact bargaining, defendants plead guilty but the prosecutor agrees to stipulate (i.e., to affirm or concede) certain facts that will affect how the defendant is punished under the sentencing guidelines.

Plea bargaining was considered a predominantly American phenomenon during the 1970s, but has since spread throughout the world.

Advantages

Plea bargaining has been defended as a voluntary exchange that leaves both parties better off, in that defendants have many procedural and substantive rights, including a right to trial and to appeal a guilty verdict. By pleading guilty, defendants waive those rights in exchange for a commitment from the prosecutor, such as a reduced charge or more favorable sentence. For a defendant who believes that conviction is almost certain, a discount to the sentence is more useful than an unlikely chance of acquittal. The prosecutor secures a conviction while avoiding the need to commit time and resources to trial preparation and a possible trial. Plea bargaining similarly helps preserve money and resources for the court in which the prosecution occurs. It also means that victims and witnesses do not have to testify at the trial, which in some cases may be traumatic.

Disadvantages and issues

Scope for coercive manipulation

Plea bargaining is criticized, particularly outside the United States, on the grounds that its close relationship with rewards, threats and coercion potentially endanger the correct legal outcome.

Author Martin Yant discusses the use of coercion in plea bargaining:

Even when the charges are more serious, prosecutors often can still bluff defense attorneys and their clients into pleading guilty to a lesser offense. As a result, people who might have been acquitted because of lack of evidence, but also who are in fact truly innocent, will often plead guilty to the charge. Why? In a word, fear. And the more numerous and serious the charges, studies have shown, the greater the fear. That explains why prosecutors sometimes seem to file every charge imaginable against defendants.

This tactic is prohibited in some other countries—for example in the United Kingdom the prosecutor's code states:

Prosecutors should never go ahead with more charges than are necessary just to encourage a defendant to plead guilty to a few. In the same way, they should never go ahead with a more serious charge just to encourage a defendant to plead guilty to a less serious one.

although it adds that in some kinds of complex cases such as major fraud trials:

The over-riding duty of the prosecutor is ... to see that justice is done. The procedures must command public and judicial confidence. Many defendants in serious and complex fraud cases are represented by solicitors experienced in commercial litigation, including negotiation. This means that the defendant is usually protected from being put under improper pressure to plead. The main danger to be guarded against in these cases is that the prosecutor is persuaded to agree to a plea or a basis that is not in the public interest and interests of justice because it does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offending ... Any plea agreement must reflect the seriousness and extent of the offending and give the court adequate sentencing powers. It must consider the impact of an agreement on victims and also the wider public, whilst respecting the rights of defendants.

John H. Langbein argues that the modern American system of plea bargaining is comparable to the medieval European system of torture:

There is, of course, a difference between having your limbs crushed if you refuse to confess, or suffering some extra years of imprisonment if you refuse to confess, but the difference is of degree, not kind. Plea bargaining, like torture, is coercive. Like the medieval Europeans, the Americans are now operating a procedural system that engages in condemnation without adjudication.

Consequences for innocent accused

Theoretical work based on the prisoner's dilemma is one reason that, in many countries, plea bargaining is forbidden. Often, precisely the prisoner's dilemma scenario applies: it is in the interest of both suspects to confess and testify against the other suspect, irrespective of the innocence of the accused. Arguably, the worst case is when only one party is guilty: here, the innocent one has no incentive to confess, while the guilty one has a strong incentive to confess and give testimony (including false testimony) against the innocent.

A 2009 study by the European Association of Law and Economics observed that innocent defendants are consistently more likely than guilty defendants to reject otherwise-favorable pleas proposals, even when theoretically disadvantageous to do so, because of perceived unfairness, and would do so even if the expected sanction would be worse if they proceeded to trial. The study concluded that "[t]his somewhat counterintuitive 'cost of innocence', where the preferences of innocents lead them collectively to fare worse than their guilty counterparts, is further increased by the practice of imposing much harsher sentences at trial on defendants who contest the charges. This 'trial penalty' seeks to facilitate guilty pleas by guilty defendants [...and ironically...] disproportionately, collectively, penalizes innocents, who reject on fairness grounds some offers their guilty counterparts accept."

The extent to which innocent people will accept a plea bargain and plead guilty is contentious and has been subjected to considerable research. Much research has focused on the relatively few actual cases where innocence was subsequently proven, such as successful appeals for murder and rape based upon DNA evidence, which tend to be atypical of trials as a whole (being by their nature only the most serious kinds of crime). Other studies have focused on presenting hypothetical situations to subjects and asking what choice they would make. More recently some studies have attempted to examine actual reactions of innocent persons generally, when faced with actual plea bargain decisions. A study by Dervan and Edkins (2013) attempted to recreate a real-life controlled plea bargain situation, rather than merely asking theoretical responses to a theoretical situation—a common approach in previous research. It placed subjects in a situation where an accusation of academic fraud (cheating) could be made, of which some subjects were in fact by design actually guilty (and knew this), and some were innocent but faced seemingly strong evidence of guilt and no verifiable proof of innocence. Each subject was presented with the evidence of guilt and offered a choice between facing an academic ethics board and potentially a heavy penalty in terms of extra courses and other forfeits, or admitting guilt and accepting a lighter "sentence". The study found that as expected from court statistics, around 90% of accused subjects who were actually guilty chose to take the plea-bargain and plead guilty. It also found that around 56% of subjects who were actually innocent (and privately knew it) also take up the plea-bargain and plead guilty, for reasons including avoiding formal quasi-legal processes, uncertainty, possibility of greater harm to personal future plans, or deprivation of home environment due to remedial courses. The authors stated:

Previous research has argued that the innocence problem is minimal because defendants are risk-prone and willing to defend themselves before a tribunal. Our research, however, demonstrates that when study participants are placed in real, rather than hypothetical, bargaining situations and are presented with accurate information regarding their statistical probability of success, just as they might be so informed by their attorney or the government during a criminal plea negotiation, innocent defendants are highly risk-averse.

More pressure to plea bargain may be applied in weak cases (where there is less certainty of both guilt and jury conviction) than strong cases. Prosecutors tend to be strongly motivated by conviction rates, and "there are many indications that prosecutors are willing to go a long way to avoid losing cases, [and that] when prosecutors decide to proceed with such weak cases they are often willing to go a long way to assure that a plea bargain is struck". Prosecutors often have great power to procure a desired level of incentive, as they select the charges to be presented. For this reason,

[P]lea bargains are just as likely in strong and weak cases. Prosecutors only need to adjust the offer to the probability of conviction in order to reach an agreement. Thus, weaker cases result in more lenient plea bargains, and stronger ones in relative harshness, but both result in an agreement. [... W]hen the case is weak, the parties must rely on charge bargaining ... But [charge bargaining] is hardly an obstacle. Charge bargaining in weak cases is not the exception; it is the norm all around the country. Thus, even if the evidence against innocent defendants is, on average, weaker, the likelihood of plea bargains is not dependent on guilt.

Another situation in which an innocent defendant may plead guilty is in the case of a defendant who cannot raise bail, and who is being held in custody in a jail or detention facility. Because it may take months, or even years, for criminal cases to come to trial or even indictment in some jurisdictions, an innocent defendant who is offered a plea bargain that includes a sentence of less time than they would otherwise spend in jail awaiting an indictment or a trial may choose to accept the plea arrangement and plead guilty.

Misalignment of goals and incentives

Agency problems may arise in plea bargaining as, although the prosecutor represents the people and the defense attorney represents the defendant, these agents' goals may not be congruent with those of their principles. For example, prosecutors and defense attorneys may seek to maintain good relations with one another, creating a potential conflict with the parties they represent. A defense attorney may receive a flat fee for representing a client, or may not receive additional money for taking a case to trial, creating an incentive for the defense attorney to settle a case to increase profits or to avoid a financial loss.

A prosecutor may want to maintain a high conviction rate or avoid a losing high-profile trials, creating the potential that they will enter into a plea bargain that furthers their interests but reduces the potential of the prosecution and sentence to deter crime. Prosecutors may also make charging decisions that significantly affect a defendant's sentence, and may file charges or offer plea deals that cause even an innocent defendant to consider or accept a plea bargain.

Issues related to cost of justice

Another argument against plea bargaining is that it may not actually reduce the costs of administering justice. For example, if a prosecutor has only a 25% chance of winning his case and sending a defendant away to prison for 10 years, they may make a plea agreement for a sentence of one year; but if plea bargaining is unavailable, a prosecutor may drop the case completely.

Usage in common law countries

Canada

In Canada, the courts always have the final say with regard to sentencing. Nevertheless, plea bargaining has become an accepted part of the criminal justice system although judges and Crown attorneys are often reluctant to refer to it as such. In most Canadian criminal proceedings, the Crown has the ability to recommend a lighter sentence than it would seek following a guilty verdict in exchange for a guilty plea.

Like other common law jurisdictions, the Crown can also agree to withdraw some charges against the defendant in exchange for a guilty plea. This has become standard procedure for certain offences such as impaired driving. In the case of hybrid offences, the Crown must make a binding decision as to whether to proceed summarily or by indictment prior to the defendant making his or her plea. If the Crown elects to proceed summarily and the defendant then pleads not guilty, the Crown cannot change its election. Therefore, the Crown is not in a position to offer to proceed summarily in exchange for a guilty plea.

Canadian judges are not bound by the Crown's sentencing recommendations and could impose harsher (or more lenient) penalties. Therefore, the Crown and the defence will often make a joint submission with respect to sentencing. While a joint submission can entail both the Crown and defence recommending exactly the same disposition of a case, this is not common except in cases that are sufficiently minor that the Crown is willing to recommend a discharge. In more serious cases, a joint submission normally call for a sentence within relatively narrow range, with the Crown arguing for a sentence at the upper end of the range and the defence arguing for a sentence at the lower end, so as to maintain the visibility of the judge's ability to exercise discretion.

Judges are not bound to impose a sentence within the range of a joint submission, and a judge's disregard for a joint submission is not in itself grounds for the sentence to be altered on appeal. However, if a judge routinely disregards joint submissions, that judge would compromise the ability of the Crown to offer meaningful incentives for defendants to plead guilty. Defence lawyers would become reluctant to enter into joint submissions if they were thought to be of little value with a particular judge, which would thus result in otherwise avoidable trials. For these reasons, Canadian judges will normally impose a sentence within the range of any joint submission.

Following a Supreme Court of Canada ruling that imposes strict time limits on the resolution of criminal cases (eighteen months for cases in provincial court and thirty months for cases in Superior Court), several provinces have initiated and intensified measures intended to maximize the number of minor criminal cases resolved by a plea bargain.

Largely particular to the Canadian justice system is that further negotiations concerning the final disposition of a criminal case may also arise even after a sentence has been passed. This is because in Canada the Crown has (by common law standards) a very broad right to appeal acquittals, and also a right to appeal for harsher sentences except in cases where the sentence imposed was maximum allowed. Therefore, in Canada, after sentencing the defence sometimes has an incentive to try to persuade the Crown to not appeal a case, in exchange for the defence also declining to appeal. While, strictly speaking, this is not plea bargaining, it is done for largely the same reasons.

England and Wales

In England and Wales, plea bargaining, in the sense of seeking a particular sentence in exchange for dropping some charges, is not permitted; only the judge or magistrates have the power to determine sentence, and an agreement between the prosecution and defence cannot bind the court. The Crown Prosecution Service is required to prosecute an offence only where there is a realistic prospect of conviction, so greater charges cannot lawfully be used in bad faith to intimidate the defendant into accepting the charge actually sought.

A defendant is permitted to plead guilty to some charges listed on the charge sheet or indictment and deny others, and the prosecution may agree to accept this plea and drop the denied charges; such an agreement will generally be accepted by the court as it serves the public interest, as well as the defendant's and victims' interests, to avoid the expense and stress of a trial. The defendant may also plead guilty on the basis of accepted facts that may affect sentencing while denying others, but the Sentencing Council stresses that the prosecution should accept such a plea only if it enables the court to impose a sentence and make other ancillary orders that are appropriate for the seriousness of the offence, and never merely for the sake of convenience. The prosecution must also take the victims' views into account.

In cases before the Crown Court, the defendant can request an indication from the judge of the likely maximum sentence that would be imposed should the defendant decide to plead guilty. Following the rule in R v Goodyear, it is only appropriate to give such an indication if requested by the defence with the defendant's written authorization; such indication is treated as binding on the court, but only if the defendant actually pleads guilty, and cannot prevent the sentence being appealed as unduly lenient.

In the case of either way offences, the decision whether to deal with a case in a magistrates' court or the Crown Court is not made by magistrates until after a plea has been entered. A defendant is thus unable to plead guilty in exchange for having a case dealt with in magistrates' court (which has lesser sentencing powers).

Where the defendant pleads guilty or indicates an intention to do so, the guidelines set by the Sentencing Council typically require that they receive a discount on the sentence, with the amount of discount depending on the timing:

• Indicating a guilty plea at the first opportunity (typically the committal hearing in the magistrates' court): one third
• Pleading guilty at a later hearing in the magistrates' court, or at the first hearing in crown court (typically the plea and case management hearing): one quarter
• Pleading guilty on the first day of trial: one tenth

The discount can sometimes involve changing the type of punishment, such as substituting a prison sentence for community service. For some offences where a mandatory minimum sentence applies, section 73 of the Sentencing Act 2020 permits the sentence to be reduced this way up to 20 percent below the minimum.

Section 73 requires the court to take into account the circumstances under which an indication to plead guilty was made in addition to its timing.

India

Plea bargaining was introduced in India by The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2005, which amended the Code of Criminal Procedure and introduced a new chapter, XXI(A), in the code, enforceable from July 5, 2006. It allows plea bargaining for cases in which the maximum punishment is imprisonment for seven years or less; however, offenses affecting the socio-economic condition of the country and offenses committed against a woman or a child below 14 are excluded.

In 2007, the Sakharam Bandekar case became the first such case in India where the accused, Sakharam Bandekar, requested lesser punishment in return for confessing to his crime (using plea bargaining). However, the court rejected his plea and accepted the CBI's argument that the accused was facing serious charges of corruption. Finally, the court convicted Bandekar and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment.

Pakistan

Plea bargaining as a formal legal provision was introduced in Pakistan by the National Accountability Ordinance 1999, an anti-corruption law. A special feature of this plea bargain is that the accused applies for it, accepting guilt, and offers to return the proceeds of corruption as determined by investigators and prosecutors. After an endorsement by the Chairman National Accountability Bureau, the request is presented before the court, which decides whether it should be accepted or not. If the request for plea bargain is accepted by the court, the accused stands convicted but neither is sentenced if in trial nor undergoes any sentence previously pronounced by a lower court if in appeal. The accused is disqualified to take part in elections, hold any public office, or obtain a loan from any bank; the accused is also dismissed from service if a government official.

In other cases, formal plea bargains in Pakistan are limited, but the prosecutor has the authority to drop a case or a charge in a case and, in practice, often does so, in return for a defendant pleading guilty on some lesser charge. No bargaining takes place over the penalty, which is the court's sole privilege.

United States

Main article: Plea bargaining in the United States

Plea bargaining is a significant part of the criminal justice system in the United States; the vast majority (roughly 90%) of criminal cases in the United States are settled by plea bargain rather than by a jury trial. Plea bargains are subject to the approval of the court, and different states and jurisdictions have different rules. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are followed in federal cases and have been created to ensure a standard of uniformity in all cases decided in the federal courts. A two- or three-level offense level reduction is usually available for those who accept responsibility by not holding the prosecution to the burden of proving its case; this usually amounts to a complete sentence reduction had they gone to trial and lost.

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for two main types of plea agreements. An 11(c)(1)(B) agreement does not bind the court; the prosecutor's recommendation is merely advisory, and the defendant cannot withdraw their plea if the court decides to impose a sentence other than what was stipulated in the agreement. An 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, however, binds the court once the court accepts the agreement. When such an agreement is proposed, the court can reject it if it disagrees with the proposed sentence, in which case the defendant has an opportunity to withdraw their plea.

Plea bargains are so common in the Superior Courts of California (the general trial courts) that the Judicial Council of California has published an optional seven-page form (containing all mandatory advisements required by federal and state law) to help prosecutors and defense attorneys reduce such bargains into written plea agreements.

Certain aspects of the American justice system serve to promote plea bargaining. For example, the adversarial nature of the U.S. criminal justice system puts judges in a passive role, in which they have no independent access to information with which to assess the strength of the case against the defendant. The prosecutor and defense may thus control the outcome of a case through plea bargaining. The court must approve a plea bargain as being within the interests of justice.

The lack of compulsory prosecution also gives prosecutors greater discretion as well as the inability of crime victims to mount a private prosecution and their limited ability to influence plea agreements. Defendants who are held in custody—who either do not have the right to bail or cannot afford bail, or who do not qualify for release on their own recognizance—may get out of jail immediately following the judge's acceptance of a plea.

Generally, once a plea bargain is made and accepted by the courts, the matter is final and cannot be appealed. However, a defendant may withdraw his plea for certain legal reasons, and a defendant may agree to a "conditional" plea bargain, whereby they plead guilty and accept a sentence, but reserve the right to appeal a specific matter (such as violation of a constitutional right). If the defendant does not win on appeal the agreement is carried out; if the defendant is successful on appeal the bargain is terminated. The defendant in Doggett v. United States made such a bargain, reserving the right to appeal solely on the grounds that he was not given a speedy trial as required by the United States Constitution; Doggett's claim was upheld by the United States Supreme Court and he was freed.

Other common law jurisdictions

In some common law jurisdictions, such as Singapore and the Australian state of Victoria, plea bargaining is practiced only to the extent that the prosecution and the defense can agree that the defendant will plead guilty to some charges or to reduced charges in exchange for the prosecutor withdrawing the remaining or more serious charges. In New South Wales, a 10-25% discount on the sentence is customarily given in exchange for an early guilty plea, but this concession is expected to be granted by the judge as a way of recognizing the utilitarian value of an early guilty plea to the justice system - it is never negotiated with a prosecutor. The courts in these jurisdictions have made it plain that they will always decide what the appropriate penalty is to be. No bargaining takes place between the prosecution and the defence over criminal penalties.

Use in civil law countries

Plea bargaining is extremely difficult in jurisdictions based on the civil law. This is because, unlike common law systems, civil law systems have no concept of plea: if the defendant confesses, a confession is entered into evidence, but the prosecution is not absolved of the duty to present a full case. A court may decide that a defendant is innocent even though they presented a full confession. Also, unlike common law systems, prosecutors in civil law countries may have limited or no power to drop or reduce charges after a case has been filed, and in some countries their power to drop or reduce charges before a case has been filed is limited, making plea bargaining impossible. Since the 1980s, some civil law nations have adapted their systems to allow for plea bargaining.

Brazil

In 2013 Brazil passed a law allowing plea bargains, which have been used in the political corruption trials taking place since then.

Central African Republic

In the Central African Republic, witchcraft carries heavy penalties but those accused of it typically confess in exchange for a modest sentence.

China

In China, a plea bargaining pilot scheme was introduced by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in 2016. For defendants that face jail terms of three years or fewer, agrees to plead guilty voluntarily and agree with prosecutors' crime and sentencing proposals are given mitigated punishments.

Denmark

In 2009, in a case about whether witness testimony originating from a plea deal in the United States was admissible in a Danish criminal trial (297/2008 H), the Supreme Court of Denmark (Danish: Højesteret) unanimously ruled that plea bargains are prima facie not legal under Danish law, but that the witnesses in the particular case would be allowed to testify regardless (with the caveat that the lower court consider the possibility that the testimony was untrue or at least influenced by the benefits of the plea bargain). The Supreme Court did, however, point out that Danish law contains mechanisms similar to plea bargains, such as § 82, nr. 10 of the Danish Penal Code (Danish: Straffeloven) which states that a sentence may be reduced if the perpetrator of a crime provides information that helps solve a crime perpetrated by others, or § 23 a of the Danish Competition Law (Danish: Konkurrenceloven) which states that someone can apply to avoid being fined or prosecuted for participating in a cartel if they provide information about the cartel that the authorities did not know at the time.

If a defendant admits to having committed a crime, the prosecution does not have to file charges against them, and the case can be heard as a so-called "admission case" (Danish: tilståelsessag) under § 831 of the Law on the Administration of Justice (Danish: Retsplejeloven) provided that: the confession is supported by other pieces of evidence (meaning that a confession is not enough to convict someone on its own); both the defendant and the prosecutor consent to it; the court does not have any objections; §§ 68, 69, 70 and 73 of the penal code do not apply to the case.

Estonia

In Estonia, plea bargaining was introduced in the 1990s: the penalty is reduced in exchange for confession and avoiding most of the court proceedings. Plea bargaining is permitted for the crimes punishable by no more than four years of imprisonment. Normally, a 25% reduction of the penalty is given.

France

The introduction of a limited form of plea bargaining (comparution sur reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité or CRPC, often summarized as plaider coupable) in 2004 was highly controversial in France. In this system, the public prosecutor could propose to suspects of relatively minor crimes a penalty not exceeding one year in prison; the deal, if accepted, had to be accepted by a judge. Opponents, usually lawyers and leftist political parties, argued that plea bargaining would greatly infringe on the rights of defense, the long-standing constitutional right of presumption of innocence, the rights of suspects in police custody, and the right to a fair trial.

For instance, Robert Badinter argued that plea bargaining would give too much power to the public prosecutor and would encourage defendants to accept a sentence only to avoid the risk of a bigger sentence in a trial, even if they did not really deserve it. Only a minority of criminal cases are settled by that method: in 2009, 77,500 out of the 673,700 or 11.5% of the decisions by the correctional courts.

Georgia

Plea bargaining (Georgian: საპროცესო შეთანხმება, literally "plea agreement") was introduced in Georgia in 2004. The substance of the Georgian plea bargaining is similar to the United States and other common law jurisdictions.

A plea bargaining, also called a plea agreement or negotiated plea, is an alternative and consensual way of criminal case settlement. A plea agreement means settlement of case without main hearing when the defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for a lesser charge or for a more lenient sentence or for dismissal of certain related charges. (Article 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia)

Defendants' rights during plea bargaining

The main principle of the plea bargaining is that it must be based on the free will of the defendant, equality of the parties and advanced protection of the rights of the defendant:

• In order to avoid fraud of the defendant or insufficient consideration of his or her interests, legislation foresees obligatory participation of the defense council; (Article 210 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia)
• The defendant has the right to reject the plea agreement on any stage of the criminal proceedings before the court renders the judgment. (Article 213 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia)
• In case of refusal, it is prohibited to use information provided by the defendant under the plea agreement against him or her in the future. (Article 214 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia)
• The defendant has the right to appeal the judgment rendered consequent to the plea agreement if the plea agreement was concluded by deception, coercion, violence, threat, or violence. (Article 215 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia)

Obligations of the prosecutor while concluding the plea agreement

While concluding the plea agreement, the prosecutor is obliged to take into consideration public interest, severity of the penalty, and personal characteristics of the defendant. (Article 210 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia) To avoid abuse of powers, legislation foresees written consent of the supervisory prosecutor as necessary precondition to conclude plea agreement and to amend its provisions. (Article 210 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia)

Oversight over the plea agreement

Plea agreement without the approval of the court does not have the legal effect. The court must satisfy itself that the plea agreement is concluded on the basis of the free will of the defendant, that the defendant fully acknowledges the essence of the plea agreement and its consequences. (Article 212 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia)

A guilty plea of the defendant is not enough to render a guilty judgment. (Article 212 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia) Consequently, the court is obliged to discuss two issues:

• Whether irrefutable evidence is presented which proves the defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Whether the sentence provided for in the plea agreement is legitimate. (Article 212 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia).

After both criteria are satisfied the court additionally checks whether formalities related to the legislative requirements are followed and only then makes its decision.

If the court finds that presented evidence is not sufficient to support the charges or that a motion to render a judgment without substantial consideration of a case is submitted in violation of the requirements stipulated by the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia, it shall return the case to the prosecution. The court before returning the case to the prosecutor offers the parties to change the terms of the agreement. If the changed terms do not satisfy the court, then it shall return the case to the prosecution. (Article 213 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia).

If the court satisfies itself that the defendant fully acknowledges the consequences of the plea agreement, and he or she was represented by the defense council, his or her will is expressed in full compliance with the legislative requirements without deception and coercion, also if there is enough body of doubtless evidence for the conviction and the agreement is reached on legitimate sentence - the court approves the plea agreement and renders guilty judgment. If any of the abovementioned requirements are not satisfied, the court rejects to approve the plea agreement and returns the case to the prosecutor. (Article 213 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia).

Role of the victim in plea agreement negotiations

The plea agreement is concluded between the parties - the prosecutor and the defendant. Notwithstanding the fact that the victim is not party to the criminal case and the prosecutor is not a tool in the hands of the victim to obtain revenge against the offender, the attitude of the victim in relation to the plea agreement is still important.

Under Article 217 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia, the prosecutor is obliged to consult with the victim prior to concluding the plea agreement and inform him or her about this. In addition, under the Guidelines of the Prosecution Service of Georgia, the prosecutor is obliged to take into consideration the interests of the victim and as a rule conclude the plea agreement after the damage is compensated.

Germany

Plea agreements have made a limited appearance in Germany. However, there is no exact equivalent of a guilty plea in German criminal procedure.

Italy

Italy has a form of bargaining, popularly known as patteggiamento but that has a technical name of penalty application under request of the parts. In fact, the bargaining is not about the charges, but about the penalty applied in sentence, reduced up to one third.

When the defendant deems that the punishment that would, concretely, be handed down is less than a five-year imprisonment (or that it would just be a fine), the defendant may request to plea bargain with the prosecutor. The defendant is rewarded with a reduction on the sentence and has other advantages (such as that the defendant does not pay the fees on the proceeding). The defendant must accept the penalty for the charges (even if the plea-bargained sentence has some particular matters in further compensation proceedings), no matter how serious the charges are.

Sometimes, the prosecutor agrees to reduce a charge or to drop some of multiple charges in exchange for the defendant's acceptance of the penalty. The defendant, in the request, could argue with the penalty and aggravating and extenuating circumstancing with the prosecutor, that can accept or refuse. The request could also be made by the prosecutor. The plea bargaining could be granted if the penalty that could be concretely applied is, after the reduction of one third, inferior to five-year imprisonment (so called patteggiamento allargato, wide bargaining); When the penalty applied, after the reduction of one third, is inferior of two years imprisonment or is only a fine (so called "patteggiamento ristretto" limited bargaining), the defendant can have other advantages, like sentence suspended and the effacement of the crime if in five year of the sentence, the defendant does not commit a similar crime.

In the request, when it could be applied the conditional suspension of the penalty according to the article 163 and following of the Italian penal code, the defendant could subordinate the request to the grant of the suspension; if the judge rejects the suspension, the bargaining is refused. When both the prosecutor and the defendant have come to an agreement, the proposal is submitted to the judge, who can refuse or accept the plea bargaining.

According to Italian law, a bargain does not need a guilty plea (in Italy there is no plea declaration); for this reason, a bargaining sentence is only an acceptance of the penalty in exchange with the stop of investigation and trial and has no binding cogency in other trials, especially in civil trials in which parts argue of the same facts at the effects of civil liability and in other criminal trials in which are processed the accomplices of the defendant that had requested and got a bargaining sentence.

Japan

In Japan, plea bargaining was previously forbidden by law, although sources reported that prosecutors illegally offered defendants plea bargains in exchange for their confessions.

Plea bargaining was introduced in Japan in June 2018. The first case of plea bargaining under this system, in July 2018, involved allegations of bribery by Mitsubishi Hitachi Power Systems in Thailand. The second case was a November 2018 deal to obtain evidence of accounting and securities law violations against Nissan executives Carlos Ghosn and Greg Kelly.

Under the Japanese system, formally known as the "mutual consultation and agreement system" (協議・合意制度, kyogi-goi seido), plea bargaining is available in prosecutions for organized crime, competition law violations, and economic crimes such as securities law violations. The prosecutor, defendant, and defense counsel each sign a written agreement, which must then be admitted into evidence in a public court without delay.

Poland

Poland also adopted a limited form of plea bargaining, which is applicable only to minor felonies (punishable by no more than 10 years of imprisonment). The procedure is called "voluntary submission to a penalty" and allows the court to pass an agreed sentence without reviewing the evidence, which significantly shortens the trial. There are some specific conditions that have to be simultaneously met:

• the defendant pleads guilty and proposes a penalty,
• the prosecutor agrees,
• the victim agrees,
• the court agrees.

However, the court may object to the terms of proposed plea agreement (even if already agreed between the defendant, victim and prosecutor) and suggest changes (not specific but rather general). If the defendant accepts these suggestions and changes his penalty proposition, the court approves it and passes the verdict according to the plea agreement. In spite of the agreement, all the parties of the trial: prosecution, defendant and the victim as an auxiliary prosecutor (in Poland, the victim may declare that he wants to act as an "auxiliary prosecutor" and consequently gains the rights similar to official prosecutor) - have the right to appeal.

Spain

Spain has relatively recently adopted a limited form of plea bargaining and the procedure is called a "conformity sentence" meaning the accused is in agreement and can only be used in minor charges but not in serious charges where nine or more years of prison may be imposed.