From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Republic (Greek: Πολιτεία, translit. Politeia; Latin: De Republica[1]) is a Socratic dialogue, authored by Plato around 375 BC, concerning justice (δικαιοσύνη), the order and character of the just city-state, and the just man.[2] It is Plato's best-known work, and has proven to be one of the world's most influential works of philosophy and political theory, both intellectually and historically.[3][4]
In the dialogue, Socrates
talks with various Athenians and foreigners about the meaning of
justice and whether the just man is happier than the unjust man.[5]
They consider the natures of existing regimes and then propose a
series of different, hypothetical cities in comparison, culminating in
Kallipolis (Καλλίπολις), a utopian city-state ruled by a philosopher-king. They also discuss the theory of forms, the immortality of the soul, and the role of the philosopher and of poetry in society.[6] The dialogue's setting seems to be during the Peloponnesian War.[7]
Structure
By book
Book I
While visiting the Piraeus with Glaucon, Polemarchus tells Socrates to join him for a romp. Socrates then asks Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus
their definitions of justice. Cephalus defines justice as giving what
is owed. Polemarchus says justice is "the art which gives good to
friends and evil to enemies." Thrasymachus proclaims "justice is nothing
else than the interest of the stronger." Socrates overturns their
definitions and says that it is to one's advantage to be just and
disadvantage to be unjust. The first book ends in aporia concerning its essence.
Book II
Socrates believes he has answered Thrasymachus and is done with the discussion of justice.
Socrates' young companions, Glaucon and Adeimantus,
continue the argument of Thrasymachus for the sake of furthering the
discussion. Glaucon gives a lecture in which he argues first that the
origin of justice was in social contracts aimed at preventing one from
suffering injustice and being unable to take revenge, second that all
those who practice justice do so unwillingly and out of fear of
punishment, and third that the life of the unjust man is far more
blessed than that of the just man. Glaucon would like Socrates to prove
that justice is not only desirable, but that it belongs to the highest
class of desirable things: those desired both for their own sake and
their consequences. To demonstrate the problem, he tells the story of Gyges, who – with the help of a ring that turns him invisible – achieves great advantages for himself by committing injustices.
After Glaucon's speech, Adeimantus
adds that, in this thought experiment, the unjust should not fear any
sort of divine judgement in the afterlife, since the very poets who
wrote about such judgement also wrote that the gods would grant
forgiveness to those humans who made ample religious sacrifice.
Adeimantus demonstrates his reason by drawing two detailed portraits,
that the unjust man could grow wealthy by injustice, devoting a
percentage of this gain to religious losses, thus rendering him innocent
in the eyes of the gods.
Socrates suggests that they look for justice in a city rather
than in an individual man. After attributing the origin of society to
the individual not being self-sufficient and having many needs which he
cannot supply himself, they go on to describe the development of the
city. Socrates first describes the "healthy state", but Glaucon asks him
to describe "a city of pigs", as he finds little difference between the
two. He then goes on to describe the luxurious city, which he calls "a
fevered state".[8] This requires a guardian class
to defend and attack on its account. This begins a discussion
concerning the type of education that ought to be given to these
guardians in their early years, including the topic of what kind of
stories are appropriate. They conclude that stories that ascribe evil
to the gods are untrue and should not be taught.
Book III
Socrates and his companions Adeimantus and Glaucon conclude their discussion concerning education. Socrates breaks the educational system into two. They suggest that guardians should be educated in these four cardinal virtues:
wisdom, courage, justice and temperance. They also suggest that the
second part of the guardians' education should be in gymnastics. With
physical training they will be able to live without needing frequent
medical attention: physical training will help prevent illness and
weakness. Socrates asserts that both male and female guardians be given
the same education, that all wives and children be shared, and that they
be prohibited from owning private property.
In the fictional tale known as the myth or parable of the metals,
Socrates presents the Noble Lie
(γενναῖον ψεῦδος, gennaion pseudos), to explain the origin of the three
social classes. Socrates proposes and claims that if the people
believed "this myth...[it] would have a good effect, making them more
inclined to care for the state and one another."[9]
Book IV
Socrates
and his companions conclude their discussion concerning the lifestyle
of the guardians, thus concluding their initial assessment of the city
as a whole. Socrates assumes each person will be happy engaging in the
occupation that suits them best. If the city as a whole is happy, then
individuals are happy. In the physical education and diet of the
guardians, the emphasis is on moderation, since both poverty and
excessive wealth will corrupt them (422a1). Without controlling their
education, the city cannot control the future rulers. Socrates says that
it is pointless to worry over specific laws, like those pertaining to
contracts, since proper education ensures lawful behavior, and poor
education causes lawlessness (425a–425c).[10]
Socrates proceeds to search for wisdom, courage, and temperance
in the city, on the grounds that justice will be easier to discern in
what remains (427e). They find wisdom among the guardian rulers, courage
among the guardian warriors (or auxiliaries), temperance among all
classes of the city in agreeing about who should rule and who should be
ruled. Finally, Socrates defines justice in the city as the state in
which each class performs only its own work, not meddling in the work of
the other classes (433b).
The virtues discovered in the city are then sought in the
individual soul. For this purpose, Socrates creates an analogy between
the parts of the city and the soul (the city–soul analogy). He argues
that psychological conflict points to a divided soul, since a completely
unified soul could not behave in opposite ways towards the same object,
at the same time, and in the same respect (436b).[11] He gives examples of possible conflicts between the rational, spirited, and appetitive parts of the soul, corresponding to the rulers, auxiliaries, and producing classes in the city.
Having established the tripartite soul, Socrates defines the
virtues of the individual. A person is wise if he is ruled by the part
of the soul that knows “what is beneficial for each part and for the
whole,” courageous if his spirited part “preserves in the midst of
pleasures and pains” the decisions reached by the rational part, and
temperate if the three parts agree that the rational part lead (442c–d).[12]
They are just if each part of the soul attends to its function and not
the function of another. It follows from this definition that one cannot
be just if one doesn't have the other cardinal virtues.[11]
Book V
Socrates,
having to his satisfaction defined the just constitution of both city
and psyche, moves to elaborate upon the four unjust constitutions of
these. Adeimantus and Polemarchus interrupt, asking Socrates instead
first to explain how the sharing of wives and children in the guardian
class is to be defined and legislated, a theme first touched on in Book
III. Socrates is overwhelmed at their request, categorizing it as three
"waves" of attack against which his reasoning must stand firm. These
three waves challenge Socrates' claims that
- both male and female guardians ought to receive the same education
- human reproduction ought to be regulated by the state and all offspring should be ignorant of their actual biological parents
- such a city and its corresponding philosopher-king could actually come to be in the real world.
Book VI
Socrates'
argument is that in the ideal city, a true philosopher with
understanding of forms will facilitate the harmonious co-operation of
all the citizens of the city—the governance of a city-state is likened to the command of a ship, the Ship of State.
This philosopher-king must be intelligent, reliable, and willing to
lead a simple life. However, these qualities are rarely manifested on
their own, and so they must be encouraged through education and the
study of the Good. Just as visible objects must be illuminated in order
to be seen, so must also be true of objects of knowledge if light is
cast on them.
Book VII
Socrates elaborates upon the immediately preceding Analogies of the Sun and of the Divided Line in the Allegory of the Cave,
in which he insists that the psyche must be freed from bondage to the
visible/sensible world by making the painful journey into the
intelligible world. He continues in the rest of this book by further
elaborating upon the curriculum which a would-be philosopher-king must
study. This is the origin of the quadrivium: arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music.
Next, they elaborate on the education of the philosopher-king.
Until age 18, would-be guardians should be engaged in basic intellectual
study and physical training, followed by two years of military
training. However, a correction is then introduced where the study of
gymnastics (martial arts) and warfare – 3 plus 2 years, respectively –
are supplanted by philosophy for 5 years instead. Next, they receive ten
years of mathematics until age 30, and then five years of dialectic
training. Guardians then spend the next 15 years as leaders, trying to
"lead people from the cave". Upon reaching 50, they are fully aware of
the form of good, and totally mature and ready to lead.
Book VIII
Socrates discusses four unjust constitutions: timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny.
He argues that a society will decay and pass through each government in
succession, eventually becoming a tyranny, the most unjust regime of
all.
The starting point is an imagined, alternate aristocracy
(ruled by a philosopher-king); a just government dominated by the
wisdom-loving element. When its social structure breaks down and enters
civil war, it is replaced by timocracy. The timocratic government is
dominated by the spirited element, with a ruling class of
property-owners consisting of warriors or generals (Ancient Sparta
is an example). As the emphasis on honor is compromised by wealth
accumulation, it is replaced by oligarchy. The oligarchic government is
dominated by the desiring element, in which the rich are the ruling
class. The gap between rich and poor widens, culminating in a revolt by
the underclass majority, establishing a democracy. Democracy emphasizes
maximum freedom, so power is distributed evenly. It is also dominated by
the desiring element, but in an undisciplined, unrestrained way. The
populism of the democratic government leads to mob rule, fueled by fear
of oligarchy, which a clever demagogue
can exploit to take power and establish tyranny. In a tyrannical
government, the city is enslaved to the tyrant, who uses his guards to
remove the best social elements and individuals from the city to retain
power (since they pose a threat), while leaving the worst. He will also
provoke warfare to consolidate his position as leader. In this way,
tyranny is the most unjust regime of all.
In parallel to this, Socrates considers the individual or soul
that corresponds to each of these regimes. He describes how an
aristocrat may become weak or detached from political and material
affluence, and how his son will respond to this by becoming overly
ambitious. The timocrat in turn may be defeated by the courts or vested
interests; his son responds by accumulating wealth in order to gain
power in society and defend himself against the same predicament,
thereby becoming an oligarch. The oligarch's son will grow up with
wealth without having to practice thrift or stinginess, and will be
tempted and overwhelmed by his desires, so that he becomes democratic,
valuing freedom above all.
Book IX
Having
discussed the tyrannical constitution of a city, Socrates wishes to
discuss the tyrannical constitution of a psyche. This is all intended to
answer Thrasymachus' first argument in Book I, that the life of the
unjust man (here understood as a true tyrant) is more blessed than that
of the just man (the philosopher-king).
First, he describes how a tyrannical man develops from a
democratic household. The democratic man is torn between tyrannical
passions and oligarchic discipline, and ends up in the middle ground:
valuing all desires, both good and bad. The tyrant will be tempted in
the same way as the democrat, but without an upbringing in discipline or
moderation to restrain him. Therefore, his most base desires and
wildest passions overwhelm him, and he becomes driven by lust, using
force and fraud to take whatever he wants. The tyrant is both a slave to
his lusts, and a master to whomever he can enslave.
Because of this, tyranny is the regime with the least freedom and
happiness, and the tyrant is most unhappy of all, since the regime and
soul correspond. His desires are never fulfilled, and he always must
live in fear of his victims. Because the tyrant can only think in terms
of servant and master, he has no equals whom he can befriend, and with
no friends the tyrant is robbed of freedom. This is the first proof that
it is better to be just than unjust. The second proof is derived from
the tripartite theory of soul. The wisdom-loving soul is best equipped
to judge what is best through reason, and the wise individual judges
wisdom to be best, then honor, then desire. This is the just proportion
for the city or soul and stands opposite to tyranny, which is entirely
satiated on base desires. The third proof follows from this. He
describes how the soul can be misled into experiencing false pleasure:
for example, a lack of pain can seem pleasurable by comparison to a
worse state. True pleasure is had by being fulfilled by things that fit
one's nature. Wisdom is the most fulfilling and is the best guide, so
the only way for the three drives of the soul to function properly and
experience the truest pleasure is by allowing wisdom to lead. To
conclude the third proof, the wisdom element is best at providing
pleasure, while tyranny is worst because it is furthest removed from
wisdom.
Finally, Socrates considers the multiple of how much worse
tyranny is than the kingly/disciplined/wise temperament, and even
quantifies the tyrant as living 729 times more painfully/less joyfully
than the king. He then gives the example of a chimera to further
illustrate justice and the tripartite soul.
The discussion concludes by refuting Thrasymachus' argument and
designating the most blessed life as that of the just man and the most
miserable life as that of the unjust man.
Book X
Concluding a theme brought up most explicitly in the Analogies of the Sun and Divided Line in Book VI, Socrates finally rejects any form of imitative art
and concludes that such artists have no place in the just city. He
continues on to argue for the immortality of the psyche and even
espouses a theory of reincarnation.
He finishes by detailing the rewards of being just, both in this life
and the next. Artists create things but they are only different copies
of the idea of the original.
"And whenever any one informs us that he has found a man who knows all
the arts, and all things else that anybody knows, and every single thing
with a higher degree of accuracy than any other man—whoever tells us
this, I think that we can only imagine to be a simple creature who is
likely to have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he met, and
whom he thought all-knowing, because he himself was unable to analyze
the nature of knowledge and ignorance and imitation."[13]
"And the same object appears straight when looked at out of the
water, and crooked when in the water; and the concave becomes convex,
owing to the illusion about colours to which the sight is liable. Thus
every sort of confusion is revealed within us; and this is that weakness
of the human mind on which the art of conjuring and deceiving by light
and shadow and other ingenious devices imposes, having an effect upon us
like magic."[13]
He speaks about illusions and confusion. Things can look very
similar, but be different in reality. Because we are human, at times we
cannot tell the difference between the two.
"And does not the same hold also of the ridiculous? There are
jests which you would be ashamed to make yourself, and yet on the comic
stage, or indeed in private, when you hear them, you are greatly amused
by them, and are not at all disgusted at their unseemliness—the case of
pity is repeated—there is a principle in human nature which is disposed
to raise a laugh, and this which you once restrained by reason, because
you were afraid of being thought a buffoon, is now let out again; and
having stimulated the risible faculty at the theatre, you are betrayed
unconsciously to yourself into playing the comic poet at home."
With all of us, we may approve of something, as long we are not
directly involved with it. If we joke about it, we are supporting it.
"Quite true, he said.
And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other affections,
of desire and pain and pleasure, which are held to be inseparable from
every action—in all of them poetry feeds and waters the passions instead
of drying them up; she lets them rule, although they ought to be
controlled, if mankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue."[13]
Sometimes we let our passions rule our actions or way of
thinking, although they should be controlled, so that we can increase
our happiness.
Scholarly views
P. Oxy. 3679, manuscript from the 3rd century AD, containing fragments of Plato's Republic.
Three interpretations of the Republic are presented in the
following section; they are not exhaustive in their treatments of the
work, but are examples of contemporary interpretation.
Bertrand Russell
In his A History of Western Philosophy (1945), Bertrand Russell identifies three parts to the Republic:[14]
- Books I–V: from the attempt to define justice, the description of an ideal community (a "utopia") and the education of its Guardians;
- Books VI–VII: the nature of philosophers, the ideal rulers of such a community;
- Books VIII–X: the pros and cons of various practical forms of government.
The core of the second part is the Allegory of the Cave and the discussion of the theory of ideal forms. The third part concerns the Five Regimes and is strongly related to the later dialogue The Laws; and the Myth of Er.
Cornford, Hildebrandt, and Voegelin
Francis Cornford, Kurt Hildebrandt [de], and Eric Voegelin contributed to an establishment of sub-divisions marked with special formulae in Greek:
- Prologue
- I.1. 327a–328b. Descent to the Piraeus
- I.2–I.5. 328b–331d. Cephalus. Justice of the older generation
- I.6–1.9. 331e–336a. Polemarchus. Justice of the middle generation
- I.10–1.24. 336b–354c. Thrasymachus. Justice of the sophist
- Introduction
- II.1–II.10. 357a–369b. The question: Is justice better than injustice?
- Part I
- Genesis and order of the polis: II.11–II.16. 369b–376e. Genesis of the polis
- II.16–III.18. 376e–412b. Education of the guardians
- III.19–IV.5. 412b–427c. Constitution of the polis
- IV.6–IV.19. 427c–445e. Justice in the polis
- Part II
- Embodiment of the idea: V.1–V.16. 449a–471c. Somatic unity of polis and the Hellenes
- V.17–VI.14. 471c–502c. Rule of the philosophers
- VI.19–VII.5. 502c–521c. The Idea of the Agathon
- VII.6–VII.18. 521c–541b. Education of the philosophers
- Part III
- Decline of the polis: VIII.1–VIII.5. 543a–550c. Timocracy
- VIII.6–VIII.9. 550c–555b. Oligarchy
- VIII.10–VIII.13. 555b–562a. Democracy
- VIII.14–IX.3. 562a–576b. Tyranny
- Conclusion
- IX.4–IX.13. 576b–592b Answer: Justice is better than injustice.
- Epilogue
- X.1–X.8. 595a–608b. Rejection of mimetic art
- X.9–X.11. 608c–612a. Immortality of the soul
- X.12. 612a–613e. Rewards of justice in life
- X.13–X.16. 613e–621d. Judgment of the dead
The paradigm of the city—the idea of the Good, the Agathon—has
manifold historical embodiments, undertaken by those who have seen the
Agathon, and are ordered via the vision. The centerpiece of the Republic, Part II, nos. 2–3, discusses the rule of the philosopher, and the vision of the Agathon with the Allegory of the Cave, which is clarified in the theory of forms. The centerpiece is preceded and followed by the discussion of the means that will secure a well-ordered polis
(city). Part II, no. 1, concerns marriage, the community of people and
goods for the guardians, and the restraints on warfare among the
Hellenes. It describes a partially communistic polis.
Part II, no. 4, deals with the philosophical education of the rulers
who will preserve the order and character of the city-state.
In part II, the Embodiment of the Idea, is preceded by the establishment of the economic and social orders of a polis
(part I), followed by an analysis (part III) of the decline the order
must traverse. The three parts compose the main body of the dialogues,
with their discussions of the "paradigm", its embodiment, its genesis,
and its decline.
The introduction and the conclusion are the frame for the body of the Republic.
The discussion of right order is occasioned by the questions: "Is
justice better than injustice?" and "Will an unjust man fare better than
a just man?" The introductory question is balanced by the concluding
answer: "Justice is preferable to injustice". In turn, the foregoing are
framed with the Prologue (Book I) and the Epilogue (Book X). The prologue is a short dialogue about the common public doxai (opinions) about justice. Based upon faith, and not reason, the Epilogue describes the new arts and the immortality of the soul.
Leo Strauss
Leo Strauss identified a four-part structure to the Republic,[citation needed]
perceiving the dialogues as a drama enacted by particular characters,
each with a particular perspective and level of intellect:
- Book I: Socrates is forcefully compelled to the house of
Cephalus. Three definitions of justice are presented, all are found
lacking.
- Books II–V: Glaucon and Adeimantus
challenge Socrates to prove why a perfectly just man, perceived by the
world as an unjust man, would be happier than the perfectly unjust man
who hides his injustice and is perceived by the world as a just man.
Their challenge begins and propels the dialogues; in answering the
challenge, of the "charge", Socrates reveals his behavior with the young
men of Athens, whom he later was convicted of corrupting. Because
Glaucon and Adeimantus presume a definition of justice, Socrates
digresses; he compels the group's attempt to discover justice, and then
answers the question posed to him about the intrinsic value of the just
life.
- Books V–VI: The "Just City in Speech" is built from the earlier
books, and concerns three critiques of the city. Leo Strauss reported
that his student Allan Bloom
identified them as: communism, communism of wives and children, and the
rule of philosophers. The "Just City in Speech" stands or falls by
these complications.
- Books VII–X: Socrates has "escaped" his captors, having momentarily
convinced them that the just man is the happy man, by reinforcing their
prejudices. He presents a rationale for political decay, and concludes
by recounting The Myth of Er ("everyman"), consolation for non-philosophers who fear death.[citation needed]
Topics
Definition of justice
In the first book, two definitions of justice are proposed but deemed inadequate.[15]
Returning debts owed, and helping friends while harming enemies, are
commonsense definitions of justice that, Socrates shows, are inadequate
in exceptional situations, and thus lack the rigidity demanded of a definition.
Yet he does not completely reject them, for each expresses a
commonsense notion of justice that Socrates will incorporate into his
discussion of the just regime in books II through V.
At the end of Book I, Socrates agrees with Polemarchus that
justice includes helping friends, but says the just man would never do
harm to anybody. Thrasymachus believes that Socrates has done the men
present an injustice by saying this and attacks his character and
reputation in front of the group, partly because he suspects that
Socrates himself does not even believe harming enemies is unjust.
Thrasymachus gives his understanding of justice and injustice as
"justice is what is advantageous to the stronger, while injustice is to
one's own profit and advantage".[16]
Socrates finds this definition unclear and begins to question
Thrasymachus. Socrates then asks whether the ruler who makes a mistake
by making a law that lessens their well-being, is still a ruler
according to that definition. Thrasymachus agrees that no true ruler
would make such an error. This agreement allows Socrates to undermine
Thrasymachus' strict definition of justice by comparing rulers to people
of various professions. Thrasymachus consents to Socrates' assertion
that an artist is someone who does his job well, and is a knower of some
art, which allows him to complete the job well. In so doing Socrates
gets Thrasymachus to admit that rulers who enact a law that does not
benefit them firstly, are in the precise sense not rulers.
Thrasymachus gives up, and is silent from then on. Socrates has trapped
Thrasymachus into admitting the strong man who makes a mistake is not
the strong man in the precise sense, and that some type of knowledge is
required to rule perfectly. However, it is far from a satisfactory
definition of justice.
At the beginning of Book II, Plato's two brothers challenge
Socrates to define justice in the man, and unlike the rather short and
simple definitions offered in Book I, their views of justice are
presented in two independent speeches. Glaucon's speech reprises
Thrasymachus' idea of justice; it starts with the legend of Gyges, who discovered a ring (the so-called Ring of Gyges)
that gave him the power to become invisible. Glaucon uses this story to
argue that no man would be just if he had the opportunity of doing
injustice with impunity.
With the power to become invisible, Gyges is able to seduce the queen,
murder the king, and take over the kingdom. Glaucon argues that the just
as well as the unjust man would do the same if they had the power to
get away with injustice exempt from punishment. The only reason that men
are just and praise justice is out of fear of being punished for
injustice. The law is a product of compromise between individuals who
agree not to do injustice to others if others will not do injustice to
them. Glaucon says that if people had the power to do injustice without
fear of punishment, they would not enter into such an agreement. Glaucon
uses this argument to challenge Socrates to defend the position that
the just life is better than the unjust life. Adeimantus adds to
Glaucon's speech the charge that men are only just for the results that
justice brings one fortune, honor, reputation. Adeimantus challenges
Socrates to prove that being just is worth something in and of itself,
not only as a means to an end.
Socrates says that there is no better topic to debate. In
response to the two views of injustice and justice presented by Glaucon
and Adeimantus, he claims incompetence, but feels it would be impious to
leave justice in such doubt. Thus the Republic sets out to define justice. Given the difficulty of this task as proven in Book I, Socrates
in Book II leads his interlocutors into a discussion of justice in the
city, which Socrates suggests may help them see justice not only in the
person, but on a larger scale, "first in cities searching for what it
is; then thusly we could examine also in some individual, examining the
likeness of the bigger in the idea of the littler" (368e–369a).[17]
For over two and a half millennia, scholars have differed on the
aptness of the city–soul analogy Socrates uses to find justice in Books
II through V.[18] The Republic
is a dramatic dialogue, not a treatise. Socrates' definition of justice
is never unconditionally stated, only versions of justice within each
city are "found" and evaluated in Books II through Book V. Socrates
constantly refers the definition of justice back to the conditions of
the city for which it is created. He builds a series of myths, or noble lies,
to make the cities appear just, and these conditions moderate life
within the communities. The "earth born" myth makes all men believe that
they are born from the earth and have predestined natures within their
veins. Accordingly, Socrates defines justice as "working at that to
which he is naturally best suited", and "to do one's own business and
not to be a busybody" (433a–433b) and goes on to say that justice
sustains and perfects the other three cardinal virtues:
Temperance, Wisdom, and Courage, and that justice is the cause and
condition of their existence. Socrates does not include justice as a
virtue within the city, suggesting that justice does not exist within
the human soul either, rather it is the result of a "well ordered" soul.
A result of this conception of justice separates people into three
types; that of the soldier, that of the producer, and that of a ruler.
If a ruler can create just laws, and if the warriors can carry out the
orders of the rulers, and if the producers can obey this authority, then
a society will be just.
The city is challenged by Adeimantus and Glaucon throughout its
development: Adeimantus cannot find happiness in the city, and Glaucon
cannot find honor and glory. This hypothetical city contains no private
property, no marriage, or nuclear families. These are sacrificed for the
common good and doing what is best fitting to one's nature. In Book V
Socrates addresses the question of "natural-ness" of and possibility for
this city, concluding in Book VI, that the city's ontological status
regards a construction of the soul, not of an actual metropolis.
The rule of philosopher-kings
appear as the issue of possibility is raised. Socrates never positively
states what justice is in the human soul/city; it appears he has
created a city where justice is not found, but can be lost. It is as
though in a well-ordered state, justice is not even needed, since the
community satisfies the needs of humans.
In terms of why it is best to be just rather than unjust for the
individual, Plato prepares an answer in Book IX consisting of three main
arguments. Plato says that a tyrant's nature will leave him with
"horrid pains and pangs" and that the typical tyrant engages in a
lifestyle that will be physically and mentally exacting on such a ruler.
Such a disposition is in contrast to the truth-loving
philosopher-king, and a tyrant "never tastes of true freedom or
friendship". The second argument proposes that of all the different
types of people, only the philosopher is able to judge which type of
ruler is best since only he can see the Form of the Good.
Thirdly, Plato argues, "Pleasures which are approved of by the lover
of wisdom and reason are the truest." In sum, Plato argues that
philosophical pleasure is the only true pleasure since other pleasures
experienced by others are simply a neutral state free of pain.
Socrates points out the human tendency to be corrupted by power leads down the road to timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny.
From this, he concludes that ruling should be left to philosophers, who
are the most just and therefore least susceptible to corruption. This
"good city" is depicted as being governed by philosopher-kings;
disinterested persons who rule not for their personal enjoyment but for
the good of the city-state (polis). The philosophers have seen
the "Forms" and therefore know what is good. They understand the
corrupting effect of greed and own no property and receive no salary.
They also live in sober communism, eating and sleeping together.
The paradigmatic society which stands behind every historical
society is hierarchical, but social classes have a marginal
permeability; there are no slaves, no discrimination between men and
women. The men and women are both to be taught the same things, so they
are both able to be used for the same things (451e). In addition to the
ruling class of guardians (φύλακες), which abolished riches, there is a class of private producers (demiourgoi),
who may be rich or poor. A number of provisions aim to avoid making the
people weak: the substitution of a universal educational system for men
and women instead of debilitating music, poetry and theatre—a startling
departure from Greek society. These provisions apply to all classes,
and the restrictions placed on the philosopher-kings chosen from the
warrior class and the warriors are much more severe than those placed on
the producers, because the rulers must be kept away from any source of
corruption.
In Books V-VI the abolition of riches among the guardian class
(not unlike Max Weber's bureaucracy) leads controversially to the
abandonment of the typical family, and as such no child may know his or
her parents and the parents may not know their own children. Socrates
tells a tale which is the "allegory
of the good government". The rulers assemble couples for reproduction,
based on breeding criteria. Thus, stable population is achieved through
eugenics and social cohesion is projected to be high because familial
links are extended towards everyone in the city. Also the education of
the youth is such that they are taught of only works of writing that
encourage them to improve themselves for the state's good, and envision
(the) god(s) as entirely good, just, and the author(s) of only that
which is good.
In Books VII-X stand Plato's criticism of the forms of
government. It begins with the dismissal of timocracy, a sort of
authoritarian regime, not unlike a military dictatorship. Plato offers
an almost psychoanalytical explanation of the "timocrat" as one who saw
his father humiliated by his mother and wants to vindicate "manliness".
The third worst regime is oligarchy, the rule of a small band of rich
people, millionaires that only respect money. Then comes the democratic
form of government, and its susceptibility to being ruled by unfit
"sectarian" demagogues. Finally the worst regime is tyranny, where the
whimsical desires of the ruler became law and there is no check upon
arbitrariness.
Theory of universals
The Republic contains Plato's Allegory of the Cave with which he explains his concept of the Forms as an answer to the problem of universals.
The Allegory of the Cave primarily depicts Plato's distinction
between the world of appearances and the 'real' world of the Forms,[19]
as well as helping to justify the philosopher's place in society as
king. Plato imagines a group of people who have lived their entire lives
as prisoners, chained to the wall of a cave in the subterranean so they
are unable to see the outside world behind them. However a constant
flame illuminates various moving objects outside, which are silhouetted
on the wall of the cave visible to the prisoners. These prisoners,
through having no other experience of reality, ascribe forms to these
shadows such as either "dog" or "cat".
Plato then goes on to explain how the philosopher is akin to a
prisoner who is freed from the cave. The prisoner is initially blinded
by the light, but when he adjusts to the brightness he sees the fire and
the statues and how they caused the images witnessed inside the cave.
He sees that the fire and statues in the cave were just copies of the
real objects; merely imitations. This is analogous to the Forms. What we
see from day to day are merely appearances, reflections of the Forms.
The philosopher, however, will not be deceived by the shadows and will
hence be able to see the 'real' world, the world above that of
appearances; the philosopher will gain knowledge of things in
themselves. In this analogy the sun is representative of the Good. This
is the main object of the philosopher's knowledge. The Good can be
thought of as the form of Forms, or the structuring of the world as a
whole.
The prisoner's stages of understanding correlate with the levels on the divided line
which he imagines. The line is divided into what the visible world is
and what the intelligible world is, with the divider being the Sun. When
the prisoner is in the cave, he is obviously in the visible realm that
receives no sunlight, and outside he comes to be in the intelligible
realm.
The shadows witnessed in the cave correspond to the lowest level
on Plato's line, that of imagination and conjecture. Once the prisoner
is freed and sees the shadows for what they are he reaches the second
stage on the divided line, the stage of belief, for he comes to believe
that the statues in the cave are real. On leaving the cave, however, the
prisoner comes to see objects more real than the statues inside of the
cave, and this correlates with the third stage on Plato's line, thought.
Lastly, the prisoner turns to the sun which he grasps as the source of
truth, or the Form of the Good, and this last stage, named as dialectic,
is the highest possible stage on the line. The prisoner, as a result of
the Form of the Good, can begin to understand all other forms in
reality.
At the end of this allegory, Plato asserts that it is the
philosopher's burden to reenter the cave. Those who have seen the ideal
world, he says, have the duty to educate those in the material world.
Since the philosopher recognizes what is truly good only he is fit to
rule society according to Plato.
Dialectical forms of government
While Plato spends much of the Republic having Socrates
narrate a conversation about the city he founds with Glaucon and
Adeimantus "in speech", the discussion eventually turns to considering
four regimes that exist in reality and tend to degrade successively into
each other: timocracy, oligarchy (also called plutocracy), democracy
and tyranny (also called despotism).
Timocracy
Socrates defines a timocracy
as a government of people who love rule and honor. Socrates argues that
the timocracy emerges from aristocracy due to a civil war breaking out
among the ruling class and the majority. Over time, many more births
will occur to people who lack aristocratic, guardian qualities, slowly
drawing the populace away from knowledge, music, poetry and "guardian
education", toward money-making and the acquisition of possessions. This
civil war between those who value wisdom and those who value material
acquisition will continue until a compromise is reached. The timocracy
values war insofar as it satisfies a love of victory and honor. The
timocratic man loves physical training, and hunting, and values his
abilities in warfare.
Oligarchy
Temptations create a confusion between economic status and honor which is responsible for the emergence of oligarchy.
In Book VIII, Socrates suggests that wealth will not help a pilot to
navigate his ship, as his concerns will be directed centrally toward
increasing his wealth by whatever means, rather than seeking out wisdom
or honor. The injustice of economic disparity divides the rich and the
poor, thus creating an environment for criminals and beggars to emerge.
The rich are constantly plotting against the poor and vice versa. The
oligarchic constitution is based on property assessment and wealth
qualification. Unlike the timocracy, oligarchs are also unable to fight
war, since they do not wish to arm the majority for fear of their rising
up against them (fearing the majority even more than their enemies),
nor do they seem to pay mercenaries, since they are reluctant to spend
money.
Democracy
As this socioeconomic divide grows, so do tensions between social
classes. From the conflicts arising out of such tensions, the poor
majority overthrow the wealthy minority, and democracy
replaces the oligarchy preceding it. The poor overthrow the oligarchs
and grant liberties and freedoms to citizens, creating a most variegated
collection of peoples under a "supermarket" of constitutions. A
visually appealing demagogue
is soon lifted up to protect the interests of the lower class. However,
with too much freedom, no requirements for anyone to rule, and having
no interest in assessing the background of their rulers (other than
honoring such people because they wish the majority well) the people
become easily persuaded by such a demagogue's appeal to try to satisfy
people's common, base, and unnecessary pleasures.
Tyranny
The excessive freedoms granted to the citizens of a democracy ultimately leads to a tyranny,
the furthest regressed type of government. These freedoms divide the
people into three socioeconomic classes: the dominating class, the
elites and the commoners. Tensions between the dominating class and the
elites cause the commoners to seek out protection of their democratic
liberties. They invest all their power in their democratic demagogue,
who, in turn, becomes corrupted by the power and becomes a tyrant with a
small entourage of his supporters for protection and absolute control
of his people.
Reception and interpretation
Aristotle
Plato's most prominent pupil Aristotle, systematises many of Plato's analyses in his Politika, and criticizes the propositions of several political philosophers for the ideal city-state.
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Ancient Greece
It has been suggested that Isocrates parodies the Republic in his work Busiris by showing Callipolis' similarity to the Egyptian state founded by a king of that name.[20]
Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism, wrote his version of an ideal society, Zeno's Republic, in opposition to Plato's Republic.[21] Zeno's Republic was controversial and was viewed with some embarrassment by some of the later Stoics due to its defenses of free love, incest, and cannibalism and due to its opposition to ordinary education and the building of temples, law-courts, and gymnasia.
Ancient Rome
Cicero
The English title of Plato's dialogue is derived from Cicero's De re publica,
written some three centuries later. Cicero's dialogue imitates Plato's
style and treats many of the same topics, and Cicero's main character Scipio Aemilianus expresses his esteem for Plato and Socrates.
Res publica is not an exact translation of Plato's Greek title politeia. Rather, politeia is a general term for the actual and potential forms of government for a polis
or city-state, and Plato attempts to survey all possible forms of the
state. Cicero's discussion is more parochial, focusing on the
improvement of the participants' own state, the Roman Republic in its final stages.
Tacitus
In antiquity, Plato's works were largely acclaimed, but a few commentators regarded them as too theoretical. Tacitus, commented on such works as The Republic and Aristotle's Politics in his Annals (IV, 33):
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Nam cunctas nationes et urbes populus aut primores
aut singuli regunt: delecta ex iis (his) et consociata (constituta) rei
publicae forma laudari facilius quam evenire, vel si evenit, haud
diuturna esse potest.
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Indeed, a nation or city is ruled by the people, or by an upper class, or by a monarch. A government system that is invented from a choice of these same components is sooner idealised than realised; and even if realised, there will be no future for it.
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In this work, Tacitus undertakes the prosaic description and minute
analysis of how real states are governed, attempting to derive more
practical lessons about good versus bad governance than can be deduced
from speculations on ideal governments.
Augustine
In the pivotal era of Rome's move from its ancient polytheist religion to Christianity, Augustine wrote his magnum opus The City of God:
Again, the references to Plato, Aristotle and Cicero and their visions
of the ideal state were legion: Augustine equally described a model of
the "ideal city", in his case the eternal Jerusalem, using a visionary language not unlike that of the preceding philosophers.
Islam
Islamic philosophers were much more interested in Aristotle than Plato, but not having access to Aristotle's Politics, Ibn Rushd (Averroes) produced instead a commentary on
Plato's Republic. He advances an authoritarian ideal, following
Plato's paternalistic model. Absolute monarchy, led by a
philosopher-king, creates a justly ordered society. This requires
extensive use of coercion,[22] although persuasion is preferred and is possible if the young are properly raised.[23]
Rhetoric, not logic, is the appropriate road to truth for the common
man. Demonstrative knowledge via philosophy and logic requires special
study. Rhetoric aids religion in reaching the masses.[24]
Following Plato, Ibn Rushd accepts the principle of women's
equality. They should be educated and allowed to serve in the military;
the best among them might be tomorrow's philosophers or rulers.[25][26]
He also accepts Plato's illiberal measures such as the censorship of
literature. He uses examples from Arab history to illustrate just and
degenerate political orders.[27]
Hegel
Hegel respected Plato's theories of state and ethics much more than those of the early modern philosophers such as Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau, whose theories proceeded from a fictional "state of nature"
defined by humanity's "natural" needs, desires and freedom. For Hegel
this was a contradiction: since nature and the individual are
contradictory, the freedoms which define individuality as such are
latecomers on the stage of history. Therefore, these philosophers
unwittingly projected man as an individual in modern society onto a
primordial state of nature. Plato however had managed to grasp the
ideas specific to his time:
Plato is not the man to dabble in
abstract theories and principles; his truth-loving mind has recognized
and represented the truth of the world in which he lived, the truth of
the one spirit that lived in him as in Greece itself. No man can
overleap his time, the spirit of his time is his spirit also; but the
point at issue is, to recognize that spirit by its content.[28]
For Hegel, Plato's Republic is not an abstract theory or ideal which
is too good for the real nature of man, but rather is not ideal enough,
not good enough for the ideals already inherent or nascent in the
reality of his time; a time when Greece was entering decline. One such
nascent idea was about to crush the Greek way of life: modern
freedoms—or Christian freedoms in Hegel's view—such as the individual's
choice of his social class, or of what property to pursue, or which
career to follow. Such individual freedoms were excluded from Plato's
Republic:
Plato recognized and caught up the
true spirit of his times, and brought it forward in a more definite way,
in that he desired to make this new principle an impossibility in his
Republic.[29]
Greece being at a crossroads, Plato's new "constitution" in the Republic
was an attempt to preserve Greece: it was a reactionary reply to the
new freedoms of private property etc., that were eventually given legal
form through Rome. Accordingly, in ethical life, it was an attempt to
introduce a religion that elevated each individual not as an owner of
property, but as the possessor of an immortal soul.
20th century
Gadamer
In his 1934 Plato und die Dichter (Plato and the Poets), as well as several other works, Hans-Georg Gadamer describes the utopic city of the Republic as a heuristic utopia
that should not be pursued or even be used as an orientation-point for
political development. Rather, its purpose is said to be to show how
things would have to be connected, and how one thing would lead to
another—often with highly problematic results—if one would opt for
certain principles and carry them through rigorously. This
interpretation argues that large passages in Plato's writing are ironic, a line of thought initially pursued by Kierkegaard.
Popper
The city portrayed in the Republic struck some critics as harsh, rigid, and unfree; indeed, as totalitarian. Karl Popper gave a voice to that view in his 1945 book The Open Society and Its Enemies, where he singled out Plato's state as a dystopia. Popper distinguished Plato's ideas from those of Socrates, claiming that the former in his later years expressed none of the humanitarian and democratic tendencies of his teacher.[30]
Popper thought Plato's envisioned state totalitarian as it advocated a
government composed only of a distinct hereditary ruling class, with the
working class – who Popper argues Plato regards as "human cattle" –
given no role in decision making. He argues that Plato has no interest
in what are commonly regarded as the problems of justice – the
resolution of disputes between individuals – because Plato has redefined
justice as "keeping one's place".[31]
Voegelin
Eric Voegelin in Plato and Aristotle
(Baton Rouge, 1957), gave meaning to the concept of 'Just City in
Speech' (Books II-V). For instance, there is evidence in the dialogue
that Socrates himself would not be a member of his 'ideal' state. His life was almost solely dedicated to the private pursuit of knowledge.
More practically, Socrates suggests that members of the lower classes
could rise to the higher ruling class, and vice versa, if they had
'gold' in their veins—a version of the concept of social mobility. The exercise of power is built on the 'noble lie'
that all men are brothers, born of the earth, yet there is a clear
hierarchy and class divisions. There is a tripartite explanation of
human psychology that is extrapolated to the city, the relation among
peoples. There is no family among the guardians, another crude version of Max Weber's concept of bureaucracy
as the state non-private concern. Together with Leo Strauss, Voegelin
considered Popper's interpretation to be a gross misunderstanding not
only of the dialogue itself, but of the very nature and character of
Plato's entire philosophic enterprise.
Strauss and Bloom
Some of Plato's proposals have led theorists like Leo Strauss and Allan Bloom to ask readers to consider the possibility that Socrates
was creating not a blueprint for a real city, but a learning exercise
for the young men in the dialogue. There are many points in the
construction of the "Just City in Speech" that seem contradictory, which raise the possibility Socrates is employing irony to make the men in the dialogue question for themselves the ultimate value of the proposals. In turn, Plato has immortalized this 'learning exercise' in the Republic.
One of many examples is that Socrates calls the marriages of the ruling class 'sacred';
however, they last only one night and are the result of manipulating
and drugging couples into predetermined intercourse with the aim of
eugenically breeding guardian-warriors. Strauss and Bloom's
interpretations, however, involve more than just pointing out
inconsistencies; by calling attention to these issues they ask readers
to think more deeply about whether Plato is being ironic or genuine, for
neither Strauss nor Bloom present an unequivocal opinion, preferring to
raise philosophic doubt over interpretive fact.
Strauss's approach developed out of a belief that Plato wrote esoterically. The basic acceptance of the exoteric-esoteric
distinction revolves around whether Plato really wanted to see the
"Just City in Speech" of Books V-VI come to pass, or whether it is just
an allegory. Strauss never regarded this as the crucial issue of the dialogue. He argued against Karl Popper's literal view, citing Cicero's opinion that the Republic's true nature was to bring to light the nature of political things.[32]
In fact, Strauss undermines the justice found in the "Just City in
Speech" by implying the city is not natural, it is a man-made conceit
that abstracts away from the erotic needs of the body. The city founded
in the Republic "is rendered possible by the abstraction from eros".[33]
An argument that has been used against ascribing ironic intent to Plato is that Plato's Academy produced a number of tyrants
who seized political power and abandoned philosophy for ruling a city.
Despite being well-versed in Greek and having direct contact with Plato
himself, some of Plato's former students like Clearchus, tyrant of Heraclea; Chaeron, tyrant of Pellene; Erastus and Coriscus, tyrants of Skepsis; Hermias of Atarneus and Assos; and Calippus, tyrant of Syracuse
ruled people and did not impose anything like a philosopher-kingship.
However, it can be argued whether these men became "tyrants" through
studying in the Academy. Plato's school had an elite student body, some
of whom would by birth, and family expectation, end up in the seats of
power. Additionally, it is important to remember that it is by no means
obvious that these men were tyrants in the modern, totalitarian
sense of the concept. Finally, since very little is actually known
about what was taught at Plato's Academy, there is no small controversy
over whether it was even in the business of teaching politics at all.[34]
Fascism and Benito Mussolini
Mussolini utilized works of Plato, Georges Sorel, Nietzsche, and the economic ideas of Vilfredo Pareto, to develop fascism. Mussolini admired Plato's The Republic, which he often read for inspiration. The Republic
expounded a number of ideas that fascism promoted, such as rule by an
elite promoting the state as the ultimate end, opposition to democracy,
protecting the class system and promoting class collaboration, rejection
of egalitarianism, promoting the militarization of a nation by creating
a class of warriors, demanding that citizens perform civic duties in
the interest of the state, and utilizing state intervention in education
to promote the development of warriors and future rulers of the state.[36]
Plato was an idealist, focused on achieving justice and morality, while
Mussolini and fascism were realist, focused on achieving political
goals.[37]
Views on the city–soul analogy
Many critics, both ancient and modern (like Julia Annas),
have suggested that the dialogue's political discussion actually serves
as an analogy for the individual soul, in which there are also many
different "members" that can either conflict or else be integrated and
orchestrated under a just and productive "government." Among other
things, this analogical reading would solve the problem of certain
implausible statements Plato makes concerning an ideal political
republic. Norbert Blössner (2007)[38] argues that the Republic
is best understood as an analysis of the workings and moral improvement
of the individual soul with remarkable thoroughness and clarity. This
view, of course, does not preclude a legitimate reading of the Republic
as a political treatise (the work could operate at both levels). It
merely implies that it deserves more attention as a work on psychology
and moral philosophy than it has sometimes received.
Practicality
The above-mentioned views have in common that they view the Republic as a theoretical work, not as a set of guidelines for good governance.
However, Popper insists that the Republic, "was meant by its author not
so much as a theoretical treatise, but as a topical political
manifesto"[39] and Bertrand Russell argues that at least in intent, and all in all not so far from what was possible in ancient Greek city-states, the form of government portrayed in the Republic was meant as a practical one by Plato.[40]
21st century
One of Plato's recurring techniques in the Republic is to refine the concept of justice with reference to various examples of greater or lesser injustice. However, in The Concept of Injustice,[41] Eric Heinze
challenges the assumption that 'justice' and 'injustice' form a
mutually exclusive pair. Heinze argues that such an assumption traces
not from strict deductive logic, but from the arbitrary etymology of the
word 'injustice'. Heinze critiques what he calls 'classical' Western
justice theory for having perpetuated that logical error, which first
appears in Plato's Republic, but manifests throughout traditional political philosophy, in thinkers otherwise as different as Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel and Marx.
In 2001, a survey of over 1,000 academics and students voted the Republic the greatest philosophical text ever written. Julian Baggini
argued that although the work "was wrong on almost every point, the
questions it raises and the methods it uses are essential to the western
tradition of philosophy. Without it we might not have philosophy as we
know it."[42]
According to a survey, The Republic is the most studied book in the top universities in the United States.[43][44]
Martin Luther King, Jr., nominated The Republic as the one book he would have taken to a deserted island, alongside the Bible.[45]
In fiction, Jo Walton's 2015 novel The Just City explored the consequences of establishing a city-state based on the Republic in practice.
Place in Plato's corpus
The Republic is generally placed in the middle period of Plato's dialogues—that is, it is believed to be written after the early period dialogues but before the late period
dialogues. However, the distinction of this group from the early
dialogues is not as clear as the distinction of the late dialogues from
all the others. Nonetheless, Ritter, Arnim, and Baron—with their
separate methodologies—all agreed that the Republic was well distinguished, along with Parmenides, Phaedrus and Theaetetus.[46]
However, the first book of the Republic, which shares many
features with earlier dialogues, is thought to have originally been
written as a separate work, and then the remaining books were conjoined
to it, perhaps with modifications to the original of the first book.[47]
Fragments
Several
Oxyrhynchus Papyri fragments were found to contain parts of the
Republic, and from other works such as
Phaedo, or the dialogue
Gorgias, written around 200–300 CE.
[48] Fragments of a different version of Plato's
Republic were discovered in 1945, part of the
Nag Hammadi library, written ca. 350 CE.
[49] These findings highlight the influence of Plato during those times in Egypt.