Gaia philosophy (named after Gaia, Greekgoddess of the Earth) is a broadly inclusive term for related concepts that living organisms on a planet will affect the nature of their environment in order to make the environment more suitable for life. This set of hypotheses holds that all organisms on a life-giving planet regulate the biosphere
in such a way as to promote its habitability. Gaia concept draws a
connection between the survivability of a species (hence its evolutionary course) and its usefulness to the survival of other species.
While there were a number of precursors to Gaia hypothesis, the first scientific form of this idea was proposed as the Gaia hypothesis by James Lovelock, a UK chemist, in 1970. The Gaia hypothesis deals with the concept of biological homeostasis,
and claims the resident life forms of a host planet coupled with their
environment have acted and act like a single, self-regulating system.
This system includes the near-surface rocks, the soil, and the
atmosphere. Today many scientists consider such ideas to be unsupported
by, or at odds with, the available evidence (see Gaia hypothesis criticism). These theories are however significant in green politics.
Predecessors to the Gaia theory
There
are some mystical, scientific and religious predecessors to the Gaia
philosophy, which had a Gaia-like conceptual basis. Many religious
mythologies had a view of Earth as being a whole that is greater than
the sum of its parts (e.g. some Native American religions and various
forms of shamanism).
Lewis Thomas believed that Earth should be viewed as a single cell; he derived this view from Johannes Kepler's view of Earth as a single round organism.
Isaac Newton wrote of the earth, "Thus this Earth resembles a great animal or rather inanimate vegetable, draws in æthereall
breath for its dayly refreshment & vitall ferment & transpires
again with gross exhalations, And according to the condition of all
other things living ought to have its times of beginning youth old age
& perishing."
Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, a paleontologist and geologist,
believed that evolution fractally unfolded from cell to organism to
planet to solar system and ultimately the whole universe, as we humans
see it from our limited perspective. Teilhard later influenced Thomas Berry and many Catholic humanist thinkers of the 20th century.
Buckminster Fuller
is generally credited with making the idea respectable in Western
scientific circles in the 20th century. Building to some degree on his
observations and artifacts, e.g. the Dymaxion map of the Earth he created, others began to ask if there was a way to make the Gaia theory scientifically sound.
In 1931, L.G.M. Baas Becking delivered an inaugural lecture about Gaia in the sense of life and earth.
Many believe that these ideas cannot be considered scientific
hypotheses; by definition a scientific hypothesis must make testable
predictions. As the above claims are not currently testable, they are
outside the bounds of current science. This does not mean that these
ideas are not theoretically testable. As one can postulate tests that
could be applied, given enough time and space, then these ideas should
be seen as scientific hypotheses.
These are conjectures and perhaps can only be considered as
social and maybe political philosophy; they may have implications for theology, or thealogy as Zell-Ravenheart and Isaac Bonewits put it.
Range of views
According to James Kirchner
there is a spectrum of Gaia hypotheses, ranging from the undeniable to
radical. At one end is the undeniable statement that the organisms on
the Earth have radically altered its composition. A stronger position is
that the Earth's biosphere effectively acts as if it is a
self-organizing system which works in such a way as to keep its systems
in some kind of equilibrium that is conducive to life. Today many
scientists consider that such a view (and any stronger views) are
unlikely to be correct.
An even stronger claim is that all lifeforms are part of a single
planetary being, called Gaia. In this view, the atmosphere, the seas,
the terrestrial crust would be the result of interventions carried out
by Gaia, through the coevolving diversity of living organisms.
The most extreme form of Gaia theory is that the entire Earth is a
single unified organism with a highly intelligent mind that arose as an
emergent property of the whole biosphere. In this view, the Earth's biosphere is consciously
manipulating the climate in order to make conditions more conducive to
life. Scientists contend that there is no evidence at all to support
this last point of view, and it has come about because many people do
not understand the concept of homeostasis. Many non-scientists instinctively and incorrectly see homeostasis as a process that requires conscious control.
The more speculative versions of Gaia, including versions in
which it is believed that the Earth is actually conscious, sentient, and
highly intelligent, are usually considered outside the bounds of what
is usually considered science.
A variant of this hypothesis was developed by Lynn Margulis,
a microbiologist, in 1979.
Her version is sometimes called the "Gaia Theory" (note uppercase-T).
Her model is more limited in scope than the one that Lovelock proposed.
Whether this sort of system is present on Earth is still open to
debate. Some relatively simple homeostatic mechanisms are generally
accepted. For example, when atmosphericcarbon dioxide
levels rise, plants are able to grow better and thus remove more carbon
dioxide from the atmosphere. Other biological effects and feedbacks
exist, but the extent to which these mechanisms have stabilized and modified the Earth's overall climate is largely not known.
The Gaia hypothesis is sometimes viewed from significantly
different philosophical perspectives. Some environmentalists view it as
an almost conscious process, in which the Earth's ecosystem is literally viewed as a single unified organism. Some evolutionary biologists, on the other hand, view it as an undirected emergent property
of the ecosystem: as each individual species pursues its own
self-interest, their combined actions tend to have counterbalancing
effects on environmental change. Proponents of this view sometimes point
to examples of life's actions in the past that have resulted in
dramatic change rather than stable equilibrium, such as the conversion
of the Earth's atmosphere from a reducing environment to an oxygen-rich
one.
Depending on how strongly the case is stated, the hypothesis conflicts with mainstream neo-Darwinism.
Most biologists would accept Daisyworld-style homeostasis as possible,
but would certainly not accept the idea that this equates to the whole
biosphere acting as one organism.
A very small number of scientists, and a much larger number of environmental activists, claim that Earth's biosphere is consciously
manipulating the climate in order to make conditions more conducive to
life. Scientists contend that there is no evidence to support this
belief.
Gaia in the social sciences
A social science view of Gaia theory is the role of humans as a keystone species who may be able to accomplish global homeostasis.
Whilst a few social scientists who draw inspiration from 'organic'
views of society have embraced Gaia philosophy as a way to explain the
human-nature interconnections, most professional social scientists are
more involved in reflecting upon the way Gaia philosophy is used and
engaged with within sub-sections of society. Alan Marshall, in the Department of Social Sciences at Mahidol University,
for example, reflects upon the way Gaia philosophy has been used and
advocated in various societal settings by environmentalists,
spiritualists, managers, economists, and scientists and engineers (see
The Unity of Nature, 2002, Imperial College Press: London and
Singapore). As Marshall explains, most social scientists had already
given up on systems ideas of society in the 1960s before Gaia philosophy
was born under James Lovelock's ideas since such ideas were interpreted
as supporting conservatism and traditionalism.
Gaia in politics
Some radical political environmentalists who accept some form of the Gaia theory call themselves Gaians. They actively seek to restore the Earth's homeostasis — whenever they see it out of balance, e.g. to prevent manmade climate change, primate extinction, or rainforest loss.
In effect, they seek to cooperate to become the "system consciously
manipulating to make conditions more conducive to life". Such activity
defines the homeostasis, but for leverage it relies on deep
investigation of the homeorhetic balances, if only to find places to intervene in a system which is changing in undesirable ways.
Tony Bondhus brings up the point in his book, Society of Conceivia,
that if Gaia is alive, then societies are living things as well. This
suggests that our understanding of Gaia can be used to create a better
society and to design a better political system.
Other intellectuals in the environmental movement, like Edward Goldsmith,
have used Gaia in the completely opposite way; to stake a claim about
how Gaia's focus on natural balance and resistance and resilience,
should be emulated to design a conservative political system (as
explored in Alan Marshall's 2002 book The Unity of Nature, (Imperial College Press: London).
Gaians do not passively ask "what is going on", but rather, "what to do next", e.g. in terraforming or climate engineering or even on a small scale, such as gardening. Changes can be planned, agreed upon by many people, being very deliberate, as in urban ecology and especially industrial ecology.
Gaians argue that it is a human duty to act as such - committing themselves in particular to the Precautionary Principle. Such views began to influence the Green Parties, Greenpeace, and a few more radical wings of the environmental movement such as the Gaia Liberation Front and the Earth Liberation Front. These views dominate some such groups, e.g. the Bioneers. Some refer to this political activity as a separate and radical branch of the ecology movement,
one that takes the axioms of the science of ecology in general, and
Gaia theory in particular, and raises them to a kind of theory of personal conduct or moral code.
Gaia in religion
Hinduism
has many tenets of Nature worship and preservation. The ecologist and
theologian Anne Primavesi is the author of two books dealing with the
Gaia hypothesis and theology.
Rosemary Radford Ruether, the American feminist scholar and theologian, wrote a book called "Gaia and God: An Ecofeminist Theology of Earth Healing".
Many new age authors have written books which mix New Age teachings with Gaia philosophy. This is known as New Age Gaian.
Often referred to as Gaianism, or the Gaian Religion, this spiritual
aspect of the philosophy is very broad and inclusive, making it
adaptable to other religions: Taoism, Neo-Paganism, Pantheism,
Judeo-Christian Religions, and many others.
Semantic debate
The question of "what is an organism",
and at what scale is it rational to speak about organisms vs.
biospheres, gives rise to a semantic debate. We are all ecologies in the
sense that our (human) bodies contain gut bacteria, parasite species, etc., and to them our body is not organism but rather more of a microclimate or biome. Applying that thinking to whole planets:
The argument is that these symbiotic organisms, being unable to
survive apart from each other and their climate and local conditions,
form an organism in their own right, under a wider conception of the
term organism than is conventionally used. It is a matter for often
heated debate whether this is a valid usage of the term, but ultimately
it appears to be a semantic dispute.
In this sense of the word organism, it is argued under the theory that
the entire biomass of the Earth is a single organism (as Johannes Kepler thought).
Unfortunately, many supporters of the various Gaia theories do
not state exactly where they sit on this spectrum; this makes discussion
and criticism difficult.
Much effort on behalf of those analyzing the theory currently is
an attempt to clarify what these different hypotheses are, and whether
they are proposals to 'test' or 'manipulate' outcomes. Both Lovelock's
and Margulis's understanding of Gaia are considered scientific
hypotheses, and like all scientific theories are constantly put to the
test.
More speculative versions of Gaia, including all versions in
which it is held that the Earth is actually conscious, are currently
held to be outside the bounds of science, and are not supported by
either Lovelock or Margulis.
Gaian reproduction
One of the most problematic issues with referring to Gaia as an organism is its apparent failure to meet the biological criterion of being able to reproduce.
Obviously this limited view misunderstands cosmic cycles of death of
planets and stars into star stuff that creates more planets and stars
over billions of years. Richard Dawkins has asserted that the planet is not the offspring of any parents and is unable to reproduce.
Dialectic or dialectics (Greek: διαλεκτική, dialektikḗ; related to dialogue; German: Dialektik), also known as the dialectical method, is a discourse between two or more people holding different points of view about a subject but wishing to establish the truth through reasonedargumentation. Dialectic resembles debate, but the concept excludes subjective elements such as emotional appeal and the modern pejorative sense of rhetoric. Dialectic may thus be contrasted with both the eristic, which refers to argument that aims to successfully dispute another's argument (rather than searching for truth), and the didactic method, wherein one side of the conversation teaches the other. Dialectic is alternatively known as minor logic, as opposed to major logic or critique.
Within Hegelianism, the word dialectic has the specialised meaning of a contradiction between ideas that serves as the determining factor in their relationship. Dialectical materialism, a theory or set of theories produced mainly by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, adapted the Hegelian dialectic into arguments regarding traditional materialism. The dialectics of Hegel and Marx were criticized in the twentieth century by the philosophers Karl Popper and Mario Bunge.
Dialectic tends to imply a process of evolution and so does not naturally fit within classical logics, but was given some formalism in the twentieth century. The emphasis on process is particularly marked in Hegelian dialectic, and even more so in Marxist dialectical logic, which tried to account for the evolution of ideas over longer time periods in the real world.
Western dialectical forms
There is a variety of meanings of dialectic or dialectics within Western philosophy.
Classical philosophy
In classicalphilosophy, dialectic (διαλεκτική) is a form of reasoning based upon dialogue of arguments and counter-arguments, advocating propositions (theses) and counter-propositions (antitheses).
The outcome of such a dialectic might be the refutation of a relevant
proposition, or of a synthesis, or a combination of the opposing
assertions, or a qualitative improvement of the dialogue.
Moreover, the term "dialectic" owes much of its prestige to its role in the philosophies of Socrates and Plato, in the Greek Classical period (5th to 4th centuries BC). Aristotle said that it was the pre-Socratic philosopher Zeno of Elea who invented dialectic, of which the dialogues of Plato are the examples of the Socratic dialectical method.
According to Kant,
however, the ancient Greeks used the word "dialectic" to signify the
logic of false appearance or semblance. To the Ancients, "it was nothing
but the logic of illusion. It was a sophistic art of giving to one's
ignorance, indeed even to one's intentional tricks, the outward
appearance of truth, by imitating the thorough, accurate method which
logic always requires, and by using its topic as a cloak for every empty
assertion."
The Socratic dialogues are a particular form of dialectic known as the method of elenchus (literally, "refutation, scrutiny")
whereby a series of questions clarifies a more precise statement of a
vague belief, logical consequences of that statement are explored, and a
contradiction is discovered. The method is largely destructive, in that
false belief is exposed
and only constructive in that this exposure may lead to further search
for truth. The detection of error does not amount to a proof of the
antithesis; for example, a contradiction in the consequences of a
definition of piety does not provide a correct definition. The
principal aim of Socratic activity may be to improve the soul of the
interlocutors, by freeing them from unrecognized errors; or indeed, by
teaching them the spirit of inquiry.
In common cases, Socrates used enthymemes as the foundation of his argument.
For example, in the Euthyphro, Socrates asks Euthyphro
to provide a definition of piety. Euthyphro replies that the pious is
that which is loved by the gods. But, Socrates also has Euthyphro
agreeing that the gods are quarrelsome and their quarrels, like human
quarrels, concern objects of love or hatred. Therefore, Socrates
reasons, at least one thing exists that certain gods love but other gods
hate. Again, Euthyphro agrees. Socrates concludes that if Euthyphro's
definition of piety is acceptable, then there must exist at least one
thing that is both pious and impious (as it is both loved and hated by
the gods)—which Euthyphro admits is absurd. Thus, Euthyphro is brought
to a realization by this dialectical method that his definition of piety
is not sufficiently meaningful.
For example, in Plato's Gorgias, dialectic occurs between
Socrates, the Sophist Gorgias, and two men, Polus and Callicles. Because
Socrates' ultimate goal was to reach true knowledge, he was even
willing to change his own views in order to arrive at the truth. The
fundamental goal of dialectic, in this instance, was to establish a
precise definition of the subject (in this case, rhetoric) and with the
use of argumentation and questioning, make the subject even more
precise. In the Gorgias, Socrates reaches the truth by asking a series
of questions and in return, receiving short, clear answers.
Plato
There is another interpretation of dialectic, suggested in The Republic, as a procedure that is both discursive and intuitive.
In Platonism and Neoplatonism, dialectic assumes an ontological and
metaphysical role in that it becomes the process whereby the intellect
passes from sensibles to intelligibles, rising from Idea to Idea until
it finally grasps the supreme Idea, the First Principle which is the
origin of all. The philosopher is consequently a "dialectician". In this sense, dialectic is a process of enquiry that does away with hypotheses up to the First Principle (Republic,
VII, 533 c-d). It slowly embraces the multiplicity in unity. Simon
Blackburn writes that the dialectic in this sense is used to understand
"the total process of enlightenment, whereby the philosopher is educated
so as to achieve knowledge of the supreme good, the Form of the Good".
Aristotle
Aristotle
stresses that rhetoric is closely related to dialectic. He offers
several formulas to describe this affinity between the two disciplines:
first of all, rhetoric is said to be a "counterpart" (antistrophos) to
dialectic (Rhet. I.1, 1354a1); (ii) it is also called an "outgrowth"
(paraphues ti) of dialectic and the study of character (Rhet. I.2,
1356a25f.); finally, Aristotle says that rhetoric is part of dialectic
and resembles it (Rhet. I.2, 1356a30f.). In saying that rhetoric is a
counterpart to dialectic, Aristotle obviously alludes to Plato's Gorgias
(464bff.), where rhetoric is ironically defined as a counterpart to
cookery in the soul. Since, in this passage, Plato uses the word
'antistrophos' to designate an analogy, it is likely that Aristotle
wants to express a kind of analogy too: what dialectic is for the
(private or academic) practice of attacking and maintaining an argument,
rhetoric is for the (public) practice of defending oneself or accusing
an opponent. The analogy to dialectic has important implications for the
status of rhetoric. Plato argued in his Gorgias that rhetoric cannot be
an art (technê), since it is not related to a definite subject, while
real arts are defined by their specific subjects, as e.g. medicine or
shoemaking are defined by their products, i.e., health and shoes.
Medieval philosophy
Logic, which could be considered to include dialectic, was one of the three liberal arts taught in medieval universities as part of the trivium; the other elements were rhetoric and grammar.
This dialectic (a quaestio disputata) was formed as follows:
The question to be determined ("It is asked whether...");
A provisory answer to the question ("And it seems that...");
The principal arguments in favor of the provisory answer;
An argument against the provisory answer, traditionally a single argument from authority ("On the contrary...");
The determination of the question after weighing the evidence ("I answer that...");
The replies to each of the initial objections. ("To the first, to the second etc., I answer that...")
Modern philosophy
The concept of dialectics was given new life at the start of the 19th century by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (following Johann Gottlieb Fichte),
whose dialectical model of nature and of history made dialectic a
fundamental aspect of the nature of reality (instead of regarding the
contradictions into which dialectics leads as a sign of the sterility of
the dialectical method, as the 18th-century philosopher Immanuel Kant tended to do in his Critique of Pure Reason).
In the mid-19th century, the concept of dialectics was appropriated by Karl Marx (see, for example, Das Kapital, published in 1867) and Friedrich Engels
and retooled in what they considered to be a nonidealistic manner. It
would also become a crucial part of later representations of Marxism as a
philosophy of dialectical materialism. These representations often contrasted dramatically
and led to vigorous debate among different Marxist groupings, leading
some prominent Marxists to give up on the idea of dialectics completely.
Hegelian dialectic, usually presented in a threefold manner, was stated by Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus
as comprising three dialectical stages of development: a thesis, giving
rise to its reaction; an antithesis, which contradicts or negates the
thesis; and the tension between the two being resolved by means of a
synthesis. Although this model is often named after Hegel, he never used
that specific formulation. Hegel ascribed that terminology to Kant. Carrying on Kant's work, Fichte greatly elaborated on the synthesis model and popularized it.
On the other hand, Hegel did use a three-valued logical model
that is very similar to the antithesis model, but Hegel's most usual
terms were: Abstract-Negative-Concrete. Hegel used this writing model as
a backbone to accompany his points in many of his works.
The formula, thesis-antithesis-synthesis, does not explain why
the thesis requires an antithesis. However, the formula,
abstract-negative-concrete, suggests a flaw, or perhaps an
incompleteness, in any initial thesis—it is too abstract and lacks the
negative of trial, error, and experience. For Hegel, the concrete, the
synthesis, the absolute, must always pass through the phase of the
negative, in the journey to completion, that is, mediation. This is the
essence of what is popularly called Hegelian dialectics.
Fichte
introduced into German philosophy the three-step of thesis, antithesis,
and synthesis, using these three terms. Schelling took up this
terminology. Hegel did not. He never once used these three terms
together to designate three stages in an argument or account in any of
his books. And they do not help us understand his Phenomenology, his Logic,
or his philosophy of history; they impede any open-minded comprehension
of what he does by forcing it into a scheme which was available to him
and which he deliberately spurned [...] The mechanical formalism [...]
Hegel derides expressly and at some length in the preface to the Phenomenology.
Kaufmann also cites Hegel's criticism of the triad model commonly
misattributed to him, adding that "the only place where Hegel uses the
three terms together occurs in his lectures on the history of
philosophy, on the last page but one of the sections on Kant—where Hegel
roundly reproaches Kant for having 'everywhere posited thesis,
antithesis, synthesis'".
To describe the activity of overcoming the negative, Hegel also often used the term Aufhebung,
variously translated into English as "sublation" or "overcoming", to
conceive of the working of the dialectic. Roughly, the term indicates
preserving the useful portion of an idea, thing, society, etc., while
moving beyond its limitations. (Jacques Derrida's preferred French translation of the term was relever.)
In the Logic, for instance, Hegel describes a dialectic of existence: first, existence must be posited as pure Being (Sein); but pure Being, upon examination, is found to be indistinguishable from Nothing (Nichts).
When it is realized that what is coming into being is, at the same
time, also returning to nothing (in life, for example, one's living is
also a dying), both Being and Nothing are united as Becoming.
As in the Socratic dialectic, Hegel claimed to proceed by making
implicit contradictions explicit: each stage of the process is the
product of contradictions inherent or implicit in the preceding stage.
For Hegel, the whole of history is one tremendous dialectic, major
stages of which chart a progression from self-alienation as slavery to self-unification and realization as the rationalconstitutional state
of free and equal citizens. The Hegelian dialectic cannot be
mechanically applied for any chosen thesis. Critics argue that the
selection of any antithesis, other than the logical negation of the
thesis, is subjective. Then, if the logical negation is used as the
antithesis, there is no rigorous way to derive a synthesis. In practice,
when an antithesis is selected to suit the user's subjective purpose,
the resulting "contradictions" are rhetorical,
not logical, and the resulting synthesis is not rigorously defensible
against a multitude of other possible syntheses. The problem with the
Fichtean "thesis–antithesis–synthesis" model is that it implies that
contradictions or negations come from outside of things. Hegel's point
is that they are inherent in and internal to things. This conception of
dialectics derives ultimately from Heraclitus.
Hegel stated that the purpose of dialectics is "to study things
in their own being and movement and thus to demonstrate the finitude of
the partial categories of understanding."
One important dialectical principle for Hegel is the transition from
quantity to quality, which he terms the Measure. The measure is the
qualitative quantum, the quantum is the existence of quantity.
The
identity between quantity and quality, which is found in Measure, is at
first only implicit, and not yet explicitly realised. In other words,
these two categories, which unite in Measure, each claim an independent
authority. On the one hand, the quantitative features of existence may
be altered, without affecting its quality. On the other hand, this
increase and diminution, immaterial though it be, has its limit, by
exceeding which the quality suffers change. [...] But if the quantity
present in measure exceeds a certain limit, the quality corresponding to
it is also put in abeyance. This however is not a negation of quality
altogether, but only of this definite quality, the place of which is at
once occupied by another. This process of measure, which appears
alternately as a mere change in quantity, and then as a sudden revulsion
of quantity into quality, may be envisaged under the figure of a nodal
(knotted) line.
As an example, Hegel mentions the states of aggregation of water:
"Thus the temperature of water is, in the first place, a point of no
consequence in respect of its liquidity: still with the increase or
diminution of the temperature of the liquid water, there comes a point
where this state of cohesion suffers a qualitative change, and the water
is converted into steam or ice".
As other examples Hegel mentions the reaching of a point where a single
additional grain makes a heap of wheat; or where the bald tail is
produced, if we continue plucking out single hairs.
Another important principle for Hegel is the negation of the negation, which he also terms Aufhebung
(sublation): Something is only what it is in its relation to another,
but by the negation of the negation this something incorporates the
other into itself. The dialectical movement involves two moments that
negate each other, something and its other. As a result of the negation
of the negation, "something becomes its other; this other is itself
something; therefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on ad
infinitum". Something in its passage into other only joins with itself, it is self-related. In becoming there are two moments:
coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be: by sublation, i.e., negation of the
negation, being passes over into nothing, it ceases to be, but something
new shows up, is coming to be. What is sublated (aufgehoben) on the one hand ceases to be and is put to an end, but on the other hand it is preserved and maintained. In dialectics, a totality transforms itself; it is self-related, then self-forgetful, relieving the original tension.
Marxist dialectic
Marxist dialectic is a form of Hegelian dialectic which applies to the study of historical materialism.
It purports to be a reflection of the real world created by man.
Dialectic would thus be a robust method under which one could examine
personal, social, and economic behaviors. Marxist dialectic is the core
foundation of the philosophy of dialectical materialism, which forms the basis of the ideas behind historical materialism.
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, writing several decades after Hegel's death, proposed that Hegel's dialectic is too abstract:
The
mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means
prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working
in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its
head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the
rational kernel within the mystical shell.
In contradiction to Hegelian idealism, Marx presented his own dialectic
method, which he claims to be "direct opposite" of Hegel's method:
My
dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its
direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e. the
process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea', he even
transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos
of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal
form of 'the Idea'. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else
than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into
forms of thought.
In Marxism, the dialectical method of historical study became intertwined with historical materialism, the school of thought exemplified by the works of Marx, Engels, and Vladimir Lenin. In the USSR, under Joseph Stalin,
Marxist dialectics became "diamat" (short for dialectical materialism),
a theory emphasizing the primacy of the material way of life; social
"praxis" over all forms of social consciousness; and the secondary,
dependent character of the "ideal".
The term "dialectical materialism" was coined by the 19th-century social theorist Joseph Dietzgen who used the theory to explain the nature of socialism and social development. The original populariser of Marxism in Russia, Georgi Plekhanov
used the terms "dialectical materialism" and "historical materialism"
interchangeably. For Lenin, the primary feature of Marx's "dialectical
materialism" (Lenin's term) was its application of materialist
philosophy to history and social sciences. Lenin's main input in the
philosophy of dialectical materialism was his theory of reflection,
which presented human consciousness as a dynamic reflection of the
objective material world that fully shapes its contents and structure.
Later, Stalin's works on the subject established a rigid and
formalistic division of Marxist–Leninist theory in the dialectical
materialism and historical materialism parts. While the first was
supposed to be the key method and theory of the philosophy of nature,
the second was the Soviet version of the philosophy of history.
Friedrich Engels proposed that Nature is dialectical, thus, in Anti-Dühring he said that the negation of negation is:
A
very simple process, which is taking place everywhere and every day,
which any child can understand as soon as it is stripped of the veil of
mystery in which it was enveloped by the old idealist philosophy.
Probably the same gentlemen who up to now have decried the transformation of quantity into quality as mysticism and incomprehensible transcendentalism
will now declare that it is indeed something quite self-evident,
trivial, and commonplace, which they have long employed, and so they
have been taught nothing new. But to have formulated for the first time
in its universally valid form a general law of development of Nature,
society, and thought, will always remain an act of historic importance.
Marxist dialectics is exemplified in Das Kapital
(Capital), which outlines two central theories: (i) surplus value and
(ii) the materialist conception of history; Marx explains dialectical
materialism:
In its rational form, it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom
and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its
comprehension an affirmative recognition of the existing state of
things, at the same time, also, the recognition of the negation of that
state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every
historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore
takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary
existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence
critical and revolutionary.
Class struggle
is the primary contradiction to be resolved by Marxist dialectics,
because of its central role in the social and political lives of a
society. Nonetheless, Marx and Marxists developed the concept of class
struggle to comprehend the dialectical contradictions between mental and
manual labor, and between town and country. Hence, philosophic
contradiction is central to the development of dialectics – the
progress from quantity to quality, the acceleration of gradual social
change; the negation of the initial development of the status quo; the negation of that negation; and the high-level recurrence of features of the original status quo.
In the USSR, Progress Publishers issued anthologies of dialectical
materialism by Lenin, wherein he also quotes Marx and Engels:
As
the most comprehensive and profound doctrine of development, and the
richest in content, Hegelian dialectics was considered by Marx and
Engels the greatest achievement of classical German philosophy.... "The
great basic thought", Engels writes, "that the world is not to be
comprehended as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of
processes, in which the things, apparently stable no less than their
mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted
change of coming into being and passing away... this great fundamental
thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated
ordinary consciousness that, in its generality, it is now scarcely ever
contradicted.
But, to acknowledge this fundamental thought in words, and to apply it
in reality in detail to each domain of investigation, are two different
things.... For dialectical philosophy nothing is final, absolute,
sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in
everything; nothing can endure before it, except the uninterrupted
process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the
lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy, itself, is nothing more
than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain." Thus,
according to Marx, dialectics is "the science of the general laws of
motion both of the external world and of human thought".
Lenin describes his dialectical understanding of the concept of development:
A
development that repeats, as it were, stages that have already been
passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher basis ("the
negation of the negation"), a development, so to speak, that proceeds in
spirals, not in a straight line; a development by leaps, catastrophes,
and revolutions; "breaks in continuity"; the transformation of quantity
into quality; inner impulses towards development, imparted by the
contradiction and conflict of the various forces and tendencies acting
on a given body, or within a given phenomenon, or within a given
society; the interdependence and the closest and indissoluble connection
between all aspects of any phenomenon (history constantly revealing
ever new aspects), a connection that provides a uniform, and universal
process of motion, one that follows definite laws – these are some of
the features of dialectics as a doctrine of development that is richer
than the conventional one.
Existentialism, like Marxism,
addresses itself to experience in order to discover there concrete
syntheses. It can conceive of these syntheses only within a moving,
dialectical totalisation, which is nothing else but history or—from the
strictly cultural point of view adopted here—'philosophy-becoming-the
world'.
Dialectical naturalism
Dialectical naturalism is a term coined by American philosopher Murray Bookchin to describe the philosophical underpinnings of the political program of social ecology.
Dialectical naturalism explores the complex interrelationship between
social problems, and the direct consequences they have on the ecological
impact of human society. Bookchin offered dialectical naturalism as a
contrast to what he saw as the "empyrean, basically antinaturalistic
dialectical idealism" of Hegel, and "the wooden, often scientistic
dialectical materialism of orthodox Marxists".
Theological dialectical forms
Baháʼí dialectics — dialectical science and religion
Baháʼí Faith
doctrine advocates a form of dialectical science and religion. A
dialectical relationship of harmony between religion and science is
presented, wherein science and religion are described as complementary,
mutually dependent, and indispensable knowledge systems. Baháʼí scripture asserts that true science and true religion can never be in conflict. 'Abdu'l-Bahá,
the son of the founder of the religion, stated that religion without
science is superstition and that science without religion is
materialism. He also admonished that true religion must conform to the
conclusions of science.
As a modern, globalist religion, the Baháʼí Faith defies simple
categorisation into any of Western, Eastern, Northern, Southern, or
other philosophical forms. Nevertheless, the principled dialectical
approach to harmony between science and religion is not unlike social ecology's implementation of dialectical naturalism to moderate the extremes of scientifically unverified idealisms with scientific insight.
Dialectical theology
Neo-orthodoxy, in Europe also known as theology of crisis and dialectical theology, is an approach to theology in Protestantism that was developed in the aftermath of the First World War (1914–1918). It is characterized as a reaction against doctrines of 19th-centuryliberal theology and a more positive reevaluation of the teachings of the Reformation, much of which had been in decline (especially in western Europe) since the late 18th century. It is primarily associated with two Swiss professors and pastors, Karl Barth (1886–1968) and Emil Brunner (1899–1966), even though Barth himself expressed his unease in the use of the term.
In dialectical theology the difference and opposition between God
and human beings is stressed in such a way that all human attempts at
overcoming this opposition through moral, religious or philosophical
idealism must be characterized as 'sin'. In the death of Christ humanity
is negated and overcome, but this judgment also points forwards to the
resurrection in which humanity is reestablished in Christ. For Barth
this meant that only through God's 'no' to everything human can his
'yes' be perceived. Applied to traditional themes of Protestant
theology, such as double predestination,
this means that election and reprobation cannot be viewed as a
quantitative limitation of God's action. Rather it must be seen as its
"qualitative definition".
As Christ bore the rejection as well as the election of God for all
humanity, every person is subject to both aspects of God's double
predestination.
Dialectic prominently figured in Bernard Lonergan's philosophy, in his books Insight and Method in Theology. Michael Shute wrote about Longergan's use of dialectic in The Origins of Lonergan's Notion of the Dialectic of History.
For Lonergan, dialectic is both individual and operative in community.
Simply described, it is a dynamic process that results in something new:
For the sake of greater precision,
let us say that a dialectic is a concrete unfolding of linked but
opposed principles of change. Thus there will be a dialectic if (1)
there is an aggregate of events of a determinate character, (2) the
events may be traced to either or both of two principles, (3) the
principles are opposed yet bound together, and (4) they are modified by
the changes that successively result from them.
Dialectic is one of the eight functional specialties Lonergan
envisaged for theology to bring this discipline into the modern world.
Lonergan believed that the lack of an agreed method among scholars had
inhibited substantive agreement from being reached and progress from
being made compared to the natural sciences. Karl Rahner,
S.J., however, criticized Lonergan's theological method in a short
article entitled "Some Critical Thoughts on 'Functional Specialties in
Theology'" where he stated: "Lonergan's theological methodology seems to
me to be so generic that it really fits every science, and hence is not the methodology of theology as such, but only a very general methodology of science."
Karl Popper
has attacked the dialectic repeatedly. In 1937, he wrote and delivered a
paper entitled "What Is Dialectic?" in which he attacked the
dialectical method for its willingness "to put up with contradictions".
Popper concluded the essay with these words: "The whole development of
dialectic should be a warning against the dangers inherent in
philosophical system-building. It should remind us that philosophy
should not be made a basis for any sort of scientific system and that
philosophers should be much more modest in their claims. One task which
they can fulfill quite usefully is the study of the critical methods of science" (Ibid., p. 335).
In chapter 12 of volume 2 of The Open Society and Its Enemies
(1944; 5th rev. ed., 1966), Popper unleashed a famous attack on
Hegelian dialectics in which he held that Hegel's thought (unjustly in
the view of some philosophers, such as Walter Kaufmann) was to some degree responsible for facilitating the rise of fascism in Europe by encouraging and justifying irrationalism. In section 17 of his 1961 "addenda" to The Open Society,
entitled "Facts, Standards and Truth: A Further Criticism of
Relativism", Popper refused to moderate his criticism of the Hegelian
dialectic, arguing that it "played a major role in the downfall of the liberal movement in Germany [...] by contributing to historicism and to an identification of might and right, encouraged totalitarian
modes of thought. [...] [And] undermined and eventually lowered the
traditional standards of intellectual responsibility and honesty".
The philosopher of science and physicist Mario Bunge repeatedly criticized Hegelian and Marxian dialectics, calling them "fuzzy and remote from science" and a "disastrous legacy".
He concluded: "The so-called laws of dialectics, such as formulated by
Engels (1940, 1954) and Lenin (1947, 1981), are false insofar as they
are intelligible."
Formalism
Since the late 20th century, European and American logicians have attempted to provide mathematical foundations for dialectic through formalisation, although logic has been related to dialectic since ancient times. There have been pre-formal and partially-formal treatises on argument and dialectic, from authors such as Stephen Toulmin (The Uses of Argument, 1958),Nicholas Rescher (Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, 1977), and Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (pragma-dialectics, 1980s). One can include works of the communities of informal logic and paraconsistent logic.
Defeasibility
Building on theories of defeasible reasoning (see John L. Pollock),
systems have been built that define well-formedness of arguments, rules
governing the process of introducing arguments based on fixed
assumptions, and rules for shifting burden. Many of these logics appear in the special area of artificial intelligence and law, though the computer scientists' interest in formalizing dialectic originates in a desire to build decision support and computer-supported collaborative work systems.
Dialectic itself can be formalised as moves in a game, where an advocate for the truth of a proposition and an opponent argue. Such games can provide a semantics of logic, one that is very general in applicability.
Pantheism is the belief that reality is identical with divinity, or that all things compose an all-encompassing, immanent god. Pantheist belief does not recognize a distinct personal god, anthropomorphic
or otherwise, but instead characterizes a broad range of doctrines
differing in forms of relationships between reality and divinity.
Pantheistic concepts date back thousands of years, and pantheistic
elements have been identified in various religious traditions. The term pantheism was coined by mathematician Joseph Raphson in 1697 and has since been used to describe the beliefs of a variety of people and organizations.
Pantheism derives from the Greek πᾶν pan (meaning "all, of everything") and θεός theos (meaning "god, divine"). The first known combination of these roots appears in Latin, in Joseph Raphson's 1697 book De Spatio Reali seu Ente Infinito, where he refers to the "pantheismus" of Spinoza and others.
It was subsequently translated into English as "pantheism" in 1702.
Definitions
There are numerous definitions of pantheism. Some consider it a theological and philosophical position concerning God.
Pantheism is the view that everything is part of an all-encompassing, immanent God. All forms of reality may then be considered either modes of that Being, or identical with it.
Some hold that pantheism is a non-religious philosophical position. To
them, pantheism is the view that the Universe (in the sense of the
totality of all existence) and God are identical (implying a denial of
the personality and transcendence of God).
History
Pre-modern times
Early traces of pantheist thought can be found within the theology of the ancient Greek religion of Orphism, where pan (the all) is made cognate with the creator God Phanes (symbolizing the universe), and with Zeus, after the swallowing of Phanes.
The Catholic Church has long regarded pantheistic ideas as heresy. Giordano Bruno, an Italian friar who evangelized about a transcendent and infinite God, was burned at the stake in 1600 by the Roman Inquisition. He has since become known as a celebrated pantheist and martyr of science.
The philosophy of Baruch Spinoza is often regarded as pantheism.
In the West, pantheism was formalized as a separate theology and
philosophy based on the work of the 17th-century philosopher Baruch
Spinoza. Spinoza was a Dutch philosopher of Portuguese descent raised in the Sephardi Jewish community in Amsterdam.
He developed highly controversial ideas regarding the authenticity of
the Hebrew Bible and the nature of the Divine, and was effectively
excluded from Jewish society at age 23, when the local synagogue issued a herem against him. A number of his books were published posthumously, and shortly thereafter included in the Catholic Church's Index of Forbidden Books. The breadth and importance of Spinoza's work would not be realized for many years – as the groundwork for the 18th-century Enlightenment and modern biblical criticism, including modern conceptions of the self and the universe.
In the posthumous Ethics,
"Spinoza wrote the last indisputable Latin masterpiece, and one in
which the refined conceptions of medieval philosophy are finally turned
against themselves and destroyed entirely." In particular, he opposed René Descartes' famous mind–body dualism, the theory that the body and spirit are separate. Spinoza held the monist
view that the two are the same, and monism is a fundamental part of his
philosophy. He was described as a "God-intoxicated man," and used the
word God to describe the unity of all substance. This view influenced philosophers such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who said, "You are either a Spinozist or not a philosopher at all."
Spinoza earned praise as one of the great rationalists of 17th-century philosophy and one of Western philosophy's most important thinkers.
Although the term "pantheism" was not coined until after his death, he
is regarded as the most celebrated advocate of the concept. Ethics was the major source from which Western pantheism spread.
Heinrich Heine, in his Concerning the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany (1833–36), remarked that "I don't remember now where I read that Herder once exploded peevishly at the constant preoccupation with Spinoza, "If Goethe
would only for once pick up some other Latin book than Spinoza!" But
this applies not only to Goethe; quite a number of his friends, who
later became more or less well-known as poets, paid homage to pantheism
in their youth, and this doctrine flourished actively in German art
before it attained supremacy among us as a philosophic theory."
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe rejected Jacobi’s personal belief in
God as the "hollow sentiment of a child’s brain" (Goethe 15/1: 446) and,
in the "Studie nach Spinoza" (1785/86), proclaimed the identity of
existence and wholeness. When Jacobi speaks of Spinoza’s "fundamentally
stupid universe" (Jacobi [31819] 2000: 312), Goethe praises nature as
his "idol" (Goethe 14: 535).
In their The Holy Family (1844) Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels note, "Spinozism dominated the eighteenth century both in its later French variety, which made matter into substance, and in deism,
which conferred on matter a more spiritual name.... Spinoza's French
school and the supporters of deism were but two sects disputing over the
true meaning of his system...."
In George Henry Lewes's words (1846), "Pantheism is as old as philosophy. It was taught in the old Greek schools — by Plato, by St. Augustine, and by the Jews.
Indeed, one may say that Pantheism, under one of its various shapes, is
the necessary consequence of all metaphysical inquiry, when pushed to
its logical limits; and from this reason do we find it in every age and
nation. The dreamy contemplative Indian, the quick versatile Greek, the
practical Roman, the quibbling Scholastic, the ardent Italian, the
lively Frenchman, and the bold Englishman, have all pronounced it as the
final truth of philosophy. Wherein consists Spinoza's originality? —
what is his merit? — are natural questions, when we see him only lead to
the same result as others had before proclaimed. His merit and
originality consist in the systematic exposition and development of that
doctrine — in his hands, for the first time, it assumes the aspect of a
science. The Greek and Indian Pantheism is a vague fanciful doctrine,
carrying with it no scientific conviction; it may be true — it looks
true — but the proof is wanting. But with Spinoza there is no choice: if
you understand his terms, admit the possibility of his science, and
seize his meaning; you can no more doubt his conclusions than you can
doubt Euclid; no mere opinion is possible, conviction only is possible."
S. M. Melamed (1933) noted, "It may be observed, however, that Spinoza was not the first prominent monist
and pantheist in modern Europe. A generation before him Bruno conveyed a
similar message to humanity. Yet Bruno is merely a beautiful episode in
the history of the human mind, while Spinoza is one of its most potent
forces. Bruno was a rhapsodist
and a poet, who was overwhelmed with artistic emotions; Spinoza,
however, was spiritus purus and in his method the prototype of the
philosopher."
18th century
The first known use of the term "pantheism" was in Latin ("pantheismus") by the English mathematician Joseph Raphson in his work De Spatio Reali seu Ente Infinito, published in 1697. Raphson begins with a distinction between atheistic "panhylists" (from the Greek roots pan, "all", and hyle,
"matter"), who believe everything is matter, and Spinozan "pantheists"
who believe in "a certain universal substance, material as well as
intelligence, that fashions all things that exist out of its own
essence."
Raphson thought that the universe was immeasurable in respect to a
human's capacity of understanding, and believed that humans would never
be able to comprehend it.
He referred to the pantheism of the Ancient Egyptians, Persians,
Syrians, Assyrians, Greek, Indians, and Jewish Kabbalists, specifically
referring to Spinoza.
The term was first used in English by a translation of Raphson's work in 1702. It was later used and popularized by Irish writer John Toland in his work of 1705 Socinianism Truly Stated, by a pantheist. Toland was influenced by both Spinoza and Bruno, and had read Joseph Raphson's De Spatio Reali, referring to it as "the ingenious Mr. Ralphson's (sic) Book of Real Space". Like Raphson, he used the terms "pantheist" and "Spinozist" interchangeably. In 1720 he wrote the Pantheisticon: or The Form of Celebrating the Socratic-Society
in Latin, envisioning a pantheist society that believed, "All things in
the world are one, and one is all in all things ... what is all in all
things is God, eternal and immense, neither born nor ever to perish." He clarified his idea of pantheism in a letter to Gottfried Leibniz in 1710 when he referred to "the pantheistic opinion of those who believe in no other eternal being but the universe".
In the mid-eighteenth century, the English theologian Daniel Waterland
defined pantheism this way: "It supposes God and nature, or God and the
whole universe, to be one and the same substance—one universal being;
insomuch that men's souls are only modifications of the divine
substance." In the early nineteenth century, the German theologian Julius Wegscheider defined pantheism as the belief that God and the world established by God are one and the same.
Between 1785–89, a major controversy about Spinoza's philosophy arose between the German philosophers Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (a critic) and Moses Mendelssohn (a defender). Known in German as the Pantheismusstreit (pantheism controversy), it helped spread pantheism to many German thinkers.
A 1780 conversation with the German dramatist Gotthold Ephraim Lessing led Jacobi to a protracted study of Spinoza's works. Lessing stated that he knew no other philosophy than Spinozism.
Jacobi's Über die Lehre des Spinozas (1st ed. 1785, 2nd ed. 1789)
expressed his strenuous objection to a dogmatic system in philosophy,
and drew upon him the enmity of the Berlin group, led by Mendelssohn.
Jacobi claimed that Spinoza's doctrine was pure materialism, because all Nature and God are said to be nothing but extended substance. This, for Jacobi, was the result of Enlightenment rationalism
and it would finally end in absolute atheism. Mendelssohn disagreed
with Jacobi, saying that pantheism shares more characteristics of theism than of atheism. The entire issue became a major intellectual and religious concern for European civilization at the time.
Willi Goetschel argues that Jacobi's publication significantly
shaped Spinoza's wide reception for centuries following its publication,
obscuring the nuance of Spinoza's philosophic work.
A letter written by William Herndon, Abraham Lincoln's law partner in 1886, was sold at auction for US$30,000 in 2011. In it, Herndon writes of the U.S. President's evolving religious views, which included pantheism.
"Mr. Lincoln's religion is too well known to me to allow of even a
shadow of a doubt; he is or was a Theist and a Rationalist, denying all
extraordinary – supernatural inspiration or revelation. At one time in
his life, to say the least, he was an elevated Pantheist, doubting the
immortality of the soul as the Christian world understands that term. He
believed that the soul lost its identity and was immortal as a force.
Subsequent to this he rose to the belief of a God, and this is all the
change he ever underwent."
The subject is understandably controversial, but the content of the
letter is consistent with Lincoln's fairly lukewarm approach to
organized religion.
Comparison with non-Christian religions
Some
19th-century theologians thought that various pre-Christian religions
and philosophies were pantheistic. They thought Pantheism was similar to
the ancient Hindu philosophy of Advaita (non-dualism) to the extent that the 19th-century German Sanskritist Theodore Goldstücker
remarked that Spinoza's thought was "... a western system of philosophy
which occupies a foremost rank amongst the philosophies of all nations
and ages, and which is so exact a representation of the ideas of the
Vedanta, that we might have suspected its founder to have borrowed the
fundamental principles of his system from the Hindus."
19th-century European theologians also considered Ancient
Egyptian religion to contain pantheistic elements and pointed to
Egyptian philosophy as a source of Greek Pantheism. The latter included some of the Presocratics, such as Heraclitus and Anaximander. The Stoics were pantheists, beginning with Zeno of Citium and culminating in the emperor-philosopher Marcus Aurelius. During the pre-Christian Roman Empire, Stoicism was one of the three dominant schools of philosophy, along with Epicureanism and Neoplatonism. The early Taoism of Laozi and Zhuangzi is also sometimes considered pantheistic, although it could be more similar to Panentheism.
Cheondoism, which arose in the Joseon Dynasty of Korea, and Won Buddhism are also considered pantheistic. The Realist Society of Canada believes that the consciousness of the self-aware universe is reality, which is an alternative view of Pantheism.
20th century
In a letter written to Eduard Büsching (25 October 1929), after Büsching sent Albert Einstein a copy of his book Es gibt keinen Gott
("There is no God"), Einstein wrote, "We followers of Spinoza see our
God in the wonderful order and lawfulness of all that exists and in its
soul [Beseeltheit] as it reveals itself in man and animal." According to Einstein, the book only dealt with the concept of a personal god and not the impersonal God of pantheism.
In a letter written in 1954 to philosopher Eric Gutkind, Einstein wrote
"the word God is for me nothing more than the expression and product of
human weaknesses." In another letter written in 1954 he wrote "I do not believe in a
personal God and I have never denied this but have expressed it
clearly." In Ideas And Opinions, published a year before his death, Einstein stated his precise conception of the word God:
Scientific research can reduce superstition by
encouraging people to think and view things in terms of cause and
effect. Certain it is that a conviction, akin to religious feeling, of
the rationality and intelligibility of the world lies behind all
scientific work of a higher order. [...] This firm belief, a belief
bound up with a deep feeling, in a superior mind that reveals itself in
the world of experience, represents my conception of God. In common
parlance this may be described as "pantheistic" (Spinoza).
In the late 20th century, some declared that pantheism was an underlying theology of Neopaganism, and pantheists began forming organizations devoted specifically to pantheism and treating it as a separate religion.
Albert Einstein is considered a pantheist by some commentators.
Dorion Sagan, son of famous scientist and science communicator Carl Sagan, published the 2007 book Dazzle Gradually: Reflections on the Nature of Nature, co-written with his mother Lynn Margulis.
In the chapter "Truth of My Father", Sagan writes that his "father
believed in the God of Spinoza and Einstein, God not behind nature, but
as nature, equivalent to it."
In 2009, pantheism was mentioned in a Papal encyclical and in a statement on New Year's Day, 2010, criticizing pantheism for denying the superiority of humans over nature and seeing the source of man's salvation in nature.
In a 2009 review of the film Avatar, Ross Douthat described pantheism as "Hollywood's religion of choice for a generation now".
There are multiple varieties of pantheism and various systems of classifying them relying upon one or more spectra or in discrete categories.
Degree of determinism
The philosopher Charles Hartshorne used the term Classical Pantheism to describe the deterministic philosophies of Baruch Spinoza, the Stoics, and other like-minded figures. Pantheism (All-is-God) is often associated with monism (All-is-One) and some have suggested that it logically implies determinism (All-is-Now). Albert Einstein explained theological determinism by stating,
"the past, present, and future are an 'illusion'". This form of
pantheism has been referred to as "extreme monism", in which – in the
words of one commentator – "God decides or determines everything,
including our supposed decisions." Other examples of determinism-inclined pantheisms include those of Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Hegel.
However, some have argued against treating every meaning of "unity" as an aspect of pantheism,
and there exist versions of pantheism that regard determinism as an
inaccurate or incomplete view of nature. Examples include the beliefs of
John Scotus Eriugena, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and William James.
Degree of belief
It
may also be possible to distinguish two types of pantheism, one being
more religious and the other being more philosophical. The Columbia
Encyclopedia writes of the distinction:
"If the pantheist starts with the belief that the one great
reality, eternal and infinite, is God, he sees everything finite and
temporal as but some part of God. There is nothing separate or distinct
from God, for God is the universe. If, on the other hand, the conception
taken as the foundation of the system is that the great inclusive unity
is the world itself, or the universe, God is swallowed up in that
unity, which may be designated nature."
Form of monism
A diagram with neutral monism compared to Cartesian dualism, physicalism and idealism.
Philosophers and theologians have often suggested that pantheism implies monism. Different types of monism include:
Substance monism, "the view that the apparent plurality of substances is due to different states or appearances of a single substance"
Attributive monism, "the view that whatever the number of substances, they are of a single ultimate kind"
Partial monism, "within a given realm of being (however many there may be) there is only one substance"
Existence monism, the view that there is only one concrete object token (The One, "Τὸ Ἕν" or the Monad).
Priority monism, "the whole is prior to its parts" or "the world has
parts, but the parts are dependent fragments of an integrated whole."
Property monism: the view that all properties are of a single type (e.g. only physical properties exist)
Genus monism: "the doctrine that there is a highest category; e.g., being"
Views contrasting with monism are:
Metaphysical dualism, which asserts that there are two ultimately irreconcilable substances or realities such as Good and Evil, for example, Manichaeism,
Metaphysical pluralism, which asserts three or more fundamental substances or realities.
Nihilism, negates any of the above categories (substances, properties, concrete objects, etc.).
Monism in modern philosophy of mind can be divided into three broad categories:
Idealism, phenomenalism, or mentalistic monism, which holds that only mind or spirit is real
Neutral monism, which holds that one sort of thing fundamentally exists, to which both the mental and the physical can be reduced
Material monism (also called Physicalism and materialism), which holds that only the physical is real, and that the mental or spiritual can be reduced to the physical
a. Eliminative Materialism, according to which everything is physical and mental things do not exist
b. Reductive physicalism, according to which mental things do exist and are a kind of physical thing
Certain positions do not fit easily into the above categories, such as functionalism, anomalous monism, and reflexive monism. Moreover, they do not define the meaning of "real".
Other
In 1896, J.
H. Worman, a theologian, identified seven categories of pantheism:
Mechanical or materialistic (God the mechanical unity of existence);
Ontological (fundamental unity, Spinoza); Dynamic; Psychical (God is the
soul of the world); Ethical (God is the universal moral order, Fichte);
Logical (Hegel); and Pure (absorption of God into nature, which Worman
equates with atheism).
In 1984, Paul D. Feinberg,
professor of biblical and systematic theology at Trinity Evangelical
Divinity School, also identified seven: Hylozoistic; Immanentistic;
Absolutistic monistic; Relativistic monistic; Acosmic; Identity of
opposites; and Neoplatonic or emanationistic.
Demographics
Prevalence
Canadian pantheist population by percentage (2011 National Household Survey)
As of 2011, about 1000 Canadians identified their religion as "Pantheist", representing 0.003% of the population. In Ireland, Pantheism rose from 202 in 1991, to 1106 in 2002, to 1691 in 2006, 1940 in 2011. In New Zealand, there was exactly one pantheist man in 1901. By 1906, the number of pantheists in New Zealand had septupled to 7 (6 male, 1 female). This number had further risen to 366 by 2006.
Age and gender
In
Canada (2011), The age group with the most pantheists was age 55 to 64.
The age group with the least pantheists was children and adolescents
aged under 15, who were 0.0005% pantheist - 9 times less likely to be
pantheist than people aged 55 to 64. In Canada, there was no significant sex difference between men and women.
However, in Ireland (2011), Pantheists were more likely to be female
(1074 pantheists, 0.046% of women) than male (866 pantheists, 0.038% of
men).
Canadian pantheists by age and gender (2011)
Under 15
15 to 24
25 to 34
35 to 44
45 to 54
55 to 64
65 or older
30
(0.0005%)
165
(0.004%)
185
(0.004%)
140
(0.003%)
140
(0.003%)
205
(0.005%)
130
(0.003%)
Male
Female
500
(0.003%)
500
(0.003%)
Total
1000
(0.003%)
Related concepts
Nature worship
or nature mysticism is often conflated and confused with pantheism. It
is pointed out by at least one expert, Harold Wood, founder of the Universal Pantheist Society,
that in pantheist philosophy Spinoza's identification of God with
nature is very different from a recent idea of a self identifying
pantheist with environmental ethical concerns. His use of the word nature
to describe his worldview may be vastly different from the "nature" of
modern sciences. He and other nature mystics who also identify as
pantheists use "nature" to refer to the limited natural environment (as opposed to man-made built environment).
This use of "nature" is different from the broader use from Spinoza and
other pantheists describing natural laws and the overall phenomena of
the physical world. Nature mysticism may be compatible with pantheism
but it may also be compatible with theism and other views.
Nontheism
is an umbrella term which has been used to refer to a variety of
religions not fitting traditional theism, and under which pantheism has
been included.
Panentheism
(from Greek πᾶν (pân) "all"; ἐν (en) "in"; and θεός (theós) "God";
"all-in-God") was formally coined in Germany in the 19th century in an
attempt to offer a philosophical synthesis between traditional theism
and pantheism, stating that God is substantially omnipresent in the physical universe but also exists "apart from" or "beyond" it as its Creator and Sustainer.
Thus panentheism separates itself from pantheism, positing the extra
claim that God exists above and beyond the world as we know it.
The line between pantheism and panentheism can be blurred depending on
varying definitions of God, so there have been disagreements when
assigning particular notable figures to pantheism or panentheism.
Pandeism is another word derived from pantheism, and is characterized as a combination of reconcilable elements of pantheism and deism.
It assumes a Creator-deity that is at some point distinct from the
universe and then transforms into it, resulting in a universe similar to
the pantheistic one in present essence, but differing in origin.
Panpsychism is the philosophical view held by many pantheists that consciousness, mind, or soul is a universal feature of all things. Some pantheists also subscribe to the distinct philosophical views hylozoism (or panvitalism), the view that everything is alive, and its close neighbor animism, the view that everything has a soul or spirit.
Ideas resembling pantheism existed in East/South Asian religions before the 18th century (notably Sikhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, and Taoism).
Although there is no evidence that these influenced Spinoza's work,
there is such evidence regarding other contemporary philosophers, such
as Leibniz, and later Voltaire. In the case of Hinduism, pantheistic views exist alongside panentheistic, polytheistic, monotheistic, and atheistic ones. In the case of Sikhism, stories attributed to Guru Nanak
suggest that he believed God was everywhere in the physical world, and
the Sikh tradition typically describes God as the preservative force
within the physical world, present in all material forms, each created
as a manifestation of God. However, Sikhs view God as the transcendent
creator, "immanent in the phenomenal reality of the world in the same way in which an artist can be said to be present in his art". This implies a more panentheistic position.
Spirituality and new religious movements
Pantheism is popular in modern spirituality and new religious movements, such as Neopaganism and Theosophy.
Two organizations that specify the word pantheism in their title formed
in the last quarter of the 20th century. The Universal Pantheist
Society, open to all varieties of pantheists and supportive of
environmental causes, was founded in 1975. The World Pantheist Movement is headed by Paul Harrison,
an environmentalist, writer and a former vice president of the
Universal Pantheist Society, from which he resigned in 1996. The World
Pantheist Movement was incorporated in 1999 to focus exclusively on
promoting naturalistic pantheism – a strict metaphysical naturalistic version of pantheism, considered by some a form of religious naturalism. It has been described as an example of "dark green religion" with a focus on environmental ethics.
