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Inclusive fitness in humans is the application of inclusive fitness theory to human social behaviour, relationships and cooperation.
Inclusive fitness theory (and the related kin selection theory) are general theories in evolutionary biology
that propose a method to understand the evolution of social behaviours
in organisms. While various ideas related to these theories have been
influential in the study of the social behaviour of non-human organisms,
their application to human behaviour has been debated.
Inclusive fitness theory is broadly understood to describe a statistical criterion by which social traits can evolve
to become widespread in a population of organisms. However, beyond this
some scientists have interpreted the theory to make predictions about
how the expression of social behavior is mediated in both humans
and other animals – typically that genetic relatedness determines the
expression of social behaviour. Other biologists and anthropologists
maintain that beyond its statistical evolutionary relevance the theory
does not necessarily imply that genetic relatedness per se determines the expression
of social behavior in organisms. Instead, the expression of social
behavior may be mediated by correlated conditions, such as shared
location, shared rearing environment, familiarity or other contextual
cues which correlate with shared genetic relatedness, thus meeting the
statistical evolutionary criteria without being deterministic. While the
former position still attracts controversy, the latter position has a
better empirical fit with anthropological data about human kinship practices, and is accepted by cultural anthropologists.
History
Applying
evolutionary biology perspectives to humans and human society has often
resulted in periods of controversy and debate, due to their apparent
incompatibility with alternative perspectives about humanity. Examples
of early controversies include the reactions to On the Origin of Species, and the Scopes Monkey Trial. Examples of later controversies more directly connected with inclusive fitness theory and its use in sociobiology include physical confrontations at meetings of the Sociobiology Study Group and more often intellectual arguments such as Sahlins' 1976 book The use and abuse of biology, Lewontin et al.'s 1984 Not in Our Genes, and Kitcher's 1985 Vaulting Ambition:Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature.
Some of these later arguments were produced by other scientists,
including biologists and anthropologists, against Wilson's 1975 book Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, which was influenced by (though not necessarily endorsed by) Hamilton's work on inclusive fitness theory.
A key debate in applying inclusive fitness theory to humans has
been between biologists and anthropologists around the extent to which
human kinship
relationships (considered to be a large component of human solidarity
and altruistic activity and practice) are necessarily based on or
influenced by genetic relationships or blood-ties ('consanguinity'). The
position of most social anthropologists
is summarized by Sahlins (1976), that for humans "the categories of
'near' and 'distant' [kin] vary independently of consanguinal distance
and that these categories organize actual social practice" (p. 112).
Biologists wishing to apply the theory to humans directly disagree,
arguing that "the categories of 'near' and 'distant' do not 'vary
independently of consanguinal distance', not in any society on earth."
(Daly et al. 1997, p282).
This disagreement is central because of the way the association
between blood ties/genetic relationships and altruism are conceptualized
by many biologists. It is frequently understood by biologists that
inclusive fitness theory makes predictions about how behaviour is mediated in both humans and other animals. For example, a recent experiment conducted on humans by the evolutionary psychologist Robin Dunbar
and colleagues was, as they understood it, designed "to test the
prediction that altruistic behaviour is mediated by Hamilton's rule"
(inclusive fitness theory) and more specifically that "If participants
follow Hamilton's rule, investment (time for which the [altruistic]
position was held) should increase with the recipient's relatedness to
the participant. In effect, we tested whether investment flows
differentially down channels of relatedness." From their results, they
concluded that "human altruistic behaviour is mediated by Hamilton's
rule ... humans behave in such a way as to maximize inclusive fitness:
they are more willing to benefit closer relatives than more distantly
related individuals." (Madsen et al. 2007). This position continues
to be rejected by social anthropologists as being incompatible with the
large amount of ethnographic data on kinship and altruism that their
discipline has collected over many decades, that demonstrates that in
many human cultures, kinship relationships (accompanied by altruism) do
not necessarily map closely onto genetic relationships.
Whilst the above understanding of inclusive fitness theory as
necessarily making predictions about how human kinship and altruism is
mediated is common amongst evolutionary psychologists, other biologists
and anthropologists have argued that it is at best a limited (and at
worst a mistaken) understanding of inclusive fitness theory. These
scientists argue that the theory is better understood as simply
describing an evolutionary criterion for the emergence of altruistic behaviour, which is explicitly statistical in character, not as predictive of proximate or mediating mechanisms of altruistic behaviour, which may not necessarily be determined by genetic relatedness (or blood ties) per se.
These alternative non-deterministic and non-reductionist understandings
of inclusive fitness theory and human behavior have been argued to be
compatible with anthropologists' decades of data on human kinship, and
compatible with anthropologists' perspectives on human kinship. This
position (e.g. nurture kinship)
has been largely accepted by social anthropologists, whilst the former
position (still held by evolutionary psychologists, see above) remains
rejected by social anthropologists.
Theoretical background
Theoretical overview
Inclusive fitness theory, first proposed by Bill Hamilton
in the early 1960s, proposes a selective criterion for the potential
evolution of social traits in organisms, where social behavior that is
costly to an individual organism's survival and reproduction could
nevertheless emerge under certain conditions. The key condition relates
to the statistical likelihood that significant benefits of a social
trait or behavior accrue to (the survival and reproduction of) other
organisms who also carry the social trait. Inclusive fitness
theory is a general treatment of the statistical probabilities of
social traits accruing to any other organisms likely to propagate a copy
of the same social trait. Kin selection
theory treats the narrower but more straightforward case of the
benefits accruing to close genetic relatives (or what biologists call
'kin') who may also carry and propagate the trait. Under conditions
where the social trait sufficiently correlates (or more properly, regresses) with other likely bearers, a net overall increase in reproduction of the social trait in future generations can result.
The concept serves to explain how natural selection can
perpetuate altruism. If there is an "altruism gene" (or complex of genes
or heritable factors) that influence an organism's behavior in such a
way that is helpful and protective of relatives and their offspring,
this behavior can also increase the proportion of the altruism gene in
the population, because relatives are likely to share genes with the
altruist due to common descent. In formal terms, if such a complex of
genes arises, Hamilton's rule (rb>c) specifies the selective criteria
(in terms of relatedness (r), cost (c) benefit (b)) for such a trait to
increase in frequency in the population (see Inclusive fitness
for more details). Hamilton noted that inclusive fitness theory does
not by itself predict that a given species will necessarily evolve such
altruistic behaviors, since an opportunity or context for interaction
between individuals is a more primary and necessary requirement in order
for any social interaction to occur in the first place. As Hamilton put
it, "Altruistic or selfish acts are only possible when a suitable
social object is available. In this sense behaviours are conditional
from the start." (Hamilton 1987, 420).
In other words, whilst inclusive fitness theory specifies a set of
necessary criteria for the evolution of certain altruistic traits, it
does not specify a sufficient condition for their evolution in any given
species, since the typical ecology, demographics and life pattern of
the species must also allow for social interactions between individuals
to occur before any potential elaboration of social traits can evolve in
regard to those interactions.
Initial presentations of the theory
The initial presentation of inclusive fitness theory (in the mid 1960s, see The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour) focused on making the general mathematical case for the possibility of social evolution. However, since many field biologists
mainly use theory as a guide to their observations and analysis of
empirical phenomena, Hamilton also speculated about possible proximate
behavioural mechanisms that might be observable in organisms whereby a
social trait could effectively achieve this necessary statistical
correlation between its likely bearers:
The selective advantage which makes
behaviour conditional in the right sense on the discrimination of
factors which correlate with the relationship of the individual
concerned is therefore obvious. It may be, for instance, that in respect
of a certain social action performed towards neighbours
indiscriminately, an individual is only just breaking even in terms of
inclusive fitness. If he could learn to recognise those of his
neighbours who really were close relatives and could devote his
beneficial actions to them alone an advantage to inclusive fitness
would at once appear. Thus a mutation causing such discriminatory
behaviour itself benefits inclusive fitness and would be selected. In
fact, the individual may not need to perform any discrimination so
sophisticated as we suggest here; a difference in the generosity of his
behaviour according to whether the situations evoking it were
encountered near to, or far from, his own home might occasion an
advantage of a similar kind." (Hamilton 1996 [1964], 51)
Hamilton here was suggesting two broad proximate mechanisms by which
social traits might meet the criterion of correlation specified by the
theory:
Kin recognition (active discrimination):
If a social trait enables an organism to distinguish between different
degrees of genetic relatedness when interacting in a mixed population,
and to discriminate (positively) in performing social behaviours on the
basis of detecting genetic relatedness, then the average relatedness of
the recipients of altruism could be high enough to meet the criterion.
In another section of the same paper (page 54) Hamilton considered
whether 'supergenes' that identify copies of themselves in others might
evolve to give more accurate information about genetic relatedness. He
later (1987, see below) considered this to be wrong-headed and withdrew
the suggestion.
Viscous populations (spatial cues): Even indiscriminate altruism may achieve the correlation in 'viscous' populations where individuals have low rates of dispersal
or short distances of dispersal from their home range (their location
of birth). Here, social partners are typically genealogically closely
related, and so altruism can flourish even in the absence of kin recognition and kin discrimination faculties – spatial proximity and circumstantial cues provide the necessary correlation.
These two alternative suggestions had important effects on how
field biologists understood the theory and what they looked for in the
behavior of organisms. Within a few years biologists were looking for
evidence that 'kin recognition' mechanisms might occur in organisms,
assuming this was a necessary prediction of inclusive fitness theory,
leading to a sub-field of 'kin recognition' research.
Later theoretical refinements
A common source of confusion around inclusive fitness theory is that
Hamilton's early analysis included some inaccuracies, that, although corrected by him in later publications,
are often not fully understood by other researchers who attempt to
apply inclusive fitness to understanding organisms' behaviour. For
example, Hamilton had initially suggested that the statistical
correlation in his formulation could be understood by a correlation
coefficient of genetic relatedness, but quickly accepted George Price's
correction that a general regression coefficient was the more relevant
metric, and together they published corrections in 1970. A related
confusion is the connection between inclusive fitness and multi-level selection,
which are often incorrectly assumed to be mutually exclusive theories.
The regression coefficient helps to clarify this connection:
Because of the way it was first
explained, the approach using inclusive fitness has often been
identified with 'kin selection' and presented strictly as an alternative
to 'group selection'. But the foregoing discussion shows that kinship
should be considered just one way of getting positive regression of
genotype in the recipient, and that it is this positive regression that
is vitally necessary for altruism. Thus the inclusive-fitness concept is
more general than 'kin selection'.(Hamilton 1996 [1975], 337)
Hamilton also later modified his thinking about likely mediating
mechanisms whereby social traits achieve the necessary correlation with
genetic relatedness. Specifically he corrected his earlier speculations
that an innate ability (and 'supergenes') to recognise actual genetic
relatedness was a likely mediating mechanism for kin altruism:
But once again, we do not expect
anything describable as an innate kin recognition adaptation, used for
social behaviour other than mating, for the reasons already given in the
hypothetical case of the trees. (Hamilton 1987, 425)
The point about inbreeding avoidance is significant, since the whole
genome of sexual organisms benefits from avoiding close inbreeding;
there is a different selection pressure at play compared to the
selection pressure on social traits (see Kin recognition for more information).
It does not follow… that ability to
discriminate degrees of relatedness automatically implies that kin
selection is the model relevant to its origin. In fact, since even
earlier than Darwin, it had been realised that most organisms tend to
avoid closely inbred matings. The reasons must have to do with the
function of sexuality and this is not quite yet resolved (see e.g. Bell,
1982; Shields, 1982; Hamilton, 1982); but whatever the function is,
here must be another set of reasons for discriminating. Some animals
clearly do use discrimination for purposes of mate selection. Japanese
quail for example evidently use an early imprinting of their chick
companions towards obtaining, much later, preferred degrees of
consanguinity in their mates (Bateson 1983). (Hamilton 1987, 419)
Since Hamiton's 1964 speculations about active discrimination mechanisms (above), other theorists such as Richard Dawkins
had clarified that there would be negative selection pressure against
mechanisms for genes to recognize copies of themselves in other
individuals and discriminate socially between them on this basis.
Dawkins used his 'Green beard'
thought experiment, where a gene for social behaviour is imagined also
to cause a distinctive phenotype that can be recognised by other
carriers of the gene. Due to conflicting genetic similarity in the rest
of the genome, there would be selection pressure for green-beard
altruistic sacrifices to be suppressed via meitoic drive.
Ongoing misconceptions
Hamilton's
later clarifications often go unnoticed, and because of the
long-standing assumption that kin selection requires innate powers of
kin recognition, some theorists have later tried to clarify the
position:
[T]he fact that animals benefit
from engaging in spatially mediated behaviors is not evidence that these
animals can recognize their kin, nor does it support the conclusion
that spatially based differential behaviors represent a kin recognition
mechanism (see also discussions by Blaustein, 1983; Waldman, 1987;
Halpin 1991). In other words, from an evolutionary perspective it may
well be advantageous for kin to aggregate and for individuals to behave
preferentially towards nearby kin, whether or not this behaviour is the
result of kin recognition per se" (Tang-Martinez 2001, 25)
In his original papers on inclusive
fitness theory, Hamilton pointed out a sufficiently high relatedness to
favour altruistic behaviours could accrue in two ways – kin
discrimination or limited dispersal (Hamilton, 1964, 1971,1972, 1975).
There is a huge theoretical literature on the possible role of limited
dispersal reviewed by Platt & Bever (2009) and West et al. (2002a),
as well as experimental evolution tests of these models (Diggle et al.,
2007; Griffin et al., 2004; Kümmerli et al., 2009). However, despite
this, it is still sometimes claimed that kin selection requires kin
discrimination (Oates & Wilson, 2001; Silk, 2002 ). Furthermore, a
large number of authors appear to have implicitly or explicitly assumed
that kin discrimination is the only mechanism by which altruistic
behaviours can be directed towards relatives... [T]here is a huge
industry of papers reinventing limited dispersal as an explanation for
cooperation. The mistakes in these areas seem to stem from the incorrect
assumption that kin selection or indirect fitness benefits require kin
discrimination (misconception 5), despite the fact that Hamilton pointed
out the potential role of limited dispersal in his earliest papers on
inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton, 1964; Hamilton, 1971; Hamilton,
1972; Hamilton, 1975). (West et al. 2010, p.243 and supplement)
The assumption that 'kin selection requires kin discrimination' has
obscured the more parsimonious possibility that spatial-cue-based
mediation of social cooperation based on limited dispersal and shared
developmental context are commonly found in many organisms that have
been studied, including in social mammal species. As Hamilton pointed
out, "Altruistic or selfish acts are only possible when a suitable
social object is available. In this sense behaviours are conditional
from the start" (Hamilton 1987, see above section). Since a reliable
context of interaction between social actors is always a necessary condition
for social traits to emerge, a reliable context of interaction is
necessarily present to be leveraged by context-dependent cues to mediate
social behaviours. Focus on mediating mechanisms of limited dispersal
and reliable developmental context has allowed significant progress in
applying kin selection and inclusive fitness theory to a wide variety of
species, including humans, on the basis of cue-based mediation of social bonding and social behaviours (see below).
Mammal evidence
In mammals, as well as in other species, ecological niche
and demographic conditions strongly shape typical contexts of
interaction between individuals, including the frequency and
circumstances surrounding the interactions between genetic relatives.
Although mammals exist in a wide variety of ecological conditions and
varying demographic arrangements, certain contexts of interaction
between genetic relatives are nevertheless reliable enough for selection
to act upon. New born mammals are often immobile and always totally
dependent (socially dependent if you will) on their carer(s) for nursing
with nutrient rich milk and for protection. This fundamental social
dependence is a fact of life for all mammals, including humans. These
conditions lead to a reliable spatial context in which there is a
statistical association of replica genes between a reproductive female
and her infant offspring (and has been evolutionary typical) for most
mammal species. Beyond this natal context, extended possibilities for
frequent interaction between related individuals are more variable and
depend on group living vs. solitary living, mating patterns, duration of
pre-maturity development, dispersal patterns, and more. For example, in
group living primates
with females remaining in their natal group for their entire lives,
there will be lifelong opportunities for interactions between female
individuals related through their mothers and grandmothers etc. These
conditions also thus provide a spatial-context for cue-based mechanisms
to mediate social behaviours.
The most widespread and important
mechanism for kin recognition in mammals appears to be familiarity
through prior association (Bekoff, 1981; Sherman, 1980). During
development, individuals learn and respond to cues from the most
familiar or most commonly encountered conspecifics in their environment.
Individuals respond to familiar individuals as kin and unfamiliar
individuals as nonkin. (Erhart et al. 1997, 153–154)
Mammalian young are born into a
wide variety of social situations, ranging from being isolated from all
other individuals except their mother (and possibly other siblings) to
being born into large social groups. Although siblings do interact in a
wide variety of species having different life histories, there are
certain conditions, almost all of which have to do with the
developmental environment, that will favor a biased occurrence of
interactions between littermates and/or different-aged siblings. It will
be argued later that it is these, and perhaps other, conditions that predispose
(in a probabilistic way) siblings to interact with one another.
However, if two (or more) very young unrelated individuals (assume
conspecifics for simplicity) are exposed to these conditions, they too
will behave like siblings. That is, although [relatedness] and
[familiarity] are tightly linked in many mammals, it is [familiarity]
that can override [relatedness], rather than the reverse. (Bekoff 1981,
309)
In addition to the above examples, a wide variety of evidence from
mammal species supports the finding that shared context and familiarity
mediate social bonding, rather than genetic relatedness per se.
Cross-fostering studies (placing unrelated young in a shared
developmental environment) strongly demonstrate that unrelated
individuals bond and cooperate just as would normal littermates. The
evidence therefore demonstrates that bonding and cooperation are
mediated by proximity, shared context and familiarity, not via active
recognition of genetic relatedness. This is problematic for those
biologists who wish to claim that inclusive fitness theory predicts that
social cooperation is mediated via genetic relatedness, rather than understanding the theory simply to state that social traits can evolve under conditions where there is statistical
association of genetically related organisms. The former position sees
the expression of cooperative behaviour as more or less
deterministically caused by genetic relatedness, where the latter
position does not. The distinction between cooperation mediated by
shared context, and cooperation mediated by genetic relatedness per se,
has significant implications for whether inclusive fitness theory can
be seen as compatible with the anthropological evidence on human social
patterns or not. The shared context perspective is largely compatible, the genetic relatedness perspective is not (see below).
Human kinship and cooperation
The
debate about how to interpret the implications of Inclusive fitness
theory for human social cooperation has paralleled some of the key
misunderstandings outlined above. Initially, evolutionary biologists
interested in humans wrongly assumed that in the human case, 'kin
selection requires kin discrimination' along with their colleagues
studying other species (see West et al., above). In other words, many
biologists assumed that strong social bonds accompanied by altruism and
cooperation in human societies (long studied by the anthropological
field of kinship) were necessarily built upon recognizing genetic
relatedness (or 'blood ties'). This seemed to fit well with historical
research in anthropology originating in the nineteenth century (see history of kinship) that often assumed that human kinship was built upon a recognition of shared blood ties.
However, independently of the emergence of inclusive fitness
theory, from 1960s onwards many anthropologists themselves had
reexamined the balance of findings in their own ethnographic data and
had begun to reject the notion that human kinship is 'caused by' blood
ties (see Kinship). Anthropologists have gathered very extensive ethnographic
data on human social patterns and behaviour over a century or more,
from a wide spectrum of different cultural groups. The data demonstrates
that many cultures do not consider 'blood ties' (in the genealogical
sense) to underlie their close social relationships and kinship bonds.
Instead social bonds are often considered to be based on location-based
shared circumstances including living together (co-residence), sleeping
close together, working together, sharing food (commensality) and other
forms of shared life together. Comparative anthropologists have shown
that these aspects of shared circumstances are a significant component
of what influences kinship in most human cultures, notwithstanding
whether or not 'blood ties' are necessarily present (see Nurture kinship, below).
Although blood ties (and genetic relatedness) often correlate
with kinship, just as in the case of mammals (above section), evidence
from human societies suggests that it is not the genetic relatedness per se
that is the mediating mechanism of social bonding and cooperation,
instead it is the shared context (albeit typically consisting of genetic
relatives) and the familiarity that arises from it, that mediate the
social bonds. This implies that genetic relatedness is not the determining mechanism
nor required for the formation of social bonds in kinship groups, or
for the expression of altruism in humans, even if statistical
correlations of genetic relatedness are an evolutionary criterion
for the emergence of such social traits in biological organisms over
evolutionary timescales. Understanding this distinction between the statistical role of genetic relatedness in the evolution of social traits and yet its lack of necessary determining role in mediating mechanisms of social bonding and the expression of altruism is key to inclusive fitness theory's proper application to human social behaviour (as well as to other mammals).
Nurture kinship
Compatible with biologists' emphasis on familiarity and shared context mediating social bonds, the concept of nurture kinship
in the anthropological study of human social relationships highlights
the extent to which such relationships are brought into being through
the performance of various acts of sharing, acts of care, and
performance of nurture
between individuals who live in close proximity. Additionally the
concept highlights ethnographic findings that, in a wide swath of human
societies, people understand, conceptualize and symbolize their
relationships predominantly in terms of giving, receiving and sharing
nurture. The concept stands in contrast to the earlier anthropological
concepts of human kinship relations being fundamentally based on "blood
ties", some other form of shared substance, or a proxy for these (as in fictive kinship), and the accompanying notion that people universally understand their social relationships predominantly in these terms.
The nurture kinship perspective on the ontology of social ties,
and how people conceptualize them, has become stronger in the wake of David M. Schneider's influential Critique of the Study of Kinship and Holland's subsequent Social Bonding and Nurture Kinship: Compatibility between Cultural and Biological approaches, demonstrating that as well as the ethnographic record, biological theory and evidence also more strongly support the nurture perspective than the blood perspective. Both Schneider and Holland argue that the earlier blood theory of kinship derived from an unwarranted extension of symbols and values from anthropologists' own cultures (see ethnocentrism).