Welfare economics is a field of economics that applies microeconomic techniques to evaluate the overall well-being (welfare) of a society.
The principles of welfare economics are often used to inform public economics, which focuses on the ways in which government intervention can improve social welfare. Additionally, welfare economics serves as the theoretical foundation for several instruments of public economics, such as cost–benefit analysis. The intersection of welfare economics and behavioral economics has given rise to the subfield of behavioral welfare economics.
Two fundamental theorems are associated with welfare economics. The first states that competitive markets, under certain assumptions, lead to Pareto efficient outcomes. This idea is sometimes referred to as Adam Smith's invisible hand.
The second theorem states that with further restrictions, any Pareto
efficient outcome can be achieved through a competitive market
equilibrium,
provided that a social planner uses a social welfare function to choose
the most equitable efficient outcome and then uses lump sum transfers
followed by competitive trade to achieve it. Arrow's impossibility theorem which is closely related social choice theory, is sometimes considered a third fundamental theorem of welfare economics.
Welfare economics typically involves the derivation or assumption of a social welfare function, which can then be used to rank economically feasible allocations of resources based on the social welfare they generate.
History
Until 1951, the objective of welfare economics remained largely
uncontested. Economists viewed welfare economics as the branch of the
discipline concerned with delineating the actions a governing body
should undertake. It was commonly accepted that the term "maximizing
welfare" held a specific meaning rooted in the philosophical framework
of utilitarianism. Within the profession, there was ongoing debate
regarding whether utility was an ordinal or cardinal concept. This
debate seemed to have been addressed by Abram Bergson's
seminal paper in 1938, "A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare
Economics." Bergson demonstrated that economic efficiency conditions
could be precisely formulated without fully specifying the underlying
social welfare function. By postulating W as W(UA, UB) and assuming W to
be a positive function of each individual's utility, it was shown that
maximum welfare occurred when allocative efficiency was achieved, and
the marginal contribution to welfare of each individual was equalized.
But this decision did not last long. In 1951, Kenneth Arrow tested whether rational collective selection rules could derive social welfare
functions from individuals in preference to social states. He argued
that rational law satisfies four conditions: partial universality, the Pareto principle, totalitarianism,
and free will Arrow concluded that there is no rational way to
articulate individual preferences forms together resulting in a
harmonious social status of the various social societies.
Amartya Sen
later emphasized the nature of the sequential gain approach, and
Arrow's theory emphasized it. Sen said collective action often arises in
social decision-making, because Arrow's theory is delivered through the
aggregate of individual preferences rather than the formation of
government or income, especially those that exist because of neutrality,
presented a challenge to reconcile conflicting interests in revenue
sharing. The neutral results, avoiding special utility issues,
restricted the social analyzes to structural utility issues. This
restriction did not exclude important information about an individual’s social status
or position needed to make an income allocation decision. Sen
recommended expanding the scope of data used in welfare research and
emphasized the need for explicit discussion of ethics and morality in
welfare economics.
Utility is cardinal, that is, scale-measurable by observation or judgment,
Preferences are exogenously given and stable,
Additional consumption provides smaller and smaller increases in utility (diminishing marginal utility).
With these assumptions, it is possible to construct a social welfare function
simply by summing all the individual utility functions. Note that such a
measure would still be concerned with the distribution of income (distributive efficiency) but not the distribution of final utilities. In normative terms, such authors were writing in the Benthamite tradition.
The ordinal-behaviorist approach, originally called the new welfare economics, is based on the work of Pareto, Kaldor, Hicks, and Scitovsky.
It explicitly recognizes the differences between the efficiency aspect
of the discipline and the distribution aspect and treats them
differently. Questions of efficiency are assessed with criteria such as Pareto efficiency and Kaldor–Hicks efficiency, while questions of income distribution are covered in the specification of the social welfare function Further, efficiency dispenses with cardinal measures of utility, replacing it with ordinal utility, which merely ranks commodity bundles (with an indifference-curve map, for example).
Situations are considered to have distributive efficiency when goods are distributed to the people who can gain the most utility from them.
Pareto efficiency
is an efficiency goal that is standard in economics. A situation is
Pareto-efficient only if no individual can be made better off without
making someone else worse off. An example of an inefficient situation
would be if Smith owns an apple but would prefer to consume an orange
while Jones owns an orange but would be prefer to consume an apple. Both
could be made better off by trading.
A Pareto-efficient state of affairs can only come about if four criteria are met:
The marginal rates of substitution
in consumption for any two goods are identical for all consumers. We
cannot reallocate goods between two consumers and make both happier.
The marginal rate of transformation
in production for any two goods is identical for all producers of those
two goods. We cannot reallocate production between two producers and
increase total output.
The marginal physical product
of a factor input (e.g. labor) must be the same for all producers of a
good. We cannot reduce production cost by reallocating production
between two producers.
The marginal rates of substitution in consumption equal the marginal
rates of transformation in production for any pair of goods. Producers
cannot make consumers happier by producing more of one good and less of
the other.
There are a number of conditions that can lead to inefficiency. They include:
Government restrictions on prices and quantities sold and other regulation resulting from government failure.
Note that if one of these conditions leads to inefficiency, another
condition might help by counteracting it. For example, if a pollution
externality leads to overproduction of tires, a tax on tires might
restore the efficient level of production. A condition inefficient in
the "first-best" might be desirable in the second-best.
To determine whether an activity is moving the economy towards
Pareto efficiency, two compensation tests have been developed. Policy
changes usually help some people while hurting others, so these tests
ask what would happen if the winners were to compensate the losers.
Using the Kaldor criterion, the change is desirable if the
maximum amount the winners would be willing to pay is greater than the
minimum the losers would accept. Under the Hicks criterion, the
change is desirable if the maximum the losers would be willing to offer
the winners to prevent the change is less than the minimum the winners
would accept as a bribe to give up the change. The Hicks compensation
test is from the losers' point of view; the Kaldor compensation test is
from the winners'. If both conditions are satisfied, the proposed change
will move the economy toward Pareto optimality. This idea is known as Kaldor–Hicks efficiency. If the two conditions disagree, that yields the Scitovsky paradox.
Equity
There
are many combinations of consumer utility, production mixes, and factor
input combinations consistent with efficiency. In fact, there are an
infinity of consumption and production equilibria that yield Pareto
optimal results. There are as many optima as there are points on the
aggregate production–possibility frontier.
Hence, Pareto efficiency is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition
for social welfare. Each Pareto optimum corresponds to a different
income distribution in the economy. Some may involve great inequalities
of income. So how do we decide which Pareto optimum is most desirable?
This decision is made, either tacitly or overtly, when we specify the social welfare function.
This function embodies value judgements about interpersonal utility.
The social welfare function shows the relative importance of the
individuals that comprise society.
A utilitarian welfare function (also called a Benthamite
welfare function) sums the utility of each individual in order to
obtain society's overall welfare. All people are treated the same,
regardless of their initial level of utility. One extra unit of utility
for a starving person is not seen to be of any greater value than an
extra unit of utility for a millionaire. At the other extreme is the
Max-Min, or Rawlsian utility function.
According to the Max-Min criterion, welfare is maximized when the
utility of those society members that have the least is the greatest. No
economic activity will increase social welfare unless it improves the
position of the society member that is the worst off. Most economists
specify social welfare functions that are intermediate between these two
extremes.
The social welfare function is typically translated into social indifference curves
so that they can be used in the same graphic space as the other
functions that they interact with. A utilitarian social indifference
curve is linear and downward sloping to the right. The Max-Min social
indifference curve takes the shape of two straight lines joined so as
they form a 90-degree angle. A social indifference curve drawn from an
intermediate social welfare function is a curve that slopes downward to
the right.
The intermediate form of social indifference curve can be interpreted
as showing that as inequality increases, a larger improvement in the
utility of relatively rich individuals is needed to compensate for the
loss in utility of relatively poor individuals.
A crude social welfare function can be constructed by measuring
the subjective dollar value of goods and services distributed to
participants in the economy.
The field of welfare economics is associated with two fundamental
theorems. The first states that given certain assumptions, competitive
markets (price equilibria with transfers, e.g. Walrasian equilibria) produce Pareto efficient outcomes. The assumptions required are generally characterised as "very weak". More specifically, the existence of competitive equilibrium implies both price-taking behaviour and complete markets, but the only additional assumption is the local non-satiation of agents' preferences – that consumers would like, at the margin, to have slightly more of any given good. The first fundamental theorem is said to capture the logic of Adam Smith's invisible hand,
though in general there is no reason to suppose that the "best" Pareto
efficient point (of which there are a set) will be selected by the
market without intervention, only that some such point will be.The second fundamental theorem states that given further
restrictions, any Pareto efficient outcome can be supported as a
competitive market equilibrium. These restrictions are stronger than for the first fundamental theorem, with convexity of preferences and production functions a sufficient but not necessary condition. A direct consequence of the second theorem is that a benevolent social planner
could use a system of lump sum transfers to ensure that the "best"
Pareto efficient allocation was supported as a competitive equilibrium
for some set of prices.
More generally, it suggests that redistribution should, if possible, be
achieved without affecting prices (which should continue to reflect
relative scarcity), thus ensuring that the final (post-trade) result is efficient. Put into practice, such a policy might resemble predistribution.
Utility
functions can be derived from the points on a contract curve. Numerous
utility functions can be derived, one for each point on the production
possibility frontier (PQ in the diagram above). A social utility
frontier (also called a grand utility frontier)
can be obtained from the outer envelope of all these utility functions.
Each point on a social utility frontier represents an efficient
allocation of an economy's resources; that is, it is a Pareto optimum in
factor allocation, in production, in consumption, and in the
interaction of production and consumption (supply and demand). In the
diagram below, the curve MN is a social utility frontier. Point D
corresponds with point C from the earlier diagram. Point D is on the
social utility frontier because the marginal rate of substitution at
point C is equal to the marginal rate of transformation at point A.
Point E corresponds with point B in the previous diagram, and lies
inside the social utility frontier (indicating inefficiency) because the
MRS at point C is not equal to the MRT at point A.
Although all the points on the grand social utility frontier are
Pareto efficient, only one point identifies where social welfare is
maximized. Such point is called "the point of bliss". This point is Z
where the social utility frontier MN is tangent to the highest possible
social indifference curve labelled SI.
The Great Leap Forward stemmed from multiple factors, including
"the purge of intellectuals, the surge of less-educated radicals, the
need to find new ways to generate domestic capital, rising enthusiasm
about the potential results mass mobilization might produce, and
reaction against the sociopolitical results of the Soviet's development strategy."
Mao ambitiously sought an increase in rural grain production and an
increase in industrial activity. Mao was dismissive of technical experts
and basic economic principles, which meant that industrialization of
the countryside would solely be dependent on the peasants. Grain quotas
were introduced with the idea of having peasants provide grains for
themselves and support urban areas. Output from the industrial
activities such as steel was also supposed to be used for urban growth. Local officials were fearful of Anti-Rightist Campaigns
and they competed to fulfill or over-fulfill quotas which were based on
Mao's exaggerated claims, collecting non-existent "surpluses" and
leaving farmers to starve to death. Higher officials did not dare to
report the economic disaster which was being caused by these policies,
and national officials, blaming bad weather for the decline in food
output, took little or no action.
The major changes which occurred in the lives of rural Chinese people included the incremental introduction of mandatory agricultural collectivization. Private farming was prohibited, and those people who engaged in it were persecuted and labeled counter-revolutionaries. Restrictions on rural people were enforced with public struggle sessions and social pressure, and forced labor was also exacted on people.
Rural industrialization, while officially a priority of the campaign,
saw "its development ... aborted by the mistakes of the Great Leap
Forward". The Great Leap was one of two periods between 1953 and 1976 in which China's economy shrank (the other being the Cultural Revolution). Economist Dwight Perkins
argues that "enormous amounts of investment only produced modest
increases in production or none at all. ... In short, the Great Leap
[Forward] was a very expensive disaster".
The CCP studied the damage that was done at various conferences from 1960 to 1962, especially at the "Seven Thousand Cadres Conference" in 1962, during which Mao Zedong ceded day-to-day leadership to pragmatic moderates like Chinese President Liu Shaoqi and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping.
Acknowledging responsibilities for the Great Leap Forward, Mao did not
retreat from his policies; instead, he blamed problems on bad
implementation and "rightists" who opposed him. He initiated the Socialist Education Movement in 1963 and the Cultural Revolution in 1966 in order to remove opposition and re-consolidate his power. In addition, dozens of dams constructed in Zhumadian, Henan, during the Great Leap Forward collapsed in 1975 (under the influence of Typhoon Nina) and resulted in the 1975 Banqiao Dam failure, with estimates of its death toll ranging from tens of thousands to 240,000.
Classical Marxist
theory hypothesized a relatively linear progression of development and a
worldwide revolution beginning with the most developed countries. At the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the country was one of poorest in the world. The Great Leap Forward attempted to defy the conventional understanding of the time required for economic development. Through rapid industrialization, it aimed to close the gap between China's developmental stage and its political aspirations.
In March 1955, at a national conference of the Party, Mao declared that
China "would catch up with and surpass the most powerful capitalist
countries in several dozen years", and in October, Mao announced that he
would complete the building of a socialist state in 15 years.
In the late 1950s, China's socio-political landscape experienced
significant rural reforms and the aftermath of previous policies aimed
at collectivization rather than individualism.
Before the Great Leap Forward, the Chinese government initiated land
reforms that redistributed land from landlords to peasants, but these
reforms still needed to attain the expected agricultural productivity.
The early 1950s saw the establishment of agricultural cooperatives, yet
these changes brought mixed outcomes. However, the push towards rapid
industrialization and the establishment of people’s communes in rural
areas were central to the Great Leap Forward, reflecting the
government’s belief that collectivization and large-scale projects would
boost agricultural and industrial outputs. The communes were meant to
centralize farming and labour, supposedly leading to increased
efficiency and output; still, in reality, and practice, these measures
often disrupted traditional farming practices and led to decreased
productivity. Dali Yang stated, "The initial stages of collectivization
brought chaos and inefficiency, with agricultural productivity often
declining".
Government officials being sent to work in the countryside, 1957
Before 1949, peasants had farmed their own small pockets of land and
observed traditional practices—festivals, banquets, and paying homage to
ancestors. It was realized that Mao's policy of using a state monopoly
on agriculture to finance industrialization would be unpopular with the
peasants. Therefore, it was proposed that the peasants should be
brought under Party control by the establishment of agricultural collectives which would also facilitate the sharing of tools and draft animals.
This policy was gradually pushed through between 1949 and 1958 in
response to immediate policy needs, first by establishing "mutual aid
teams" of 5–15 households, then in 1953 "elementary agricultural
cooperatives" of 20–40 households, then from 1956 in "higher
co-operatives" of 100–300 families. From 1954 onward peasants were
encouraged to form and join collective-farming associations, which would
supposedly increase their efficiency without robbing them of their own
land or restricting their livelihoods.
By 1958, private ownership was abolished and all households were
forced into state-operated communes. Mao demanded that the communes
increase grain production to feed the cities and to earn foreign
exchange through exports.
Apart from progressive taxation on each household's harvest, the
state introduced a system of compulsory state purchases of grain at
fixed prices to build up stockpiles for famine-relief and meet the terms
of its trade agreements with the Soviet Union.
Together, taxation and compulsory purchases accounted for 30% of the
harvest by 1957, leaving very little surplus. Rationing was also
introduced in the cities to curb 'wasteful consumption' and encourage
savings (which were deposited in state-owned banks and thus became
available for investment), and although food could be purchased from
state-owned retailers the market price was higher than that for which it
had been purchased. This too was done in the name of discouraging
excessive consumption.
Besides these economic changes, the CCP implemented major social
changes in the countryside including the banishing of all religious and
mystic institutions and ceremonies, replacing them with political
meetings and propaganda sessions. Attempts were made to enhance rural
education and the status of women (allowing them to initiate divorce if
they desired) and ending foot-binding, child marriage and opium addiction. The old system of internal passports (the hukou)
was introduced in 1956, preventing inter-county travel without
appropriate authorization. Highest priority was given to the urban proletariat for whom a welfare state was created.
The first phase of collectivization resulted in modest improvements in output.
Famine along the mid-Yangzi was averted in 1956 through the timely
allocation of food-aid, but in 1957 the Party's response was to increase
the proportion of the harvest collected by the state to insure against
further disasters. Moderates within the Party, including Zhou Enlai,
argued for a reversal of collectivization on the grounds that claiming
the bulk of the harvest for the state had made the people's
food-security dependent upon the constant, efficient, and transparent
functioning of the government.
Hundred Flowers Campaign and Anti-Rightist Campaign
In 1957, Mao responded to the tensions which existed in the Party by launching the Hundred Flowers Campaign
as a way to promote free speech and criticism. Some scholars have
retroactively concluded that this campaign was a ploy designed to allow
critics of the regime, primarily intellectuals but also low ranking
members of the party who were critical of the agricultural policies, to
identify themselves.
By the time of the completion of the first 5 Year Economic Plan
in 1957, Mao had come to believe that the path to socialism that had
been followed by the Soviet Union was not appropriate for China. He was
critical of Khrushchev's reversal of Stalinist policies and he was also alarmed by the uprisings that had taken place in East Germany, Poland and Hungary, and the perception that the USSR was seeking "peaceful coexistence" with the Western powers. Mao had become convinced that China should follow its own path to communism. According to Jonathan Mirsky,
a historian and a journalist who specialized in Chinese affairs,
China's isolation from most of the rest of the world, along with the Korean War,
had accelerated Mao's attacks on his perceived domestic enemies. It led
him to accelerate his designs to develop an economy where the regime
would get maximum benefit from rural taxation.
The Anti-Rightist Campaign
started on June 8th, 1957. The main goal was to purge "rightists" from
the CCP and China altogether. It was believed that approximately 5
percent of the population was still "rightists" (Political conservatives
sabotaging the revolution).
Rash advance movement and anti-rash advance movement
In the early years of the New China, due to the lack of experience in
financial and economic work, it was a common practice to include the
fiscal surplus of the previous year in the budget of the current year.
Because of the low level of budgeting in the fiscal sector and
inaccurate estimates of economic development, revenues and expenditures
were underestimated. However, no problems arose because the government
usually managed to end the fiscal year with a surplus. In 1953, when
China entered the first five-year plan period, the Chinese economy had
improved and the Ministry of Finance
still decided to include the fiscal surplus of the previous fiscal year
as credit funds in the 1953 budget revenue to cover the current year's
expenditures. As a result, budget expenditures were expanded and so was
the size of the budget. At that time, only the Soviet expert Kutuzov
warned the Chinese fiscal authorities not to use the fiscal surplus of
the previous year, however, it was not heeded by the Ministry of
Finance. In that year, the gross industrial and agricultural output grew
by 21.3%, while the capital construction budget increased by 50%
compared to the previous year, which led to an imbalance between
production and demand. Such was the "small rash advance" (小冒進) at the
start of the first five-year plan period. The issue had caused widespread social controversy. The faction of Li Xiannian, Chen Yun
and others did not think it was appropriate to continue this practice,
but they also had opponents. Li Xiannian finally decided to hold a
collective meeting to discuss the issue, and after listening to the
views of all parties, he decided to abolish the practice.
Nevertheless, the controversy over the use of the fiscal surplus
persisted, which brought another reckless "rash advance" to China's
economic development in 1956. At that time, China lacked consideration
in three areas: capital construction, employee wages and agricultural
loans, making the central treasury tight again. This drew the attention
of Zhou Enlai, Li Xiannian and others, and at a state meeting held on
June 5, 1956, proposals were made to curb impetuousness and rash
advances, revise the 1956 national economic plan, and cut capital
construction investment. Such was the anti-"rash advance" movement.
The excess of the first five-year plan gave the nation great
confidence, and at the Second Plenary Session of the 8th Central
Committee, "go all out, aim high, and build socialism with greater,
faster, better, and more economical results" (simplified Chinese: 鼓足干劲、力争上游、多快好省地建设社会主义; traditional Chinese: 鼓足幹勁、力爭上游、多快好省地建設社會主義) was adopted as the "General Line for Socialist Construction" in China.
In 1955, Mao had already expressed his belief that socialist
construction should achieve "greater, faster, better, and more
economical" results. These led to the re-emergence of "rash advances",
which further led to the reintroduction of policies and tendencies that
had previously been overturned. Those who opposed Mao's policies were
accused of not upholding the tenets of the "class struggle" under
people's cult of Mao.
Regarding agriculture, the Chinese government recognized the
country's dilemma of feeding its rapidly growing population without the
means to make significant capital improvements in agriculture. Viewing human labor as an underutilized factor of production, the government intensified the mobilization of masses of people to increase labor inputs in agriculture.
In November 1957, party leaders of communist countries gathered in Moscow to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution. Soviet Communist Party First SecretaryNikita Khrushchev
proposed not only to catch up with but exceed the United States in
industrial output in the next 15 years through peaceful competition. Mao
Zedong was so inspired by the slogan that China put forward its own
one: to catch up with and surpass the United Kingdom in 15 years. As
with its approach to agriculture, the Chinese government attempted to
compensate for its inability to invest in industry with mass
mobilizations to increase human labor inputs.
The initial projects of the Great Leap Forward were accelerating the construction of waterworks on the North China Plain during the 1957-1958 winter and next the development of people's communes and crude forms of rural industrialization.
Some Great Leap Projects had lots of long-term value to China's economy
and continued to benefit China after The Great Leap Forward ended. Some
of the projects included bridges, railroads, canals and reservoirs.
However, some of these projects were completed quickly, resulting in
errors and delays that did more harm than good.
Organizational and operational factors
The Great Leap Forward campaign began during the period of the Second Five Year Plan which was scheduled to run from 1958 to 1963, though the campaign itself was discontinued by 1961. Mao unveiled the Great Leap Forward at a meeting in January 1958 in Nanjing.
The Great Leap Forward was grounded in a logical theory of economic development and represented an unambiguous social invention.
The central idea behind the Great Leap was that China should "walk on
two legs", by rapidly developing both heavy and light industry, urban
and rural areas, and large and small scale labor.
The hope was to industrialize by making use of the massive supply of
cheap labour and avoid having to import heavy machinery. The government
also sought to avoid both social stratification and technical
bottlenecks involved in the Soviet model of development, but sought
political rather than technical solutions to do so. Distrusting
technical experts, Mao and the party sought to replicate the strategies used in its 1930s regrouping in Yan'an following the Long March: "mass mobilization, social leveling, attacks on bureaucratism, [and] disdain for material obstacles". In the absence of material development inputs, Mao sought to increase development through voluntarism and organizational advantages brought about by socialism. Mao advocated that a further round of collectivization modeled on the USSR's "Third Period" was necessary in the countryside where the existing collectives would be merged into huge people's communes.
An experimental commune was established at Chayashan in Henan in April 1958. Here for the first time private plots were entirely abolished and communal kitchens were introduced. At the Politburo
meetings in August 1958, it was decided that these people's communes
would become the new form of economic and political organization
throughout rural China. By the end of the year approximately 25,000
communes had been set up, with an average of 5,000 households each. The
communes were relatively self-sufficient co-operatives where wages and
money were replaced by work points.
The commune system was aimed at maximizing production for
provisioning the cities and constructing offices, factories, schools,
and social insurance systems for urban-dwelling workers, cadres, and
officials.And also a semi governmental structure where activities in the
countryside could manage what went on in there. People's commune took
care of every aspects of people's lives: health care, job employment,
food, housing, finance, defense, culture, education, political affairs
and entertainment.
People in the communes were united with the saying: Exceeding the UK,
catching the USA, created by Mao to energize the people and their work
ethics by reducing the influence of Western Countries and reinforce his
leadership legitimacy.
Citizens in rural areas who criticized the system were labeled
"dangerous". Later on, as more and more families link together to form
people's communes, peasants started to lose individual identities, since
families were from vastly different communities with different cultures
views, political views, family and financial background, which created
conflict regarding the means and modes of production. Some wealthier
families who refused to join a People's commune might be labeled as
rightists.
Escape was also difficult or impossible, and those who attempted were
subjected to "party-orchestrated public struggle", which further
jeopardized their survival.
Besides agriculture, communes also incorporated some light industry and
construction projects. Harvests did increase. However this was because
of exceptional weather, not, which a lot of officials mistook, as the
result of hard work of the peasants, creating further complications.
(106) This lead to famine in the countryside since they were required to
reach set harvest goal, leaving not enough food for themselves.
Industrialization
A minecart leading to the steel base, October 1957
Mao saw grain and steel production as the key pillars of economic
development. He forecast that within 15 years of the start of the Great
Leap, China's industrial output would surpass that of the UK. In the
August 1958 Politburo meetings, it was decided that steel production
would be set to double within the year, most of the increase coming
through backyard steel furnaces.
Major investments in larger state enterprises were made: 1587, 1361 and
1815 medium and large-scale state projects were started in 1958, 1959
and 1960 respectively, more in each year than in the first Five Year
Plan.
Millions of Chinese became state workers as a consequence of this
industrial investment: in 1958, 21 million were added to
non-agricultural state payrolls, and total state employment reached a
peak of 50.44 million in 1960, more than doubling the 1957 level; the
urban population swelled by 31.24 million people.
These new workers placed major stress on China's food-rationing system,
which led to increased and unsustainable demands on rural food
production. Those between the ages of sixteen and thirty were considered ideal candidates for the militia.
Peasants were working long hours, all year round, even contributed
their own cooking utensils to be melted as a source of production.
The consequences of the Great Leap Forward were devastating, leading to one of the most severe famines in human history.
The policies that diverted labour from agriculture to industrial
projects, such as backyard steel furnaces, resulted in a catastrophic
drop in agricultural output; consequently, food shortages became
widespread. According to demographic studies, the famine caused an
estimated 15 to 45 million deaths, with rural areas being the hardest
hit.
Ashton et al. (1984) highlight, “During the period 1958-62, about 30
million premature deaths occurred in China: deaths that occurred earlier
than they would have on the basis of mortality trends for more normal
years.”
During this rapid expansion, coordination suffered and material
shortages were frequent, resulting in "a huge rise in the wage bill,
largely for construction workers, but no corresponding increase in
manufactured goods".
Facing a massive deficit, the government cut industrial investment from
38.9 to 7.1 billion yuan from 1960 to 1962 (an 82% decrease; the 1957
level was 14.4 billion).
partly due to misreporting, or corruption at every level of the
government where they'd overreport harvest and steel production, by the
time people realized, it was too late to correct statistics without
angering Mao.
The Great Leap Forward sought to revive folk technologies, including in the area of steel production. China's steel industry faced a shortage of imported iron and calls to increase production of "native iron" had begun in 1956. By mid-1958, the Chinese state began promoting indigenous metallurgical methods and the proliferation of "folk furnaces".
Mao was shown an example of a backyard furnace in Hefei, Anhui, in September 1958 by provincial first secretary Zeng Xisheng. The unit was claimed to be manufacturing high quality steel.
Moreover, the experience of the intellectual classes following the Hundred Flowers Campaign silenced those aware of the folly of such a plan. According to his private doctor, Li Zhisui, Mao and his entourage visited traditional steel works in Manchuria
in January 1959 where he found out that high quality steel could only
be produced in large-scale factories using reliable fuel such as coal.
However, he decided not to order a halt to the backyard steel furnaces
so as not to dampen the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses. The
program was only quietly abandoned much later in that year.
A People's Daily front page report on 13 August 1958, that the Macheng Jianguo commune in Hubei had set a record of in early rice
On the communes, a number of radical and controversial agricultural
innovations were promoted at the behest of Mao. Many of these
innovations were based on the ideas of now discredited Soviet agronomist Trofim Lysenko
and his followers. The policies included close cropping, whereby seeds
were sown far more densely than normal on the incorrect assumption that
seeds of the same class would not compete with each other. Yang provides
data on the failure of close planting techniques, which reduced yields
in Anhui province from 400 jin per mu to less than 200 jin per mu due to
overcrowded plants competing for nutrients and sunlight." Deep plowing was encouraged on the mistaken belief that this would yield plants with extra large root systems.
Moderately productive land was left unplanted based on the belief that
concentrating manure and effort on the most fertile land would lead to
large productivity gains per-acre. Altogether, these untested
innovations generally led to decreases in grain production rather than
increases.
Meanwhile, local leaders were pressured into falsely reporting
ever-higher grain production figures to their political superiors.
Participants at political meetings remembered production figures being
inflated up to 10 times their actual production amounts as the race to
please superiors and win plaudits—like the chance to meet Mao
himself—intensified. The state was later able to force many production
groups to sell more grain than they could spare based on these false
production figures.
Treatment of villagers
Commune members working fields at night using lampsPeople's commune at a nursery school
The ban on private holdings
severely disrupted peasant life at its most basic level. Villagers were
unable to secure enough food to go on living because they were deprived
by the commune system of their traditional means of being able to rent,
sell, or use their land as collateral for loans.
In one village, once the commune was operational, the Party boss and
his colleagues "swung into manic action, herding villagers into the
fields to sleep and to work intolerable hours, and forcing them to walk,
starving, to distant additional projects."
Edward Friedman, political scientist, Paul Pickowicz, historian, and Mark Selden, sociologist, wrote about the dynamic of interaction between the Party and villagers:
Beyond attack, beyond question, was the systemic and structured dynamic of the socialist state that intimidated and impoverished millions of patriotic and loyal villagers.
The authors present a similar picture to Thaxton in depicting the
party's destruction of the traditions of Chinese villagers.
Traditionally prized local customs were deemed signs of "feudalism"
to be extinguished. "Among them were funerals, weddings, local markets,
and festivals. The Party thus destroyed much that gave meaning to
Chinese lives. These private bonds were social glue. To mourn and to
celebrate is to be human. To share joy, grief, and pain is humanizing."
Failure to participate in the CCP's political campaigns—though the aims
of such campaigns were often conflicting—"could result in detention,
torture, death, and the suffering of entire families".
Public struggle sessions
were often used to intimidate the peasants into obeying local
officials; they increased the death rate of the famine in several ways.
"In the first case, blows to the body caused internal injuries that, in
combination with physical emaciation
and acute hunger, could induce death." In one case, after a peasant
stole two cabbages from the common fields, the thief was publicly
criticized for half a day. He collapsed, fell ill, and never recovered.
Others were sent to labor camps.
About 7% of those who died during the Great Leap Forward were tortured to death or summarily killed.
Benjamin Valentino notes that "communist officials sometimes tortured
and killed those accused of failing to meet their grain quota".
However, J. G. Mahoney has said that "there is too much diversity
and dynamism in the country for one work to capture ... rural China as
if it were one place." Mahoney describes an elderly man in rural Shanxi
who recalls Mao fondly, saying "Before Mao we sometimes ate leaves,
after liberation we did not." Regardless, Mahoney points out that Da Fo
villagers recall the Great Leap Forward as a period of famine and death,
and among those who survived in Da Fo were precisely those who could
digest leaves.
Direct consequences
The
failure of agricultural policies, the movement of farmers from
agricultural to industrial work, and weather conditions suppressed the
food supply. At the same time improvements in medicine, infant mortality, and average life expectancy promoted by the Patriotic Health Campaign
led to a greatly increased need for food. The shortage of supply
clashed with an explosion in demand, leading to millions of deaths from
severe famine. The economy, which had improved since the end of the
civil war, was devastated, and in response to the severe conditions,
there was resistance among the populace.
The effects on the upper levels of government in response to the
disaster were complex, with Mao purging the Minister of National Defense
Peng Dehuai in 1959, the temporary promotion of Lin Biao, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping, and Mao losing some power and prestige following the Great Leap Forward, during the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference in 1962, which led him to launch the Cultural Revolution in 1966.
Despite the harmful agricultural innovations, the weather was very
favorable in 1958 and the harvest was also good. However, the amount of
labor which was diverted to steel production and construction projects
meant that much of the harvest was left to rot because it was not
collected in some areas. This problem was exacerbated by a devastating locust swarm, which was caused when their natural predators were killed as part of the Four Pests Campaign.
Although actual harvests were reduced, local officials, under
tremendous pressure to report record harvests to central authorities in
response to the innovations, competed with each other to announce
increasingly exaggerated results. These results were used as the basis
for determining the amount of grain which would be taken by the State,
supplied to the towns and cities and exported. This barely left enough
grain for the peasants, and in some areas, starvation set in. A 1959
drought and flooding from the Yellow River in the same year also contributed to the famine.
During 1958–1960 China continued to be a substantial net exporter
of grain, despite the widespread famine which was being experienced in
the countryside, as Mao sought to maintain face and convince the outside
world of the success of his plans. Foreign aid was refused. When the
Japanese foreign minister told his Chinese counterpart Chen Yi about an
offer of 100,000 tonnes of wheat which was going to be shipped away from
public view, he was rebuffed.
John F. Kennedy was also aware that the Chinese were exporting food to Africa and Cuba during the famine.
He said during the news conference on 23 May 1962, "Well, there has
been no indication of any expression of interest or desire by the
Chinese Communists to receive any food from us, as I have said at the
beginning, and we would certainly have to have some idea as to whether
the food was needed and under what conditions it might be distributed.
Up to the present, we have had no such indication." But Kennedy said
that the US provided food for about half a million refugees in British
Hong Kong.
With dramatically reduced yields, even urban areas received
greatly reduced rations; however, mass starvation was largely confined
to the countryside, where, as a result of drastically inflated
production statistics, very little grain was left for the peasants to
eat. Food shortages were bad throughout the country, but the provinces
which had adopted Mao's reforms with the most vigor, such as Anhui, Gansu and Henan, tended to suffer disproportionately. Sichuan,
one of China's most populous provinces, known in China as "Heaven's
Granary" because of its fertility, is thought to have suffered the
highest number of deaths from starvation due to the vigor with which
provincial leader Li Jingquan
undertook Mao's reforms. There are widespread oral reports, though
little official documentation, of cannibalism being practiced in various
forms as a result of the famine. Author Yan Lianke
also claims that, while growing up in Henan during the Great Leap
Forward, he was taught to "recognize the most edible kinds of bark and
clay by his mother. When all of the trees had been stripped and there
was no more clay, he learned that lumps of coal could appease the devil
in his stomach, at least for a little while."
The agricultural policies of the Great Leap Forward and the
associated famine continued until January 1961, when, at the Ninth
Plenum of the 8th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party,
the restoration of agricultural production through a reversal of the
Great Leap policies was started. Grain exports were stopped, and imports
from Canada and Australia reduced the impact of the food shortages, at
least in the coastal cities.
Deaths by famine
The exact number of deaths by famine is difficult to determine, and estimates range from 15 million to 55 million people.
Because of the uncertainties which are involved in estimating the
number of deaths which were caused by the failure of the Great Leap
Forward and the ensuing famine and because of the uncertainties which
are involved in estimating the numbers of deaths which were caused by other famines,
it is difficult to compare the severity of different famines. If an
estimate of 30 million deaths is accepted, the failure of the Great Leap
Forward caused the deadliest famine in the history of China, and it
also caused the deadliest famine in human history.This extremely high loss of human lives was partially caused by China's large population. To put things into absolute and relative numerical perspective: in the Great Irish Famine, approximately 1 million people
out of a total population of 8 million people died, or 12.5% of
Ireland's entire population. If approximately 23 million people out of a
total population of 650 million people died during the Great Chinese
Famine, the percentage would be 3.5%.
Hence, the famine during the Great Leap Forward had the highest
absolute death toll, though not the highest relative (percentage) one.
The Great Leap Forward reversed the downward trend in mortality that had occurred since 1950, though even during the Leap, mortality may not have reached pre-1949 levels. Famine deaths and the reduction in number of births caused the population of China to drop in 1960 and 1961. This was only the third time in 600 years that the population of China had decreased. Mao Zedong himself suggested, in a discussion with Field Marshal Montgomery in Autumn 1961, that "unnatural deaths" exceeded 5 million in 1960–1961, according to a de-classifiedCIA report.
After the Great Leap Forward, mortality rates decreased to below
pre-Leap levels and the downward trend begun in 1950 continued.
The severity of the famine varied from region to region. By
correlating the increases in the death rates of different provinces,
Peng Xizhe found that Gansu, Sichuan, Guizhou, Hunan, Guangxi, and Anhui were the hardest-hit regions, while Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tianjin, and Shanghai experienced the lowest increases in death rates during the Great Leap Forward (there was no data for Tibet). In some areas, people resorted to eating tree bark and dirt, and in some places cannibalism as a result of starvation. Peng also noted that the increase in death rates in urban areas was about half the increase in death rates in rural areas. According to Chinese government reports in the Fuyang Party History Research Office, between the years 1959 and 1961, 2.4 million people from Fuyang died from the famine. On the other hand, the Gao Village in the Jiangxi Province there was a famine, but no one actually died of starvation.
Long-term Impact
The long-term impact of the Great Leap Forward extended beyond
immediate famine and loss of life. The policies and their disastrous
outcomes led to significant changes in Chinese society and governance.
In rural areas, the effects on education and women's labour roles were
profound. The collapse of agricultural production systems and the
communal structure led to a reevaluation of economic strategies in
subsequent decades. Rural education suffered due to the upheaval, and
while women were initially mobilized into the workforce, the ensuing
chaos often negated these advances. Dali Yang explains, “The Great Leap
Forward’s failure necessitated significant policy shifts, leading to a
more pragmatic approach in China’s economic reforms.”
Global famines history
The Great Leap Forward produced a significant spike in the global number of deaths (1950–2017)
Methods of estimating the death toll and sources of error
Estimates of Great Chinese Famine death toll
Deaths (millions)
Author(s)
Year
15
Houser, Sands, and Xiao
2005
18
Yao
1999
23
Peng
1987
27
Coale
1984
30
Ashton, et al.
1984
30
Banister
1987
30
Becker
1996
32.5
Cao
2005
36
Yang
2008
38
Chang and Halliday
2005
38
Rummel
2008
45 minimum
Dikötter
2010
43 to 46
Chen
1980
55
Yu Xiguang
2005
Some outlier estimates include 11 million by Utsa Patnaik, an Indian Marxist economist, 3.66 million by mathematician Sun Jingxian (孙经先) and 2.6–4 million by historian and political economist Yang Songlin (杨松林).
The number of famine deaths during the Great Leap Forward has
been estimated with different methods. Banister, Coale, and Ashton et
al. compare age cohorts from the 1953, 1964, and 1982 censuses, yearly
birth and death records, and results of the 1982 1:1000 fertility
survey. From these they calculate excess deaths above a death rate
interpolated between pre- and post-Leap death rates. All involve
corrections for perceived errors inherent in the different data sets.Peng uses reported deaths from the vital statistics of 14 provinces,
adjusts 10% for under reporting, and expands the result to cover all of
China assuming similar mortality rates in the other provinces. He uses
1956/57 death rates as the baseline death rate rather than an
interpolation between pre- and post-GLF death rates.
Houser, Sands, and Xiao in their 2005 research study using
"provincial-level demographic panel data and a Bayesian empirical
approach in an effort to distinguish the relative importance of weather
and national policy on China's great demographic disaster" conclude that
"in aggregate, from 1959 to 1961 China suffered about 14.8 million
excess deaths. Of those, about 69% (or 10.3 million) seem attributable
to effects stemming from national policies."
Cao uses information from "local annals" to determine for each
locality the expected population increase from normal births and deaths,
the population increase due to migration, and the loss of population
between 1958 and 1961. He then adds the three figures to determine the
number of excess deaths during the period 1959–1961.
Chang and Halliday use death rates determined by "Chinese demographers"
for the years 1957–1963, subtract the average of the pre-and post-Leap
death rates (1957, 1962, and 1963) from the death rates of each of the
years 1958–1961, and multiply each yearly excess death rate by the
year's population to determine excess deaths.
Chen was part of a large investigation by the System Reform
Institute think tank which "visited every province and examined internal
Party documents and records."
Becker, Rummel, Dikötter, and Yang each compare several earlier
estimates. Becker considers Banister's estimate of 30 million excess
deaths to be "the most reliable estimate we have". Rummel initially took Coale's 27 million as a "most likely figure", then accepted the later estimate of 38 million by Chang and Halliday after it was published. Dikötter judged Chen's estimate of 43 to 46 million to be "in all likelihood a reliable estimate". He also claimed that at least 2.5 million of these deaths were caused by beatings, tortures, or summary executions.
On the other hand, Daniel Vukovich asserts that this claim is coming
from a problematic and unverified reference, because Chen simply threw
that number as an "estimate" during an interview and because Chen hasn't
published any scholarly work on the subject.
Yang takes Cao's, Wang Weizhi's, and Jin Hui's estimates ranging from
32.5 to 35 million excess deaths for the period 1959–1961, adds his own
estimates for 1958 (0.42 million) and 1962 (2.23 million) "based on
official figures reported by the provinces" to get 35 to 37 million, and
chooses 36 million as a number that "approaches the reality but is
still too low".
Estimates contain several sources of error. National census data
was not accurate and even the total population of China at the time was
not known to within 50 to 100 million people. The statistical reporting system had been taken over by party cadre from statisticians in 1957,
making political considerations more important than accuracy and
resulting in a complete breakdown in the statistical reporting system.Population figures were routinely inflated at the local level, often in order to obtain increased rations of goods. During the Cultural Revolution, a great deal of the material in the State Statistical Bureau was burned.
According to Jasper Becker, under-reporting of deaths was also a problem. The death registration system, which was inadequate before the famine, was completely overwhelmed by the large number of deaths during the famine. In addition, he claims that many deaths went unreported so that family
members of the deceased could continue to draw the deceased's food
ration and that counting the number of children who both were born and
died between the 1953 and 1964 censuses is problematic.
However, Ashton, et al. believe that because the reported number of
births during the GLF seems accurate, the reported number of deaths
should be accurate as well. Massive internal migration made both population counts and registering deaths problematic, though Yang believes the degree of unofficial internal migration was small and Cao's estimate takes internal migration into account.
Coale's, Banister's, Ashton et al.'s, and Peng's figures all
include adjustments for demographic reporting errors, though Dikötter,
in his book Mao's Great Famine, argues that their results, as well as Chang and Halliday's, Yang's, and Cao's, are still underestimates. The System Reform Institute's (Chen's) estimate has not been published and therefore it cannot be verified.
Causes of the famine and responsibility for it
The
policies of the Great Leap Forward, the failure of the government to
respond quickly and effectively to famine conditions, as well as Mao's
insistence on maintaining high grain export quotas in the face of clear
evidence of poor crop output were responsible for the famine. There is
disagreement over how much, if at all, weather conditions contributed to
the famine.
Significant amounts of agricultural labor had been transferred
for steel production, resulting in a shortage of agricultural workers. Approximately 10% of crops could not be harvested as a result.
Yang Jisheng, a former CCP member and former reporter for the official Chinese news agency Xinhua, puts the blame squarely on Maoist policies and the political system of totalitarianism, such as diverting agricultural workers to steel production instead of growing crops, and exporting grain at the same time.
During the course of his research, Yang uncovered that some 22 million
tons of grain was held in public granaries at the height of the famine,
reports of starvation went up the bureaucracy only to be ignored by top
officials, and the authorities ordered that statistics be destroyed in
regions where population decline became evident.
Using Henan province as an example, Yang documents that inflated
reports claimed production of 1200 jin per mu, while the actual
production was closer to 600 jin per mu, resulting in excessive grain
requisitions and local starvation, nearly 6% of the population passed
away.
In the later book, Yang states, "36 million Chinese starved to death in
the years between 1958 and 1962, while 40 million others failed to be
born, which means that "China's total population loss during the Great
Famine then comes to 76 million."
Economist Steven Rosefielde
argues that Yang's account "shows that Mao's slaughter was caused in
considerable part by terror-starvation; that is, voluntary manslaughter
(and perhaps murder) rather than innocuous famine."
Yang claims that local party officials were indifferent to the large
number of people dying around them, as their primary concern was the
delivery of grain, which Mao wanted to use to pay back debts to the USSR
totaling 1.973 billion yuan. In Xinyang, people died of starvation at the doors of grain warehouses. Mao refused to open the state granaries as he dismissed reports of food shortages and accused the "rightists" and the kulaks of conspiring to hide grain.
From his research into records and talks with experts at the
meteorological bureau, Yang concludes that the weather during the Great
Leap Forward was not unusual compared to other periods and was not a
factor. Yang also believes that the Sino-Soviet split was not a factor because it did not happen until 1960, when the famine was well under way.
Mao's efforts to cool the Leap in late 1958 met resistance within
the Party and when Mao proposed a scaling down of steel targets, "many
people just wouldn't change and wouldn't accept it".
Thus, according to historian Tao Kai, the Leap "wasn't the problem of a
single person, but that many people had ideological problems". Tao also
pointed out that "everyone was together" on the anti-rightist campaign
and only a minority didn't approve of the Great Leap's policies or put
forth different opinions.
The actions of the party under Mao in the face of widespread famine are
reminiscent of Soviet policy nearly three decades earlier during the Soviet famine of 1932-33.
At that time, the USSR exported grain for international propaganda
purposes despite millions dying of starvation across southern areas of
the Soviet Union.
Benjamin Valentino writes that like in the USSR during the famine of 1932–33, peasants were confined to their starving villages by a system of household registration, and the worst effects of the famine were directed against enemies of the regime.
Those labeled as "black elements" (religious leaders, rightists, rich
peasants, etc.) in any previous campaign were given the lowest priority
in the allocation of food, and therefore died in the greatest numbers. Drawing from Jasper Becker's book Hungry Ghosts, genocide scholar Adam Jones states that "no group suffered more than the Tibetans" from 1959 to 1962.
Ashton, et al. write that policies leading to food shortages,
natural disasters, and a slow response to initial indications of food
shortages were to blame for the famine.
Policies leading to food shortages included the implementation of the
commune system and an emphasis on non-agricultural activities such as
backyard steel production. Natural disasters included drought, flood, typhoon, plant disease, and insect pest. The slow response was in part due to a lack of objective reporting on the agricultural situation, including a "nearly complete breakdown in the agricultural reporting system".
This was partly caused by strong incentives for officials to over-report crop yields.
According to Frank Dikötter, local officials frequently reported
production figures 30-40% higher than the actual output to meet the
central government's ambitious targets.
The unwillingness of the Central Government to seek international aid
was a major factor; China's net grain exports in 1959 and 1960 would
have been enough to feed 16 million people 2000 calories per day.
Ashton, et al. conclude that "It would not be inaccurate to say that 30
million people died prematurely as a result of errors of internal
policy and flawed international relations."
Mobo Gao suggested that the Great Leap Forward's terrible effects
came not from malignant intent on the part of the Chinese leadership at
the time, but instead related to the structural nature of its rule, and
the vastness of China as a country. Gao says "the terrible lesson
learnt is that China is so huge and when it is uniformly ruled, follies
or wrong policies will have grave implications of tremendous magnitude".
As of 2012, the Chinese government's official English web portal
places the responsibility for the "serious losses" to "country and
people" of 1959–1961 (without mentioning famine) mainly on the Great
Leap Forward and the anti-rightist struggle, and lists weather and
cancellation of contracts by the Soviet Union as contributing factors.
Deaths by violence
Not all deaths during the Great Leap were from starvation. In accounts documented by Yang Jisheng,
people were beaten or killed for rebelling against the government,
reporting the real harvest numbers, for sounding alarm, for refusing to
hand over what little food they had left, for trying to flee the famine
area, for begging for food or as little as stealing scraps or angering
officials.
In the book Tombstone, a cycle of starvation and violence was documented during the Great Leap Forward.
Other impacts
Failure of food supply
In agrarian policy, the failures of food supply during the Great Leap were met by a gradual de-collectivization over the course of the 1960s that foreshadowed the further measures taken under Deng Xiaoping. Political scientist Meredith Jung-En Woo
argues: "Unquestionably the regime failed to respond in time to save
the lives of millions of peasants, but when it did respond, it
ultimately transformed the livelihoods of several hundred million
peasants (modestly in the early 1960s, but permanently after Deng
Xiaoping's reforms subsequent to 1978)."
Despite the risks to their careers, some CCP members openly laid
blame for the disaster at the feet of the Party leadership and took it
as proof that China must rely more on education, acquiring technical
expertise and applying bourgeois methods in developing the economy. Liu Shaoqi made a speech at the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference in 1962, stating that "[the] economic disaster was 30% fault of nature, 70% human error."
A 2017 paper by economists found "strong evidence that the
unrealistic yield targets led to excessive death tolls from 1959 to
1961, and further analysis shows that yield targets induced the
inflation of grain output figures and excessive procurement. We also
find that Mao's radical policy caused serious deterioration in human capital accumulation and slower economic development in the policy-affected regions decades after the death of Mao."
A dramatic decline in grain output continued for several years,
involving in 1960–61 a drop in output of more than 25 percent. Causes of
this drop are found in both natural disaster and government policy.
Industrialization
Overall, the Great Leap Forward failed to rapidly industrialize China as intended.
According to Joseph Ball, writing in the Monthly Review,
there is a good argument to suggest that the policies of the Great Leap
Forward did a lot to sustain China's overall economic growth, after an
initial period of disruption.
Official Chinese statistics show that after the end of the Leap in
1962, industrial output value had doubled; the gross value of
agricultural products increased by 35 percent; steel production in 1962
was between 10.6 million tons or 12 million tons; investment in capital
construction rose to 40 percent from 35 percent in the First Five-Year
Plan period; the investment in capital construction was doubled; and the
average income of workers and farmers increased by up to 30 percent.
Additionally, there was significant capital construction (especially in
iron, steel, mining and textile enterprises) that ultimately
contributed greatly to China's industrialization. The Great Leap Forward period also marked the initiation of China's rapid growth in tractor and fertilizer production.
The successful construction of the Daqing oil field
despite harsh weather conditions and supply limitations became a model
held up by the Party as an example during subsequent industrialization
campaigns. During its 1960 construction, Oil Minister Yu Qiuli
mobilized workers through ideological motivation instead of material
incentives, focusing enthusiasm, energy, and resources to complete a
rapid industrialization project.
The project also delivered critical economic benefits because without
the production of the Daqing oil field, crude oil would have been
severely limited after the Soviet Union cut off supplies as a result of
the Sino-Soviet split.
Large-scale irrigation projects begun during the late 1950s as
part of the Great Leap Forward continued to grow rapidly until the late
1970s.
The initial impact of the Great Leap Forward was discussed at the Lushan Conference
in July–August 1959. Although many of the more moderate leaders had
reservations about the new policy, the only senior leader to speak out
openly was Marshal Peng Dehuai.
Mao responded to Peng's criticism of the Great Leap by dismissing Peng
from his post as Defence Minister, denouncing Peng (who came from a poor
peasant family) and his supporters as "bourgeois", and launching a
nationwide campaign against "rightist opportunism". Peng was replaced by
Lin Biao, who began a systematic purge of Peng's supporters from the military.
Women's labor advancement
The Great Leap Forward's focus on total workforce mobilization resulted in opportunities for women's labor advancement.
Increasing collectivization of labor brought more opportunities for
women to "leave the home", thereby increasing their economic and
personal independence. The number of women in state institutions and state-owned enterprises more than tripled during the period 1957 to 1960.
As women became increasingly needed to work in agriculture and industry, and encouraged by policy to do so, the phenomenon of Iron Women arose. Women did traditionally male work in both fields and factories, including major movements of women into management positions. Women competed for high productivity, and those who distinguished themselves came to be called Iron Women.
Slogans such as "There is no difference between men and women in this
new age," and "We can do anything, and anything we do, we can do it
well," became popular.
Neighborhood production teams established during this period
offered women labor that allowed them to leave the home without leaving
the neighborhood community. This mode of labor provided urban women with the right to work while still preserving existing forms of household social life.
Education
During the Great Leap Forward, the number of universities in China
increased to 1,289 by 1960 and nationwide enrollment more than doubled
to 962,000 in 1960. This was a wave of "great leap forward" in higher education. Many of the newly established "universities", however, were affiliated with people's communes and were directly transformed from local middle schools. For example, in Xushui county of Hebei province, every commune built one "university" of its own and local middle school teachers were promoted to "professors"; for another example, in Suiping County of Henan province,
a new "university" was established with 10 departments and 529
students, where some "professors" were actually teachers from local elementary school. According to official sources:
Some
comrades expressed the fear that the movement would be a mockery of
school education ....With regard to the development of higher education,
some comrades, hearing that peasants have set up their own universities
in the countryside, would ridicule the idea, believing that a
university without a staff of qualified professors and students who have
graduated from senior middle schools cannot be called a university.
Educational
reforms during the Great Leap Forward sought to increase student and
staff participation in the administration process, to favor students
from worker, peasant, or soldier backgrounds in admissions, and to
increase the role of the CCP and of politics in schools.
Beginning in 1961, universities rolled back these policy initiatives,
and increase meritocratic university policies instead of egalitarian
ones.
Resistance
There were various forms of resistance to the consequences of the Great Leap Forward. Several provinces saw armed rebellion, though these rebellions never posed a serious threat to the Central Government. Rebellions are documented to have occurred in Henan, Shandong, Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, Fujian, and Yunnan provinces and in the Tibetan Autonomous Region. In Henan, Shandong, Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan, these rebellions lasted more than a year, with the Spirit Soldier rebellion of 1959 being one of the few larger-scale uprisings. There was also occasional violence against cadre members. Raids on granaries, arson and other vandalism, train robberies, and raids on neighboring villages and counties were common.
According to Ralph Thaxton, professor of politics at Brandeis University, villagers turned against the CCP during and after the Great Leap, seeing it as autocratic, brutal, corrupt, and mean-spirited.
According to Thaxton, the CCP's policies included plunder, forced
labor, and starvation, which led villagers "to think about their
relationship with the Communist Party in ways that do not bode well for
the continuity of socialist rule."
Often, villagers composed doggerel
to show their defiance to the regime, and "perhaps, to remain sane".
During the Great Leap, one jingle ran: "Flatter shamelessly—eat
delicacies.... Don't flatter—starve to death for sure."
Officials were prosecuted for exaggerating production figures,
although punishments varied. In one case, a provincial party secretary
was dismissed and prohibited from holding higher office. A number of
county-level officials were publicly tried and executed.
Mao stepped down as State Chairman of the PRC on April 27, 1959,
but remained CCP Chairman. Liu Shaoqi (the new PRC Chairman) and
reformist Deng Xiaoping
(CCP General Secretary) were left in charge to change policy to bring
economic recovery. Mao's Great Leap Forward policy was openly criticized
at the Lushan party conference by one person. Criticism from Minister of National Defense Peng Dehuai,
who, discovered that people from his home province starved to death
caused him to write a letter to Mao to ask for the policies to be
adapted. After the Lushan showdown, Mao replaced Peng with Lin Biao and Peng was sent off into obscurity.
However, by 1962, it was clear that the party had changed away
from the extremist ideology that led to the Great Leap. During 1962, the
party held a number of conferences and rehabilitated most of the
deposed comrades who had criticized Mao in the aftermath of the Great
Leap. The event was again discussed, with much self-criticism, and the contemporary government called it a "serious [loss] to our country and people" and blamed the cult of personality of Mao.
At the Lushan conference of 1959, Peng Dehuai, one of the great
marshals of the Chinese civil war against the nationalists, was a strong
supporter of the Leap. But the discovery that people from his own home
area were starving to death prompted him to write to Mao to ask for the
policies to be adapted. Mao was furious, reading the letter out in
public and demanding that his colleagues in the leadership line up
either behind him or Peng. Almost to a man, they supported Mao, with his
security chief Kang Sheng declaring of the letter: "I make bold to
suggest that this cannot be handled with lenience."
In particular, at the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference in January – February 1962, Mao made a self-criticism and re-affirmed his commitment to democratic centralism.
In the years that followed, Mao mostly abstained from the operations of
government, making policy largely the domain of Liu Shaoqi and Deng
Xiaoping. Maoist ideology took a back seat in the CCP, until Mao
launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966 which marked his political comeback.
Following the failures of the Great Leap Forward, Chinese
leadership slowed the pace of industrialization, focusing more on the
development of China's already more developed coastal areas and the
production of consumer goods. Thus, during the preliminary formulation of the Third Five Year Plan (which had been delayed due to the economic turmoil), Liu stated:
In the past, the infrastructure
battlefront was too long. There were too many projects. Demands were too
high and rushed. Designs were done badly, and projects were hurriedly
begun ... We only paid attention to increasing output and ignored
quality. We set targets too highly. We must always remember these
painful learning experiences.
During the discussion of the Third Five Year Plan, Mao made similar
statements about the Great Leap Forward having "extended the
infrastructure battlefront too long", acknowledging that it was "best to
do less and well".
The failures of the Great Leap Forward also informed the government's approach to the Third Front
construction campaign which followed a few years later and which built
basic industry and national defense industry in China's interior.
Rather than adopting the Great Leap Forward's approach of locally
developed projects, the mass mobilizations of the Third Front were
centrally planned.
In addition, according to historian Philipp Brigham, the failures
of the Great Leap Forward significantly contributed to the Cultural
Revolution, which is another pivotal event in modern Chinese politics
that happened later in Chairman Mao’s regime. Specifically, he posits
that one of the main objectives of the Cultural Revolution was to
extricate Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party from the responsibility for the Great Leap Forward.
According to Brigham's explanation, Chairman Mao and the central
committee tried to incite through the Cultural Revolution that the Great
Leap Forward had failed despite the right direction from above due to
inadequate leadership of the local cadres.
Ecological impact
The Great Leap Forward resulted in ecological impacts through deforestation that resulted, as well as the expansion of agriculture into areas ill-suited for it.
Health impacts
There
is evidence that survivors of the famine suffered sustained negative
effects to their long-term health and economic outcomes. Those in early
childhood during the famine were impacted the most, and it has been
estimated that the 1959 birth cohort would have otherwise grown 3cm
taller in adulthood.
Cohorts born during the famine showed higher infant and early
life mortality, but exhibit a "mortality crossover" pattern, with
mortality rates leveling off or even dropping relative to non-famine
cohorts beyond a certain point. This could be explained by the combined
effects of initial debilitation, in which malnutrition and hardship
increase early deaths, and selection for robustness among famine
survivors resulting in fewer later deaths.
Cultural impact
Consistent
with the Great Leap Forward in agriculture and industry, authorities
promoted the New Folksong Movement and the Peasant Painting Movement,
from which hundreds of thousands of new artists emerged. Through the New Folksong Movement, millions of new folk songs and poems were written and collected. As part of the Peasant Painting Movement, peasant artists decorated village walls with Great Leap Forward-themed murals.
The Great Leap Forward also prompted a wave of the New Guohua
Campaign in which the state commissioned landscape artists to paint new
production projects; select paintings of the campaign were taught in
schools, published widely as propaganda posters, exhibited in museums,
and used as the backdrops of state events.
On March 9, 1958, the Ministry of Culture held a meeting to introduce a Great Leap Forward in cinema.
During the Great Leap Forward, the film industry rapidly expanded, with
documentary films being the genre that experienced the greatest growth.
The total number of film-screening venues, including both urban cinemas
and mobile projection units which traveled through rural China,
radically increased.
.jpg)
![The Great Leap Forward produced a significant spike in the global number of deaths (1950–2017)[59]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Total_number_of_deaths_by_age_globally_for_both_sexes_combined_1950%E2%80%932017.png)
