A plea bargain (also plea agreement or plea deal) is an agreement in criminal law proceedings, whereby the prosecutor provides a concession to the defendant in exchange for a plea of guilt or nolo contendere.
  This may mean that the defendant will plead guilty to a less serious 
charge, or to one of the several charges, in return for the dismissal of
 other charges; or it may mean that the defendant will plead guilty to 
the original criminal charge in return for a more lenient sentence.  
A plea bargain allows both parties to avoid a lengthy criminal 
trial and may allow criminal defendants to avoid the risk of conviction 
at trial on a more serious charge. For example, in the legal system of 
the United States, a criminal defendant charged with a felony
 theft charge, the conviction of which would require imprisonment in 
state prison, may be offered the opportunity to plead guilty to a misdemeanor theft charge, which may not carry a custodial sentence.
In cases such as an automobile collision when there is a 
potential for civil liability against the defendant, the defendant may 
agree to plead "no contest" or "guilty with a civil reservation", which 
essentially is a guilty plea without admitting civil liability.
Plea bargaining can present a dilemma to defense attorneys,
 in that they must choose between vigorously seeking a good deal for 
their present client, or maintaining a good relationship with the 
prosecutor for the sake of helping future clients.
 However, in the case of the US for example, defense attorneys are 
required by the ethics of the bar to defend the present client's 
interests over the interests of others. Violation of this rule may 
result in disciplinary sanctions being imposed against the defense 
attorney by the appropriate state's bar association.
In charge bargaining, defendants plead guilty to a less serious 
crime than the original charge that was filed against them. In count 
bargaining, they plead guilty to a subset of multiple original charges. 
In sentence bargaining, they plead guilty agreeing in advance what 
sentence will be given; however, this sentence can still be denied by 
the judge. In fact bargaining,
 defendants plead guilty but the prosecutor agrees to stipulate (i.e., 
to affirm or concede) certain facts that will affect how the defendant 
is punished under the sentencing guidelines.
Plea bargaining was considered a predominantly American phenomenon during the 1970s, but has since spread throughout the world.
Advantages
  Plea
 bargaining has been defended as a voluntary exchange that leaves both 
parties better off, in that defendants have many procedural and 
substantive rights, including a right to trial and to appeal a guilty 
verdict. By pleading guilty, defendants waive those rights in exchange 
for a commitment from the prosecutor, such as a reduced charge or more 
favorable sentence.
 For a defendant who believes that conviction is almost certain, a 
discount to the sentence is more useful than an unlikely chance of 
acquittal.
 The prosecutor secures a conviction while avoiding the need to commit 
time and resources to trial preparation and a possible trial.
 Plea bargaining similarly helps preserve money and resources for the 
court in which the prosecution occurs. It also means that victims and 
witnesses do not have to testify at the trial, which in some cases may 
be traumatic.
Disadvantages and issues
Scope for coercive manipulation
Plea
 bargaining is criticized, particularly outside the United States, on 
the grounds that its close relationship with rewards, threats and 
coercion potentially endanger the correct legal outcome.
Author Martin Yant discusses the use of coercion in plea bargaining:
Even when the charges are more serious, prosecutors often
 can still bluff defense attorneys and their clients into pleading 
guilty to a lesser offense. As a result, people who might have been 
acquitted because of lack of evidence, but also who are in fact truly 
innocent, will often plead guilty to the charge. Why? In a word, fear. 
And the more numerous and serious the charges, studies have shown, the 
greater the fear. That explains why prosecutors sometimes seem to file 
every charge imaginable against defendants.
This tactic is prohibited in some other countries—for example in the United Kingdom the prosecutor's code states:
Prosecutors should never go ahead with more charges than 
are necessary just to encourage a defendant to plead guilty to a few. In
 the same way, they should never go ahead with a more serious charge 
just to encourage a defendant to plead guilty to a less serious one.
although it adds that in some kinds of complex cases such as major fraud trials:
The over-riding duty of the prosecutor is ... to see that
 justice is done. The procedures must command public and judicial 
confidence. Many defendants in serious and complex fraud cases are 
represented by solicitors experienced in commercial litigation, 
including negotiation. This means that the defendant is usually 
protected from being put under improper pressure to plead. The main 
danger to be guarded against in these cases is that the prosecutor is 
persuaded to agree to a plea or a basis that is not in the public 
interest and interests of justice because it does not adequately reflect
 the seriousness of the offending ... Any plea agreement must reflect 
the seriousness and extent of the offending and give the court adequate 
sentencing powers. It must consider the impact of an agreement on 
victims and also the wider public, whilst respecting the rights of 
defendants.
John H. Langbein argues that the modern American system of plea bargaining is comparable to the medieval European system of torture:
There is, of course, a difference between having your 
limbs crushed if you refuse to confess, or suffering some extra years of
 imprisonment if you refuse to confess, but the difference is of degree,
 not kind. Plea bargaining, like torture, is coercive. Like the medieval
 Europeans, the Americans are now operating a procedural system that 
engages in condemnation without adjudication.
Consequences for innocent accused
Theoretical work based on the prisoner's dilemma
 is one reason that, in many countries, plea bargaining is forbidden. 
Often, precisely the prisoner's dilemma scenario applies: it is in the 
interest of both suspects to confess and testify against the other 
suspect, irrespective of the innocence of the accused. Arguably, the 
worst case is when only one party is guilty: here, the innocent one has 
no incentive to confess, while the guilty one has a strong incentive to 
confess and give testimony (including false testimony) against the innocent.
A 2009 study by the European Association of Law and Economics 
observed that innocent defendants are consistently more likely than 
guilty defendants to reject otherwise-favorable pleas proposals, even 
when theoretically disadvantageous to do so, because of perceived 
unfairness, and would do so even if the expected sanction would be worse
 if they proceeded to trial. The study concluded that "[t]his somewhat 
counterintuitive 'cost of innocence', where the preferences of innocents
 lead them collectively to fare worse than their guilty counterparts, is
 further increased by the practice of imposing much harsher sentences at
 trial on defendants who contest the charges. This 'trial penalty'
 seeks to facilitate guilty pleas by guilty defendants [...and 
ironically...] disproportionately, collectively, penalizes innocents, 
who reject on fairness grounds some offers their guilty counterparts 
accept."
The extent to which innocent people will accept a plea bargain 
and plead guilty is contentious and has been subjected to considerable 
research. Much research has focused on the relatively few actual cases 
where innocence was subsequently proven, such as successful appeals for 
murder and rape based upon DNA evidence,
 which tend to be atypical of trials as a whole (being by their nature 
only the most serious kinds of crime). Other studies have focused on 
presenting hypothetical situations to subjects and asking what choice 
they would make. More recently some studies have attempted to examine 
actual reactions of innocent persons generally, when faced with actual 
plea bargain decisions. A study by Dervan and Edkins (2013) attempted to
 recreate a real-life controlled plea bargain situation, rather than 
merely asking theoretical responses to a theoretical situation—a common 
approach in previous research. It placed subjects in a situation where an accusation of academic fraud
 (cheating) could be made, of which some subjects were in fact by design
 actually guilty (and knew this), and some were innocent but faced 
seemingly strong evidence of guilt and no verifiable proof of innocence.
 Each subject was presented with the evidence of guilt and offered a 
choice between facing an academic ethics board and potentially a heavy 
penalty in terms of extra courses and other forfeits, or admitting guilt
 and accepting a lighter "sentence". The study found that as expected 
from court statistics, around 90% of accused subjects who were actually 
guilty chose to take the plea-bargain and plead guilty. It also found 
that around 56% of subjects who were actually innocent (and privately 
knew it) also take up the plea-bargain and plead guilty, for reasons 
including avoiding formal quasi-legal processes, uncertainty, 
possibility of greater harm to personal future plans, or deprivation of 
home environment due to remedial courses. The authors stated:
Previous research has argued that the innocence problem 
is minimal because defendants are risk-prone and willing to defend 
themselves before a tribunal. Our research, however, demonstrates that 
when study participants are placed in real, rather than hypothetical, 
bargaining situations and are presented with accurate information 
regarding their statistical probability of success, just as they might 
be so informed by their attorney or the government during a criminal 
plea negotiation, innocent defendants are highly risk-averse.
More pressure to plea bargain may be applied in weak cases (where 
there is less certainty of both guilt and jury conviction) than strong 
cases. Prosecutors tend to be strongly motivated by conviction rates, 
and "there are many indications that prosecutors are willing to go a 
long way to avoid losing cases, [and that] when prosecutors decide to 
proceed with such weak cases they are often willing to go a long way to 
assure that a plea bargain is struck".
 Prosecutors often have great power to procure a desired level of 
incentive, as they select the charges to be presented. For this reason,
[P]lea bargains are just as likely in strong and weak 
cases. Prosecutors only need to adjust the offer to the probability of 
conviction in order to reach an agreement. Thus, weaker cases result in 
more lenient plea bargains, and stronger ones in relative harshness, but
 both result in an agreement. [... W]hen the case is weak, the parties 
must rely on charge bargaining ... But [charge bargaining] is hardly an 
obstacle. Charge bargaining in weak cases is not the exception; it is 
the norm all around the country. Thus, even if the evidence against 
innocent defendants is, on average, weaker, the likelihood of plea 
bargains is not dependent on guilt.
Another situation in which an innocent defendant may plead guilty is 
in the case of a defendant who cannot raise bail, and who is being held 
in custody in a jail or detention facility. Because it may take months, 
or even years, for criminal cases to come to trial or even indictment in
 some jurisdictions, an innocent defendant who is offered a plea bargain
 that includes a sentence of less time than they would otherwise spend 
in jail awaiting an indictment or a trial may choose to accept the plea 
arrangement and plead guilty.
Misalignment of goals and incentives
Agency problems
 may arise in plea bargaining as, although the prosecutor represents the
 people and the defense attorney represents the defendant, these agents'
 goals may not be congruent with those of their principles. For example,
 prosecutors and defense attorneys may seek to maintain good relations 
with one another, creating a potential conflict with the parties they 
represent. A defense attorney may receive a flat fee for representing a 
client, or may not receive additional money for taking a case to trial, 
creating an incentive for the defense attorney to settle a case to 
increase profits or to avoid a financial loss.
A prosecutor may want to maintain a high conviction rate
 or avoid a losing high-profile trials, creating the potential that they
 will enter into a plea bargain that furthers their interests but 
reduces the potential of the prosecution and sentence to deter crime.
 Prosecutors may also make charging decisions that significantly affect a
 defendant's sentence, and may file charges or offer plea deals that 
cause even an innocent defendant to consider or accept a plea bargain.
Issues related to cost of justice
Another
 argument against plea bargaining is that it may not actually reduce the
 costs of administering justice. For example, if a prosecutor has only a
 25% chance of winning his case and sending a defendant away to prison 
for 10 years, they may make a plea agreement for a sentence of one year;
 but if plea bargaining is unavailable, a prosecutor may drop the case 
completely.
Usage in common law countries
Canada
In
 Canada, the courts always have the final say with regard to sentencing.
 Nevertheless, plea bargaining has become an accepted part of the 
criminal justice system although judges and Crown attorneys are often 
reluctant to refer to it as such. In most Canadian criminal proceedings,
 the Crown has the ability to recommend a lighter sentence than it would seek following a guilty verdict in exchange for a guilty plea.
Like other common law jurisdictions, the Crown can also agree to 
withdraw some charges against the defendant in exchange for a guilty 
plea. This has become standard procedure for certain offences such as impaired driving. In the case of hybrid offences, the Crown must make a binding decision as to whether to proceed summarily or by indictment prior to the defendant making his or her plea. If the Crown elects to proceed summarily and the defendant then pleads not guilty,
 the Crown cannot change its election. Therefore, the Crown is not in a 
position to offer to proceed summarily in exchange for a guilty plea.
Canadian judges are not bound by the Crown's sentencing 
recommendations and could impose harsher (or more lenient) penalties. 
Therefore, the Crown and the defence will often make a joint submission
 with respect to sentencing. While a joint submission can entail both 
the Crown and defence recommending exactly the same disposition of a 
case, this is not common except in cases that are sufficiently minor 
that the Crown is willing to recommend a discharge.
 In more serious cases, a joint submission normally call for a sentence 
within relatively narrow range, with the Crown arguing for a sentence at
 the upper end of the range and the defence arguing for a sentence at 
the lower end, so as to maintain the visibility of the judge's ability 
to exercise discretion.
Judges are not bound to impose a sentence within the range of a 
joint submission, and a judge's disregard for a joint submission is not 
in itself grounds for the sentence to be altered on appeal. However, if a
 judge routinely disregards joint submissions, that judge would 
compromise the ability of the Crown to offer meaningful incentives for 
defendants to plead guilty. Defence lawyers would become reluctant to 
enter into joint submissions if they were thought to be of little value 
with a particular judge, which would thus result in otherwise avoidable 
trials. For these reasons, Canadian judges will normally impose a 
sentence within the range of any joint submission.
Following a Supreme Court of Canada
 ruling that imposes strict time limits on the resolution of criminal 
cases (eighteen months for cases in provincial court and thirty months 
for cases in Superior Court), several provinces have initiated and 
intensified measures intended to maximize the number of minor criminal 
cases resolved by a plea bargain.
Largely particular to the Canadian justice system is that further
 negotiations concerning the final disposition of a criminal case may 
also arise even after a sentence has been passed. This is because in 
Canada the Crown has (by common law standards) a very broad right to 
appeal acquittals,
 and also a right to appeal for harsher sentences except in cases where 
the sentence imposed was maximum allowed. Therefore, in Canada, after 
sentencing the defence sometimes has an incentive to try to persuade the
 Crown to not appeal a case, in exchange for the defence also declining 
to appeal. While, strictly speaking, this is not plea bargaining, it is 
done for largely the same reasons.
England and Wales
In
 England and Wales, plea bargaining, in the sense of seeking a 
particular sentence in exchange for dropping some charges, is not 
permitted; only the judge or magistrates have the power to determine 
sentence, and an agreement between the prosecution and defence cannot 
bind the court. The Crown Prosecution Service
 is required to prosecute an offence only where there is a realistic 
prospect of conviction, so greater charges cannot lawfully be used in 
bad faith to intimidate the defendant into accepting the charge actually
 sought.
A defendant is permitted to plead guilty to some charges listed 
on the charge sheet or indictment and deny others, and the prosecution 
may agree to accept this plea and drop the denied charges; such an 
agreement will generally be accepted by the court as it serves the 
public interest, as well as the defendant's and victims' interests, to 
avoid the expense and stress of a trial. The defendant may also plead 
guilty on the basis of accepted facts that may affect sentencing while 
denying others, but the Sentencing Council stresses that the prosecution
 should accept such a plea only if it enables the court to impose a 
sentence and make other ancillary orders that are appropriate for the 
seriousness of the offence, and never merely for the sake of 
convenience. The prosecution must also take the victims' views into 
account.
In cases before the Crown Court, the defendant can request an 
indication from the judge of the likely maximum sentence that would be 
imposed should the defendant decide to plead guilty. Following the rule 
in R v Goodyear,
 it is only appropriate to give such an indication if requested by the 
defence with the defendant's written authorization; such indication is 
treated as binding on the court, but only if the defendant actually 
pleads guilty, and cannot prevent the sentence being appealed as unduly lenient.
In the case of either way offences,
 the decision whether to deal with a case in a magistrates' court or the
 Crown Court is not made by magistrates until after a plea has been 
entered. A defendant is thus unable to plead guilty in exchange for 
having a case dealt with in magistrates' court (which has lesser 
sentencing powers).
Where the defendant pleads guilty or indicates an intention to do so, the guidelines set by the Sentencing Council typically require that they receive a discount on the sentence, with the amount of discount depending on the timing:
- Indicating a guilty plea at the first opportunity (typically the committal hearing in the magistrates' court): one third
 - Pleading guilty at a later hearing in the magistrates' court, or at 
the first hearing in crown court (typically the plea and case management
 hearing): one quarter
 - Pleading guilty on the first day of trial: one tenth
 
The discount can sometimes involve changing the type of punishment, such as substituting a prison sentence for community service. For some offences where a mandatory minimum sentence applies, section 73 of the Sentencing Act 2020 permits the sentence to be reduced this way up to 20 percent below the minimum.
Section 73 requires the court to take into account the 
circumstances under which an indication to plead guilty was made in 
addition to its timing.
India
Plea bargaining was introduced in India by The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2005, which amended the Code of Criminal Procedure and introduced a new chapter, XXI(A), in the code, enforceable from July 5, 2006.
 It allows plea bargaining for cases in which the maximum punishment is 
imprisonment for seven years or less; however, offenses affecting the 
socio-economic condition of the country and offenses committed against a
 woman or a child below 14 are excluded.
In 2007, the Sakharam Bandekar case became the first such case in
 India where the accused, Sakharam Bandekar, requested lesser punishment
 in return for confessing to his crime (using plea bargaining). However,
 the court rejected his plea and accepted the CBI's argument that the accused was facing serious charges of corruption. Finally, the court convicted Bandekar and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment.
Pakistan
Plea 
bargaining as a formal legal provision was introduced in Pakistan by the
 National Accountability Ordinance 1999, an anti-corruption law. A 
special feature of this plea bargain is that the accused applies for it,
 accepting guilt, and offers to return the proceeds of corruption as 
determined by investigators and prosecutors. After an endorsement by the
 Chairman National Accountability Bureau, the request is presented 
before the court, which decides whether it should be accepted or not. If
 the request for plea bargain is accepted by the court, the accused 
stands convicted but neither is sentenced if in trial nor undergoes any 
sentence previously pronounced by a lower court if in appeal. The 
accused is disqualified to take part in elections, hold any public 
office, or obtain a loan from any bank; the accused is also dismissed 
from service if a government official.
In other cases, formal plea bargains in Pakistan are limited, but
 the prosecutor has the authority to drop a case or a charge in a case 
and, in practice, often does so, in return for a defendant pleading 
guilty on some lesser charge. No bargaining takes place over the 
penalty, which is the court's sole privilege.
United States
Plea bargaining is a significant part of the criminal justice system in the United States; the vast majority (roughly 90%) of criminal cases in the United States are settled by plea bargain rather than by a jury trial. Plea bargains are subject to the approval of the court, and different states and jurisdictions have different rules. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
 are followed in federal cases and have been created to ensure a 
standard of uniformity in all cases decided in the federal courts. A 
two- or three-level offense level reduction is usually available for 
those who accept responsibility
 by not holding the prosecution to the burden of proving its case; this 
usually amounts to a complete sentence reduction had they gone to trial 
and lost.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
 provide for two main types of plea agreements. An 11(c)(1)(B) agreement
 does not bind the court; the prosecutor's recommendation is merely 
advisory, and the defendant cannot withdraw their plea if the court 
decides to impose a sentence other than what was stipulated in the 
agreement. An 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, however, binds the court once the 
court accepts the agreement. When such an agreement is proposed, the 
court can reject it if it disagrees with the proposed sentence, in which
 case the defendant has an opportunity to withdraw their plea.
Plea bargains are so common in the Superior Courts of California (the general trial courts) that the Judicial Council of California
 has published an optional seven-page form (containing all mandatory 
advisements required by federal and state law) to help prosecutors and 
defense attorneys reduce such bargains into written plea agreements.
Certain aspects of the American justice system serve to promote 
plea bargaining. For example, the adversarial nature of the U.S. 
criminal justice system puts judges in a passive role, in which they 
have no independent access to information with which to assess the 
strength of the case against the defendant. The prosecutor and defense 
may thus control the outcome of a case through plea bargaining. The 
court must approve a plea bargain as being within the interests of 
justice.
The lack of compulsory prosecution also gives prosecutors greater discretion as well as the inability of crime victims to mount a private prosecution and their limited ability to influence plea agreements. Defendants who are held in custody—who either do not have the right to 
bail or cannot afford bail, or who do not qualify for release on their 
own recognizance—may get out of jail immediately following the judge's 
acceptance of a plea.
Generally, once a plea bargain is made and accepted by the 
courts, the matter is final and cannot be appealed.  However, a 
defendant may withdraw his plea for certain legal reasons,
 and a defendant may agree to a "conditional" plea bargain, whereby they
 plead guilty and accept a sentence, but reserve the right to appeal a 
specific matter (such as violation of a constitutional right).  If the 
defendant does not win on appeal the agreement is carried out; if the 
defendant is successful on appeal the bargain is terminated.  The 
defendant in Doggett v. United States
 made such a bargain, reserving the right to appeal solely on the 
grounds that he was not given a speedy trial as required by the United 
States Constitution; Doggett's claim was upheld by the United States 
Supreme Court and he was freed.
Other common law jurisdictions
In some common law jurisdictions, such as Singapore and the Australian state of Victoria,
 plea bargaining is practiced only to the extent that the prosecution 
and the defense can agree that the defendant will plead guilty to some 
charges or to reduced charges in exchange for the prosecutor withdrawing
 the remaining or more serious charges. In New South Wales,
 a 10-25% discount on the sentence is customarily given in exchange for 
an early guilty plea, but this concession is expected to be granted by 
the judge as a way of recognizing the utilitarian value of an early 
guilty plea to the justice system - it is never negotiated with a 
prosecutor.
 The courts in these jurisdictions have made it plain that they will 
always decide what the appropriate penalty is to be. No bargaining takes
 place between the prosecution and the defence over criminal penalties.
Use in civil law countries
Plea bargaining is extremely difficult in jurisdictions based on the civil law. This is because, unlike common law systems, civil law systems have no concept of plea:
 if the defendant confesses, a confession is entered into evidence, but 
the prosecution is not absolved of the duty to present a full case. A 
court may decide that a defendant is innocent even though they presented
 a full confession. Also, unlike common law systems, prosecutors in 
civil law countries may have limited or no power to drop or reduce 
charges after a case has been filed, and in some countries their power 
to drop or reduce charges before a case has been filed is 
limited, making plea bargaining impossible. Since the 1980s, some civil 
law nations have adapted their systems to allow for plea bargaining.
Brazil
In 2013 
Brazil passed a law allowing plea bargains, which have been used in the 
political corruption trials taking place since then.
Central African Republic
In the Central African Republic, witchcraft carries heavy penalties but those accused of it typically confess in exchange for a modest sentence.
China
In China, a plea bargaining pilot scheme was introduced by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in 2016.
 For defendants that face jail terms of three years or fewer, agrees to 
plead guilty voluntarily and agree with prosecutors' crime and 
sentencing proposals are given mitigated punishments.
Denmark
In 
2009, in a case about whether witness testimony originating from a plea 
deal in the United States was admissible in a Danish criminal trial (297/2008 H), the Supreme Court of Denmark (Danish: Højesteret) unanimously ruled that plea bargains are prima facie not legal under Danish law,
 but that the witnesses in the particular case would be allowed to 
testify regardless (with the caveat that the lower court consider the 
possibility that the testimony was untrue or at least influenced by the 
benefits of the plea bargain). The Supreme Court did, however, point out that Danish law contains mechanisms similar to plea bargains, such as § 82, nr. 10 of the Danish Penal Code (Danish: Straffeloven)
 which states that a sentence may be reduced if the perpetrator of a 
crime provides information that helps solve a crime perpetrated by 
others, or § 23 a of the Danish Competition Law (Danish: Konkurrenceloven) which states that someone can apply to avoid being fined or prosecuted for participating in a cartel if they provide information about the cartel that the authorities did not know at the time.
If a defendant admits to having committed a crime, the 
prosecution does not have to file charges against them, and the case can
 be heard as a so-called "admission case" (Danish: tilståelsessag) under § 831 of the Law on the Administration of Justice (Danish: Retsplejeloven)
 provided that: the confession is supported by other pieces of evidence 
(meaning that a confession is not enough to convict someone on its own);
 both the defendant and the prosecutor consent to it; the court does not
 have any objections; §§ 68, 69, 70 and 73 of the penal code do not 
apply to the case.
Estonia
In 
Estonia, plea bargaining was introduced in the 1990s: the penalty is 
reduced in exchange for confession and avoiding most of the court 
proceedings. Plea bargaining is permitted for the crimes punishable by 
no more than four years of imprisonment. Normally, a 25% reduction of 
the penalty is given.
France
The introduction of a limited form of plea bargaining (comparution sur reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité or CRPC, often summarized as plaider coupable)
 in 2004 was highly controversial in France. In this system, the public 
prosecutor could propose to suspects of relatively minor crimes a 
penalty not exceeding one year in prison; the deal, if accepted, had to 
be accepted by a judge. Opponents, usually lawyers and leftist
 political parties, argued that plea bargaining would greatly infringe 
on the rights of defense, the long-standing constitutional right of presumption of innocence, the rights of suspects in police custody, and the right to a fair trial.
For instance, Robert Badinter
 argued that plea bargaining would give too much power to the public 
prosecutor and would encourage defendants to accept a sentence only to 
avoid the risk of a bigger sentence in a trial, even if they did not 
really deserve it. Only a minority of criminal cases are settled by that
 method: in 2009, 77,500 out of the 673,700 or 11.5% of the decisions by
 the correctional courts.
Georgia
Plea 
bargaining (Georgian: საპროცესო შეთანხმება, literally "plea agreement") 
was introduced in Georgia in 2004. The substance of the Georgian plea 
bargaining is similar to the United States and other common law 
jurisdictions.
A plea bargaining, also called a plea agreement or negotiated 
plea, is an alternative and consensual way of criminal case settlement. A
 plea agreement means settlement of case without main hearing when the 
defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for a lesser charge or for a
 more lenient sentence or for dismissal of certain related charges. 
(Article 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia)
Defendants' rights during plea bargaining
The
 main principle of the plea bargaining is that it must be based on the 
free will of the defendant, equality of the parties and advanced 
protection of the rights of the defendant:
- In order to avoid fraud of the defendant or insufficient 
consideration of his or her interests, legislation foresees obligatory 
participation of the defense council; (Article 210 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code of Georgia)
 - The defendant has the right to reject the plea agreement on any 
stage of the criminal proceedings before the court renders the judgment.
 (Article 213 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia)
 - In case of refusal, it is prohibited to use information provided by 
the defendant under the plea agreement against him or her in the future.
 (Article 214 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia)
 - The defendant has the right to appeal the judgment rendered 
consequent to the plea agreement if the plea agreement was concluded by 
deception, coercion, violence, threat, or violence. (Article 215 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia)
 
Obligations of the prosecutor while concluding the plea agreement
While
 concluding the plea agreement, the prosecutor is obliged to take into 
consideration public interest, severity of the penalty, and personal 
characteristics of the defendant. (Article 210 of the Criminal Procedure
 Code of Georgia)
To avoid abuse of powers, legislation foresees written consent of the 
supervisory prosecutor as necessary precondition to conclude plea 
agreement and to amend its provisions. (Article 210 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code of Georgia)
Oversight over the plea agreement
Plea
 agreement without the approval of the court does not have the legal 
effect. 
The court must satisfy itself that the plea agreement is concluded on 
the basis of the free will of the defendant, that the defendant fully 
acknowledges the essence of the plea agreement and its consequences. 
(Article 212 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia)
A guilty plea of the defendant is not enough to render a guilty 
judgment. (Article 212 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia) 
Consequently, the court is obliged to discuss two issues:
- Whether irrefutable evidence is presented which proves the defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 - Whether the sentence provided for in the plea agreement is legitimate. (Article 212 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia).
 
After both criteria are satisfied the court additionally checks 
whether formalities related to the legislative requirements are followed
 and only then makes its decision.
If the court finds that presented evidence is not sufficient to 
support the charges or that a motion to render a judgment without 
substantial consideration of a case is submitted in violation of the 
requirements stipulated by the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia, it 
shall return the case to the prosecution. The court before returning the
 case to the prosecutor offers the parties to change the terms of the 
agreement. If the changed terms do not satisfy the court, then it shall 
return the case to the prosecution. (Article 213 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code of Georgia).
If the court satisfies itself that the defendant fully 
acknowledges the consequences of the plea agreement, and he or she was 
represented by the defense council, his or her will is expressed in full
 compliance with the legislative requirements without deception and 
coercion, also if there is enough body of doubtless evidence for the 
conviction and the agreement is reached on legitimate sentence - the 
court approves the plea agreement and renders guilty judgment. If any of
 the abovementioned requirements are not satisfied, the court rejects to
 approve the plea agreement and returns the case to the prosecutor. 
(Article 213 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia).
Role of the victim in plea agreement negotiations
The
 plea agreement is concluded between the parties - the prosecutor and 
the defendant. Notwithstanding the fact that the victim is not party to 
the criminal case and the prosecutor is not a tool in the hands of the 
victim to obtain revenge against the offender, the attitude of the 
victim in relation to the plea agreement is still important.
Under Article 217 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia, the 
prosecutor is obliged to consult with the victim prior to concluding the
 plea agreement and inform him or her about this. In addition, under the
 Guidelines of the Prosecution Service of Georgia, the prosecutor is 
obliged to take into consideration the interests of the victim and as a 
rule conclude the plea agreement after the damage is compensated.
Germany
Plea agreements have made a limited appearance in Germany. However, there is no exact equivalent of a guilty plea in German criminal procedure.
Italy
Italy has a form of bargaining, popularly known as patteggiamento
 but that has a technical name of penalty application under request of 
the parts. In fact, the bargaining is not about the charges, but about 
the penalty applied in sentence, reduced up to one third.
When the defendant deems that the punishment that would, 
concretely, be handed down is less than a five-year imprisonment (or 
that it would just be a fine), the defendant may request to plea bargain
 with the prosecutor. The defendant is rewarded with a reduction on the 
sentence and has other advantages (such as that the defendant does not 
pay the fees on the proceeding). The defendant must accept the penalty 
for the charges (even if the plea-bargained sentence has some particular
 matters in further compensation proceedings), no matter how serious the
 charges are.
Sometimes, the prosecutor agrees to reduce a charge or to drop 
some of multiple charges in exchange for the defendant's acceptance of 
the penalty. The defendant, in the request, could argue with the penalty
 and aggravating and extenuating circumstancing with the prosecutor, 
that can accept or refuse. The request could also be made by the 
prosecutor. The plea bargaining could be granted if the penalty that 
could be concretely applied is, after the reduction of one third, 
inferior to five-year imprisonment (so called patteggiamento allargato,
 wide bargaining); When the penalty applied, after the reduction of one 
third, is inferior of two years imprisonment or is only a fine (so 
called "patteggiamento ristretto" limited bargaining), the defendant can
 have other advantages, like sentence suspended and the effacement of 
the crime if in five year of the sentence, the defendant does not commit
 a similar crime.
In the request, when it could be applied the conditional 
suspension of the penalty according to the article 163 and following of 
the Italian penal code, the defendant could subordinate the request to 
the grant of the suspension; if the judge rejects the suspension, the 
bargaining is refused. When both the prosecutor and the defendant have 
come to an agreement, the proposal is submitted to the judge, who can 
refuse or accept the plea bargaining.
According to Italian law, a bargain does not need a guilty plea 
(in Italy there is no plea declaration); for this reason, a bargaining 
sentence is only an acceptance of the penalty in exchange with the stop 
of investigation and trial and has no binding cogency in other trials, 
especially in civil trials in which parts argue of the same facts at the
 effects of civil liability and in other criminal trials in which are 
processed the accomplices of the defendant that had requested and got a 
bargaining sentence.
Japan
In Japan,
 plea bargaining was previously forbidden by law, although sources 
reported that prosecutors illegally offered defendants plea bargains in 
exchange for their confessions.
Plea bargaining was introduced in Japan in June 2018. The first 
case of plea bargaining under this system, in July 2018, involved 
allegations of bribery by Mitsubishi Hitachi Power Systems in Thailand. The second case was a November 2018 deal to obtain evidence of accounting and securities law violations against Nissan executives Carlos Ghosn and Greg Kelly.
Under the Japanese system, formally known as the "mutual consultation and agreement system" (協議・合意制度, kyogi-goi seido),
 plea bargaining is available in prosecutions for organized crime, 
competition law violations, and economic crimes such as securities law 
violations. The prosecutor, defendant, and defense counsel each sign a 
written agreement, which must then be admitted into evidence in a public
 court without delay.
Poland
Poland 
also adopted a limited form of plea bargaining, which is applicable only
 to minor felonies (punishable by no more than 10 years of 
imprisonment). The procedure is called "voluntary submission to a 
penalty" and allows the court to pass an agreed sentence without 
reviewing the evidence, which significantly shortens the trial.
There are some specific conditions that have to be simultaneously met:
- the defendant pleads guilty and proposes a penalty,
 - the prosecutor agrees,
 - the victim agrees,
 - the court agrees.
 
However, the court may object to the terms of proposed plea agreement
 (even if already agreed between the defendant, victim and prosecutor) 
and suggest changes (not specific but rather general). If the defendant 
accepts these suggestions and changes his penalty proposition, the court
 approves it and passes the verdict according to the plea agreement. In 
spite of the agreement, all the parties of the trial: prosecution, 
defendant and the victim as an auxiliary prosecutor (in Poland, the 
victim may declare that he wants to act as an "auxiliary prosecutor" and
 consequently gains the rights similar to official prosecutor) - have 
the right to appeal.
Spain
Spain has 
relatively recently adopted a limited form of plea bargaining and the 
procedure is called a "conformity sentence" meaning the accused is in 
agreement and can only be used in minor charges but not in serious 
charges where nine or more years of prison may be imposed.