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Sunday, October 6, 2024

Regulation of nanotechnology

Because of the ongoing controversy on the implications of nanotechnology, there is significant debate concerning whether nanotechnology or nanotechnology-based products merit special government regulation. This mainly relates to when to assess new substances prior to their release into the market, community and environment.

Nanotechnology refers to an increasing number of commercially available products – from socks and trousers to tennis racquets and cleaning cloths. Such nanotechnologies and their accompanying industries have triggered calls for increased community participation and effective regulatory arrangements. However, these calls have presently not led to such comprehensive regulation to oversee research and the commercial application of nanotechnologies, or any comprehensive labeling for products that contain nanoparticles or are derived from nano-processes.

Regulatory bodies such as the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the Food and Drug Administration in the U.S. or the Health and Consumer Protection Directorate of the European Commission have started dealing with the potential risks posed by nanoparticles. So far, neither engineered nanoparticles nor the products and materials that contain them are subject to any special regulation regarding production, handling or labelling.

Managing risks: human and environmental health and safety

Studies of the health impact of airborne particles generally shown that for toxic materials, smaller particles are more toxic. This is due in part to the fact that, given the same mass per volume, the dose in terms of particle numbers increases as particle size decreases.

Based upon available data, it has been argued that current risk assessment methodologies are not suited to the hazards associated with nanoparticles; in particular, existing toxicological and eco-toxicological methods are not up to the task; exposure evaluation (dose) needs to be expressed as quantity of nanoparticles and/or surface area rather than simply mass; equipment for routine detecting and measuring nanoparticles in air, water, or soil is inadequate; and very little is known about the physiological responses to nanoparticles.

Regulatory bodies in the U.S. as well as in the EU have concluded that nanoparticles form the potential for an entirely new risk and that it is necessary to carry out an extensive analysis of the risk. The challenge for regulators is whether a matrix can be developed which would identify nanoparticles and more complex nanoformulations which are likely to have special toxicological properties or whether it is more reasonable for each particle or formulation to be tested separately.

The International Council on Nanotechnology maintains a database and Virtual Journal of scientific papers on environmental, health and safety research on nanoparticles. The database currently has over 2000 entries indexed by particle type, exposure pathway and other criteria. The Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies (PEN) currently lists 807 products that manufacturers have voluntarily identified that use nanotechnology. No labeling is required by the FDA so that number could be significantly higher. "The use of nanotechnology in consumer products and industrial applications is growing rapidly, with the products listed in the PEN inventory showing just the tip of the iceberg" according to PEN Project Director David Rejeski . A list of those products that have been voluntarily disclosed by their manufacturers is located here .

The Material Safety Data Sheet that must be issued for certain materials often does not differentiate between bulk and nanoscale size of the material in question and even when it does these MSDS are advisory only.

Democratic governance

Many argue that government has a responsibility to provide opportunities for the public to be involved in the development of new forms of science and technology. Community engagement can be achieved through various means or mechanisms. An online journal article identifies traditional approaches such as referendums, consultation documents, and advisory committees that include community members and other stakeholders. Other conventional approaches include public meetings and "closed" dialog with stakeholders. More contemporary engagement processes that have been employed to include community members in decisions about nanotechnology include citizens' juries and consensus conferences. Leach and Scoones (2006, p. 45) argue that since that “most debates about science and technology options involve uncertainty, and often ignorance, public debate about regulatory regimes is essential.”

It has been argued that limited nanotechnology labeling and regulation may exacerbate potential human and environmental health and safety issues associated with nanotechnology, and that the development of comprehensive regulation of nanotechnology will be vital to ensure that the potential risks associated with the research and commercial application of nanotechnology do not overshadow its potential benefits. Regulation may also be required to meet community expectations about responsible development of nanotechnology, as well as ensuring that public interests are included in shaping the development of nanotechnology.

Community education, engagement and consultation tend to occur "downstream": once there is at least a moderate level of awareness, and often during the process of disseminating and adapting technologies. "Upstream" engagement, by contrast, occurs much earlier in the innovation cycle and involves: "dialogue and debate about future technology options and pathways, bringing the often expert-led approaches to horizon scanning, technology foresight and scenario planning to involve a wider range of perspectives and inputs." Daniel Sarewitz Director of Arizona State University's Consortium on Science, Policy and Outcomes, argues that "by the time new devices reach the stage of commercialization and regulation, it is usually too late to alter them to correct problems." However, Xenos, et al. argue that upstream engagement can be utilized in this area through anticipated discussion with peers. Upstream engagement in this sense is meant to "create the best possible conditions for sound policy making and public judgments based on careful assessment of objective information". Discussion may act as a catalyst for upstream engagement by prompting accountability for individuals to seek and process additional information ("anticipatory elaboration"). However, though anticipated discussion did lead to participants seeking further information, Xenos et al. found that factual information was not primarily sought out; instead, individuals sought out opinion pieces and editorials.

The stance that the research, development and use of nanotechnology should be subject to control by the public sector is sometimes referred to as nanosocialism.

Newness

The question of whether nanotechnology represents something 'new' must be answered to decide how best nanotechnology should be regulated. The Royal Society recommended that the UK government assess chemicals in the form of nanoparticles or nanotubes as new substances. Subsequent to this, in 2007 a coalition of over forty groups called for nanomaterials to be classified as new substances, and regulated as such.

Despite these recommendations, chemicals comprising nanoparticles that have previously been subject to assessment and regulation may be exempt from regulation, regardless of the potential for different risks and impacts. In contrast, nanomaterials are often recognized as 'new' from the perspective of intellectual property rights (IPRs), and as such are commercially protected via patenting laws.

There is significant debate about who is responsible for the regulation of nanotechnology. While some non-nanotechnology specific regulatory agencies currently cover some products and processes (to varying degrees) – by "bolting on" nanotechnology to existing regulations – there are clear gaps in these regimes. This enables some nanotechnology applications to figuratively "slip through the cracks" without being covered by any regulations. An example of this has occurred in the US, and involves nanoparticles of titanium dioxide (TiO2) for use in sunscreen where they create a clearer cosmetic appearance. In this case, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) reviewed the immediate health effects of exposure to nanoparticles of TiO2 for consumers. However, they did not review its impacts for aquatic ecosystems when the sunscreen rubs off, nor did the EPA, or any other agency. Similarly the Australian equivalent of the FDA, the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) approved the use of nanoparticles in sunscreens (without the requirement for package labelling) after a thorough review of the literature, on the basis that although nanoparticles of TiO2 and zinc oxide (ZnO) in sunscreens do produce free radicals and oxidative DNA damage in vitro, such particles were unlikely to pass the dead outer cells of the stratum corneum of human skin; a finding which some academics have argued seemed not to apply the precautionary principle in relation to prolonged use on children with cut skin, the elderly with thin skin, people with diseased skin or use over flexural creases. Doubts over the TGA's decision were raised with publication of a paper showing that the uncoated anatase form of TiO2 used in some Australian sunscreens caused a photocatalytic reaction that degraded the surface of newly installed prepainted steel roofs in places where they came in contact with the sunscreen coated hands of workmen. Such gaps in regulation are likely to continue alongside the development and commercialization of increasingly complex second and third generation nanotechnologies.

Nanomedicines are just beginning to enter drug regulatory processes, but within a few decades could comprise a dominant group within the class of innovative pharmaceuticals, the current thinking of government safety and cost-effectiveness regulators appearing to be that these products give rise to few if any nano-specific issues. Some academics (such as Thomas Alured Faunce) have challenged that proposition and suggest that nanomedicines may create unique or heightened policy challenges for government systems of cost-effectiveness as well as safety regulation. There are also significant public good aspects to the regulation of nanotechnology, particularly with regard to ensuring that industry involvement in standard-setting does not become a means of reducing competition and that nanotechnology policy and regulation encourages new models of safe drug discovery and development more systematically targeted at the global burden of disease.

Self-regulation attempts may well fail, due to the inherent conflict of interest in asking any organization to police itself. If the public becomes aware of this failure, an external, independent organization is often given the duty of policing them, sometimes with highly punitive measures taken against the organization. The Food and Drug Administration notes that it only regulates on the basis of voluntary claims made by the product manufacturer. If no claims are made by a manufacturer, then the FDA may be unaware of nanotechnology being employed.

Yet regulations worldwide still fail to distinguish between materials in their nanoscale and bulk form. This means that nanomaterials remain effectively unregulated; there is no regulatory requirement for nanomaterials to face new health and safety testing or environmental impact assessment prior to their use in commercial products, if these materials have already been approved in bulk form. The health risks of nanomaterials are of particular concern for workers who may face occupational exposure to nanomaterials at higher levels, and on a more routine basis, than the general public.

International law

There is no international regulation of nanoproducts or the underlying nanotechnology. Nor are there any internationally agreed definitions or terminology for nanotechnology, no internationally agreed protocols for toxicity testing of nanoparticles, and no standardized protocols for evaluating the environmental impacts of nanoparticles. Moreover, nanomaterials do not fall within the scope of existing international treaties regulating toxic chemicals.

Since products that are produced using nanotechnologies will likely enter international trade, it is argued that it will be necessary to harmonize nanotechnology standards across national borders. There is concern that some countries, most notably developing countries, will be excluded from international standards negotiations. The Institute for Food and Agricultural Standards notes that “developing countries should have a say in international nanotechnology standards development, even if they lack capacity to enforce the standards". (p. 14).

Concerns about monopolies and concentrated control and ownership of new nanotechnologies were raised in community workshops in Australia in 2004.

Arguments against regulation

Wide use of the term nanotechnology in recent years has created the impression that regulatory frameworks are suddenly having to contend with entirely new challenges that they are unequipped to deal with. Many regulatory systems around the world already assess new substances or products for safety on a case by case basis, before they are permitted on the market. These regulatory systems have been assessing the safety of nanometre scale molecular arrangements for many years and many substances comprising nanometre scale particles have been in use for decades e.g. Carbon black, Titanium dioxide, Zinc oxide, Bentonite, Aluminum silicate, Iron oxides, Silicon dioxide, Diatomaceous earth, Kaolin, Talc, Montmorillonite, Magnesium oxide, Copper sulphate.

These existing approval frameworks almost universally use the best available science to assess safety and do not approve substances or products with an unacceptable risk benefit profile. One proposal is to simply treat particle size as one of the several parameters defining a substance to be approved, rather than creating special rules for all particles of a given size regardless of type. A major argument against special regulation of nanotechnology is that the projected applications with the greatest impact are far in the future, and it is unclear how to regulate technologies whose feasibility is speculative at this point. In the meantime, it has been argued that the immediate applications of nanomaterials raise challenges not much different from those of introducing any other new material, and can be dealt with by minor tweaks to existing regulatory schemes rather than sweeping regulation of entire scientific fields.

A truly precautionary approach to regulation could severely impede development in the field of nanotechnology safety studies are required for each and every nanoscience application. While the outcome of these studies can form the basis for government and international regulations, a more reasonable approach might be development of a risk matrix that identifies likely culprits.

Response from governments

United Kingdom

In its seminal 2004 report Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies: Opportunities and Uncertainties, the United Kingdom's Royal Society concluded that:

Many nanotechnologies pose no new risks to health and almost all the concerns relate to the potential impacts of deliberately manufactured nanoparticles and nanotubes that are free rather than fixed to or within a material... We expect the likelihood of nanoparticles or nanotubes being released from products in which they have been fixed or embedded (such as composites) to be low but have recommended that manufacturers assess this potential exposure risk for the lifecycle of the product and make their findings available to the relevant regulatory bodies... It is very unlikely that new manufactured nanoparticles could be introduced into humans in doses sufficient to cause the health effects that have been associated with [normal air pollution].

but have recommended that nanomaterials be regulated as new chemicals, that research laboratories and factories treat nanomaterials "as if they were hazardous", that release of nanomaterials into the environment be avoided as far as possible, and that products containing nanomaterials be subject to new safety testing requirements prior to their commercial release.

The 2004 report by the UK Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineers noted that existing UK regulations did not require additional testing when existing substances were produced in nanoparticulate form. The Royal Society recommended that such regulations were revised so that “chemicals produced in the form of nanoparticles and nanotubes be treated as new chemicals under these regulatory frameworks” (p.xi). They also recommended that existing regulation be modified on a precautionary basis because they expect that “the toxicity of chemicals in the form of free nanoparticles and nanotubes cannot be predicted from their toxicity in a larger form and... in some cases they will be more toxic than the same mass of the same chemical in larger form.”

The Better Regulation Commission's earlier 2003 report had recommended that the UK Government:

  1. enable, through an informed debate, the public to consider the risks for themselves, and help them to make their own decisions by providing suitable information;
  2. be open about how it makes decisions, and acknowledge where there are uncertainties;
  3. communicate with, and involve as far as possible, the public in the decision making process;
  4. ensure it develops two-way communication channels; and
  5. take a strong lead over the handling of any risk issues, particularly information provision and policy implementation.

These recommendations were accepted in principle by the UK Government. Noting that there was “no obvious focus for an informed public debate of the type suggested by the Task Force”, the UK government's response was to accept the recommendations.

The Royal Society's 2004 report identified two distinct governance issues:

  1. the “role and behaviour of institutions” and their ability to “minimise unintended consequences” through adequate regulation and
  2. the extent to which the public can trust and play a role in determining the trajectories that nanotechnologies may follow as they develop.

United States

Rather than adopt a new nano-specific regulatory framework, the United States' Food and Drug Administration (FDA) convenes an 'interest group' each quarter with representatives of FDA centers that have responsibility for assessment and regulation of different substances and products. This interest group ensures coordination and communication.[32] A September 2009 FDA document called for identifying sources of nanomaterials, how they move in the environment, the problems they might cause for people, animals and plants, and how these problems could be avoided or mitigated.

The Bush administration in 2007 decided that no special regulations or labeling of nanoparticles were required. Critics derided this as treating consumers like a "guinea pig" without sufficient notice due to lack of labelling.

Berkeley, CA is currently the only city in the United States to regulate nanotechnology. Cambridge, MA in 2008 considered enacting a similar law, but the committee it instituted to study the issue Cambridge recommended against regulation in its final report, recommending instead other steps to facilitate information-gathering about potential effects of nanomaterials.

On December 10, 2008 the U.S. National Research Council released a report calling for more regulation of nanotechnology.

California

Assembly Bill (AB) 289 (2006) authorizes the Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) within the California Environmental Protection Agency and other agencies to request information on environmental and health impacts from chemical manufacturers and importers, including testing techniques.

California

In October 2008, the Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC), within the California Environmental Protection Agency, announced its intent to request information regarding analytical test methods, fate and transport in the environment, and other relevant information from manufacturers of carbon nanotubes. DTSC is exercising its authority under the California Health and Safety Code, Chapter 699, sections 57018-57020. These sections were added as a result of the adoption of Assembly Bill AB 289 (2006). They are intended to make information on the fate and transport, detection and analysis, and other information on chemicals more available. The law places the responsibility to provide this information to the Department on those who manufacture or import the chemicals.

On January 22, 2009, a formal information request letter was sent to manufacturers who produce or import carbon nanotubes in California, or who may export carbon nanotubes into the State. This letter constitutes the first formal implementation of the authorities placed into statute by AB 289 and is directed to manufacturers of carbon nanotubes, both industry and academia within the State, and to manufacturers outside California who export carbon nanotubes to California. This request for information must be met by the manufacturers within one year. DTSC is waiting for the upcoming January 22, 2010 deadline for responses to the data call-in.

The California Nano Industry Network and DTSC hosted a full-day symposium on November 16, 2009 in Sacramento, CA. This symposium provided an opportunity to hear from nanotechnology industry experts and discuss future regulatory considerations in California.

On December 21, 2010, the Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) initiated the second Chemical Information Call-in for six nanomaterials: nano cerium oxide, nano silver, nano titanium dioxide, nano zero valent iron, nano zinc oxide, and quantum dots. DTSC sent a formal information request letter to forty manufacturers who produce or import the six nanomaterials in California, or who may export them into the State. The Chemical Information Call-in is meant to identify information gaps of these six nanomaterials and to develop further knowledge of their analytical test methods, fate and transport in the environment, and other relevant information under California Health and Safety Code, Chapter 699, sections 57018-57020. DTSC completed the carbon nanotube information call-in in June 2010.

DTSC partners with University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Santa Barbara (UCSB), and Riverside (UCR), University of Southern California (USC), Stanford University, Center for Environmental Implications of Nanotechnology (CEIN), and The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) on safe nanomaterial handling practices.

DTSC is interested in expanding the Chemical Information Call-in to members of the brominated flame retardants, members of the methyl siloxanes, ocean plastics, nano-clay, and other emerging chemicals.

European Union

The European Union has formed a group to study the implications of nanotechnology called the Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks which has published a list of risks associated with nanoparticles.

Consequently, manufacturers and importers of carbon products, including carbon nano-tubes will have to submit full health and safety data within a year or so in order to comply with REACH.

A number of European member states have called for the creation of either national or European nanomaterials registries. France, Belgium, Sweden, and Denmark have established national registries of nanomaterials. In addition, the European Commission requested the Europeach Chemicals Agency (ECHA) to create a European Union Observatory for Nanomaterials (EUON) that aims at collecting publicly available information on the safety and markets of nanomaterials and nanotechnology.

Response from advocacy groups

In January 2008, a coalition of over 40 civil society groups endorsed a statement of principles calling for precautionary action related to nanotechnology. The coalition called for strong, comprehensive oversight of the new technology and its products in the International Center for Technology Assessment's report Principles for the Oversight of Nanotechnologies and Nano materials, which states:

Hundreds of consumer products incorporating nano-materials are now on the market, including cosmetics, sunscreens, sporting goods, clothing, electronics, baby and infant products, and food and food packaging. But evidence indicates that current nano-materials may pose significant health, safety, and environmental hazards. In addition, the profound social, economic, and ethical challenges posed by nano-scale technologies have yet to be addressed ... 'Since there is currently no government oversight and no labeling requirements for nano-products anywhere in the world, no one knows when they are exposed to potential nano-tech risks and no one is monitoring for potential health or environmental harm. That's why we believe oversight action based on our principles is urgent' ... This industrial boom is creating a growing nano-workforce which is predicted to reach two million globally by 2015. 'Even though potential health hazards stemming from exposure have been clearly identified, there are no mandatory workplace measures that require exposures to be assessed, workers to be trained, or control measures to be implemented,' explained Bill Kojola of the AFL-CIO. 'This technology should not be rushed to market until these failings are corrected and workers assured of their safety'" also.

The group has urged action based on eight principles. They are (1) A Precautionary Foundation (2) Mandatory Nano-specific Regulations (3) Health and Safety of the Public and Workers (4) Environmental Protection (5) Transparency (6) Public Participation (7) Inclusion of Broader Impacts and (8) Manufacturer Liability.

Some NGOs, including Friends of the Earth, are calling for the formation of a separate nanotechnology specific regulatory framework for the regulation of nanotechnology. In Australia, Friends of the Earth propose the establishment of a Nanotechnology Regulatory Coordination Agency, overseen by a Foresight and Technology Assessment Board. The advantage of this arrangement is that it could ensure a centralized body of experts that are able to provide oversight across the range of nano-products and sectors. It is also argued that a centralized regulatory approach would simplify the regulatory environment, thereby supporting industry innovation. A National Nanotechnology Regulator could coordinate existing regulations related to nanotechnology (including intellectual property, civil liberties, product safety, occupation health and safety, environmental and international law). Regulatory mechanisms could vary from "hard law at one extreme through licensing and codes of practice to 'soft' self-regulation and negotiation in order to influence behavior." The formation of national nanotechnology regulatory bodies may also assist in establishing global regulatory frameworks.

In early 2008, The UK's largest organic certifier, the Soil Association, announced that its organic standard would exclude nanotechnology, recognizing the associated human and environmental health and safety risks. Certified organic standards in Australia exclude engineered nanoparticles. It appears likely that other organic certifiers will also follow suit. The Soil Association was also the first to declare organic standards free from genetic engineering.

Technical aspects

Size

Regulation of nanotechnology will require a definition of the size, in which particles and processes are recognized as operating at the nano-scale. The size-defining characteristic of nanotechnology is the subject of significant debate, and varies to include particles and materials in the scale of at least 100 to 300 nanometers (nm). Friends of the Earth Australia recommend defining nano-particles up to 300 nanometers (nm) in size. They argue that "particles up to a few hundred nanometers in size share many of the novel biological behaviors of nano-particles, including novel toxicity risks", and that "nano-materials up to approximately 300 nm in size can be taken up by individual cells". The UK Soil Association define nanotechnology to include manufactured nano-particles where the mean particle size is 200 nm or smaller. The U.S. National Nanotechnology Initiative defines nanotechnology as “the understanding and control of matter at dimensions of roughly 1 to 100 nm.

Mass thresholds

Regulatory frameworks for chemicals tend to be triggered by mass thresholds. This is certainly the case for the management of toxic chemicals in Australia through the National pollutant inventory. However, in the case of nanotechnology, nano-particle applications are unlikely to exceed these thresholds (tonnes/kilograms) due to the size and weight of nano-particles. As such, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars questions the usefulness of regulating nanotechnologies on the basis of their size/weight alone. They argue, for example, that the toxicity of nano-participles is more related to surface area than weight, and that emerging regulations should also take account of such factors.

Smart power

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In international relations, the term smart power refers to the combination of hard power and soft power strategies. It is defined by the Center for Strategic and International Studies as "an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions of all levels to expand one's influence and establish legitimacy of one's action." 

Joseph Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs under the Clinton administration and author of several books on smart power strategy, suggests that the most effective strategies in foreign policy today require a mix of hard and soft power resources. Employing only hard power or only soft power in a given situation will usually prove inadequate. Nye utilizes the example of terrorism, arguing that combatting terrorism demands smart power strategy. He advises that simply utilizing soft power resources to change the hearts and minds of the Taliban government would be ineffective and requires a hard power component. In developing relationships with the mainstream Muslim world, however, soft power resources are necessary and the use of hard power would have damaging effects.

According to Chester A. Crocker, smart power "involves the strategic use of diplomacy, persuasion, capacity building, and the projection of power and influence in ways that are cost-effective and have political and social legitimacy" – essentially the engagement of both military force and all forms of diplomacy.

Origin

Joseph Nye's book describing the concept of "soft power"

The origin of the term "smart power" is under debate and has been attributed to both Suzanne Nossel and Joseph Nye.

Suzanne Nossel, Deputy to Ambassador Holbrooke at the United Nations during the Clinton administration, is credited with coining the term in an article in Foreign Affairs entitled, "Smart Power: Reclaiming Liberal Internationalism", in 2004. In a more recent article for CNN, she has criticized the Trump administration for its "tunnel-vision" foreign policy that neglects both soft power and smart power. She writes: "..Trump seems oblivious toward the brand value of what Joseph Nye has called the 'soft power' that comes from projecting appealing aspects of American society and character abroad. He is also indifferent to my own concept of 'smart power,'or the imperative to engage a broad range of tools of statecraft, from diplomacy to aid to private sector engagement to military intervention."

Joseph Nye, however, claims that smart power is a term he introduced in 2003 "to counter the misperception that soft power alone can produce effective foreign policy." He created the term to name an alternative to the hard power-driven foreign policy of the Bush administration. Nye notes that smart power strategy denotes the ability to combine hard and soft power depending on whether hard or soft power would be more effective in a given situation. He states that many situations require soft power; however, in stopping North Korea's nuclear weapons program, for instance, hard power might be more effective than soft power. In the words of the Financial Times, "to win the peace, therefore, the US will have to show as much skill in exercising soft power as it has in using hard power to win the war." Smart power addresses multilateralism and enhances foreign policy.

A successful smart power narrative for the United States in the twenty-first century, Nye argues, will not obsess over power maximization or the preservation of hegemony. Rather, it will find "ways to combine resources into successful strategies in the new context of power diffusion and the 'rise of the rest.'" A successful smart power strategy will provide answers to the following questions: 1) What goals or outcomes are preferred? 2) What resources are available and in which contexts? 3) What are the positions and preferences of the targets of attempts at influence? 4) Which forms of power behavior are most likely to succeed? 5) What is the probability of success?

History

United Kingdom

Since the period of Pax Britannica (1815–1914) the foreign relations of the United Kingdom has employed a combination of influence and coercion in international relations.

United States

The term smart power emerged in the past decade, but the concept of smart power has much earlier roots in the history of the United States and is a popular notion in international relations today.

1901
President Theodore Roosevelt proclaims: "Speak softly and carry a big stick."
1948
The United States initiates major peacetime soft power programs under the authority of the Smith-Mundt Act, including broadcasting, exchange and information world wide to combat the outreach of the Soviet Union.
1991
The end of the Cold War was marked by the collapse of the Berlin Wall, which fell as a result of a combination of hard and soft power. Throughout the Cold War, hard power was used to deter Soviet aggression and soft power was used to erode faith in Communism. Joseph Nye said: "When the Berlin Wall finally collapsed, it was destroyed not by artillery barrage but by hammers and bulldozers wielded by those who had lost faith in communism."
2004
Joseph S. Nye introduces the term "smart power" in his book, "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics". "Smart power is neither hard nor soft. It is both," he writes. In an article in "Foreign Affairs", analyst Suzanne Nossel uses the term "smart power". For Nossel, "Smart power means knowing that the United States' own hand is not always its best tool: U.S. interests are furthered by enlisting others on behalf of U.S. goals."
2007
In light of 9/11 and the war in Iraq, the Bush administration was criticized for placing too much emphasis on a hard power strategy. To counter this hard power strategy, the Center for Strategic and International Studies released the "Commission on Smart Power" to introduce the concept of smart power into discussion on which principles should guide the future of U.S. foreign policy in light of 9/11 and the war in Iraq. The report identifies five critical areas of focus for the U.S.: Alliances, Global Development, Public Diplomacy, Economic Integration, and Technology and Innovation. According to the report, these five goals constitute smart foreign policy and will help the United States achieve the goal of "American preeminence as an agent of good."
2009
The Center for Strategic and International Studies, released a second report, "Investing in a New Multilateralism", to address the concept of smart power in international releases. This report addressed the United Nations as an instrument of U.S. smart power. By collaborating with the UN, the U.S. can lead the way in reinvigorating multilateralism within the international community in the 21st century.
2009
Under the Obama administration, smart power became a core principle of his foreign policy strategy. It was popularized by Hillary Clinton during her Senate confirmation hearing on January 13, 2009 for the position of Secretary of State:

We must use what has been called smart power---the full range of tools at our disposal---diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural---picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy.

Both Suzanne Nossel and Joseph Nye were supportive of Clinton's encouragement of smart power, since it would popularize the use of smart power in U.S. foreign policy. That popularization has been accompanied by more frequent use of the term, and David Ignatius describes it as an "overused and vapid phrase meant to connote the kind of power between hard and soft".
2010
The "First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR)" entitled, "Leading through Civilian Power", called for the implementation of a smart power strategy through civilian leadership.
2011
Obama's "2011 May Speech on the Middle East and North Africa" called for a smart power strategy, incorporating development, in addition to defense and diplomacy, as the third pillar of his foreign policy doctrine.

Contemporary application

United Kingdom

The UK government Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 was based on a combination of hard power and soft power strategies. Following the Poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in 2018, the National Security Review described a "fusion doctrine", that will combine resources from British intelligence agencies, the British Armed Forces, foreign relations and economic considerations to defeat the UK's enemies.

United States

In recent years, some scholars have sought to differentiate smart power further from soft power, while also including military posture and other tools of statecraft as part of a broad smart power philosophy. Christian Whiton, a State Department official during the George W. Bush administration, recalled U.S. political influence activities from the Cold War, including CIA-backed programs like the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and called for adapting these to contemporary challenges to the U.S. posed by China, Iran, and Islamists.

Challenges in the application of smart power

According to "Dealing with Today's Asymmetric Threat to U.S. and Global Security", a symposium sponsored by CACI, an effective smart power strategy faces multiple challenges in transitioning from smart power as a theory to smart power in practice. Applying smart power today requires great difficulty, since it operates in an environment of asymmetric threats, ranging from cybersecurity to terrorism. These threats exist in a dynamic international environment, adding yet another challenge to the application of smart power strategy. In order to effectively address asymmetric threats arising in a dynamic international environment, the symposium suggests addressing the following factors: rule of law, organizational roadblocks, financing smart power, and strategic communications.

Rule of law

In order to implement smart power approaches on both a domestic and international level, the United States must develop a legal framework for the use of smart power capabilities. Developing a legal foundation for smart power, however, demands a clear concept of these asymmetric threats, which is often difficult. The cyber domain, for instance, presents an extremely nebulous concept. Hence, the challenge will be conceptualizing asymmetric threats before formulating a legal framework.

Organizational roadblocks

The inability to promote smart power approaches because of organizational failures within agencies presents another obstacle to successful smart power implementation. Agencies often lack either the appropriate authority or resources to employ smart power. The only way to give smart power long-term sustainability is to address these organizational failures and promote the coordination and accessibility of hard and soft power resources.

Financing smart power

With the ongoing financial crisis, the dire need for financial resources presents a critical obstacle to the implementation of smart power. According to Secretary Gates, 'there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security---diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development." In order to successfully implement smart power, the U.S. budget needs to be rebalanced so that non-military foreign affairs programs receive more funding. Sacrificing defense spending will, however, be met with stalwart resistance.

Strategic communications

"Asymmetries of perception," according to the report, are a major obstacle to strategic communications. A long-term smart power strategy will mitigate negative perceptions by discussing the nature of these threats and making a case for action using smart power strategy. The report states that the central theme of our strategic communications campaign should be education of our nation in our values as a democratic nation and in the nature of the threats our nation faces today.

United Nations as an instrument of smart power

Of all the tools at the disposal of smart power strategists in the United States, experts suggest that the U.N. is the most critical. The Center for Strategic and International Studies issued a report, Investing in a New Multilateralism, in January 2009 to outline the role of the United Nations as an instrument of U.S. smart power strategy. The report suggests that in an increasingly multipolar world, the UN cannot be discarded as outdated and must be regarded as an essential tool to thinking strategically about the new multilateralism that our nation faces. An effective smart power strategy will align the interests of the U.S. and the UN, thereby effectively addressing threats to peace and security, climate change, global health, and humanitarian operations.

Global perspectives on smart power

U.S.-China relations

As announced by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in November 2011, the United States will begin to shift its attention to the Asia-Pacific region, making the strategic relationship between the U.S. and China of supreme importance in determining the future of international affairs in the region. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, in "Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations," offers recommendations for building a cooperative strategic relationship between the U.S. and China through smart power strategy. Rather than relying on unilateral action, the U.S. and China should combine their smart power resources to promote the global good and enhance the peace and security of the region. The report recommends the following policy objectives: implement an aggressive engagement agenda, launch an action agenda on energy and climate, and institute a new dialogue on finance and economics. Overall, the report suggests that U.S.-Sino relations should be pursued without the black-and-white view of China as either benign or hostile, but rather, as a partner necessary in serving the interests of the U.S. and the region while promoting the global good.

U.S-Turkish Relations

The Obama administration continually stresses the importance of smart power strategy in relations with the Middle East and especially Turkey due to its increasing leadership role as a regional soft power. As not only an Islamic democratic nation but also the only Muslim member of NATO, Turkey's leverage in the region could inspire other nations to follow in its footsteps. By establishing a cooperative relationship with Turkey and working to clarify misunderstandings through smart power, Turkey could eventually become the bridge between the East and the West. A smart power approach to U.S.-Turkish relations will expand the leadership role of Turkey in the region and increases its strategic importance to NATO.

Debate surrounding smart power

Transformational diplomacy versus smart power strategy

Condoleezza Rice, Bush's Secretary of State, coined the term "Transformational Diplomacy" to denote Bush's policy to promote democracy through a hard power driven strategy. "Transformational diplomacy" stands at odds with "smart power," which utilizes hard and soft power resources based on the situation. The Obama administration's foreign policy was based on smart power strategy, attempting to strike a balance between defense and diplomacy.

Smart power as an instrument of American imperialism

In an interview with the Boston Globe, interviewer Anna Mundow, questioned Joseph Nye over the criticism that smart power is the friendly face of American imperialism. By the same token, the Bush doctrine has also been criticized for being "imperialistic," by focusing on American power over partnerships with the rest of the world. Joseph Nye defends smart power by noting that criticism often stems from a misunderstanding of the smart power theory. Nye himself designed the theory to apply to any nation of any size, not just the United States. It was meant to be a more sophisticated method of thinking about power in the context of the information age and post-9/11 world.19 President Obama defined his vision for U.S. leadership as "not in the spirit of a patron but the spirit of a partner."

Ineffective use of smart power

Ken Adelman, in an article entitled "Not-So-Smart Power," argues that there is no correlation between U.S. aid and the ability of America to positively influence events abroad. He points out that the nations who receive the most foreign aid, such as Egypt and Pakistan, are no more in tune with American values than those who receive less or no U.S. foreign aid. Overall, he criticizes the instruments of smart power, such as foreign aid and exchange programs, for being ineffective in achieving American national interests.

Questioning old institutions and alliances

In the application of smart power in U.S. strategy, Ted Galen Carpenter, author of the work Smart Power', criticizes U.S. foreign policy for failing to question outdated alliances, such as NATO. Carpenter articulated his disapproval of interventionist foreign policy, saying, "America does not need to be — and should not aspire to be — a combination global policeman and global social worker." Rather than utilizing antiquated institutions, the U.S. should rethink certain alliances in arriving at a new vision for the future of American foreign policy. Carpenter fears that America's domestic interests will be sacrificed in favor of global interests through smart power. Essentially, interventionist foreign policies advocated by U.S. smart power strategies undercut domestic liberties.

Brezhnev Doctrine

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Eastern Bloc: the USSR and its satellite states

The Brezhnev Doctrine was a Soviet foreign policy that proclaimed that any threat to "socialist rule" in any state of the Soviet Bloc in Central and Eastern Europe was a threat to all of them, and therefore, it justified the intervention of fellow socialist states. It was proclaimed in order to justify the Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia earlier in 1968, with the overthrow of the reformist government there. The references to "socialism" meant control by the communist parties which were loyal to the Kremlin. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev repudiated the doctrine in the late 1980s, as the Kremlin accepted the peaceful overthrow of Soviet rule in all its satellite countries in Eastern Europe.

The policy was first and most clearly outlined by Sergei Kovalev in a September 26, 1968 Pravda article entitled "Sovereignty and the International Obligations of Socialist Countries". Leonid Brezhnev reiterated it in a speech at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party on November 13, 1968, which stated: "When forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of some socialist country towards capitalism, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries."

This doctrine was announced to retroactively justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 that ended the Prague Spring, along with earlier Soviet military interventions, such as the invasion of Hungary in 1956. These interventions were meant to put an end to liberalization efforts and uprisings that had the potential to compromise Soviet hegemony inside the Soviet Bloc, which was considered by the Soviet Union to be an essential and defensive and strategic buffer in case hostilities with NATO were to break out.

In practice, the policy meant that only limited independence of the satellite states' communist parties was allowed and that none would be allowed to compromise the cohesiveness of the Eastern Bloc in any way. That is, no country could leave the Warsaw Pact or disturb a ruling communist party's monopoly on power. Implicit in this doctrine was that the leadership of the Soviet Union reserved, for itself, the power to define "socialism" and "capitalism". Following the announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine, numerous treaties were signed between the Soviet Union and its satellite states to reassert these points and to further ensure inter-state cooperation. The principles of the doctrine were so broad that the Soviets even used it to justify their military intervention in the communist (but non-Warsaw Pact) nation of Afghanistan in 1979. The Brezhnev Doctrine stayed in effect until it was ended with the Soviet reaction to the Polish crisis of 1980–1981.

Mikhail Gorbachev refused to use military force when Poland held free elections in 1989 and Solidarity defeated the Polish United Workers' Party. It was superseded by the facetiously named Sinatra Doctrine in 1989, alluding to the Frank Sinatra song "My Way". The refusal to intervene in the emancipation of the Eastern European satellite states and the Pan-European Picnic then led to the fall of the Iron Curtain and the largely peaceful collapse of the Eastern Bloc.

Origins

1956 Hungarian Revolution and Soviet invasion

The period between 1953 and 1968 was saturated with dissidence and reformation within the Soviet satellite states. 1953 saw the death of Soviet Leader Joseph Stalin, followed closely by Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 "Secret Speech" denouncing Stalin. This denouncement of the former leader led to a period of the Soviet Era known commonly as "De-Stalinization." Under the blanket reforms of this process, Imre Nagy came to power in Hungary as the new Prime Minister, taking over for Mátyás Rákosi. Almost immediately Nagy set out on a path of reform. Police power was reduced, collectivized farms were split up and being returned to individual peasants, industry and food production shifted and religious tolerance was becoming more prominent. These reforms shocked the Hungarian Communist Party. Nagy was quickly overthrown by Rákosi in 1955, and stripped of his political livelihood. Shortly after this coup, Khrushchev signed the Belgrade Declaration which stated "separate paths to socialism were permissible within the Soviet Bloc." With hopes for serious reform just having been extinguished in Hungary, this declaration was not received well by the Hungarians. Tensions quickly mounted in Hungary with demonstrations and calls for not only the withdrawal of Soviet troops, but for a Hungarian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact as well. By October 23 Soviet forces landed in Budapest. A chaotic and bloody suppression of revolutionary forces lasted from October 24 until November 7, ending with thousands of Hungarians murdered and many more fleeing the country. Although order was restored, tensions remained on both sides of the conflict. Hungarians resented the end of the reformation, and the Soviets wanted to avoid a similar crisis from occurring again anywhere in the Soviet Bloc.

A peaceful Brezhnev Doctrine

When the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was suppressed, the Soviets adopted the mindset that governments supporting both communism and capitalism must coexist, and more importantly, build relations. This idea stressed that all people are equal, and own the right to solve the problems of their own countries themselves, and that in order for both states to peacefully coexist, neither country can exercise the right to get involved in each other's internal affairs. While this idea was brought up following the events of Hungary, they were not put into effect for a great deal of time. This is further explained in the Renunciation section.

1968 Prague Spring

Notions of reform had been slowly growing in Czechoslovakia since the early-mid 1960s. However, once the Stalinist President Antonín Novotný resigned as head of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in January 1968, the Prague Spring began to take shape. Alexander Dubček replaced Novotný as head of the party, initially thought a friend to the Soviet Union. It was not long before Dubček began making serious liberal reforms. In an effort to establish what Dubček called "developed socialism", he instituted changes in Czechoslovakia to create a much more free and liberal version of the socialist state. Aspects of a market economy were implemented, travel restrictions were eased for citizens, state censorship loosened, the power of the secret police was limited, and steps were taken to improve relations with the west. As the reforms piled up, the Kremlin quickly grew uneasy as they hoped to not only preserve their power within Czechoslovakia, but to avoid another Hungarian-style revolution as well. Soviet panic compounded in March 1968 when student protests erupted in Poland and Antonín Novotný resigned as the Czechoslovak President. On March 21, Yuri Andropov, the KGB Chairman, issued a grave statement concerning the reforms taking place under Dubček. "The methods and forms by which the work is progressing in Czechoslovakia remind one very much of Hungary. In this outward appearance of chaos…there is a certain order. It all began like this in Hungary also, but then came the first and second echelons, and then, finally the social democrats."

Leonid Brezhnev sought clarification from Dubček on March 21, with the Politburo convened, on the situation in Czechoslovakia. Eager to avoid a similar fate as Imre Nagy, Dubček reassured Brezhnev that the reforms were totally under control and not on a similar path to those seen in 1956 in Hungary. Despite Dubček's assurances, other Soviet allies grew uneasy by the reforms taking place in an Eastern European neighbor. The First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party (banned after the restoration of Ukrainian independence in 1991) called on Moscow for an immediate invasion of Czechoslovakia in order to stop Dubček's "socialism with a human face" from spreading into the Ukrainian SSR and sparking unrest. By May 6, Brezhnev condemned Dubček's system, declaring it a step toward "the complete collapse of the Warsaw Pact." After three months of negotiations, agreements, and rising tensions between Moscow and Czechoslovakia, the Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion began on the night of August 20, 1968, which was to be met with great Czechoslovak discontent and resistance for many months into 1970.

Formation of the Doctrine

Brezhnev realized the need for a shift from Nikita Khrushchev's idea of "different paths to socialism" towards one that fostered a more unified vision throughout the socialist camp. "Economic integration, political consolidation, a return to ideological orthodoxy, and inter-Party cooperation became the new watchwords of Soviet bloc relations." On November 12, 1968, Brezhnev stated that "[w]hen external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist country in the direction of … the capitalist system ... this is no longer merely a problem for that country's people, but a common problem, the concern of all socialist countries." Brezhnev's statement at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers Party effectively classified the issue of sovereignty as less important than the preservation of Soviet-style socialism. While no new doctrine had been officially announced, it was clear that Soviet intervention was imminent if Moscow perceived any satellite to be at risk of jeopardizing the Soviet hegemony.

Brezhnev Doctrine in practice

The vague, broad nature of the Brezhnev Doctrine allowed application to any international situation the USSR saw fit. This is clearly evident not only through the Prague Spring in 1968, and the indirect pressure on Poland from 1980 to 1981, but also in the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan starting in the 1970s. Any instance which caused the USSR to question whether or not a country was becoming a "risk to international socialism", the use of military intervention was, in Soviet eyes, not only justified, but necessary.

Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979

The Soviet government's desire to link its foreign policy to the Brezhnev Doctrine was evoked again when it ordered a military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. This was perhaps the last chapter of this doctrine's saga.

In April 1978, a coup in Kabul brought the Afghan Communist Party to power with Nur Muhammad Taraki being installed as the second president of Afghanistan. The previous president, Mohammed Daoud Khan was killed during the coup. The Saur Revolution (as the coup was known) took Moscow by surprise, who preferred that the pro-Soviet Daoud Khan stay in power. The previous regime had maintained a pro-Soviet foreign policy as Daoud Khan was a Pashtun who rejected the Durand Line as the frontier with Pakistan. The Afghan Communist Party was divided into a factional struggle between factions known as the Khalq and Parcham. The Parcham was the more moderate of the two factions, arguing that Afghanistan was not ready for socialism, requiring more gradual process while the ultra-Communist Khalq favored a more radical approach. The Khalq faction was victorious and the leader of the Pacham faction Babrak Karmal fled to Moscow in fear of his life, to take up the position as Afghan ambassador in Moscow.

Islamic fundamentalists took issue with the Communist party in power. As a result, a jihad was proclaimed against the Communist government. Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders falsely portrayed the United States as the one behind the jihad in Afghanistan, and the rebellion in Afghanistan was seen in Moscow not so much in the context of Afghan politics with an unpopular government pursuing policies that much of the population rejected (such as the collectivisation of agriculture), but rather in the context of the Cold War, being seen as the first stage of an alleged American plot to instigate a jihad in Soviet Central Asia where the majority of the population was Muslim. To assist the government, the Soviet Union drastically increased its military aid to Afghanistan while sending Soviet advisers to train the Afghan military.

Following a split in the Communist Party, the leader of the Khalq faction, Hafizullah Amin, overthrew President Nur Muhammad Taraki and had him murdered on 8 October 1979. Soviet diplomats in Kabul had a low opinion of Taraki's ability to handle the rebellion, and an even lower one of Amin, who was regarded as a fanatic, but incompetent leader who lost control of the situation. In the fall of 1979, the leaders who pressed the most strongly for an invasion of Afghanistan to replace the incompetent Amin with Karmal, who was the man better able to preserve the communist regime's existence, were the Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the Chairman of KGB, Yuri Andropov and the Defense Minister Marshal Dmitry Ustinov. The intervention was envisioned in Moscow was merely a short conflict to stabilize the situation and allow the Communist regime to regain power. Brezhnev was indecisive, fearing that an occupation of Afghanistan might not be the short war that Gromyko, Ustinov and Andropov kept insisting it would be, but was fearful of the possibility of an Islamic fundamentalist regime being established that would export Islam into Soviet Central Asia. As it was, the inability and unwillingness of much of the Soviet-controlled Afghan Army to fight led the Soviets to involve themselves in Afghanistan for almost 10 years. Ironically, despite what was being feared in Moscow, the United States was not supporting the Islamic fundamentalist rebellion in Afghanistan, and only started to support the mujahideen ("warriors of Allah") with weapons after the Soviet invasion, concentrating foreign policy matters in the form of linkage towards preventing Soviet expansion.

During his talks with the Soviets during his time as Ambassador, Karmal coordinated with the Soviet government to replace Amin. It was this coordination that led to both Soviet soldiers and airborne units organizing a coup against the Amin-led Afghanistan government, during which Amin was assassinated. In his place, the Soviets installed their ally, former-Ambassador Babrak Karmal, as the new lead of the government in Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union, once again, fell back to the Brezhnev Doctrine for rationale, claiming that it was both morally and politically justified. It was also explained by the Soviets that they owed help to their friend and ally Babrak Karmal.

Renunciation

The long lasting struggle of the war in Afghanistan made the Soviets realize that their reach and influence was in fact limited. "[The war in Afghanistan] had shown that socialist internationalism and Soviet national interests were not always compatible." Tensions between the USSR and Czechoslovakia since 1968, as well as Poland in 1980, proved the inefficiencies inherent in the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Solidarity trade union protests in Poland were suppressed without outside intervention, leaving the Brezhnev doctrine effectively dead. Although the Kremlin wanted to preserve communism in its satellites, the decision was not to intervene. Gorbachev's Glasnost and Perestroika finally opened the door for Soviet Bloc countries and republics to make reforms without fear of Soviet intervention. When East Germany desperately asked for Soviet troops to put down growing unrest in 1989, Gorbachev flatly refused.

Post-Brezhnev Doctrine

With the agreement to terminate the Brezhnev Doctrine, later came on a new leader for the Soviets—Mikhail Gorbachev. His views were much more relaxed. This is most likely due to the fact that Brezhnev Doctrine was no longer at the disposal of the Soviet Union. This had a major effect on the way that the Soviets carried out their new mentality when dealing with countries they once tried to control. This was best captured by Gorbachev's involvement with a group by the name of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). This organization lessens the control that the Soviets had on all other partners of the agreement. This notion provided other countries that were once oppressed under communist intervention, to go about their own political reform. This actually carried over internally as well. In fact, the Soviet Union's biggest problem after the removal of the Brezhnev Doctrine, was the Khrushchev Dilemma. This did not address how to stop internal political reform, but how to tame the physical violence that comes along with it. It had become clear that the Soviet Union was beginning to loosen up.

It is possible to pinpoint the renouncement of the Brezhnev Doctrine as to what started the end for the Soviet Union. Countries that were once micromanaged now could do what they wanted to politically, because the Soviets could no longer try to conquer where they saw fit. With that, the Soviet Union began to collapse. While the communist agenda had caused infinite problems for other countries, it was the driving force behind the Soviet Union staying together. After all, it seems that the removal of the incentive to conquer, and forcing of communism upon other nations, defeated the one thing Soviet Russia had always been about, the expansion of Communism.

With the fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine, came the fall of the man, Brezhnev himself, the share of power in the Warsaw Pact, and perhaps the final moment for the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall that had prevented the migration of East Germans to West Germany. The Brezhnev Doctrine coming to a close, was perhaps the beginning of the end for one of the strongest empires in the world's history, the Soviet Union.

In other Communist countries

The Soviet Union was not the only Communist country to intervene militarily in fellow countries. Vietnam deposed the Khmer Rouge in the Cambodian–Vietnamese War of 1978, which was followed by a revenge Chinese invasion of Vietnam in the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979.

Saturday, October 5, 2024

Peasant

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peasant
Young women offer berries to visitors to their izba home, 1909. Those who had been serfs among the Russian peasantry were officially emancipated in 1861. Photograph by Sergey Prokudin-Gorsky.

A peasant is a pre-industrial agricultural laborer or a farmer with limited land-ownership, especially one living in the Middle Ages under feudalism and paying rent, tax, fees, or services to a landlord. In Europe, three classes of peasants existed: non-free slaves, semi-free serfs, and free tenants. Peasants might hold title to land outright (fee simple), or by any of several forms of land tenure, among them socage, quit-rent, leasehold, and copyhold.

In some contexts, "peasant" has a pejorative meaning, even when referring to farm laborers. As early as in 13th-century Germany, the concept of "peasant" could imply "rustic" as well as "robber", as the English term villain/villein. In 21st-century English, the word "peasant" can mean "an ignorant, rude, or unsophisticated person". The word rose to renewed popularity in the 1940s–1960s as a collective term, often referring to rural populations of developing countries in general, as the "semantic successor to 'native', incorporating all its condescending and racial overtones".

The word peasantry is commonly used in a non-pejorative sense as a collective noun for the rural population in the poor and developing countries of the world. Via Campesina, an organization claiming to represent the rights of about 200 million farm-workers around the world, self-defines as an "International Peasant's Movement" as of 2019. The United Nations and its Human Rights Council prominently uses the term "peasant" in a non-pejorative sense, as in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas adopted in 2018. In general English-language literature, the use of the word "peasant" has steadily declined since about 1970.

Etymology

A farm in 1794

The word "peasant" is derived from the 15th-century French word païsant, meaning one from the pays, or countryside; ultimately from the Latin pagus, or outlying administrative district.

Social position

Finnish Savonian farmers at a cottage in early 19th century; by Pehr Hilleström and J. F. Martin

Peasants typically made up the majority of the agricultural labour force in a pre-industrial society. The majority of the people—according to one estimate 85% of the population—in the Middle Ages were peasants.

Though "peasant" is a word of loose application, once a market economy had taken root, the term peasant proprietors was frequently used to describe the traditional rural population in countries where smallholders farmed much of the land. More generally, the word "peasant" is sometimes used to refer pejoratively to those considered to be "lower class", perhaps defined by poorer education and/or a lower income.

Medieval European peasants

The open field system of agriculture dominated most of Europe during medieval times and endured until the nineteenth century in many areas. Under this system, peasants lived on a manor presided over by a lord or a bishop of the church. Peasants paid rent or labor services to the lord in exchange for their right to cultivate the land. Fallowed land, pastures, forests, and wasteland were held in common. The open field system required cooperation among the peasants of the manor. It was gradually replaced by individual ownership and management of land.

The relative position of peasants in Western Europe improved greatly after the Black Death had reduced the population of medieval Europe in the mid-14th century, resulting in more land for the survivors and making labor more scarce. In the wake of this disruption to the established order, it became more productive for many laborers to demand wages and other alternative forms of compensation, which ultimately led to the development of widespread literacy and the enormous social and intellectual changes of the Enlightenment.

The evolution of ideas in an environment of relatively widespread literacy laid the groundwork for the Industrial Revolution, which enabled mechanically and chemically augmented agricultural production while simultaneously increasing the demand for factory workers in cities, who became what Karl Marx called the proletariat. The trend toward individual ownership of land, typified in England by Enclosure, displaced many peasants from the land and compelled them, often unwillingly, to become urban factory-workers, who came to occupy the socio-economic stratum formerly the preserve of the medieval peasants.

This process happened in an especially pronounced and truncated way in Eastern Europe. Lacking any catalysts for change in the 14th century, Eastern European peasants largely continued upon the original medieval path until the 18th and 19th centuries. Serfdom was abolished in Russia in 1861, and while many peasants would remain in areas where their family had farmed for generations, the changes did allow for the buying and selling of lands traditionally held by peasants, and for landless ex-peasants to move to the cities. Even before emancipation in 1861, serfdom was on the wane in Russia. The proportion of serfs within the empire had gradually decreased "from 45–50 percent at the end of the eighteenth century, to 37.7 percent in 1858."

Early modern Germany

"Feiernde Bauern" ("Celebrating Peasants"), artist unknown, 18th or 19th century

In Germany, peasants continued to center their lives in the village well into the 19th century. They belonged to a corporate body and helped to manage the community resources and to monitor community life. In the East they had the status of serfs bound permanently to parcels of land. A peasant is called a "Bauer" in German and "Bur" in Low German (pronounced in English like boor).

In most of Germany, farming was handled by tenant farmers who paid rents and obligatory services to the landlord—typically a nobleman. Peasant leaders supervised the fields and ditches and grazing rights, maintained public order and morals, and supported a village court which handled minor offenses. Inside the family the patriarch made all the decisions, and tried to arrange advantageous marriages for his children. Much of the villages' communal life centered on church services and holy days. In Prussia, the peasants drew lots to choose conscripts required by the army. The noblemen handled external relationships and politics for the villages under their control, and were not typically involved in daily activities or decisions.

France

Information about the complexities of the French Revolution, especially the fast-changing scene in Paris, reached isolated areas through both official announcements and long-established oral networks. Peasants responded differently to different sources of information. The limits on political knowledge in these areas depended more on how much peasants chose to know than on bad roads or illiteracy. Historian Jill Maciak concludes that peasants "were neither subservient, reactionary, nor ignorant."

In his seminal book Peasants into Frenchmen: the Modernization of Rural France, 1880–1914 (1976), historian Eugen Weber traced the modernization of French villages and argued that rural France went from backward and isolated to modern and possessing a sense of French nationhood during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. He emphasized the roles of railroads, republican schools, and universal military conscription. He based his findings on school records, migration patterns, military-service documents and economic trends. Weber argued that until 1900 or so a sense of French nationhood was weak in the provinces. Weber then looked at how the policies of the Third Republic created a sense of French nationality in rural areas. The book was widely praised, but some argued that a sense of Frenchness existed in the provinces before 1870.

Chinese farmers

A Chinese painting depicting an agricultural scene probably during the Ming dynasty
Chinese peasants in Kunming

Farmers in China have been sometimes referred to as "peasants" in English-language sources. However, the traditional term for farmer, nongfu (农夫), simply refers to "farmer" or "agricultural worker". In the 19th century, Japanese intellectuals reinvented the Chinese terms fengjian (封建) for "feudalism" and nongmin (农民), or "farming people", terms used in the description of feudal Japanese society. These terms created a negative image of Chinese farmers by making a class distinction where one had not previously existed. Anthropologist Myron Cohen considers these terms to be neologisms that represented a cultural and political invention. He writes:

This divide represented a radical departure from tradition: F. W. Mote and others have shown how especially during the later imperial era (Ming and Qing dynasties), China was notable for the cultural, social, political, and economic interpenetration of city and countryside. But the term nongmin did enter China in association with Marxist and non-Marxist Western perceptions of the "peasant," thereby putting the full weight of the Western heritage to use in a new and sometimes harshly negative representation of China's rural population. Likewise, with this development Westerners found it all the more "natural" to apply their own historically derived images of the peasant to what they observed or were told in China. The idea of the peasant remains powerfully entrenched in the Western perception of China to this very day.

Modern Western writers often continue to use the term peasant for Chinese farmers, typically without ever defining what the term means. This Western use of the term suggests that China is stagnant, "medieval", underdeveloped, and held back by its rural population. Cohen writes that the "imposition of the historically burdened Western contrasts of town and country, shopkeeper and peasant, or merchant and landlord, serves only to distort the realities of the Chinese economic tradition".

Latin American farmers

In Latin America, the term "peasant" is translated to "Campesino" (from campo—country person), but the meaning has changed over time. While most Campesinos before the 20th century were in equivalent status to peasants—they usually did not own land and had to make payments to or were in an employment position towards a landlord (the hacienda system), most Latin American countries saw one or more extensive land reforms in the 20th century. The land reforms of Latin America were more comprehensive initiatives that redistributed lands from large landholders to former peasants—farm workers and tenant farmers. Hence, many Campesinos in Latin America today are closer smallholders who own their land and do not pay rent to a landlord, rather than peasants who do not own land.

The Catholic Bishops of Paraguay have asserted that "Every campesino has a natural right to possess a reasonable allotment of land where he can establish his home, work for [the] subsistence of his family and a secure life".

Historiography

Portrait sculpture of 18th-century French peasants by artist George S. Stuart, in the permanent collection of the Museum of Ventura County, Ventura, California

In medieval Europe society was theorized as being organized into three estates: those who work, those who pray, and those who fight. The Annales School of 20th-century French historians emphasized the importance of peasants. Its leader Fernand Braudel devoted the first volume—called The Structures of Everyday Life—of his major work, Civilization and Capitalism 15th–18th Century to the largely silent and invisible world that existed below the market economy.

Other research in the field of peasant studies was promoted by Florian Znaniecki and Fei Xiaotong, and in the post-1945 studies of the "great tradition" and the "little tradition" in the work of Robert Redfield. In the 1960s, anthropologists and historians began to rethink the role of peasant revolt in world history and in their own disciplines. Peasant revolution was seen as a Third World response to capitalism and imperialism.

The anthropologist Eric Wolf, for instance, drew on the work of earlier scholars in the Marxist tradition such as Daniel Thorner, who saw the rural population as a key element in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Wolf and a group of scholars criticized both Marx and the field of Modernization theorists for treating peasants as lacking the ability to take action. James C. Scott's field observations in Malaysia convinced him that villagers were active participants in their local politics even though they were forced to use indirect methods. Many of these activist scholars looked back to the peasant movement in India and to the theories of the revolution in China led by Mao Zedong starting in the 1920s. The anthropologist Myron Cohen, however, asked why the rural population in China were called "peasants" rather than "farmers", a distinction he called political rather than scientific. One important outlet for their scholarly work and theory was The Journal of Peasant Studies.

Nanotoxicology

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanotoxicology Nanonotoxicology is th...