Confabulation

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confabulation

In psychology, confabulation is a memory error consisting of the production of fabricated, distorted, or misinterpreted memories about oneself or the world. It is generally associated with certain types of brain damage (especially aneurysm in the anterior communicating artery) or a specific subset of dementias. While still an area of ongoing research, the basal forebrain is implicated in the phenomenon of confabulation. People who confabulate present with incorrect memories ranging from subtle inaccuracies to surreal fabrications, and may include confusion or distortion in the temporal framing (timing, sequence or duration) of memories. In general, they are very confident about their recollections, even when challenged with contradictory evidence.

Confabulation occurs when individuals mistakenly recall false information, without intending to deceive. Brain damage, dementia, and anticholinergic toxidrome can cause this distortion. Two types of confabulation exist: provoked and spontaneous, with two distinctions: verbal and behavioral. Verbal statements, false information, and the patient's unawareness of the distortion are all associated with this phenomenon. Personality structure also plays a role in confabulation.

Numerous theories have been developed to explain confabulation. Neuro­psycho­log­i­cal theories suggest that cognitive dysfunction causes the distortion. Self-identity theories posit that people confabulate to preserve themselves. The temporality theory believes that confabulation occurs when an individual cannot place events properly in time. The monitoring and strategic retrieval account theories argue that confabulation arises when individuals cannot recall memories correctly or monitor them after retrieval. The executive control and fuzzy-trace theories also attempt to explain why confabulation happens.

Confabulation can occur with nervous system injuries or illnesses, including Korsakoff's syndrome, Alzheimer's disease, schizophrenia, and traumatic brain injury. It is believed that the right frontal lobe of the brain is damaged, causing false memories. Children are especially susceptible to forced confabulation as they are highly impressionable. Feedback can increase confidence in false memories. In rare cases, confabulation occurs in ordinary individuals.

Different memory tests, including recognition tasks and free recall tasks, can be used to study confabulation. Treatment depends on the underlying cause of the distortion. Ongoing research aims to develop a standard test battery to discern between different types of confabulations, distinguish delusions from confabulations, understand the role of unconscious processes, and identify pathological and nonpathological confabulations.

Description

Confabulation is distinguished from lying as there is no intent to deceive and the person is unaware the information is false. Although individuals can present blatantly false information, confabulation can also seem to be coherent, internally consistent, and relatively normal.

Most known cases of confabulation are symptomatic of brain damage or dementias, such as aneurysm, Alzheimer's disease, or Wernicke–Korsakoff syndrome (a common manifestation of thiamine deficiency caused by alcohol use disorder). Additionally confabulation often occurs in people with anticholinergic toxidrome when interrogated about bizarre or irrational behaviour.

Confabulated memories of all types most often occur in autobiographical memory and are indicative of a complicated and intricate process that can be led astray at any point during encoding, storage, or recall of a memory. This type of confabulation is commonly seen in Korsakoff's syndrome.

Distinctions

Two types of confabulation are often distinguished:

• Provoked (momentary, or secondary) confabulations represent a normal response to a faulty memory, are common in both amnesia and dementia, and can become apparent during memory tests.
• Spontaneous (or primary) confabulations do not occur in response to a cue and seem to be involuntary. They are relatively rare, more common in cases of dementia, and may result from the interaction between frontal lobe pathology and organic amnesia.

Another distinction is that between:

• Verbal confabulations- spoken false memories, most common type
• Behavioral confabulations- occur when an individual acts on their false memories

Signs and symptoms

Confabulation is associated with several characteristics:

1. Typically verbal statements but can also be non-verbal gestures or actions.
2. Can include autobiographical and non-personal information, such as historical facts, fairy-tales, or other aspects of semantic memory.
3. The account can be fantastic or coherent.
4. Both the premise and the details of the account can be false.
5. The account is usually drawn from the patient's memory of actual experiences, including past and current thoughts.
6. The patient is unaware of the accounts' distortions or inappropriateness, and is not concerned when errors are pointed out.
7. There is no hidden motivation behind the account.
8. The patient's personality structure may play a role in their readiness to confabulate.

Theories

Theories of confabulation range in emphasis. Some theories propose that confabulations represent a way for memory disabled people to maintain their self-identity. Other theories use neurocognitive links to explain the process of confabulation. Still other theories frame confabulation around the more familiar concept of delusion. Other researchers frame confabulation within the fuzzy-trace theory. Finally, some researchers call for theories that rely less on neurocognitive explanations and more on epistemic accounts.

Neuropsychological theories

The most popular theories of confabulation come from the field of neuropsychology or cognitive neuroscience. Research suggests that confabulation is associated with dysfunction of cognitive processes that control the retrieval from long-term memory. Frontal lobe damage often disrupts this process, preventing the retrieval of information and the evaluation of its output. Furthermore, researchers argue that confabulation is a disorder resulting from failed "reality monitoring/source monitoring" (i.e. deciding whether a memory is based on an actual event or whether it is imagined). Some neuropsychologists suggest that errors in retrieval of information from long-term memory that are made by normal subjects involve different components of control processes than errors made by confabulators. Kraepelin distinguished two subtypes of confabulation, one of which he called simple confabulation, caused partly by errors in the temporal ordering of real events. The other variety he called fantastic confabulation, which was bizarre and patently impossible statements not rooted in true memory. Simple confabulation may result from damage to memory systems in the medial temporal lobe. Fantastic confabulations reveal a dysfunction of the Supervisory System, which is believed to be a function of the frontal cortex.

Temporality theory

Support for the temporality account suggests that confabulations occur when an individual is unable to place events properly in time. Thus, an individual might correctly state an action they performed, but say they did it yesterday, when they did it weeks ago. In the Memory, Consciousness, and Temporality Theory, confabulation occurs because of a deficit in temporal consciousness or awareness.

Monitoring theory

Along a similar notion are the theories of reality and source monitoring theories. In these theories, confabulation occurs when individuals incorrectly attribute memories as reality, or incorrectly attribute memories to a certain source. Thus, an individual might claim an imagined event happened in reality, or that a friend told him/her about an event he/she actually heard about on television.

Strategic retrieval account theory

Supporters of the strategic retrieval account suggest that confabulations occur when an individual cannot actively monitor a memory for truthfulness after its retrieval. An individual recalls a memory, but there is some deficit after recall that interferes with the person establishing its falseness.

Executive control theory

Still others propose that all types of false memories, including confabulation, fit into a general memory and executive function model. In 2007, a framework for confabulation was proposed that stated confabulation is the result of two things: Problems with executive control and problems with evaluation. In the executive control deficit, the incorrect memory is retrieved from the brain. In the evaluative deficit, the memory will be accepted as a truth due to an inability to distinguish a belief from an actual memory.

In the context of delusion theories

Recent models of confabulation have attempted to build upon the link between delusion and confabulation. More recently, a monitoring account for delusion, applied to confabulation, proposed both the inclusion of conscious and unconscious processing. The claim was that by encompassing the notion of both processes, spontaneous versus provoked confabulations could be better explained. In other words, there are two ways to confabulate. One is the unconscious, spontaneous way in which a memory goes through no logical, explanatory processing. The other is the conscious, provoked way in which a memory is recalled intentionally by the individual to explain something confusing or unusual.

Fuzzy-trace theory

Fuzzy-trace theory, or FTT, is a concept more commonly applied to the explanation of judgement decisions. According to this theory, memories are encoded generally (gist), as well as specifically (verbatim). Thus, a confabulation could result from recalling the incorrect verbatim memory or from being able to recall the gist portion, but not the verbatim portion, of a memory.

FTT uses a set of five principles to explain false-memory phenomena. Principle 1 suggests that subjects store verbatim information and gist information parallel to one another. Both forms of storage involve the surface content of an experience. Principle 2 shares factors of retrieval of gist and verbatim traces. Principle 3 is based on dual-opponent processes in false memory. Generally, gist retrieval supports false memory, while verbatim retrieval suppresses it. Developmental variability is the topic of Principle 4. As a child develops into an adult, there is obvious improvement in the acquisition, retention, and retrieval of both verbatim and gist memory. However, during late adulthood, there will be a decline in these abilities. Finally, Principle 5 explains that verbatim and gist processing cause vivid remembering. Fuzzy-trace Theory, governed by these 5 principles, has proved useful in explaining false memory and generating new predictions about it.

Epistemic theory

However, not all accounts are so embedded in the neurocognitive aspects of confabulation. Some attribute confabulation to epistemic accounts. In 2009, theories underlying the causation and mechanisms for confabulation were criticized for their focus on neural processes, which are somewhat unclear, as well as their emphasis on the negativity of false remembering. Researchers proposed that an epistemic account of confabulation would be more encompassing of both the advantages and disadvantages of the process.

Presentation

Associated neurological and psychological conditions

Confabulations are often symptoms of various syndromes and psychopathologies in the adult population, including Korsakoff's syndrome, Alzheimer's disease, schizophrenia, and traumatic brain injury.

Wernicke–Korsakoff syndrome is a neurological disorder typically characterized by years of alcohol use disorder characterized by excessive alcohol consumption and a nutritional thiamine deficiency. Confabulation is one salient symptom of this syndrome. A study on confabulation in Korsakoff's patients found that they are subject to provoked confabulation when prompted with questions pertaining to episodic memory, not semantic memory, and when prompted with questions where the appropriate response would be "I don't know." This suggests that con­fab­u­l­ation in these patients is "domain-specific." Korsakoff's patients who confabulate are more likely than healthy adults to falsely recognize distractor words, suggesting that false recognition is a "confabulatory behavior."

Alzheimer's disease is a condition with both neurological and psychological components. It is a form of dementia associated with severe frontal lobe dys­func­tion. Confabulation in individuals with Alzheimer's is often more spontaneous than it is in other conditions, especially in the advanced stages of the disease. Alzheimer's patients demonstrate comparable abilities to encode information as healthy elderly adults, suggesting that impairments in encoding are not associated with confabulation. However, as seen in Korsakoff's patients, confabulation in Alzheimer's patients is higher when prompted with questions investigating episodic memory. Researchers suggest this is due to damage in the posterior cortical regions of the brain, which is a symptom characteristic of Alzheimer's disease.

Schizophrenia is a psychological disorder in which confabulation is sometimes observed. Although confabulation is usually coherent in its presentation, con­fab­u­l­ations of schizophrenic patients are often delusional. Researchers have noted that these patients tend to make up delusions on the spot which are often fantastic and become increasingly elaborate with questioning. Unlike patients with Korsakoff's and Alzheimer's, patients with schizophrenia are more likely to confabulate when prompted with questions regarding their semantic memories, as opposed to episodic memory prompting. In addition, confabulation does not appear to be related to any memory deficit in schiz­o­phrenic patients. This is contrary to most forms of confabulation. Also, confabulations made by schizophrenic patients often do not involve the creation of new information, but instead involve an attempt by the patient to reconstruct actual details of a past event.

Traumatic brain injury (TBI) can also result in confabulation. Research has shown that patients with damage to the inferior medial frontal lobe confabulate significantly more than patients with damage to the posterior area and healthy controls. This suggests that this region is key in producing confabulatory responses, and that memory deficit is important but not necessary in con­fab­u­l­ation. Additionally, research suggests that confabulation can be seen in patients with frontal lobe syndrome, which involves an insult to the frontal lobe as a result of disease or traumatic brain injury (TBI). Finally, rupture of the anterior or posterior communicating artery, subarachnoid hemorrhage, and encephalitis are also possible causes of confabulation.

Location of brain lesions

Confabulation is believed to be a result of damage to the right frontal lobe of the brain. In particular, damage can be localized to the ventromedial frontal lobes and other structures fed by the anterior communicating artery (ACoA), including the basal forebrain, septum, fornix, cingulate gyrus, cingulum, anterior hypothalamus, and head of the caudate nucleus.

Developmental differences

While some recent literature has suggested that older adults may be more susceptible than their younger counterparts to have false memories, the majority of research on forced confabulation centers around children. Children are particularly susceptible to forced confabulations based on their high suggestibility. When forced to recall confabulated events, children are less likely to remember that they had previously confabulated these situations, and they are more likely than their adult counterparts to come to remember these confabulations as real events that transpired. Research suggests that this inability to distinguish between past confabulatory and real events is centered on developmental differences in source monitoring. Due to underdeveloped encoding and critical reasoning skills, children's ability to distinguish real memories from false memories may be impaired. It may also be that younger children lack the meta-memory processes required to remember confabulated versus non-confabulated events. Children's meta-memory processes may also be influenced by expectancies or biases, in that they believe that highly plausible false scenarios are not confabulated. However, when knowingly being tested for accuracy, children are more likely to respond, "I don't know" at a rate comparable to adults for unanswerable questions than they are to confabulate. Ultimately, misinformation effects can be minimized by tailoring individual interviews to the specific developmental stage, often based on age, of the participant.

Provoked versus spontaneous confabulations

There is evidence to support different cognitive mechanisms for provoked and spontaneous confabulation. One study suggested that spontaneous confabulation may be a result of an amnesic patient's inability to distinguish the chronological order of events in their memory. In contrast, provoked confabulation may be a compensatory mechanism, in which the patient tries to make up for their memory deficiency by attempting to demonstrate competency in recollection.

Confidence in false memories

Confabulation of events or situations may lead to an eventual acceptance of the confabulated information as true. For instance, people who knowingly lie about a situation may eventually come to believe that their lies are truthful with time. In an interview setting, people are more likely to confabulate in situations in which they are presented false information by another person, as opposed to when they self-generate these falsehoods. Further, people are more likely to accept false information as true when they are interviewed at a later time (after the event in question) than those who are interviewed immediately or soon after the event. Affirmative feedback for confabulated responses is also shown to increase the confabulator's confidence in their response. For instance, in culprit identification, if a witness falsely identifies a member of a line-up, he will be more confident in his identification if the interviewer provides affirmative feedback. This effect of confirmatory feedback appears to last over time, as witnesses will even remember the confabulated information months later.

Among normal subjects

On rare occasions, confabulation can also be seen in normal subjects. It is currently unclear how completely healthy individuals produce confabulations. It is possible that these individuals are in the process of developing some type of organic condition that is causing their confabulation symptoms. It is not uncommon, however, for the general population to display some very mild symptoms of provoked confabulations. Subtle distortions and intrusions in memory are commonly produced by normal subjects when they remember something poorly.

Diagnosis and treatment

Spontaneous confabulations, due to their involuntary nature, cannot be manipulated in a laboratory setting. However, provoked confabulations can be researched in various theoretical contexts. The mechanisms found to underlie provoked confabulations can be applied to spontaneous confabulation mechanisms. The basic premise of researching confabulation comprises finding errors and distortions in memory tests of an individual.

Deese–Roediger–McDermott lists

Confabulations can be detected in the context of the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm by using the Deese–Roediger–McDermott lists. Participants listen to audio recordings of several lists of words centered around a theme, known as the critical word. The participants are later asked to recall the words on their list. If the participant recalls the critical word, which was never explicitly stated in the list, it is considered a confabulation. Participants often have a false memory for the critical word.

Recognition tasks

Confabulations can also be researched by using continuous recognition tasks. These tasks are often used in conjunction with confidence ratings. Generally, in a recognition task, participants are rapidly presented with pictures. Some of these pictures are shown once; others are shown multiple times. Participants press a key if they have seen the picture previously. Following a period of time, participants repeat the task. More errors on the second task, versus the first, are indicative of confusion, representing false memories.

Free recall tasks

Confabulations can also be detected using a free recall task, such as a self-narrative task. Participants are asked to recall stories (semantic or autobiographical) that are highly familiar to them. The stories recalled are encoded for errors that could be classified as distortions in memory. Distortions could include falsifying true story elements or including details from a completely different story. Errors such as these would be indicative of confabulations.

Treatment

Treatment for confabulation is somewhat dependent on the cause or source, if identifiable. For example, treatment of Wernicke–Korsakoff syndrome involves large doses of vitamin B in order to reverse the thiamine deficiency. If there is no known physiological cause, more general cognitive techniques may be used to treat confabulation. A case study published in 2000 showed that Self-Monitoring Training (SMT) reduced delusional confabulations. Furthermore, improvements were maintained at a three-month follow-up and were found to generalize to everyday settings. Although this treatment seems promising, more rigorous research is necessary to determine the efficacy of SMT in the general confabulation population.

Research

Although significant gains have been made in the understanding of confabulation in recent years, there is still much to be learned. One group of researchers in particular has laid out several important questions for future study. They suggest more information is needed regarding the neural systems that support the different cognitive processes necessary for normal source monitoring. They also proposed the idea of developing a standard neuropsychological test battery able to discriminate between the different types of confabulations. And there is a considerable amount of debate regarding the best approach to organizing and combining neuro-imaging, pharmacological, and cognitive/behavioral approaches to understand confabulation.

In a recent review article, another group of researchers contemplate issues concerning the distinctions between delusions and confabulation. They question whether delusions and confabulation should be considered distinct or overlapping disorders and, if overlapping, to what degree? They also discuss the role of unconscious processes in confabulation. Some researchers suggest that unconscious emotional and motivational processes are potentially just as important as cognitive and memory problems. Finally, they raise the question of where to draw the line between the pathological and the nonpathological. Delusion-like beliefs and confabulation-like fabrications are commonly seen in healthy individuals. What are the important differences between patients with similar etiology who do and do not confabulate? Since the line between pathological and nonpathological is likely blurry, should we take a more dimensional approach to confabulation? Research suggests that confabulation occurs along a continuum of implausibility, bizarreness, content, conviction, preoccupation, and distress, and impact on daily life.

Self-deception

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-deception 

Self-deception is a process of denying or rationalizing away the relevance, significance, or importance of opposing evidence and logical argument. Self-deception involves convincing oneself of a truth (or lack of truth) so that one does not reveal any self-knowledge of the deception.

Brief history

While Freudian analysis of the conscious and the unconscious minds dominated the field, psychological scientists in the 1970s became curious about how those two seemingly separate worlds could work together. The lack of mechanistic models available to this line of research, led to the debate being unresolved. Later, the focus has been shifted to vision-related research in social psychology.

Theorization

Analysis

The traditional paradigm of self-deception is modeled after interpersonal deception, where A intentionally gets B to believe some proposition p, all the while knowing or believing truly ¬p (not p). Such deception is intentional and requires the deceiver to know or believe ¬p and the deceived to believe p. On this traditional mode, self-deceivers must (1) hold contradictory beliefs and (2) intentionally get themselves to hold a belief they know or believe truly to be false.

The process of rationalization, however, can obscure the intent of self-deception. Brian McLaughlin illustrates that such rationalizations in certain circumstances permit the phenomenon. When a person, who disbelieves p, intentionally tries to make himself believe or continue believing p by engaging in such activities, and, as a result unintentionally misleads himself into believing or continuing to believe p via biased thinking, he deceives himself in a way appropriate for self-deception. No deceitful intention is required for this.

Psychology

Self-deception calls into question the nature of the individual, specifically in a psychological context and the nature of "self". Irrationality is the foundation from which the argued paradoxes of self-deception stem, and it is argued that not everyone has the "special talents" and capacities for self-deception. However, rationalization is influenced by myriad factors, including socialization, personal biases, fear, and cognitive repression. Such rationalization can be manipulated in both positive and negative fashions; convincing one to perceive a negative situation optimistically and vice versa. In contrast, rationalization alone cannot effectively clarify the dynamics of self-deception, as reason is just one adaptive form mental processes can take.

Paradoxes

The works of philosopher Alfred R. Mele have provided insight into some of the more prominent paradoxes regarding self-deception. Two of these paradoxes include the self-deceiver's state of mind and the dynamics of self-deception, coined the "static" paradox and the "dynamic/strategic" paradox, respectively.

Mele formulates an example of the "static" paradox as the following:

If ever a person A deceives a person B into believing that something, p, is true, A knows or truly believes that p is false while causing B to believe that p is true. So when A deceives A (i.e., himself) into believing that p is true, he knows or truly believes that p is false while causing himself to believe that p is true. Thus, A must simultaneously believe that p is false and believe that p is true. But how is this possible?

Mele then describes the "dynamic/strategy" paradox:

In general, A cannot successfully employ a deceptive strategy against B if B knows A's intention and plan. This seems plausible as well when A and B are the same person. A potential self-deceiver's knowledge of his intention and strategy would seem typically to render them ineffective. On the other hand, the suggestion that self-deceivers typically successfully execute their self-deceptive strategies without knowing what they are up to may seem absurd; for an agent's effective execution of his plans seems generally to depend on his cognizance of them and their goals. So how, in general, can an agent deceive himself by employing a self-deceptive strategy?

These models call into question how one can simultaneously hold contradictory beliefs ("static" paradox) and deceive oneself without rendering one's intentions ineffective ("dynamic/strategic" paradox). Attempts at a resolution to these have created two schools of thought: one that maintains that paradigmatic cases of self-deception are intentional and one that denies the notion—intentionalists and non-intentionalists, respectively.

Intentionalists tend to agree that self-deception is intentional, but divide over whether it requires the holding of contradictory beliefs. This school of thought incorporates elements of temporal partitioning (extended over time to benefit the self-deceiver, increasing the chance of forgetting the deception altogether) and psychological partitioning (incorporating various aspects of the "self").

Non-intentionalists, in contrast, tend to believe that cases of self-deception are not necessarily accidental, but motivated by desire, anxiety, or some other emotion regarding p or related to p. This notion distinguishes self-deception from misunderstanding. Furthermore, "wishful thinking" is distinguished from self-deception in that the self-deceivers recognize evidence against their self-deceptive belief or possess, without recognizing, greater counterevidence than wishful thinkers.

Numerous questions and debates remain in play with respect to the paradoxes of self-deception, and a consensual paradigm has yet to appear.

Trivers' theory

It has been theorized that humans are susceptible to self-deception because most people have emotional attachments to beliefs, which in some cases may be irrational. Some evolutionary biologists, such as Robert Trivers, have suggested that deception plays a significant role in human behavior, and more generally speaking in animal behavior. One deceives oneself to trust something that is not true as to better convince others of that "truth". When a person convinces himself of this untrue thing, they better mask the signs of deception. Trivers, along with two colleagues (Daniel Kriegman and Malcolm Slavin), applied his theory of "self-deception in the service of deception" in order to explain how in his view Donald Trump was able to employ the "big lie" with such great success.

This notion is based on the following logic: deception is a fundamental aspect of communication in nature, both between and within species. It has evolved so that one can have an advantage over another. From alarm calls to mimicry, animals use deception to further their survival. Those who are better able to perceive deception are more likely to survive. As a result, self-deception behavior evolved to better mask deception from those who perceive it well or, as Trivers puts it "hiding the truth from yourself to hide it more deeply from others." In humans, awareness of the fact that one is acting deceptively often leads to tell-tale signs of deception, such as nostrils flaring, clammy skin, quality and tone of voice, eye movement, or excessive blinking. Therefore, if self-deception enables an individual to believe its own distortions, it will not present such signs of deception, and will therefore appear to be telling the truth.

Self-deception can be used both to act greater or lesser than one actually is. For example, one can act overconfident to attract a mate or act under-confident to avoid a threat such as a predator. If an individual is capable of concealing their true feelings and intentions well, then it is more likely to successfully deceive others.

It may also be argued that the ability to deceive, or self-deceive, is not the selected trait but rather a by-product of a more primary trait called abstract thinking. Abstract thinking allows many evolutionary advantages such as more flexible, adaptive behaviors, leading to innovation. Since a lie is an abstraction, the mental process of creating it can only occur in animals with enough brain complexity to permit abstract thinking. Moreover, self-deception lowers cognitive cost; that is to say, if one has convinced oneself that that very thing is indeed true, it is less complicated for one to behave or think as that thing was untrue; the mind not thinking constantly of the true thing and then the false thing, but simply being convinced that the false thing is true.

Evolutionary implications

Because there is deceit, there exists a strong selection to recognize when deception occurs. As a result, self-deception behavior evolves so as to better hide the signs of deception from others. The presence of deception explains the existence of an innate ability to commit self-deception to hide the indications of deceptions. Humans deceive themselves in order to better deceive others and thus have an advantage over them. In the three decades since Trivers introduced his adaptive theory of self-deception, there has been an ongoing debate over the genetic basis of such a behavior.

The explanation of deception and self-deception as innate characteristics is perhaps true, but there are many other explanations for this pattern of behavior. It is possible that the ability to self-deceive is not innate, but a learned trait, acquired through experience. For example, a person could have been caught being deceitful by revealing their knowledge of information they were trying to hide. Their nostrils flared, indicating that they were lying to the other person, and thus did not get what they wanted. Next time, to better achieve success, the person will more actively deceive himself of having knowledge to better hide the signs of deception. Therefore, people could have the capacity to learn self-deception. However, simply because something is learned does not mean that it is not innate; what is learned and what is innate work in conjunction. This is outlined in many introductory textbooks in evolutionary psychology. For example, preparedness occurs in learning to explain why some behaviours are more easily learned than others. Evolutionary psychologists argue that there are learning mechanisms that allow learning to occur.

Medicine

Self-deception has a prominent role in several medical conditions, such as borderline personality disorder, narcissistic personality disorder, and histrionic personality disorder.

Examples

Simple instances of self-deception include common occurrences such as: the alcoholic who is self-deceived in believing that his drinking is under control, the husband who is self-deceived in believing that his wife is not having an affair, the jealous colleague who is self-deceived in believing that her colleague's greater professional success is due to ruthless ambition.

An example of self-deception is provided by Robert Trivers and Huey P. Newton published in the form of an analysis of the role of flight crew self-deception in the crash of Air Florida Flight 90.

Criticisms

The claim that not being conscious about deception would decrease the body language signs of lying is criticized for being incompatible with the unconscious nature of body language as in body language giving away non-conscious processes, as well as for not being able to account for why evolutionary selection for lying would allow a body language that gives away lying to exist instead of simply selecting for lack of such signals.

The notion that non-conscious deception would be less costly than conscious deception is subject to criticism, citing that a non-conscious lie followed by a process of creating a conscious confabulation would amount to more, not fewer, brain processes than simply making up a conscious lie.

The concept of self-deception is criticized for being able to classify any criticism of the notion of self-deception as being self-deception in itself, removing its falsifiability and therefore making it unscientific, and also for being an obstacle to science in general by being able to classify anything as self-deception in a way that confirms itself in a way that is not self-correcting.

The assumption that individuals who derive pleasure from hurting others would self-deceive into believing that their victims were not hurt is criticized for contradicting its own premise, since if the individual did enjoy knowing that the victim was hurt such self-deception would reduce and not increase the pleasure.

Origin of death

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Origin_of_death

The origin of death is a theme in the myths of many cultures. Death is a universal feature of human life, so stories about its origin appear to be universal in human cultures. As such it is a type of origin myth, a myth that describes the origin of some feature of the natural or social world. No one type of these myths is universal, but each region has its own characteristic types. Such myths have therefore been a frequent topic of study in the field of comparative mythology.

Africa

See also: African traditional religion

Pervasively in the myths of African cultures, in the beginning there was no death. This can be because a supreme being makes people young again when they grow old; people die but go to heaven to live. In some stories eternal life is lost through some flaw (such as greed, curiosity, stubbornness or arrogance), or as a punishment for disobedience, or as the result of human indifference. Other themes are the failure of a message to be delivered to humans, or a severing of the link between heaven and Earth. Sometimes it is as a result of an accident.

Asante

In Asante mythology, death came to humanity as a result of Tano being unable to best Owuo (the Asante embodiment of death) in a series of contests to claim a hunter, and the same for Owuo. The two came to an agreement. If a human, specifically a warrior, was dying Tano and Owuo would race to them in an attempt to claim their souls. If Tano got there first, the person would not die. However, If Owuo got there first the person would die.

Krachi

According to Krachi traditional stories, death came to humanity as a result of a young Krachi boy pouring reviving medicine into the eye of a dead Owuo (the Asante god of death). Owuo had been killed for a boy who had canabalised three people and the townspeople resolved to kill Owuo by setting his long hair ablaze. In his hair was a reviving medicine, which the boy and the townspeople used to revive the three people by splashing it on their bones. Feeling sorry for Owuo, because Owuo had been kind to him, the boy poured the medicine into Owuo's eye, reviving it. Now the eye winks, and every time the eye of Owuo winks, someone dies.

North America

Coyote—a common trickster figure in North American myths

The origin of death is a common theme in Native American mythology. The myths of the plateau tribes blame its origin on the interference of the trickster figure Coyote. The Chiricahua Apache myth also blames Coyote. The plains tribes ascribe it to the result of unfavorable chance. For example, in the Blackfeet account, Old Man and Old Woman arguing over whether people should die, with Old Woman using magic to ensure that the sign that they agreed upon gave her desired result.

Among the native peoples of the Western United States, a common explanation of death was that it was the result of a debate between two people or animals in which one would favour death and the other immortality. For example, the story of the Thompson Indians was that Raven wanted death as there would otherwise be too many men. Coyote preferred sleep to death but was outvoted by Crow, Fly and Maggot, who sided with Raven. Raven's daughter was then the first to die and so Raven wanted to reverse his choice. But Coyote, the trickster, said that the decision was now irrevocable.

Oceania

In Oceania, the most common myth is that originally people had the power to rejuvenate themselves by shedding their skin like a snake. However, when somebody, usually an old woman, does this, she frightens her grandchildren, who cry until she resumes her old skin, an act which mandates death for future generations.

Polynesia

Further information: Māui (Māori mythology) § Seeks immortality

In Polynesian mythology, death is the result of the hero Māui being swallowed up by Hine-nui-te-po or Night. If he had escaped, mankind would be immortal, however one of the birds that accompanied him burst out laughing, awakening Hine-nui-te-po who crushed Māui to death, ending hopes of immortality with him.

Western civilization

Christianity

Adam and Eve by Albrecht Dürer

See also: Abrahamic mythology

According to Christianity, death is a consequence of the fall of man from a prior state of innocence, as described in the Book of Genesis.

Greek mythology

Pandora by Lefebvre

In an early Greek myth, death is a consequence of the disagreement between Zeus and Prometheus. As a result of this quarrel, Zeus creates woman, in the form of Pandora and presents her to Prometheus' brother Epimetheus, with death being one of the results of his opening of Pandora's box, which she brought with her.

Deities of death

Such myths of death and the end have brought to life gods/goddess that guide a person to their death. In some religions there are deities that even control when an individual will die. For example, in Greek mythology the goddess who has control over an individual's death would be Atropos (known as the one who cuts the thread of life). In a modern sense, the most common deity of death is the Grim Reaper.

Epic poetry

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epic_poetry

A tablet containing a fragment of the Epic of Gilgamesh

An epic poem, or simply an epic, is a lengthy narrative poem typically about the extraordinary deeds of extraordinary characters who, in dealings with gods or other superhuman forces, gave shape to the mortal universe for their descendants.

Etymology

The English word epic comes from Latin epicus, which itself comes from the Ancient Greek adjective ἐπικός (epikos), from ἔπος (epos), "word, story, poem."

In ancient Greek, 'epic' could refer to all poetry in dactylic hexameter (epea), which included not only Homer but also the wisdom poetry of Hesiod, the utterances of the Delphic oracle, and the strange theological verses attributed to Orpheus. Later tradition, however, has restricted the term 'epic' to heroic epic, as described in this article.

Overview

The first edition (1835) of the Finnish national epic poem Kalevala by Elias Lönnrot

Originating before the invention of writing, primary epics, such as those of Homer, were composed by bards who used complex rhetorical and metrical schemes by which they could memorize the epic as received in tradition and add to the epic in their performances. Later writers like Virgil, Apollonius of Rhodes, Dante, Camões, and Milton adopted and adapted Homer's style and subject matter, but used devices available only to those who write.

The oldest epic recognized is the Epic of Gilgamesh (c. 2500–1300 BCE), which was recorded in ancient Sumer during the Neo-Sumerian Empire. The poem details the exploits of Gilgamesh, the king of Uruk. Although recognized as a historical figure, Gilgamesh, as represented in the epic, is a largely legendary or mythical figure.

The longest written epic from antiquity is the ancient Indian Mahabharata (c. 3rd century BC–3rd century AD), which consists of 100,000 ślokas or over 200,000 verse lines (each shloka is a couplet), as well as long prose passages, so that at ~1.8 million words it is roughly twice the length of Shahnameh, four times the length of the Rāmāyaṇa, and roughly ten times the length of the Iliad and the Odyssey combined.

Famous examples of epic poetry include the Sumerian Epic of Gilgamesh, the ancient Indian Mahabharata and Rāmāyaṇa in Sanskrit and Silappatikaram and Manimekalai in Tamil, the Persian Shahnameh, the Ancient Greek Odyssey and Iliad, Virgil's Aeneid, the Old English Beowulf, Dante's Divine Comedy, the Finnish Kalevala, the German Nibelungenlied, the French Song of Roland, the Spanish Cantar de mio Cid, the Portuguese Os Lusíadas, the Armenian Daredevils of Sassoun, the Old Russian The Tale of Igor's Campaign, John Milton's Paradise Lost, The Secret History of the Mongols, the Kyrgyz Manas, and the Malian Sundiata. Epic poems of the modern era include Derek Walcott's Omeros, Mircea Cărtărescu's The Levant and Adam Mickiewicz's Pan Tadeusz. Paterson by William Carlos Williams, published in five volumes from 1946 to 1958, was inspired in part by another modern epic, The Cantos by Ezra Pound.

Oral epics

The first epics were products of preliterate societies and oral history poetic traditions. Oral tradition was used alongside written scriptures to communicate and facilitate the spread of culture. In these traditions, poetry is transmitted to the audience and from performer to performer by purely oral means. Early 20th-century study of living oral epic traditions in the Balkans by Milman Parry and Albert Lord demonstrated the paratactic model used for composing these poems. What they demonstrated was that oral epics tend to be constructed in short episodes, each of equal status, interest and importance. This facilitates memorization, as the poet is recalling each episode in turn and using the completed episodes to recreate the entire epic as he performs it. Parry and Lord also contend that the most likely source for written texts of the epics of Homer was dictation from an oral performance.

Milman Parry and Albert Lord have argued that the Homeric epics, the earliest works of Western literature, were fundamentally an oral poetic form. These works form the basis of the epic genre in Western literature. Nearly all of Western epic (including Virgil's Aeneid and Dante's Divine Comedy) self-consciously presents itself as a continuation of the tradition begun by these poems.

Composition and conventions

In his work Poetics, Aristotle defines an epic as one of the forms of poetry, contrasted with lyric poetry and drama (in the form of tragedy and comedy).

Epic poetry agrees with Tragedy in so far as it is an imitation in verse of characters of a higher type. They differ in that Epic poetry admits but one kind of meter and is narrative in form. They differ, again, in their length: for Tragedy endeavors, as far as possible, to confine itself to a single revolution of the sun, or but slightly to exceed this limit, whereas the Epic action has no limits of time. This, then, is a second point of difference; though at first the same freedom was admitted in Tragedy as in Epic poetry.

Of their constituent parts some are common to both, some peculiar to Tragedy: whoever, therefore knows what is good or bad Tragedy, knows also about Epic poetry. All the elements of an Epic poem are found in Tragedy, but the elements of a Tragedy are not all found in the Epic poem. – Aristotle, Poetics Part V

Harmon & Holman (1999) define an epic:

Epic

A long narrative poem in elevated style presenting characters of high position in adventures forming an organic whole through their relation to a central heroic figure and through their development of episodes important to the history of a nation or race.

— Harmon & Holman (1999)

Harmon and Holman delineate ten main characteristics of an epic:

1. Begins in medias res ("in the thick of things").
2. The setting is vast, covering many nations, the world or the universe.
3. Begins with an invocation to a muse (epic invocation).
4. Begins with a statement of the theme.
5. Includes the use of epithets.
6. Contains long lists, called an epic catalogue.
7. Features long and formal speeches.
8. Shows divine intervention in human affairs.
9. Features heroes that embody the values of the civilization.
10. Often features the tragic hero's descent into the underworld or hell.

The hero generally participates in a cyclical journey or quest, faces adversaries that try to defeat them in their journey, and returns home significantly transformed by their journey. The epic hero illustrates traits, performs deeds, and exemplifies certain morals that are valued by the society the epic originates from. Many epic heroes are recurring characters in the legends of their native cultures.

Conventions of the Indian Epic

In the Indian mahākāvya epic genre, more emphasis was laid on description than on narration. Indeed, the traditional characteristics of a mahākāvya are listed as:

• It must take its subject matter from the epics (Ramayana or Mahabharata), or from history,
• It must help further the four goals of man (purusharthas),
• It must contain descriptions of cities, seas, mountains, moonrise and sunrise, and accounts of merrymaking in gardens, of bathing parties, drinking bouts, and love-making.
• It should tell the sorrow of separated lovers and should describe a wedding and the birth of a son.
• It should describe a king's council, an embassy, the marching forth of an army, a battle, and the victory of a hero.

Themes

Classical epic poetry recounts a journey, either physical (as typified by Odysseus in the Odyssey) or mental (as typified by Achilles in the Iliad) or both. Epics also tend to highlight cultural norms and to define or call into question cultural values, particularly as they pertain to heroism.

Conventions

Proem

In the proem or preface, the poet may begin by invoking a Muse or similar divinity. The poet prays to the Muses to provide them with divine inspiration to tell the story of a great hero.

Example opening lines with invocations:

Sing goddess the baneful wrath of Achilles son of Peleus – Iliad 1.1

Muse, tell me in verse of the man of many wiles – Odyssey 1.1

From the Heliconian Muses let us begin to sing – Hesiod, Theogony 1.1

Beginning with thee, Oh Phoebus, I will recount the famous deeds of men of old – Argonautica 1.1

Muse, remember to me the causes – Aeneid 1.8

Sing Heav'nly Muse, that on the secret top

of Oreb, or of Sinai, didst inspire – Paradise Lost 1.6–7

An alternative or complementary form of proem, found in Virgil and his imitators, opens with the performative verb "I sing". Examples:

I sing arms and the man – Aeneid 1.1

I sing pious arms and their captain – Gerusalemme liberata 1.1

I sing ladies, knights, arms, loves, courtesies, audacious deeds – Orlando Furioso 1.1–2

This Virgilian epic convention is referenced in Walt Whitman's poem title / opening line "I sing the body electric".

Compare the first six lines of the Kalevala:

Mastered by desire impulsive,

By a mighty inward urging,

I am ready now for singing,

Ready to begin the chanting

Of our nation's ancient folk-song

Handed down from by-gone ages.

These conventions are largely restricted to European classical culture and its imitators. The Epic of Gilgamesh, for example, or the Bhagavata Purana do not contain such elements, nor do early medieval Western epics that are not strongly shaped by the classical traditions, such as the Chanson de Roland or the Poem of the Cid.

In medias res

Narrative opens "in the middle of things", with the hero at his lowest point. Usually flashbacks show earlier portions of the story. For example, the Iliad does not tell the entire story of the Trojan War, starting with the judgment of Paris, but instead opens abruptly on the rage of Achilles and its immediate causes. So too, Orlando Furioso is not a complete biography of Roland, but picks up from the plot of Orlando Innamorato, which in turn presupposes a knowledge of the romance and oral traditions.

Enumeratio

Epic catalogues and genealogies are given, called enumeratio. These long lists of objects, places, and people place the finite action of the epic within a broader, universal context, such as the catalog of ships. Often, the poet is also paying homage to the ancestors of audience members. Examples:

• In The Faerie Queene, the list of trees I.i.8–9.
• In Paradise Lost, the list of demons in Book I.
• In the Aeneid, the list of enemies the Trojans find in Etruria (Central Italy) in Book VII. Also, the list of ships in Book X.
• In the Iliad, the Catalogue of Ships, the most famous epic catalogue, and the Trojan Battle Order

Stylistic features

In the Homeric and post-Homeric tradition, epic style is typically achieved through the use of the following stylistic features:

• Heavy use of repetition or stock phrases: e.g., Homer's "rosy-fingered dawn" and "wine-dark sea".
• Epic similes

Form

Many verse forms have been used in epic poems through the ages, but each language's literature typically gravitates to one form, or at least to a very limited set.

Ancient Sumerian epic poems did not use any kind of poetic meter and lines did not have consistent lengths; instead, Sumerian poems derived their rhythm solely through constant repetition and parallelism, with subtle variations between lines. Indo-European epic poetry, by contrast, usually places strong emphasis on the importance of line consistency and poetic meter. Ancient Greek epics were composed in dactylic hexameter. Very early Latin epicists, such Livius Andronicus and Gnaeus Naevius, used Saturnian meter. By the time of Ennius, however, Latin poets had adopted dactylic hexameter.

Dactylic hexameter has been adapted by a few anglophone poets such as Longfellow in "Evangeline", whose first line is as follows:

This is the | forest pri | meval. The | murmuring | pines and the | hemlocks

Old English, German and Norse poems were written in alliterative verse, usually without rhyme. The alliterative form can be seen in the Old English "Finnsburg Fragment":

Ac onwacnigeað nū, wīgend mīne ealra ǣrest eorðbūendra,

But awake now, my warriors, of all first the men

While the above classical and Germanic forms would be considered stichic, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese long poems favored stanzaic forms, usually written in terza rima or especially ottava rima. Terza rima is a rhyming verse stanza form that consists of an interlocking three-line rhyme scheme. An example is found in the first lines of the Divine Comedy by Dante, who originated the form:

Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita (A)
mi ritrovai per una selva oscura (B)
ché la diritta via era smarrita. (A)

Ahi quanto a dir qual era è cosa dura (B)
esta selva selvaggia e aspra e forte (C)
che nel pensier rinnova la paura! (B)

In ottava rima, each stanza consists of three alternate rhymes and one double rhyme, following the ABABABCC rhyme scheme. Example:

Canto l'arme pietose, e 'l Capitano Che 'l gran sepolcro liberò di Cristo. Molto egli oprò col senno e con la mano; Molto soffrì nel glorioso acquisto: E invan l'Inferno a lui s'oppose; e invano s'armò d'Asia e di Libia il popol misto: Chè 'l Ciel gli diè favore, e sotto ai santi Segni ridusse i suoi compagni erranti.	The sacred armies, and the godly knight, That the great sepulchre of Christ did free, I sing; much wrought his valor and foresight, And in that glorious war much suffered he; In vain 'gainst him did Hell oppose her might, In vain the Turks and Morians armèd be: His soldiers wild, to brawls and mutines prest, Reducèd he to peace, so Heaven him blest.
—Tasso. Gerusalemme Liberata. lines 1–8.	—Translation by Edward Fairfax

From the 14th century English epic poems were written in heroic couplets, and rhyme royal, though in the 16th century the Spenserian stanza and blank verse were also introduced. The French alexandrine is currently the heroic line in French literature, though in earlier literature – such as the chanson de geste – the decasyllable grouped in laisses took precedence. In Polish literature, couplets of Polish alexandrines (syllabic lines of 7+6 syllables) prevail. In Russian, iambic tetrameter verse is the most popular. In Serbian poetry, the decasyllable is the only form employed.

Balto-Finnic (e.g. Estonian, Finnish, Karelian) folk poetry uses a form of trochaic tetrameter that has been called the Kalevala meter. The Finnish and Estonian national epics, Kalevala and Kalevipoeg, are both written in this meter. The meter is thought to have originated during the Proto-Finnic period.

In Indic epics such as the Ramayana and Mahabharata, the shloka form is used.

Genres and related forms

The primary form of epic, especially as discussed in this article, is the heroic epic, including such works as the Iliad and Mahabharata. Ancient sources also recognized didactic epic as a category, represented by such works as Hesiod's Works and Days and Lucretius's De rerum natura.

A related type of poetry is the epyllion (plural: epyllia), a brief narrative poem with a romantic or mythological theme. The term, which means "little epic", came into use in the nineteenth century. It refers primarily to the erudite, shorter hexameter poems of the Hellenistic period and the similar works composed at Rome from the age of the neoterics; to a lesser degree, the term includes some poems of the English Renaissance, particularly those influenced by Ovid. The most famous example of classical epyllion is perhaps Catullus 64.

Epyllion is to be understood as distinct from mock epic, another light form.

Romantic epic is a term used to designate works such as Morgante, Orlando Innamorato, Orlando Furioso and Gerusalemme Liberata, which freely lift characters, themes, plots and narrative devices from the world of prose chivalric romance.

Non-European forms

Long poetic narratives that do not fit the traditional European definition of the heroic epic are sometimes known as folk epics. Indian folk epics have been investigated by Lauri Honko (1998), Brenda Beck (1982)  and John Smith, amongst others. Folk epics are an important part of community identities. For example, in Egypt, the folk genre known as al-sira relates the saga of the Hilālī tribe and their migrations across the Middle East and north Africa, see Bridget Connelly (1986). In India, folk epics reflect the caste system of Indian society and the life of the lower levels of society, such as cobblers and shepherds, see C.N. Ramachandran, "Ambivalence and Angst: A Note on Indian folk epics," in Lauri Honko (2002. p. 295). Some Indian oral epics feature strong women who actively pursue personal freedom in their choice of a romantic partner (Stuart, Claus, Flueckiger and Wadley, eds, 1989, p. 5). Japanese traditional performed narratives were sung by blind singers. One of the most famous, The Tale of the Heike, deals with historical wars and had a ritual function to placate the souls of the dead (Tokita 2015, p. 7). A variety of epic forms are found in Africa. Some have a linear, unified style while others have a more cyclical, episodic style (Barber 2007, p. 50). People in the rice cultivation zones of south China sang long narrative songs about the origin of rice growing, rebel heroes, and transgressive love affairs (McLaren 2022). The borderland ethnic populations of China sang heroic epics, such as the Epic of King Gesar of the Mongols, and the creation-myth epics of the Yao people of south China.

Magical thinking

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magical_thinking

Magical thinking, or superstitious thinking, is the belief that unrelated events are causally connected despite the absence of any plausible causal link between them, particularly as a result of supernatural effects. Examples include the idea that personal thoughts can influence the external world without acting on them, or that objects must be causally connected if they resemble each other or have come into contact with each other in the past. Magical thinking is a type of fallacious thinking and is a common source of invalid causal inferences. Unlike the confusion of correlation with causation, magical thinking does not require the events to be correlated.

The precise definition of magical thinking may vary subtly when used by different theorists or among different fields of study. In anthropology, the posited causality is between religious ritual, prayer, sacrifice, or the observance of a taboo, and an expected benefit or recompense. In psychology, magical thinking is the belief that one's thoughts by themselves can bring about effects in the world or that thinking something corresponds with doing it. These beliefs can cause a person to experience an irrational fear of performing certain acts or having certain thoughts because of an assumed correlation between doing so and threatening calamities. In psychiatry, magical thinking defines false beliefs about the capability of thoughts, actions or words to cause or prevent undesirable events. It is a commonly observed symptom in thought disorder, schizotypal personality disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder.

Types

Direct effect

Bronisław Malinowski's Magic, Science and Religion (1954) discusses another type of magical thinking, in which words and sounds are thought to have the ability to directly affect the world. This type of wish fulfillment thinking can result in the avoidance of talking about certain subjects ("speak of the devil and he'll appear"), the use of euphemisms instead of certain words, or the belief that to know the "true name" of something gives one power over it, or that certain chants, prayers, or mystical phrases will bring about physical changes in the world. More generally, it is magical thinking to take a symbol to be its referent or an analogy to represent an identity.

Sigmund Freud believed that magical thinking was produced by cognitive developmental factors. He described practitioners of magic as projecting their mental states onto the world around them, similar to a common phase in child development. From toddlerhood to early school age, children will often link the outside world with their internal consciousness, e.g. "It is raining because I am sad."

Symbolic approaches

Another theory of magical thinking is the symbolic approach. Leading thinkers of this category, including Stanley J. Tambiah, believe that magic is meant to be expressive, rather than instrumental. As opposed to the direct, mimetic thinking of Frazer, Tambiah asserts that magic utilizes abstract analogies to express a desired state, along the lines of metonymy or metaphor.

An important question raised by this interpretation is how mere symbols could exert material effects. One possible answer lies in John L. Austin's concept of performativity, in which the act of saying something makes it true, such as in an inaugural or marital rite. Other theories propose that magic is effective because symbols are able to affect internal psycho-physical states. They claim that the act of expressing a certain anxiety or desire can be reparative in itself.

Causes

A healing ritual (the laying on of hands)

According to theories of anxiety relief and control, people turn to magical beliefs when there exists a sense of uncertainty and potential danger, and with little access to logical or scientific responses to such danger. Magic is used to restore a sense of control over circumstance. In support of this theory, research indicates that superstitious behavior is invoked more often in high stress situations, especially by people with a greater desire for control.

Another potential reason for the persistence of magic rituals is that the rituals prompt their own use by creating a feeling of insecurity and then proposing themselves as precautions. Boyer and Liénard propose that in obsessive-compulsive rituals — a possible clinical model for certain forms of magical thinking — focus shifts to the lowest level of gestures, resulting in goal demotion. For example, an obsessive-compulsive cleaning ritual may overemphasize the order, direction, and number of wipes used to clean the surface. The goal becomes less important than the actions used to achieve the goal, with the implication that magic rituals can persist without efficacy because the intent is lost within the act. Alternatively, some cases of harmless "rituals" may have positive effects in bolstering intent, as may be the case with certain pre-game exercises in sports.

Some scholars believe that magic is effective psychologically. They cite the placebo effect and psychosomatic disease as prime examples of how our mental functions exert power over our bodies. Similarly, Robin Horton suggests that engaging in magical practices surrounding healing can relieve anxiety, which could have a significant positive physical effect. In the absence of advanced health care, such effects would play a relatively major role, thereby helping to explain the persistence and popularity of such practices.

Phenomenological approach

Ariel Glucklich tries to understand magic from a subjective perspective, attempting to comprehend magic on a phenomenological, experientially based level. Glucklich seeks to describe the attitude that magical practitioners feel what he calls "magical consciousness" or the "magical experience". He explains that it is based upon "the awareness of the interrelatedness of all things in the world by means of simple but refined sense perception."

Another phenomenological model is that of Gilbert Lewis, who argues that "habit is unthinking". He believes that those practicing magic do not think of an explanatory theory behind their actions any more than the average person tries to grasp the pharmaceutical workings of aspirin. When the average person takes an aspirin, he does not know how the medicine chemically functions. He takes the pill with the premise that there is proof of efficacy. Similarly, many who avail themselves of magic do so without feeling the need to understand a causal theory behind it.

Social

Anthropology

In religion, folk religion, and superstitious beliefs, the posited causality is between religious ritual, prayer, meditation, trances, sacrifice, incantation, curses, benediction, faith healing, or the observance of a taboo, and an expected benefit or recompense. The use of a lucky charm or ritual, for example, is assumed to increase the probability that one will perform at a level so that one can achieve a desired goal or outcome.

Researchers have identified two possible principles as the formal causes of the attribution of false causal relationships:

• the temporal contiguity of two events
• "associative thinking", the association of entities based upon their resemblance to one another

Prominent Victorian theorists identified associative thinking (a common feature of practitioners of magic) as a characteristic form of irrationality. As with all forms of magical thinking, association-based and similarities-based notions of causality are not always said to be the practice of magic by a magician. For example, the doctrine of signatures held that similarities between plant parts and body parts indicated their efficacy in treating diseases of those body parts, and was a part of Western medicine during the Middle Ages. This association-based thinking is a vivid example of the general human application of the representativeness heuristic.

Edward Burnett Tylor coined the term "associative thinking", characterizing it as pre-logical, in which the "magician's folly" is in mistaking an imagined connection with a real one. The magician believes that thematically linked items can influence one another by virtue of their similarity. For example, in E. E. Evans-Pritchard's account, members of the Azande tribe believe that rubbing crocodile teeth on banana plants can invoke a fruitful crop. Because crocodile teeth are curved (like bananas) and grow back if they fall out, the Azande observe this similarity and want to impart this capacity of regeneration to their bananas. To them, the rubbing constitutes a means of transference.

Sir James Frazer (1854–1941) elaborated upon Tylor's principle by dividing magic into the categories of sympathetic and contagious magic. The latter is based upon the law of contagion or contact, in which two things that were once connected retain this link and have the ability to affect their supposedly related objects, such as harming a person by harming a lock of his hair. Sympathetic magic and homeopathy operate upon the premise that "like affects like", or that one can impart characteristics of one object to a similar object. Frazer believed that some individuals think the entire world functions according to these mimetic, or homeopathic, principles.

In How Natives Think (1925), Lucien Lévy-Bruhl describes a similar notion of mystical, "collective representations". He too sees magical thinking as fundamentally different from a Western style of thought. He asserts that in these representations, "primitive" people's "mental activity is too little differentiated for it to be possible to consider ideas or images of objects by themselves apart from the emotions and passions which evoke those ideas or are evoked by them". Lévy-Bruhl explains that the indigenous people commit the post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy, in which people observe that x is followed by y, and conclude that x has caused y. He believes that this fallacy is institutionalized in native culture and is committed regularly and repeatedly.

Despite the view that magic is less than rational and entails an inferior concept of causality, in The Savage Mind (1966), Claude Lévi-Strauss suggested that magical procedures are relatively effective in exerting control over the environment. This outlook has generated alternative theories of magical thinking, such as the symbolic and psychological approaches, and softened the contrast between "educated" and "primitive" thinking: "Magical thinking is no less characteristic of our own mundane intellectual activity than it is of Zande curing practices."

Cultural differences

Robin Horton maintains that the difference between the thinking of Western and of non-Western peoples is predominantly "idiomatic". He says that the members of both cultures use the same practical common-sense, and that both science and magic are ways beyond basic logic by which people formulate theories to explain whatever occurs. However, non-Western cultures use the idiom of magic and have community spiritual figures, and therefore non-Westerners turn to magical practices or to a specialist in that idiom. Horton sees the same logic and common-sense in all cultures, but notes that their contrasting ontological idioms lead to cultural practices which seem illogical to observers whose own culture has correspondingly contrasting norms. He explains, "[T]he layman's grounds for accepting the models propounded by the scientist are often no different from the young African villager's ground for accepting the models propounded by one of his elders."

Along similar lines, Michael F. Brown argues that the Aguaruna of Peru see magic as a type of technology, no more supernatural than their physical tools. Brown says that the Aguaruna utilize magic in an empirical manner; for example, they discard any magical stones which they have found to be ineffective. To Brown—as to Horton—magical and scientific thinking differ merely in idiom. These theories blur the boundaries between magic, science, and religion, and focus on the similarities in magical, technical, and spiritual practices. Brown even ironically writes that he is tempted to disclaim the existence of 'magic.'

One theory of substantive difference is that of the open versus closed society. Horton describes this as one of the key dissimilarities between traditional thought and Western science. He suggests that the scientific worldview is distinguished from a magical one by the scientific method and by skepticism, requiring the falsifiability of any scientific hypothesis. He notes that for native peoples "there is no developed awareness of alternatives to the established body of theoretical texts." He notes that all further differences between traditional and Western thought can be understood as a result of this factor. He says that because there are no alternatives in societies based on magical thought, a theory does not need to be objectively judged to be valid.

In children

According to Jean Piaget's Theory of Cognitive Development, magical thinking is most prominent in children between ages 2 and 7. Due to examinations of grieving children, it is said that during this age, children strongly believe that their personal thoughts have a direct effect on the rest of the world. It is posited that their minds will create a reason to feel responsible if they experience something tragic that they do not understand, e.g. a death. Jean Piaget, a developmental psychologist, came up with a theory of four developmental stages.

Children between ages 2 and 7 would be classified under his preoperational stage of development. During this stage children are still developing their use of logical thinking. A child's thinking is dominated by perceptions of physical features, meaning that if the child is told that a family pet has "gone away to a farm" when it has in fact died, then the child will have difficulty comprehending the transformation of the dog not being around anymore. Magical thinking would be evident here, since the child may believe that the family pet being gone is just temporary. Their young minds in this stage do not understand the finality of death and magical thinking may bridge the gap.

Grief

It was discovered that children often feel that they are responsible for an event or events occurring or are capable of reversing an event simply by thinking about it and wishing for a change: namely, "magical thinking". Make-believe and fantasy are an integral part of life at this age and are often used to explain the inexplicable.

According to Piaget, children within this age group are often "egocentric", believing that what they feel and experience is the same as everyone else's feelings and experiences. Also at this age, there is often a lack of ability to understand that there may be other explanations for events outside of the realm of things they have already comprehended. What happens outside their understanding needs to be explained using what they already know, because of an inability to fully comprehend abstract concepts.

Magical thinking is found particularly in children's explanations of experiences about death, whether the death of a family member or pet, or their own illness or impending death. These experiences are often new for a young child, who at that point has no experience to give understanding of the ramifications of the event. A child may feel that they are responsible for what has happened, simply because they were upset with the person who died, or perhaps played with the pet too roughly. There may also be the idea that if the child wishes it hard enough, or performs just the right act, the person or pet may choose to come back, and not be dead any longer.

When considering their own illness or impending death, some children may feel that they are being punished for doing something wrong, or not doing something they should have, and therefore have become ill. If a child's ideas about an event are incorrect because of their magical thinking, there is a possibility that the conclusions the child makes could result in long-term beliefs and behaviours that create difficulty for the child as they mature.

Related terms

"Quasi-magical thinking" describes "cases in which people act as if they erroneously believe that their action influences the outcome, even though they do not really hold that belief". People may realize that a superstitious intuition is logically false, but act as if it were true because they do not exert an effort to correct the intuition.