Search This Blog

Tuesday, November 13, 2018

Group dynamics

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Group dynamics is a system of behaviors and psychological processes occurring within a social group (intragroup dynamics), or between social groups (intergroup dynamics). The study of group dynamics can be useful in understanding decision-making behaviour, tracking the spread of diseases in society, creating effective therapy techniques, and following the emergence and popularity of new ideas and technologies. Group dynamics are at the core of understanding racism, sexism, and other forms of social prejudice and discrimination. These applications of the field are studied in psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, epidemiology, education, social work, business, and communication studies.

The three main factors affecting a team's cohesion (working together well) are: environmental, personal and leadership.

History

The history of group dynamics (or group processes) has a consistent, underlying premise: 'the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.' A social group is an entity that has qualities which cannot be understood just by studying the individuals that make up the group. In 1924, Gestalt psychologist Max Wertheimer proposed ‘There are entities where the behaviour of the whole cannot be derived from its individual elements nor from the way these elements fit together; rather the opposite is true: the properties of any of the parts are determined by the intrinsic structural laws of the whole’ (Wertheimer 1924, p. 7). (The proposition remains questionable, since modern biologists and game theorists do look to explain the 'structural laws of the whole' in terms of 'the way the elements fit together'.)

As a field of study, group dynamics has roots in both psychology and sociology. Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920), credited as the founder of experimental psychology, had a particular interest in the psychology of communities, which he believed possessed phenomena (human language, customs, and religion) that could not be described through a study of the individual. On the sociological side, Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), who was influenced by Wundt, also recognized collective phenomena, such as public knowledge. Other key theorists include Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931) who believed that crowds possessed a 'racial unconscious' with primitive, aggressive, and antisocial instincts, and William McDougall (psychologist), who believed in a 'group mind,' which had a distinct existence born from the interaction of individuals. (The concept of a collective consciousness is not essential to group dynamics.)

Eventually, the social psychologist Kurt Lewin (1890–1947) coined the term group dynamics to describe the positive and negative forces within groups of people. In 1945, he established The Group Dynamics Research Center at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the first institute devoted explicitly to the study of group dynamics. Throughout his career, Lewin was focused on how the study of group dynamics could be applied to real-world, social issues.

Increasingly, research has applied evolutionary psychology principles to group dynamics. As humans social environments became more complex, they acquired adaptations by way of group dynamics that enhance survival. Examples include mechanisms for dealing with status, reciprocity, identifying cheaters, ostracism, altruism, group decision, leadership, and intergroup relations. Also, a combination of evolution and game theory has been used to explain the development and maintenance of cooperative behavior between individuals in a group.

Key theorists

Gustave Le Bon

Gustave Le Bon was a French social psychologist whose seminal study, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (1896) led to the development of group psychology.

William McDougall

The British psychologist William McDougall in his work The Group Mind (1920) researched the dynamics of groups of various sizes and degrees of organization.

Sigmund Freud

In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, (1922), Sigmund Freud based his preliminary description of group psychology on Le Bon's work, but went on to develop his own, original theory, related to what he had begun to elaborate in Totem and Taboo. Theodor Adorno reprised Freud's essay in 1951 with his Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda, and said that "It is not an overstatement if we say that Freud, though he was hardly interested in the political phase of the problem, clearly foresaw the rise and nature of fascist mass movements in purely psychological categories."

Jacob L. Moreno

Jacob L. Moreno was a psychiatrist, dramatist, philosopher and theoretician who coined the term "group psychotherapy" in the early 1930s and was highly influential at the time.

Kurt Lewin

Kurt Lewin (1943, 1948, 1951) is commonly identified as the founder of the movement to study groups scientifically. He coined the term group dynamics to describe the way groups and individuals act and react to changing circumstances.

William Schutz

William Schutz (1958, 1966) looked at interpersonal relations as stage-developmental, inclusion (am I included?), control (who is top dog here?), and affection (do I belong here?). Schutz sees groups resolving each issue in turn in order to be able to progress to the next stage.
Conversely, a struggling group can devolve to an earlier stage, if unable to resolve outstanding issues at its present stage. Schutz referred to these group dynamics as "the interpersonal underworld," group processes which are largely unseen and un-acknowledged, as opposed to "content" issues, which are nominally the agenda of group meetings.

Wilfred Bion

Wilfred Bion (1961) studied group dynamics from a psychoanalytic perspective, and stated that he was much influenced by Wilfred Trotter for whom he worked at University College Hospital London, as did another key figure in the Psychoanalytic movement, Ernest Jones. He discovered several mass group processes which involved the group as a whole adopting an orientation which, in his opinion, interfered with the ability of a group to accomplish the work it was nominally engaged in. His experiences are reported in his published books, especially Experiences in Groups. The Tavistock Institute has further developed and applied the theory and practices developed by Bion.

Bruce Tuckman

Bruce Tuckman (1965) proposed the four-stage model called Tuckman's Stages for a group. Tuckman's model states that the ideal group decision-making process should occur in four stages:
  • Forming (pretending to get on or get along with others)
  • Storming (letting down the politeness barrier and trying to get down to the issues even if tempers flare up)
  • Norming (getting used to each other and developing trust and productivity)
  • Performing (working in a group to a common goal on a highly efficient and cooperative basis)
Tuckman later added a fifth stage for the dissolution of a group called adjourning. (Adjourning may also be referred to as mourning, i.e. mourning the adjournment of the group). This model refers to the overall pattern of the group, but of course individuals within a group work in different ways. If distrust persists, a group may never even get to the norming stage.

M. Scott Peck

M. Scott Peck developed stages for larger-scale groups (i.e., communities) which are similar to Tuckman's stages of group development. Peck describes the stages of a community as:
  • Pseudo-community
  • Chaos
  • Emptiness
  • True Community
Communities may be distinguished from other types of groups, in Peck's view, by the need for members to eliminate barriers to communication in order to be able to form true community. Examples of common barriers are: expectations and preconceptions; prejudices; ideology, counterproductive norms, theology and solutions; the need to heal, convert, fix or solve and the need to control. A community is born when its members reach a stage of "emptiness" or peace.

Richard Hackman

Richard Hackman developed a synthetic, research-based model for designing and managing work groups. Hackman suggested that groups are successful when they satisfy internal and external clients, develop capabilities to perform in the future, and when members find meaning and satisfaction in the group. Hackman proposed five conditions that increase the chance that groups will be successful.[13] These include:
  1. Being a real team: which results from having a shared task, clear boundaries which clarify who is inside or outside of the group, and stability in group membership.
  2. Compelling direction: which results from a clear, challenging, and consequential goal.
  3. Enabling structure: which results from having tasks which have variety, a group size that is not too large, talented group members who have at least moderate social skill, and strong norms that specify appropriate behaviour.
  4. Supportive context: which occurs in groups nested in larger groups (e.g. companies). In companies, supportive contexts involves a) reward systems that reward performance and cooperation (e.g. group based rewards linked to group performance), b) an educational system that develops member skills, c) an information and materials system that provides the needed information and raw materials (e.g. computers).
  5. Expert coaching: which occurs on the rare occasions when group members feel they need help with task or interpersonal issues. Hackman emphasizes that many team leaders are overbearing and undermine group effectiveness.

Intragroup dynamics

Intragroup dynamics (also referred to as ingroup-, within-group, or commonly just ‘group dynamics’) are the underlying processes that give rise to a set of norms, roles, relations, and common goals that characterize a particular social group. Examples of groups include religious, political, military, and environmental groups, sports teams, work groups, and therapy groups. Amongst the members of a group, there is a state of interdependence, through which the behaviours, attitudes, opinions, and experiences of each member are collectively influenced by the other group members. In many fields of research, there is an interest in understanding how group dynamics influence individual behaviour, attitudes, and opinions.

The dynamics of a particular group depend on how one defines the boundaries of the group. Often, there are distinct subgroups within a more broadly defined group. For example, one could define U.S. residents (‘Americans’) as a group, but could also define a more specific set of U.S. residents (for example, 'Americans in the South'). For each of these groups, there are distinct dynamics that can be discussed. Notably, on this very broad level, the study of group dynamics is similar to the study of culture. For example, there are group dynamics in the U.S. South that sustain a culture of honor, which is associated with norms of toughness, honour-related violence, and self-defence.

Group formation

Group formation starts with a psychological bond between individuals. The social cohesion approach suggests that group formation comes out of bonds of interpersonal attraction. In contrast, the social identity approach suggests that a group starts when a collection of individuals perceive that they share some social category (‘smokers’, ‘nurses,’ ‘students,’ ‘hockey players’), and that interpersonal attraction only secondarily enhances the connection between individuals. Additionally, from the social identity approach, group formation involves both identifying with some individuals and explicitly not identifying with others. So to say, a level of psychological distinctiveness is necessary for group formation. Through interaction, individuals begin to develop group norms, roles, and attitudes which define the group, and are internalized to influence behaviour.

Emergent groups arise from a relatively spontaneous process of group formation. For example, in response to a natural disaster, an emergent response group may form. These groups are characterized as having no preexisting structure (e.g. group membership, allocated roles) or prior experience working together. Yet, these groups still express high levels of interdependence and coordinate knowledge, resources, and tasks.

Joining groups

Joining a group is determined by a number of different factors, including an individual's personal traits; gender; social motives such as need for affiliation, need for power, and need for intimacy; attachment style; and prior group experiences. Groups can offer some advantages to its members that would not be possible if an individual decided to remain alone, including gaining social support in the forms of emotional support, instrumental support, and informational support. It also offers friendship, potential new interests, learning new skills, and enhancing self esteem. However, joining a group may also cost an individual time, effort, and personal resources as they may conform to social pressures and strive to reap the benefits that may be offered by the group.

The Minimax Principle is a part of social exchange theory that states that people will join and remain in a group that can provide them with the maximum amount of valuable rewards while at the same time, ensuring the minimum amount of costs to themselves. However, this does not necessarily mean that a person will join a group simply because the reward/cost ratio seems attractive. According to Howard Kelley and John Thibaut, a group may be attractive to us in terms of costs and benefits, but that attractiveness alone does not determine whether or not we will join the group. Instead, our decision is based on two factors: our comparison level, and our comparison level for alternatives.

In John Thibaut and Harold Kelley's social exchange theory, comparison level is the standard by which an individual will evaluate the desirability of becoming a member of the group and forming new social relationships within the group. This comparison level is influenced by previous relationships and membership in different groups. Those individuals who have experienced positive rewards with few costs in previous relationships and groups will have a higher comparison level than a person who experienced more negative costs and fewer rewards in previous relationships and group memberships. According to the social exchange theory, group membership will be more satisfying to a new prospective member if the group's outcomes, in terms of costs and rewards, are above the individual's comparison level. As well, group membership will be unsatisfying to a new member if the outcomes are below the individual's comparison level.

Comparison level only predicts how satisfied a new member will be with the social relationships within the group. To determine whether people will actually join or leave a group, the value of other, alternative groups needs to be taken into account. This is called the comparison level for alternatives. This comparison level for alternatives is the standard by which an individual will evaluate the quality of the group in comparison to other groups the individual has the opportunity to join. Thiabaut and Kelley stated that the "comparison level for alternatives can be defined informally as the lowest level of outcomes a member will accept in the light of available alternative opportunities” (p. 21).

Joining and leaving groups is ultimately depends on the comparison level for alternatives, whereas member satisfaction within a group depends on the comparison level. To summarize, if membership in the group is above the comparison level for alternatives and above the comparison level, the membership within the group will be satisfying and an individual will be more likely to join the group. If membership in the group is above the comparison level for alternatives but below the comparison level, membership will be not be satisfactory; however, the individual will likely join the group since no other desirable options are available. When group membership is below the comparison level for alternatives but above the comparison level, membership is satisfying but an individual will be unlikely to join. If group membership is below both the comparison and alternative comparison levels, membership will be dissatisfying and the individual will be less likely to join the group.

Types of groups

Groups can vary drastically from one another. For example, three best friends who interact every day as well as a collection of people watching a movie in a theater both constitute a group. Past research has identified four basic types of groups which include, but are not limited to: primary groups, social groups, collective groups, and categories . It is important to define these four types of groups because they are intuitive to most lay people. For example, in an experiment , participants were asked to sort a number of groups into categories based on their own criteria. Examples of groups to be sorted were a sports team, a family, women, and people at a bus stop. It was found that participants consistently sorted groups into four categories: intimacy groups, task groups, loose associations, and social categories. These categories are conceptually similar to the four basic types to be discussed. Therefore, it seems that individuals intuitively define aggregations of individuals in this way.

Primary groups

Primary groups are characterized by relatively small, long-lasting groups of individuals who share personally meaningful relationships. Since these groups often interact face-to-face, they know each other very well and are unified. Individuals that are a part of primary groups consider the group to be an important part of their lives. Consequently, members strongly identify with their group, even without regular meetings . Cooley  believed that primary groups were essential for integrating individuals into their society since this is often their first experience with a group. For example, individuals are born into a primary group, their family, which creates a foundation for them to base their future relationships. Individuals can be born into a primary group; however, primary groups can also form when individuals interact for extended periods of time in meaningful ways . Examples of primary groups include family, close friends, and gangs.

Social groups

A social group is characterized by a formally organized group of individuals who are not as emotionally involved with each other as those in a primary group. These groups tend to be larger, with shorter memberships compared to primary groups . Further, social groups do not have as stable memberships, since members are able to leave their social group and join new groups. The goals of social groups are often task-oriented as opposed to relationship-oriented.  Examples of social groups include coworkers, clubs, and sports teams.

Collectives

Collectives are characterized by large groups of individuals who display similar actions or outlooks. They are loosely formed, spontaneous, and brief . Examples of collectives include a flash mob, an audience at a movie, and a crowd watching a building burn.

Categories

Categories are characterized by a collection of individuals who are similar in some way. Categories become groups when their similarities have social implications. For example, when people treat others differently because of their race, this creates groups of different races. For this reason, categories can appear to be higher in entitativity and essentialism than primary, social, and collective groups. Entitativity is defined by Campbell as the extent to which collections of individuals are perceived to be a group. The degree of entitativity that a group has is influenced by whether a collection of individuals experience the same fate, display similarities, and are close in proximity. If individuals believe that a group is high in entitativity, then they are likely to believe that the group has unchanging characteristics that are essential to the group, known as essentialism . Examples of categories are New Yorkers, gamblers, and women.

Group membership and social identity

The social group is a critical source of information about individual identity. An individual’s identity (or self-concept) has two components: personal identity and social identity (or collective self). One’s personal identity is defined by more idiosyncratic, individual qualities and attributes. In contrast, one’s social identity is defined by his or her group membership, and the general characteristics (or prototypes) that define the group and differentiate it from others. We naturally make comparisons between our own group and other groups, but we do not necessarily make objective comparisons. Instead, we make evaluations that are self-enhancing, emphasizing the positive qualities of our own group (see ingroup bias). In this way, these comparisons give us a distinct and valued social identity that benefits our self-esteem. Our social identity and group membership also satisfies a need to belong. Of course, individuals belong to multiple groups. Therefore, one’s social identity can have several, qualitatively distinct parts (for example, one’s ethnic identity, religious identity, and political identity).

Optimal distinctiveness theory suggests that individuals have a desire to be similar to others, but also a desire to differentiate themselves, ultimately seeking some balance of these two desires (to obtain optimal distinctiveness). For example, one might imagine a young teenager in the United States who tries to balance these desires, not wanting to be ‘just like everyone else,’ but also wanting to ‘fit in’ and be similar to others. One’s collective self may offer a balance between these two desires. That is, to be similar to others (those who you share group membership with), but also to be different from others (those who are outside of your group).

Group cohesion

In the social sciences, group cohesion refers to the processes that keep members of a social group connected. Terms such as attraction, solidarity, and morale are often used to describe group cohesion. It is thought to be one of the most important characteristics of a group, and has been linked to group performance, intergroup conflict and therapeutic change.

Group cohesion, as a scientifically studied property of groups, is commonly associated with Kurt Lewin and his student, Leon Festinger. Lewin defined group cohesion as the willingness of individuals to stick together, and believed that without cohesiveness a group could not exist. As an extension of Lewin’s work, Festinger (along with Stanley Schachter and Kurt Back) described cohesion as, “the total field of forces which act on members to remain in the group” (Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950, p. 37). Later, this definition was modified to describe the forces acting on individual members to remain in the group, termed attraction to the group. Since then, several models for understanding the concept of group cohesion have been developed, including Albert Carron’s hierarchical model and several bi-dimensional models (vertical v. horizontal cohesion, task v. social cohesion, belongingness and morale, and personal v. social attraction). Before Lewin and Festinger, there were, of course, descriptions of a very similar group property. For example, Emile Durkheim described two forms of solidarity (mechanical and organic), which created a sense of collective conscious and an emotion-based sense of community.

Black sheep effect

Beliefs within the ingroup are based on how individuals in the group see their other members. Individuals tend to upgrade likeable in-group members and deviate from unlikeable group members, making them a separate outgroup. This is called the black sheep effect. The way a person judges socially desirable and socially undesirable individuals depends upon whether they are part of the ingroup or outgroup.

This phenomenon has been later accounted for by subjective group dynamics theory. According to this theory, people derogate socially undesirable (deviant) ingroup members relative to outgroup members, because they give a bad image of the ingroup and jeopardize people's social identity.
In more recent studies, Marques and colleagues have shown that this occurs more strongly with regard to ingroup full members than other members. Whereas new members of a group must prove themselves to the full members to become accepted, full members have undergone socialization and are already accepted within the group. They have more privilege than newcomers but more responsibility to help the group achieve its goals. Marginal members were once full members but lost membership because they failed to live up to the group’s expectations. They can rejoin the group if they go through re-socialization. Therefore, full members' behavior is paramount to define the ingroup's image.

Bogart and Ryan surveyed the development of new members' stereotypes about in-groups and out-groups during socialization. Results showed that the new members judged themselves as consistent with the stereotypes of their in-groups, even when they had recently committed to join those groups or existed as marginal members. They also tended to judge the group as a whole in an increasingly less positive manner after they became full members. However, there is no evidence that this affects the way they are judged by other members. Nevertheless, depending on the self-esteem of an individual, members of the in-group may experience different private beliefs about the group’s activities but will publicly express the opposite—that they actually share these beliefs. One member may not personally agree with something the group does, but to avoid the black sheep effect, they will publicly agree with the group and keep the private beliefs to themselves. If the person is privately self-aware, he or she is more likely to comply with the group even if they possibly have their own beliefs about the situation.

In situations of hazing within fraternities and sororities on college campuses, pledges may encounter this type of situation and may outwardly comply with the tasks they are forced to do regardless of their personal feelings about the Greek institution they are joining. This is done in an effort to avoid becoming an outcast of the group. Outcasts who behave in a way that might jeopardize the group tend to be treated more harshly than the likeable ones in a group, creating a black sheep effect. Full members of a fraternity might treat the incoming new members harshly, causing the pledges to decide if they approve of the situation and if they will voice their disagreeing opinions about it.

Group influence on individual behaviour

Individual behaviour is influenced by the presence of others. For example, studies have found that individuals work harder and faster when others are present, and that an individual’s performance is reduced when others in the situation create distraction or conflict. Groups also influence individual’s decision-making processes. These include decisions related to ingroup bias, persuasion, obedience, and groupthink. There are both positive and negative implications of group influence on individual behaviour. This type of influence is often useful in the context of work settings, team sports, and political activism. However, the influence of groups on the individual can also generate extremely negative behaviours, evident in Nazi Germany, the My Lai Massacre, and in the Abu Ghraib prison.

Group structure

A group's structure is the internal framework that defines members' relations to one another over time. Frequently studied elements of group structure include roles, norms, values, communication patterns, and status differentials. Group structure has also been defined as the underlying pattern of roles, norms, and networks of relations among members that define and organize the group.

Roles can be defined as a tendency to behave, contribute and interrelate with others in a particular way. Roles may be assigned formally, but more often are defined through the process of role differentiation. Role differentiation is the degree to which different group members have specialized functions. A group with a high level of role differentiation would be categorized as having many different roles that are specialized and narrowly defined. A key role in a group is the leader, but there are other important roles as well, including task roles, relationship roles, and individual roles. Functional (task) roles are generally defined in relation to the tasks the team is expected to perform. Individuals engaged in task roles focus on the goals of the group and on enabling the work that members do; examples of task roles include coordinator, recorder, critic, or technician. A group member engaged in a relationship role (or socioemotional role) is focused on maintaining the interpersonal and emotional needs of the groups' members; examples of relationship role include encourager, harmonizer, or compromiser.

Norms are the informal rules that groups adopt to regulate members' behaviour. Norms refer to what should be done and represent value judgments about appropriate behaviour in social situations. Although they are infrequently written down or even discussed, norms have powerful influence on group behaviour. They are a fundamental aspect of group structure as they provide direction and motivation, and organize the social interactions of members. Norms are said to be emergent, as they develop gradually throughout interactions between group members. While many norms are widespread throughout society, groups may develop their own norms that members must learn when they join the group. There are various types of norms, including: prescriptive, proscriptive, descriptive, and injunctive.
  • Prescriptive Norms: the socially appropriate way to respond in a social situation, or what group members are supposed to do (e.g. saying thank you after someone does a favour for you)
  • Proscriptive Norms: actions that group members should not do; prohibitive (e.g. not belching in public)
  • Descriptive Norms: describe what people usually do (e.g. clapping after a speech)
  • Injunctive Norms: describe behaviours that people ought to do; more evaluative in nature than a descriptive norm
Intermember Relations are the connections among the members of a group, or the social network within a group. Group members are linked to one another at varying levels. Examining the intermember relations of a group can highlight a group's density (how many members are linked to one another), or the degree centrality of members (number of ties between members). Analysing the intermember relations aspect of a group can highlight the degree centrality of each member in the group, which can lead to a better understanding of the roles of certain group (e.g. an individual who is a 'go-between' in a group will have closer ties to numerous group members which can aid in communication, etc.).

Values are goals or ideas that serve as guiding principles for the group. Like norms, values may be communicated either explicitly or on an ad hoc basis. Values can serve as a rallying point for the team. However, some values (such as conformity) can also be dysfunction and lead to poor decisions by the team.

Communication patterns describe the flow of information within the group and they are typically described as either centralized or decentralized. With a centralized pattern, communications tend to flow from one source to all group members. Centralized communications allow standardization of information, but may restrict the free flow of information. Decentralized communications make it easy to share information directly between group members. When decentralized, communications tend to flow more freely, but the delivery of information may not be as fast or accurate as with centralized communications. Another potential downside of decentralized communications is the sheer volume of information that can be generated, particularly with electronic media.

Status differentials are the relative differences in status among group members. When a group is first formed the members may all be on an equal level, but over time certain members may acquire status and authority within the group; this can create what is known as a pecking order within a group. Status can be determined by a variety of factors and characteristics, including specific status characteristics (e.g. task-specific behavioural and personal characteristics, such as experience) or diffuse status characteristics (e.g. age, race, ethnicity). It is important that other group members perceive an individual's status to be warranted and deserved, as otherwise they may not have authority within the group. Status differentials may affect the relative amount of pay among group members and they may also affect the group's tolerance to violation of group norms (e.g. people with higher status may be given more freedom to violate group norms).

Group performance

Forsyth suggests that while many daily tasks undertaken by individuals could be performed in isolation, the preference is to perform with other people.

Social facilitation and performance gains

In a study of dynamogenic stimulation for the purpose of explaining pacemaking and competition in 1898, Norman Triplett theorized that "the bodily presence of another rider is a stimulus to the racer in arousing the competitive instinct...". This dynamogenic factor is believed to have laid the groundwork for what is now known as social facilitation—an "improvement in task performance that occurs when people work in the presence of other people".

Further to Triplett's observation, in 1920, Floyd Allport found that although people in groups were more productive than individuals, the quality of their product/effort was inferior.

In 1965, Robert Zajonc expanded the study of arousal response (originated by Triplett) with further research in the area of social facilitation. In his study, Zajonc considered two experimental paradigms. In the first—audience effects—Zajonc observed behaviour in the presence of passive spectators, and the second—co-action effects—he examined behaviour in the presence of another individual engaged in the same activity.

Zajonc observed two categories of behaviours—dominant responses to tasks that are easier to learn and which dominate other potential responses and nondominant responses to tasks that are less likely to be performed. In his Theory of Social Facilitation, Zajonc concluded that in the presence of others, when action is required, depending on the task requirement, either social facilitation or social interference will impact the outcome of the task. If social facilitation occurs, the task will have required a dominant response from the individual resulting in better performance in the presence of others, whereas if social interference occurs the task will have elicited a nondominant response from the individual resulting in subpar performance of the task.

Several theories analysing performance gains in groups via drive, motivational, cognitive and personality processes, explain why social facilitation occurs.

Zajonc hypothesized that compresence (the state of responding in the presence of others) elevates an individual's drive level which in turn triggers social facilitation when tasks are simple and easy to execute, but impedes performance when tasks are challenging.

Nickolas Cottrell, 1972, proposed the evaluation apprehension model whereby he suggested people associate social situations with an evaluative process. Cottrell argued this situation is met with apprehension and it is this motivational response, not arousal/elevated drive, that is responsible for increased productivity on simple tasks and decreased productivity on complex tasks in the presence of others.

In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959), Erving Goffman assumes that individuals can control how they are perceived by others. He suggests that people fear being perceived as having negative, undesirable qualities and characteristics by other people, and that it is this fear that compels individuals to portray a positive self-presentation/social image of themselves. In relation to performance gains, Goffman's self-presentation theory predicts, in situations where they may be evaluated, individuals will consequently increase their efforts in order to project/preserve/maintain a positive image.

Distraction-conflict theory contends that when a person is working in the presence of other people, an interference effect occurs splitting the individual's attention between the task and the other person. On simple tasks, where the individual is not challenged by the task, the interference effect is negligible and performance, therefore, is facilitated. On more complex tasks, where drive is not strong enough to effectively compete against the effects of distraction, there is no performance gain. The Stroop task (Stroop effect) demonstrated that, by narrowing a person's focus of attention on certain tasks, distractions can improve performance.

Social orientation theory considers the way a person approaches social situations. It predicts that self-confident individuals with a positive outlook will show performance gains through social facilitation, whereas a self-conscious individual approaching social situations with apprehension is less likely to perform well due to social interference effects.

Intergroup dynamics

Intergroup dynamics refers to the behavioural and psychological relationship between two or more groups. This includes perceptions, attitudes, opinions, and behaviours towards one’s own group, as well as those towards another group. In some cases, intergroup dynamics is prosocial, positive, and beneficial (for example, when multiple research teams work together to accomplish a task or goal). In other cases, intergroup dynamics can create conflict. For example, Fischer & Ferlie found initially positive dynamics between a clinical institution and its external authorities dramatically changed to a 'hot' and intractable conflict when authorities interfered with its embedded clinical model. Similarly, underlying the 1999 Columbine High School shooting in Littleton, Colorado, United States, intergroup dynamics played a significant role in Eric Harris’ and Dylan Klebold’s decision to kill a teacher and 14 students (including themselves).

Intergroup conflict

According to social identity theory, intergroup conflict starts with a process of comparison between individuals in one group (the ingroup) to those of another group (the outgroup). This comparison process is not unbiased and objective. Instead, it is a mechanism for enhancing one’s self-esteem. In the process of such comparisons, an individual tends to:
  • favour the ingroup over the outgroup;
  • exaggerate and overgeneralize the differences between the ingroup and the outgroup (to enhance group distinctiveness);
  • minimize the perception of differences between ingroup members;
  • remember more detailed and positive information about the ingroup, and more negative information about the outgroup.
Even without any intergroup interaction (as in the minimal group paradigm), individuals begin to show favouritism towards their own group, and negative reactions towards the outgroup. This conflict can result in prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination. Intergroup conflict can be highly competitive, especially for social groups with a long history of conflict (for example, the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, rooted in group conflict between the ethnic Hutu and Tutsi). In contrast, intergroup competition can sometimes be relatively harmless, particularly in situations where there is little history of conflict (for example, between students of different universities) leading to relatively harmless generalizations and mild competitive behaviours. Intergroup conflict is commonly recognized amidst racial, ethnic, religious, and political groups.

The formation of intergroup conflict was investigated in a popular series of studies by Muzafer Sherif and colleagues in 1961, called the Robbers Cave Experiment. The Robbers Cave Experiment was later used to support realistic conflict theory. Other prominent theories relating to intergroup conflict include social dominance theory, and social-/self-categorization theory.

Intergroup conflict reduction

There have been several strategies developed for reducing the tension, bias, prejudice, and conflict between social groups. These include the contact hypothesis, the jigsaw classroom, and several categorization-based strategies.

Contact hypothesis (intergroup contact theory)

In 1954, Gordon Allport suggested that by promoting contact between groups, prejudice can be reduced. Further, he suggested four optimal conditions for contact: equal status between the groups in the situation; common goals; intergroup cooperation; and the support of authorities, law, or customs. Since then, over 500 studies have been done on prejudice reduction under variations of the contact hypothesis, and a meta-analytic review suggests overall support for its efficacy. In some cases, even without the four optimal conditions outlined by Allport, prejudice between groups can be reduced.

Superordinate identities

Under the contact hypothesis, several models have been developed. A number of these models utilize a superordinate identity to reduce prejudice. That is, a more broadly defined, ‘umbrella’ group/identity that includes the groups that are in conflict. By emphasizing this superordinate identity, individuals in both subgroups can share a common social identity. For example, if there is conflict between White, Black, and Latino students in a high school, one might try to emphasize the ‘high school’ group/identity that students share to reduce conflict between the groups. Models utilizing superordinate identities include the common ingroup identity model, the ingroup projection model, the mutual intergroup differentiation model, and the ingroup identity model. Similarly, "recategorization" is a broader term used by Gaertner et al. to describe the strategies aforementioned.

Interdependence

There are also techniques for reducing prejudice that utilize interdependence between two or more groups. That is, members across groups have to rely on one another to accomplish some goal or task. In the Robbers Cave Experiment, Sherif used this strategy to reduce conflict between groups. Elliot Aronson’s Jigsaw Classroom also uses this strategy of interdependence. In 1971, thick racial tensions were abounding in Austin, Texas. Aronson was brought in to examine the nature of this tension within schools, and to devise a strategy for reducing it (so to improve the process of school integration, mandated under Brown v. Board of Education in 1954). Despite strong evidence for the effectiveness of the jigsaw classroom, the strategy was not widely used (arguably because of strong attitudes existing outside of the schools, which still resisted the notion that racial and ethnic minority groups are equal to Whites and, similarly, should be integrated into schools).

Selected academic journals

Cognitive bias mitigation

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Cognitive bias mitigation is the prevention and reduction of the negative effects of cognitive biases – unconscious, automatic influences on human judgment and decision making that reliably produce reasoning errors.

Coherent, comprehensive theories of cognitive bias mitigation are lacking. This article describes debiasing tools, methods, proposals and other initiatives, in academic and professional disciplines concerned with the efficacy of human reasoning, associated with the concept of cognitive bias mitigation; most address mitigation tacitly rather than explicitly.

A long-standing debate regarding human decision making bears on the development of a theory and practice of bias mitigation. This debate contrasts the rational economic agent standard for decision making versus one grounded in human social needs and motivations. The debate also contrasts the methods used to analyze and predict human decision making, i.e. formal analysis emphasizing intellectual capacities versus heuristics emphasizing emotional states. This article identifies elements relevant to this debate.

Context

A large body of evidence has established that a defining characteristic of cognitive biases is that they manifest automatically and unconsciously over a wide range of human reasoning, so even those aware of the existence of the phenomenon are unable to detect, let alone mitigate, their manifestation via awareness only.

Real-world effects of cognitive bias

There are few studies explicitly linking cognitive biases to real-world incidents with highly negative outcomes. Examples:
  • One study explicitly focused on cognitive bias as a potential contributor to a disaster-level event; this study examined the causes of the loss of several members of two expedition teams on Mount Everest on two consecutive days in 1996. This study concluded that several cognitive biases were 'in play' on the mountain, along with other human dynamics. This was a case of highly trained, experienced people breaking their own rules, apparently under the influence of the overconfidence effect, the sunk cost fallacy, the availability heuristic, and perhaps other cognitive biases. Five people, including both expedition leaders, lost their lives despite explicit warnings in briefings prior to and during the ascent of Everest. In addition to the leaders' mistakes, most team members, though they recognized their leader's faulty judgments, failed to insist on following through on the established ascent rules.
  • In a 2010 MarketBeat study, German researchers examined the role that certain cognitive biases may have had in the global financial crisis beginning in 2007. Their conclusion was that the expertise level of stock analysts and traders made them highly resistant to signals that did not conform to their beliefs in the continuation of the status quo. In the grip of strong confirmation bias reinforced by the overconfidence effect and the status quo bias, they apparently could not see the signals of financial collapse, even after they had become evident to non-experts.
  • Similarly, Kahneman, a Nobel Laureate in Economics, reports in a peer-reviewed study that highly experienced financial managers performed 'no better than chance', largely due to similar factors as reported in the study above, which he termed the "illusion of skill".
There are numerous investigations of incidents determining that human error was central to highly negative potential or actual real-world outcomes, in which manifestation of cognitive biases is a plausible component. Examples:
  • The 'Gimli Glider' Incident, in which a July 23, 1983 Air Canada flight from Montreal to Edmonton ran out of fuel 41,000 feet over Manitoba because of a measurement error on refueling, an outcome later determined to be the result of a series of unchecked assumptions made by ground personnel. Without power to operate radio, radar or other navigation aids, and only manual operation of the aircraft's control surfaces, the flight crew managed to locate an abandoned Canadian Air Force landing strip near Gimli, Manitoba. Without engine power, and with only manual wheel braking, the pilot put the aircraft down, complete with 61 passengers plus crew, and safely brought it to a stop. This outcome was the result of skill (the pilot had glider experience) and luck (the co-pilot just happened to know about the airstrip); no lives were lost, the damage to the aircraft was modest, and there were knowledgeable survivors to inform modifications to fueling procedures at all Canadian airports.
  • The Loss of the Mars Climate Orbiter, which on September 23, 1999 "encountered Mars at an improperly low altitude" and was lost. NASA described the systemic cause of this mishap as an organizational failure, with the specific, proximate cause being unchecked assumptions across mission teams regarding the mix of metric and United States customary units used in different systems on the craft. A host of cognitive biases can be imagined in this situation: confirmation bias, hindsight bias, overconfidence effect, availability bias, and even the meta-bias bias blind spot.
  • The Sullivan Mine Incident of May 18, 2006, in which two mining professionals and two paramedics at the closed Sullivan mine in British Columbia, Canada, all specifically trained in safety measures, lost their lives by failing to understand a life-threatening situation that in hindsight was obvious. The first person to succumb failed to accurately discern an anoxic environment at the bottom of a sump within a sampling shed, accessed by a ladder. After the first fatality, three other co-workers, all trained in hazardous operational situations, one after the other lost their lives in exactly the same manner, each apparently discounting the evidence of the previous victims' fate. The power of confirmation bias alone would be sufficient to explain why this happened, but other cognitive biases probably manifested as well.
  • The London Ambulance Service Failures, in which several Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system failures resulted in out-of-specification service delays and reports of deaths attributed to these delays. A 1992 system failure was particularly impactful, with service delays of up to 11 hours resulting in an estimated 30 unnecessary deaths in addition to hundreds of delayed medical procedures. This incident is one example of how large computer system development projects exhibit major flaws in planning, design, execution, test, deployment and maintenance.
  • Atul Gawande, an accomplished professional in the medical field, recounts the results of an initiative at a major US hospital, in which a test run showed that doctors skipped at least one of only 5 steps in 1/3 of certain surgery cases, after which nurses were given the authority and responsibility to catch doctors missing any steps in a simple checklist aimed at reducing central line infections. In the subsequent 15-month period, infection rates went from 11% to 0%, 8 deaths were avoided and some $2 million in avoidable costs were saved.
  • Other disaster-level examples of negative outcomes resulting from human error, possibly including multiple cognitive biases: the Three Mile Island nuclear meltdown, the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger, the Chernobyl nuclear reactor fire, the downing of an Iran Air passenger aircraft, the ineffective response to the Hurricane Katrina weather event, and many more.
Each of the approximately 100 cognitive biases known to date can also produce negative outcomes in our everyday lives, though rarely as serious as in the examples above. An illustrative selection, recounted in multiple studies:
  • Confirmation bias, the tendency to seek out only that information that supports one's preconceptions, and to discount that which does not. For example, hearing only one side of a political debate, or, failing to accept the evidence that one's job has become redundant.
  • Framing effect, the tendency to react to how information is framed, beyond its factual content. For example, choosing no surgery when told it has a 10% failure rate, where one would have opted for surgery if told it has a 90% success rate, or, opting not to choose organ donation as part of driver's license renewal when the default is 'No'.
  • Anchoring bias, the tendency to produce an estimate near a cue amount that may or may not have been intentionally offered. For example, producing a quote based on a manager's preferences, or, negotiating a house purchase price from the starting amount suggested by a real estate agent rather than an objective assessment of value.
  • Gambler's fallacy (aka sunk cost bias), the failure to reset one's expectations based on one's current situation. For example, refusing to pay again to purchase a replacement for a lost ticket to a desired entertainment, or, refusing to sell a sizable long stock position in a rapidly falling market.
  • Representativeness heuristic, the tendency to judge something as belonging to a class based on a few salient characteristics without accounting for base rates of those characteristics. For example, the belief that one will not become an alcoholic because one lacks some characteristic of an alcoholic stereotype, or, that one has a higher probability to win the lottery because one buys tickets from the same kind of vendor as several known big winners.
  • Halo effect, the tendency to attribute unverified capabilities in a person based on an observed capability. For example, believing an Oscar-winning actor's assertion regarding the harvest of Atlantic seals, or, assuming that a tall, handsome man is intelligent and kind.
  • Hindsight bias, the tendency to assess one's previous decisions as more efficacious than they were. For example, 'recalling' one's prediction that Vancouver would lose the 2011 Stanley Cup, or, 'remembering' to have identified the proximate cause of the 2007 Great Recession.
  • Availability heuristic, the tendency to estimate that what is easily remembered is more likely than that which is not. For example, estimating that an information meeting on municipal planning will be boring because the last such meeting you attended (on a different topic) was so, or, not believing your Member of Parliament's promise to fight for women's equality because he didn't show up to your home bake sale fundraiser for him.
  • Bandwagon effect, the tendency to do or believe what others do or believe. For example, voting for a political candidate because your father unfailingly voted for that candidate's party, or, not objecting to a bully's harassment because the rest of your peers don't.

To date

An increasing number of academic and professional disciplines are identifying means of cognitive bias mitigation. Notable examples in the field of debiasing, is a model by the NeuroLeadership Institute that categorizes over 150 known cognitive biases into a decision-making framework.

What follows is a characterization of the assumptions, theories, methods and results, in disciplines concerned with the efficacy of human reasoning, that plausibly bear on a theory and/or practice of cognitive bias mitigation. In most cases this is based on explicit reference to cognitive biases or their mitigation, in others on unstated but self-evident applicability. This characterization is organized along lines reflecting historical segmentation of disciplines, though in practice there is a significant amount of overlap.

Decision theory

Decision theory, a discipline with its roots grounded in neo-classical economics, is explicitly focused on human reasoning, judgment, choice and decision making, primarily in 'one-shot games' between two agents with or without perfect information. The theoretical underpinning of decision theory assumes that all decision makers are rational agents trying to maximize the economic expected value/utility of their choices, and that to accomplish this they utilize formal analytical methods such as mathematics, probability, statistics, and logic under cognitive resource constraints.

Normative, or prescriptive, decision theory concerns itself with what people should do, given the goal of maximizing expected value/utility; in this approach there is no explicit representation in practitioners' models of unconscious factors such as cognitive biases, i.e. all factors are considered conscious choice parameters for all agents. Practitioners tend to treat deviations from what a rational agent would do as 'errors of irrationality', with the implication that cognitive bias mitigation can only be achieved by decision makers becoming more like rational agents, though no explicit measures for achieving this are proffered.

Positive, or descriptive, decision theory concerns itself with what people actually do; practitioners tend to acknowledge the persistent existence of 'irrational' behavior, and while some mention human motivation and biases as possible contributors to such behavior, these factors are not made explicit in their models. Practitioners tend to treat deviations from what a rational agent would do as evidence of important, but as yet not understood, decision-making variables, and have as yet no explicit or implicit contributions to make to a theory and practice of cognitive bias mitigation.

Game theory

Game theory, a discipline with roots in economics and system dynamics, is a method of studying strategic decision making in situations involving multi-step interactions with multiple agents with or without perfect information. As with decision theory, the theoretical underpinning of game theory assumes that all decision makers are rational agents trying to maximize the economic expected value/utility of their choices, and that to accomplish this they utilize formal analytical methods such as mathematics, probability, statistics, and logic under cognitive resource constraints.

One major difference between decision theory and game theory is the notion of 'equilibrium', a situation in which all agents agree on a strategy because any deviation from this strategy punishes the deviating agent. Despite analytical proofs of the existence of at least one equilibrium in a wide range of scenarios, game theory predictions, like those in decision theory, often do not match actual human choices. As with decision theory, practitioners tend to view such deviations as 'irrational', and rather than attempt to model such behavior, by implication hold that cognitive bias mitigation can only be achieved by decision makers becoming more like rational agents.

In the full range of game theory models there are many that do not guarantee the existence of equilibria, i.e. there are conflict situations where there is no set of agents' strategies that all agents agree are in their best interests. However, even when theoretical equilibria exist, i.e. when optimal decision strategies are available for all agents, real-life decision-makers often do not find them; indeed they sometimes apparently do not even try to find them, suggesting that some agents are not consistently 'rational'. game theory does not appear to accommodate any kind of agent other than the rational agent.

Behavioral economics

Unlike neo-classical economics and decision theory, behavioral economics and the related field, behavioral finance, explicitly consider the effects of social, cognitive and emotional factors on individuals' economic decisions. These disciplines combine insights from psychology and neo-classical economics to achieve this.

Prospect theory was an early inspiration for this discipline, and has been further developed by its practitioners. It is one of the earliest economic theories that explicitly acknowledge the notion of cognitive bias, though the model itself accounts for only a few, including loss aversion, anchoring and adjustment bias, endowment effect, and perhaps others. No mention is made in formal prospect theory of cognitive bias mitigation, and there is no evidence of peer-reviewed work on cognitive bias mitigation in other areas of this discipline.

However, Daniel Kahneman and others have authored recent articles in business and trade magazines addressing the notion of cognitive bias mitigation in a limited form. These contributions assert that cognitive bias mitigation is necessary and offer general suggestions for how to achieve it, though the guidance is limited to only a few cognitive biases and is not self-evidently generalizable to others.

Neuroeconomics

Neuroeconomics is a discipline made possible by advances in brain activity imaging technologies. This discipline merges some of the ideas in experimental economics, behavioral economics, cognitive science and social science in an attempt to better understand the neural basis for human decision making.

fMRI experiments suggest that the limbic system is consistently involved in resolving economic decision situations that have emotional valence, the inference being that this part of the human brain is implicated in creating the deviations from rational agent choices noted in emotionally valent economic decision making. Practitioners in this discipline have demonstrated correlations between brain activity in this part of the brain and prospection activity, and neuronal activation has been shown to have measurable, consistent effects on decision making. These results must be considered speculative and preliminary, but are nonetheless suggestive of the possibility of real-time identification of brain states associated with cognitive bias manifestation, and the possibility of purposeful interventions at the neuronal level to achieve cognitive bias mitigation.

Cognitive psychology

Several streams of investigation in this discipline are noteworthy for their possible relevance to a theory of cognitive bias mitigation.

One approach to mitigation originally suggested by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, expanded upon by others, and applied in real-life situations, is reference class forecasting. This approach involves three steps: with a specific project in mind, identify a number of past projects that share a large number of elements with the project under scrutiny; for this group of projects, establish a probability distribution of the parameter that is being forecast; and, compare the specific project with the group of similar projects, in order to establish the most likely value of the selected parameter for the specific project. This simply stated method masks potential complexity regarding application to real-life projects: few projects are characterizable by a single parameter; multiple parameters exponentially complicates the process; gathering sufficient data on which to build robust probability distributions is problematic; and, project outcomes are rarely unambiguous and their reportage is often skewed by stakeholders' interests. Nonetheless, this approach has merit as part of a cognitive bias mitigation protocol when the process is applied with a maximum of diligence, in situations where good data is available and all stakeholders can be expected to cooperate.

A concept rooted in considerations of the actual machinery of human reasoning, bounded rationality is one that may inform significant advances in cognitive bias mitigation. Originally conceived of by Herbert A. Simon in the 1960s and leading to the concept of satisficing as opposed to optimizing, this idea found experimental expression in the work of Gerd Gigerenzer and others. One line of Gigerenzer's work led to the "Fast and Frugal" framing of the human reasoning mechanism, which focused on the primacy of 'recognition' in decision making, backed up by tie-resolving heuristics operating in a low cognitive resource environment. In a series of objective tests, models based on this approach outperformed models based on rational agents maximizing their utility using formal analytical methods. One contribution to a theory and practice of cognitive bias mitigation from this approach is that it addresses mitigation without explicitly targeting individual cognitive biases and focuses on the reasoning mechanism itself to avoid cognitive biases manifestation.

Intensive situational training is capable of providing individuals with what appears to be cognitive bias mitigation in decision making, but amounts to a fixed strategy of selecting the single best response to recognized situations regardless of the 'noise' in the environment. Studies and anecdotes reported in popular-audience media of firefighter captains, military platoon leaders and others making correct, snap judgments under extreme duress suggest that these responses are likely not generalizable and may contribute to a theory and practice of cognitive bias mitigation only the general idea of domain-specific intensive training.

Similarly, expert-level training in such foundational disciplines as mathematics, statistics, probability, logic, etc. can be useful for cognitive bias mitigation when the expected standard of performance reflects such formal analytical methods. However, a study of software engineering professionals suggests that for the task of estimating software projects, despite the strong analytical aspect of this task, standards of performance focusing on workplace social context were much more dominant than formal analytical methods. This finding, if generalizable to other tasks and disciplines, would discount the potential of expert-level training as a cognitive bias mitigation approach, and could contribute a narrow but important idea to a theory and practice of cognitive bias mitigation.
Laboratory experiments in which cognitive bias mitigation is an explicit goal are rare. One 1980 study explored the notion of reducing the optimism bias by showing subjects other subjects' outputs from a reasoning task, with the result that their subsequent decision-making was somewhat debiased.

A recent research effort by Morewedge and colleagues (2015) found evidence for domain-general forms of debiasing. In two longitudinal experiments, debiasing training techniques featuring interactive games that elicited six cognitive biases (anchoring, bias blind spot, confirmation bias, fundamental attribution error, projection bias, and representativeness), provided participants with individualized feedback, mitigating strategies, and practice, resulted in an immediate reduction of more than 30% in commission of the biases and a long term (2 to 3-month delay) reduction of more than 20%. The instructional videos were also effective, but were less effective than the games.

Evolutionary psychology

This discipline explicitly challenges the prevalent view that humans are rational agents maximizing expected value/utility, using formal analytical methods to do so. Practitioners such as Cosmides, Tooby, Haselton, Confer and others posit that cognitive biases are more properly referred to as cognitive heuristics, and should be viewed as a toolkit of cognitive shortcuts selected for by evolutionary pressure and thus are features rather than flaws, as assumed in the prevalent view. Theoretical models and analyses supporting this view are plentiful. This view suggests that negative reasoning outcomes arise primarily because the reasoning challenges faced by modern humans, and the social and political context within which these are presented, make demands on our ancient 'heuristic toolkit' that at best create confusion as to which heuristics to apply in a given situation, and at worst generate what adherents of the prevalent view call 'reasoning errors'.

In a similar vein, Mercier and Sperber describe a theory for confirmation bias, and possibly other cognitive biases, which is a radical departure from the prevalent view, which holds that human reasoning is intended to assist individual economic decisions. Their view suggests that it evolved as a social phenomenon and that the goal was argumentation, i.e. to convince others and to be careful when others try to convince us. It is too early to tell whether this idea applies more generally to other cognitive biases, but the point of view supporting the theory may be useful in the construction of a theory and practice of cognitive bias mitigation.

There is an emerging convergence between evolutionary psychology and the concept of our reasoning mechanism being segregated (approximately) into 'System 1' and 'System 2'. In this view, System 1 is the 'first line' of cognitive processing of all perceptions, including internally generated 'pseudo-perceptions', which automatically, subconsciously and near-instantaneously produces emotionally valenced judgments of their probable effect on the individual's well-being. By contrast, System 2 is responsible for 'executive control', taking System 1's judgments as advisories, making future predictions, via prospection, of their actualization and then choosing which advisories, if any, to act on. In this view, System 2 is slow, simple-minded and lazy, usually defaulting to System 1 advisories and overriding them only when intensively trained to do so or when cognitive dissonance would result. In this view, our 'heuristic toolkit' resides largely in System 1, conforming to the view of cognitive biases being unconscious, automatic and very difficult to detect and override. Evolutionary psychology practitioners emphasize that our heuristic toolkit, despite the apparent abundance of 'reasoning errors' attributed to it, actually performs exceptionally well, given the rate at which it must operate, the range of judgments it produces, and the stakes involved. The System 1/2 view of the human reasoning mechanism appears to have empirical plausibility and thus may contribute to a theory and practice of cognitive bias mitigation.

Neuroscience

Neuroscience offers empirical support for the concept of segregating the human reasoning mechanism into System 1 and System 2, as described above, based on brain activity imaging experiments using fMRI technology. While this notion must remain speculative until further work is done, it appears to be a productive basis for conceiving options for constructing a theory and practice of cognitive bias mitigation.

Anthropology

Anthropologists have provided generally accepted scenarios of how our progenitors lived and what was important in their lives. These scenarios of social, political, and economic organization are not uniform throughout history or geography, but there is a degree of stability throughout the Paleolithic era, and the Holocene in particular. This, along with the findings in Evolutionary psychology and Neuroscience above, suggests that our cognitive heuristics are at their best when operating in a social, political and economic environment most like that of the Paleolithic/Holocene. If this is true, then one possible means to achieve at least some cognitive bias mitigation is to mimic, as much as possible, Paleolithic/Holocene social, political and economic scenarios when one is performing a reasoning task that could attract negative cognitive bias effects.

Human reliability engineering

A number of paradigms, methods and tools for improving human performance reliability have been developed within the discipline of human reliability engineering. Although there is some attention paid to the human reasoning mechanism itself, the dominant approach is to anticipate problematic situations, constrain human operations through process mandates, and guide human decisions through fixed response protocols specific to the domain involved. While this approach can produce effective responses to critical situations under stress, the protocols involved must be viewed as having limited generalizability beyond the domain for which they were developed, with the implication that solutions in this discipline may provide only generic frameworks to a theory and practice of cognitive bias mitigation.

Machine learning

Machine learning, a branch of artificial intelligence, has been used to investigate human learning and decision making.

One technique particularly applicable to cognitive bias mitigation is neural network learning and choice selection, an approach inspired by the imagined structure and function of actual biological neural networks in the human brain. The multilayer, cross-connected signal collection and propagation structure typical of neural network models, where weights govern the contribution of signals to each connection, allow very small models to perform rather complex decision-making tasks at high fidelity.

In principle, such models are capable of modeling decision making that takes account of human needs and motivations within social contexts, and suggest their consideration in a theory and practice of cognitive bias mitigation. Challenges to realizing this potential: accumulating the considerable amount of appropriate real world 'training sets' for the neural network portion of such models; characterizing real-life decision-making situations and outcomes so as to drive models effectively; and the lack of direct mapping from a neural network's internal structure to components of the human reasoning mechanism.

Software engineering

This discipline, though not focused on improving human reasoning outcomes as an end goal, is one in which the need for such improvement has been explicitly recognized, though the term "cognitive bias mitigation" is not universally used.

One study identifies specific steps to counter the effects of confirmation bias in certain phases of the software engineering lifecycle.

Another study takes a step back from focussing on cognitive biases and describes a framework for identifying "Performance Norms", criteria by which reasoning outcomes are judged correct or incorrect, so as to determine when cognitive bias mitigation is required, to guide identification of the biases that may be 'in play' in a real-world situation, and subsequently to prescribe their mitigations. This study refers to a broad research program with the goal of moving toward a theory and practice of cognitive bias mitigation.

Other

Other initiatives aimed directly at a theory and practice of cognitive bias mitigation may exist within other disciplines under different labels than employed here.

Peace education

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to navigation Jump to search

Peace education is the process of acquiring the values, the knowledge and developing the attitudes, skills, and behaviors to live in harmony with oneself, with others, and with the natural environment.

There are numerous United Nations declarations on the importance of peace education. Ban Ki Moon, U.N. Secretary General, has dedicated the International Day of Peace 2013 to peace education in an effort to refocus minds and financing on the preeminence of peace education as the means to bring about a culture of peace. Koichiro Matsuura, the immediate past Director-General of UNESCO, has written of peace education as being of "fundamental importance to the mission of UNESCO and the United Nations". Peace education as a right is something which is now increasingly emphasized by peace researchers such as Betty Reardon and Douglas Roche. There has also been a recent meshing of peace education and human rights education.

Definition

Ian Harris and John Synott have described peace education as a series of "teaching encounters" that draw from people:
  • their desire for peace,
  • nonviolent alternatives for managing conflict, and
  • skills for critical analysis of structural arrangements that produce and legitimize injustice and inequality.
James Page suggests peace education be thought of as "encouraging a commitment to peace as a settled disposition and enhancing the confidence of the individual as an individual agent of peace; as informing the student on the consequences of war and social injustice; as informing the student on the value of peaceful and just social structures and working to uphold or develop such social structures; as encouraging the student to love the world and to imagine a peaceful future; and as caring for the student and encouraging the student to care for others".

Often the theory or philosophy of peace education has been assumed and not articulated. Johan Galtung suggested in 1975 that no theory for peace education existed and that there was clearly an urgent need for such theory. More recently there have been attempts to establish such a theory. Joachim James Calleja has suggested that a philosophical basis for peace education might be located in the Kantian notion of duty. James Page has suggested that a rationale for peace education might be located in virtue ethics, consequentialist ethics, conservative political ethics, aesthetic ethics and the ethics of care.

Since the early decades of the 20th century, "peace education" programs around the world have represented a spectrum of focal themes, including anti-nuclearism, international understanding, environmental responsibility, communication skills, nonviolence, conflict resolution techniques, democracy, human rights awareness, tolerance of diversity, coexistence and gender equality, among others. Some have also addressed spiritual dimensions of inner harmony, or synthesized a number of the foregoing issues into programs on world citizenship. While academic discourse on the subject has increasingly recognized the need for a broader, more holistic approach to peace education, a review of field-based projects reveals that three variations of peace education are most common: conflict resolution training, democracy education, and human rights education. New approaches are emerging and calling into question some of theoretical foundations of the models just mentioned. The most significant of these new approaches focuses on peace education as a process of worldview transformation.

Forms

Conflict resolution training

Peace education programs centered on conflict resolution typically focus on the social-behavioural symptoms of conflict, training individuals to resolve inter-personal disputes through techniques of negotiation and (peer) mediation. Learning to manage anger, "fight fair" and improve communication through skills such as listening, turn-taking, identifying needs, and separating facts from emotions, constitute the main elements of these programs. Participants are also encouraged to take responsibility for their actions and to brainstorm together on compromises.

In general, approaches of this type aim to "alter beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours...from negative to positive attitudes toward conflict as a basis for preventing violence" (Van Slyck, Stern and Elbedour, 1999, emphasis added). There are various styles or approaches in conflict resolution training (ADR, Verbal Aikido, NVC) that can give the practitioner the means to accept the conflictual situation and orient it towards a peaceful resolution. As one peer mediation coordinator put it: "Conflict is very natural and normal, but you can't go through your entire life beating everybody up—you have to learn different ways to resolve conflict".

Democracy education

Peace education programs centered on democracy education typically focus on the political processes associated with conflict, and postulate that with an increase in democratic participation the likelihood of societies resolving conflict through violence and war decreases. At the same time, "a democratic society needs the commitment of citizens who accept the inevitability of conflict as well as the necessity for tolerance" (U.S. Department of State, The Culture of Democracy, emphasis added). Thus programs of this kind attempt to foster a conflict-positive orientation in the community by training students to view conflict as a platform for creativity and growth.

Approaches of this type train participants in the skills of critical thinking, debate and coalition-building, and promote the values of freedom of speech, individuality, tolerance of diversity, compromise and conscientious objection. Their aim is to produce "responsible citizens" who will hold their governments accountable to the standards of peace, primarily through adversarial processes. Activities are structured to have students "assume the role of the citizen that chooses, makes decisions, takes positions, argues positions and respects the opinions of others": skills that a multi-party democracy are based upon. Based on the assumption that democracy decreases the likelihood of violence and war, it is assumed that these are the same skills necessary for creating a culture of peace.

Human rights education

Peace education programs centered on raising awareness of human rights typically focus at the level of policies that humanity ought to adopt in order to move closer to a peaceful global community. The aim is to engender a commitment among participants to a vision of structural peace in which all individual members of the human race can exercise their personal freedoms and be legally protected from violence, oppression and indignity.

Approaches of this type familiarize participants with the international covenants and declarations of the United Nations system; train students to recognize violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and promote tolerance, solidarity, autonomy and self-affirmation at the individual and collective levels.

Human rights education "faces continual elaboration, a significant theory-practice gap and frequent challenge as to its validity". In one practitioner's view:
"Human rights education does not work in communities fraught with conflict unless it is part of a comprehensive approach... In fact, such education can be counterproductive and lead to greater conflict if people become aware of rights which are not realized. In this respect, human rights education can increase the potential for conflict"
To prevent these outcomes, many such programs are now being combined with aspects of conflict resolution and democracy education schools of thought, along with training in nonviolent action.

Worldview transformation

Some approaches to peace education start from insights gleaned from psychology which recognize the developmental nature of human psychosocial dispositions. Essentially, while conflict-promoting attitudes and behaviours are characteristic of earlier phases of human development, unity-promoting attitudes and behaviours emerge in later phases of healthy development. H.B. Danesh (2002a, 2002b, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008a, 2008b) proposes an "Integrative Theory of Peace" in which peace is understood as a psychosocial, political, moral and spiritual reality. Peace education, he says, must focus on the healthy development and maturation of human consciousness through assisting people to examine and transform their worldviews. Worldviews are defined as the subconscious lens (acquired through cultural, family, historical, religious and societal influences) through which people perceive four key issues: 1) the nature of reality, 2) human nature, 3) the purpose of existence, 4) the principles governing appropriate human relationships. Surveying a mass of material, Danesh argues that the majority of people and societies in the world hold conflict-based worldviews, which express themselves in conflicted intrapersonal, interpersonal, intergroup, and international relationships. He subdivides conflict-based worldviews into two main categories which he correlates to phases of human development: the Survival-Based Worldview and the Identity-Based Worldview. It is through the acquisition of a more integrative, Unity-Based Worldview that human capacity to mitigate conflict, create unity in the context of diversity, and establish sustainable cultures of peace, is increased—be it in the home, at school, at work, or in the international community.

Critical peace education

Modern forms of peace education relate to new scholarly explorations and applications of techniques used in peace education internationally, in plural communities and with individuals. Critical Peace Education (Bajaj 2008, 2015; Bajaj & Hantzopoulos 2016; Trifonas & Wright 2013) is an emancipatory pursuit that seeks to link education to the goals and foci of social justice disrupting inequality through critical pedagogy (Freire 2003). Critical peace education addresses the critique that peace education is imperial and impository mimicking the 'interventionism' of Western peacebuilding by foregrounding local practices and narratives into peace education (Salomon 2004; MacGinty & Richmond 2007; Golding 2017). The project of critical peace education includes conceiving of education as a space of transformation where students and teachers become change agents that recognise past and present experiences of inequity and bias and where schools become strategic sites for fostering emancipatory change.

Yogic peace education

Where Critical Peace Education is emancipatory, seeking to foster full humanity in society for everyone, yogic peace education (Standish & Joyce 2017) in concerned with transforming personal (as opposed to interpersonal, structural or societal/cultural) violence. In yogic peace education, techniques from yogic science are utilised to alter the physical, mental and spiritual instrument of humanity (the self) to address violence that comes from within. Contemporary peace education (similar to all peace education) relate to specific forms of violence (and their transformation) and similar to teaching human rights and conflict resolution in schools critical peace education and yogic peace education are complementary curricula that seek to foster positive peace and decrease violence in society.

Criticism

Toh Swee-Hin (1997) observes that each of the various streams of peace education "inevitably have their own dynamics and 'autonomy' in terms of theory and practice". "Salomon (2002) has described how the challenges, goals, and methods of peace education differ substantially between areas characterized by intractable conflict, interethnic tension, or relative tranquility".

Salomon (2002) raises the problem and its consequences:
"Imagine that medical practitioners would not distinguish between invasive surgery to remove malignant tumors and surgery to correct one's vision. Imagine also that while surgeries are practiced, no research and no evaluation of their differential effectiveness accompany them. The field would be considered neither very serious nor very trustworthy. Luckily enough, such a state of affairs does not describe the field of medicine, but it comes pretty close to describing the field of peace education. First, too many profoundly different kinds of activities taking place in an exceedingly wide array of contexts are all lumped under the same category label of "peace education" as if they belong together. Second, for whatever reason, the field's scholarship in the form of theorizing, research and program evaluation badly lags behind practice… In the absence of clarity of what peace education really is, or how its different varieties relate to each other, it is unclear how experience with one variant of peace education in one region can usefully inform programs in another region."
According to Clarke-Habibi (2005), "A general or integrated theory of peace is needed: one that can holistically account for the intrapersonal, inter-personal, inter-group and international dynamics of peace, as well as its main principles and pre-requisites. An essential component of this integrated theory must also be the recognition that a culture of peace can only result from an authentic process of transformation, both individual and collective."

News about Peace Education

Up-to-date news about peace education initiatives is provided by the Global Campaign for Peace Education on their website. Another source is the Culture of Peace News Network, which is dedicated to education for a culture of peace. See especially the CPNN section Where is Peace Education Taking Place?

Mandatory Palestine

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_Palestine   Palestine 1920–...