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Thursday, May 6, 2021

Space policy of the United States

The space policy of the United States includes both the making of space policy through the legislative process, and the implementation of that policy in the civilian and military US space programs through regulatory agencies. The early history of United States space policy is linked to the US–Soviet Space Race of the 1960s, which gave way to the Space Shuttle program. There is a current debate on the post-Space Shuttle future of the civilian space program.

Space policy process

United States space policy is drafted by the Executive branch at the direction of the President of the United States, and submitted for approval and establishment of funding to the legislative process of the United States Congress.

Space advocacy organizations may provide advice to the government and lobby for space goals. These include advocacy groups such as the Space Science Institute, Space Force Association, National Space Society, and the Space Generation Advisory Council, the last of which among other things runs the annual Yuri's Night event; learned societies such as the American Astronomical Society and the American Astronautical Society; and policy organizations such as the National Academies.

Drafting

In drafting space policy, the President consults with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), responsible for civilian and scientific space programs, and with the Department of Defense, responsible for military space activities, which include communications, reconnaissance, intelligence, mapping, and missile defense. The President is legally responsible for deciding which space activities fall under the civilian and military areas. The President also consults with the National Security Council, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the Office of Management and Budget.

The 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act, which created NASA, created a National Aeronautics and Space Council chaired by the President to help advise him, which included the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, NASA Administrator, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, plus up to one member of the federal government, and up to three private individuals "eminent in science, engineering, technology, education, administration, or public affairs" appointed by the President. Before taking office as president, John F. Kennedy persuaded Congress to amend the Act to allow him to set the precedent of delegating chairmanship of this council to his vice president (Lyndon B. Johnson). The council was discontinued in 1973 during the presidency of Richard M. Nixon. In 1989, President George H. W. Bush re-established a differently constituted National Space Council by executive order, which was discontinued in 1993 by President Bill Clinton. President Donald Trump reestablished the council by executive order in 2017.

International aspects of US space policy may involve diplomatic negotiation with other countries, such as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. In these cases, the President negotiates and signs the treaty on behalf of the United States according to his constitutional authority, then presents it to the Congress for ratification.

Legislation

Once a request is submitted, the Congress exercises due diligence to approve the policy and authorize a budgetary expenditure for its implementation. In support of this, civilian policies are reviewed by the House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics and the Senate Subcommittee on Science and Space. These committees may exercise oversight of NASA's implementation of established space policies, monitoring progress of large space programs such as the Apollo program, and in special cases such as serious space accidents like the Apollo 1 fire, where Congress oversees NASA's investigation of the accident.

Military policies are reviewed and overseen by the House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and the Senate Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, as well as the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducts hearings on proposed space treaties, and the various appropriations committees have power over the budgets for space-related agencies. Space policy efforts are supported by Congressional agencies such as the Congressional Research Service and, until it was disbanded in 1995, the Office of Technology Assessment, as well as the Congressional Budget Office and Government Accountability Office.

Congress' final space policy product is, in the case of domestic policy a bill explicitly stating the policy objectives and the budget appropriation for their implementation to be submitted to the President for signature into law, or else a ratified treaty with other nations.

Implementation

Civilian space activities have traditionally been implemented exclusively by NASA, but the nation is transitioning into a model where more activities are implemented by private companies under NASA's advisement and launch site support. In addition, the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration operates various services with space components, such as the Landsat program.

Military space activities are implemented by the United States Space Force and United States Space Command.

Licensing

Any activities "which are intended to conduct in the United States a launch of a launch vehicle, operation of a launch or re-entry site, re-entry of a re-entry vehicle" needs a license to operate in outer space. This license needs to by applied for by "any citizen of or entity organized under the laws of the United States, as well as other entities, as defined by space-related regulations, which are intended to conduct in the United States… should obtain a license form the Secretary of Transportation" compliance is monitored by the FAA, FCC and the Secretary of Commerce.

Space programs in the budget

Funding for space programs occurs through the federal budget process, where it is mainly considered to be part of the nation's science policy. In the Obama administration's budget request for fiscal year 2011, NASA would receive $11.0 billion, out of a total research and development budget of $148.1 billion. Other space activities are funded out of the research and development budget of the Department of Defense, and from the budgets of the other regulatory agencies involved with space issues.

International law

The United States is a party to four of the five space law treaties ratified by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The United States has ratified the Outer Space Treaty, Rescue Agreement, Space Liability Convention, and the Registration Convention, but not the Moon Treaty.

The five treaties and agreements of international space law cover "non-appropriation of outer space by any one country, arms control, the freedom of exploration, liability for damage caused by space objects, the safety and rescue of spacecraft and astronauts, the prevention of harmful interference with space activities and the environment, the notification and registration of space activities, scientific investigation and the exploitation of natural resources in outer space and the settlement of disputes."

The United Nations General Assembly adopted five declarations and legal principles which encourage exercising the international laws, as well as unified communication between countries. The five declarations and principles are:

The Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space (1963)
All space exploration will be done with good intentions and is equally open to all States that comply with international law. No one nation may claim ownership of outer space or any celestial body. Activities carried out in space must abide by the international law and the nations undergoing these said activities must accept responsibility for the governmental or non-governmental agency involved. Objects launched into space are subject to their nation of belonging, including people. Objects, parts, and components discovered outside the jurisdiction of a nation will be returned upon identification. If a nation launches an object into space, they are responsible for any damages that occur internationally.
The Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting (1982)
The Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (1986)
The Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space (1992)
The Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries (1996)

History

Truman administration

President Truman officially approved the ongoing Operation Paperclip in 1946, in the aftermath of World War 2. The operation was a secret US intelligence program in which more than 1600 German scientists, engineers, and technicians, such as Wernher von Braun and his V-2 rocket team, were taken between 1945 and 1959, from Germany to the United States, for US government employment. The primary purpose for Operation Paperclip was to bring a US military advantage in the Soviet–American Cold War, and the Space Race. In a comparable operation, the Soviet Union relocated more than 2200 German specialists with Operation Osoaviakhim during one night in 1946.

Von Braun was a strong proponent of spaceflight. It is believed that technically he and his team were capable of launching a satellite from the early 1950s onwards, several years earlier than the Soviet launch of Sputnik-1 in 1957, but the Truman administration did not consider this a priority. He may also have been the coiner of the concept of space superiority, and he lobbied the Truman administration for the construction of a nuclearly armed space station, which was to be used as a weapon against the Soviet Union. He often spoke in public speeches about the need and feasibility of such a space station, to garner public support for the idea, yet he never talked publicly about its intended armament. Similarly, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the RAND Project was secretly recommending to the US government a major effort to design a man-made satellite that would take photographs from space, and to develop the rockets necessary to put such a satellite in orbit. Already in May 1946, the organization released a Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship, which was a proposal for a United States satellite program.

President Truman did establish the Joint Long Range Proving Ground at Cape Canaveral, which would, later on, become the Cape Canaveral Space Force Station area. From 1949, the United States government used the site to test missiles. The location was among the best in the continental US for this purpose, as it allowed for launches out over the Atlantic Ocean, and is closer to the equator than most other parts of the United States, allowing rockets to get a boost from the Earth's rotation. In 1951, the Air Force established the Air Force Missile Test Center at Cape Canaveral. The Army, Air Force, and the Applied Physics Laboratory started in 1950 their use of Aerobee sounding rockets on a variety of physics, aeronomy, photography, weather, and biomedical missions, and reached beyond the 100 kilometres (62 mile) boundary of space in 1952. Meanwhile, the Navy fired its Viking rocket to a record-breaking 136 miles (219 km) in August 1951.

Eisenhower administration

In December 1953, the US Air Force had pulled together all its various satellite efforts into a single program known as Weapon Systems-117L (WS-117L). In October 1956, the Lockheed Aircraft Corp. got the first WS-117L production contract, but a diplomatic problem associated with aerial surveillance worried President Eisenhower and held back the spy satellite program.

President Dwight Eisenhower was skeptical about human spaceflight, but sought to advance the commercial and military applications of satellite technology. Prior to the Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957, Eisenhower had already authorized Project Vanguard, a scientific satellite program associated with the International Geophysical Year. As a supporter of small government, he sought to avoid a space race which would require an expensive bureaucracy to conduct, and was surprised by, and sought to downplay, the public response to the Soviet launch of Sputnik. In an effort to prevent similar technological surprises by the Soviets, Eisenhower authorized the creation in 1958 of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), responsible for the development of advanced military technologies.

Space programs such as the Explorer satellite were proposed by the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA), but Eisenhower, seeking to avoid giving the US space program the militaristic image Americans had of the Soviet program, had rejected Explorer in favor of the Vanguard, but after numerous embarrassing Vanguard failures, was forced to give the go-ahead to the Army's launch

Later in 1958, Eisenhower asked Congress to create an agency for civilian control of non-military space activities. At the suggestion of Eisenhower's science advisor James R. Killian, the drafted bill called for creation of the new agency out of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. The result was the National Aeronautics and Space Act passed in July 1958, which created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Eisenhower appointed T. Keith Glennan as NASA's first Administrator, with the last NACA Director Hugh Dryden serving as his Deputy.

NASA as created in the act passed by Congress was substantially stronger than the Eisenhower administration's original proposal. NASA took over the space technology research started by DARPA. NASA also took over the US manned satellite program, Man In Space Soonest, from the Air Force, as Project Mercury.

Kennedy administration

President Kennedy's speech at Rice University on September 12, 1962, famous for the quote "We choose to go to the Moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard." (17 mins 47 secs).

Early in John F. Kennedy's presidency, he was inclined to dismantle plans for the Apollo program, which he had opposed as a senator, but postponed any decision out of deference to his vice president whom he had appointed chairman of the National Advisory Space Council and who strongly supported NASA due to its Texas location. This changed with his January 1961 State of the Union address, when he suggested international cooperation in space.

In response to the flight of Yuri Gagarin as the first man in space, Kennedy in 1961 committed the United States to landing a man on the Moon by the end of the decade. At the time, the administration believed that the Soviet Union would be able to land a man on the Moon by 1967, and Kennedy saw an American Moon landing as critical to the nation's global prestige and status. His pick for NASA administrator, James E. Webb, however pursued a broader program incorporating space applications such as weather and communications satellites. During this time the Department of Defense pursued military space applications such as the Dyna-Soar spaceplane program and the Manned Orbiting Laboratory. Kennedy also had elevated the status of the National Advisory Space Council by assigning the Vice President as its chair.

Johnson administration

President Lyndon Johnson was committed to space efforts, and as Senate majority leader and Vice President, he had contributed much to setting up the organizational infrastructure for the space program. However, the costs of the Vietnam War and the programs of the Great Society forced cuts to NASA's budget as early as 1965. However, the Apollo 8 mission carrying the first men into lunar orbit occurred just before the end of his term in 1968.

Nixon administration

President Nixon visits the Apollo 11 astronauts in quarantine after observing their landing in the ocean from the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Hornet.

Apollo 11, the first Moon landing, occurred early in Richard Nixon's presidency, and five more Apollo program Moon landings followed during his time in office. But NASA's budget continued to decline and three planned Moon landings were cancelled. The Nixon administration approved the beginning of the Space Shuttle program, but did not support funding of other projects such as a Mars landing, colonization of the Moon, or a permanent space station.

On January 5, 1972, Nixon approved the development of NASA's Space Shuttle program, a decision that profoundly influenced American efforts to explore and develop space for several decades thereafter. Under the Nixon administration, however, NASA's budget declined. NASA Administrator Thomas O. Paine was drawing up ambitious plans for the establishment of a permanent base on the Moon by the end of the 1970s and the launch of a manned expedition to Mars as early as 1981. Nixon, however, rejected this proposal. On May 24, 1972, Nixon approved a five-year cooperative program between NASA and the Soviet space program, which would culminate in the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, a joint-mission of an American Apollo and a Soviet Soyuz spacecraft, during Gerald Ford's presidency in 1975.

Ford administration

Space policy had little momentum during the presidency of Gerald Ford. NASA funding improved somewhat, the Apollo–Soyuz Test Project occurred and the Shuttle program continued, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy was formed.

Carter administration

The Jimmy Carter administration was also fairly inactive on space issues, stating that it was "neither feasible nor necessary" to commit to an Apollo-style space program, and his space policy included only limited, short-range goals. With regard to military space policy, the Carter space policy stated, without much specification in the unclassified version, that "The United States will pursue Activities in space in support of its right of self-defense."

Reagan administration

President Reagan delivering the March 23, 1983 speech initiating the Strategic Defense Initiative.

The first flight of the Space Shuttle occurred in April 1981, early in President Ronald Reagan's first term. Reagan in 1982 announced a renewed active space effort, which included initiatives such as privatization of the Landsat program, a new commercialization policy for NASA, the construction of Space Station Freedom, and the military Strategic Defense Initiative. Late in his term as president, Reagan sought to increase NASA's budget by 30 percent. However, many of these initiatives would not be completed as planned.

The January 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger disaster led to the Rogers Commission Report on the causes of the disaster, and the National Commission on Space report and Ride Report on the future of the national space program.

George H. W. Bush administration

President George H. W. Bush continued to support space development, announcing the bold Space Exploration Initiative, and ordering a 20 percent increase in NASA's budget in a tight budget era. The Bush administration also commissioned another report on the future of NASA, the Advisory Committee on the Future of the United States Space Program, also known as the Augustine Report.

Clinton administration

During the Clinton administration, Space Shuttle flights continued, and the construction of the International Space Station began.

The Clinton administration's National Space Policy (Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-49/NSTC-8) was released on September 14, 1996. Clinton's top goals were to "enhance knowledge of the Earth, the solar system and the universe through human and robotic exploration" and to "strengthen and maintain the national security of the United States." The Clinton space policy, like the space policies of Carter and Reagan, also stated that "The United States will conduct those space activities necessary for national security." These activities included "providing support for the United States' inherent right of self-defense and our defense commitments to allies and friends; deterring, warning, and if necessary, defending against enemy attack; assuring that hostile forces cannot prevent our own use of space; and countering, if necessary, space systems and services used for hostile purposes." The Clinton policy also said the United States would develop and operate "space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space" only when such steps would be "consistent with treaty obligations."

George W. Bush administration

The launch of the Ares I-X prototype on October 28, 2009, was the only flight performed under the Bush administration's Constellation program.

The Space Shuttle Columbia disaster occurred early in George W. Bush's term, leading to the report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board being released in August 2003. The Vision for Space Exploration, announced on January 14, 2004, by President George W. Bush, was seen as a response to the Columbia disaster and the general state of human spaceflight at NASA, as well as a way to regain public enthusiasm for space exploration. The Vision for Space Exploration sought to implement a sustained and affordable human and robotic program to explore the Solar System and beyond; extend human presence across the Solar System, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020, in preparation for human exploration of Mars and other destinations; develop the innovative technologies, knowledge, and infrastructures both to explore and to support decisions about the destinations for human exploration; and to promote international and commercial participation in exploration to further U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests

To this end, the President's Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy was formed by President Bush on January 27, 2004. Its final report was submitted on June 4, 2004. This led to the NASA Exploration Systems Architecture Study in mid-2005, which developed technical plans for carrying out the programs specified in the Vision for Space Exploration. This led to the beginning of execution of Constellation program, including the Orion spacecraft, the Altair lunar lander, and the Ares I and Ares V rockets. The Ares I-X mission, a test launch of a prototype Ares I rocket, was successfully completed in October 2009.

A new National Space Policy was released on August 31, 2006, that established overarching national policy that governs the conduct of U.S. space activities. The document, the first full revision of overall space policy in 10 years, emphasized security issues, encouraged private enterprise in space, and characterized the role of U.S. space diplomacy largely in terms of persuading other nations to support U.S. policy. The United States National Security Council said in written comments that an update was needed to "reflect the fact that space has become an even more important component of U.S. Economic security, National security, and homeland security." The Bush policy accepted current international agreements, but stated that it "rejects any limitations on the fundamental right of the United States to operate in and acquire data from space," and that "The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space."

Obama administration

President Barack Obama announces his administration's space policy at the Kennedy Space Center on April 15, 2010.

The Obama administration commissioned the Review of United States Human Space Flight Plans Committee in 2009 to review the human spaceflight plans of the United States and to ensure the nation is on "a vigorous and sustainable path to achieving its boldest aspirations in space," covering human spaceflight options after the time NASA plans to retire the Space Shuttle.

On April 15, 2010, President Obama spoke at the Kennedy Space Center announcing the administration's plans for NASA. None of the 3 plans outlined in the committee's final report were completely selected. The President cancelled the Constellation program and rejected immediate plans to return to the Moon on the premise that the current plan had become nonviable. He instead promised $6 billion in additional funding and called for development of a new heavy lift rocket program to be ready for construction by 2015 with manned missions to Mars orbit by the mid-2030s. The Obama administration released its new formal space policy on June 28, 2010, in which it also reversed the Bush policy's rejection of international agreements to curb the militarization of space, saying that it would "consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies."

The NASA Authorization Act of 2010, passed on October 11, 2010, enacted many of these space policy goals.

Trump administration

President Trump signs an executive order re-establishing the National Space Council, with astronauts Dave Wolf and Al Drew, and Apollo 11 astronaut Buzz Aldrin (left-to-right) looking on.
 
President Trump signs Space Policy Directive 1 on December 11, 2017, with astronauts Harrison Schmitt, Buzz Aldrin, Peggy Whitson, and Christina Koch looking on.

On June 30, 2017, President Donald Trump signed an executive order to re-establish the National Space Council, chaired by Vice President Mike Pence. The Trump administration's first budget request keeps Obama-era human spaceflight programs in place: commercial spacecraft to ferry astronauts to and from the International Space Station, the government-owned Space Launch System, and the Orion crew capsule for deep space missions, while reducing Earth science research and calling for the elimination of NASA's education office.

On December 11, 2017, President Trump signed Space Policy Directive 1, a change in national space policy that provides for a U.S.-led, integrated program with private sector partners for a human return to the Moon, followed by missions to Mars and beyond. The policy calls for the NASA administrator to "lead an innovative and sustainable program of exploration with commercial and international partners to enable human expansion across the solar system and to bring back to Earth new knowledge and opportunities." The effort will more effectively organize government, private industry, and international efforts toward returning humans on the Moon, and will lay the foundation that will eventually enable human exploration of Mars.

The President stated "The directive I am signing today will refocus America's space program on human exploration and discovery." "It marks a first step in returning American astronauts to the Moon for the first time since 1972, for long-term exploration and use. This time, we will not only plant our flag and leave our footprints – we will establish a foundation for an eventual mission to Mars, and perhaps someday, to many worlds beyond."

"Under President Trump's leadership, America will lead in space once again on all fronts," said Vice President Pence. "As the President has said, space is the 'next great American frontier' – and it is our duty – and our destiny – to settle that frontier with American leadership, courage, and values. The signing of this new directive is yet another promise kept by President Trump."

Among other dignitaries on hand for the signing, were NASA astronauts Sen. Harrison "Jack" Schmitt, Buzz Aldrin, Peggy Whitson, and Christina Koch. Schmitt landed on the Moon 45 years to the minute that the policy directive was signed as part of NASA's Apollo 17 mission, and is the most recent living person to have set foot on our lunar neighbor. Aldrin was the second person to walk on the Moon during the Apollo 11 mission. Whitson spoke to the president from space in April aboard the International Space Station and while flying back home after breaking the record for most time in space by a U.S. astronaut in September. Koch is a member of NASA's astronaut class of 2013.

On December 20, 2019 the United States Space Force was established with the passing of NDAA FY2020.

On December 9, 2020, the White House issued a National Space Policy, which advocated expanding U.S. leadership in space, allowing unfettered access to space, encouraging private sector growth, expanding international cooperation, and establishing a human presence on the Moon with an eventual human mission to Mars.

Biden administration

President Joe Biden's press secretary has expressed his support of the Artemis Program which seeks to land a man and the first woman on the surface of the Moon. It is uncertain whether the Biden Administration will retain the 2024 target date for the first crewed landing as the Trump Administration did. President Biden also has expressed his approval of the United States Space Force.

Wednesday, May 5, 2021

Helsinki Accords

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helsinki_Accords

Helsinki Accords
Bundesarchiv Bild 183-P0801-026, Helsinki, KSZE-Konferenz, Schlussakte.jpg
Chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) Helmut Schmidt, Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) Erich Honecker, US president Gerald Ford and Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky
 
Host country Finland
Date30 July – 1 August 1975
Venue(s)Finlandia Hall
CitiesHelsinki


Paris Charter
From left is Kissinger, Brezhnev, Ford, and Gromyko at outside of the American Embassy, Helsinki, Finland,1975)

The Helsinki Final Act, also known as Helsinki Accords or Helsinki Declaration was the document signed at the closing meeting of the third phase of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held in Helsinki, Finland, during 30 July – 1 August 1975, following two years of negotiations known as the Helsinki Process. All then-existing European countries (except pro-Chinese Albania and semi-sovereign Andorra) as well as United States and Canada, altogether 35 participating states, signed the Final Act in an attempt to improve the détente between the Soviet bloc and the West. The Helsinki Accords, however, were not binding as they did not have treaty status that would have to be ratified by parliaments. Sometimes the term "Helsinki pact(s)" was also used unofficially.

Articles

In the CSCE terminology, there were four groupings or baskets. In the first basket, the "Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States" (also known as "The Decalogue") enumerated the following 10 points:

  1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty
  2. Refraining from the threat or use of force
  3. Inviolability of frontiers
  4. Territorial integrity of states
  5. Peaceful settlement of disputes
  6. Non-intervention in internal affairs
  7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief
  8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples
  9. Co-operation among States
  10. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law

The second basket promised economic scientific and technological cooperation, facilitating business contacts and industrial cooperation, linking together transportation networks and increasing the flow of information. The third basket involved commitments to improve the human context of family reunions, marriages and travel. It also sought to improve the conditions of journalists and expand cultural exchanges. The fourth basket dealt with procedures to monitor implementation, and to plan future meetings.

Freedom of information

The United States had sought a provision that would prohibit radio jamming but it failed to find consensus due to Soviet opposition. Despite this, the West believed jamming was illegal under the agreed upon language for "expansion of the dissemination of information broadcast by radio". The Soviet Union believed that jamming was a legally justified response to broadcasts they argued were a violation of the Helsinki Accords broad purpose to "meet the interest of mutual understanding among people and the aims set forth by the Conference".

Ford administration

When president Gerald Ford came into office in August 1974, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) negotiations had been underway for nearly two years. Although the USSR was looking for a rapid resolution, none of the parties were quick to make concessions, particularly on human rights points. Throughout much of the negotiations, US leaders were disengaged and uninterested with the process. In August 1974, National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said to Ford "we never wanted it but we went along with the Europeans [...] It is meaningless — it is just a grandstand play to the left. We are going along with it."

In the months leading up to the conclusion of negotiations and signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the American public, in particular Americans of Eastern European descent voiced their concerns that the agreement would mean the acceptance of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe and incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR. President Ford was concerned about this as well and sought clarification on this issue from the US National Security Council. The US Senate was also worried about the fate of the Baltic States and the CSCE in general. Several Senators wrote to President Ford requesting that the final summit stage be delayed until all matters had been settled, and in a way favorable to the West.

Shortly before President Ford departed for Helsinki, he held a meeting with a group of Americans of Eastern European background, and stated definitively that US policy on the Baltic States would not change, but would be strengthened since the agreement denies the annexation of territory in violation of international law and allows for the peaceful change of borders.

Ford in July 1975 told the delegation of Americans from East European backgrounds that:

The Helsinki documents involve political and moral commitments aimed at lessening tensions and opening further the lines of communication between peoples of East and West. ... We are not committing ourselves to anything beyond what we are already committed to by our own moral and legal standards and by more formal treaty agreements such as the United Nations Charter and Declaration of Human Rights. ... If it all fails, Europe will be no worse off than it is now. If even a part of it succeeds, the lot the people in Eastern Europe will be that much better, and the cause of freedom will advance at least that far."

His reassurances had little effect. The volume of negative mail continued to grow. The American public was still unconvinced that American policy on the incorporation of the Baltic States would not be changed by the Helsinki Final Act. Despite protests from all around, Ford decided to move forward and sign the agreement. As domestic criticism mounted, Ford hedged on his support for the Helsinki Accords, which had the impact of overall weakening his foreign-policy stature. His blunder in the debate with Carter when he denied Kremlin control of Poland proved disastrous.

Finlandia Hall, the venue for the Helsinki Accords conference

Reception and impact

The document was seen both as a significant step toward reducing Cold War tensions and as a major diplomatic boost for the Soviet Union at the time, due to its clauses on the inviolability of national frontiers and respect for territorial integrity, which were seen to consolidate the USSR's territorial gains in Eastern Europe following the World War II. Considering objections from Canada, Spain, Ireland and other states, the Final Act simply stated that "frontiers" in Europe should be stable but could change by peaceful internal means. US president Gerald Ford also reaffirmed that US non-recognition policy of the Baltic states' (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) forced incorporation into the Soviet Union had not changed. Leaders of other NATO member states made similar statements.

However, the civil rights portion of the agreement provided the basis for the work of the Helsinki Watch, an independent non-governmental organization created to monitor compliance to the Helsinki Accords (which evolved into several regional committees, eventually forming the International Helsinki Federation and Human Rights Watch). While these provisions applied to all signatories, the focus of attention was on their application to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Soviet propaganda presented the Final Act as a great triumph for Soviet diplomacy and for Brezhnev personally.

According to the Cold War scholar John Lewis Gaddis in his book The Cold War: A New History (2005), "Leonid Brezhnev had looked forward, Anatoly Dobrynin recalls, to the 'publicity he would gain... when the Soviet public learned of the final settlement of the postwar boundaries for which they had sacrificed so much'... '[Instead, the Helsinki Accords] gradually became a manifesto of the dissident and liberal movement'... What this meant was that the people who lived under these systems — at least the more courageous — could claim official permission to say what they thought."

The then-People's Republic of Albania refused to participate in the Accords, its leader Enver Hoxha arguing, "All the satellites of the Soviets with the possible exception of the Bulgarians want to break the shackles of the Warsaw Treaty, but they cannot. Then their only hope is that which the Helsinki document allows them, that is, to strengthen their friendship with the United States of America and the West, to seek investments from them in the form of credits and imports of their technology without any restrictions, to allow the church to occupy its former place, to deepen the moral degeneration, to increase the anti-Sovietism, and the Warsaw Treaty will remain an empty egg-shell."

The Helsinki Accords served as the groundwork for the later Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), established in 1995 under the Paris Charter of 1990.

Signatory states

Heads of state or government

The "undersigned High Representatives of the participating States" as well as seating at the conference were ordered alphabetically by the countries' short names in French (thus starting with the two Allemagnes followed by America, and Tchécoslovaquie separated from Union Sovietique by Turquie etc.). This also influenced the act's headers consecutively in German, English, Spanish, French, Italian and Russian, which were also the conference's working languages and languages of the act itself.

International organizations

Tuesday, May 4, 2021

Saturn (rocket family)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Three variants of the Saturn family which were developed: Saturn I, Saturn IB, and Saturn V

The Saturn family of American rockets was developed by a team of mostly German rocket scientists led by Wernher von Braun to launch heavy payloads to Earth orbit and beyond. The Saturn family used liquid hydrogen as fuel in the upper stages. Originally proposed as a military satellite launcher, they were adopted as the launch vehicles for the Apollo Moon program. Three versions were built and flown: the medium-lift Saturn I, the heavy-lift Saturn IB, and the super heavy-lift Saturn V.

The Saturn name was proposed by von Braun in October 1958 as a logical successor to the Jupiter series as well as the Roman god's powerful position.

In 1963, President John F. Kennedy identified the Saturn I SA-5 launch as being the point where US lift capability would surpass the Soviets, after having been behind since Sputnik. He last mentioned this in a speech given at Brooks AFB in San Antonio on the day before he was assassinated.

To date, the Saturn V is the only launch vehicle to transport human beings beyond low Earth orbit. A total of 24 humans were flown to the Moon in the four years spanning December 1968 through December 1972. No Saturn rocket failed catastrophically in flight.

Summary of variants

All the Saturn family rockets are listed here by date of introduction.

Name Serial number Function Maiden flight Final flight Launches Remarks
Total Success Failure
(+ partial)
Saturn I Block I SA–1–4 Development October 27, 1961 March 28, 1963 4 4 0 Live first stage only
Saturn I Block II SA–5–10 Development January 29, 1964 July 30, 1965 6 6 0 Carried Apollo boilerplate CSM and Pegasus micrometeroid satellites. World's first
Saturn IB SA–200 Apollo spacecraft Earth orbital carrier February 26, 1966 July 15, 1975 9 9 0 Used for Skylab crews and Apollo-Soyuz Test Project
Saturn V SA–500 Apollo spacecraft lunar carrier November 9, 1967 May 14, 1973 13 12 1 Launched nine crewed lunar missions and the Skylab space station

History

Early development

A Saturn I (SA-1) liftoff from LC-34

In the early 1950s, the US Navy and US Army actively developed long-range missiles with the help of German rocket engineers who were involved in developing the successful V-2 during the Second World War. These missiles included the Navy's Viking, and the Army's Corporal, Jupiter and Redstone. Meanwhile, the US Air Force developed its Atlas and Titan missiles, relying more on American engineers.

Infighting among the various branches was constant, with the United States Department of Defense (DoD) deciding which projects to fund for development. On November 26, 1956, Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson issued a memorandum stripping the Army of offensive missiles with a range of 200 miles (320 km) or greater, and turning their Jupiter missiles over to the Air Force.[4] From that point on, the Air Force would be the primary missile developer, especially for dual-use missiles that could also be used as space launch vehicles.

In late 1956, the Department of Defense released a requirement for a heavy-lift vehicle to orbit a new class of communications and "other" satellites (the spy satellite program was top secret). The requirements, drawn up by the then-unofficial Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), called for a vehicle capable of putting 9,000 to 18,000 kilograms into orbit, or accelerating 2,700 to 5,400 kg to escape velocity.

Since the Wilson memorandum covered only weapons, not space vehicles, the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) saw this as a way to continue the development of their own large-rocket projects. In April 1957, von Braun directed Heinz-Hermann Koelle, chief of the Future Projects design branch, to study dedicated launch vehicle designs that could be built as quickly as possible. Koelle evaluated a variety of designs for missile-derived launchers that could place a maximum of about 1,400 kg in orbit, but might be expanded to as much as 4,500 kg with new high-energy upper stages. In any event, these upper stages would not be available until 1961 or 1962 at the earliest, and the launchers would still not meet the DoD requirements for heavy loads.

In order to fill the projected need for loads of 10,000 kg or greater, the ABMA team calculated that a booster (first stage) with a thrust of about 1,500,000 lbf (6,700 kN) thrust would be needed, far greater than any existing or planned missile. For this role they proposed using a number of existing missiles clustered together to produce a single larger booster; using existing designs they looked at combining tankage from one Jupiter as a central core, with eight Redstone diameter tanks attached to it. This relatively cheap configuration allowed existing fabrication and design facilities to be used to produce this "quick and dirty" design.

Two approaches to building the Super-Jupiter were considered; the first used multiple engines to reach the 1,500,000 lbf (6,700 kN) mark, the second used a single much larger engine. Both approaches had their own advantages and disadvantages. Building a smaller engine for clustered use would be a relatively low-risk path from existing systems, but required duplication of systems and made the possibility of a stage failure much higher (adding engines generally reduces reliability, as per Lusser's law). A single larger engine would be more reliable, and would offer higher performance because it eliminated duplication of "dead weight" like propellant plumbing and hydraulics for steering the engines. On the downside, an engine of this size had never been built before and development would be expensive and risky. The Air Force had recently expressed an interest in such an engine, which would develop into the famed F-1, but at the time they were aiming for 1,000,000 lbf (4,400 kN) and the engines would not be ready until the mid-1960s. The engine-cluster appeared to be the only way to meet the requirements on time and budget.

Super-Jupiter was the first-stage booster only; to place payloads in orbit, additional upper stages would be needed. ABMA proposed using either the Titan or Atlas as a second stage, optionally with the new Centaur upper-stage. The Centaur had been proposed by General Dynamics (Astronautics Corp.) as an upper stage for the Atlas (also their design) in order to quickly produce a launcher capable of placing loads up to 8,500 lb (3,900 kg) into low Earth orbit. The Centaur was based on the same "balloon tank" concept as the Atlas, and built on the same jigs at the same 120-inch (3,000 mm) diameter. As the Titan was deliberately built at the same size as well, this meant the Centaur could be used with either missile Given that the Atlas was the higher priority of the two ICBM projects and its production was fully accounted for, ABMA focused on "backup" design, Titan, although they proposed extending it in length in order to carry additional fuel.

In December 1957, ABMA delivered Proposal: A National Integrated Missile and Space Vehicle Development Program to the DoD, detailing their clustered approach. They proposed a booster consisting of a Jupiter missile airframe surrounded by eight Redstones acting as tankage, a thrust plate at the bottom, and four Rocketdyne E-1 engines, each having 380,000 lbf (1,700 kN) of thrust. The ABMA team also left the design open to future expansion with a single 1,500,000 lbf (6,700 kN) engine, which would require relatively minor changes to the design. The upper stage was the lengthened Titan, with the Centaur on top. The result was a very tall and skinny rocket, quite different from the Saturn that eventually emerged.

Specific uses were forecast for each of the military services, including navigation satellites for the Navy; reconnaissance, communications, and meteorological satellites for the Army and Air Force; support for Air Force crewed missions; and surface-to-surface logistics supply for the Army at distances up to 6400 km. Development and testing of the lower stage stack were projected to be completed by 1963, about the same time that the Centaur should become available for testing in combination. The total development cost of $850 million during the years 1958-1963 covered 30 research and development flights.

Sputnik stuns the world

While the Super-Juno program was being drawn up, preparations were underway for the first satellite launch as the US contribution to the International Geophysical Year in 1957. For complex political reasons, the program had been given to the US Navy under Project Vanguard. The Vanguard launcher consisted of a Viking lower stage combined with new uppers adapted from sounding rockets. ABMA provided valuable support on Viking and Vanguard, both with their first-hand knowledge of the V-2, as well as developing its guidance system. The first three Vanguard suborbital test flights had gone off without a hitch, starting in December 1956, and a launch was planned for late 1957.

On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union unexpectedly launched Sputnik I. Although there had been some idea that the Soviets were working towards this goal, even in public, no one considered it to be very serious. When asked about the possibility in a November 1954 press conference, Defense Secretary Wilson replied: "I wouldn't care if they did." The public did not see it the same way, however, and the event was a major public relations disaster for the US. Vanguard was planned to launch shortly after Sputnik, but a series of delays pushed this into December, when the rocket exploded in spectacular fashion. The press was harsh, referring to the project as "Kaputnik" or "Project Rearguard". As Time magazine noted at the time:

But in the midst of the cold war, Vanguard's cool scientific goal proved to be disastrously modest: the Russians got there first. The post-Sputnik White House explanation that the U.S. was not in a satellite "race" with Russia was not just an after-the-fact alibi. Said Dr. Hagen ten months ago: "We are not attempting in any way to race with the Russians". But in the eyes of the world, the U.S. was in a satellite race whether it wanted to be or not, and because of the Administration's costly failure of imagination, Project Vanguard shuffled along when it should have been running. It was still shuffling when Sputnik's beeps told the world that Russia's satellite program, not the U.S.'s, was the vanguard.

Von Braun responded to Sputnik I's launch by claiming he could have a satellite in orbit within 90 days of being given a go-ahead. His plan was to combine the existing Jupiter C rocket (confusingly, a Redstone adaptation, not a Jupiter) with the solid-fuel engines from the Vanguard, producing the Juno I. There was no immediate response while everyone waited for Vanguard to launch, but the continued delays in Vanguard and the November launch of Sputnik II resulted in the go-ahead being given that month. Von Braun kept his promise with the successful launch of Explorer I on 1 February 1958. Vanguard was finally successful on March 17, 1958.

ARPA selects Juno

Concerned that the Soviets continued to surprise the U.S. with technologies that seemed beyond their capabilities, the DoD studied the problem and concluded that it was primarily bureaucratic. As all of the branches of the military had their own research and development programs, there was considerable duplication and inter-service fighting for resources. Making matters worse, the DoD imposed its own Byzantine procurement and contracting rules, adding considerable overhead. To address these concerns, the DoD initiated the formation of a new research and development group focused on launch vehicles and given wide discretionary powers that cut across traditional Army/Navy/Air Force lines. The group was given the job of catching up to the Soviets in space technology as quickly as possible, using whatever technology it could, regardless of the origin. Formalized as Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) on February 7, 1958, the group examined the DoD launcher requirements and compared the various approaches that were currently available.

At the same time that ABMA was drawing up the Super-Juno proposal, the Air Force was in the midst of working on their Titan C concept. The Air Force had gained valuable experience working with liquid hydrogen on the Lockheed CL-400 Suntan spy plane project and felt confident in their ability to use this volatile fuel for rockets. They had already accepted Krafft Ehricke's arguments that hydrogen was the only practical fuel for upper stages, and started the Centaur project based on the strength of these arguments. Titan C was a hydrogen-burning intermediate stage that would normally sit between the Titan lower and Centaur upper, or could be used without the Centaur for low-Earth orbit missiles like Dyna-Soar. However, as hydrogen is much less dense than "traditional" fuels then in use, especially kerosene, the upper stage would have to be fairly large in order to hold enough fuel. As the Atlas and Titan were both built at 120" diameters it would make sense to build Titan C at this diameter as well, but this would result in an unwieldy tall and skinny rocket with dubious strength and stability. Instead, Titan C proposed building the new stage at a larger 160" diameter, meaning it would be an entirely new rocket.

In comparison, the Super-Juno design was based on off-the-shelf components, with the exception of the E-1 engines. Although it too relied on the Centaur for high-altitude missions, the rocket was usable for low-Earth orbit without Centaur, which offered some flexibility in case Centaur ran into problems. ARPA agreed that the Juno proposal was more likely to meet the timeframes required, although they felt that there was no strong reason to use the E-1, and recommended a lower-risk approach here as well. ABMA responded with a new design, the Juno V (as a continuation of the Juno I and Juno II series of rockets, while Juno III and IV were unbuilt Atlas- and Titan-derived concepts), which replaced the four E-1 engines with eight H-1s, a much more modest upgrade of the existing S-3D already used on the Thor and Jupiter missiles, raising thrust from 150,000 to 188,000 lbf (670 to 840 kN). It was estimated that this approach would save as much as $60 million in development and cut as much as two years of R&D time.

Happy with the results of the redesign, on August 15, 1958, ARPA issued Order Number 14-59 that called on ABMA to:

Initiate a development program to provide a large space vehicle booster of approximately 1 500 000-lb. thrust based on a cluster of available rocket engines. The immediate goal of this program is to demonstrate a full-scale captive dynamic firing by the end of CY 1959.

This was followed on September 11, 1958, with another contract with Rocketdyne to start work on the H-1. On September 23, 1958, ARPA and the Army Ordnance Missile Command (AOMC) drew up an additional agreement enlarging the scope of the program, stating "In addition to the captive dynamic firing..., it is hereby agreed that this program should now be extended to provide for a propulsion flight test of this booster by approximately September 1960". Further, they wanted ABMA to produce three additional boosters, the last two of which would be "capable of placing limited payloads in orbit."

By this point, many in the ABMA group were already referring to the design as Saturn, as von Braun explained it as a reference to the planet after Jupiter. The name change became official in February 1959.

NASA involvement

In addition to ARPA, various groups within the US government had been considering the formation of a civilian agency to handle space exploration. After the Sputnik launch, these efforts gained urgency and were quickly moved forward. NASA was formed on July 29, 1958, and immediately set about studying the problem of crewed space flight, and the launchers needed to work in this field. One goal, even in this early stage, was a crewed lunar mission. At the time, the NASA panels felt that the direct ascent mission profile was the best approach; this placed a single very large spacecraft in orbit, which was capable of flying to the Moon, landing and returning to Earth. To launch such a large spacecraft, a new booster with much greater power would be needed; even the Saturn was not nearly large enough. NASA started examining a number of potential rocket designs under their Nova program.

NASA was not alone in studying crewed lunar missions. Von Braun had always expressed an interest in this goal, and had been studying what would be required for a lunar mission for some time. ABMA's Project Horizon proposed using fifteen Saturn launches to carry up spacecraft components and fuel that would be assembled in orbit to build a single very large lunar craft. This Earth orbit rendezvous mission profile required the least amount of booster capacity per launch, and was thus able to be carried out using the existing rocket design. This would be the first step towards a small crewed base on the moon, which would require several additional Saturn launches every month to supply it.

The Air Force had also started their Lunex Project in 1958, also with a goal of building a crewed lunar outpost. Like NASA, Lunex favored the direct ascent mode, and therefore required much larger boosters. As part of the project, they designed an entirely new rocket series known as the Space Launcher System, or SLS (not to be confused with the Space Launch System part of the Artemis program), which combined a number of solid-fuel boosters with either the Titan missile or a new custom booster stage to address a wide variety of launch weights. The smallest SLS vehicle consisted of a Titan and two strap-on solids, giving it performance similar to Titan C, allowing it to act as a launcher for Dyna-Soar. The largest used much larger solid-rockets and a much-enlarged booster for their direct ascent mission. Combinations in-between these extremes would be used for other satellite launching duties.

Silverstein Committee

Line drawings showing the evolution of the Saturn I rocket, from the original designs to the flown versions, and the uprated Saturn IB

A government commission, the "Saturn Vehicle Evaluation Committee" (better known as the Silverstein Committee), was assembled to recommend specific directions that NASA could take with the existing Army program. The committee recommended the development of new, hydrogen-burning upper stages for the Saturn, and outlined eight different configurations for heavy-lift boosters ranging from very low-risk solutions making heavy use of existing technology, to designs that relied on hardware that had not been developed yet, including the proposed new upper stage. The configurations were:

  • Saturn A
    • A-1 – Saturn lower stage, Titan second stage, and Centaur third stage (von Braun's original concept).
    • A-2 – Saturn lower stage, proposed clustered Jupiter second stage, and Centaur third stage.
  • Saturn B
    • B-1 – Saturn lower stage, proposed clustered Titan second stage, proposed S-IV third stage and Centaur fourth stage.
  • Saturn C
    • C-1 – Saturn lower stage, proposed S-IV second stage.
    • C-2 – Saturn lower stage, proposed S-II second stage, proposed S-IV third stage.
    • C-3, C-4, and C-5 – all based on different variations of a new lower stage using F-1 engines, variations of proposed S-II second stages, and proposed S-IV third stages.

Contracts for the development of a new hydrogen-burning engine were given to Rocketdyne in 1960 and for the development of the Saturn IV stage to Douglas the same year.

Launch history

1965 graph showing cumulative history and projection of Saturn launches by month (along with Atlas and Titan).
 
Saturn Launch History 
PROGRAM VEHICLE MISSION LAUNCH DATE PAD
Saturn I SA-1 SA-1 Oct 27, 1961 LC-34
Saturn I SA-2 SA-2 Apr 25, 1962 34
Saturn I SA-3 SA-3 Nov 16, 1962 34
Saturn I SA-4 SA-4 Mar 28, 1963 34
Saturn I SA-5 SA-5 Jan 29, 1964 LC-37B
Saturn I SA-6 A-101 May 28, 1964 37B
Saturn I SA-7 A-102 Sep 18, 1964 37B
Saturn I SA-9 A-103 Feb 16, 1965 37B
Saturn I SA-8 A-104 May 25, 1965 37B
Saturn I SA-10 A-105 Jul 30, 1965 37B
Saturn IB SA-201 AS-201 Feb 26, 1966 34
Saturn IB SA-203 AS-203 Jul 5, 1966 37B
Saturn IB SA-202 AS-202 Aug 25, 1966 34
Saturn V SA-501 Apollo 4 Nov 9, 1967 LC-39A
Saturn IB SA-204 Apollo 5 Jan 22, 1968 37B
Saturn V SA-502 Apollo 6 Apr 4, 1968 39A
Saturn IB SA-205 Apollo 7 Oct 11, 1968 34
Saturn V SA-503 Apollo 8 Dec 21, 1968 39A
Saturn V SA-504 Apollo 9 Mar 3, 1969 39A
Saturn V SA-505 Apollo 10 May 18, 1969 LC-39B
Saturn V SA-506 Apollo 11 Jul 16, 1969 39A
Saturn V SA-507 Apollo 12 Nov 14, 1969 39A
Saturn V SA-508 Apollo 13 Apr 11, 1970 39A
Saturn V SA-509 Apollo 14 Jan 31, 1971 39A
Saturn V SA-510 Apollo 15 Jul 26, 1971 39A
Saturn V SA-511 Apollo 16 Apr 16, 1972 39A
Saturn V SA-512 Apollo 17 Dec 7, 1972 39A
Saturn V SA-513 Skylab 1 May 14, 1973 39A
Saturn IB SA-206 Skylab 2 May 25, 1973 39B
Saturn IB SA-207 Skylab 3 Jul 28, 1973 39B
Saturn IB SA-208 Skylab 4 Nov 16, 1973 39B
Saturn IB SA-210 ASTP Jul 15, 1975 39B

Apollo program

A Saturn IB (AS-202) liftoff from LC-34
 
von Braun with the F-1 engines of the Saturn V first stage at the U.S. Space and Rocket Center
 
Rollout of Apollo 11's Saturn V on launch pad

The challenge that President John F. Kennedy put to NASA in May 1961 to put an astronaut on the Moon by the end of the decade put a sudden new urgency on the Saturn program. That year saw a flurry of activity as different means of reaching the Moon were evaluated.

Both the Nova and Saturn rockets, which shared a similar design and could share some parts, were evaluated for the mission. However, it was judged that the Saturn would be easier to get into production, since many of the components were designed to be air-transportable. Nova would require new factories for all the major stages, and there were serious concerns that they could not be completed in time. Saturn required only one new factory, for the largest of the proposed lower stages, and was selected primarily for that reason.

The Saturn C-5 (later given the name Saturn V), the most powerful of the Silverstein Committee's configurations, was selected as the most suitable design. At the time the mission mode had not been selected, so they chose the most powerful booster design in order to ensure that there would be ample power. Selection of the lunar orbit rendezvous method reduced the launch weight requirements below those of the Nova, into the C-5's range.

At this point, however, all three stages existed only on paper, and it was realized that it was very likely that the actual lunar spacecraft would be developed and ready for testing long before the booster. NASA, therefore, decided to also continue development of the C-1 (later Saturn I) as a test vehicle, since its lower stage was based on existing technology (Redstone and Jupiter tankage) and its upper stage was already in development. This would provide valuable testing for the S-IV as well as a launch platform for capsules and other components in low earth orbit.

The members of the Saturn family that were actually built were:

  • Saturn I – ten rockets flew: five development flights, and five launches of boilerplate Apollo spacecraft and Pegasus micrometeoroid satellites.
  • Saturn IB – nine launches; a refined version of the Saturn I with a more powerful first stage (designated the S-IB) and using the Saturn V's S-IVB as a second stage. These carried the first Apollo flight crew, plus three Skylab and one Apollo-Soyuz crews, into Earth orbit.
  • Saturn V – 13 launches; the Moon rocket that sent Apollo astronauts to the Moon, and carried the Skylab space station into orbit.

Anglo-Saxon law

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