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Friday, June 25, 2021

Peace economics

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Peace economics is a branch of conflict economics and focuses on the design of the sociosphere's political, economic, and cultural institutions and their interacting policies and actions with the goal of preventing, mitigating, or resolving violent conflict within and between societies. This violent conflict could be of any type and could involve either latent or actual violence. Recognizing the cost of violence, peace economics focuses on the benefits of (re)constructing societies with a view toward achieving irreversible, stable peace. Along with approaches drawn from other areas of scholarship, peace economics forms part of peace science, an evolving part of peace and conflict studies.

Despite overlaps, peace economics is distinct from war, military, defense, and security economics, all of which are branches of conflict economics. A key difference between peace economics and these related fields is that peace economics emphasizes the study of the presence of or conditions for peace, as distinct from studying the absence or presence of conflict, violence, war, or insecurity.

Other definitions

Peace economics has also been defined as "the use of economics to understand the causes and effects of violent conflict in the international system and the ways that conflict can be avoided, managed, or resolved." This restricts the subject matter to the international realm and leaves out the study of peace itself. Walter Isard defines peace economics as "generally concerned with: (1) resolution, management or reduction of conflict in the economic sphere, or among behaving units in their economic activity; (2) the use of economic measures and policy to cope with and control conflicts whether economic or not; and (3) the impact of conflict on the economic behavior and welfare of firms, consumers organizations, government and society." The notion of violence is absent and peace itself is not studied, but the level of analysis can be other than conflict between states. In a context restricted to international trade, another author writes that "Peace economics studies ways to eradicate and control conflict as well as to assess conflict's impact on society." The notion of violence is not explicit and the benefits of peace are seen only inasmuch as a reduction of conflict may improve opportunities for expanded global trade. Others make a distinction between "productive" and "unproductive" or "appropriative" economic activities their starting point of analysis in peace economics.

Economics Nobelist Jan Tinbergen defines peace economics as "economic science used for [a purpose that] prohibits [war] as an instrument of settling conflicts between nations and [to organize] the world in a way that warfare is punished". Violence is addressed only at the level of sovereigns, not dealing with civil war or debilitating organized or individual-level criminal violence. In related work, Tinbergen writes about a world order that would inhibit violence and permit peace between and among states. In his view, this requires a "world government", a sentiment not now commonly agreed among economists. These definitions of peace economics all share Johan Galtung's characterization of negative peace (the absence of violent conflict) as opposed to positive peace (the presence of peace-enabling structures).

Methods, norms, and context

A number of peace economists are explicit about the use of particular explanatory schema to be applied in peace economics, e.g., rational choice theory. In contrast, the main definition of peace economics is open to a variety of approaches. Virtually all authors acknowledge that peace economics is part of both positive economics and normative economics. While for most contemporary economists, work in positive economics may lead them to lay out a descriptive array or evaluation of policy choices from which one that is most valued is recommended to or chosen by policy makers, in peace economics, in contrast, it is the norm of peace to be achieved that inspires the search for a system design that can reliably deliver on the desired norm.

Peace economics is built on general systems theory exemplified by the work of Kenneth Boulding. Earth may be viewed as a self-regulating (homeostatic) system, consisting of natural and social subsystems. In each, deviation from a set goal is self-corrected through feedback loops. Homeostatic systems are commonly observed in nature, such as in ecology and in the physiology of organisms (e.g., self-regulation of population sizes, self-regulation of body heat). The systems concept has been adopted in the engineering sciences, for example in designing thermostats. The user sets a desired goal state (temperature), the instrument measures the actual state, and for a deviation of sufficient degree a corrective action is taken (heating or cooling).

Relatively new is the insight that social systems designed to achieve certain purposes (e.g., the retirement or pension system) imply a choice architecture that may permit failed or failing social systems to persist. Similarly, choice architecture may facilitate the (re)design of institutions aimed at securing beneficial social outcomes such as peace. This is social engineering applied to the problem of peace (peace engineering) and overlaps with ideas of mechanism design (reverse game theory) in which a solution is stipulated a priori and the structure of the game that would bring about the desired outcome is inferred. In this way, system design links back to normative economics.

Examples

Free trade and peace

Economic ties between the US, EU, China, Russia and India in 2014 (thickness of the lines is proportional to the bilateral trade volume)

The classical English liberals of the 19th century largely believed that free trade promoted peace. This view, attributed to Adam Smith and Edmund Burke, was evident in the advocacy of Richard Cobden and John Bright, and in the writings of the most prominent English economists and political thinkers of the 19th and early 20th centuries, such as John Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall. John Maynard Keynes said that he was "brought up" on this idea. A prominent 20th century US exponent of this idea was the Secretary of State under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Cordell Hull.

World War I and the Paris Peace Conference

Upon resigning from the United Kingdom's Treasury team at the Paris Peace Conference in June 1919, John Maynard Keynes penned a small book. Published in 1920, The Economic Consequences of the Peace famously lays out his case for why the allies' Terms of Peace to be imposed on Germany were physically and financially impossible to fulfill and how they would encourage Germany to rise up again. Predicting a coming World War II, Keynes wrote: "... if this view of nations and of their relation to one another (i.e., a Carthaginian Peace) is adopted by the democracies of Western Europe, and is financed by the United States, heaven help us all. If we aim deliberately at the impoverishment of Central Europe, vengeance, I dare predict, will not limp. Nothing can then delay for very long that final civil war between the forces of Reaction and the despairing convulsions of Revolution, before which the horrors of the late German war will fade into nothing, and which will destroy, whoever is victor, the civilisation and the progress of our generation." Although Keynes' effort to change the treaty terms failed, it is a dramatic demonstration of what peace economics is about: the creation of a mutually reinforcing structure of political, economic, and cultural systems to achieve peace such that reversal to violence is unlikely.

Capitalism and war, and managed capitalism

In the 1930s, in the midst of the Great Depression and with the rise of fascist powers, many western socialist and liberal thinkers believed that capitalism caused war. However, Keynes in his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money in 1936, argued that this need not be so, and that the management of capitalism along the lines he proposed to promote high employment would be more conducive to peace than laissez-faire capitalism with the gold standard had been. This analysis underlay his approach during World War II to the creation of institutions for international economic governance in the post-war world.

World War II, Bretton Woods, and the Marshall Plan

Late in World War II, as Nazi-Germany's eventual defeat appeared clear, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., then-Secretary of the United States Treasury, advocated the partitioning of Germany, stripping it of its most valuable raw materials and industrial assets, and envisioned the complete pastoralization of Germany. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill agreed to the Morgenthau Plan, in modified form, on 16 September 1944. Following victory, Germany's remaining factories were dismantled, parts, machinery, and equipment shipped abroad, patents expropriated, research forbidden, and useful engineers and scientists transferred out of the country. Despite the negotiation of international treaties at Bretton Woods to create a set of complementary global monetary, trade, and reconstruction and development institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (today part of the World Bank Group), and, separately, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (incorporated in today's World Trade Organization), Germany's and Europe's other postwar economies collapsed. Keynes' Economic Consequences of the Peace appeared to repeat themselves. However, Roosevelt had died and Harry S. Truman assumed the U.S. American Presidency on 12 April 1945. Even as the deindustrialization of Germany proceeded as planned, Truman's first Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, by 1947 took a dismal view of its effects on Germany's impoverished population. So did former president Herbert C. Hoover in a series of reports penned in 1947. 

Meanwhile, Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union emerged as a formidable power and the implication seemed clear: An economically strengthened, resurgent Germany could either be part of a new Western political, economic, and cultural alliance or else be incorporated into a Soviet one. Truman thus came to abolish the punitive measures imposed on Germany, and his new Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall, formulated what would become the Marshall Plan, in effect from 1948 to 1952. The new global institutions and the unilateral Marshall Plan action combined to endow new institutions with sufficient resources to result in a somewhat unwitting peace economics: clearly designed toward the purpose of international peace and prosperity, yet skewed toward Western Europe and the incipient Cold War. Moreover, the new social architecture was invested with incentives, such as the United Nations Security Council that provided five of its members with permanent seats and veto powers, that, while keeping superpower peace, threatened peace and prosperity in the post-colonial Third World.

Origins of the European Union

Like Keynes, Jean Monnet participated in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, in Monnet's case as an assistant to the French delegation. Like Keynes, he envisioned a pan-European economic cooperation zone. Like Keynes, he would be disappointed. Despite this, the French appreciated his good efforts and awarded him with the post of Deputy Secretary-General of the then newly founded League of Nations. Monnet was but 31 years old. He resigned four years later to devote himself to international business and finance in private capacity but resurfaced during the early World War II years in positions of high influence in France, Britain, and the United States, urging Roosevelt to get on with an industrial armaments plan. Following World War II, Monnet, however, at first crafted the Monnet Plan which, similar to Morgenthau's, envisioned the transfer of the German Ruhr and Saarland territories, raw materials, and industries (coal and steel) to France to assist it in its own reconstruction. This was approved by French Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle shortly before his resignation in January 1946. The transfer of the Saar region took place with U.S. help in 1947, while the Ruhr region was placed under an international authority in 1949 that assured France access to German coal at low prices. This led to rising frictions between Germany and the allies, just as Keynes had foretold 30 years earlier.

Monnet changed course and, together with Paul Reuter, Bernard Clappier, Pierre Uri, and Étienne Hirsch, plans were crafted that resulted in the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, celebrated today as Europe Day or Schuman Day. Robert Schuman, the Franco-German-Luxembourgian statesman, French Minister of Finance, Minister of Foreign Affairs and two-time Prime Minister of France, envisioned, first, a Franco-German and, then, a pan-European sharing of crucial coal and steel resources among Italy, France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg that would make future war "not only unthinkable but materially impossible." By 1951, this resulted in the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the forerunner to today's European Union. In contrast to the negotiations surrounding the founding of the United Nations and a set of associated organizations in 1945, the European idea appears to have been deliberately designed as a kernel with organic growth-potential, the precise development of which would be learned in future. Thus, no institutional structures were put in place that, due to accrued vested interests, would later prove to be too difficult to change.

Current research directions

War at the interstate level has subsided and, to a degree, so have the massive civil wars that took place in the immediate Post-Cold War period (especially in Africa in the 1990s and 2000s). But violent conflict takes place at many levels, from self-directed harm (e.g., self-injury and suicide) and domestic violence between intimate partners and family members to workplace violence and organized criminal violence, all of which are massively costly and ultimately require positive, structural solutions whereby resort to violence becomes "unthinkable," even as it may remain "materially possible."

The Institute for Economics and Peace, a think tank headquartered in Sydney, is "developing metrics to analyse peace and to quantify its economic value. It does this by developing global and national indices, calculating the economic cost of violence, analysing country-level risk and understanding positive peace." More recently, there is a turn towards local implications of economic reforms in conflict-affected societies in an attempt to understand how economies of peace impact on the everyday. This includes the use of qualitative methodologies in a field usually dominated by quantitative approaches.

Journals

Academic journals that publish work by peace economists include the Journal of Conflict Resolution (since 1956), the Journal of Peace Research (since 1964), Conflict Management and Peace Science (since 1973), Defence and Peace Economics (since 1990), Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy (since 1993), the Economics of Peace and Security Journal (since 2006), the International Journal of Development and Conflict (since 2011), and Business, Peace and Sustainable Development (since 2013).

Neorealism (international relations)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Neorealism or structural realism is a theory of international relations that says power is the most important factor in international relations. It was first outlined by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 book Theory of International Politics. Alongside neoliberalism, neorealism is one of the two most influential contemporary approaches to international relations; the two perspectives have dominated international relations theory for the last three decades. Neorealism emerged from the North American discipline of political science, and reformulates the classical realist tradition of E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan and Reinhold Niebuhr. Neo realism emerged because the earlier tradition suffered a setback due to the emergence of neo liberal thought, particularly the challenge posed by pluralism. State centrism of the traditional realists received a serious jolt as pluralist emphasized on the fact that state may be a significant actor in international relations but it is not the sole actor;this sometimes termed as "inside-out theory" Neorealism is subdivided into defensive and offensive neorealism.

Origins

Neorealism is an ideological departure from Hans Morgenthau's writing on classical realism. Classical realism originally explained the machinations of international politics as being based on human nature, and therefore subject to the ego and emotion of world leaders. Neorealist thinkers instead propose that structural constraints—not strategy, egoism, or motivation—will determine behavior in international relations. John Mearsheimer made significant distinctions between his version of offensive neorealism and Morgenthau in his book titled The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.

Theory

Structural realism holds that the nature of the international structure is defined by its ordering principle (anarchy), units of the system (states), and by the distribution of capabilities (measured by the number of great powers within the international system), with only the last being considered an independent variable with any meaningful change over time. The anarchic ordering principle of the international structure is decentralized, meaning there is no formal central authority; every sovereign state is formally equal in this system. These states act according to the logic of egoism, meaning states seek their own interest and will not subordinate their interest to the interests of other states.

States are assumed at a minimum to want to ensure their own survival as this is a prerequisite to pursue other goals. This driving force of survival is the primary factor influencing their behavior and in turn ensures states develop offensive military capabilities for foreign interventionism and as a means to increase their relative power. Because states can never be certain of other states' future intentions, there is a lack of trust between states which requires them to be on guard against relative losses of power which could enable other states to threaten their survival. This lack of trust, based on uncertainty, is called the security dilemma.

States are deemed similar in terms of needs but not in capabilities for achieving them. The positional placement of states in terms of abilities determines the distribution of capabilities. The structural distribution of capabilities then limits cooperation among states through fears of relative gains made by other states, and the possibility of dependence on other states. The desire and relative abilities of each state to maximize relative power constrain each other, resulting in a 'balance of power', which shapes international relations. It also gives rise to the 'security dilemma' that all nations face. There are two ways in which states balance power: internal balancing and external balancing. Internal balancing occurs as states grow their own capabilities by increasing economic growth and/or increasing military spending. External balancing occurs as states enter into alliances to check the power of more powerful states or alliances.

Neorealists contend that there are essentially three possible systems according to changes in the distribution of capabilities, defined by the number of great powers within the international system. A unipolar system contains only one great power, a bipolar system contains two great powers, and a multipolar system contains more than two great powers. Neorealists conclude that a bipolar system is more stable (less prone to great power war and systemic change) than a multipolar system because balancing can only occur through internal balancing as there are no extra great powers with which to form alliances. Because there is only internal balancing in a bipolar system, rather than external balancing, there is less opportunity for miscalculations and therefore less chance of great power war. That is a simplification and a theoretical ideal.

Neorealist argue that processes of emulation and competition lead states to behave in the aforementioned ways. Emulation leads states to adopt the behaviors of successful states (for example, those victorious in war), whereas competition leads states to vigilantly ensure their security and survival through the best means possible.

For neorealists, social norms are considered largely irrelevant. This is in contrast to some classical realists which did see norms as potentially important.

Defensive realism

Structural realism has become divided into two branches, defensive and offensive realism, following the publication of Mearsheimer's 'The Tragedy of Great Power Politics' in 2001. Waltz's original formulation of neorealism is now sometimes called Defensive Realism, while Mearsheimer's modification of the theory is referred to as Offensive Realism. Both branches agree that the structure of the system is what causes states to compete, but Defensive Realism posits that most states concentrate on maintaining their security (i.e. states are security maximizers), while Offensive Realism claims that all states seek to gain as much power as possible (i.e. states are power maximizers). A foundational study in the area of defensive realism is Robert Jervis' classic 1978 article on the "security dilemma." It examines how uncertainty and the offense-defense balance may heighten or soften the security dilemma. Building on Jervis, Stephen Van Evera explores the causes of war from a defensive realist perspective.

Offensive realism

Offensive realism, developed by Mearsheimer differs in the amount of power that states desire. Mearsheimer proposes that states maximize relative power ultimately aiming for regional hegemony.

In addition to Mearsheimer, a number of other scholars have sought to explain why states expand when opportunities to do so arise. For instance, Randall Schweller refers to states' revisionist agendas to account for their aggressive military action. Eric Labs investigates the expansion of war aims during wartime as an example of offensive behavior. Fareed Zakaria analyzes the history of US foreign relations from 1865 to 1914 and asserts that foreign interventions during this period were not motivated by worries about external threats but by a desire to expand US influence.

Scholarly debate

Within realist thought

While neorealists agree that the structure of the international relations is the primary impetus in seeking security, there is disagreement among neorealist scholars as to whether states merely aim to survive or whether states want to maximize their relative power. The former represents the ideas of Kenneth Waltz, while the latter represents the ideas of John Mearsheimer and offensive realism. Other debates include the extent to which states balance against power (in Waltz's original neorealism and classic realism), versus the extent to which states balance against threats (as introduced in Stephen Walt's 'The Origins of Alliances' (1987)), or balance against competing interests (as introduced in Randall Schweller's 'Deadly Imbalances' (1998)).

With other schools of thought

Neorealists conclude that because war is an effect of the anarchic structure of the international system, it is likely to continue in the future. Indeed, neorealists often argue that the ordering principle of the international system has not fundamentally changed from the time of Thucydides to the advent of nuclear warfare. The view that long-lasting peace is not likely to be achieved is described by other theorists as a largely pessimistic view of international relations. One of the main challenges to neorealist theory is the democratic peace theory and supporting research, such as the book Never at War. Neorealists answer this challenge by arguing that democratic peace theorists tend to pick and choose the definition of democracy to achieve the desired empirical result. For example, the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the Dominican Republic of Juan Bosch, and the Chile of Salvador Allende are not considered to be "democracies of the right kind" or the conflicts do not qualify as wars according to these theorists. Furthermore, they claim several wars between democratic states have been averted only by causes other than ones covered by democratic peace theory.

Advocates of democratic peace theory see the spreading of democracy as helping to mitigate the effects of anarchy. With enough democracies in the world, Bruce Russett thinks that it "may be possible in part to supersede the 'realist' principles (anarchy, the security dilemma of states) that have dominated practice ... since at least the seventeenth century." John Mueller believes that it is not the spreading of democracy but rather other conditions (e.g., power) that bring about democracy and peace. In consenting with Mueller's argument, Kenneth Waltz notes that "some of the major democracies—Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth century—have been among the most powerful states of their eras."

One of the most notable schools contending with neorealist thought, aside from neoliberalism, is the constructivist school, which is often seen to disagree with the neorealist focus on power and instead emphasises a focus on ideas and identity as an explanatory point for international relations trends. Recently, however, a school of thought called the English School merges neo-realist tradition with the constructivist technique of analyzing social norms to provide an increasing scope of analysis for International Relations.

Taxation as theft

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
 
Loot and Extortion. Statues at Trago Mills (near Liskeard, Cornwall), poking fun at the UK Inland Revenue Service

The position that taxation is theft, and therefore immoral, is found in a number of political philosophies considered radical. It marks a significant departure from conservatism and classical liberalism. This position is often held by anarcho-capitalists, objectivists, most minarchists, right-wing libertarians, and voluntaryists.

Proponents of this position see taxation as a violation of the non-aggression principle. Under this view, government transgresses property rights by enforcing compulsory tax collection, regardless of what the amount may be. Some opponents of taxation, like Michael Huemer, argue that rightful ownership of property should be based on what he calls "natural property rights", not those determined by the law of the state.

Defenders of taxation argue that the notions of both legal private property rights and theft are defined by the legal framework of the state, and thus taxation by the state does not represent a violation of property law, unless the tax itself is illegal. Some defenders of taxation, such as Matt Bruenig, argue that the phrase "taxation is theft" is question-begging, since it relies on presupposing a particular theory of property entitlement.

History

In the 17th century, John Locke takes the position in Second Treatise of Government that government authority arises from the consent of the governed, and not through the accidental birth of rulers. L.K. Samuels asserts in his "Rulers' Paradox" that since the citizenry is the holder of all rights, governmental bodies derive their authority to govern society via elections of government officials. In that vein, Samuels maintains that citizens can only give rights which they have. The Rulers' Paradox comes into play when governmental bodies exercise rights that the citizens do not hold or could not hold. According to Samuels: "If ordinary citizens could assassinate, steal, imprison, torture, kidnap, and wiretap without incrimination, that authority could be transferred to government for its democratic arsenal of policymaking weaponry." Taxation could be viewed as theft since, according to Lockean natural rights doctrine, government authority must obtain their rights from the citizenry.

Lysander Spooner, a 19th-century lawyer and political philosopher, who had argued before the Supreme Court, wrote the essay No Treason: The Constitution of No Authority. In it he stated that a supposed social contract cannot be used to justify governmental actions such as taxation, because government will initiate force against anyone who does not wish to enter into such a contract.

No open, avowed, or responsible association, or body of men, can say this to him; because there is no such association or body of men in existence. If any one should assert that there is such an association, let him prove, if he can, who compose it. Let him produce, if he can, any open, written, or other authentic contract, signed or agreed to by these men; forming themselves into an association; making themselves known as such to the world; appointing him as their agent; and making themselves individually, or as an association, responsible for his acts, done by their authority. Until all this can be shown, no one can say that, in any legitimate sense, there is any such association; or that he is their agent; or that he ever gave his oath to them; or ever pledged his faith to them.

The 19th-century French economist Frédéric Bastiat described taxes as legal plunder. Bastiat held that the state's only legitimate function was to protect the life, liberty, and property of the individual.

Now, legal plunder may be exercised in an infinite multitude of ways. Hence come an infinite multitude of plans for organization; tariffs, protection, perquisites, gratuities, encouragements, progressive taxation, free public education, right to work, right to profit, right to wages, right to assistance, right to instruments of labor, gratuity of credit, etc., etc. And it is all these plans, taken as a whole, with what they have in common, legal plunder, that takes the name of socialism.

Murray Rothbard argued in The Ethics of Liberty in 1982 that taxation is theft and that tax resistance is therefore legitimate: "Just as no one is morally required to answer a robber truthfully when he asks if there are any valuables in one's house, so no one can be morally required to answer truthfully similar questions asked by the state, e.g., when filling out income tax returns."

Andrew Napolitano attempts to justify the position that "taxation is theft" in his book It Is Dangerous to Be Right When the Government Is Wrong where he asks a series of rhetorical questions like "Is it theft if one man steals a car?" and "What if a gang of ten men take a vote (allowing the victim to vote as well) on whether to steal the car before stealing it?", showing what he believes are similarities between theft and taxation.

Response

Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel assert that since property rights are determined by laws and conventions, of which the state forms an integral part, taxation by the state cannot be considered theft. In their 2002 book, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice, they argue:

...the emphasis on distributing the tax burden relative to pretax income is a fundamental mistake. Taxation does not take from people what they already own. Property rights are the product of a set of laws and conventions, of which the tax system forms a central part, so the fairness of taxes can’t be evaluated by their impact on preexisting entitlements. Pretax income has no independent moral significance. Standards of justice should be applied not to the distribution of tax burdens but to the operation and results of the entire framework of economic institutions.

Another justification of taxation is contained in social contract theory. Proponents argue that the public has democratically allowed people to accumulate wealth only with the understanding that a portion of that wealth would be allocated for public use. In their view, to accumulate wealth without taxation would be to violate this social understanding. They argue that since public infrastructure provides the foundation for wealth creation, a portion of economic gains should be used to fund basic provisions that provide for infrastructure and enhance economic growth.


Mercantilism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 
Seaport at sunset, a French seaport painted by Claude Lorrain in 1639, at the height of mercantilism

Mercantilism is an economic policy that is designed to maximize the exports and minimize the imports for an economy. It promotes imperialism, tariffs and subsidies on traded goods to achieve that goal. The policy aims to reduce a possible current account deficit or reach a current account surplus, and it includes measures aimed at accumulating monetary reserves by a positive balance of trade, especially of finished goods. Historically, such policies frequently led to war and motivated colonial expansion. Mercantilist theory varies in sophistication from one writer to another and has evolved over time.

Mercantilism was dominant in modernized parts of Europe, and some areas in Africa from the 16th to the 19th centuries, a period of proto-industrialization, before it fell into decline, but some commentators argue that it is still practiced in the economies of industrializing countries, in the form of economic interventionism. It promotes government regulation of a nation's economy for the purpose of augmenting state power at the expense of rival national powers. High tariffs, especially on manufactured goods, were almost universally a feature of mercantilist policy.

With the efforts of supranational organizations such as the World Trade Organization to reduce tariffs globally, non-tariff barriers to trade have assumed a greater importance in neomercantilism.

Merchants in Venice

History

Mercantilism became the dominant school of economic thought in Europe throughout the late Renaissance and the early-modern period (from the 15th to the 18th centuries). Evidence of mercantilistic practices appeared in early-modern Venice, Genoa, and Pisa regarding control of the Mediterranean trade in bullion. However, the empiricism of the Renaissance, which first began to quantify large-scale trade accurately, marked mercantilism's birth as a codified school of economic theories. The Italian economist and mercantilist Antonio Serra is considered to have written one of the first treatises on political economy with his 1613 work, A Short Treatise on the Wealth and Poverty of Nations.

Mercantilism in its simplest form is bullionism, yet mercantilist writers emphasize the circulation of money and reject hoarding. Their emphasis on monetary metals accords with current ideas regarding the money supply, such as the stimulative effect of a growing money-supply. Fiat money and floating exchange rates have since rendered specie concerns irrelevant. In time, industrial policy supplanted the heavy emphasis on money, accompanied by a shift in focus from the capacity to carry on wars to promoting general prosperity. Mature neomercantilist theory recommends selective high tariffs for "infant" industries or the promotion of the mutual growth of countries through national industrial specialization.

England began the first large-scale and integrative approach to mercantilism during the Elizabethan Era (1558–1603). An early statement on national balance of trade appeared in Discourse of the Common Weal of this Realm of England, 1549: "We must always take heed that we buy no more from strangers than we sell them, for so should we impoverish ourselves and enrich them." The period featured various but often disjointed efforts by the court of Queen Elizabeth (reigned 1558–1603) to develop a naval and merchant fleet capable of challenging the Spanish stranglehold on trade and of expanding the growth of bullion at home. Queen Elizabeth promoted the Trade and Navigation Acts in Parliament and issued orders to her navy for the protection and promotion of English shipping.

Elizabeth's efforts organized national resources sufficiently in the defense of England against the far larger and more powerful Spanish Empire, and in turn, paved the foundation for establishing a global empire in the 19th century. Authors noted most for establishing the English mercantilist system include Gerard de Malynes (fl. 1585–1641) and Thomas Mun (1571–1641), who first articulated the Elizabethan system (England's Treasure by Foreign Trade or the Balance of Foreign Trade is the Rule of Our Treasure), which Josiah Child (c. 1630/31 – 1699) then developed further. Numerous French authors helped cement French policy around mercantilism in the 17th century. Jean-Baptiste Colbert (Intendant général, 1661–1665; Contrôleur général des finances, 1661–1683) best articulated this French mercantilism. French economic policy liberalized greatly under Napoleon (in power from 1799 to 1814/1815)

Many nations applied the theory, notably France. King Louis XIV (reigned 1643–1715) followed the guidance of Jean Baptiste Colbert, his Controller-General of Finances from 1665 to 1683. It was determined that the state should rule in the economic realm as it did in the diplomatic, and that the interests of the state as identified by the king were superior to those of merchants and of everyone else. Mercantilist economic policies aimed to build up the state, especially in an age of incessant warfare, and theorists charged the state with looking for ways to strengthen the economy and to weaken foreign adversaries.

In Europe, academic belief in mercantilism began to fade in the late-18th century after the East India Company annexed the Mughal Bengal, a major trading nation, and the establishment of the British India through the activities of the East India Company, in light of the arguments of Adam Smith (1723–1790) and of the classical economists. The British Parliament's repeal of the Corn Laws under Robert Peel in 1846 symbolized the emergence of free trade as an alternative system.

Theory

Most of the European economists who wrote between 1500 and 1750 are today generally considered mercantilists; this term was initially used solely by critics, such as Mirabeau and Smith, but historians proved quick to adopt it. Originally the standard English term was "mercantile system". The word "mercantilism" came into English from German in the early-19th century.

The bulk of what is commonly called "mercantilist literature" appeared in the 1620s in Great Britain. Smith saw the English merchant Thomas Mun (1571–1641) as a major creator of the mercantile system, especially in his posthumously published Treasure by Foreign Trade (1664), which Smith considered the archetype or manifesto of the movement. Perhaps the last major mercantilist work was James Steuart's Principles of Political Economy, published in 1767.

Mercantilist literature also extended beyond England. Italy and France produced noted writers of mercantilist themes, including Italy's Giovanni Botero (1544–1617) and Antonio Serra (1580–?) and, in France, Jean Bodin and Colbert. Themes also existed in writers from the German historical school from List, as well as followers of the American and British systems of free-trade, thus stretching the system into the 19th century. However, many British writers, including Mun and Misselden, were merchants, while many of the writers from other countries were public officials. Beyond mercantilism as a way of understanding the wealth and power of nations, Mun and Misselden are noted for their viewpoints on a wide range of economic matters.

The Austrian lawyer and scholar Philipp Wilhelm von Hornick, one of the pioneers of Cameralism, detailed a nine-point program of what he deemed effective national economy in his Austria Over All, If She Only Will of 1684, which comprehensively sums up the tenets of mercantilism:

  • That every little bit of a country's soil be utilized for agriculture, mining or manufacturing.
  • That all raw materials found in a country be used in domestic manufacture, since finished goods have a higher value than raw materials.
  • That a large, working population be encouraged.
  • That all exports of gold and silver be prohibited and all domestic money be kept in circulation.
  • That all imports of foreign goods be discouraged as much as possible.
  • That where certain imports are indispensable they be obtained at first hand, in exchange for other domestic goods instead of gold and silver.
  • That as much as possible, imports be confined to raw materials that can be finished [in the home country].
  • That opportunities be constantly sought for selling a country's surplus manufactures to foreigners, so far as necessary, for gold and silver.
  • That no importation be allowed if such goods are sufficiently and suitably supplied at home.

Other than Von Hornick, there were no mercantilist writers presenting an overarching scheme for the ideal economy, as Adam Smith would later do for classical economics. Rather, each mercantilist writer tended to focus on a single area of the economy. Only later did non-mercantilist scholars integrate these "diverse" ideas into what they called mercantilism. Some scholars thus reject the idea of mercantilism completely, arguing that it gives "a false unity to disparate events". Smith saw the mercantile system as an enormous conspiracy by manufacturers and merchants against consumers, a view that has led some authors, especially Robert E. Ekelund and Robert D. Tollison, to call mercantilism "a rent-seeking society". To a certain extent, mercantilist doctrine itself made a general theory of economics impossible. Mercantilists viewed the economic system as a zero-sum game, in which any gain by one party required a loss by another. Thus, any system of policies that benefited one group would by definition harm the other, and there was no possibility of economics being used to maximize the commonwealth, or common good. Mercantilists' writings were also generally created to rationalize particular practices rather than as investigations into the best policies.

Mercantilist domestic policy was more fragmented than its trade policy. While Adam Smith portrayed mercantilism as supportive of strict controls over the economy, many mercantilists disagreed. The early modern era was one of letters patent and government-imposed monopolies; some mercantilists supported these, but others acknowledged the corruption and inefficiency of such systems. Many mercantilists also realized that the inevitable results of quotas and price ceilings were black markets. One notion that mercantilists widely agreed upon was the need for economic oppression of the working population; laborers and farmers were to live at the "margins of subsistence". The goal was to maximize production, with no concern for consumption. Extra money, free time, and education for the lower classes were seen to inevitably lead to vice and laziness, and would result in harm to the economy.

The mercantilists saw a large population as a form of wealth that made possible the development of bigger markets and armies. Opposite to mercantilism was the doctrine of physiocracy, which predicted that mankind would outgrow its resources. The idea of mercantilism was to protect the markets as well as maintain agriculture and those who were dependent upon it.

Policies

Mercantilist ideas were the dominant economic ideology of all of Europe in the early modern period, and most states embraced it to a certain degree. Mercantilism was centred on England and France, and it was in these states that mercantilist policies were most often enacted.

The policies have included:

  • High tariffs, especially on manufactured goods.
  • Forbidding colonies to trade with other nations.
  • Monopolizing markets with staple ports.
  • Banning the export of gold and silver, even for payments.
  • Forbidding trade to be carried in foreign ships, as per, for example, the Navigation Acts.
  • Subsidies on exports.
  • Promoting manufacturing and industry through research or direct subsidies.
  • Limiting wages.
  • Maximizing the use of domestic resources.
  • Restricting domestic consumption through non-tariff barriers to trade.

Aztec Empire

Pochteca (singular pochtecatl) were professional, long-distance traveling merchants in the Aztec Empire. The trade or commerce was referred to as pochtecayotl. Within the empire, the pochteca performed three primary duties: market management, international trade, and acting as market intermediaries domestically. They were a small but important class as they not only facilitated commerce, but also communicated vital information across the empire and beyond its borders, and were often employed as spies due to their extensive travel and knowledge of the empire. The pochteca are the subject of Book 9 of the Florentine Codex (1576), compiled by Bernardino de Sahagún.

Pochteca occupied a high status in Aztec society, below the noble class. They were responsible for providing the materials that the Aztec nobility used to display their wealth, which were often obtained from foreign sources. The pochteca also acted as agents for the nobility, selling the surplus tribute that had been bestowed on the noble and warrior elite and also sourcing rare goods or luxury items. The pochteca traded the excess tribute (food, garments, feathers and slaves) in the marketplace or carried it to other areas to exchange for trade goods.

Due to the success of the pochteca, many of these merchants became as wealthy as the noble class, but were obligated to hide this wealth from the public. Trading expeditions often left their districts late in the evening, and their wealth was only revealed within their private guildhalls. Although politically and economically powerful, the pochteca strove to avoid undue attention. The merchants followed their own laws in their own calpulli, and venerating their god, Yacatecuhtli, "The Lord Who Guides" and Lord of the Vanguard an aspect of Quetzalcoatl. Eventually the merchants were elevated to the rank of the warriors of the military orders.

France

French finance minister and mercantilist Jean-Baptiste Colbert served for over 20 years.

Mercantilism arose in France in the early 16th century soon after the monarchy had become the dominant force in French politics. In 1539, an important decree banned the import of woolen goods from Spain and some parts of Flanders. The next year, a number of restrictions were imposed on the export of bullion.

Over the rest of the 16th century, further protectionist measures were introduced. The height of French mercantilism is closely associated with Jean-Baptiste Colbert, finance minister for 22 years in the 17th century, to the extent that French mercantilism is sometimes called Colbertism. Under Colbert, the French government became deeply involved in the economy in order to increase exports. Protectionist policies were enacted that limited imports and favored exports. Industries were organized into guilds and monopolies, and production was regulated by the state through a series of more than one thousand directives outlining how different products should be produced.

To encourage industry, foreign artisans and craftsmen were imported. Colbert also worked to decrease internal barriers to trade, reducing internal tariffs and building an extensive network of roads and canals. Colbert's policies were quite successful, and France's industrial output and the economy grew considerably during this period, as France became the dominant European power. He was less successful in turning France into a major trading power, and Britain and the Dutch Republic remained supreme in this field.

New France

France imposed its mercantilist philosophy on its colonies in North America, especially New France. It sought to derive the maximum material benefit from the colony, for the homeland, with a minimum of colonial investment in the colony itself. The ideology was embodied in New France through the establishment under Royal Charter of a number of corporate trading monopolies including La Compagnie des Marchands, which operated from 1613 to 1621, and the Compagnie de Montmorency, from that date until 1627. It was in turn replaced by La Compagnie des Cent-Associés, created in 1627 by King Louis XIII, and the Communauté des habitants in 1643. These were the first corporations to operate in what is now Canada.

Great Britain

In England, mercantilism reached its peak during the Long Parliament government (1640–60). 

Mercantilist policies were also embraced throughout much of the Tudor and Stuart periods, with Robert Walpole being another major proponent. In Britain, government control over the domestic economy was far less extensive than on the Continent, limited by common law and the steadily increasing power of Parliament. Government-controlled monopolies were common, especially before the English Civil War, but were often controversial.

The Anglo-Dutch Wars were fought between the English and the Dutch for control over the seas and trade routes.

With respect to its colonies, British mercantilism meant that the government and the merchants became partners with the goal of increasing political power and private wealth, to the exclusion of other European powers. The government protected its merchants—and kept foreign ones out—through trade barriers, regulations, and subsidies to domestic industries in order to maximize exports from and minimize imports to the realm. The government had to fight smuggling, which became a favourite American technique in the 18th century to circumvent the restrictions on trading with the French, Spanish, or Dutch. The goal of mercantilism was to run trade surpluses to benefit the government. The government took its share through duties and taxes, with the remainder going to merchants in Britain. The government spent much of its revenue on the Royal Navy, which both protected the colonies of Britain but was vital in capturing the colonies of other European powers.

British mercantilist writers were themselves divided on whether domestic controls were necessary. British mercantilism thus mainly took the form of efforts to control trade. A wide array of regulations were put in place to encourage exports and discourage imports. Tariffs were placed on imports and bounties given for exports, and the export of some raw materials was banned completely. The Navigation Acts removed foreign merchants from being involved England's domestic trade. British policies in their American colonies led to friction with the inhabitants of the Thirteen Colonies, and mercantilist policies (such as forbidding trade with other European powers and enforcing bans on smuggling) were a major irritant leading to the American Revolution.

Mercantilism taught that trade was a zero-sum game, with one country's gain equivalent to a loss sustained by the trading partner. Overall, however, mercantilist policies had a positive impact on Britain, helping to transform the nation into the world's dominant trading power and a global hegemon. One domestic policy that had a lasting impact was the conversion of "wastelands" to agricultural use. Mercantilists believed that to maximize a nation's power, all land and resources had to be used to their highest and best use, and this era thus saw projects like the draining of The Fens.

Other countries

Mercantilism helped create trade patterns such as the triangular trade in the North Atlantic, in which raw materials were imported to the metropolis and then processed and redistributed to other colonies.

The other nations of Europe also embraced mercantilism to varying degrees. The Netherlands, which had become the financial centre of Europe by being its most efficient trader, had little interest in seeing trade restricted and adopted few mercantilist policies. Mercantilism became prominent in Central Europe and Scandinavia after the Thirty Years' War (1618–48), with Christina of Sweden, Jacob Kettler of Courland, and Christian IV of Denmark being notable proponents.

The Habsburg Holy Roman Emperors had long been interested in mercantilist policies, but the vast and decentralized nature of their empire made implementing such notions difficult. Some constituent states of the empire did embrace Mercantilism, most notably Prussia, which under Frederick the Great had perhaps the most rigidly controlled economy in Europe.

Spain benefited from mercantilism early on as it brought a large amount of precious metals such as gold and silver into their treasury by way of the new world. In the long run, Spain's economy collapsed as it was unable to adjust to the inflation that came with the large influx of bullion. Heavy intervention from the crown put crippling laws for the protection of Spanish goods and services. Mercantilist protectionist policy in Spain caused the long-run failure of the Castilian textile industry as the efficiency severely dropped off with each passing year due to the production being held at a specific level. Spain's heavily protected industries led to famines as much of its agricultural land was required to be used for sheep instead of grain. Much of their grain was imported from the Baltic region of Europe which caused a shortage of food in the inner regions of Spain. Spain limiting the trade of their colonies is one of the causes that lead to the separation of the Dutch from the Spanish Empire. The culmination of all of these policies lead to Spain defaulting in 1557, 1575, and 1596.

During the economic collapse of the 17th century, Spain had little coherent economic policy, but French mercantilist policies were imported by Philip V with some success. Russia under Peter I (Peter the Great) attempted to pursue mercantilism, but had little success because of Russia's lack of a large merchant class or an industrial base.

Wars and imperialism

Mercantilism was the economic version of warfare using economics as a tool for warfare by other means backed up by the state apparatus and was well suited to an era of military warfare. Since the level of world trade was viewed as fixed, it followed that the only way to increase a nation's trade was to take it from another. A number of wars, most notably the Anglo-Dutch Wars and the Franco-Dutch Wars, can be linked directly to mercantilist theories. Most wars had other causes but they reinforced mercantilism by clearly defining the enemy, and justified damage to the enemy's economy.

Mercantilism fueled the imperialism of this era, as many nations expended significant effort to conquer new colonies that would be sources of gold (as in Mexico) or sugar (as in the West Indies), as well as becoming exclusive markets. European power spread around the globe, often under the aegis of companies with government-guaranteed monopolies in certain defined geographical regions, such as the Dutch East India Company or the Hudson's Bay Company (operating in present-day Canada).

With the establishment of overseas colonies by European powers early in the 17th century, mercantile theory gained a new and wider significance, in which its aim and ideal became both national and imperialistic.

The connection between imperialism and mercantilism has been explored by economist and sociologist Giovanni Arrighi, who analyzed mercantilism as having three components: "settler colonialism, capitalist slavery, and economic nationalism," and further noted that slavery was "partly a condition and partly a result of the success of settler colonialism."

In France, the triangular trade method was integral in the continuation of mercantilism throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. In order to maximize exports and minimize imports, France worked on a strict Atlantic route: France, to Africa, to the Americas and then back to France. By bringing African slaves to labor in the New World, their labor value increased, and France capitalized upon the market resources produced by slave labor.

Mercantilism as a weapon has continued to be used by nations through the 21st century by way of modern tariffs as it puts smaller economies in a position to conform to the larger economies goals or risk economic ruin due to an imbalance in trade. Trade wars are often dependent on such tariffs and restrictions hurting the opposing economy.

Origins

The term "mercantile system" was used by its foremost critic, Adam Smith, but Mirabeau (1715–1789) had used "mercantilism" earlier.

Mercantilism functioned as the economic counterpart of the older version of political power: divine right of kings and absolute monarchy.

Scholars debate over why mercantilism dominated economic ideology for 250 years. One group, represented by Jacob Viner, sees mercantilism as simply a straightforward, common-sense system whose logical fallacies remained opaque to people at the time, as they simply lacked the required analytical tools.

The second school, supported by scholars such as Robert B. Ekelund, portrays mercantilism not as a mistake, but rather as the best possible system for those who developed it. This school argues that rent-seeking merchants and governments developed and enforced mercantilist policies. Merchants benefited greatly from the enforced monopolies, bans on foreign competition, and poverty of the workers. Governments benefited from the high tariffs and payments from the merchants. Whereas later economic ideas were often developed by academics and philosophers, almost all mercantilist writers were merchants or government officials.

Monetarism offers a third explanation for mercantilism. European trade exported bullion to pay for goods from Asia, thus reducing the money supply and putting downward pressure on prices and economic activity. The evidence for this hypothesis is the lack of inflation in the British economy until the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, when paper money came into vogue.

A fourth explanation lies in the increasing professionalisation and technification of the wars of the era, which turned the maintenance of adequate reserve funds (in the prospect of war) into a more and more expensive and eventually competitive business.

Mercantilism developed at a time of transition for the European economy. Isolated feudal estates were being replaced by centralized nation-states as the focus of power. Technological changes in shipping and the growth of urban centers led to a rapid increase in international trade. Mercantilism focused on how this trade could best aid the states. Another important change was the introduction of double-entry bookkeeping and modern accounting. This accounting made extremely clear the inflow and outflow of trade, contributing to the close scrutiny given to the balance of trade. Of course, the impact of the discovery of America cannot be ignored. New markets and new mines propelled foreign trade to previously inconceivable volumes, resulting in "the great upward movement in prices" and an increase in "the volume of merchant activity itself".

Prior to mercantilism, the most important economic work done in Europe was by the medieval scholastic theorists. The goal of these thinkers was to find an economic system compatible with Christian doctrines of piety and justice. They focused mainly on microeconomics and on local exchanges between individuals. Mercantilism was closely aligned with the other theories and ideas that began to replace the medieval worldview. This period saw the adoption of the very Machiavellian realpolitik and the primacy of the raison d'état in international relations. The mercantilist idea of all trade as a zero-sum game, in which each side was trying to best the other in a ruthless competition, was integrated into the works of Thomas Hobbes. This dark view of human nature also fit well with the Puritan view of the world, and some of the most stridently mercantilist legislation, such as the Navigation Ordinance of 1651, was enacted by the government of Oliver Cromwell.

Jean-Baptiste Colbert's work in 17th-century France came to exemplify classical mercantilism. In the English-speaking world, its ideas were criticized by Adam Smith with the publication of The Wealth of Nations in 1776 and later by David Ricardo with his explanation of comparative advantage. Mercantilism was rejected by Britain and France by the mid-19th century. The British Empire embraced free trade and used its power as the financial center of the world to promote the same. The Guyanese historian Walter Rodney describes mercantilism as the period of the worldwide development of European commerce, which began in the 15th century with the voyages of Portuguese and Spanish explorers to Africa, Asia, and the New World.

End of mercantilism

Adam Smith, David Hume, Edward Gibbon, Voltaire and Jean-Jacques Rousseau were the founding fathers of anti-mercantilist thought. A number of scholars found important flaws with mercantilism long before Smith developed an ideology that could fully replace it. Critics like Hume, Dudley North and John Locke undermined much of mercantilism and it steadily lost favor during the 18th century.

In 1690, Locke argued that prices vary in proportion to the quantity of money. Locke's Second Treatise also points towards the heart of the anti-mercantilist critique: that the wealth of the world is not fixed, but is created by human labor (represented embryonically by Locke's labor theory of value). Mercantilists failed to understand the notions of absolute advantage and comparative advantage (although this idea was only fully fleshed out in 1817 by David Ricardo) and the benefits of trade.

Much of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations is an attack on mercantilism.

Hume famously noted the impossibility of the mercantilists' goal of a constant positive balance of trade. As bullion flowed into one country, the supply would increase, and the value of bullion in that state would steadily decline relative to other goods. Conversely, in the state exporting bullion, its value would slowly rise. Eventually, it would no longer be cost-effective to export goods from the high-price country to the low-price country, and the balance of trade would reverse. Mercantilists fundamentally misunderstood this, long arguing that an increase in the money supply simply meant that everyone gets richer.

The importance placed on bullion was also a central target, even if many mercantilists had themselves begun to de-emphasize the importance of gold and silver. Adam Smith noted that at the core of the mercantile system was the "popular folly of confusing wealth with money", that bullion was just the same as any other commodity, and that there was no reason to give it special treatment. More recently, scholars have discounted the accuracy of this critique. They believe Mun and Misselden were not making this mistake in the 1620s, and point to their followers Josiah Child and Charles Davenant, who in 1699 wrote, "Gold and Silver are indeed the Measures of Trade, but that the Spring and Original of it, in all nations is the Natural or Artificial Product of the Country; that is to say, what this Land or what this Labour and Industry Produces." The critique that mercantilism was a form of rent seeking has also seen criticism, as scholars such as Jacob Viner in the 1930s pointed out that merchant mercantilists such as Mun understood that they would not gain by higher prices for English wares abroad.

The first school to completely reject mercantilism was the physiocrats, who developed their theories in France. Their theories also had several important problems, and the replacement of mercantilism did not come until Adam Smith published The Wealth of Nations in 1776. This book outlines the basics of what is today known as classical economics. Smith spent a considerable portion of the book rebutting the arguments of the mercantilists, though often these are simplified or exaggerated versions of mercantilist thought.

Scholars are also divided over the cause of mercantilism's end. Those who believe the theory was simply an error hold that its replacement was inevitable as soon as Smith's more accurate ideas were unveiled. Those who feel that mercantilism amounted to rent-seeking hold that it ended only when major power shifts occurred. In Britain, mercantilism faded as the Parliament gained the monarch's power to grant monopolies. While the wealthy capitalists who controlled the House of Commons benefited from these monopolies, Parliament found it difficult to implement them because of the high cost of group decision making.

Mercantilist regulations were steadily removed over the course of the 18th century in Britain, and during the 19th century, the British government fully embraced free trade and Smith's laissez-faire economics. On the continent, the process was somewhat different. In France, economic control remained in the hands of the royal family, and mercantilism continued until the French Revolution. In Germany, mercantilism remained an important ideology in the 19th and early 20th centuries, when the historical school of economics was paramount.

Legacy

Adam Smith rejected the mercantilist focus on production, arguing that consumption was paramount to production. He added that mercantilism was popular among merchants because it was what is now called rent seeking. John Maynard Keynes argued that encouraging production was just as important as encouraging consumption, and he favored the "new mercantilism". Keynes also noted that in the early modern period the focus on the bullion supplies was reasonable. In an era before paper money, an increase in bullion was one of the few ways to increase the money supply. Keynes said mercantilist policies generally improved both domestic and foreign investment—domestic because the policies lowered the domestic rate of interest, and investment by foreigners by tending to create a favorable balance of trade. Keynes and other economists of the 20th century also realized that the balance of payments is an important concern. Keynes also supported government intervention in the economy as necessity, as did mercantilism.

As of 2010, the word "mercantilism" remains a pejorative term, often used to attack various forms of protectionism. The similarities between Keynesianism (and its successor ideas) and mercantilism have sometimes led critics to call them neo-mercantilism.

Paul Samuelson, writing within a Keynesian framework, wrote of mercantilism, "With employment less than full and Net National Product suboptimal, all the debunked mercantilist arguments turn out to be valid."

Some other systems that copy several mercantilist policies, such as Japan's economic system, are also sometimes called neo-mercantilist. In an essay appearing in the 14 May 2007 issue of Newsweek, business columnist Robert J. Samuelson wrote that China was pursuing an essentially neo-mercantilist trade policy that threatened to undermine the post–World War II international economic structure.

Murray Rothbard, representing the Austrian School of economics, describes it this way:

Mercantilism, which reached its height in the Europe of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was a system of statism which employed economic fallacy to build up a structure of imperial state power, as well as special subsidy and monopolistic privilege to individuals or groups favored by the state. Thus, mercantilism held exports should be encouraged by the government and imports discouraged.

In specific instances, protectionist mercantilist policies also had an important and positive impact on the state that enacted them. Adam Smith, for instance, praised the Navigation Acts, as they greatly expanded the British merchant fleet and played a central role in turning Britain into the world's naval and economic superpower from the 18th century onward. Some economists thus feel that protecting infant industries, while causing short-term harm, can be beneficial in the long term.

Subject-oriented programming

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