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Thursday, February 8, 2024

Censorship in China

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The government has censorship over all media capable of reaching a wide audience. This includes television, print media, radio, film, theater, text messaging, instant messaging, video games, literature, and the internet. The Chinese government asserts that it has the legal right to control the Internet's content within their territory and that their censorship rules do not infringe on their citizens' right to free speech. Government officials have access to uncensored information via an internal document system.

As of 2023, the World Press Freedom Index ranks China as the country with the second least press freedom in the world after North Korea.[4] In August 2012, the OpenNet Initiative classified Internet censorship in China as "pervasive" in the political and conflict/security areas and "substantial" in the social and Internet tools areas, the two most extensive classifications of the five they use. Freedom House ranks the Chinese press as "not free", the worst possible ranking, saying that "state control over the news media in China is achieved through a complex combination of party monitoring of news content, legal restrictions on journalists, and financial incentives for self-censorship," and an increasing practice of "cyber-disappearance" of material written by or about activist bloggers.

Other views suggest that Chinese businesses such as Baidu, Tencent and Alibaba, some of the world's largest internet enterprises, have benefited from the way China blocked international rivals from the domestic market.

Background

In the Republican China period, the earliest known instance of Chinese censorship was in 1941 when the second volume of the book "Inside Asia", by John Gunther, was banned by the Nationalist government.

Following the 1942-1943 American dollar bond scandal, Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek blocked newspapers from publishing the corruption allegations against finance minister H.H. Kung, also one of Chiang's relatives through marriage.

The People's Republic of China adopted the "Economic Reform" policy in 1978, which transformed China's economic structure from a planned economy to a market economy. To stimulate the economy, the Chinese government relaxed its control on media, which promoted media commercialization, profits, and growth. The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests were a turning point for Chinese censorship, especially after they were forcibly suppressed on 4 June 1989 following a declaration of martial law and People's Liberation Army troops being deployed, and the Chinese government was condemned internationally. Following the protests and subsequent massacre, news censorship was strengthened because government officials considered that free media had promoted the "turmoil" and represented a potential threat to the regime. After 1995, the Chinese government expanded internet access because it thought that a developed internet would have a positive effect on economic growth; it simultaneously adopted strategic censorship to control information.

The CCP Propaganda Department (中共中央宣传部; CCPPD) is the main official institution responsible for censorship work. Other departments, for example the State Council Information Office and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (formerly known as the Ministry of Culture until 2018), assist with censorship work. In 2013, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping upgraded the Internet censorship department and established the Cyberspace Administration of China (中央网络安全和信息化委员会办公室; CAC), an independent network regulation agency.

The Chinese government censors the domestic internet community and foreign websites differently. For the domestic internet community, the propaganda department governs what type of content should be banned or deleted on the internet, and the system of social media or website conduct self-censorship which automatically filters all sensitive content. Censors review the posts on social media, and the users must register by their real name. For foreign websites, the "Great Firewall" prevents Chinese citizens from accessing particular websites with sensitive content by blocking the IP address of these websites. Meanwhile, some foreign websites are not blocked, but the government extends the loading time for these websites. By 2020, an estimated 12 million to 20 million Chinese internet users were using Virtual Private Networks (VPN) to bypass the internet blockade. In accordance with "Implementation Rules for Provisional Regulations of the Administration of International Networking of Computer Information in the People's Republic of China" (中华人民共和国计算机信息网络国际联网管理暂行规定), the Chinese government does not support Internet users who use VPN to bypass Internet censorship and visit blocked websites within the Chinese mainland. In principle, it is forbidden for Internet users to use a VPN, but if they only do so without selling VPNs or making profits, the government will not investigate.

Goals

Most broadly, the purpose of the censorship apparatus is to maintain the stability of the status quo system of governance under the CCP. This includes political censorship as well as censorship of content deemed obscene and harmful to public morality, although the latter justification can be used as a means to censor political topics as well. The more specific reasoning and logic of censorship is not publicized by the state, however; scholars outside of China generally tend to take two overarching views of its purpose: first, censorship primarily targets unauthorized criticisms of the party-state; and/or second, censorship primarily targets expression of sentiment that is conducive to organization of collective action (whether or not it is critical of the party-state).

In 2013, Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts published research based on large-scale sampling of posts on a variety of Chinese social media, arguing that the primary motive for censorship is to quash potential for collective action, and not prevent criticism of the government per se. Through regular, automated sampling of extant posts, the authors were able to analyze which were deleted over time. While drawing only from Internet-based sources, King et al. argued their data demonstrated that "despite widespread censorship of social media, we find that when the Chinese people write scathing criticisms of their government and its leaders, the probability that their post will be censored does not increase. Instead, we find that the purpose of the censorship program is to reduce the probability of collective action by clipping social ties whenever any collective movements are in evidence or expected."

Further experiments conducted by King et al. (2014) demonstrated and recreated mechanisms of censorship of social media. The authors created social media accounts to publish text online, tracking what was and was not deleted, and additionally obtained social media censorship software used by private corporations to comply with government regulations. King et el. again argued their work offered "rigorous support for the recent hypothesis that criticisms of the state, its leaders, and their policies are published, whereas posts about real-world events with collective action potential are censored."

In 2019, however, Dimitar Gueorguiev and Edmund Malesky published an analysis of the data gathered in King, Pan & Roberts (2013), arguing that the sample included critical posts garnered through state-led consultation campaigns, wherein the Chinese government specifically solicited public comment on certain proposals, laws and regulations. Gueorguiev and Malesky subsequently concluded that controlling for such condoned criticism, the "strong" thesis of King, Pan & Roberts (2013)—that collective action potential is the primary trigger of censorship, and not a criticism of the government—failed to stand. Rather, while collective action may be a strong, or the strongest, condition for censorship, general criticism is also a major target as well.

In 2017, Bei Qin, David Strömberg, and Yanhui Wu published an article titled "Why Does China Allow Freer Social Media? Protests versus Surveillance and Propaganda." This article, based on King, Pan, and Roberts' argument, explores the Chinese government's censorship goals by analyzing data from Chinese social media site Sina Weibo. Qin et al. also point out that the Chinese government can monitor and predict upcoming collective action events, and can ask local governments to intervene and prevent violent conflicts. Qin et al. state that "Governments can use these methods to track and analyze online activities, to gauge public opinion, and to contain threats before they spread." Qin et al. also note that the central government limits its censorship to encourage people to express their opinions about the government's performance and public policies. Therefore, the government can receive feedback from the internet, which helps officials to get to know local issues and improve their work. Also, this article discusses some posts on Weibo that have accused local officials of corruption, which means some corruption cases can be predicted on social media, and the central government can supervise the local officials on the internet.

Chinese scholars Liu Liming and Sheng Qiwen state that censorship helps to protect national information security as well as prevent in the disclosure and infringement of any important national or personal information. Song Minlei points out that censorship is conducive to the maintenance of China's "ideological security." Internet censorship, Song writes, can protect the mainstream ideology, such as the core socialist value system, prevent the spread of harmful information abroad, and maintain national political stability.

Mechanisms

Party and state bodies

Multiple organs of both the CCP and the Chinese state exercise various degrees of responsibility for censorship.

The Publicity Department of the CCP plays a major role in censorship. It issues editorial guidelines for media nationwide, delineating topics that cannot be covered or must be covered in a certain way. In 2013, The Beijing News, a CCP-run newspaper, noted that the Publicity Department employed over 2 million 'public sentiment analysts' (Chinese: 舆情分析师; pinyin: yúqíng fēnxī shī) across the country, who monitor comments on particular topics on the Chinese Internet and compile reports for relevant government or Party bodies if discussion crosses certain thresholds, which in turn decide if and how to respond. Additionally, the Cyberspace Administration of China, another Party body, monitors and censors Internet-based media and speech, and issues guidelines to online platforms outlining priorities for controlling discourse.

In 2018, a number of agencies underwent a reorganization designed to strengthen CCP control of media. Most of the duties of the General Administration of Press and Publication (previously the State Administration for Press Publishing Radio Film & Television), which licensed and censored all content publishers within China, including in print, audio, and online formats, were taken over by the new National Radio and Television Administration under the authority of the State Council. Film and press work was transferred directly to the Publicity Department in the form of the State Film Administration and State Administration of Press and Publication.

Private enterprises

Media outlets usually employ their own monitors to ensure political content does not cross Party lines. For example, WeChat, a popular messaging and social media platform run by Tencent, uses semi-automated methods to monitor content sent between accounts, including images, checking for politically sensitive material, and will block said material from reaching the intended recipient, even if the sending account is non-Chinese. Other companies may contract censorship out to independent firms.

Sina Weibo, the dominant microblogging platform in China, has an internal censorship department that issues its own directives in line with government authority requirements and employs its own censors to monitor content. The Committee to Protect Journalists has published documents it said are from the Weibo censorship department between 2011 and 2014 that detailed the methodology: "... Sina's computer system scans each post using an algorithm designed to identify politically unacceptable content... [p]osts are flagged by the algorithm and forwarded to the department's employees, who decide their fate based on the instructions listed in the censorship logs." This method is consistent with those documented by King, Pan & Roberts (2014) for other websites. Weibo has been reprimanded and forced to limit certain website functions by Chinese authorities as a consequence for failure to adequately censor content.

Subject matter and agenda

Censorship in the PRC encompasses a wide range of subject matter. The motivations behind such censorship are varied; while some are stated outright by the Chinese government itself, others are surmised by observers both inside and outside of the country.

Historical

The Chinese government regulates the creation and distribution of materials regarding Chinese history. Particular emphasis is placed on combatting "historical nihilism". The CCP's historical research body, the Central Committee Party History Research Office, has defined historical nihilism as that which "seek[s] to distort the history of modern China's revolution, the CCP and the armed forces under the guise of reevaluating existing narratives", and thus countering such nihilism is "a form of political combat, crucial to the CCP leadership and the security of socialism". In practice, the term is often applied to any narratives that challenge official views of historical events. Under Xi Jinping, the government began to censor digitized archival documents that contradict official depictions of history.

One example of this is the censorship of historical writings about the Cultural Revolution. Although the Chinese government now officially denounces the Cultural Revolution, it does not allow Chinese citizens to present detailed histories of the suffering and brutality that ordinary people sustained.

Questioning folk-historical stories, such as those of the Five Heroes of Mount Langya, can be a criminal offense.

In 2021, the Cyberspace Administration of China launched a hotline for the reporting of "historical nihilists" and "illegal" comments about Chinese history. Netizens face jail time and other punishments if they are found to have posted content critical of China's leadership, policies and history.

Political

Censorship in China is seen as a tool to maintain the rule of the CCP. The Council on Foreign Relations says that unwelcome views may be censored by authorities who exploit the vagueness in laws concerning publication of state secrets. Major media outlets receive guidance from the Chinese Department of Propaganda on what content is politically acceptable. The PRC bans certain content regarding independence movements in Tibet and Taiwan, the religious movement Falun Gong, democracy, the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, Maoism, corruption, police brutality, anarchism, gossip, disparity of wealth, and food safety scandals.

In the lead-up to the Beijing Olympics, the government allegedly issued guidelines to the local media for reporting during the Games: political issues not directly related to the games were to be downplayed and topics such as the Pro-Tibetan independence and East Turkestan independence movement as well as food safety issues such as "cancer-causing mineral water" were not to be reported on. However, the government claims that such a list does not exist. As the 2008 Chinese milk scandal broke out in September, the Chinese government also denied speculation from media outlets that their desire for perfect games contributed towards the allegedly delayed recall of contaminated infant formula. This caused deaths and kidney damage in infants. On 13 February 2009, Li Dongdong, a deputy chief of the General Administration of Press and Publication, announced the introduction of a series of rules and regulations to strengthen oversight and administration of news professionals and reporting activities. The regulations would include a "full database of people who engage in unhealthy professional conduct" who would be excluded from engaging in news reporting and editing work. Although the controls were ostensibly to "resolutely halt fake news", it was criticized by Li Datong, editor at the China Youth Daily who was dismissed for criticizing state censorship. Li Datong said, "There really is a problem with fake reporting and reporters, but there are already plenty of ways to deal with that." Reuters said that although CCP's Propaganda Department micro-manages what newspapers and other media do and do not report, the government remains concerned about unrest amid the economic slowdown and the 20th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre.

In January 2011, Boxun revealed that the Politburo member responsible for the Propaganda Department, Li Changchun, issued instructions for the Chinese media to downplay social tensions on issues such as land prices, political reform and major disasters or incidents, and to ensure reporting does not show the CCP negatively. The CCP warned that the media must "ensure that the party and government do not become the targets or focus of criticism", and any mention of political reforms must reflect the government in a favorable light.

In April 2007, in the Jishan Article Case, three officials in Jishan County (Nan Huirong, Xue Zhijing and Yang Qinyu) in Shanxi Province criticized County CCP Secretary Li Runshan in a writing circulated to local government departments. They were arrested ten days later and subsequently appeared in handcuffs at a "public warning meeting" attended by more than five hundred local officials.

Moral

The Chinese government censors content it considers contrary to Chinese moral and cultural norms, or anything that the state finds to be contrary to the official state beliefs. Content censored on moral grounds has included pornography in China, particularly extreme pornography; violence in films; "low-culture" and morally "problematic" performances, such as hip-hop or those featuring visibly tattooed artists and LGBTQ content on television.

Pornography has been illegal since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949 and is a major target of censorship, but it is still commonly accessible within the country. Chinese media have reported on censors specifically hired by provincial authorities to screen movies confiscated from unlicensed dealers for pornographic content.

Censorship bodies generally treat LGBT content as immoral, and regularly censor non-pornographic depictions of such content in mass media. Positive depictions of same-sex relationships in movies and television have been taken off the air by censors, and according to Human Rights Watch, negative depictions of LGBTQ people are "common and pervasive" as of 2015. Global controversy erupted in 2018 when Mango TV edited out Ireland's Eurovision song because it depicted two men holding hands and dancing together. An LGBT flag waved during an earlier performance by Switzerland that year was also blurred out. The European Broadcasting Union subsequently terminated its relationship with Mango TV's parent company, Hunan Broadcasting System, preventing any further airing of the Eurovision Song Contest in China. Censors had also cut Albania's 2018 performance because of the lead singer's tattoos.

In 2021 the National Radio and TV Administration added a ban on "sissy men and other abnormal esthetics" to its rules using the offensive term niang pao.

Cultural

China has historically sought to use censorship to protect the country's culture. During the Cultural Revolution of the 1970s, foreign literature and art forms, religious works and symbols, and even artifacts of ancient Chinese culture were deemed "reactionary" and became targets for destruction by Red Guards.

The foreign TV shows and films on internet also become the target of censorship. In July 2017, Bilibili, one of the most popular video sites in China, removed most of American & British TV shows, and all foreign categories like "American drama" to comply with regulations.

In order to limit outside influence on Chinese society, authorities began to restrict the publishing of children's books written by foreign authors in China from early 2017, reducing the number of these kind of books from thousands to hundreds a year.

Male actor's earrings and ponytails have been blurred due to the perception that they are rebellious and countercultural.

Religious

The Constitution of China guarantees freedom of religion for citizens, as it does the freedom of speech. In practice, however, there are strict regulations on religious practice and speech. Five state religions are officially recognized: Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism; faiths outside of these are illegal, although some are tolerated to varying degrees. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, for instance, is permitted to maintain a small number of places of worship for expatriates, but is forbidden from preaching or proselytizing to Chinese citizens, as are all foreigners. Foreigners caught proselytizing have been arrested and expelled from the country.

The Falun Gong is subject to suppression in China, and virtually all religious texts, publications, and websites relating to the group have been banned, along with information on the imprisonment or torture of followers.

Christian Bibles are allowed to be printed in China but only in limited numbers and through a single press. Their sale is also restricted to officially sanctioned churches, with online sales restricted since at least April 2018. The Chinese government has fined churches for possession of unauthorized editions of the Bible. Christian literature is also restricted; in January 2016, five people were arrested for simply "buying and selling officially forbidden Christian devotionals". They were sentenced to 3–7 years in jail.

In 1989, China banned a book titled《性风俗》Xing Fengsu ("Sexual Customs") which insulted Islam and placed its authors under arrest after protests in Lanzhou and Beijing by Chinese Hui Muslims, during which the Chinese police provided protection to the Hui Muslim protesters, and the Chinese government organized public burnings of the book.  The Chinese government assisted them and gave into their demands because Hui do not have a separatist movement, unlike the Uyghurs. A collection of brain teasers published in Sichuan in 1993 caused similar effects, and the three editors of the book were sentenced to 2–5 years. Hui Muslim protesters who violently rioted by vandalizing property during the protests against the book were let off by the Chinese government and went unpunished while Uyghur protesters were imprisoned.

In 2007, anticipating the coming "Year of the Pig" in the Chinese calendar, depictions of pigs were banned from CCTV "to avoid conflicts with ethnic minorities". This is believed to refer to China's population of 20 million Muslims (to whom pigs are considered "unclean").

In response to the 2015 Charlie Hebdo shooting, Chinese state-run media attacked Charlie Hebdo for publishing cartoons insulting Muhammad, with the state-run Xinhua News Agency advocating limiting freedom of speech, while CCP-owned tabloid Global Times said the attack was "payback" for what it characterized as Western colonialism, accusing Charlie Hebdo of trying to incite a clash of civilizations.

Economic

In recent years, censorship in China has been accused of being used not only for political protectionism but also for economic protectionism. Similarly, China has been accused of using a double standard in attacking Google for "obscene" content that is also present on Chinese competitor Baidu. The 2D version of the blockbuster film Avatar was also pulled from screens in the country; reportedly for taking in too much money and seizing market share from domestic films. Furthermore, the official ban on most foreign films hardly affect Chinese citizens; such films can easily be acquired in copyright-infringing formats, allowing Chinese to view such films to be financially accessible while keeping their money within the domestic economy.

In February 2007, the website of the French organization Observatoire International des Crises was banned in the PRC after it posted an article on the risks of trading with China. "How do you assess an investment opportunity if no reliable information about social tension, corruption or local trade unions is available? This case of censorship, affecting a very specialised site with solely French-language content, shows the [Chinese] government attaches as much importance to the censorship of economic data as political content," the organization was quoted as saying. In 2016, after a series of policy mishaps in the backdrop of severe economic downturn in the country, regulators, censors and government officials have increased censorship. Officials, regulators and censors acting to stem the flow of money abroad by creating an environment of "zhengnengliang" (positive energy), have warned to commentators whose remarks or projections on the economy contradict optimistic official statements.

Discussions of poverty in the country have been increasingly censored.

Geographic

Private surveying and publication of geographic data (such as a map) without a permit is illegal in China, and geographic coordinates are obfuscated by a government-mandated coordinate system.

Health

At the end of December 2019, Hong Kong media began to report several cases of unidentified pneumonia in Wuhan, China. At the same time, Chinese mainland media had no reports related to new unidentified pneumonia.

In late December, social media networks were under official pressure to censor contents that related to the early warning of the virus. At the end of December, the Chinese livestreaming platform YY (YY 直播) started to censor content that contained specific keywords, for example, "Unknown Wuhan Pneumonia (不明武汉肺炎)" and "SARS outbreak in Wuhan (爆发SARS疫情)."

On 30 December, Li Wenliang released a message in a WeChat group, saying that "seven cases of SARS were diagnosed in the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market and isolated in the emergency department of our hospital." An hour later, Li Wenliang announced in the WeChat group that "the latest news is that coronavirus infection has been confirmed and virus typing is in progress." On 3 January 2020, he was warned and admonished by Zhongnan Road Street police station of Wuchang District. Li Wenliang died of COVID-19 on 7 February, which caused a sensation in Chinese society. China's government began to restrict information about the epidemic beginning in early January, before the existence of a novel coronavirus had been confirmed. On WeChat, the mention of Li Wenliang was blocked starting on 9 February. At the same time, topics related to criticism of the government's policies on dealing with the pandemic were being censored.

Scholars Lotus Ruan, Jeffrey Knockel, and Masashi Crete-Nishihata point out that since the outbreak, government officials have restricted the dissemination of information about the virus in order to reduce public fear. They also state that "on the other hand, censoring keywords critical of central leadership and government actors may be an effort to avoid embarrassment and maintain a positive image of the government." Historian Jeremy Brown said, "the initial cover-up of the virus in December and January in Wuhan allowed it to spread and fueled a global pandemic instead of containing it locally."

Media, communication and education controls

Newspapers

A page about the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests on The Economist ripped out by China's censorship departments. Publications like The Economist are not allowed to be printed within mainland China; thus, China's censors can rip out unwanted contents from every imported publication by hand while clearing customs.

Language is a sensitive matter in the PRC. But in the same way, false or unreal praise and devotion must be subjected to careful scrutiny in China. Since the 1960s, there are several articles in newspapers that have been criticized and censored consequently. The Chinese government has maintained strict control over both traditional and contemporary media to prevent any potential undermining of its authority.

On the twentieth anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, Chinese media came under tremendous pressure from authorities. Ming Pao reported on the CCP Propaganda Department's "hitherto unimaginable extent" of pressure to screen out any related content. The journal reported two incidents in 2008 which caused official concern, but which could not be proven to be deliberate challenges: Beijing News published an image of an injured person being taken to the hospital on 4 June and Southern Metropolis Daily reported on unusual weather in Guangdong province with the headline of "4 storms in June," which both journals insisted were due to carelessness. Some newspapers have therefore instructed their editors to refrain from using the numbers '6' and '4' in their reports during this sensitive period. Furthermore, the numbers cannot be used in the headlines lest the Publicity Department disapprove.

30 journalists and 74 netizens were reportedly imprisoned in China as of September 2014; China had "44 journalists in prison, more than any other country."

The CCP also often employs teams of writers (Chinese: 写作组; pinyin: xiězuò zǔ; lit. 'writing group') to write articles under pseudonyms for the People's Daily, the official newspaper of the CCP, as well as other journals. These writing teams are most often employed by the Central Propaganda Department, the Central Organization Department, and the Political and Legislative Affairs Committee. The main purpose of these writing groups is to spread the opinions and political thoughts of the CCP without these ideas being perceived as propaganda. Writing teams consistently use the same pseudonyms to write about specific topics that they specialize in. For example, Ke Jiaoping is the pseudonym for a writing group that publishes articles about technological education and He Zhenhua is the pseudonym for a writing group that publishes articles opposing separatism.

The CCP punished foreign journalists by failing to renew their credentials when foreign journalists criticized its policies. On 19 February 2020, China announced the revoking of the press credentials of three Wall Street Journal reporters based in Beijing. The government of China accused The Wall Street Journal of failing to apologize for publishing articles criticizing China's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic and failing to "investigate and deal with those responsible".

Television

Foreign and Hong Kong news broadcasts in mainland China from ViuTV. CNN International, BBC World Service, and Bloomberg Television are occasionally censored by being "blacked out" during controversial segments. It is reported that CNN has made an arrangement that allowed their signal to pass through a Chinese-controlled satellite. Chinese authorities have been able to censor CNN segments at any time in this way. CNN's broadcasts are not widely available throughout China, but rather only in certain diplomatic compounds, hotels, and apartment blocks.

Numerous content which have been blacked out has included references to the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, the Dalai Lama, the death of Zhao Ziyang, the 2008 Tibetan unrest, the 2008 Chinese milk scandal and negative developments about the Beijing Olympics. Due to the anti-censorship stance taken in the South Park episode "Band in China," as well as the appearance of the Dalai Lama and Winnie-the-Pooh, South Park was entirely banned in the PRC following the episode's broadcast.

During the Summer Olympics in Beijing all Chinese TV stations were ordered to delay live broadcasts by 10 seconds, a policy that was designed to give censors time to react in case free-Tibet demonstrators or others staged political protests.

In January 2009, during a television report of the inauguration of U.S. President Barack Obama, the state-run China Central Television abruptly cut away from its coverage of Obama's address when he spoke of how "earlier generations faced down fascism and communism." Foreign animation is also banned from prime-time viewing hours (5 pm to 8 pm) to protect domestic animation production.

In September 2020, China's Ministry of Culture and Tourism announced it was "strengthening the content review and onsite supervision" of television media, such as talk shows and period dramas, that explore cultural, historical, and political themes. In 2019, it had already begun censoring popular historical Chinese dramas for not promoting socialist values, such as Story of Yanxi Palace.

Film

China has a large diversity of different foreign films broadcast through the media and sold in markets. China has no motion picture rating system, and films must therefore be deemed suitable by Chinese censors for all audiences to be allowed to screen.

For foreign-made films, this sometimes means controversial footage must be cut before such films can play in Chinese cinemas. Examples include the removal of a reference to the Cold War in Casino Royale, and the omission of footage containing Chow Yun-fat that "vilifies and humiliates the Chinese" in Pirates of the Caribbean: At World's End. Prior to the 2008 Summer Olympics, the PRC administration announced that "wronged spirits and violent ghosts, monsters, demons, and other inhuman portrayals" were banned from audio visual content.

Access to the 12,000 movie screens in China is a powerful incentive for film makers, especially those producing material such as Kung Fu Panda 3 to consult and cooperate with Chinese censors. Taking a Chinese partner, as was done in the case of Kung Fu Panda 3, can bypass the quota. Despite this, almost all internationally released foreign films are freely available in Chinese- and English-language versions through the counterfeit trade in DVDs.

All audio visual works dealing with "serious topics" such as the Cultural Revolution must be registered before distribution on the mainland. For example, The Departed was not given permission to screen because it suggested that the government intends to use nuclear weapons on Taiwan. Films with sexually explicit themes have also been banned, including Farewell My Concubine, Brokeback Mountain and Memoirs of a Geisha. Warner Brothers never submitted The Dark Knight for censors, citing "cultural sensitivities in some elements of the film" due to the appearance by a Hong Kong singer whose sexually explicit photographs leaked onto the internet. Films by PRC nationals cannot be submitted to foreign film festivals without government approval.

On 16 December 2012, the film V for Vendetta was aired unedited on CCTV-6, which raised hopes that China is loosening censorship. However, in August 2014 government officials caused the shutdown of the Beijing Independent Film Festival, an annual event for independent Chinese filmmakers to showcases their latest works. It was understood by the organizers the government was concerned the festival would be used as a forum to criticize the government.

Hollywood producers generally seek to comply with the Chinese government's censorship requirements in a bid to access the country's restricted and lucrative cinema market, with the second-largest box office in the world as of 2016. This includes prioritizing sympathetic portrayals of Chinese characters in movies, such as changing the villains in Red Dawn from Chinese to North Koreans.

Literature

China's state-run General Administration of Press and Publication (新闻出版总署) screens all Chinese literature that is intended to be sold on the open market. The GAPP has the legal authority to screen, censor, and ban any print, electronic, or Internet publication in China. Because all publishers in China are required to be licensed by the GAPP, that agency also has the power to deny people the right to publish, and completely shut down any publisher who fails to follow its dictates. Resultingly, the ratio of official-to-unlicensed books is said to be 40:60. According to a report in ZonaEuropa, there are more than 4,000 underground publishing factories around China. In 2008 there was one instance of burning of religious and politically incorrect books by local library officials. The banning of unapproved literature or books that have since fallen out of favor with the CCP continues, though critics claim this spotlight on individual titles only helps fuel book sales.

Publishing in Hong Kong was uncensored prior to the passage of the Hong Kong national security law. Publishers such as New Century Press had freely published books about Chinese officials and forbidden episodes of Chinese history. Banned material including imported material such as that published by Mirror Books of New York City were sold in bookshops such as "People's Commune bookstore" patronized by shoppers from the mainland.

Music

The album Chinese Democracy by American rock band Guns N' Roses is banned in China, reportedly due to supposed criticism in its title track of the government and a reference to the currently persecuted Falun Gong spiritual movement. The government said through a state controlled newspaper that it "turns its spear point on China". Also banned is the track "Communist China" by British rock group Japan.

The album X by Australian pop singer Kylie Minogue was released as a 10-track edition of the album by EMI Records. The album got three tracks banned due to strict censorship in the People's Republic of China. The tracks that were omitted were "Nu-di-ty", "Speakerphone" and "Like a Drug".

China has historically issued bans to music acts who proclaim support of Tibetan independence or otherwise interact with the Dalai Lama, such as Oasis—which had concerts cancelled after lead singer Noel Gallagher had performed in a concert to benefit the movement, Maroon 5—which had concerts cancelled after a band member made a Twitter post celebrating his 80th birthday, and Lady Gaga—who became the subject of a ban issued by the CCP Central Propaganda Department after having posted an online video of her meeting with him.

After Google announced its withdrawal from China, some people came to Google China's headquarters in Zhongguancun for an "illegal flower tribute".

China's internet censorship is regarded by many as the most pervasive and sophisticated in the world. The system for blocking sites and articles is referred to as "The Great Firewall of China". According to a Harvard study conducted in 2002, at least 18,000 websites were blocked from within the country, and the number is believed to have been growing constantly. A more recent large-scale study published in 2021 revealed more than 311,000 domain names blocked. Of which 41,000 are blocked by accident. Banned sites include YouTube (from March 2009), Facebook (from July 2009), Google services (including Search, Google+, Maps, Docs, Drive, Sites, and Picasa), Twitter, Instagram, Dropbox, Foursquare, and Flickr. Google was planning to launch a censored version of its search engine in China, blocking information about human rights, democracy, religion, and peaceful protest, but it was terminated. Certain search engine terms are blocked as well.

Reporters have also suggested that China's internet censorship of foreign websites may also be a means of forcing mainland Chinese users to rely on China's own e-commerce industry, thus self-insulating their economy. In 2011, although China-based users of many Google services such as Google+ did not always find the services entirely blocked, they were nonetheless throttled so that users could be expected to become frustrated with the frequent timeouts and switch to the faster, more reliable services of Chinese competitors. According to BBC, local Chinese businesses such as Baidu, Tencent, and Alibaba, some of the world's largest internet enterprises, benefited from the way China has blocked international rivals from the market, assisting domestic companies.

More recently, under current CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, there has been a big push to improve information technology and use the improved technology as a means to further promote propaganda and the CCP agenda. This initiative has been successful, and by the end of 2015, almost 700 million Chinese citizens had internet access. However, with this improvement in technological access, there is now much more efficient communication regarding current events and government issues through social media, resulting in broader discussions amongst Chinese netizens on government policies and affairs; the government has implemented rules and preventative measures to counter the spread of negative public opinion regarding the CCP and governmental affairs. For example, Article 246. Section 1 in Criminal Law states that unlawful posts that are shared over 500 times or seen over 5000 times will result in the poster being charged with up to 3 years in prison.

A study by American researchers of 13.2 billion Weibo blog posts over the period 2009-2013 found that many sensitive topics were discussed, including on ethnic conflict, political scandals, and protests.

The regulation of public opinion was tightened after the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference in August 2013. At the conference, General Secretary Xi Jinping underscored the importance of "ideological work" in strengthening and uniting China; more specifically, he strongly emphasized the need to suppress controversies, "mistaken viewpoints", and rumors on every public platform. Shortly after this conference, a nationwide Internet Cleaning-up Campaign (净网行动) was implemented, during which there was a widespread deletion of blogs containing views deviating from those of the Party. That same month in 2013, the government also made a concerted attack against "Big V's" (verified social media celebrities with large public influence) who had a history of online activism and rumor-mongering.

Yang Qiuyu, Zhou Lubao, and Qin Huo Huo are three "Big V's" that were arrested between 21 and 23 August 2013 on charges of rumormongering and slander. In that same month, Chinese-American investor Charles Xue (Xue Manzi), one of the most popular liberal social commentators on Chinese social media, was also arrested. Three weeks after his arrest, he appeared on CCTV-1 (a Chinese TV channel), confessing that he "irresponsibly posted rumors about political and social issues online," and commending the new internet regulations passed under General Secretary Xi Jinping's administration. These arrests served as an example to the rest of the "Big V's" as well as other Chinese internet users to be careful of what they expressed online; in fact, even five months after these arrests in August, there was a noticeable decrease in the number of posts and discussions from prominent online figures. On popular microblogging site Weibo, opinion leaders decreased their posts by around 40% from the previous year. By 2015, instances of censored posts from popular Weibo accounts included messages that were only mildly critical of the government – for example, the blocking of sarcastic comments in the wake of a widely viewed documentary about urban air pollution in China entitled, Under the Dome (Chinese: 穹顶之下; pinyin: qióng dǐng zhī xià).

From 2017 onwards, Chinese censors began removing all images of the character Winnie the Pooh in response to the spread of memes comparing General Secretary Xi Jinping to the plump bear, as well as other characters from the works of A.A. Milne, later leading to the film Christopher Robin being denied release in China.

The Chinese government also employs people as "black PRs" to remove information from the Internet and criticize those who speak negatively about the government. Network operators are obligated by the Cyberspace Administration to assist the government in monitoring and removing "illegal information" online. Moreover, the Cybersecurity Law that went into effect on 1 June 2017 forces internet providers to identify internet users, facilitating control and monitoring of public expression online.

The State Council has the right to cut off network access or shut down internet access in response to incidents it deems a risk to national security. For example, in response to the July 2009 Ürümqi riots, the Chinese government restricted internet access in the region and shut down the social media platforms Twitter and Fanfou. In May 2022, outspoken market strategist Hong Hao's social media accounts in China (Weibo & WeChat) were suspended due to series of negative commentaries regarding the country's two-year slump on COVID-19 lockdowns and political tensions.

Text messaging

According to Reporters without Borders, China has over 2,800 surveillance centers devoted to text messaging. As of early 2010, cell phone users in Shanghai and Beijing risk having their text messaging service cut off if they are found to have sent "illegal or unhealthy" content.

In 2003, during the severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome (SARS) outbreak, a dozen Chinese people were reportedly arrested for sending text messages about SARS. Skype reported that it was required to filter messages passing through its service for words like "Falun Gong" and "Dalai Lama" before being allowed to operate in China.

During protests over a proposed chemical plant in Xiamen during the summer of 2007, text messaging was blocked to prevent the rallying of more protesters.

Video games

In 2004, the Ministry of Culture set up a committee to screen imported online video games before they entered the Chinese market. It was stated that games with any of the following violations would be banned from importation:

  • Violating basic principles of the Constitution
  • Threatening national unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity
  • Divulging state secrets
  • Threatening state security
  • Damaging the nation's glory
  • Disturbing social order
  • Infringing on others' legitimate rights

The State General Administration of Press and Publication and anti-porn and illegal publication offices have also played a role in screening games.

Examples of banned games have included:

The historic ban of major video game consoles in the country was lifted in 2014 as part of the establishment of the Shanghai Free-Trade Zone. Consoles had been banned under a rule enacted in 2000 to combat the perceived corrupting influence of video games on young people.

In addition, chat in Chinese video games is subject to similar or even wider restrictions as elsewhere on the Chinese Internet. For example, the chat in the English-language version of Genshin Impact censors not only swear words but also words such as Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong, Falun Gong, Stalin, Hitler and Putin. A study of about 200 Chinese games found out that over 180,000 words have been subject to blacklisting. Extending outside of purely political wordage, innocuous terms such as "enemies" and "words" were also being censored.

Education and science

Censorship is part of knowledge production and education since 1949 and organized and sustained within universities, academies, and schools. In authoritarian countries, censorship is not "from afar", but censorship gains power precisely when members of these organizations respect the political red lines and politically sensitive topics. Censorship and self-censorship are closely related in politically controlled organizations like universities and schools in China. Educational institutions within China have been accused of whitewashing PRC history by downplaying or avoiding mention of controversial historical events such as the Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution, and the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989.

In 2005, customs officials in China seized a shipment of textbooks intended for a Japanese school because maps in the books depicted mainland China and Taiwan using different colors, implying Taiwan was an independent state.

In a January 2006 issue of Freezing Point, a weekly supplement to the China Youth Daily, Zhongshan University professor Yuan Weishi published an article entitled "Modernization and History Textbooks" in which he criticized several middle school textbooks used in mainland China. In particular, he felt that depictions in the books of the Second Opium War avoided mention of Chinese diplomatic failures leading up to the war and that depictions of the Boxer Rebellion glossed over atrocities committed by the Boxer rebels. As a result of Yuan's article, Freezing Point was temporarily shut down and its editors were fired.

New Threads, a website for reporting academic misconduct in China such as plagiarism or fabrication of data, is banned in China.

A new standard world history textbook introduced in Shanghai high schools in 2006 supposedly omits several wars; it mentions Mao Zedong, founder of the PRC, only once.

In a FRONTLINE segment, four students from Peking University are seemingly unable to identify the context of the infamous Tank Man photo from the 1989 unrest sparked by Peking University students, though possibly, the students were feigning ignorance so as not to upset the party official who was monitoring the interview with clipboard in hand. The segment implied that the subject is not addressed in Chinese schools.

Self-censorship in a Chinese academic journal: an editor asks the article's author to remove a sentence about blocking of Wikipedia in mainland China as it could cause trouble with the "authorities"

On 4 June 2007, a person was able to place a small ad in a newspaper in southwest China to commemorate the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square protests reading "Paying tribute to the strong(-willed) mothers of 4 June victims". The accepting clerk claimed that she was ignorant of the event and believed that 4 June was the date of a mining disaster.

Censorship makes researching certain topics more difficult, risky, or outright illegal. A confidential internal directive widely circulated within the CCP, Concerning the Situation in the Ideological Sphere (關於當前意識形態領域情況的通報), prohibiting discussion of seven topics, was issued in May 2013. Included on the list of prohibited topics were: constitutional democracy, universal values of human rights, conceptions of media independence and civil society, pro-market neo-liberalism, and "nihilist" criticisms of past errors of the party.

In the late 2010s, a number of incidents in which Chinese authorities requested that Western publishers of academic journals, such as Cambridge University Press, carry out censorship of their articles or risk them being not disseminated in China, became public. Themes that were common elements of this censorship included: Cultural Revolution, Falun Gong, Mao Zedong, Tibet, Tiananmen, and Taiwan.

During the COVID-19 pandemic in mainland China, investigations into the origins of the virus were censored.

Historical trends

In 1955, the Chinese state issued State Council Instructions on How to Deal with Antirevolutionary, Obscene, and Preposterous Books, Magazines, and Pictures, which sought to regulate the media market through a combination of both mass political mobilization and state administrative action. The Instructions resulted from multi-sided negotiations involving the state and new culture intellectuals. The document provided a range of approaches for various types of media, including banning, "clearing" (which referred to ceasing further publication), or preserving. Pursuant to the Instructions, books and journals that were "extremely antirevolutionary," as well as pictures of sex acts were banned. With regard to action stories, martial arts stories dealing with "outlandish" themes were to cease publication but materials of "good knights-errant" should be preserved.

Cultural Revolution

The goal of the Cultural Revolution was to get rid of the "Four Olds" ("old customs", "old culture", "old habits", and "old ideas"). If newspapers touched on sensitive topics like these, the journalists were subject to arrests and sometimes violence. Libraries in which there were books containing "offensive literature" would often be burned down. Television was regulated by the government and its goal was to encourage the efforts of chairman Mao Zedong and the CCP. Radio was the same way, and played songs such as, "The Great Cultural Revolution is Indeed Good".

Under Xi Jinping

Xi Jinping has personally consolidated power and control within the state and party to an extent far greater than his predecessors Hu and Jiang. Accordingly, the intensity and range of censorship in China has increased under his rule. Xi has overseen the increased coordination and consolidation and of censorship authorities, raising their efficiency, and under his leadership censorship practices have tightened.

In April 2021 Chinese authorities censored a tribute that former Premier Wen Jiabao had written for his mother in the small paper Macau Herald. Under Xi dissent has been stifled and censorship has been expanded. Later in August, all mentions of Zhao Wei, a billionaire film director and actress, were scrubbed from Chinese platforms without explanation.

According to James Palmer, writing for Foreign Policy in 2023, "[i]n the 2010s, China placed a lot of data online as it attempted to hold local governments more accountable, but it is now being pulled because the data has turned out to be inadvertently revelatory. The use of procurement notices and population data by Western analysts to identify the scale of the atrocities in Xinjiang helped spur the online cleanup."

In September 2023, a law was proposed before the National People's Congress that would criminalize comments, clothing, or symbols that "harm the feelings" of China.

Responses from society

Self-censorship

Various individuals and organizations both in and outside of China sometimes voluntarily self-censor information that they share publicly by avoiding topics that are believed to be politically sensitive or controversial. These individuals and organizations often self-censor to avoid inviting unwanted attention or repercussions from the Chinese government. For example, in 2017 journalism professor Luwei Rose Luqiu conducted several anonymous interviews with well-known political satirists residing in China to demonstrate how censorship has increased since the creation of the State Internet Information Office in 201interviewees described how, since 2011, they became increasingly cautious of the content they posted online and on social media in fear of repercussions from authorities. Most of the interviewees personally experienced being contacted by the National Security Police to "drink tea" (unofficial and casual conversation in plain clothes and in public), or be summoned, detained, and possibly disappeared. Luqiu argues that the changing policies of the Chinese government about what is considered unacceptable to share and discuss on the internet has made the practice of self-censorship more necessary for individuals such as political satirists who want to avoid such consequences as being banned from online platforms or being contacted by the police. These perspectives on self-censorship by the interviewees are a part of internet censorship in China, which the Chinese government describes as regulations meant to prevent "subversion of state power," "undermining of national unity," and infringing upon national honor and interests.

Hong Kong

The introduction of the national-security law in Hong Kong on 30 June 2020, which was implemented during a wave of protests that escalated in 2019, led many, especially activists, journalists, and others already subject to police scrutiny to practice self-censorship. A newspaper article by The Wall Street Journal reported on a restaurant that had been warned by the police that it had violated the national-security law by displaying posters and messages supporting the protesters. As a result, the restaurant closed for in-person dining and only allowed staff inside to operate takeout services while some other restaurants and businesses preemptively removed supportive posters and notes to protect themselves. A newspaper article by Reuters also reported that a book publisher hastily made revisions to remove words and passages that were may have been problematic in light of the new law. The article also mentioned that other publishing houses and writers within the city halted sensitive projects while printers, distributors, and bookstores rejected controversial books.

Although independent from the mainland's legal system and hence censorship laws, some Hong Kong media have been accused of practicing self-censorship in order to exchange for permission to expand their media business into the mainland market and for greater journalistic access in the mainland too.

At the launch of a joint report published by the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) and "ARTICLE 19" in July 2001, the Chairman of the HKJA said: "More and more newspapers self-censor themselves because they are controlled by either a businessman with close ties to Beijing, or part of a large enterprise, which has financial interests over the border." For example, Robert Kuok, who has business interests all over Asia, has been criticized over the departures of several China desk staff in rapid succession since he acquired the South China Morning Post, namely the editorial pages editor Danny Gittings, Beijing correspondent Jasper Becker, and China pages editor Willy Lam. Lam, in particular departed after his reporting had been publicly criticized by Robert Kuok.

After the implementation of the Hong Kong national security law in July 2020, media, publishers, and libraries began censoring content perceived as promoting Hong Kong independence, as well as works by prominent democratic activists. International media outlets like The New York Times also withdrew some of its staff from the city in anticipation of greater censorship in Hong Kong.

International businesses and education

International companies and organizations have also self-censored sensitive topics to maintain and avoid negatively affecting business and professional relationships within China. For example, in 2020, various American politicians accused the Hollywood film industry of self-censoring movies to appease the Chinese government and its audiences and gain access to its market. An article in the magazine The Hollywood Reporter commented on an extensive 94-page report by PEN America showing how major Hollywood studios and directors increasingly made decisions on elements like cast, plot, dialogue, and more to avoid antagonizing Chinese officials. The article criticizes these decisions as being made in the interest of profit making, as "American movies earned $2.6 billion [USD] in China in 2019, with Disney's Avengers: Endgame pulling in $614 million [USD] there alone."

International corporations such as Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, Myspace, Shutterstock, and Yahoo! have voluntarily censored content for Chinese markets in order to be allowed to do business in the country. In October 2008, Canadian research group Citizen Lab released a new report saying TOM's Chinese-language Skype software filtered sensitive words and then logged these, with users' information to a file on computer servers which were insecure. In September 2007, activists in China had already warned about the possibility that TOM's versions have or will have more trojan horse capability. Skype president Josh Silverman said it was "common knowledge" that Tom Online had "established procedures to meet local laws and regulations ... to monitor and block instant messages containing certain words deemed offensive by the Chinese authorities."

Ivy League schools such as Harvard University and Princeton University have also been accused of this behavior, as the national-security law in Hong Kong reportedly prompted the schools to use code words and warning labels for sensitive courses related to China to protect the schools and their students. An article in Forbes described these decisions as being sparked by schools like Harvard and Princeton getting funding from current and former students from China.

Xinjiang cotton controversy

In March 2021, apparel brands H&M, Nike, Adidas, and other large companies were criticized and boycotted in China by celebrities, social media platforms, and government media for expressing concern about the use of Uyghur forced labor in producing cotton. As a result, these companies reportedly had contracts terminated and ties cut by Chinese celebrities while Chinese e-commerce companies like Alibaba and JD.com removed products from sale on its platforms. A Xinjiang government spokesman, Xu Guixiang, directly criticized H&M over its statement on Xinjiang cotton for allegedly politicizing the company's economic behavior. In response to the backlash from Chinese consumers, media, and government officials, H&M published a statement on its website that stated it was "working together with our colleagues in China to do everything we can to manage the current challenges and find a way forward." Journalists noted that H&M's messaging reverted to careful self-censorship following these events. An article by Elizabeth Paton in The New York Times commented on this statement saying that it did not explicitly reference cotton, Xinjiang, or forced labour and that company executives during an earnings conference call similarly avoided such references and "did not comment on the impact of the controversy on sales, except to state that around 20 stores in China were currently closed." Xu Guixiang, the Xinjiang spokesman, along with other Chinese media outlets, celebrities, and businesses have rejected the allegations from the companies and spoken in defense of their cotton industry in Xinjiang while simultaneously accusing Western companies of aiming to destabilize China through accusations of genocide in Xinjiang.

Marketing

Publishers and other media in the Western world have sometimes used the "Banned in China" label to market cultural works, with the hope that censored products are seen as more valuable or attractive. The label was also used by Penguin Books to sell Mo Yan's novel The Garlic Ballads, which had been pulled from bookshelves because of its themes (anti-government riots) being published so close to a period of actual riots. However, the book was allowed to be sold in China in a few years. Political scientist Richard Curt Kraus criticized Penguin for falsely portraying Mo Yan as a dissident in order to increase his marketability, as well as the underlying assumption that if the United States bans some work, that it must be genuinely obscene, but that if the Chinese government does the same, it is acting on purely political grounds.

On the Internet, people use proxy websites that allow anonymous access to otherwise restricted websites, services, and information. Falun Gong and others have been working in the field of anti-censorship software development.

Circumventing censorship

Chinese citizens frequently use many techniques to circumvent Internet censorship in order to discuss social and political current events on online platforms and gain access to web pages blocked by the Great Firewall of China.

Public relay servers such as virtual private networks (VPNs) and The Onion Router nodes (Tor nodes) are widely used by Chinese netizens in order to visit blocked web pages. Typically, Internet Service Providers can view an internet user's traffic and data; however, virtual private networks connect internet users to a server through an encrypted connection. This prevents Internet Service Providers from being able to access the internet users' IP addresses, data, activity, and physical location. As a result, the internet user can access blocked websites through this external server. VPNs are so widely used by Chinese netizens that many journalists, both within Party-sanctioned media outlets and private media outlets, are instructed by their editors and supervisors to use VPNs in order to access international news.

Chinese netizens also use the method of "tunneling" to access blocked webpages. Tunneling is when information is transmitted using a different communications protocol than the usual. One example of tunneling is if internet user "A" in China emailed internet user "B" in America asking for the contents of a blocked webpage. Internet user "B" could then respond with an email containing the contents of that blocked webpage, allowing internet user "A" to access the censored information. This method can be generalized by Web-page-by-mail services; for example, if an internet user emails web@cnn.com with the URL of a CNN webpage, that internet user will receive an email containing the contents of that specific Webpage.

Mirrored web pages are another way to circumvent Internet censorship by the Great Firewall of China. A web page can be mirrored simply by recreating that page under a different URL. Because of the large scope of the Internet, it becomes near impossible for internet filters to identify and block all of the different mirrors of blocked webpages under their various non-specific URLs, increasing public access to censored information.

Netizens also have methods to express their opinions online without being censored by the government. The primary method is in the form of code words, metaphors, or plays on words. For example, the phrase "Grass Mud Horse" (Cao Ni Ma) is commonly used by netizens as a pun on a homophonous profanity; this phrase has been broadly used to signify a subversive means of broaching topics not permitted by the government, and it has been used by netizens advocating for greater freedom of speech. The rise of online satire and code words used to mock or criticize the government or sociopolitical issues has formed a subculture on the Chinese Internet called "egao" ("恶搞"), which translates literally into "evil doings" in Chinese. These code words and phrases allow netizens to discuss topics ranging from government corruption to health and environment scandals to everyday society and culture. Through this subculture, Chinese netizens can broach sensitive issues on social media with less risk of government censorship.

Besides Internet censorship, Chinese citizens have devised methods to circumvent censorship of print media as well. As news organizations in China try to move away from the reputation of simply being mouthpieces for CCP propaganda, they face a difficult challenge of having to report the news objectively while remaining on good terms with the government. Journalists do their best to resist government censorship by maintaining a relatively neutral balance of positive and negative tones in articles, reporting on officials who have already been officially removed from their positions, disparaging the CCP as an entity instead of targeting individual officials, and focusing blame on lower-ranking officials. News organizations encourage their journalists to report on more sensitive yet risky articles by promising journalists compensation even if their articles get cut by government officials before publication. Editors also try to ensure job security by continuing to employ a journalist under another position even when told by the CCP to fire that journalist for disobeying Party protocol.

Wednesday, February 7, 2024

Cyberstalking

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Cyberstalking is the use of the Internet or other electronic means to stalk or harass an individual, group, or organization. It may include false accusations, defamation, slander and libel. It may also include monitoring, identity theft, threats, vandalism, solicitation for sex, doxing, or blackmail.

Cyberstalking is often accompanied by realtime or offline stalking. In many jurisdictions, such as California, both are criminal offenses. Both are motivated by a desire to control, intimidate or influence a victim. A stalker may be an online stranger or a person whom the target knows. They may be anonymous and solicit involvement of other people online who do not even know the target.

Cyberstalking is a criminal offense under various state anti-stalking, slander and harassment laws. A conviction can result in a restraining order, probation, or criminal penalties against the assailant, including jail.

Definitions and description

There have been a number of attempts by experts and legislators to define cyberstalking. It is generally understood to be the use of the Internet or other electronic means to stalk or harass an individual, a group, or an organization. Cyberstalking is a form of cyberbullying; the terms are often used interchangeably in the media. Both may include false accusations, defamation, slander and libel.

Cyberstalking may also include monitoring, identity theft, threats, vandalism, solicitation for sex, or gathering information that may be used to threaten or harass. Cyberstalking is often accompanied by real-time or offline stalking. Both forms of stalking may be criminal offenses.

Stalking is a continuous process, consisting of a series of actions, each of which may be entirely legal in itself. Technology ethics professor Lambèr Royakkers defines cyberstalking as perpetrated by someone without a current relationship with the victim. About the abusive effects of cyberstalking, he writes that:

[Stalking] is a form of mental assault, in which the perpetrator repeatedly, unwantedly, and disruptively breaks into the life-world of the victim, with whom he has no relationship (or no longer has), with motives that are directly or indirectly traceable to the affective sphere. Moreover, the separated acts that make up the intrusion cannot by themselves cause the mental abuse, but do taken together (cumulative effect).

Distinguishing cyberstalking from other acts

There is a distinction between cyber-trolling and cyber-stalking. Research has shown that actions that can be perceived to be harmless as a one-off can be considered to be trolling, whereas if it is part of a persistent campaign then it can be considered stalking.

TM Motive Mode Gravity Description
1 Playtime Cyber-bantering Cyber-trolling In the moment and quickly regret
2 Tactical Cyber-trickery Cyber-trolling In the moment but do not regret and continue
3 Strategic Cyber-bullying Cyber-stalking Go out of way to cause problems, but without a sustained and planned long-term campaign
4 Domination Cyber-hickery Cyber-stalking Goes out of the way to create rich media to target one or more specific individuals

Cyberstalking author Alexis Moore separates cyberstalking from identity theft, which is financially motivated. Her definition, which was also used by the Republic of the Philippines in their legal description, is as follows:

Cyberstalking is a technologically-based "attack" on one person who has been targeted specifically for that attack for reasons of anger, revenge or control. Cyberstalking can take many forms, including:

  1. harassment, embarrassment and humiliation of the victim
  2. emptying bank accounts or other economic control such as ruining the victim's credit score
  3. harassing family, friends and employers to isolate the victim
  4. scare tactics to instill fear and more

Identification and detection

CyberAngels has written about how to identify cyberstalking:

When identifying cyberstalking "in the field," and particularly when considering whether to report it to any kind of legal authority, the following features or combination of features can be considered to characterize a true stalking situation: malice, premeditation, repetition, distress, obsession, vendetta, no legitimate purpose, personally directed, disregarded warnings to stop, harassment and threats.

A number of key factors have been identified in cyberstalking:

  • False accusations: Many cyberstalkers try to damage the reputation of their victim and turn other people against them. They post false information about them on websites. They may set up their own websites, blogs or user pages for this purpose. They post allegations about the victim to newsgroups, chat rooms, or other sites that allow public contributions such as Wikipedia or Amazon.com.
  • Attempts to gather information about the victim: Cyberstalkers may approach their victim's friends, family and work colleagues to obtain personal information. They may advertise for information on the Internet, or hire a private detective.
  • Monitoring their target's online activities and attempting to trace their IP address in an effort to gather more information about their victims.
  • Encouraging others to harass the victim: Many cyberstalkers try to involve third parties in the harassment. They may claim the victim has harmed the stalker or his/her family in some way, or may post the victim's name and telephone number in order to encourage others to join the pursuit.
  • False victimization: The cyberstalker will claim that the victim is harassing him or her. Bocij writes that this phenomenon has been noted in a number of well-known cases.
  • Attacks on data and equipment: They may try to damage the victim's computer by sending viruses.
  • Ordering goods and services: They order items or subscribe to magazines in the victim's name. These often involve subscriptions to pornography or ordering sex toys then having them delivered to the victim's workplace.
  • Arranging to meet: Young people face a particularly high risk of having cyberstalkers try to set up meetings between them.
  • The posting of defamatory or derogatory statements: Using web pages and message boards to incite some response or reaction from their victim.

Prevalence and impact

According to Law Enforcement Technology, cyberstalking has increased with the growth of new technology and new ways to stalk victims. "Disgruntled employees pose as their bosses to post explicit messages on social network sites; spouses use GPS to track their mates' every move. Even police and prosecutors find themselves at risk, as gang members and other organized criminals find out where they live — often to intimidate them into dropping a case."

In January 2009, the Bureau of Justice Statistics in the United States released the study "Stalking Victimization in the United States," which was sponsored by the Office on Violence Against Women. The report, based on supplemental data from the National Crime Victimization Survey, showed that one in four stalking victims had been cyberstalked as well, with the perpetrators using internet-based services such as email, instant messaging, GPS, or spyware. The final report stated that approximately 1.2 million victims had stalkers who used technology to find them. The Rape, Abuse and Incest National Network (RAINN), in Washington D.C. has released statistics that there are 3.4 million stalking victims each year in the United States. Of those, one in four reported experiencing cyberstalking.

According to Robin M. Kowalski, a social psychologist at Clemson University, cyberbullying has been shown to cause higher levels of anxiety and depression for victims than normal bullying. Kowalksi states that much of this stems from the anonymity of the perpetrators, which is a common feature of cyberstalking as well. According to a study by Kowalksi, of 3,700 bullied middle-school students, a quarter had been subjected to a form of online harassment.

Types

Stalking by strangers

According to Joey Rushing, a District Attorney of Franklin County, Alabama, there is no single definition of a cyberstalker - they can be either strangers to the victim or have a former/present relationship. "[Cyberstalkers] come in all shapes, sizes, ages and backgrounds. They patrol Web sites looking for an opportunity to take advantage of people."

Gender-based stalking

Harassment and stalking because of gender online, also known as online gender-based violence, is common, and can include rape threats and other threats of violence, as well as the posting of the victim's personal information. It is blamed for limiting victims' activities online or driving them offline entirely, thereby impeding their participation in online life and undermining their autonomy, dignity, identity, and opportunities.

Of intimate partners

Cyberstalking of intimate partners is the online harassment of a current or former romantic partner. It is a form of domestic violence, and experts say its purpose is to control the victim in order to encourage social isolation and create dependency. Harassers may send repeated insulting or threatening e-mails to their victims, monitor or disrupt their victims' e-mail use, and use the victim's account to send e-mails to others posing as the victim or to purchase goods or services the victim does not want. They may also use the Internet to research and compile personal information about the victim, to use in order to harass him or her.

Of celebrities and public persons

Profiling of stalkers shows that almost always they stalk someone they know or, via delusion, think they know, as is the case with stalkers of celebrities or public persons in which the stalkers feel they know the celebrity even though the celebrity does not know them. As part of the risk they take for being in the public eye, celebrities and public figures are often targets of lies or made-up stories in tabloids as well as by stalkers, some even seeming to be fans.

In one noted case in 2011, actress Patricia Arquette quit Facebook after alleged cyberstalking. In her last post, Arquette explained that her security warned her Facebook friends to never accept friend requests from people they do not actually know. Arquette stressed that just because people seemed to be fans did not mean they were safe. The media issued a statement that Arquette planned to communicate with fans exclusively through her Twitter account in the future.

By anonymous online mobs

Web 2.0 technologies have enabled online groups of anonymous people to self-organize to target individuals with online defamation, threats of violence and technology-based attacks. These include publishing lies and doctored photographs, threats of rape and other violence, posting sensitive personal information about victims, e-mailing damaging statements about victims to their employers, and manipulating search engines to make damaging material about the victim more prominent. Victims frequently respond by adopting pseudonyms or going offline entirely.

Experts attribute the destructive nature of anonymous online mobs to group dynamics, saying that groups with homogeneous views tend to become more extreme. As members reinforce each others' beliefs, they fail to see themselves as individuals and lose a sense of personal responsibility for their destructive acts. In doing so they dehumanize their victims, becoming more aggressive when they believe they are supported by authority figures. Internet service providers and website owners are sometimes blamed for not speaking out against this type of harassment.

A notable example of online mob harassment was the experience of American software developer and blogger Kathy Sierra. In 2007 a group of anonymous individuals attacked Sierra, threatening her with rape and strangulation, publishing her home address and Social Security number, and posting doctored photographs of her. Frightened, Sierra cancelled her speaking engagements and shut down her blog, writing "I will never feel the same. I will never be the same."

Corporate cyberstalking

Corporate cyberstalking is when a company harasses an individual online, or an individual or group of individuals harasses an organization. Motives for corporate cyberstalking are ideological, or include a desire for financial gain or revenge.

Perpetrators

Motives and profile

Mental profiling of digital criminals has identified psychological and social factors that motivate stalkers as: envy; pathological obsession (professional or sexual); unemployment or failure with own job or life; intention to intimidate and cause others to feel inferior; the stalker is delusional and believes they "know" the target; the stalker wants to instill fear in a person to justify his/her status; belief they can get away with it (anonymity); intimidation for financial advantage or business competition; revenge over perceived or imagined rejection.

Four types of cyberstalkers

Preliminary work by Leroy McFarlane and Paul Bocij has identified four types of cyberstalkers: the vindictive cyberstalkers noted for the ferocity of their attacks; the composed cyberstalker whose motive is to annoy; the intimate cyberstalker who attempts to form a relationship with the victim but turns on them if rebuffed; and collective cyberstalkers, groups with a motive. According to Antonio Chacón Medina, author of Una nueva cara de Internet, El acoso ("A new face of the Internet: stalking"), the general profile of the harasser is cold, with little or no respect for others. The stalker is a predator who can wait patiently until vulnerable victims appear, such as women or children, or may enjoy pursuing a particular person, whether personally familiar to them or unknown. The harasser enjoys and demonstrates their power to pursue and psychologically damage the victim.

Behaviors

Cyberstalkers find their victims by using search engines, online forums, bulletin and discussion boards, chat rooms, and more recently, through social networking sites, such as MySpace, Facebook, Bebo, Friendster, Twitter, and Indymedia, a media outlet known for self-publishing. They may engage in live chat harassment or flaming or they may send electronic viruses and unsolicited e-mails. Cyberstalkers may research individuals to feed their obsessions and curiosity. Conversely, the acts of cyberstalkers may become more intense, such as repeatedly instant messaging their targets. More commonly they will post defamatory or derogatory statements about their stalking target on web pages, message boards, and in guest books designed to get a reaction or response from their victim, thereby initiating contact. In some cases, they have been known to create fake blogs in the name of the victim containing defamatory or pornographic content.

When prosecuted, many stalkers have unsuccessfully attempted to justify their behavior based on their use of public forums, as opposed to direct contact. Once they get a reaction from the victim, they will typically attempt to track or follow the victim's internet activity. Classic cyberstalking behavior includes the tracing of the victim's IP address in an attempt to verify their home or place of employment. Some cyberstalking situations do evolve into physical stalking, and a victim may experience abusive and excessive phone calls, vandalism, threatening or obscene mail, trespassing, and physical assault. Moreover, many physical stalkers will use cyberstalking as another method of harassing their victims.

A 2007 study led by Paige Padgett from the University of Texas Health Science Center found that there was a false degree of safety assumed by women looking for love online.

Cyberstalking legislation

Legislation on cyberstalking varies from country to country. Cyberstalking and cyberbullying are relatively new phenomena, but that does not mean that crimes committed through the network are not punishable under legislation drafted for that purpose. Although there are often existing laws that prohibit stalking or harassment in a general sense, legislators sometimes believe that such laws are inadequate or do not go far enough, and thus bring forward new legislation to address this perceived shortcoming. The point overlooked is that enforcing these laws can be a challenge in these virtual communities. The reason being, these issues are very unique to law enforcement agencies who have never faced cases related to cyberstalking. In the United States, for example, nearly every state has laws that address cyberstalking, cyberbullying, or both.

In countries such as the US, in practice, there is little legislative difference between the concepts of "cyberbullying" and "cyberstalking." The primary distinction is one of age; if adults are involved, the act is usually termed cyberstalking, while among children it is usually referred to as cyberbullying. However, as there have not been any formal definitions of the terms, this distinction is one of semantics and many laws treat bullying and stalking as much the same issue.

Australia

In Australia, the Stalking Amendment Act (1999) includes the use of any form of technology to harass a target as forms of "criminal stalking."

Canada

In 2012, there was a high-profile investigation into the death of Amanda Todd, a young Canadian student who had been blackmailed and stalked online before committing suicide. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police were criticized in the media for not naming one of her alleged stalkers as a person of interest.

Philippines

In the Fifteenth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, a cyberstalking bill was introduced by Senator Manny Villar. The result was to "urge the Senate Committees on Science and Technology, and Public Information and Mass Media to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, on the increasing occurrence of cyber stalking cases and the modus operandi adopted in the internet to perpetuate crimes with the end in view of formulating legislation and policy measures geared towards curbing cyber stalking and other cyber crimes and protect online users in the country."

United States

History, current legislation

Cyberstalking is a criminal offense under American anti-stalking, slander, and harassment laws.

A conviction can result in a restraining order, probation, or criminal penalties against the assailant, including jail. Cyberstalking specifically has been addressed in recent U.S. federal law. For example, the Violence Against Women Act, passed in 2000, made cyberstalking a part of the federal interstate stalking statute. The current US Federal Anti-Cyber-Stalking law is found at 47 U.S.C. § 223.

Still, there remains a lack of federal legislation to specifically address cyberstalking, leaving the majority of legislative at the state level. A few states have both stalking and harassment statutes that criminalize threatening and unwanted electronic communications. The first anti-stalking law was enacted in California in 1990, and while all fifty states soon passed anti-stalking laws, by 2009 only 14 of them had laws specifically addressing "high-tech stalking." The first U.S. cyberstalking law went into effect in 1999 in California. Other states have laws other than harassment or anti-stalking statutes that prohibit misuse of computer communications and e-mail, while others have passed laws containing broad language that can be interpreted to include cyberstalking behaviors, such as in their harassment or stalking legislation.

Sentences can range from 18 months in prison and a $10,000 fine for a fourth-degree charge to ten years in prison and a $150,000 fine for a second-degree charge.

States with cyberstalking legislation
  • Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, New Hampshire, and New York have included prohibitions against harassing electronic, computer or e-mail communications in their harassment legislation.
  • Alaska, Florida, Oklahoma, Wyoming, and California, have incorporated electronically communicated statements as conduct constituting stalking in their anti-stalking laws.
  • Texas enacted the Stalking by Electronic Communications Act, 2001.
  • Missouri revised its state harassment statutes to include stalking and harassment by telephone and electronic communications (as well as cyber-bullying) after the Megan Meier suicide case of 2006. In one of the few cases where a cyberstalking conviction was obtained the cyberstalker was a woman, which is also much rarer that male cyberstalkers. The conviction was overturned in on appeal in 2009 however.
  • In Florida, HB 479 was introduced in 2003 to ban cyberstalking. This was signed into law on October 2003.

Age, legal limitations

While some laws only address online harassment of children, there are laws that protect adult cyberstalking victims. While some sites specialize in laws that protect victims age 18 and under, current and pending cyberstalking-related United States federal and state laws offer help to victims of all ages.

Most stalking laws require that the perpetrator make a credible threat of violence against the victim; others include threats against the victim's immediate family; and still others require the alleged stalker's course of conduct constitute an implied threat. While some conduct involving annoying or menacing behavior might fall short of illegal stalking, such behavior may be a prelude to stalking and violence and should be treated seriously.

Online identity stealth blurs the line on infringement of the rights of would-be victims to identify their perpetrators. There is a debate on how internet use can be traced without infringing on protected civil liberties.

Specific cases

There have been a number of high-profile legal cases in the United States related to cyberstalking, many of which have involved the suicides of young students. In thousands of other cases, charges either were not brought for the cyber harassment or were unsuccessful in obtaining convictions. As in all legal instances, much depends on public sympathy towards the victim, the quality of legal representation and other factors that can greatly influence the outcome of the crime – even if it will be considered a crime.

In the case of a fourteen-year-old student in Michigan, for instance, she pressed charges against her alleged rapist, which resulted in her being cyberstalked and cyberbullied by fellow students. After her suicide in 2010 all charges were dropped against the man who allegedly raped her, on the basis that the only witness was dead. This is the despite the fact that statutory rape charges could have been pressed.

In another case of cyberstalking, college student Dharun Ravi secretly filmed his roommate's sexual liaison with another man, then posted it online. After the victim committed suicide, Ravi was convicted in of bias intimidation and invasion of privacy in New Jersey v. Dharun Ravi. In 2012 he was sentenced to 30 days in jail, more than $11,000 in restitution and three years of probation. The judge ruled that he believes Ravi acted out of "colossal insensitivity, not hatred."

Europe

False accusation

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

A false accusation is a claim or allegation of wrongdoing that is untrue and/or otherwise unsupported by facts. False accusations are also known as groundless accusations or unfounded accusations or false allegations or false claims. They can occur in any of the following contexts:

Types

When there is insufficient supporting evidence to determine whether it is true or false, an accusation is described as "unsubstantiated" or "unfounded". Accusations that are determined to be false based on corroborating evidence can be divided into three categories:

  • A completely false allegation, in that the alleged events did not occur.
  • An allegation that describes events that did occur, but were perpetrated by an individual who is not accused, and in which the accused person is innocent.
  • An allegation that is false, in that it mixes descriptions of events that actually happened with other events that did not occur.

A false allegation can occur as the result of intentional lying on the part of the accuser; or unintentionally, due to a confabulation, either arising spontaneously due to mental illness or resulting from deliberate or accidental suggestive questioning, or faulty interviewing techniques. In 1997, researchers Poole and Lindsay suggested that separate labels should be applied to the two concepts, proposing that the term "false allegations" be used specifically when the accuser is aware that they are lying, and "false suspicions" for the wider range of false accusations in which suggestive questioning may have been involved.

When a person is suspected of a wrongdoing for which they are in fact responsible, "false accusation may be used to divert attention from one's own guilt". False accusation may also arise in part from the conduct of the accused, particularly where the accused engages in behaviors consistent with having committed the suspected wrongdoing, either unconsciously or for purposes of appearing guilty.

Additionally, once a false accusation has been made – particularly an emotionally laden one – normal human emotional responses to being falsely accused (such as fear, anger, or denial of the accusation) may be misinterpreted as evidence of guilt.

Statistics

In Japan in 2020, 33 people (21 males and 12 females) were arrested for false accusation.

Rape

A false accusation of rape is the intentional reporting of a rape where no rape has occurred. It is difficult to assess the prevalence of false accusations because they are often conflated with non-prosecuted cases under the designation "unfounded". However, in the United States, the FBI Uniform Crime Report in 1996 and the United States Department of Justice in 1997 stated 8% of rape accusations in the United States were regarded as unfounded or false. Studies in other countries have reported their own rates at anywhere from 1.5% (Denmark) to 10% (Canada). Due to varying definitions of a "false accusation", the true percentage remains unknown.

Child abuse

A false allegation of child sexual abuse is an accusation that a person committed one or more acts of child sexual abuse when in reality there was no perpetration of abuse by the accused person as alleged. Such accusations can be brought by the victim, or by another person on the alleged victim's behalf. Studies of child abuse allegations suggest that the overall rate of false accusation is under 10%, as approximated based on multiple studies. Of the allegations determined to be false, only a small portion originated with the child, the studies showed; most false allegations originated with an adult bringing the accusations on behalf of a child, and of those, a large majority occurred in the context of divorce and child-custody battles.

Workplace bullying

According to a 2003 survey by the Workplace Bullying Institute, the most common bullying tactics included false attribution of "errors" to an employee, glaring or other hostile body language, dismissive comments, the "silent treatment", and/or making up arbitrary "rules" to ensure that a victim breaks them.

Workplace mobbing

Workplace mobbing can be considered as a "virus" or a "cancer" that spreads throughout the workplace via gossip, rumour and unfounded accusations.

Münchausen syndrome by proxy

The case has been made that diagnoses of Münchausen syndrome by proxy, that is harming someone else in order to gain attention for oneself, are often false or highly questionable.

Stalking

In 1999, Pathe, Mullen, and Purcell wrote that popular interest in stalking was promoting false claims. In 2004, Sheridan and Blaauw said that they estimated that 11.5% of claims in a sample of 357 reported claims of stalking were false.

Murder

In the mid 2000, LAPD arrested a young man Juan Catalan after a little girl was shot dead. Catalan was sentenced to death after a witness stated that he looked like the killer. Catalan turned out to be innocent; it was a television show (Curb Your Enthusiasm) which showed him seated at a baseball game, thus exonerating him. A documentary was later produced about the event.

Cellphone surveillance

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
diagram showing people speaking on cellphones, their signals passing through a van, before being passed to a legitimate cell tower.
Diagram showing the operation of a StingRay device for cellphone surveillance.

Cellphone surveillance (also known as cellphone spying) may involve tracking, bugging, monitoring, eavesdropping, and recording conversations and text messages on mobile phones. It also encompasses the monitoring of people's movements, which can be tracked using mobile phone signals when phones are turned on.

Mass cellphone surveillance

Stingray devices

StingRay devices are a technology that mimics a cellphone tower, causing nearby cellphones to connect and pass data through them instead of legitimate towers. This process is invisible to the end-user and allows the device operator full access to any communicated data. This technology is a form of man-in-the-middle attack.

StingRays are used by law enforcement agencies to track people's movements, and intercept and record conversations, names, phone numbers and text messages from mobile phones. Their use entails the monitoring and collection of data from all mobile phones within a target area. Law enforcement agencies in Northern California that have purchased StingRay devices include the Oakland Police Department, San Francisco Police Department, Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, San Jose Police Department and Fremont Police Department. The Fremont Police Department's use of a StingRay device is in a partnership with the Oakland Police Department and Alameda County District Attorney's Office.

End-to-end encryption such as Signal protects traffic against StingRay devices via cryptographic strategies.

image of a cell tower
A typical cell tower mounted on electric lines.

Tower dumps

A tower dump is the sharing of identifying information by a cell tower operator, which can be used to identify where a given individual was at a certain time. As mobile phone users move, their devices will connect to nearby cell towers in order to maintain a strong signal even while the phone is not actively in use. These towers record identifying information about cellphones connected to them which then can be used to track individuals.

In most of the United States, police can get many kinds of cellphone data without obtaining a warrant. Law-enforcement records show police can use initial data from a tower dump to ask for another court order for more information, including addresses, billing records and logs of calls, texts and locations.

Targeted surveillance

Software vulnerabilities

Cellphone bugs can be created by disabling the ringing feature on a mobile phone, allowing a caller to call a phone to access its microphone and listening. One example of this was the group FaceTime bug. This bug enables people to eavesdrop on conversations without calls being answered by the recipient.

In the United States, the FBI has used "roving bugs", which entails the activation of microphones on mobile phones to the monitoring of conversations.

Cellphone spying software

Cellphone spying software is a type of cellphone bugging, tracking, and monitoring software that is surreptitiously installed on mobile phones. This software can enable conversations to be heard and recorded from phones upon which it is installed. Cellphone spying software can be downloaded onto cellphones. Cellphone spying software enables the monitoring or stalking of a target cellphone from a remote location with some of the following techniques:

  • Allowing remote observation of the target cellphone position in real-time on a map
  • Remotely enabling microphones to capture and forward conversations. Microphones can be activated during a call or when the phone is on standby for capturing conversations near the cellphone.
  • Receiving remote alerts and/or text messages each time somebody dials a number on the cellphone
  • Remotely reading text messages and call logs

Cellphone spying software can enable microphones on mobile phones when phones are not being used, and can be installed by mobile providers.

Bugging

Intentionally hiding a cell phone in a location is a bugging technique. Some hidden cellphone bugs rely on Wi-Fi hotspots, rather than cellular data, where the tracker rootkit software periodically "wakes up" and signs into a public Wi-Fi hotspot to upload tracker data onto a public internet server.

Lawful interception

Governments may sometimes legally monitor mobile phone communications - a procedure known as lawful interception.

In the United States, the government pays phone companies directly to record and collect cellular communications from specified individuals. U.S. law enforcement agencies can also legally track the movements of people from their mobile phone signals upon obtaining a court order to do so.

These invasive legal surveillance can cause a change in public behaviors directing our ways of communication away from technology based devices.

Real-time location data

In 2018, United States cellphone carriers that sell customers' real-time location data - AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, and Sprint- publicly stated they would cease those data sales because the FCC found the companies had been negligent in protecting the personal privacy of their customers' data. Location aggregators, bounty hunters, and others including law enforcement agencies that did not obtain search warrants used that information. FCC Chairman Ajit Pai concluded that carriers had apparently violated federal law. However, in 2019, the carriers were continuing to sell real-time location data. In late February 2020, the FCC was seeking fines on the carriers in the case.

Occurrences

In 2005, the prime minister of Greece was advised that his, over 100 dignitaries', and the mayor of Athens' mobile phones were bugged. Kostas Tsalikidis, a Vodafone-Panafon employee, was implicated in the matter as using his position as head of the company's network planning to assist in the bugging. Tsalikidis was found hanged in his apartment the day before the leaders were notified about the bugging, which was reported as "an apparent suicide."

Security holes within Signalling System No. 7 (SS7), called Common Channel Signalling System 7 (CCSS7) in the US and Common Channel Interoffice Signaling 7 (CCIS7) in the UK, were demonstrated at Chaos Communication Congress, Hamburg in 2014.

During the coronavirus pandemic Israel authorized its internal security service, Shin Bet, to use its access to historic cellphone metadata to engage in location tracking of COVID-19 carriers.

Detection

Some indications of possible cellphone surveillance occurring may include a mobile phone waking up unexpectedly, using a lot of battery power when on idle or when not in use, hearing clicking or beeping sounds when conversations are occurring and the circuit board of the phone being warm despite the phone not being used. However, sophisticated surveillance methods can be completely invisible to the user and may be able to evade detection techniques currently employed by security researchers and ecosystem providers.

Prevention

Preventive measures against cellphone surveillance include not losing or allowing strangers to use a mobile phone and the utilization of an access password. Another technique would be turning off the phone and then also removing the battery when not in use. Jamming or a Faraday cage may also work, the latter obviating removal of the battery. Another solution is a cellphone with a physical (electric) switch or isolated electronic switch that disconnects the microphone and the camera without bypass, meaning the switch can be operated by the user only - no software can connect it back.

Golden Shield Project

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The Golden Shield Project is one of the 12 important "golden" projects. The other "golden" projects are Golden Customs (also known as Golden Gate) (for customs), Golden Tax (for taxation), Golden Macro, Golden Finance (for financial management), Golden Auditing, Golden Security, Golden Agriculture (for agricultural information), Golden Quality (for quality supervision), Golden Water (for water conservancy information), Golden Credit, and Golden Discipline projects.

The Golden Shield Project also manages the Bureau of Public Information and Network Security Supervision, which is a bureau that is widely believed, though not officially claimed, to operate a subproject called the Great Firewall of China (GFW) which is a censorship and surveillance project that blocks data from foreign countries that may be unlawful in the PRC. It is operated by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) of the government of China. This subproject was initiated in 1998 and began operations in November 2003. It has also seemingly been used to attack international web sites using Man-on-the-side DDoS, for example GitHub on 2015/03/28.

History

The political and ideological background of the Golden Shield Project is considered to be one of Deng Xiaoping's favorite sayings in the early 1980s: "If you open the window for fresh air, you have to expect some flies to blow in." The saying is related to a period of economic reform in China that became known as the "socialist market economy". Superseding the political ideologies of the Cultural Revolution, the reform led China towards a market economy and opened up the market for foreign investors. Nonetheless, despite the economic freedom, values and political ideas of the Chinese Communist Party have had to be protected by "swatting flies" of other unwanted ideologies.

The Internet in China arrived in 1994, as the inevitable consequence of and supporting tool for the "socialist market economy". As availability of the Internet has gradually increased, it has become a common communication platform and tool for trading information.

The Ministry of Public Security took initial steps to control Internet use in 1997, when it issued comprehensive regulations governing its use. The key sections, Articles 4–6, are the following:

Individuals are prohibited from using the Internet to: harm national security; disclose state secrets; or injure the interests of the state or society. Users are prohibited from using the Internet to create, replicate, retrieve, or transmit information that incites resistance to the PRC Constitution, laws, or administrative regulations; promotes the overthrow of the government or socialist system; undermines national unification; distorts the truth, spreads rumors, or destroys social order; or provides sexually suggestive material or encourages gambling, violence, or murder. Users are prohibited from engaging in activities that harm the security of computer information networks and from using networks or changing network resources without prior approval.

In 1998, the Chinese Communist Party feared that the China Democracy Party (CDP) would breed a powerful new network that the party elites might not be able to control. The CDP was immediately banned, followed by arrests and imprisonment. That same year, the Golden Shield project was started. The first part of the project lasted eight years and was completed in 2006. The second part began in 2006 and ended in 2008. On 6 December 2002, 300 people in charge of the Golden Shield project from 31 provinces and cities throughout China participated in a four-day inaugural "Comprehensive Exhibition on Chinese Information System". At the exhibition, many western high-tech products, including Internet security, video monitoring and human face recognition were purchased. It is estimated that around 30,000-50,000 police are employed in this gigantic project.

A subsystem of the Golden Shield has been nicknamed "the Great Firewall" (防火长城) (a term that first appeared in a Wired magazine article in 1997) in reference to its role as a network firewall and to the ancient Great Wall of China. This part of the project includes the ability to block content by preventing IP addresses from being routed through and consists of standard firewalls and proxy servers at the six Internet gateways. The system also selectively engages in DNS cache poisoning when particular sites are requested. The government does not appear to be systematically examining Internet content, as this appears to be technically impractical. Because of its disconnection from the larger world of IP routing protocols, the network contained within the Great Firewall has been described as "the Chinese autonomous routing domain".

During the 2008 Summer Olympics, Chinese officials told Internet providers to prepare to unblock access from certain Internet cafés, access jacks in hotel rooms and conference centers where foreigners were expected to work or stay.

Actions and purpose

The Golden Shield Project contains an integrated, multi-layered system, involving technical, administrative, public security, national security, publicity and many other departments. This project was planning to finish within five years, separated into two phases.

Phase I

The first phase of the project focused on the construction of the first-level, second-level, and the third-level information communication network, application database, shared platform, etc. The period was three years.

According to the Xinhua News Agency, since September 2003, the Public Security department of China has recorded 96% of the population information of mainland China into the database. In other words, the information of 1.25 billion out of 1.3 billion people has recorded in the information database of the Public Security department of China. Within three years, phase I project has finished the first-level, second-level, and the third-level backbone network and access network. This network has covered public security organs at all levels. The grass-roots teams of public security organs have accessed to the backbone network with the coverage rate 90%, that is to say, every 100 police officers have 40 computers connected to the network of the phase I project. The Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China said that the phase I project had significantly enhanced the combat effectiveness of public security.

Members participated in the phase I project include Tsinghua University from China, and some high-tech companies from the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Israel, etc. Cisco Systems from the United States of America has provided massive hardware devices for this project, and therefore was criticized by some members of the United States Congress. According to an internal Cisco document, Cisco viewed China's Great Firewall and its Internet censorship as an opportunity to expand its business with China.

According to China Central Television, phase I cost 6.4 billion yuan. On 6 December 2002, there came the "2002 China Large Institutions Informationization Exhibition", 300 leaders from the Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China and from other public security bureaus of 31 provinces or municipalities attended the exhibition. There were many western high-tech products, including network security, video surveillance and face recognition. It was estimated that about 30000 police officers have been employed to maintain the system. There was a multi-level system to track netizens violating the provisions. Netizens who want to use the internet in a cybercafé are required to show their Resident Identity Cards. If some violating event happened, the owner of the cybercafé can send the personal information to the police through the internet. It is called a public security automation system, but it is actually an integrated, multi-layered, internet blocking and monitoring system, involving the technical, administrative, public security, national security, publicity, etc. The features are known as: readable, listenable, and thinkable.

Phase II

The phase II project started in 2006. The main task was to enhance the terminal construction, and the public security business application system, trying to informatize of the public security work. The period was two years.

Based on the phase I project, phase II project expanded the information application types of public security business, and informationized further public security information. The key points of this project included application system construction, system integration, the expansion of information centre, and information construction in central and western provinces. The system of was planning to strengthen the integration, to share and analysis of information. It would greatly enhance the information for the public security work support.

Censored content

Mainland Chinese Internet censorship programs have censored Web sites that include (among other things):

Blocked web sites are indexed to a lesser degree, if at all, by some Chinese search engines. This sometimes has considerable impact on search results.

According to The New York Times, Google has set up computer systems inside China that try to access Web sites outside the country. If a site is inaccessible, then it is added to Google China's blacklist. However, once unblocked, the Web sites will be reindexed. Referring to Google's first-hand experience of the great firewall, there is some hope in the international community that it will reveal some of its secrets. Simon Davies, founder of London-based pressure group Privacy International, is now challenging Google to reveal the technology it once used at China's behest. "That way, we can understand the nature of the beast and, perhaps, develop circumvention measures so there can be an opening up of communications." "That would be a dossier of extraordinary importance to human rights," Davies says. Google has yet to respond to his call.

Bypass techniques

Because the Great Firewall blocks destination IP addresses and domain names and inspects the data being sent or received, a basic censorship circumvention strategy is to use proxy nodes and encrypt the data. Most circumvention tools combine these two mechanisms.

  • Proxy servers outside China can be used, although using just a simple open proxy (HTTP or SOCKS) without also using an encrypted tunnel (such as HTTPS) does little to circumvent the sophisticated censors.
  • Companies can establish regional Web sites within China. This prevents their content from going through the Great Firewall of China; however, it requires companies to apply for local ICP licenses.
  • Onion routing and Garlic routing, such as I2P or Tor, can be used.
  • Freegate, Ultrasurf, and Psiphon are free programs that circumvent the China firewall using multiple open proxies, but still behave as though the user is in China.
  • VPNs (virtual private network) and SSH (secure shell) are the powerful and stable tools for bypassing surveillance technologies. They use the same basic approaches, proxies and encrypted channels, used by other circumvention tools, but depend on a private host, a virtual host, or an account outside of China, rather than open, free proxies.
  • Open application programming interface (API) used by Twitter which enables to post and retrieve tweets on sites other than Twitter. "The idea is that coders elsewhere get to Twitter, and offer up feeds at their own URLs—which the government has to chase down one by one." says Jonathan Zittrain, co-director of Harvard's Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society.
  • Reconfiguration at the end points of communication, encryption, discarding reset packets according to the TTL value (time to live) by distinguishing those resets generated by the Firewall and those made by end user, not routing any further packets to sites that have triggered blocking behavior.

Exporting technology

Reporters Without Borders suspects that countries such as Australia, Cuba, Vietnam, Zimbabwe and Belarus have obtained surveillance technology from China although the censorships in these countries are not much in comparison to China.

Since at least 2015, the Russian Roskomnadzor agency collaborates with Chinese Great Firewall security officials in implementing its data retention and filtering infrastructure. Since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, in order to combat disinformation and enforce the war censorship law, Russia authorities began improving and widening the capabilities of this system.

Differences from the Great Firewall

The Golden Shield Project is distinct from the Great Firewall (GFW), which has a different mission. The differences are listed below:

Politically,

  1. The GFW is a tool for the propaganda system, whereas the Golden Shield Project is a tool for the public security system.
  2. The original requirements of the GFW are from the 610 office, whereas the original requirements of the Golden Shield Project are from the public security department.
  3. The GFW is a national gateway for filtering foreign websites, whereas the Golden Shield Project is for monitoring the domestic internet.

Technically,

  1. The GFW is attached to the three national internet exchange centres, and then spread to some of the ISPs to implement the blocking effect, whereas the Golden Shield Project stations in the most exchange centres and data centres.
  2. The GFW is very powerful in scientific research, including many information security scientists, such as people from Harbin Institute of Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, whereas the Golden Shield Project is less powerful in scientific research.
  3. The GFW is built by Fang Binxing, whereas the Golden Shield Project is built by Shen Changxiang.

Inequality (mathematics)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inequality...