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Wednesday, October 5, 2022

Adolf Hitler's cult of personality

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
A Nazi propaganda poster of Hitler used during the 1932 election campaign

Adolf Hitler's cult of personality was a prominent feature of Nazi Germany (1933–1945), which began in the 1920s during the early days of the Nazi Party. Based on the Führerprinzip that the leader is always right, promulgated by incessant Nazi propaganda, and reinforced by Hitler's apparent success in fixing Germany's economic problems, his bloodless triumphs in foreign policy prior to World War II, and his quick military successes in Poland and France in the early part of the war, it eventually became a central aspect of Nazi control of the German people.

The myth of Hitler as an infallible multi-faceted genius with heroic, almost superhuman qualities approached deification. It was used as a tool to unify the German people behind the personality, opinions, and goals of Hitler, and was also insurance against the Nazi movement fragmenting into warring factions.

Adolf Hitler's image in propaganda and the mass media

Beginning in the early years of the Nazi Party, Nazi propaganda depicted the Nazi leader Adolf Hitler as an iconic figure who was the only person capable of saving Germany. Following the end of World War I and during the interwar period, the German people suffered greatly under the Weimar Republic and, according to the Nazis, only Hitler as a messiah could save them and restore Germany's greatness, which in turn gave rise to the myth of the "Führer-cult". As early as a few days after Benito Mussolini's "March on Rome" on 28 October 1922, a Nazi Party speaker announced to a beer-hall crowd that "Germany's Mussolini is called Adolf Hitler", thus giving a boost to Hitler's cult of personality, which was only just getting started. In December 1922, the Nazi newspaper Völkischer Beobachter claimed that Hitler was no longer the drummer of the Nazi Party, but was in fact the leader who could only rescue Germany.

After the failed Beer Hall Putsch in November 1923 and Hitler's imprisonment, he set out to construct an image of himself that would appeal to all sections of the German people. He developed over time a self-image with nationalistic and religious overtones which made him appealing to all Germans, and which prompted him to proclaim, "I have awakened the masses".

"Ja dem Führer" ("Yes to the Leader"), a Nazi slogan banner outside of a school in 1934

The Nazis deliberately chose their party's name, the "National Socialist German Workers' Party", as a way to appeal to Germans with both left-wing and right-wing sensibilities. When Hitler took over the party as its Führer ("leader") in 1921, he insisted on adding "National Socialist" to the party's name, which up to that point had simply been called the German Workers' Party. Despite Hitler and the Nazis claiming to be socialists, they were not, and it was used merely for propaganda purposes and to attract new members. Once the Nazis were in power, they suppressed trade unions and persecuted left-wing opponents such as communists and socialists.

Nazi propaganda chief Joseph Goebbels' newspaper, Der Angriff ("The Attack"), played a large role in the creation of the Führer myth. From its early days of publication, photos and drawings of Hitler were common. The myth made Hitler seem mystical to many Nazi Party members. Hitler was regarded as a model in every aspect: he was regarded as one of the people, a worker and a soldier who put his life on the line to fight for Germany during World War I, but at the same time, the image presented was a heroic one, with Hitler depicted as a genius with almost superhuman qualities, close to a god to be venerated. After the Nazis came to power, Hitler annually received over 12,000 letters of adoration and praise from Germans of all classes and vocations, from all over the country.

Hitler with Nazi Party members in 1930

In 1930, Hitler allegedly told Otto Strasser, “For us the Idea is the Führer, and each Party member has only to obey the Führer”. During five election campaigns in 1932, the Nazi newspaper Völkischer Beobachter ("People's Observer") portrayed Hitler as a man who had a mass movement united behind him, a man whose sole mission was to save Germany, who was the "Leader of the coming Germany". During the campaigns, Hitler took on a quasi-religious status within the party. The Völkischer Beobachter ran the headline "The National Socialist movement is the resurrection of the German nation", with the article quoting Hitler as saying, "I believe that I am instrument of nature to liberate Germany". Similarly, Goebbels wrote in Der Angriff that Hitler was "the Greater German, the Führer, the Prophet, the Fighter that last hope of the masses, the shining symbol of the German will to freedom". During those campaigns, Hitler became the first politician to campaign by air, flying from city to city under the slogan Hitler über Deutschland ("Hitler Over Germany"), sometimes visiting up to five cities in a day to make speeches before mass audiences. Hitler's charismatic and mesmerizing speaking abilities played a major role in his attraction to the German people.

As Germany's economic crisis – caused by the onset of the Great Depression – continued and grew, and as the Nazis gained political power by virtue of the number of seats they held in the Reichstag, Goebbels' propaganda machine created an image of Hitler that personified the people's anger at the Weimar Republic's inability to solve their problems. Hitler was, the propaganda said, the only man who could save Germany and create a new social order, the "people's community" (Volksgemeinschaft); Hitler was "the hope of millions", the flesh-and-blood instantiation of national salvation. According to historian Ian Kershaw, "[The people] projected onto Hitler their own beliefs, wishes and desires. He incorporated them in a vision of complete national rebirth." Goebbels cultivated an image of Hitler as a "heroic genius". During the existence of Nazi Germany, every year on the eve of Hitler's birthday, Goebbels would deliver a speech titled "Our Hitler", in which he lauded all the many supposed virtues of Hitler's personality and ideas.

The myth also gave rise to the concept behind the saying "If only the Führer knew": when the German people were dissatisfied with the way the country was being run, they blamed it on Nazi bigwigs but fell short of laying any blame on Hitler himself, instead exempting him from culpability. They believed that if Hitler knew what was happening, he would set things right. The Night of the Long Knives in 1934 – a murderous purge of Hitler's opponents inside the Nazi Party and in its paramilitary arm, the Sturmabteilung (SA), as well as numerous others – was presented to the public as Hitler preventing chaos by preemptively suppressing a coup attempt. This helped to reinforce Hitler's image as the protector of the German people.

Hitler stamp
Hitler stamp
Images of Hitler on stamps were common during Nazi Germany

The cult of leader was evidenced in Nazi propaganda films by Leni Riefenstahl, such as 1935's Triumph of the Will, which Hitler ordered to be made. The film showed the 1934 Nuremberg Rally, which was attended by over 700,000 supporters, and is one of the first examples of the Hitler myth filmed and put into full effect during Nazi Germany. The mysticism is evident from the start when Hitler begins to descend from the clouds in an airplane, and as the rally finishes with a climax uniting Hitler, the Nazi Party, and the German people, with Rudolf Hess saying, "The Party is Hitler. But Hitler is Germany, just as Germany is Hitler. Hitler! Sieg Heil!" Those Germans who watched the film were exposed to the full force of the Führer myth.

In 1934, Hitler’s chosen successor, Hermann Göring, said, "There is something mystical, inexpressible, almost incomprehensible about this one man. ... We love Adolf Hitler because we believe, deeply and steadfastly, that he was sent to us by God to save Germany. ... There is no quality that he does not possess to the highest degree. ... For us the fuhrer is simply infallible in all matters political and all other issues concerning the national and social interest of the people".

Nazi propaganda relentlessly aimed to persuade Germans to have faith and confidence in the ideas of Hitler. The extent of how images of Hitler were used in Nazi propaganda was summarized in 1941 when a Nazi newsreel stated that "a newsreel without pictures of the Führer was not regarded as up to standard".

British historian Ian Kershaw's book The "Hitler Myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich was published in 1987. In it, he wrote:

Hitler stood for at least some things they [German people] admired, and for many had become the symbol and embodiment of the national revival which the Third Reich had in many respects been perceived to accomplish.

The Wochenspruch der NSDAP wall newspaper published on February 16, 1941: "The Führer is always right."

Although the political ideology of Nazism mattered to Hitler himself, many Nazi Party members were indifferent to it, since to the majority of them he was the embodiment of Nazism.

Führerprinzip

The Führerprinzip ("leader principle") was the fundamental basis of political authority in Nazi Germany. This principle can be most succinctly understood to mean that "the Führer's word is above all written law" and that governmental policies, decisions, and offices ought to work toward the realization of this end. The principle also extended to the leadership of other organizations, who were expected to have the last word in their purviews.

The Führerprinzip was given credence during the Night of Long Knives in 1934 when Hitler ordered a number of extrajudicial executions because of an alleged imminent coup by the SA under Ernst Röhm – the so-called "Röhm Putsch". Hitler gave a speech at the Reichstag and said, "The National Socialist State will wage a Hundred Years’ War, if necessary, to stamp out and destroy every last trace within its boundaries of this phenomenon which poisons and makes dupes of the Volk (Volksvernarrung)" and argued that "in this hour, I was responsible for the fate of the German nation and was therefore the supreme judge of the German people!" Nazi propaganda claimed that Hitler's actions had saved Germany.

Führer Myth

The "Führer Myth" utilized propaganda and the Führerprinzip to portray Hitler as an infallible genius who was above party politics, and was totally dedicated to protecting and saving the German people from both insidious outside forces, such as "Jewish Bolshevism", and from internal factors such as conservative, centrist and liberal politics and politicians who supported democracy and were the backbone of the Weimar Republic. To a lesser extent, religion was included in the Nazi's litany of destructive internal forces, but because the German people – both Protestants and Roman Catholics – were very attached to their religious beliefs, this aspect of Nazi ideology was soft-pedaled, and its presentation was inconsistent.

The power of the myth was so embedded into German society that the ballot cards for elections and plebiscites in the early 1930s did not refer to the "Nazi Party" but rather the "Hitler Movement". Although "National Socialism" had been used by other political parties before the rise of the Nazis, Nazism was Hitlerism in simple terms.

Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels stated in 1941 that one of his greatest achievements was creating the Führer myth.

During the 1930s, Hitler's popularity was largely due to the Führer myth being accepted by a majority of Germans. Most Germans sought recovery, security and prosperity, and Hitler seemed to offer all of those things. Most Germans approved of his socio-economic policies and the draconian measures against those regarded as "enemies" of the state because the Nazis appeared to have the solutions to all of Germany's problems. The Führer myth enabled the Schutzstaffel (SS) to carry out terror among the German population, because it went largely unnoticed, due to the enthusiasm for Hitler and the Nazi regime. The myth helped Germans to view Hitler as a statesman who was determined to "save" Germany from the scourge of "Jewish Bolshevism", which is how the Nazis and other ultra-nationalists referred to Marxism and communism. To some extent, the myth contributed to Germans accepting or overlooking the Nazi's policies towards Jews.

Hitler himself – along with Joseph Goebbels – was a significant contributor to the creation of the myth. Hitler understood the importance of propaganda and the need to create an aura about himself. Reflecting on the claims he had made in 1933 to the German people, Hitler said in 1938:

The German people should once again examine what I and my comrades have done in the five years since the first Reichstag election in March 1933. They will have to agree that the results have been unique in all history.

Joseph Goebbels told officials at the Propaganda Ministry in 1941 that his two greatest achievements were "the style and technique of the Party's public ceremonies; the ceremonial of the mass demonstrations, the ritual of the great Party occasion" and the "creation of the myth, Hitler had been given the halo of infallibility, with the result that many people who looked askance at the Party after 1933 had now complete confidence in Hitler". The most important theme of Nazi propaganda was the cult of the leader, portraying Hitler as a charismatic leader who had saved Germany.

The Führer myth, along with the Führerprinzip, helped to curb internal crises within the Nazi Party, as Hitler himself said in 1935, "No, gentlemen. The Führer is the Party and the Party is the Führer". The myth also lent to the legitimacy of Nazism as a political ideology abroad. Although it was not the case, the myth gave credence to the idea that the Nazis had managed to integrate all Germans in society. The extent that the myth had penetrated into German society meant that it was nearly impossible for any German who read a newspaper, listened to a radio or watched any films to avoid it, since the Nazis owned all of the media and they determined what Germans were able to read and watch.

The Führer myth was a double-sided phenomenon. On the one hand, Nazi propaganda worked continuously to convey an image of Hitler as a heroic figure who made all of the right choices. On the other hand, it can be seen as observation of value-systems and ethics which subscribed to a "supreme" leadership.

The cult of leadership surrounding Hitler also served to prevent the Nazi Party from fragmenting into warring factions, especially after Hitler had eliminated his rivals Ernst Röhm and Gregor Strasser in the purge of 1934. With the Führer as the embodiment of the Party's ideology and the people's hopes for national salvation, held blameless by the public when things went badly, it was virtually impossible for any of Hitler's paladins to attempt to replace him via a palace coup.

Economic aspects

After World War I, the Weimar Republic of Germany was hit hard by hyperinflation and the Great Depression which followed it. Many Germans had difficulty separating the German loss of the war from the unrelated effects of the economic collapse which followed, and, in a country with no history of democracy, tended to blame the conditions laid down by the Allies in the Treaty of Versailles and the novel governmental form of democracy in a republic for their economic woes, instead of looking at the root cause, which was world-wide economic conditions. When Weimar was not able to offer them the relief they needed, they started to look for a champion who could fix things, one who also did not believe in democracy or republican government, and who offered what appeared to be solutions to Germany's economic problems.

Without the apparent economic successes of the early 1930s, it is highly unlikely that the Hitler myth would have been able to penetrate so far into German society. The irony of this is that what economic successes occurred were not Hitler's doing. Relief from Germany's onerous war reparations – which had been lessened by the Dawes Plan in 1925, the Young Plan in 1929, and the Hoover Moratorium in 1931, and were cancelled by the Lausanne Conference of 1932 – was due to much careful negotiating and diplomacy by Germany's long-term Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann before his death in 1929, and afterwards by Chancellor Heinrich Brüning. The massive public-works program, for instance, which brought down unemployment by two million in early 1933 was instituted by Brüning's successor, and Hitler's predecessor, Chancellor Kurt von Schleicher, 48 hours before he left office; Hitler merely got to take credit for von Schleicher's program. Then, of course, there was the fact that, globally, the Great Depression was slowly giving way by the mid-1930s, although some of its negative effects lasted until the beginning of World War II. The one aspect of Germany's economic recovery after Hitler took office which he could legitimately take credit for, was the effect – both positive and negative – on the German economy of massive spending for rearmament, including the wholesale expansion of the army, the building of new battleships and U-boats, and the creation from whole cloth of the Luftwaffe, the German air force.

The working class was the least susceptible to the Hitler myth since they still had low wages and longer working hours. Nevertheless, the "socialist" appeal of Nazism ensured some amount of support from German workers, who benefited from the Winter Relief campaigns. The middle class benefited the most from the apparent economic successes and despite their criticisms, at least until the middle of the war, they remained the most firm supporters of Hitler and the Nazi regime.

Foreign policy and military aspects

Hitler was regarded as the unique force behind the Nazi movement and someone who transcended party politics and aimed to unite all Germans into a people's community (Volksgemeinschaft). Despite criticism of the Nazi regime being apparent during the 1930s, Hitler's early successful foreign policies, reversing the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles and uniting all ethnic Germans under one state led to Hitler's popularity soaring, which enhanced the myth.

Although it remains unknown how many Germans genuinely believed in the Führer myth, even those Germans who were critical of Hitler and the Nazi regime believed in it by the late 1930s. Most Germans had been impressed by the apparent successes of the Nazi regime, which were all attributed to Hitler himself. For example, in 1938 after the Anschluss one report by the Social Democratic Party of Germany concluded:

The Führer's foreign-policy statements strike a chord with many workers too; especially with young people. The firm stand the Führer has taken over the occupation of the Rhineland has been universally impressive. Many people are convinced that Germany's foreign-policy demands are justified and cannot be passed over. The last few days have been marked by big fresh advanced in the Führer's personal reputation, including among workers. There is no mistaking the enormous personal gains in credibility and prestige that Hitler has made, mainly perhaps among workers. The fact that Austria was subjugated by force has had little or no effect so far on the way the event is being judged here. The crucial point is that Austria has been annexed; not how. On the contrary, it is being taken for granted that the annexation was carried out with violence, since almost all the major successes of the system have been achieved with the use of violent methods.

Up until 1938, the myth helped to convince most Germans that Hitler was a politician of conviction who was standing up for Germany's rights. Before the start of World War II, the Führer myth was almost complete, but it was still missing an important trait: Hitler being a military genius. Even before the start of the war, the Nazi propaganda machine was working towards portraying that image to the German people. This was preceded by the myth of Hitler's diplomatic and foreign policy genius, which was spawned by his triumphs in the Remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Anschluss with Austria, being given the Sudetenland by the Western powers in Munich, and the bloodless invasion and partition of Czechoslovakia. By the lead-up to the Invasion of Poland, foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was threatening to execute anyone on his staff who doubted Hitler's prediction that Poland would collapse in days and that England would not intervene on its behalf.

On Hitler's 50th birthday on April 20, 1939, the military parade was aimed to portray him as "the future military leader, taking muster of his armed forces". After the war began on September 1, 1939, the image of Hitler being a supreme war leader and a military genius came to dominate the myth more than any other aspect of it. Although many Germans were worried about the aspect of another war, once the war began, there was a development in the myth.

The early successes brought about a deeper level of emotional attachment because he was said to have represented the national community and national greatness, and that he was going to turn Germany into a world power. The euphoria only lasted while triumphs continued, but once they stopped then the emotional attachment was lost.

Legal aspects

Beginning in 1934–35, the Führer myth began to determine the constitutional law of Nazi Germany. Nazi lawyer Hans Frank stated, "Constitutional Law in the Third Reich is the legal formulation of the historic will of the Führer, but the historic will of the Führer is not the fulfilment of legal preconditions for his activity."

Hans Frank (centre) was one of the main lawyers who implemented Hitler's will as the law of Nazi Germany

As early as March 23, 1933, Hitler declared that the primary reason for the law was so that, "Our judiciary must, first and foremost, serve the preservation of the Volk community", that "the flexibility of judgements calculated to serve the preservation of society must be appropriate in light of the fixed tenure of the judges" and warned that, "in the future, state and national treason will be annihilated with barbaric ruthlessness".

Shortly after Hitler had merged the two positions of Chancellor and President into one to create the position "Führer and chancellor", Frank gave a speech on September 10, 1934, and announced the implementation of Hitler's will as the law:

The Führer announced that National Socialism would greatly transform the German legal system in the party program of 1920. We formulated the first principles at that time, demanding the replacement of law that served a materialistic worldview foreign to us and its replacement with German law. Now that the Führer with his movement and party have taken power in the German Reich and its provinces, it is essential to implement National Socialist principles of justice. Today, just as National Socialism has taken over the political, economic, and cultural life of the nation and formed them according to its irrevocable program, it is also necessary to have a breakthrough in law to fill it with National Socialist thinking. [...] As everywhere else in government, the party and its ideas must guide justice since it is only a means of the Führer for the realization of National Socialism. [...] As leader of the German legal professionals I can say that the foundation of the National Socialist State is the National Socialist legal system, and that for us our supreme leader is also the supreme judge and that his will is now the foundation of our legal system. Since we know how holy the foundations of our legal system are to the Führer, we and our people’s comrades can be sure: Your life and your existence are secure in this National Socialist state of order, freedom, and justice.

— Hans Frank on the Nazi takeover of and the implementation of Hitler's will as the law in 1934

The various racial definitions of "Aryan", "German blood" and so that were used during Nazi Germany were all said to be determined by Hitler himself which prompted Nazi author Andreas Veit to write that "All with a truly German sense know to thank the Führer". Nazi experts on the law in Nazi Germany described it as a "Führer state" to convey the notion that the will of the German people was determined by Hitler's will.

On April 26, 1942, Hitler gave a speech to the Reichstag in which he declared himself to be the supreme judge of the German people, the survival of the German people was not to be bound by any legal matters, he would intervene when sentences did not match the severity of the crimes and declared that, "I will take a hand in these cases from now on and direct the order to the judges that they recognize that as right what I order". The speech was met with a thunderous applause by those who were present. Shortly afterwards, a decree was issued by the Reichstag which stated:

There can be no doubt that the Fuhrer must during the present time of war in which the German Volk is engaged in a battle for life or death, have the right which has been assumed by him, to do everything that serves the achievement of victory or contributes thereto. The Fuhrer, therefore, must – without being bound by existing rules of law – in his capacity as Fuhrer of the Nation, as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, as Chief of the Government, and as supreme possessor of executive powers, as supreme lord of the judiciary, and as Fuhrer of the Party, at any time be in a position to order, if necessary, any German – be he a common soldier or officer, low-class or high-class officer or judge, executive or ministerial functionary of the Party, laborer or employer – with all means which he deems suitable, to fulfill his duties, and to visit him, in case of violation of these duties, after conscientious examination, with the punishment which is due to him, without regard to so-called vested rights, and to remove him from office, from his rank, and his position without the institution of prescribed procedures.

On August 28, 1942, Hitler issued a decree which enabled Nazi jurist Otto Georg Thierack to do whatever was necessary to coerce judges to toe the line with Hitler's thinking and guidelines on matters. Thus, legal procedures were made to match Hitler's will.

Religious aspects

A painting of Hitler by Albert Reich

Hitler often used religious terms in his speeches, such as the "resurrection" of the German people and finished his speeches with "Amen". The 24th point of the Nazi 25-point Program stated that the Nazi Party advocated "positive Christianity, and Hitler emphasized his commitment to Christianity to the Catholic Centre Party to persuade them to vote for the Enabling Act of 1933. In reality, many Nazis – such as Alfred Rosenberg and Martin Bormann – were deeply opposed to religion and were anti-Christian. After gaining complete power they pursued an attack on the church ("Kirchenkampf"), especially against the Catholic Church. The primary reason that Hitler and the Nazis did not openly advocate anti-Christian views before gaining power was because they knew that it would have alienated so many Germans, since the vast majority of them were religious to some extent. During Nazi Germany, German children were told that Hitler was "sent from God" and that he was their "faith" and "light", which portrayed him as a divine prophet rather than a normal politician.

During the 1930s, Hitler began to speak in mystical terms when talking to German "national comrades". After the Nazi remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936, Hitler declared, "I go the way that Providence dictates with the assurance of a sleepwalker". In May 1936 in Lustgarten, he said, "We are so fortunate to be able to live amongst these people, and I am proud to be your Fuhrer. So proud that I cannot imagine anything in this world capable of convincing me to trade it for something else. I would sooner, a thousand times sooner, be the last national comrade among you than a king anywhere else. And this pride fills me today above all". Hitler identified himself with the German people in September 1936 when he said, "That you have found me... among so many millions is the miracle of our time! And that I have found you, that is Germany's fortune!"

Loyalty and devotion

Different types of devotion were used to cement the cult of the leader and the German people in Nazi propaganda.

I swear to God this holy oath
that I shall render unconditional obedience
to the Leader of the German Reich and people,
Adolf Hitler, supreme commander of the armed forces,
and that as a brave soldier I shall at all times be prepared
to give my life for this oath.

— Wehrmacht Oath of Loyalty to Adolf Hitler

I swear: I will be faithful and obedient
to the leader of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler,
to observe the law, and to conscientiously fulfill my official duties, so help me God!

— Public servants Oath to Adolf Hitler
Soldiers in the Reichswehr swearing the Hitler oath in 1934, with hands raised in the traditional schwurhand gesture.

One key aspect of the myth was personal obedience to Hitler himself. After the death of German President Paul von Hindenburg on August 2, 1934, Hitler decided to merge the offices of President and Chancellor, and declared himself to be "Führer und Reichskanzler" ("Leader and Reich Chancellor"). Shortly afterwards, War Minister Werner von Blomberg issued an order that all military personnel, who had previously sworn an oath to Germany, would instead swear a oath of allegiance and binding loyalty to Hitler personally. Civil servants were also required to swear such an oath.

The "Heil Hitler" salute, which was made compulsory for all Nazi Party members and, later, for civil servants and the military, was a symbol of total devotion to Hitler.

Between 1933 and 1945, roughly 4,000 cities and towns made Hitler an honorary citizen as a way to show loyalty to him. Since the end of World War II, many of them have revoked the decision.

Hitler deliberately kept his private life from the German public as a way to ensure his popularity, especially to German women. When questioned why he did not have a wife, he would reply, "I am married to Germany". German women genuinely believed that he was celibate and was devoted to Germany.  Many German women idolized him and wrote to him, often in an erotic manner. Thousands of German women would wait outside of his Berghof home at the Obersalzberg just to get a glimpse of him; once they saw him, many would become hysterical and would shout to him things such as "Mein Führer, I would like to have a child by you!" Many of the women also tried to get close enough to him to kiss him, but were stopped and dragged away by his bodyguards. Hitler's relationship with his mistress, Eva Braun, remained a closely guarded secret, because Hitler believed that if women knew he had a wife, he would lose his appeal to them.

Hitler and German youth

Nazi propaganda indoctrinated German youth, especially the members of the Hitler Youth. They were told that they all belonged to one classless people's community, and their group identity was reinforced through communal marching, singing and camping. Hitler was depicted as their father figure who would always protect them. The Nazis were able to convey the image that they were the protectors of the youth who would offer them prosperity and safety. Owing to the intense propaganda, the Nazis were able to control both public and private attitudes and behavior of the youth. Young Germans were heavily indoctrinated with racial theories and the supposed supremacy of the German Volk. The German youth were the most susceptible to the emotional appeal of the Hitler myth. Eleven year olds entering the Deutsches Jungvolk were told on their first day of induction, "from today onwards your life belongs to the Führer".

Hitler being given flowers by members of the Hitler Youth

Heinrich Hoffmann, who was Hitler's personal photographer, published the book "Youth Around Hitler" ("Jugend um Hitler") in 1934, which was intended to show that Hitler cared about children.

Hitler's charismatic oratory had a great appeal among German youth. A former member of the Hitler Youth, Alfons Heck, wrote in his book:

We erupted into a frenzy of nationalistic pride that bordered on hysteria. For minutes on end, we shouted at the top of our lungs, with tears streaming down our faces: Sieg Heil, Sieg Heil, Sieg Heil! From that moment on, I belonged to Adolf Hitler body and soul.

As depicted in the Triumph of the Will, Hitler gave a speech to the Hitler Youth at Nuremberg and said, "We want to be a united nation, and you, my youth, are to become this nation. In the future, we do not wish to see classes and castes, and you must not allow them to develop among you. One day, we want to see one nation".

German boys and girls who wished to join the Hitler Youth had to declare, "I swear, in the Hitler Youth, always to do my duty with love and loyalty, for the Führer and our flag. So help me God." Afterwards, they were made to declare that they would die for Hitler:

In the presence of this blood banner which represents our fuhrer, I swear to devote all my energies and my strength to the savior of our country, Adolf Hitler. I am willing and ready to give up my life for him, so help me God.

— Hitler Youth Oath to Adolf Hitler

Nazi propaganda indoctrinated Hitler Youth members to denounce anyone who showed any form of criticism about the Nazi regime. They were told that they were racially superior, and over time this engendered an open feeling of arrogance towards those whom they regarded as inferior. They were indoctrinated in racial myths about Aryan superiority, that they belonged to a master race, and that the Jews were an inferior race who destroyed cultures. The Nazis required all schools to teach a study about a supposed superior German culture which emphasized Teutonic superiority and encouraged the youth to become educated on German history, literature, things related to the Nordic race, preservation of their Aryan ancestry and devotion to Germany.

Baldur von Schirach , the leader of the Hitler Youth, generally presented Hitler in a quasi-religious way. During a speech he said, "We do not need intellectual leaders who create new ideas because the superimposing leader of all the desires of youth is Adolf Hitler"." Schirach exclaimed, "Your name, my Führer, is the happiness of youth, your name, my Führer, is for us everlasting life". During the Anschluss with Austria in 1938, he told members of the Hitler Youth, "Yes, mein Führer, He who serves Adolf Hitler, the Führer, serves Germany, whoever serves Germany, serves God" and, "When we lead the youth to Germany, we lead it to God".

Hitler believed that in time he could turn the youth into Nazis when they grew older, as he claimed in 1938, when he said:

These boys and girls enter our organizations with their ten years of age, and often for the first time get a little fresh air; after four years of the Young Folk they go on to the Hitler Youth, where we have them for another four years . . . And even if they are still not complete National Socialists, they go to Labor Service and are smoothed out there for another six, seven months . . . And whatever class consciousness or social status might still be left . . . the Wehrmacht will take care of that.

Hitler Youth members remained loyal to Hitler even when their parents were becoming critical of him during the war. In 1943, when the Germans started to suffer military defeats, SS Security Service (SD) reports suggest that many Hitler Youth members were no longer showing faith in the Nazi Party, but distinguished the Party from Hitler; one report noted that, "The Führer is not the representative of the Party, but in the first instance Führer of the State and above all Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht". Nevertheless, the Führer myth began to wane even among German youth, where it had been the strongest, when Germany's defeat became palpable and inevitable.

End of the cult

Workers removing the signage from a former "Adolf Hitler-Straße" (street) in Trier, Germany, on May 12, 1945

Even before the start of World War II, the myth was already beginning to be noticed, but it was not until nearer the end of the war that it became fully exposed to the German people. The Minister of Armaments and War Production Albert Speer wrote in his memoir Inside the Third Reich that in 1939 there was a sense that the myth was waning since the Nazis had to organize cheering crowds to turn up to speeches:

The shift in the mood of the population, the drooping morale which began to be felt throughout Germany in 1939, was evident in the necessity to organize cheering crowds where two years earlier Hitler had been able to count on spontaneity. What is more, he himself had meanwhile moved away from the admiring masses. He tended to be angry and impatient more often than in the past when, as still occasionally happened, a crowd on Wilhelmsplatz began clamoring for him to appear. Two years before he had often stepped out on the "historic balcony." Now he sometimes snapped at his adjutants when they came to him with the request that he show himself: "Stop bothering me with that!"

The Führer myth began to become exposed after Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union, which he thought would last a little longer than six weeks. As time went on and Germany began to suffer consistent military defeats after the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943, the Führer myth began to be exposed. The claim that Hitler was a military genius after his successful Blitzkrieg victories in the West was shown to be false, although Hitler himself blamed the defeats on his generals. For the first time, Hitler now became personally blamed for starting the war. Hitler became more withdrawn and rarely spoke to the German people again. Goebbels attempted to portray Hitler as the equivalent of Frederick the Great, who would eventually triumph despite all of the setbacks; however, by this time, most Germans knew they were going to lose the war and Hitler's early appeal was almost entirely lost. The appeal of the Hitler myth remained strong among the German youth more than any other Germans, since they had been indoctrinated for over a decade by Nazi propaganda.

Nevertheless, hatred of the Allies for the terror caused by bombing campaigns, and promises of new wonder weapons which would ultimately win the war, prompted some Germans to remain faithful to Hitler for a short period of time. The failed assassination attempt of Hitler on July 20, 1944 also prompted an upsurge of loyalty to Hitler, although this was short-lived.

The Old Party fighters who had been keen supporters of Hitler during the 1920s were the last Germans to still strongly believe in the Führer myth, even when it was obvious that the war was lost. The fighters mainly consisted of people who had personally benefited from the Nazi regime in one way or another. The disillusionment towards Hitler remained flexible, depending on whether or not it seemed that a military victory appeared to be possible in the foreseeable future or not. Up until the end of Nazi Germany, there still remained some Nazis who had an "unshakeable belief" in the myth.

Following multiple military defeats, and when it became obvious to ordinary Germans that Germany was going to lose the war, the myth began to become exposed and Hitler's popularity began to wane. An example of this can be seen in a report given in the Bavarian town of Markt Schellenberg on March 11, 1945:

When the leader of the Wehrmacht unit at the end of his speech called for a Sieg Heil for the Führer, it was returned neither by the Wehrmacht present, nor by the Volkssturm, nor by the spectators of the civilian population who had turned up. This silence of the masses ... probably reflects better than anything else, the attitudes of the population.

American journalist Howard K. Smith wrote in his book Last Train from Berlin:

I was convinced that of all the millions on whom the Hitler Myth had fastened itself, the most carried away was Adolf Hitler, himself.

According to historian Lisa Pine, during the last phase of World War II, the Führer myth "collapsed entirely". Few German civilians mourned Hitler's suicide in 1945 since they were too busy dealing with the collapse of Germany or fleeing from the fighting. According to Hitler biographer John Toland, Nazism "burst like a bubble" without its leader.

Conspicuous consumption

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
The sociologist and economist Thorstein Veblen coined the term "conspicuous consumption", and was a pioneer of the institutional economics movement.

In sociology and in economics, the term conspicuous consumption describes and explains the consumer practice of buying and using goods of a higher quality, price, or in greater quantity than practical. In 1899, the sociologist Thorstein Veblen coined the term conspicuous consumption to explain the spending of money on and the acquiring of luxury commodities (goods and services) specifically as a public display of economic power — the income and the accumulated wealth of the buyer. To the conspicuous consumer, the public display of discretionary income is an economic means of either attaining or of maintaining a given social status.

The development of Veblen's sociology of conspicuous consumption also identified and described other economic behaviours such as invidious consumption, which is the ostentatious consumption of goods, an action meant to provoke the envy of other people; and conspicuous compassion, the ostentatious use of charity meant to enhance the reputation and social prestige of the donor; thus the socio-economic practises of consumerism derive from conspicuous consumption.

History and development

In The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study in the Evolution of Institutions (1899), Thorstein Veblen identified, described, and explained the behavioural characteristics of the nouveau riche (new rich) social class that emerged from capital accumulation during the Second Industrial Revolution (1860–1914). In that 19th-century social and historical context, the term "conspicuous consumption" applied narrowly in association with the men, women, and families of the upper class who applied their great wealth as a means of publicly manifesting their social power and prestige, either real or perceived. The strength of one's reputation is in direct relationship to the amount of money possessed and displayed; that is to say, the basis "of gaining and retaining a good name, are leisure and conspicuous consumption."

In the 1920s, economists such as Paul Nystrom proposed that changes in lifestyle as result of the industrial age led to massive expansion of the "pecuniary emulation." That conspicuous consumption had induced in the mass of society a "philosophy of futility" that would increase the consumption of goods and services as a social fashion; consumption for the sake of consumption.

In 1949, James Duesenberry proposed the "demonstration effect" and the "bandwagon effect", whereby a person's conspicuous consumption psychologically depends upon the actual level of spending, but also depends upon the degree of his or her spending, when compared with and to the spending of other people. That the conspicuous consumer is motivated by the importance, to him or to her, of the opinion of the social and economic reference groups for whom he or she are performed the conspicuous consumption.

Social class and consumption

Veblen said that conspicuous consumption comprised socio-economic behaviours practised by rich people as activities usual and exclusive to people with much disposable income; yet a variation of Veblen's theory is presented in the conspicuous consumption behaviours that are very common to the middle class and to the working class, regardless of the person's race and ethnic group. Such upper-class economic behaviour is especially common in societies with emerging economies in which the conspicuous consumption of goods and services ostentatiously signals that the buyer rose from poverty and has something to prove to society.

In The Millionaire Next Door: The Surprising Secrets of America's Wealthy (1996), Thomas J. Stanley and William D. Danko reported conspicuous frugality, another variation of Veblen's social-class relation to conspicuous consumption. That Americans with a net worth of more than a million dollars usually avoid conspicuous consumption, and tend to practise frugality, such as paying cash for a used car rather using credit, in order to avoid material depreciation and paying interest upon a car loan.

Consumerism theory

Since the 19th century, conspicuous consumption explains the psychology behind the economics of a consumer society, and the increase in the types of goods and services that people consider necessary to and for their lives in a developed economy. Supporting interpretations and explanations of contemporary conspicuous consumption are presented in Consumer Culture (1996) by Celia Lury, Consumer Culture and Modernity (1997) by Don Slater, Symbolic Exchange and Death (1998) by Jean Baudrillard, and Spent: Sex, Evolution, and the Secrets of Consumerism (2009) by Geoffrey Miller.

Moreover, D. Hebdige, in Hiding in the Light (1994), proposes that conspicuous consumption is a form of displaying a personal identity, and a consequent function of advertising, as proposed in Ads, Fads, and Consumer Culture (2000), by A. A. Berger. Each variant interpretation and complementary explanation is derived from Veblen's original sociologic proposition in The Theory of the Leisure Class: that conspicuous consumption is a psychological end in itself, from which the practitioner (man, woman, family) derived the honour of superior social status.

Materialism and gender

In An Examination of Materialism, Conspicuous Consumption and Gender Differences (2013), the researchers Brenda Segal and Jeffrey S. Podoshen reported great differences in the consumerism practised by men and women. The data about materialism and impulse purchases of 1,180 Americans indicate that men have greater scores for materialism and conspicuous consumption; and that women tended to buy goods and services on impulse; and both sexes were equally loyal to a given brand of goods and services.

Distinctions of type

The term conspicuous consumption denotes the act of buying something, especially something expensive, that is not necessary to one's life, in a noticeable way. Scholar Andrew Trigg (2001) defined conspicuous consumption as behaviour by which one can display great wealth, by means of idleness—expending much time in the practice of leisure activities, and spending much money to consume luxury goods and services.

Conspicuous compassion, the practice of publicly donating large sums of money to charity to enhance the social prestige of the donor, is sometimes described as a type of conspicuous consumption. This behaviour has long been recognised and sometimes attacked—for example, the New Testament story Lesson of the widow's mite criticises wealthy people who make large donations ostentatiously, while praising poorer people who make small but comparatively more difficult donations in private.

Possible motivations for conspicuous consumption include:

  • Demonstration/bandwagon effect — In the book Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behavior (1949), James Duesenberry proposed that a person's conspicuous consumption psychologically depends not only upon the actual level of spending, but also upon the degree of his or her spending, as compared with the spending of other people. Thus the conspicuous consumer is motivated by the importance, to him or to her, of the opinion of the social and economic reference groups for whom are performed the patterns of conspicuous consumption.
  • 'Aggressive ostentation — In a 2006 CBSNews.com article, Dick Meyer said that conspicuous consumption is a form of anger towards society, an "aggressive ostentation" that is an antisocial behaviour, which arose from the social alienation suffered by men, women, and families who feel they have become anonymous in and to their societies. This feeling of alienation is aggravated by the decay of the communitarian ethic essential to a person feeling him or herself part of the whole society.
  • Shelter and transport — In the United States, the trend towards building houses that were larger than needed by a nuclear family began in the 1950s. Decades later, in the year 2000, that practice of conspicuous consumption resulted in people buying houses that were double the average size needed to comfortably house a nuclear family. Negative consequences of either buying or building an oversized house might include:
    • the loss of or reduction in the family's domestic recreational space—the backyard and the front yard;
    • the spending of old-age retirement funds to pay for a too-big house;
    • over-long commuting time, from house to job, and vice versa, because the required plot of land was unavailable near a city.

Oversized houses facilitated other forms of conspicuous consumption, such as an oversized garage for the family's oversized motor vehicles or buying more clothing to fill larger clothes closets. Conspicuous consumption becomes a self-generating cycle of spending money for the sake of social prestige. Analogous to the consumer trend for oversized houses is the trend towards buying oversized light trucks, specifically the off-road sport utility vehicle type (cf. station wagon/estate car), as a form of psychologically comforting conspicuous consumption, because such large vehicles usually are bought by city-dwellers, an urban nuclear family.

  • Prestige – In a 1999 article, Jacqueline Eastman, Ronald Goldsmith, and Leisa Reinecke Flynn said that status consumption is based upon conspicuous consumption; however, the literature of contemporary marketing does not establish definitive meanings for the terms status consumption and conspicuous consumption. Moreover, A. O'Cass and H. Frost (2002) claim that sociologists often incorrectly used the two terms as interchangeable and equivalent terms. In a later study, O'Cass and Frost determined that, as sociological constructs, the terms status consumption and conspicuous consumption denote different sociological behaviours. About the ambiguities of denotation and connotation of the term conspicuous consumption, R. Mason (1984) reported that the classical, general theories of consumer decision-processes do not readily accommodate the construct of "conspicuous consumption," because the nature of said socio-economic behaviours varies according to the social class and the economic group studied.
  • Motivations — Paurav Shukla (2010) says that, whilst marketing and sales researchers recognise the importance of the buyer's social and psychological environment, the definition of the term status-directed consumption remains ambiguous, because the development of a comprehensive general theory requires that social scientists accept two fundamental assumptions, which usually do not concord. First, though the "rational" (economic) and the "irrational" (psychologic) elements of consumer decision-making often influence a person's decision to buy particular goods and services, marketing and sales researchers usually consider the rational element dominant in a person's decision to buy the particular goods and services. Second, the consumer perceives the utility of the product (the goods, the services) as a prime consideration in evaluating its usefulness, i.e. the reason to buy the product. These assumptions, required for the development of a general theory of brand selection and brand purchase, are problematic, because the resultant theories tend either to misunderstand or to ignore the "irrational" element in the behaviour of the buyer-as-consumer; and because conspicuous consumption is a behaviour predominantly "psychological" in motivation and expression, Therefore, a comprehensive, general theory of conspicuous consumption would require a separate construct for the psychological (irrational) elements of the socio-economic phenomenon that is conspicuous consumption.

Examples

Conspicuous consumption is exemplified by purchasing goods that are exclusively designed to serve as symbols of wealth, such as luxury-brand clothing, high-tech tools, and vehicles.

Luxury fashion

Materialistic consumers are likely to engage in conspicuous luxury consumption. The global yearly revenue of the luxury fashion industry was €1.64 trillion in 2019. Buying of conspicuous goods is likely to be influenced by the spending habits of others. This view of luxury conspicuous consumption is being incorporated into social media platforms which is impacting consumer behaviour.

Criticism

The journalist H. L. Mencken addressed the sociological and psychological particulars of the socio-economic behaviours that are conspicuous consumption, by asking:

Do I enjoy a decent bath because I know that John Smith cannot afford one — or because I delight in being clean? Do I admire Beethoven's Fifth Symphony because it is incomprehensible to Congressmen and Methodists — or because I genuinely love music? Do I prefer terrapin à la Maryland to fried liver because plowhands must put up with the liver — or because the terrapin is intrinsically a more charming dose? Do I prefer kissing a pretty girl to kissing a charwoman, because even a janitor may kiss a charwoman — or because the pretty girl looks better, smells better, and kisses better?

Inequality and debt

In The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899) Veblen said that “among the motives which lead men to accumulate wealth, the primacy, both in scope and intensity, therefore, continues to belong to this motive of pecuniary emulation of the rich". In the study “Borrowing to Keep Up (with the Joneses): Inequality, Debt, and Conspicuous Consumption” (2020), Sheheryar Banuri and Ha Nguyen reported three findings:

  • Consumption tends to increase when the buying and the using of goods and services is conspicuous: Consumption signals status to other people.
  • Conspicuous consumption increases the frequency of borrowing money: Poor people take out loans in order to compete at consumption.
  • Economic inequality is worsened with access to credit: Poor people borrow money in order to signal status, which becomes a vicious circle.

The findings that Banuri and Nguyen reported indicate that the cyclical effect of borrowing money for conspicuous consumption leads to and perpetuates economic inequality. That poor people imitate, try to match, and emulate the consumption patterns of rich people in order to increase their social status, and perhaps rise in society. That such socio-economic behaviours, facilitated by easy access to credit, generate macroeconomic volatility and support Veblen's concept of pecuniary emulation used to finance a person's social standing.

Other research supports these and similar results. For example income inequality has been found to be associated with reduced savings rates. One hypothesized mechanism for this relationship is 'expenditure cascades' whereby consumption norms are set by the relatively wealthy, who then have more income and consumption relative to others as inequality rises. This emulation of the consumption norms of relatively wealthy peers is supported by a large literature.

One complication found in the macro literature is that the link between inequality and savings may depend on context, in particular on the degree of financialisation. When the degree of financialisation is high, inequality tends to reduce the national savings rate as the emulation effect is more powerful when finance is readily available, but the opposite effect may occur when financialisation is low as the emulation effect is weak, and the rich tend to save at a higher rate than the poor. The effect of inequality on savings is also found to be positive in Asia, where financialization is lower. The relationship is also found to depend on economic policy and institutions. For example inequality appears to lower savings in 'liberal market economies' but to rather reduce aggregate demand in 'coordinated market economies'. 

In the case where inequality lowers savings, and increases leverage and a tendency to run large current account imbalances via the expenditure cascade mechanism, this has been associated with more frequent and/or severe economic crisis.

Solutions

In the case of conspicuous consumption, taxes upon luxury goods diminish societal expenditures on high-status goods, by rendering them more expensive than non-positional goods. In this sense, luxury taxes can be seen as a market failure correcting Pigovian tax—with an apparent negative deadweight loss, these taxes are a more efficient mechanism for increasing revenue than 'distorting' labour or capital taxes. A luxury tax applied to goods and services for conspicuous consumption is a type of progressive sales tax that at least partially corrects the negative externality associated with the conspicuous consumption of positional goods. In Utility from Accumulation (2009), Louis Kaplow said that assets exercise an objective social-utility function, i.e. the rich man and the rich woman hoard material assets, because the hoard, itself, functions as status goods that establish his and her socio-economic position within society. When utility is derived directly from accumulation of assets, this lowers the dead weight loss associated with inheritance taxes and raises the optimal rate of inheritance taxation.

In the 19th century, the philosopher John Stuart Mill recommended taxing the practice of conspicuous consumption.

In place of luxury taxes, economist Robert H. Frank proposed the application of a progressive consumption tax; in a 1998 New York Times article, John Tierney said that as a remedy for the social and psychological malaise that is conspicuous consumption, the personal income tax should be replaced with a progressive tax upon the yearly sum of discretionary income spent on the conspicuous consumption of goods and services. Another option is the redistribution of wealth, either by means of an incomes policy – for example the conscious efforts to promote wage compression under variants of social corporatism such as the Rehn–Meidner model and/or by some mix of progressive taxation and transfer policies, and provision of public goods. When individuals are concerned with their relative income or consumption in comparison to their peers, the optimal degree of public good provision and of progression of the tax system is raised. Because the activity of conspicuous consumption, itself, is a form of superior good, diminishing the income inequality of the income distribution by way of an egalitarian policy reduces the conspicuous consumption of positional goods and services. In Wealth and Welfare (1912), the economist A. C. Pigou said that the redistribution of wealth might lead to great gains in social welfare:

Now the part played by comparative, as distinguished from absolute, income is likely to be small for incomes that only suffice to provide the necessaries and primary comforts of life, but to be large with large incomes. In other words, a larger proportion of the satisfaction yielded by the incomes of rich people comes from their relative, rather than from their absolute, amount. This part of it will not be destroyed if the incomes of all rich people are diminished together. The loss of economic welfare suffered by the rich when command over resources is transferred from them to the poor will, therefore, be substantially smaller relatively to the gain of economic welfare to the poor than a consideration of the law of diminishing utility taken by itself suggests.

The economic case for the taxation of positional, luxury goods has a long history; in the mid-19th century, in Principles of Political Economy with some of their Applications to Social Philosophy (1848), John Stuart Mill said:

I disclaim all asceticism, and by no means wish to see discouraged, either by law or opinion, any indulgence which is sought from a genuine inclination for, any enjoyment of, the thing itself; but a great portion of the expenses of the higher and middle classes in most countries ... is not incurred for the sake of the pleasure afforded by the things on which the money is spent, but from regard to opinion, and an idea that certain expenses are expected from them, as an appendage of station; and I cannot but think that expenditure of this sort is a most desirable subject of taxation. If taxation discourages it, some good is done, and if not, no harm; for in so far as taxes are levied on things which are desired and possessed from motives of this description, nobody is the worse for them. When a thing is bought not for its use but for its costliness, cheapness is no recommendation.

In the case where conspicuous consumption mediates a link between inequality and unsustainable borrowing, one suggested policy response is tighter financial regulation.

"Conspicuous non consumption" is a phrase used to describe a conscious choice to opt out of consumption with the intention of sending deliberate social signals.

Terrestrial planet

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
The terrestrial planets of the Solar System: Mercury, Venus, Earth and Mars, sized to scale

A terrestrial planet, telluric planet, or rocky planet, is a planet that is composed primarily of silicate rocks or metals. Within the Solar System, the terrestrial planets accepted by the IAU are the inner planets closest to the Sun: Mercury, Venus, Earth and Mars. Among astronomers who use the geophysical definition of a planet, two or three planetary-mass satellites – Earth's Moon, Io, and sometimes Europa – may also be considered terrestrial planets; and so may be the rocky protoplanet-asteroids Pallas and Vesta. The terms "terrestrial planet" and "telluric planet" are derived from Latin words for Earth (Terra and Tellus), as these planets are, in terms of structure, Earth-like.

Terrestrial planets have a solid planetary surface, making them substantially different from the larger gaseous planets, which are composed mostly of some combination of hydrogen, helium, and water existing in various physical states.

Structure

All terrestrial planets in the Solar System have the same basic structure, such as a central metallic core (mostly iron) with a surrounding silicate mantle.

The large rocky asteroid 4 Vesta has a similar structure; possibly so does the smaller one 21 Lutetia. Another rocky asteroid 2 Pallas is about the same size as Vesta, but is significantly less dense; it appears to have never differentiated a core and a mantle. The Earth's Moon and Jupiter's moon Io have similar structures to the terrestrial planets, but Earth's Moon has a much smaller iron core. Another Jovian moon Europa has a similar density but has a significant ice layer on the surface: for this reason, it is sometimes considered an icy planet instead.

Terrestrial planets can have surface structures such as canyons, craters, mountains, volcanoes, and others, depending on the presence at any time of an erosive liquid or tectonic activity or both.

Terrestrial planets have secondary atmospheres, generated by volcanic out-gassing or from comet impact debris. This contrasts with the outer, giant planets, whose atmospheres are primary; primary atmospheres were captured directly from the original solar nebula.

Solar System's terrestrial planets

Relative masses of the terrestrial planets of the Solar System, and the Moon (shown here as Luna)
 
The inner planets (sizes to scale). From left to right: Earth, Mars, Venus and Mercury.

The Solar System has four terrestrial planets under the dynamical definition: Mercury, Venus, Earth and Mars. The Earth's Moon as well as Jupiter's moons Io and Europa would also count geophysically. Among these bodies, only the Earth has an active surface hydrosphere. Europa is believed to have an active hydrosphere under its ice layer.

During the formation of the Solar System, there were many terrestrial planetesimals and proto-planets, but most merged with or were ejected by the four terrestrial planets, leaving only Pallas and Vesta to survive more or less intact. These two were likely both dwarf planets in the past, but have been battered out of equilibrium shapes by impacts. Some other protoplanets began to accrete and differentiate, but suffered catastrophic collisions that left only a metallic or rocky core, like 16 Psyche or 8 Flora respectively. Many S-type and M-type asteroids may be such fragments.

The other round bodies from the asteroid belt outward are geophysically icy planets. They are similar to terrestrial planets in that they have a solid surface, but are composed of ice and rock rather than of rock and metal. These include the dwarf planets, such as Ceres, Pluto and Eris, which are found today only in the regions beyond the formation snow line where water ice was stable under direct sunlight in the early Solar System. It also includes the other round moons, which are ice-rock (e.g. Ganymede, Callisto, Titan, and Triton) or even primarily ice (e.g. Mimas, Tethys, and Iapetus). Some of these bodies are known to have subsurface hydrospheres (Ganymede, Callisto, Enceladus, and Titan), like Europa, and it is also possible for some others (e.g. Ceres, Dione, Miranda, Ariel, Triton, and Pluto). Titan even has surface bodies of liquid, albeit liquid methane rather than water. Jupiter's Ganymede, though icy, does have a metallic core like the Moon, Io, Europa, and the terrestrial planets.

The name Terran world has been suggested to define all solid worlds (bodies assuming a rounded shape), without regard to their composition. It would thus include both terrestrial and icy planets.

Density trends

The uncompressed density of a terrestrial planet is the average density its materials would have at zero pressure. A greater uncompressed density indicates greater metal content. Uncompressed density differs from the true average density (also often called "bulk" density) because compression within planet cores increases their density; the average density depends on planet size, temperature distribution, and material stiffness as well as composition.

Calculations to estimate uncompressed density inherently require a model of the planet's structure. Where there have been landers or multiple orbiting spacecraft, these models are constrained by seismological data and also moment of inertia data derived from the spacecraft orbits. Where such data is not available, uncertainties are inevitably higher.

The uncompressed density of the rounded terrestrial bodies directly orbiting the Sun trends towards lower values as the distance from the Sun increases, consistent with the temperature gradient that would have existed within the primordial solar nebula. The Galilean satellites show a similar trend going outwards from Jupiter; however, no such trend is observable for the icy satellites of Saturn or Uranus. The icy worlds typically have densities less than 2 g·cm−3. Eris is significantly denser (2.43±0.05 g·cm−3), and may be mostly rocky with some surface ice, like Europa. It is unknown whether extrasolar terrestrial planets in general will follow such a trend.

The data in the tables below is mostly taken from list of gravitationally rounded objects of the Solar System and planetary-mass moon. All distances from the Sun are averages.

Extrasolar terrestrial planets

Most of the planets discovered outside the Solar System are giant planets, because they are more easily detectable. But since 2005, hundreds of potentially terrestrial extrasolar planets have also been found, with several being confirmed as terrestrial. Most of these are super-Earths, i.e. planets with masses between Earth's and Neptune's; super-Earths may be gas planets or terrestrial, depending on their mass and other parameters.

It is likely that most known super-Earths are in fact gas planets similar to Neptune, as examination of the relationship between mass and radius of exoplanets (and thus density trends) shows a transition point at about two Earth masses. This suggests that this is the point at which significant gas envelopes accumulate. In particular, Earth and Venus may already be close to the largest possible size at which a planet can usually remain rocky. Exceptions to this are very close to their stars (and thus would have had their volatile atmospheres boiled away).

During the early 1990s, the first extrasolar planets were discovered orbiting the pulsar PSR B1257+12, with masses of 0.02, 4.3, and 3.9 times that of Earth's, by pulsar timing.

When 51 Pegasi b, the first planet found around a star still undergoing fusion, was discovered, many astronomers assumed it to be a gigantic terrestrial, because it was assumed no gas giant could exist as close to its star (0.052 AU) as 51 Pegasi b did. It was later found to be a gas giant.

In 2005, the first planets orbiting a main-sequence star and which show signs of being terrestrial planets were found: Gliese 876 d and OGLE-2005-BLG-390Lb. Gliese 876 d orbits the red dwarf Gliese 876, 15 light years from Earth, and has a mass seven to nine times that of Earth and an orbital period of just two Earth days. OGLE-2005-BLG-390Lb has about 5.5 times the mass of Earth, orbits a star about 21,000 light years away in the constellation Scorpius. From 2007 to 2010, three (possibly four) potential terrestrial planets were found orbiting within the Gliese 581 planetary system. The smallest, Gliese 581e, is only about 1.9 Earth masses, but orbits very close to the star. Two others, Gliese 581c and Gliese 581d, as well as a disputed planet, Gliese 581g, are more-massive super-Earths orbiting in or close to the habitable zone of the star, so they could potentially be habitable, with Earth-like temperatures.

Another possibly terrestrial planet, HD 85512 b, was discovered in 2011; it has at least 3.6 times the mass of Earth. The radius and composition of all these planets are unknown.

Sizes of Kepler planet candidates based on 2,740 candidates orbiting 2,036 stars as of 4 November 2013 (NASA).

The first confirmed terrestrial exoplanet, Kepler-10b, was found in 2011 by the Kepler Mission, specifically designed to discover Earth-size planets around other stars using the transit method.

In the same year, the Kepler Space Observatory Mission team released a list of 1235 extrasolar planet candidates, including six that are "Earth-size" or "super-Earth-size" (i.e. they have a radius less than 2 Earth radii) and in the habitable zone of their star. Since then, Kepler has discovered hundreds of planets ranging from Moon-sized to super-Earths, with many more candidates in this size range (see image).

In September 2020, astronomers using microlensing techniques reported the detection, for the first time, of an Earth-mass rogue planet (named OGLE-2016-BLG-1928) unbounded by any star, and free-floating in the Milky Way galaxy.

List of terrestrial exoplanets

The following exoplanets have a density of at least 5 g/cm3 and a mass below Neptune's and are thus very likely terrestrial:

Kepler-10b, Kepler-20b, Kepler-36b, Kepler-48d, Kepler 68c, Kepler-78b, Kepler-89b, Kepler-93b, Kepler-97b, Kepler-99b, Kepler-100b, Kepler-101c, Kepler-102b, Kepler-102d, Kepler-113b, Kepler-131b, Kepler-131c, Kepler-138c, Kepler-406b, Kepler-406c, Kepler-409b.

Frequency

In 2013, astronomers reported, based on Kepler space mission data, that there could be as many as 40 billion Earth- and super-Earth-sized planets orbiting in the habitable zones of Sun-like stars and red dwarfs within the Milky Way. 11 billion of these estimated planets may be orbiting Sun-like stars. The nearest such planet may be 12 light-years away, according to the scientists. However, this does not give estimates for the number of extrasolar terrestrial planets, because there are planets as small as Earth that have been shown to be gas planets (see Kepler-138d).

Types

Artist's impression of a carbon planet

Several possible classifications for solid planets have been proposed.

Silicate planet
A solid planet like Venus, Earth, or Mars, made primarily of silicon-based rocky mantle with a metallic (iron) core.
Carbon planet (also called "diamond planet")
A theoretical class of planets, composed of a metal core surrounded by primarily carbon-based minerals. They may be considered a type of terrestrial planet if the metal content dominates. The Solar System contains no carbon planets but does have carbonaceous asteroids, such as Ceres and 10 Hygiea. It is unknown if Ceres has a rocky or a metallic core.
Iron planet
A theoretical type of solid planet that consists almost entirely of iron and therefore has a greater density and a smaller radius than other solid planets of comparable mass. Mercury in the Solar System has a metallic core equal to 60–70% of its planetary mass, and is sometimes called an iron planet, though its surface is made of silicates and is iron-poor. Iron planets are thought to form in the high-temperature regions close to a star, like Mercury, and if the protoplanetary disk is rich in iron.
Icy planet
Geysers erupting on Enceladus
A type of solid planet with an icy surface of volatiles. In the Solar System, most planetary-mass moons (such as Titan, Triton, and Enceladus) and many dwarf planets (such as Pluto and Eris) have such a composition. Europa is sometimes considered an icy planet due to its surface ice, but its higher density indicates that its interior is mostly rocky. Such planets can have internal saltwater oceans and cryovolcanoes erupting liquid water (i.e. an internal hydrosphere, like Europa or Enceladus); they can have an atmosphere and hydrosphere made from methane or nitrogen (like Titan). A metallic core is possible, as exists on Ganymede.
Coreless planet
A theoretical type of solid planet that consists of silicate rock but has no metallic core, i.e. the opposite of an iron planet. Although the Solar System contains no coreless planets, chondrite asteroids and meteorites are common in the Solar System. Ceres and Pallas have mineral compositions similar to carbonaceous chondrites, though Pallas is significantly less hydrated. Coreless planets are thought to form farther from the star where volatile oxidizing material is more common.

Representation of a Lie group

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representation_of_a_Lie_group...