Fundamentalism usually has a religious connotation that indicates unwavering attachment to a set of irreducible beliefs.
However, fundamentalism has come to be applied to a tendency among
certain groups – mainly, although not exclusively, in religion – that is
characterized by a markedly strict literalism as it is applied to certain specific scriptures, dogmas, or ideologies, and a strong sense of the importance of maintaining ingroup and outgroup distinctions, leading to an emphasis on purity and the desire to return to a previous ideal
from which advocates believe members have strayed. Rejection of
diversity of opinion as applied to these established "fundamentals" and
their accepted interpretation within the group often results from this
tendency.
Depending upon the context, the label "fundamentalism" can be a pejorative rather than a neutral characterization, similar to the ways that calling political perspectives "right-wing" or "left-wing" can have negative connotations.
Historic and contemporary examples of Buddhist fundamentalism occur in each of the three main branches of Buddhism: Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana. In Japan, a prominent example has been the practice among some members of the Mahayana Nichiren sect of shakubuku — a method of proselytizing involving strident condemnation of other sects as deficient or evil.
Christianity
Christian fundamentalism has been defined by George Marsden as the demand for a strict adherence to certain theological doctrines, in reaction against Modernist theology.
The term was originally coined by its supporters to describe what they
claimed were five specific classic theological beliefs of Christianity,
and that developed into a Christian fundamentalist movement within the Protestant community of the United States in the early part of the 20th century. Fundamentalism as a movement arose in the United States, starting among conservativePresbyterian theologians at Princeton Theological Seminary in the late 19th century. It soon spread to conservatives among the Baptists
and other denominations around 1910 to 1920. The movement's purpose was
to reaffirm key theological tenets and defend them against the
challenges of liberal theology and higher criticism.
The concept of "fundamentalism" has roots in the Niagara Bible Conferences that were held annually between 1878 and 1897. During those conferences, the tenets considered fundamental to Christian belief were identified.
"Fundamentalism" was prefigured by The Fundamentals: A Testimony To The Truth, a collection of twelve pamphlets published between 1910 and 1915, by brothers Milton and Lyman Stewart. It is widely considered to be the foundation of modern Christian fundamentalism.
In 1910, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church identified what became known as the five fundamentals:
In 1920, the word "fundamentalist" was first used in print by Curtis
Lee Laws, editor of "The Watchman Examiner," a Baptist newspaper. Laws proposed that those Christians who were fighting for the fundamentals of the faith should be called "fundamentalists."
Theological conservatives who rallied around the five
fundamentals came to be known as "fundamentalists". They rejected the
existence of commonalities with theologically related religious
traditions, such as the grouping of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism into one Abrahamic family of religions. By contrast, while Evangelical groups (such as the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association) typically agree with the "fundamentals" as they are expressed in The Fundamentals, they are often willing to participate in events with religious groups which do not hold to the essential doctrines.
Hinduism
Scholars identify several politically active Hindu movements as part of the "Hindu fundamentalist family."
Islam
Extremism within Islam goes back to the 7th century to the time of the Kharijites.
From their essentially political position, they developed extreme
doctrines that set them apart from both mainstream Sunni and Shia
Muslims. The Kharijites were particularly noted for adopting a radical
approach to Takfir, whereby they declared other Muslims to be unbelievers and therefore deemed them worthy of death.
The Shia and Sunni religious conflicts since the 7th century created an opening for radical ideologues, such as Ali Shariati (1933–77), to merge social revolution with Islamic fundamentalism, as exemplified by the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Islamic fundamentalism has appeared in many countries; the Wahhabi version is promoted worldwide and financed by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Pakistan.
The Iran hostage crisis
of 1979–80 marked a major turning point in the use of the term
"fundamentalism". The media, in an attempt to explain the ideology of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution
to a Western audience described it as a "fundamentalist version of
Islam" by way of analogy to the Christian fundamentalist movement in the
U.S. Thus was born the term Islamic fundamentalist, which became a common use of the term in following years.
Political
usage of the term "fundamentalism" has been criticized. It has been
used by political groups to berate opponents, using the term flexibly
depending on their political interests. According to Judith Nagata, a
professor of Asia Research Institute in the National University of Singapore, "The Afghan mujahiddin,
locked in combat with the Soviet enemy in the 1980s, could be praised
as 'freedom fighters' by their American backers at the time, while the
present Taliban, viewed, among other things, as protectors of American
enemy Osama bin Laden, are unequivocally 'fundamentalist'."
"Fundamentalist" has been used pejoratively to refer to
philosophies perceived as literal-minded or carrying a pretense of being
the sole source of objective truth, regardless of whether it is usually
called a religion. For instance, the Archbishop of Wales has criticized "atheistic fundamentalism" broadly and said "Any kind of fundamentalism, be it Biblical, atheistic or Islamic, is dangerous".
He also said, "the new fundamentalism of our age ... leads to the
language of expulsion and exclusivity, of extremism and polarisation,
and the claim that, because God is on our side, he is not on yours." He claimed it led to situations such as councils calling Christmas "Winterval", schools refusing to put on nativity plays and crosses being removed from chapels. Others have countered that some of these attacks on Christmas are urban legends, not all schools do nativity plays because they choose to perform other traditional plays like A Christmas Carol or The Snow Queen and, because of rising tensions between various religions, opening up public spaces to alternate displays rather than the Nativity scene is an attempt to keep government religion-neutral.
In France, during a protestation march against the imposition of
restrictions on the wearing of headscarves in state-run schools, a
banner labeled the ban as "secular fundamentalism". In the United States, private or cultural intolerance of women wearing the hijab (Islamic headcovering) and political activism by Muslims also has been labeled "secular fundamentalism".
The term "fundamentalism" is sometimes applied to signify a
counter-cultural fidelity to a principle or set of principles, as in the
pejorative term "market fundamentalism", used to imply exaggerated religious-like faith in the ability of unfettered laissez-faire or free-marketcapitalist economic views or policies to solve economic and social problems. According to economist John Quiggin,
the standard features of "economic fundamentalist rhetoric" are
"dogmatic" assertions and the claim that anyone who holds contrary views
is not a real economist. Retired professor in religious studies
Roderick Hindery lists positive qualities attributed to political,
economic, or other forms of cultural fundamentalism, including
"vitality, enthusiasm, willingness to back up words with actions, and
the avoidance of facile compromise" as well as negative aspects such as
psychological attitudes, occasionally elitist and pessimistic perspectives, and in some cases literalism.
In order to carry out the fundamentalist program in
practice, one would need a perfect understanding of the ancient language
of the original text, if indeed the true text can be discerned from
among variants. Furthermore, human beings are the ones who transmit this
understanding between generations. Even if one wanted to follow the
literal word of God, the need for people first to understand that word
necessitates human interpretation. Through that process human
fallibility is inextricably mixed into the very meaning of the divine
word. As a result, it is impossible to follow the indisputable word of
God; one can only achieve a human understanding of God's will.
Howard Thurman was interviewed in the late 1970s for a BBC feature on religion. He told the interviewer:
I say that creeds, dogmas, and
theologies are inventions of the mind. It is the nature of the mind to
make sense out of experience, to reduce the conglomerates of experience
to units of comprehension which we call principles, or ideologies, or
concepts. Religious experience is dynamic, fluid, effervescent, yeasty.
But the mind can't handle these so it has to imprison religious
experience in some way, get it bottled up. Then, when the experience
quiets down, the mind draws a bead on it and extracts concepts, notions,
dogmas, so that religious experience can make sense to the mind.
Meanwhile religious experience goes on experiencing, so that by the time
I get my dogma stated so that I can think about it, the religious
experience becomes an object of thought.
Influential criticisms of fundamentalism include James Barr's books on Christian fundamentalism and Bassam Tibi's analysis of Islamic fundamentalism.
A study at the University of Edinburgh
found that of its six measured dimensions of religiosity, "lower
intelligence is most associated with higher levels of fundamentalism."
Controversy
The Associated Press' AP Stylebook
recommends that the term fundamentalist not be used for any group that
does not apply the term to itself. Many scholars have adopted a similar
position.
Other scholars, however, use the term in the broader descriptive sense
to refer to various groups in various religious traditions including
those groups that would object to being classified as fundamentalists,
such as in the Fundamentalism Project.
Tex Sample asserts that it is a mistake to refer to a Muslim, Jewish, or Christian
fundamentalist. Rather, a fundamentalist's fundamentalism is their
primary concern, over and above other denominational or faith
considerations.
Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is an ideological variable studied in political, social and personality psychology.
Right-wing authoritarians are people who have a high degree of
willingness to submit to authorities they perceive as established and
legitimate, who adhere to societal conventions and norms, and who are
hostile and punitive in their attitudes towards people who do not adhere
to them. They value uniformity and are in favour of using group
authority, including coercion, to achieve it.
In the academic use of the term right-wing authoritarianism, the label right-wing
does not automatically match the popular use of the label, with some
academics allowing for either left-wing or right-wing politics to
motivate people to submit.
After extensive questionnaire research and statistical analysis,
Altemeyer found that only three of the original nine hypothesized
components of the model correlated together: authoritarian submission,
authoritarian aggression and conventionalism. Researchers have
traditionally assumed that there was just one kind of authoritarian
personality, who could be either a follower or a leader. The discovery
that followers and leaders are usually different types of authoritarians
is based on research done by Sam McFarland.
Altemeyer describes another scale called "Social Dominance" which
measures how domineering a person is. Altemeyer calls people who score
highly on both his "Right-Wing Authoritarian" and "Social Dominance"
scales as "Double Highs".
Assessment
Right-wing authoritarianism is measured by the RWA scale which uses a Likert scale
response. The first scored item on the scale states: "Our country
desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to
destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us". People
who strongly agree with this are showing a tendency toward
authoritarian submission ("Our country desperately needs a mighty
leader"), authoritarian aggression ("who will do what has to be done to
destroy") and conventionalism ("the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us").
Psychometrically, the RWA scale was a significant improvement over the F-scale
which was the original measure of the authoritarian personality. The
F-scale was worded so that agreement always indicated an authoritarian
response, thus leaving it susceptible to the acquiescence response bias.
The RWA scale is balanced to have an equal number of pro and anti
authoritarian statements. The RWA scale also has excellent internal
reliability, with coefficient alpha typically measuring between 0.85 and 0.94.
The RWA scale has been modified over the years as many of the items
lost their social significance as society changed. The current version
is 22 items long.
Although Altemeyer has continually updated the scale, researchers
in different domains have tended to lock-in on particular versions. In
the social psychology of religion, the 1992 version of the scale is
still commonly used.
In addition, the length of the earlier versions (30 items) led many
researchers to develop shorter versions of the scale. Some of those are
published, but many researchers simply select a subset of items to use in their research, a practice that Altemeyer strongly criticizes.
The uni-dimensionality of the scale has also been challenged
recently. Florian Funke showed that it is possible to extract the three
underlying dimensions of RWA if the double- and triple-barreled nature
of the items is removed. Given the possibility of underlying dimensions
emerging from the scale, it is then the case that the scale is no longer
balanced since all the items primarily capturing authoritarian
aggression are pro-trait worded (higher scores mean more
authoritarianism) and all the items primarily measuring conventionalism
are con-trait worded (higher scores mean less authoritarianism).
Work by Winnifred R. Louis, Kenneth I. Mavor and Chris G. Sibley
recently demonstrated that the existence of two or three factors in the
RWA scale reflects real differences in these dimensions rather than
acquiescence response bias.
Attitudes
Right-wing
authoritarians want society and social interactions structured in ways
that increase uniformity and minimize diversity. In order to achieve
that, they tend to be in favour of social control, coercion and the use
of group authority to place constraints on the behaviours of people such
as political dissidents and immigrants. These constraints might include
restrictions on immigration, limits on free speech and association and
laws regulating moral behaviour. It is the willingness to support or
take action that leads to increased social uniformity that makes
right-wing authoritarianism more than just a personal distaste for
difference. Right-wing authoritarianism is characterized by obedience to
authority, moral absolutism
and punitiveness towards dissidents and deviants. In parenting,
right-wing authoritarians value children's obedience, neatness and good
manners.
In 2013, Boris Bizumic and John Duckitt wrote that RWA measures the support "for the subordination of individual freedom and autonomy to the collective and its authority". Their studies show that it can be split into three distinct factors:
Authoritarianism: tough attitude towards violations of social rules, norms and laws.
Conservatism: favoring obedient and respectful support for societal authorities.
Traditionalism: favoring traditional, religious social norms and values.
The names of these three components of RWA resemble their standard
use but actually correspond to the three statistical factors. Right-wing
authoritarianism was previously split differently into three attitudinal and behavioral clusters which correlate together:
Authoritarian submission — a high degree of submissiveness to
the authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate in
the society in which one lives.
Authoritarian aggression — a general aggressiveness directed against
deviants, outgroups and other people that are perceived to be targets
according to established authorities.
Conventionalism — a high degree of adherence to the traditions and
social norms that are perceived to be endorsed by society and its
established authorities and a belief that others in one's society should
also be required to adhere to these norms.
The terminology of authoritarianism, authoritarian personality and right-wing authoritarianism tend to be used interchangeably by psychologists, although inclusion of the term personality may indicate a psychodynamic interpretation consistent with the original formulation of the theory.
Left and right
The phrase right-wing
in right-wing authoritarianism does not necessarily refer to someone's
specific political beliefs, but to his general preference vis-à-vis
social equality and hierarchy. The classic definition of left-wing describes somebody who believes in social equality and right-wing
describes somebody who believes in social hierarchy. Altemeyer's
personal distinction is that a right-wing authoritarian submits to the
established authorities in society whereas left-wing authoritarians
submit to authorities who want to overthrow the establishment.
In his books, Altemeyer writes that right-wing authoritarians are drawn
to domineering leaders, who by nature do not believe in equality and
thus have something in common. Milton Rokeach's
dogmatism scale was an early attempt to measure pure authoritarianism,
whether left-wing or right-wing. The scale was carefully designed to
measure closed-mindedness without regard to ideology. Nevertheless, researchers found that it correlated with British conservatism. In a similar line of research, Philip Tetlock found that right-wing beliefs are associated with less integrative complexity than left-wing beliefs. People with moderate liberal attitudes had the highest integrative complexity in their cognitions.
There have been a number of other attempts to identify "left-wing
authoritarians" in the United States and Canada. These would be people
who submit to leftist authorities, are highly conventional to liberal
viewpoints and are aggressive to people who oppose left-wing ideology.
These attempts have failed because measures of authoritarianism always
correlate at least slightly with the right. However, left-wing
authoritarians were found in Eastern Europe.
There are certainly extremists across the political spectrum, but most
psychologists now believe that authoritarianism is a predominantly
right-wing phenomenon.
Although authoritarians in North America generally support
conservative political parties, this finding must be considered in a
historical and cultural context. During the Cold War, authoritarians in the United States were usually anti-communist whereas in the Soviet Union authoritarians generally supported the Soviet Communist Party and were opposed to capitalism.
Authoritarians thus generally favor the established ways and oppose
social and political change, hence even politics usually labeled as
left-wing or right-wing is not descriptive. While communism in the Soviet Union
is seen as leftist, it still inspired the same responses. Furthermore,
recent research indicates that political progressives can exhibit the
qualities of authoritarianism when they are asked about conservative
Christians. A 2017 study found evidence that was suggestive of the existence of left-wing authoritarians
and a 2015 study suggested that support for political correctness
(defined as censoring views that offend or disadvantage a particular
group in society) could be a manifestation of left-wing authoritarianism (this was also supported by a 2020 study).
A 2012 study criticised research into authoritarianism, arguing that
there had been biased and inadequate research into left-wing
authoritarianism. Three 2020 papers argued there was increasing evidence for the existence of left-wing authoritarianism.
According to Karen Stenner,
an Australian professor who specializes in authoritarianism,
authoritarianism is different from conservatism because authoritarianism
reflects aversion to difference across space (i.e. diversity of people
and beliefs at a given moment) while conservatism reflects aversion to
difference over time (i.e. change). Stenner argues that conservatives
will embrace racial diversity, civil liberties and moral freedom to the
extent they are already institutionalized authoritatively-supported
traditions and are therefore supportive of social stability.
Conservatives tend to be drawn to authoritarianism when public opinion
is fractious and there is a loss of confidence in public institutions,
but in general they value stability and certainty over increased
uniformity. However, Stenner says that authoritarians also want
difference restricted even when so doing would require significant
social change and instability.
Research
According
to research by Altemeyer, right-wing authoritarians tend to exhibit
cognitive errors and symptoms of faulty reasoning. Specifically, they
are more likely to make incorrect inferences from evidence and to hold contradictory ideas
that result from compartmentalized thinking. They are also more likely
to uncritically accept insufficient evidence that supports their beliefs
and they are less likely to acknowledge their own limitations.
Whether right-wing authoritarians are less intelligent than average is
disputed, with Stenner arguing that variables such as high verbal
ability (indicative of high cognitive capacity) have a very substantial
ameliorative effect in diminishing authoritarian tendencies.
However, one study suggested the apparent negative relationship between
cognition and RWA could be partially explained by methodological
issues. Measured against other factors of personality, authoritarians generally score lower on openness to experience and slightly higher on conscientiousness.
Altemeyer suggested that authoritarian politicians are more likely to be in the Conservative or Reform party in Canada, or the Republican Party
in the United States. They generally have a conservative economic
philosophy, are highly nationalistic, oppose abortion, support capital
punishment, oppose gun control legislation and do not value social
equality.
The RWA scale reliably correlates with political party affiliation,
reactions to Watergate, pro-capitalist attitudes, religious orthodoxy
and acceptance of covert governmental activities such as illegal
wiretaps.
Authoritarians are generally more favorable to punishment and
control than personal freedom and diversity. They are more willing to
suspend constitutional guarantees of liberty such as the Bill of Rights. They are more likely to advocate strict, punitive sentences for criminals and report that punishing such people is satisfying for them. They tend to be ethnocentric and prejudiced against racial and ethnic minorities and homosexuals.
However, Stenner argues that authoritarians will support programs
intended to increase opportunities for minority groups, such as
affirmative action, if they believe such programs will lead to greater
societal uniformity.
In roleplaying situations, authoritarians tend to seek dominance
over others by being competitive and destructive instead of cooperative.
In a study by Altemeyer, 68 authoritarians played a three-hour
simulation of the Earth's future entitled the Global Change Game. Unlike a comparison game played by individuals with low RWA scores which resulted in world peace
and widespread international cooperation, the simulation by
authoritarians became highly militarized and eventually entered the
stage of nuclear war. By the end of the high RWA game, the entire population of the earth was declared dead.
The vast majority of research on right-wing authoritarianism has
been done in the United States and Canada. However, a 2003
cross-cultural study examined the relation between authoritarianism and
individualism–collectivism in samples (1,080) from Bulgaria, Canada,
Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Poland and the United States. Both at the
individual level and the societal level, authoritarianism was correlated
with vertical individualism or dominance seeking and vertical or
hierarchical collectivism which is the tendency to submit to the demands
of one's ingroup.
A study done on both Israeli and Palestinian students in Israel found
that RWA scores of right-wing party supporters were significantly higher
than those of left-wing party supporters and scores of secular subjects
were lowest.
Right-wing authoritarianism has been found to correlate only slightly with social dominance orientation
(SDO). The two measures can be thought of as two sides of the same coin
as RWA provides submissive followers and SDO provides power-seeking
leaders.
Relationship to personality traits
Research comparing RWA with the Big Five personality traits has found that RWA is positively correlated with conscientiousness (r = 0.15) and negatively correlated with openness to experience
(r = −0.36). SDO has a somewhat different pattern of correlations with
the Big Five, as it is also associated with low openness to experience
(r = −0.16), but is not significantly correlated with conscientiousness
(r = −0.05) and instead has a negative correlation with agreeableness
(r = −0.29). Low openness to experience and high conscientiousness have
been found to be predictive of social conformity. People low in
openness to experience tend to prefer clear, unambiguous moral rules and
are more likely to support the existing social order insofar as it
provides clear guidance about social norms for behavior and how the
world should be. People low in openness to experience are also more
sensitive to threats (both real and symbolic) to the social order and
hence tend to view outgroups who deviate from traditional social norms
and values as a threat to ingroup norms and values. Conscientiousness is
associated with a preference for order, structure and security, hence
this might explain the connection with RWA.
Criticism and development
A recent refinement to this body of research was presented in Karen Stenner's 2005 book, The Authoritarian Dynamic.
Stenner argues that RWA is best understood as expressing a dynamic
response to external threat, not a static disposition based only on the
traits of submission, aggression and conventionalism. Stenner is
critical of Altemeyer's social learning interpretation and argues that
it cannot account for how levels of authoritarianism fluctuate with
social conditions. She argues that the RWA Scale can be viewed as a
measure of expressed authoritarianism, but that other measures are needed to assess authoritarian predispositions which interact with threatening circumstances to produce the authoritarian response.
Recent criticism has also come as a result of treating RWA as
uni-dimensional even in contexts where it makes no sense to do so. This
include RWA being used in regression analyses with fundamentalism as another predictor and attitudes to homosexuality and racism as the outcomes.
This research seemed to show that fundamentalism would be associated
with reduced racism once the authoritarian component was removed and
this was summarized in a recent review of the field.
However, since the RWA scale has items that also measure fundamentalist
religiosity and attitudes to homosexuality, this undermines the
interpretation of such analyses.
Even worse is the possibility that the unrecognised dimensionality in
RWA can cause a statistical artifact to arise in such regressions which
can reduce or even reverse some of the relationships. Mavor and
colleagues have argued that this artifact eliminates or even reverses
any apparent tendency for fundamentalism to reduce racism once RWA is
controlled. The implication is that in some domains such as the social
psychology of religion it is not only preferable to think of RWA as
consisting of at least two components, but it is essential in order to
avoid statistical errors and incorrect conclusions.
Several options currently exist for scales that acknowledge at least
the two main underlying components in the scale (aggression/submission
and conventionalism).
Altemeyer's research on authoritarianism has been challenged by
psychologist John J. Ray, who questions the sampling methods used and
the ability of the RWA Scale to predict authoritarian behavior and
provides evidence that the RWA Scale measures conservatism rather than
"directiveness", a construct that John J. Ray invented and that he
relates to authoritarianism. However, Ray's approach is a minority position among researchers
and other psychologists have found that both the RWA scale and the
original F-scale are good predictors of both attitudes and behavior.
In 2012, the American Journal of Political Science published an article discussing the correlation between conservatism and psychoticism which they associated with authoritarianism, among other traits. In 2015, they released an erratum showing mixed correlations.
In 2017, the new Regality Theory suggested a reinterpretation of RWA in the light of evolutionary psychology.
Regality theory agrees that authoritarianism is a dynamic response to
external threats, but rather than seeing it as a psychological
aberration, regality theory posits that authoritarianism is an evolved
response to perceived collective danger. The tendency to support a
strong leader when faced with common existential threats has contributed
to Darwinianfitness in human prehistory because it helped solve the collective action problem in war and suppress free riders.
It is argued that regality theory adds a deeper level of analysis to
our understanding of authoritarianism and avoids the political bias that the research in the authoritarian personality and RWA is often criticized for.
In 2019, Ronald Inglehart combined RWA with his theory of postmaterialism,
arguing that both reflected the tendency of insecure environments to
produce individuals whose worldview values conformism over
self-expression.
Although some earlier scholars had claimed that a comparable
construct of left-wing authoritarinism (LWA) on the political left does
not exist and compared the search for LWA to trying to find the Loch
Ness monster, more recent work suggests the possibility that LWA does
exist and that it predicts similar outcomes as RWA. This has spurred debate about whether liberals might be similarly authoritarian as conservatives.
Honeycutt et al argue that RWA scores may be misrepresented by
distribution as high-scorers on the scale may actually have moderate
scores and are only "high" relative to lower scorers, rather than
scoring high on the scale in any absolute sense. Thus differences
between "high" and "low" scorers may be exaggerated.
Crony capitalism is an economic system in which businesses thrive not as a result of risk, but rather as a return on money amassed through a nexus between a business class and the political class. This is often achieved by using state power rather than competition in managing permits, government grants, tax breaks, or other forms of state intervention
over resources where the state exercises monopolist control over public
goods, for example, mining concessions for primary commodities or
contracts for public works. Money is then made not merely by making a
profit in the market, but through profiteering by rent seeking using this monopoly or oligopoly. Entrepreneurship
and innovative practices which seek to reward risk are stifled since
the value-added is little by crony businesses, as hardly anything of
significant value is created by them, with transactions taking the form
of trading. Crony capitalism spills over into the government, the
politics, and the media, when this nexus distorts the economy and affects society to an extent it corrupts public-serving economic, political, and social ideals.
Historical usage
The first extensive use of the term "crony capitalism" came about in the 1980s, to characterize the Philippine economy under the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos. Early uses of this term to describe the economic practices of the Marcos regime included that of Ricardo Manapat, who introduced it in his 1979 pamphlet "Some are Smarter than Others," which was later published in 1991; former Time magazine business editor George M. Taber, who used the term in a Time magazine article in 1980,[4] and activist (and later Finance Minister) Jaime Ongpin, who used the term extensively in his writing and is sometimes credited for having coined it.
The term crony capitalism made a significant impact in the public as an explanation of the Asian financial crisis.
It is also used to describe governmental decisions favoring cronies of governmental officials. In this context, the term is often used comparatively with corporate welfare,
a technical term often used to assess government bailouts and
favoritistic monetary policy as opposed to the economic theory described
by crony capitalism. The extent of difference between these terms is
whether a government action can be said to benefit the individual rather
than the industry.
In practice
South Korean President Park Geun-hye at a breakfast meeting with business magnates Lee Kun-hee and Chung Mong-koo. A group of massive, mostly family-run business conglomerates, called chaebol, dominates South Korea's economy.
Crony capitalism exists along a continuum. In its lightest form,
crony capitalism consists of collusion among market players which is
officially tolerated or encouraged by the government. While perhaps
lightly competing against each other, they will present a unified front
(sometimes called a trade association or industry trade group) to the government in requesting subsidies or aid or regulation.
For instance, newcomers to a market then need to surmount significant
barriers to entry in seeking loans, acquiring shelf space, or receiving
official sanction. Some such systems are very formalized, such as sports
leagues and the Medallion System of the taxicabs of New York City,
but often the process is more subtle, such as expanding training and
certification exams to make it more expensive for new entrants to enter a
market and thereby limiting potential competition. In technological
fields, there may evolve a system whereby new entrants may be accused of
infringing on patents that the established competitors never assert
against each other. In spite of this, some competitors may succeed when
the legal barriers are light.
The term crony capitalism is generally used when these practices either
come to dominate the economy as a whole, or come to dominate the most
valuable industries in an economy.
Intentionally ambiguous laws and regulations are common in such
systems. Taken strictly, such laws would greatly impede practically all
business activity, but in practice they are only erratically enforced.
The specter of having such laws suddenly brought down upon a business
provides an incentive to stay in the good graces of political officials.
Troublesome rivals who have overstepped their bounds can have these
laws suddenly enforced against them, leading to fines or even jail time.
Even in high-income democracies with well-established legal systems and
freedom of the press in place, a larger state is generally associated
with increased political corruption.
The term crony capitalism was initially applied to states involved in the 1997 Asian financial crisis
such as Thailand and Indonesia. In these cases, the term was used to
point out how family members of the ruling leaders become extremely
wealthy with no non-political justification. Southeast Asian nations, such as Hong Kong and Malaysia, still score very poorly in rankings measuring this. The term has also been applied to the system of oligarchs in Russia. Other states to which the term has been applied include India, in particular the system after the 1990s liberalization, whereby land and other resources were given at throwaway prices in the name of public private partnerships, the more recent coal-gate scam and cheap allocation of land and resources to Adani SEZ under the Congress and BJP governments.
Similar references to crony capitalism have been made to other countries such as Argentina and Greece. Wu Jinglian, one of China's leading economists and a longtime advocate of its transition to free markets, says that it faces two starkly contrasting futures, namely a market economy under the rule of law or crony capitalism. A dozen years later, prominent political scientist Pei Minxin had concluded that the latter course had become deeply embedded in China. The anti-corruption campaign under Xi Jinping (2012–2017) has seen more than 100,000 high- and low-ranking Chinese officials indicted and jailed.
Many prosperous nations have also had varying amounts of cronyism
throughout their history, including the United Kingdom especially in
the 1600s and 1700s, the United States and Japan.
Crony capitalism index
The Economist benchmarks countries based on a crony-capitalism index
calculated via how much economic activity occurs in industries prone to
cronyism. Its 2014 Crony Capitalism Index ranking listed Hong Kong,
Russia and Malaysia in the top three spots.
In finance
Crony capitalism in finance was found in the Second Bank of the United States.
It was a private company, but its largest stockholder was the federal
government which owned 20%. It was an early bank regulator and grew to
be one being the most powerful organizations in the country due largely
to being the depository of the government's revenue.
More direct government involvement in a specific sector can also lead
to specific areas of crony capitalism, even if the economy as a whole
may be competitive. This is most common in natural resource sectors
through the granting of mining or drilling concessions, but it is also
possible through a process known as regulatory capture
where the government agencies in charge of regulating an industry come
to be controlled by that industry. Governments will often establish in
good faith government agencies to regulate an industry.
However, the members of an industry have a very strong interest in the
actions of that regulatory body while the rest of the citizenry are only
lightly affected. As a result, it is not uncommon for current industry
players to gain control of the watchdog and to use it against
competitors. This typically takes the form of making it very expensive
for a new entrant to enter the market. An 1824 landmark United States Supreme Court ruling overturned a New York State-granted monopoly ("a veritable model of state munificence" facilitated by Robert R. Livingston, one of the Founding Fathers) for the then-revolutionary technology of steamboats. Leveraging the Supreme Court's establishment of Congressional supremacy over commerce, the Interstate Commerce Commission was established in 1887 with the intent of regulating railroad robber barons. President Grover Cleveland appointed Thomas M. Cooley, a railroad ally, as its first chairman and a permit system was used to deny access to new entrants and legalize price fixing.
The defense industry in the United States is often described as an example of crony capitalism in an industry. Connections with the Pentagon
and lobbyists in Washington are described by critics as more important
than actual competition due to the political and secretive nature of
defense contracts. In the Airbus-Boeing WTO dispute, Airbus (which receives outright subsidies from European governments) has stated Boeing receives similar subsidies which are hidden as inefficient defense contracts. Other American defense companies were put under scrutiny for no-bid contracts for Iraq War and Hurricane Katrina related contracts purportedly due to having cronies in the Bush administration.
Gerald P. O'Driscoll, former vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, stated that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac became examples of crony capitalism as government backing let Fannie and Freddie dominate mortgage underwriting,
saying. "The politicians created the mortgage giants, which then
returned some of the profits to the pols—sometimes directly, as campaign
funds; sometimes as "contributions" to favored constituents".
In developing economies
In
its worst form, crony capitalism can devolve into simple corruption
where any pretense of a free market is dispensed with. Bribes to
government officials are considered de rigueur and tax evasion is common. This is seen in many parts of Africa and is sometimes called plutocracy (rule by wealth) or kleptocracy
(rule by theft).Kenyan economist David Ndii has repeatedly brought to
light how this system has manifested over time, occasioned by the reign
of Uhuru Kenyatta as president.
Corrupt governments may favor one set of business owners who have
close ties to the government over others. This may also be done with,
religious, or ethnic favoritism. For instance, Alawites in Syria have a disproportionate share of power in the government and business there (President Assad himself is an Alawite). This can be explained by considering personal relationships as a social network.
As government and business leaders try to accomplish various things,
they naturally turn to other powerful people for support in their
endeavors. These people form hubs in the network. In a developing
country those hubs may be very few, thus concentrating economic and
political power in a small interlocking group.
Normally, this will be untenable to maintain in business as new
entrants will affect the market. However, if business and government are
entwined, then the government can maintain the small-hub network.
Raymond Vernon, specialist in economics and international affairs, wrote that the Industrial Revolution
began in Great Britain because they were the first to successfully
limit the power of veto groups (typically cronies of those with power in
government) to block innovations,
writing: "Unlike most other national environments, the British
environment of the early 19th century contained relatively few threats
to those who improved and applied existing inventions, whether from
business competitors, labor, or the government itself. In other
European countries, by contrast, the merchant guilds [...] were a
pervasive source of veto for many centuries. This power was typically
bestowed upon them by government". For example, a Russian inventor
produced a steam engine in 1766 and disappeared without a trace.
Vermon further stated that "a steam powered horseless carriage produced in France in 1769 was officially suppressed". James Watt began experimenting with steam in 1763, got a patent in 1769 and began commercial production in 1775.
Raghuram Rajan, former governor of the Reserve Bank of India, has said: "One of the greatest dangers to the growth of developing countries is the middle income trap,
where crony capitalism creates oligarchies that slow down growth. If
the debate during the elections is any pointer, this is a very real
concern of the public in India today". Tavleen Singh, columnist for The Indian Express,
has disagreed. According to Singh, India's corporate success is not a
product of crony capitalism, but because India is no longer under the
influence of crony socialism.
Political viewpoints
While the problem is generally accepted across the political
spectrum, ideology shades the view of the problem's causes and therefore
its solutions. Political views mostly fall into two camps which might
be called the socialist and capitalist critique. The socialist position
is that crony capitalism is the inevitable result of any strictly
capitalist system and thus broadly democratic government must regulate
economic, or wealthy, interests to restrict monopoly. The capitalist
position is that natural monopolies are rare, therefore governmental regulations generally abet established wealthy interests by restricting competition.
Socialist critique
Critics of crony capitalism including socialists and anti-capitalists often assert that crony capitalism is the inevitable result of any strictly capitalist system. Jane Jacobs described it as a natural consequence of collusion between those managing power and trade while Noam Chomsky has argued that the word crony is superfluous when describing capitalism.
Since businesses make money and money leads to political power,
business will inevitably use their power to influence governments. Much
of the impetus behind campaign finance reform in the United States and in other countries is an attempt to prevent economic power being used to take political power.
Ravi Batra argues that "all official economic measures adopted since 1981 ... have devastated the middle class" and that the Occupy Wall Street
movement should push for their repeal and thus end the influence of the
super wealthy in the political process which he considers a
manifestation of crony capitalism.
Socialist economists, such as Robin Hahnel,
have criticized the term as an ideologically motivated attempt to cast
what is in their view the fundamental problems of capitalism as
avoidable irregularities. Socialist economists dismiss the term as an apologetic for failures of neoliberal policy and more fundamentally their perception of the weaknesses of market allocation.
Capitalist critique
Supporters of capitalism also generally oppose crony capitalism and supporters such as classical liberals, neoliberals and right-libertarians consider it an aberration brought on by governmental favors incompatible with free market. Such proponents of capitalism tend to regard the term as an oxymoron, arguing that crony capitalism is not capitalism at all.
In the capitalist view, cronyism is the result of an excess of
interference in the market which inherently will result in a toxic
combination of corporations and government officials running the sector
of the economy. Some advocates prefer to equate this problem with terms
such as corporatocracy or corporatism, considered "a modern form of mercantilism", to emphasize that the only way to run a profitable business in such a system is to have help from corrupt government officials.
Even if the initial regulation was well-intentioned (to curb
actual abuses) and even if the initial lobbying by corporations was
well-intentioned (to reduce illogical regulations), the mixture of
business and government stifle competition, a collusive result called regulatory capture. Burton W. Folsom Jr.
distinguishes those that engage in crony capitalism—designated by him
political entrepreneurs—from those who compete in the marketplace
without special aid from government, whom he calls market entrepreneurs.
The market entrepreneurs such as James J. Hill, Cornelius Vanderbilt and John D. Rockefeller succeeded by producing a quality product at a competitive price. For example, the political entrepreneurs such as Edward Collins in steamships and the leaders of the Union Pacific Railroad
in railroads were men who used the power of government to succeed. They
tried to gain subsidies or in some way use government to stop
competitors.
The definition of corporate welfare is sometimes restricted to direct government subsidies of major corporations, excluding tax loopholes and all manner of regulatory and trade decisions, which in practice could be worth much more than any direct subsidies.
Origin of term
The term "corporate welfare" was reportedly invented in 1956 by Ralph Nader.
"Privatizing
profits and socializing losses" refers to the idea that corporations
want to reserve financial gains for themselves and pass along losses to
the rest of society, potentially through lobbying the government for
assistance. This practice was criticized in the Wall Street bailout of 2008.
By country
United States
Background
Subsidies considered excessive, unwarranted, wasteful, unfair, inefficient, or bought by lobbying are often called corporate welfare.
The label of corporate welfare is often used to decry projects
advertised as benefiting the general welfare that spend a
disproportionate amount of funds on large corporations, and often in
uncompetitive, or anti-competitive ways. For instance, in the United States, agricultural subsidies
are usually portrayed as helping independent farmers stay afloat.
However, the majority of income gained from commodity support programs
actually goes to large agribusiness corporations such as Archer Daniels Midland, as they own a considerably larger percentage of production.
Alan Peters and Peter Fisher, Associate Professors at the University of Iowa, have estimated that state and local governments provide $40–50 billion annually in economic development incentives, which critics characterize as corporate welfare.
Some economists consider the 2008 bank bailouts in the United States to be corporate welfare. U.S. politicians have also contended that zero-interest loans from the Federal Reserve System to financial institutions during the global financial crisis were a hidden, backdoor form of corporate welfare. The term gained increased prominence in 2018 when Senator Bernie Sanders introduced a bill, singling out Amazon and Walmart
in particular, to require a company with 500 or more employees to pay
the full cost of welfare benefits received by its workers.
Daniel D. Huff, professor emeritus of social work at Boise State University, published a comprehensive analysis of corporate welfare in 1993.
Huff reasoned that a very conservative estimate of corporate welfare
expenditures in the United States would have been at least US$170 billion in 1990. Huff compared this number with social welfare:
In 1990 the federal government
spent 4.7 billion dollars on all forms of international aid. Pollution
control programs received 4.8 billion dollars of federal assistance
while both secondary and elementary education were allotted only 8.4
billion dollars. More to the point, while more than 170 billion dollars
is expended on assorted varieties of corporate welfare the federal
government spends 11 billion dollars on Aid for Dependent Children. The
most expensive means tested welfare program, Medicaid, costs the federal
government 30 billion dollars a year or about half of the amount
corporations receive each year through assorted tax breaks. S.S.I., the
federal program for the disabled, receives 13 billion dollars while
American businesses are given 17 billion in direct federal aid.
Huff argued that deliberate obfuscation was a complicating factor.
United Kingdom
In 2015, Kevin Farnsworth, a senior lecturer in Social Policy at the University of York published a paper in which he claimed that the government was providing corporate subsidies of £93 billion.
This amount includes the role of the government in increasing trade,
tax relief for businesses that invest in new plants and machinery
(estimated by Farnsworth at £20 billion), not charging fuel duty on fuel
used by railways or airlines, green energy subsidies, a lower
corporation tax rate for small companies, regional development
grants and government procurement for businesses (which Farnsworth
suggests often favours British businesses even when these are not the
best value option available). However, The Register
wrote that Farnsworth's figure for tax relief for investment was
incorrect and that he had made mistakes in his calculations, noting that
he was not an accountant. It also stated that not charging businesses
taxes under certain circumstances (when the reliefs applied) was not the
same as giving them a subsidy. Fuel duty is not charged on airlines due to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (a UN agency) which specifies that aeroplanes should be exempt from fuel duties.
Political discussion
In 2015, Labour Party leaderJeremy Corbyn
said he would "strip out" the £93bn of "corporate tax relief and
subsidies" Farnsworth referred to and use the proceeds for public
investment. Corbyn did not say which specific policies he would change. The Guardian
wrote the policy "sounds wonderful, but careful scrutiny of 'corporate
welfare' shows that it includes capital allowances designed to persuade
companies to invest, regional aid to boost growth in rundown parts of
the UK, and subsidies to keep bus and rail routes open – none of which
Corbyn would presumably like to see stopped."
The Reform Party and its successor the Canadian Alliance were known for opposing mostly business subsidies. However, after their merger with the Progressive Conservative party, they dropped their opposition to it.
India
It was observed by The Wire that the effective tax rate
was low for the larger corporations which meant companies making
smaller profits are competing in an unequal environment against bigger
companies with substantial taxation benefits, with the gap in effective
tax rates widening over the years. Prime Minister of IndiaNarendra Modi criticised this practice and said
"Why is it that subsidies going to
the well-off are portrayed in a positive manner? Let me give you an
example. The total revenue loss from incentives to corporate tax payers
was over Rs 62,000 crore...
I must confess I am surprised by the way words are used by experts on
this matter. When a benefit is given to farmers or to the poor, experts
and government officers normally call it a subsidy. However, I find that
if a benefit is given to industry or commerce, it is usually an
'incentive' or a 'subvention'."
Right-wing populism, also called national populism and right-wing nationalism, is a political ideology which combines right-wing politics and populist rhetoric and themes. The rhetoric often consists of anti-elitist sentiments, opposition to the Establishment, and speaking to the "common people". Both right-wing populism and left-wing populism object to the perceived control of liberal democracies
by elites; however, populism of the left also objects to the power of
large corporations and their allies, while populism of the right
normally supports strong controls on immigration.
From the 1990s, right-wing populist parties became established in the legislatures of various democracies. Although extreme right-wing movements in the United States (where they are normally referred to as the "radical right") have been characterized atomistically, some writers consider them to be a part of a broader, right-wing populist phenomenon.
Classification of right-wing populism into a single political family
has proved difficult and it is not certain whether a meaningful
category exists, or merely a cluster of categories since the parties
differ in ideology, organization and leadership rhetoric. Unlike
traditional parties, they also do not belong to international
organizations of like-minded parties, and they do not use similar terms
to describe themselves.
Cas Mudde
argues that two definitions can be given of the "populist radical
right": a maximum and a minimum one, with the "maximum" group being a
subgroup of the "minimum" group. The minimum definition describes what Michael Freeden has called the "core concept"
of the right-wing populist ideology, that is the concept shared by all
parties generally included in the family. Looking at the primary
literature, Mudde concludes that the core concept of right-populism "is
undoubtedly the "nation".
"This concept", he explains, "also certainly functions as a
"coat-hanger" for most other ideological features. Consequently, the
minimum definition of the party family should be based on the key
concept, the nation". He however rejects the use of "nationalism"
as a "core ideology" of right-wing populism on the ground that there
are also purely "civic" or "liberal" forms of nationalism, preferring
instead the term "nativism":
a xenophobic form of nationalism asserting that "states should be
inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ("the nation"), and
that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally
threatening to the homogeneous nation-state". Mudde further argues that
"while nativism could include racist arguments, it can also be
non-racist (including and excluding on the basis of culture or even
religion)", and that the term nativism does not reduce the parties to
mere single-issue parties, such as the term "anti-immigrant" does. In
the maximum definition, to nativism is added authoritarianism—an attitude, not necessary anti-democratic or automatic, to prefer "law and order" and the submission to authority—and populism—a
"thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately
separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "the pure
people" versus "the corrupt elite", and which argues that politics
should be an expression of the "general will of the people", if needed
before human rights or constitutional guarantees.
Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser reiterated in 2017 that
within European right-wing populism there is a "marriage of convenience"
of populism based on an "ethnic and chauvinistic definition of the
people", authoritarianism, and nativism. This results in right-wing
populism having a "xenophobic nature."
Roger Eatwell, Emeritus Professor of Comparative Politics at the University of Bath,
writes that "whilst populism and fascism differ notably ideologically,
in practice the latter has borrowed aspects of populist discourse and
style, and populism can degenerate into leader-oriented authoritarian
and exclusionary politics." For populism to transition into fascism or proto-fascism, it requires a "nihilistic culture and an intractable crisis."
[P]opulism is like fascism in being a response to liberal
and socialist explanations of the political. And also like fascism,
populism does not recognize a legitimate political place for an
opposition that it regards as acting against the desires of the people
and that it also accuses of being tyrannical, conspiratorial, and
antidemocratic. ... The opponents are turned into public enemies, but
only rhetorically. If populism moves from rhetorical enmity to practices
of enemy identification and persecution, we could be talking about its
transformation into fascism or another form of dictatorial repression.
This has happened in the past ... and without question it could happen
in the future. This morphing of populism back into fascism is always a
possibility, but it is very uncommon, and when it does happen, and
populism becomes fully antidemocratic, it is no longer populism.
In summary, Erik Berggren and Andres Neergard wrote in 2015 that "[m]ost researchers agree [...] that xenophobia, anti-immigration sentiments, nativism, ethno-nationalism
are, in different ways, central elements in the ideologies, politics,
and practices of right-wing populism and Extreme Right Wing Parties."
Similarly, historian Rick Shenkman describes the ideology presented by
right-wing populism as "a deadly mix of xenophobia, racism, and
authoritarianism."
Tamir Bar-On also concluded in 2018 that the literature generally
places "nativism" or "ethnic nationalism" as the core concept of the
ideology, which "implicitly posits a politically dominant group, while
minorities are conceived as threats to the nation". It is "generally,
but not necessarily racist"; in the case of the Dutch PVV for instance, "a religious [minority, i.e. Muslims] instead of an ethnic minority constitutes the main 'enemy'".
To Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin,
"national populists prioritize the culture and interests of the nation,
and promise to give voice to a people who feel that they have been
neglected, even held in contempt, by distant and often corrupt elites."
They are part, Eatwell and Goodwin follow, of a "growing revolt against
mainstream politics and liberal values. This challenge is in general not
anti-democratic. Rather, national populists are opposed to certain aspects
of liberal democracy as it has evolved in the West. [...] [Their]
"direct" conception of democracy differs from the "liberal" one that has
flourished across the West following the defeat of fascism and which
has gradually become more elitist in character." Furthermore, national
populists question what they call the "erosion of the nation-state",
"hyper ethnic change" and the "capacity to rapidly absorb [high] rates
of immigration", the "highly unequal societies" of the West's current
economic settlement, and are suspicious of "cosmopolitan and globalizing
agendas".
Populist parties use crisis in their domestic governments to enhance
anti-globalist reactions; these include refrainment towards trade and
anti-immigration policies. The support for these ideologies commonly
comes from people whose employment might have low occupational mobility.
This makes them more likely to develop an anti-immigrant and
anti-globalization mentality that aligns with the ideals of the populist
party.
Jean-Yves Camus and Nicolas Lebourg
see "national populism" as an attempt to combine socio-economical
values of the left and political values of the right, and the support
for a referendary republic that would bypass traditional political divisions and institutions. As they aim at a unity of the political (the demos), ethnic (the ethnos) and social (the working class)
interpretations of the "people", national populists claim to defend the
"average citizen" and "common sense", against the "betrayal of
inevitably corrupt elites". As Front National ideologue François Duprat
put in the 1970s, inspired by the Latin American right of that time,
right-populism aims to constitute a "national, social, and popular"
ideology. If populism
itself is shared by both left and right parties, their premises are
indeed different in that right-wing populists perceive society as in a
state of decadence, from which "only the healthy common people can free
the nation by forming one national class from the different social
classes and casting aside the corrupt elites".
Methodologically, by co-opting concepts from the left – such as multiculturalism and ethnopluralism,
which is espoused by the left as a means of preserving minority ethnic
cultures within a pluralistic society – and then jettisoning their
non-hierarchical essence, right-wing populists are able to, in the words
of sociologist Jens Rydgren, "mobilize on xenophobic and racist public opinions without being stigmatized as racists."
History
Europe
European right-wing populism can be traced back to the period 1870–1900 in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, with the nascence of two different trends in Germany and France: the Völkisch movement and Boulangism. Völkischen represented a romantic nationalist, racialist,
and from the 1900s antisemitic tendency in German society, as they
idealized a bio-mystical "original nation", that still could be found in
their views in the rural regions, a form of "primitive democracy freely
subjected to their natural elites". In France, the anti-parliamentarian Ligue des Patriotes, led by Boulanger, Déroulède and Barrès, called for a "plebiscitary republic", with the president elected by universal suffrage,
and the popular will expressed not through elected representatives (the
"corrupted elites"), but rather via "legislative plebiscites", another
name for referendums. It also evolved to antisemitism after the Dreyfus affair (1894).
Modern national populism—what Pierro Ignazi called "post-industrial parties"—emerged in the 1970s, in a dynamic sustained by voters' rejection of the welfare state
and of the tax system, both deemed "confiscatory"; the rise of
xenophobia against the backdrop of immigration which, because
originating from outside Europe, was considered to be of a new kind; and
finally, the end of the prosperity that had reigned since the
post–World War II era, symbolized by the oil crisis of 1973. Two precursor parties consequently appeared in the early 1970s: the Progress Party, ancestor of the Danish People's Party; and the Anders Lange's Party in Norway.
A new wave of right-wing populism arose in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.
"Neo-populists" are nationalist and Islamophobic politicians who aspire
"to be the champions of freedoms for minorities (gays, Jews, women)
against the Arab-Muslim masses"; a trend first embodied by the Dutch Pim Fortuyn List, and later followed by Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom and Marine Le Pen's National Rally. According to Jean-Yves Camus and Nicolas Lebourg, those parties are however not a real syncretism of the left and right, as both their ideology and voter base are interclassist. Furthermore, neo-populist parties went from a critique of the welfare state to that of multiculturalism, and their priority demand remains the reduction of immigration.
Political scientist Gaël Brustier defines that new populist trend as a
"national security hedonism", that is the alliance between liberal
individualism and national security concerns.
In Brazil, right-wing populism began to rise roughly around the time Dilma Rousseff won the 2014 presidential election. In the Brazilian general election of 2014, Levy Fidelix, from the Brazilian Labour Renewal Party presented himself with a conservative speech and, according to him, the only right-wing candidate. He spoke for traditional family values
and opposed abortion, legalization of marijuana, same-sex marriage and
proposed homosexual individuals to be treated far away from the good
citizens' and workers' families. In the first round of the general election, Fidelix received 446,878 votes, representing 0.43% of the popular vote. Fidelix ranked 7th out of 11 candidates. In the second round, Fidelix supported candidate Aécio Neves.
In addition, according to the political analyst of the
Inter-Union Department of Parliamentary Advice Antônio Augusto de
Queiroz the National Congresselected in 2014
may be considered the most conservative since the "re-democratization"
movement, noting an increase in the number of parliamentarians linked to
more conservative segments, such as ruralists, the military, the police and the religious right.
The subsequent economic crisis of 2015 and investigations of corruption
scandals led to a right-wing movement that sought to rescue fiscally and socially conservative ideas from in opposition to the left-wing policies of the Workers' Party. At the same time, young market liberals and right-libertarians such as those that make up the Free Brazil Movement
emerged among many others. For Manheim (1952), within a single real
generation there may be several generations which he called
"differentiated and antagonistic". For him, it is not the common birth
date that marks a generation, though it matters, but rather the
historical moment in which they live in common. In the case, the
historical moment was the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff. They can be called the "post-Dilma generation".
In August 2018, Conservative MP Maxime Bernier left the party, and the following month he founded the People's Party of Canada, which has been described as a "right of centre, populist" movement.
Moore (1996) argues that "populist opposition to the growing
power of political, economic, and cultural elites" helped shape
"conservative and right-wing movements" since the 1920s. Historical right-wing populist figures in both major parties in the United States have included Thomas E. Watson, Strom Thurmond, Joe McCarthy, Barry Goldwater, George Wallace and Pat Buchanan.
The Tea Party movement
has been characterized as "a right-wing anti-systemic populist
movement" by Rasmussen and Schoen (2010). They add: "Today our country
is in the midst of a...new populist revolt that has emerged
overwhelmingly from the right – manifesting itself as the Tea Party
movement". In 2010, David Barstow wrote in The New York Times: "The Tea Party movement has become a platform for conservative populist discontent". Some political figures closely associated with the Tea Party, such as U.S. Senator Ted Cruz and former U.S. Representative Ron Paul, have been described as appealing to right-wing populism. In the U.S. House of Representatives, the Freedom Caucus, which is associated with the Tea Party movement, has been described as right-wing populist.
Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign, noted for its anti-establishment, anti-immigration and anti-free trade rhetoric, was characterized as that of a right-wing populist. The ideology of Trump's former Chief Strategist, Steve Bannon, has also been described as such. According to a 2018 study, there is a strong correlation between the ratio of U.S. jobs that were lost to automation
and the states—such as Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania and
Wisconsin—that voted for Barack Obama in 2012 and for Trump in 2016.
Some figures within the Liberal Party of Australia, which is part of the Coalition, have been described as right-wing populists, including former Prime Minister Tony Abbott and Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton.
India
In India, right-wing populism came into the picture in the late 1980s by current ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the political party having close relation to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Right-wing populism has been fostered by RSS which stands against persecution of Hindus by various invading forces over the centuries and have also been attributed to the concept of Hindutva. It vows to protect the ancient religion and culture of Hinduism
and have strong views against destruction of its ancient heritage, in
India. BJP became a significant force in the state legislative
assemblies and in the parliament in the 1990s by raising the issue of
Ram Mandir (temple) establishment by demolishing the existing Babri
Masjid (constructed by demolishing a Hindu temple) in Ayodhya, in the state of Uttar Pradesh. BJP and other conservative right wing organization such as Vishva Hindu Parishad, Akhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha etc. argues that the Masjid was built by Babur, the Muslim, Turco-Mongol founder of the Mughal Empire in India in 1526, by demolishing a temple, dedicated to Lord Ram. This issue is known as the Ayodhya Dispute
for which the final judgement was declared by the Supreme Court of
India on 9 November 2019. The Supreme Court of India ordered the
disputed land (2.77 acres) to be handed over to a trust (to be created
by Government of India) to build the Ram Janmabhoomi (revered as the
birthplace of Hindu deity, Ram) temple. The court also ordered the
government to give an alternate 5 acres (almost double that of the Ram
Janmabhumi) of land in another place to the Sunni Waqf Board for the
purpose of building a mosque.
In recently concluded 2019 Indian general election,
the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by BJP have swept across the
elections with unprecedented majority of 353 seats by gaining
popularity across India and reducing the United Progressive Alliance led
by Indian National Congress to only 91 seats.
In a speech to LDP lawmakers in Tokyo on 8 March 2019, Steve Bannon
said that “Prime Minister Abe is a great hero to the grassroots, the
populist, and the nationalist movement throughout the world.”
Pakistan
The recent wave of right-wing populism is in Pakistan in the form of Pakistan Tehreek Insaaf (PTI). Its leader Imran Khan has furiously attacked traditional politicians and made people believe that only he has the solutions. British journalist Ben Judah, in an interview, compared Imran Khan with Donald Trump on his populist rhetoric.
Taiwan's
right-wing populists tend to deny the independent identity of their
country's 'Taiwan' and emphasize their identity as a 'Republic of
China'. Taiwan's left-wingTaiwanese nationalists have strong pro-American tendencies, so Taiwan's major and minor conservatives are critical of this. In particular, Taiwan's right-wing populists demand that economic growth Issues and right-wing Chinese nationalist issues be more important than liberal democracy, and that they become closer to the People's Republic of China. One of Taiwan's leading right-wing populists is Terry Gou and Han Kuo-yu.
European countries
European national parliaments with representatives from right-wing populist parties in May 2019: Right-wing populists represented in the parliament Right-wing populists providing external support for government Right-wing populists involved in the government Right-wing populists appoint prime minister/president
Senior European Union diplomats cite growing anxiety in Europe about Russian financial support for far-right and populist movements and told the Financial Times that the intelligence agencies of "several" countries had stepped up scrutiny of possible links with Moscow. In 2016, the Czech Republic warned that Russia tries to "divide and conquer" the European Union by supporting right-wing populist politicians across the bloc.
However, as there in the United States of America, there seems to be an
underlying problem that isn't massively discussed in the media. That
underlying problem is that of housing. A 2019 study shows an immense correlation between the price of housing and voting for populist parties.
In that study, it was revealed that the French citizens that saw the
price of their houses stagnate or drop, were much more likely to vote
for Marine Le Pen in the 2017 French presidential election. Whereas those that the price of their house rise, were much more likely to vote for Emmanuel Macron. The same pattern emerged in the 2016 United Kingdom European Union membership referendum,
in which those that saw the price of their house rise, voted to Remain.
Whereas those that saw it flatline or drop, voted to Leave.
Austria
The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) established in 1955 claims to represent a "Third Camp" (Drittes Lager), beside the Socialist Party and the social Catholic Austrian People's Party. It succeeded the Federation of Independents founded after World War II, adopting the pre-war heritage of German nationalism,
although it did not advocate Nazism and placed itself in the political
centre. Though it did not gain much popularity for decades, it exercised
considerable balance of power by supporting several federal governments, be it right-wing or left-wing, e.g. the Socialist Kreisky cabinet of 1970.
From 1980, the Freedom Party adopted a more liberal stance. Upon the 1983 federal election, it entered a coalition government with the Socialist Party, whereby party chairman Norbert Steger served as Vice-Chancellor. The liberal interlude however ended, when Jörg Haider was elected chairman in 1986. By his down-to-earth manners and patriotic
attitude, Haider re-integrated the party's nationalist base voters.
Nevertheless, he was also able to obtain votes from large sections of
population disenchanted with politics by publicly denouncing corruption
and nepotism of the Austrian Proporz system. The electoral success was boosted by Austria's accession to the European Union in 1995.
Upon the 1999 federal election, the Freedom Party (FPÖ) with 26.9% of the votes cast became the second strongest party in the National Council
parliament. Having entered a coalition government with the People's
Party, Haider had to face the disability of several FPÖ ministers, but
also the impossibility of agitation against members of his own cabinet.
In 2005, he finally countered the FPÖ's loss of reputation by the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) relaunch in order to carry on his government. The remaining FPÖ members elected Heinz-Christian Strache chairman, but since the 2006 federal election
both right-wing parties have run separately. After Haider was killed in
a car accident in 2008, the BZÖ has lost a measurable amount of
support.
Vlaams Blok,
established in 1978, operated on a platform of law and order,
anti-immigration (with particular focus on Islamic immigration) and
secession of the Flanders
region of the country. The secession was originally planned to end in
the annexation of Flanders by the culturally and linguistically similar Netherlands
until the plan was abandoned due to the multiculturalism in that
country. In the elections to the Flemish Parliament in June 2004, the
party received 24.2% of the vote, within less than 2% of being the
largest party. However, in November of the same year, the party was ruled illegal under the country's anti-racism law for, among other things, advocating segregated schools for citizens and immigrants.
In less than a week, the party was re-established under the name Vlaams Belang, with a near-identical ideology. It advocates the adoption of the Flemish culture and language by immigrants who wish to stay in the country. Despite some accusations of antisemitism from Belgium's Jewish population, the party has demonstrated a staunch pro-Israel stance as part of its opposition to Islam. With 23 of 124 seats, Vlaams Belang leads the opposition in the Flemish Parliament and it also holds 11 out of the 150 seats in the Belgian House of Representatives.
As of the 2019 federal, regional and European elections Vlaams
Belang (VB) has surged from 248,843 votes in 2014 to 783,977 votes on 26
May 2019.
Bulgaria
Volya is a right-wing populist political party founded by Bulgarian businessman Veselin Mareshki on 15 July 2007. Before 2016, it was known variously as Today and Liberal Alliance.
The party advocates populist and reform policies, promoting patriotism,
strict immigration controls, friendlier relations with Moscow,
Bulgarian withdrawal form NATO, and the need to "sweep away the garbage" of a corrupt political establishment.
Cyprus
The ELAM (National People's Front) (Εθνικό Λαϊκό Μέτωπο) was formed in 2008. Its platform includes maintaining Cypriot identity, opposition to further European integration, immigration and the status quo
that remains due to Turkey's invasion of a third of the island (and the
international community's lack of intention to solve the issue).
Denmark
In the early 1970s, the home of the strongest right-wing-populist party in Europe was in Denmark, the Progress Party. In the 1973 election, it received almost 16% of the vote. In the following years, its support dwindled away, but was replaced by the Danish People's Party
in the 1990s, which has gone on to be an important support party for
the governing Liberal-Conservative coalition in the 2000s (decade).
The Danish People's Party is the largest and most influential
right-wing populist party in Denmark today. It won 37 seats in the 2015 Danish general election
and became the second largest party in Denmark. The Danish People's
Party advocates immigration reductions, particularly from non-Western
countries, favor cultural assimilation of first generation migrants into
Danish society and are opposed to Denmark becoming a multicultural
society.
Additionally, the Danish People's Party's stated goals are to enforce a strict rule of law, to maintain a strong welfare system for those in need, to promote economic growth by strengthening education and encouraging people to work and in favor of protecting the environment. In 2015, The New Right was founded, but they have not yet participated in an election.
France's National Front (NF) – renamed in 2018 as the "National Rally" – has been cited the "prototypical populist radical right-wing party".
The party was founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen
as the unification of a number of French nationalist movements of the
time, it was developed by him into a well-organized party.
After struggline for a decade, the party reached its first peak in
1984. By 2002, Le Pen received more votes than the Socialist candidate
in the first round of voting for the French presidency, becoming the
first time a NF candidate had qualified for a high-level run-off
election.
Since Le Pen's daughter, Marine Le Pen,
took over as the head of the party in 2011, the National Front has
established itself as one of the main political parties in France.
Marine Le Pen's policy of "de-demonizing", or normalizing the party
resulted in her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, being first suspended and
then ejected from the party in 2015.
Marine Le Pen finished second in the 2017 election and lost in the second round of voting versus Emmanuel Macron
which was held on 7 May 2017. However, polls published in 2018 showed
that a majority of the French population consider the party to be a
threat to democracy.
The 2018 Hungarian parliamentary election result was a victory for the Fidesz–KDNP alliance, preserving its two-thirds majority, with Viktor Orbán
remaining Prime Minister. Orbán and Fidesz campaigned primarily on the
issues of immigration and foreign meddling, and the election was seen as
a victory for right-wing populism in Europe.
The Golden Dawn
has grown significantly in Greece during the country's economic
downturn, gaining 7% of the vote and 18 out of 300 seats in the Hellenic Parliament. The party's ideology includes annexation of territory in Albania and Turkey, including the Turkish cities of Istanbul and Izmir. Controversial measures by the party included a poor people's kitchen in Athens which only supplied to Greek citizens and was shut down by the police.
In Italy, the most prominent right-wing populist party is Lega, formerly Lega Nord (Northern League), whose leaders reject the right-wing label, though not the "populist" one. The League is a federalist, regionalist and sometimes secessionist party, founded in 1991 as a federation of several regional parties of Northern and Central Italy,
most of which had arisen and expanded during the 1980s. LN's program
advocates the transformation of Italy into a federal state, fiscal
federalism and greater regional autonomy, especially for the Northern
regions. At times, the party has advocated for the secession of the
North, which it calls Padania. The party generally takes an anti-Southern Italian
stance as members are known for opposing Southern Italian emigration to
Northern Italian cities, stereotyping Southern Italians as welfare
abusers and detrimental to Italian society and attributing Italy's
economic troubles and the disparity of the North-South divide in the Italian economy to supposed inherent negative characteristics of the Southern Italians, such as laziness, lack of education or criminality. Certain LN members have been known to publicly deploy the offensive slur "terrone", a common pejorative term for Southern Italians that is evocative of negative Southern Italian stereotypes.
As a federalist, regionalist, populist party of the North, LN is also
highly critical of the centralized power and political importance of Rome, sometimes adopting to a lesser extent an anti-Roman stance in addition to an anti-Southern stance.
With the rise of immigration into Italy since the late 1990s, LN
has increasingly turned its attention to criticizing mass immigration to
Italy. The LN, which also opposes illegal immigration, is critical of Islam and proposes Italy's exit from the Eurozone, is considered a Eurosceptic movement and as such is apart of the Identity and Democracy(ID) group in the European Parliament.
LN was or is part of the national government in 1994, 2001–2006,
2008–2011 and 2018–2019. Most recently, the party, which notably
includes among its members the Presidents of Lombardy and Veneto, won 17.4% of the vote in the 2018 general election, becoming the third-largest party in Italy (largest within the centre-right coalition). In the 2014 European election, under the leadership of Matteo Salvini it took 6.2% of votes. Under Salvini, the party has to some extent embraced Italian nationalism
and emphasised Euroscepticism, opposition to immigration and other
"populist" policies, while forming an alliance with right-wing populist
parties in Europe.
Silvio Berlusconi, leader of Forza Italia and Prime Minister of Italy
from 1994–1995, 2001–2006 and 2008–2011, has sometimes been described
as a right-wing populist, although his party is not typically described
as such.
Additionally, in the German-speaking South Tyrol the local second-largest party, Die Freiheitlichen, is often described as a right-wing populist party.
In the Netherlands, right-wing populism was represented in the 150-seat House of Representatives in 1982, when the Centre Party won a single seat. During the 1990s, a splinter party, the Centre Democrats,
was slightly more successful, although its significance was still
marginal. Not before 2002 did a right-wing populist party break through
in the Netherlands, when the Pim Fortuyn List won 26 seats and subsequently formed a coalition with the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). Fortuyn,
who had strong views against immigration, particularly by Muslims, was
assassinated in May 2002, two weeks before the election. The coalition had broken up by 2003, and the party went into steep decline until it was dissolved.
Since 2006, the Party for Freedom
(PVV) has been represented in the House of Representatives. Following
the 2010 general election, it has been in a pact with the right-wing minority government of CDA and VVD after it won 24 seats in the House of Representatives. The party is Eurosceptic and plays a leading role in the changing stance of the Dutch government towards European integration as they came second in the 2009 European Parliament election, winning 4 out of 25 seats. The party's main programme revolves around strong criticism of Islam,
restrictions on migration from new European Union countries and Islamic
countries, pushing for cultural assimilation of migrants into Dutch
society, opposing the accession of Turkey to the European Union, advocating for the Netherlands to withdraw from the European Union and advocating for a return to the guilder through ending Dutch usage of the euro.
The PVV withdrew its support for the First Rutte cabinet in 2012 after refusing to support austerity measures. This triggered the 2012 general election in which the PVV was reduced to 15 seats and excluded from the new government.
In the 2017 Dutch general election,
Wilders' PVV gained an extra five seats to become the second largest
party in the Dutch House of Representatives, bringing their total to 20
seats.
From 2017 onwards, the Forum for Democracy has emerged as another right-wing populist force in the Netherlands.
Polish Congress of the New Right, headed by Michał Marusik, aggressively promotes fiscally conservative
concepts like radical tax reductions preceded by abolishment of social
security, universal public healthcare, state-sponsored education and
abolishment of Communist Polish 1944 agricultural reform as a way to
dynamical economic and welfare growth. The party is considered populist both by right-wing and left-wing publicists.
Spain
Santiago Abascal, leader of VOX, during the party conference in October 2018.
In Spain, the appearance of right-wing populism began to gain strength after the December 2018 election for the Parliament of Andalusia, in which the right-wing populist party VOX managed to obtain 12 seats, and agreed to support a coalition government of the parties of the right People's Party and Citizens, even though the Socialist Party won the elections. VOX, that has been frequently described as far-right, both by the left parties and by Spanish or international press, promotes characteristic policies of the populist right,
such as the expulsion of all illegal immigrants from the country -even
of legal immigrants who commit crimes-, a generalized criminal
tightening, combined with traditional claims of right-wing
conservatives, such as the centralization of the State and the
suppression of the Autonomous Communities, and has harshly criticized the laws against gender violence, approved by the socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, but later maintained by the PP executive of Mariano Rajoy, accusing the people and institutions that defend them of applying "gender totalitarianism".
Party official Javier Ortega Smith is being investigated for alleged hate speech
after Spanish prosecutors admitted a complaint by an Islamic
association in connection with a rally that talked about “the Islamist
invasion”. The party election manifesto that was finally published merged classic far-right-inspired policies with right-wing liberalism in tax and social security matters.
After months of political uncertainty and protests against the party in Andalusia and other regions, in the 2019 Spanish general election VOX managed to obtain 24 deputies in the Congress of Deputies, with 10.26% of the vote, falling short from expectations
after an intense electoral campaign in which VOX gathered big crowds of
people at their events. Although the People's Party and Citizens
leaders, Pablo Casado and Albert Rivera, had admitted repeatedly during the campaign that they would again agree with VOX in order to reach the government, the sum of all their seats finally left them far from any possibility, giving the government to the socialist Pedro Sánchez.
In Switzerland, the right-wing populist Swiss People's Party (SVP) reached an all-time high in the 2015 elections. The party is mainly considered to be national conservative, but it has also variously been identified as "extreme right" and "radical right-wing populist", reflecting a spectrum of ideologies present among its members. In its far-right wing, it includes members such as Ulrich Schlüer, Pascal Junod, who heads a New Right study group and has been linked to Holocaust denial and neo-Nazism.
In Switzerland, radical right populist parties held close to 10%
of the popular vote in 1971, were reduced to below 2% by 1979 and again
grew to more than 10% in 1991. Since 1991, these parties (the Swiss Democrats and the Swiss Freedom Party)
have been absorbed by the SVP. During the 1990s, the SVP grew from
being the fourth largest party to being the largest and gained a second
seat the Swiss Federal Council in 2003, with prominent politician and businessman Christoph Blocher.
In 2015, the SVP received 29.4% of the vote, the highest vote ever
recorded for a single party throughout Swiss parliamentary history.
.jpg)
.png)
.JPG)
_(cropped).jpg)
