Summum bonum is a Latin expression meaning the highest or ultimate good, which was introduced by the Roman philosopherCicero
to denote the fundamental principle on which some system of ethics is
based — that is, the aim of actions, which, if consistently pursued,
will lead to the best possible life. Since Cicero, the expression has
acquired a secondary meaning as the essence or ultimate metaphysical
principle of Goodness itself, or what Plato called the Form of the Good. These two meanings do not necessarily coincide. For example, Epicurean and Cyrenaic
philosophers claimed that the 'good life' consistently aimed for
pleasure, without suggesting that pleasure constituted the meaning or
essence of Goodness outside the ethical sphere. In De finibus, Cicero explains and compares the ethical systems of several schools of Greek philosophy, including Stoicism, Epicureanism, Aristotelianism and Platonism, based on how each defines the ethical summum bonum differently.
Plato's The Republic
argued that, "In the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last
of all, and is seen...to be the universal author of all things beautiful
and right". Silent contemplation was the route to appreciation of the Idea of the Good.
Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics
accepted that the target of human activity, "Must be the 'Good', that
is, the supreme good.", but challenged Plato's Idea of the Good with the
pragmatic question: "Will one who has had a vision of the Idea itself become thereby a better doctor or general?". However, arguably at least, Aristotle's concept of the unmoved mover owed much to Plato's Idea of the Good.
Hellenic syncretism
Philo of Alexandria conflated the Old Testament God with the unmoved mover and the Idea of the Good. Plotinus, the neoplatonic philosopher, built on Plato's Good for his concept of the supreme One, while Plutarch drew on Zoroastrianism to develop his eternal principle of good.
Augustine of Hippo in his early writings offered the summum bonum as the highest human goal, but was later to identify it as a feature of the Christian God in De natura boni (On the Nature of Good, c. 399). Augustine denies the positive existence of absolute evil, describing a world with God as the supreme good at the center, and defining different grades of evil as different stages of remoteness from that center.
Later developments
The summum bonum has continued to be a focus of attention in Western philosophy, secular and religious. Hegel replaced Plato's dialectical ascent to the Good by his own dialectical ascent to the Real.
G. E. Moore placed the highest good in personal relations and the contemplation of beauty – even if not all his followers in the Bloomsbury Group may have appreciated what Clive Bell called his "all-important distinction between 'Good on the whole' and 'Good as a whole'".
Immanuel Kant
The doctrine of the highest good maintained by Immanuel Kant can be seen as the state in which an agent experiences happiness in proportion to their virtue. It is the supreme end of the will, meaning that beyond the attainment of a good will, which is moral excellence signified by abiding by the categorical imperative and pure practical reason, the attainment of happiness in proportion to your moral excellence is the supreme, unconditional motivation of the will.
Furthermore, in virtue of the doctrine of the highest good, Kant
postulates the existence of God and the eternal existence of rational
agents, in order to reconcile three premises: (i) that agents are
morally obligated to fully attain the highest good; (ii) that the object
of an agent’s obligation must be possible; (iii) that an agent’s full
realization of the highest good is not possible.
Judgments
Judgments on the highest good have generally fallen into four categories:
Utilitarianism, when the highest good is identified with the maximum possible psychological happiness for the maximum number of people;
In the work of Aristotle, eudaimonia
(based on older Greek tradition) was used as the term for the highest
human good, and so it is the aim of practical philosophy, including ethics and political philosophy, to consider (and also experience) what it really is, and how it can be achieved. It is thus a central concept in Aristotelian ethics and subsequent Hellenistic philosophy, along with the terms aretē (most often translated as 'virtue' or 'excellence') and phronesis" ('practical or ethical wisdom').
Discussion of the links between ēthikē aretē (virtue of character) and eudaimonia
(happiness) is one of the central concerns of ancient ethics, and a
subject of much disagreement. As a result, there are many varieties of
eudaimonism.
Definition and etymology
In terms of its etymology, eudaimonia is an abstract noun derived from the words eu ('good, well') and daimōn ('spirit'), the latter referring to a minor deity or a guardian spirit.
Definitions, a dictionary of Greek philosophical terms attributed to Plato himself but believed by modern scholars to have been written by his immediate followers in the Academy, provides the following definition of the word eudaimonia:
"The good composed of all goods; an ability which suffices for living
well; perfection in respect of virtue; resources sufficient for a living
creature."
In his Nicomachean Ethics
(§21; 1095a15–22), Aristotle says that everyone agrees that eudaimonia
is the highest good for human beings, but that there is substantial
disagreement on what sort of life counts as doing and living well; i.e.
eudaimon:
Verbally there is a very general agreement; for both the general run
of men and people of superior refinement say that it is [eudaimonia],
and identify living well and faring well with being happy; but with
regard to what [eudaimonia] is they differ, and the many do not give the
same account as the wise. For the former think it is some plain and
obvious thing like pleasure, wealth or honour… [1095a17]
So, as Aristotle points out, saying that eudaimon life is a life
which is objectively desirable, and means living well, is not saying
very much. Everyone wants to be eudaimon; and everyone agrees that being
eudaimon is related to faring well and to an individual's well-being.
The really difficult question is to specify just what sort of activities
enable one to live well. Aristotle presents various popular conceptions
of the best life for human beings. The candidates that he mentions are a
(1) life of pleasure, (2) a life of political activity, and (3) a
philosophical life.
Positive psychology on eudaemonia
The "Questionnaire for Eudaimonic Well-Being" developed in Positive Psychology lists six dimensions of eudaimonia:
self-discovery;
perceived development of one's best potentials;
a sense of purpose and meaning in life;
investment of significant effort in pursuit of excellence;
intense involvement in activities; and
enjoyment of activities as personally expressive.
Eudaimonia and areté
One important move in Greek philosophy to answer the question of how
to achieve eudaimonia is to bring in another important concept in
ancient philosophy, aretē ('virtue'). Aristotle says that the eudaimon life is one of "virtuous activity in accordance with reason" [1097b22–1098a20]; even Epicurus,
who argues that the eudaimon life is the life of pleasure, maintains
that the life of pleasure coincides with the life of virtue. So, the
ancient ethical theorists tend to agree that virtue is closely bound up
with happiness (areté is bound up with eudaimonia).
However, they disagree on the way in which this is so. We shall consider
the main theories in a moment, but first a warning about the proper
translation of areté.
One problem with the English translation of areté as
'virtue' is that we are inclined to understand virtue in a moral sense,
which is not always what the ancients had in mind. For a Greek, areté
pertains to all sorts of qualities we would not regard as relevant to
ethics, for example, physical beauty. So it is important to bear in mind
that the sense of ‘virtue' operative in ancient ethics is not
exclusively moral and includes more than states such as wisdom, courage
and compassion. The sense of virtue which areté connotes would
include saying something like "speed is a virtue in a horse," or "height
is a virtue in a basketball player." Doing anything well requires
virtue, and each characteristic activity (such as carpentry, flute
playing, etc.) has its own set of virtues. The alternative translation
'excellence' (or 'a desirable quality') might be helpful in conveying
this general meaning of the term. The moral virtues are simply a subset
of the general sense in which a human being is capable of functioning
well or excellently.
Eudaimonia and happiness
Eudaimonia implies a positive and divine state of being that humanity
is able to strive toward and possibly reach. A literal view of eudaimonia
means achieving a state of being similar to benevolent deity, or being
protected and looked after by a benevolent deity. As this would be
considered the most positive state to be in, the word is often
translated as 'happiness' although incorporating the divine nature of
the word extends the meaning to also include the concepts of being
fortunate, or blessed. Despite this etymology, however, discussions of
eudaimonia in ancient Greek ethics are often conducted independently of
any super-natural significance.
In his Nicomachean Ethics (1095a15–22) Aristotle says that eudaimonia means 'doing and living well'. It is significant that synonyms for eudaimonia are living well and doing well. On the standard English translation, this would be to say that ‘happiness is doing well and living well'. The word happiness does not entirely capture the meaning of the Greek word. One important difference is that happiness
often connotes being or tending to be in a certain pleasant state of
mind. For example, when we say that someone is "a very happy person," we
usually mean that they seem subjectively contented with the way things
are going in their life. We mean to imply that they feel good about the
way things are going for them. In contrast, eudaimonia is a more
encompassing notion than feeling happy since events that do not
contribute to one's experience of feeling happy may affect one's
eudaimonia.
Eudaimonia depends on all the things that would make us happy if
we knew of their existence, but quite independently of whether we do
know about them. Ascribing eudaimonia to a person, then, may include
ascribing such things as being virtuous, being loved and having good
friends. But these are all objective judgments about someone's life:
they concern a person's really being virtuous, really being loved, and
really having fine friends. This implies that a person who has evil sons
and daughters will not be judged to be eudaimonic even if he or she
does not know that they are evil and feels pleased and contented with
the way they have turned out (happy). Conversely, being loved by your
children would not count towards your happiness if you did not know that
they loved you (and perhaps thought that they did not), but it would
count towards your eudaimonia. So, eudaimonia corresponds to the idea of
having an objectively good or desirable life, to some extent
independently of whether one knows that certain things exist or not. It
includes conscious experiences of well-being, success, and failure, but
also a whole lot more. (See Aristotle's discussion: Nicomachean Ethics, book 1.10–1.11.)
Because of this discrepancy between the meanings of eudaimonia and happiness, some alternative translations have been proposed. W.D. Ross
suggests 'well-being' and John Cooper proposes 'flourishing'. These
translations may avoid some of the misleading associations carried by
"happiness" although each tends to raise some problems of its own. In
some modern texts therefore, the other alternative is to leave the term
in an English form of the original Greek, as eudaimonia.
What we know of Socrates'
philosophy is almost entirely derived from Plato's writings. Scholars
typically divide Plato's works into three periods: the early, middle,
and late periods. They tend to agree also that Plato's earliest works
quite faithfully represent the teachings of Socrates and that Plato's
own views, which go beyond those of Socrates, appear for the first time
in the middle works such as the Phaedo and the Republic. This division will be employed here in dividing up the positions of Socrates and Plato on eudaimonia.
As with all ancient ethical thinkers, Socrates thought that all
human beings wanted eudaimonia more than anything else (see Plato, Apology 30b, Euthydemus 280d–282d, Meno 87d–89a). However, Socrates adopted a quite radical form of eudaimonism (see above): he seems to have thought that virtue
is both necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia. Socrates is convinced
that virtues such as self-control, courage, justice, piety, wisdom and
related qualities of mind and soul are absolutely crucial if a person is
to lead a good and happy (eudaimon) life. Virtues guarantee a happy
life eudaimonia. For example, in the Meno, with respect to wisdom, he says: "everything the soul endeavours or endures under the guidance of wisdom ends in happiness" (Meno 88c).
In the Apology, Socrates clearly presents his disagreement with
those who think that the eudaimon life is the life of honour or
pleasure, when he chastises the Athenians for caring more for riches and
honour than the state of their souls.
Good Sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen
of the greatest city with the greatest reputation for both wisdom and
power; are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth,
reputation, and honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give
thought to wisdom or truth or the best possible state of your soul.
(29e)
... [I]t does not seem like human nature for me to have neglected all my
own affairs and to have tolerated this neglect for so many years while I
was always concerned with you, approaching each one of you like a
father or an elder brother to persuade you to care for virtue. (31a–b; italics added)
It
emerges a bit further on that this concern for one's soul, that one's
soul might be in the best possible state, amounts to acquiring moral
virtue. So Socrates' pointing out that the Athenians should care for
their souls means that they should care for their virtue, rather than
pursuing honour or riches. Virtues are states of the soul. When a soul
has been properly cared for and perfected it possesses the virtues.
Moreover, according to Socrates, this state of the soul, moral virtue,
is the most important good. The health of the soul is incomparably more
important for eudaimonia than (e.g.) wealth and political power. Someone
with a virtuous soul is better off than someone who is wealthy and
honoured but whose soul is corrupted by unjust actions. This view is
confirmed in the Crito, where Socrates gets Crito to agree that the perfection of the soul, virtue, is the most important good:
And is life worth living for us with that part of us corrupted that
unjust action harms and just action benefits? Or do we think that part
of us, whatever it is, that is concerned with justice and injustice, is
inferior to the body? Not at all. It is much more valuable…? Much more…
(47e–48a)
Here, Socrates argues that life is not worth living if the soul is ruined by wrongdoing.
In summary, Socrates seems to think that virtue is both necessary and
sufficient for eudaimonia. A person who is not virtuous cannot be happy,
and a person with virtue cannot fail to be happy. We shall see later on
that Stoic ethics takes its cue from this Socratic insight.
Plato
Plato's great work of the middle period, the Republic, is devoted to answering a challenge made by the sophistThrasymachus,
that conventional morality, particularly the 'virtue' of justice,
actually prevents the strong man from achieving eudaimonia.
Thrasymachus's views are restatements of a position which Plato
discusses earlier on in his writings, in the Gorgias, through the
mouthpiece of Callicles. The basic argument presented by Thrasymachus
and Callicles is that justice (being just) hinders or prevents the
achievement of eudaimonia because conventional morality requires that we
control ourselves and hence live with un-satiated desires. This idea is
vividly illustrated in book 2 of the Republic when Glaucon,
taking up Thrasymachus' challenge, recounts a myth of the magical ring
of Gyges. According to the myth, Gyges becomes king of Lydia when he
stumbles upon a magical ring, which, when he turns it a particular way,
makes him invisible, so that he can satisfy any desire he wishes without
fear of punishment. When he discovers the power of the ring he kills
the king, marries his wife and takes over the throne. The thrust of
Glaucon's challenge is that no one would be just if he could escape the
retribution he would normally encounter for fulfilling his desires at
whim. But if eudaimonia is to be achieved through the satisfaction of
desire, whereas being just or acting justly requires suppression of
desire, then it is not in the interests of the strong man to act
according to the dictates of conventional morality. (This general line
of argument reoccurs much later in the philosophy of Nietzsche.) Throughout the rest of the Republic, Plato aims to refute this claim by showing that the virtue of justice is necessary for eudaimonia.
The argument of the Republic is lengthy and complex. In brief,
Plato argues that virtues are states of the soul, and that the just
person is someone whose soul is ordered and harmonious, with all its
parts functioning properly to the person's benefit. In contrast, Plato
argues that the unjust man's soul, without the virtues, is chaotic and
at war with itself, so that even if he were able to satisfy most of his
desires, his lack of inner harmony and unity thwart any chance he has of
achieving eudaimonia. Plato's ethical theory is eudaimonistic because
it maintains that eudaimonia depends on virtue. On Plato's version of
the relationship, virtue is depicted as the most crucial and the
dominant constituent of eudaimonia.
Aristotle
Aristotle's account is articulated in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics. In outline, for Aristotle, eudaimonia involves activity, exhibiting virtue (aretē sometimes translated as excellence) in accordance with reason. This conception of eudaimonia derives from Aristotle's essentialist understanding of human nature, the view that reason (logos sometimes translated as rationality) is unique to human beings and that the ideal function or work (ergon)
of a human being is the fullest or most perfect exercise of reason.
Basically, well-being (eudaimonia) is gained by proper development of
one's highest and most human capabilities and human beings are "the
rational animal". It follows that eudaimonia for a human being is the
attainment of excellence (areté) in reason.
According to Aristotle, eudaimonia actually requires activity,
action, so that it is not sufficient for a person to possess a
squandered ability or disposition. Eudaimonia requires not only good
character but rational activity. Aristotle clearly maintains that to
live in accordance with reason means achieving excellence thereby.
Moreover, he claims this excellence cannot be isolated and so
competencies are also required appropriate to related functions. For
example, if being a truly outstanding scientist requires impressive math
skills, one might say "doing mathematics well is necessary to be a
first rate scientist". From this it follows that eudaimonia, living
well, consists in activities exercising the rational part of the psyche
in accordance with the virtues or excellency of reason
[1097b22–1098a20]. Which is to say, to be fully engaged in the
intellectually stimulating and fulfilling work at which one achieves
well-earned success. The rest of the Nicomachean Ethics is
devoted to filling out the claim that the best life for a human being is
the life of excellence in accordance with reason. Since reason for
Aristotle is not only theoretical but practical as well, he spends quite
a bit of time discussing excellence of character, which enables a
person to exercise his practical reason (i.e., reason relating to
action) successfully.
Aristotle's ethical theory is eudaimonist because it maintains
that eudaimonia depends on virtue. However, it is Aristotle's explicit
view that virtue is necessary but not sufficient for eudaimonia. While
emphasizing the importance of the rational aspect of the psyche, he does
not ignore the importance of other ‘goods' such as friends, wealth, and
power in a life that is eudaimonic. He doubts the likelihood of being
eudaimonic if one lacks certain external goods such as ‘good birth, good
children, and beauty'. So, a person who is hideously ugly or has "lost
children or good friends through death" (1099b5–6), or who is isolated,
is unlikely to be eudaimon. In this way, "dumb luck" (chance) can preempt one's attainment of eudaimonia.
Whoever wants eudaimonia must consider these three questions: First, how are pragmata
(ethical matters, affairs, topics) by nature? Secondly, what attitude
should we adopt towards them? Thirdly, what will be the outcome for
those who have this attitude?" Pyrrho's answer is that "As for pragmata they are all adiaphora (undifferentiated by a logical differentia), astathmēta (unstable, unbalanced, not measurable), and anepikrita (unjudged, unfixed, undecidable). Therefore, neither our sense-perceptions nor our doxai (views, theories, beliefs) tell us the truth or lie; so we certainly should not rely on them. Rather, we should be adoxastoi (without views), aklineis (uninclined toward this side or that), and akradantoi
(unwavering in our refusal to choose), saying about every single one
that it no more is than it is not or it both is and is not or it neither
is nor is not.
With respect to aretē, the Pyrrhonist philosopher Sextus Empiricus said:
If one defines a system as an attachment to a number of dogmas that agree with one another and with appearances,
and defines a dogma as an assent to something non-evident, we shall say
that the Pyrrhonist does not have a system. But if one says that a
system is a way of life that, in accordance with appearances, follows a
certain rationale, where that rationale shows how it is possible to seem
to live rightly ("rightly" being taken, not as referring only to aretē,
but in a more ordinary sense) and tends to produce the disposition to suspend judgment, then we say that he does have a system.
Epicurus
Epicurus identified eudaimonia with the life of pleasure.
Epicurus' ethical theory is hedonistic. (His view proved very influential on the founders and best proponents of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.)
Hedonism is the view that pleasure is the only intrinsic good and that
pain is the only intrinsic bad. An object, experience or state of
affairs is intrinsically valuable if it is good simply because of what
it is. Intrinsic value is to be contrasted with instrumental value. An
object, experience or state of affairs is instrumentally valuable if it
serves as a means to what is intrinsically valuable. To see this,
consider the following example. Suppose a person spends their days and
nights in an office, working at not entirely pleasant activities for the
purpose of receiving money. Someone asks them "why do you want the
money?", and they answer: "So, I can buy an apartment overlooking the
ocean, and a red sports car." This answer expresses the point that money
is instrumentally valuable because its value lies in what one obtains
by means of it – in this case, the money is a means to getting an
apartment and a sports car and the value of making this money dependent
on the price of these commodities.
Epicurus identifies the good life with the life of pleasure. He
understands eudaimonia as a more or less continuous experience of
pleasure and, also, freedom from pain and distress. But it is important
to notice that Epicurus does not advocate that one pursue any and every
pleasure. Rather, he recommends a policy whereby pleasures are maximized
"in the long run". In other words, Epicurus claims that some pleasures
are not worth having because they lead to greater pains, and some pains
are worthwhile when they lead to greater pleasures. The best strategy
for attaining a maximal amount of pleasure overall is not to seek
instant gratification but to work out a sensible long term policy.
Ancient Greek ethics is eudaimonist because it links virtue and
eudaimonia, where eudaimonia refers to an individual's well-being.
Epicurus' doctrine can be considered eudaimonist since Epicurus argues
that a life of pleasure will coincide with a life of virtue.
He believes that we do and ought to seek virtue because virtue brings
pleasure. Epicurus' basic doctrine is that a life of virtue is the life
which generates the most amount of pleasure, and it is for this reason
that we ought to be virtuous. This thesis—the eudaimon life is the
pleasurable life—is not a tautology
as "eudaimonia is the good life" would be: rather, it is the
substantive and controversial claim that a life of pleasure and absence
of pain is what eudaimonia consists in.
One important difference between Epicurus' eudaimonism and that
of Plato and Aristotle is that for the latter virtue is a constituent of
eudaimonia, whereas Epicurus makes virtue a means to happiness. To this
difference, consider Aristotle's theory. Aristotle maintains that
eudaimonia is what everyone wants (and Epicurus would agree). He also
thinks that eudaimonia is best achieved by a life of virtuous activity
in accordance with reason. The virtuous person takes pleasure in doing
the right thing as a result of a proper training of moral and
intellectual character (See e.g., Nicomachean Ethics 1099a5).
However, Aristotle does not think that virtuous activity is pursued for
the sake of pleasure. Pleasure is a byproduct of virtuous action: it
does not enter at all into the reasons why virtuous action is virtuous.
Aristotle does not think that we literally aim for eudaimonia. Rather,
eudaimonia is what we achieve (assuming that we aren't particularly
unfortunate in the possession of external goods) when we live according
to the requirements of reason. Virtue is the largest constituent in a
eudaimon life.
By contrast, Epicurus holds that virtue is the means to achieve
happiness. His theory is eudaimonist in that he holds that virtue is
indispensable to happiness; but virtue is not a constituent of a
eudaimon life, and being virtuous is not (external goods aside)
identical with being eudaimon. Rather, according to Epicurus, virtue is
only instrumentally related to happiness. So whereas Aristotle would not
say that one ought to aim for virtue in order to attain pleasure,
Epicurus would endorse this claim.
Stoic philosophy begins with Zeno of Citium c.300 BC, and was developed by Cleanthes (331–232 BC) and Chrysippus (c.280–c.206 BC) into a formidable systematic unity.
Zeno believed happiness was a "good flow of life"; Cleanthes suggested
it was "living in agreement with nature", and Chrysippus believed it was
"living in accordance with experience of what happens by nature."
Stoic ethics is a particularly strong version of eudaimonism. According
to the Stoics, virtue is necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia. (This
thesis is generally regarded as stemming from the Socrates of Plato's
earlier dialogues.) We saw earlier that the conventional Greek concept
of arete is not quite the same as that denoted by virtue, which
has Christian connotations of charity, patience, and uprightness, since
arete includes many non-moral virtues such as physical strength and
beauty. However, the Stoic concept of arete is much nearer to the
Christian conception of virtue, which refers to the moral virtues.
However, unlike Christian understandings of virtue, righteousness or
piety, the Stoic conception does not place as great an emphasis on
mercy, forgiveness, self-abasement (i.e. the ritual process of declaring
complete powerlessness and humility before God), charity and
self-sacrificial love, though these behaviors/mentalities are not
necessarily spurned by the Stoics (they are spurned by some other
philosophers of Antiquity). Rather Stoicism emphasizes states such as
justice, honesty, moderation, simplicity, self-discipline, resolve,
fortitude, and courage (states which Christianity also encourages).
The Stoics make a radical claim that the eudaimon life is the
morally virtuous life. Moral virtue is good, and moral vice is bad, and
everything else, such as health, honour and riches, are merely
"neutral".
The Stoics therefore are committed to saying that external goods such
as wealth and physical beauty are not really good at all. Moral virtue
is both necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia. In this, they are akin
to Cynic philosophers such as Antisthenes and Diogenes
in denying the importance to eudaimonia of external goods and
circumstances, such as were recognized by Aristotle, who thought that
severe misfortune (such as the death of one's family and friends) could
rob even the most virtuous person of eudaimonia. This Stoic doctrine
re-emerges later in the history of ethical philosophy in the writings of
Immanuel Kant,
who argues that the possession of a "good will" is the only
unconditional good. One difference is that whereas the Stoics regard
external goods as neutral, as neither good nor bad, Kant's position
seems to be that external goods are good, but only so far as they are a
condition to achieving happiness.
Modern conceptions
"Modern Moral Philosophy"
Interest in the concept of eudaimonia and ancient ethical theory more generally had a revival in the 20th century. G. E. M. Anscombe in her article "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1958) argued that duty-based conceptions of morality are conceptually incoherent for they are based on the idea of a "law without a lawgiver." She claims a system of morality conceived along the lines of the Ten Commandments depends on someone having made these rules.
Anscombe recommends a return to the eudaimonistic ethical theories of
the ancients, particularly Aristotle, which ground morality in the
interests and well-being of human moral agents, and can do so without
appealing to any such lawgiver.
Anscombe's article Modern Moral Philosophy stimulated the
development of virtue ethics as an alternative to Utilitarianism,
Kantian Ethics, and Social Contract theories. Her primary charge in the
article is that, as secular approaches to moral theory, they are without
foundation. They use concepts such as "morally ought", "morally
obligated", "morally right", and so forth that are legalistic and
require a legislator as the source of moral authority.
In the past God occupied that role, but systems that dispense with God
as part of the theory are lacking the proper foundation for meaningful
employment of those concepts.
Modern psychology
Eudaimonic well-being in 166 nations based on Gallup World Poll data
The Japanese concept of Ikigai
has been described as eudaimonic well-being, as it "entails actions of
devoting oneself to pursuits one enjoys and is associated with feelings
of accomplishment and fulfillment."
Ethical egoism is the normative ethical position that moral agents ought to act in their own self-interest. It differs from psychological egoism, which claims that people can only act in their self-interest. Ethical egoism also differs from rational egoism, which holds that it is rational to act in one's self-interest. Ethical egoism holds, therefore, that actions whose consequences will benefit the doer are ethical.
Ethical egoism contrasts with ethical altruism, which holds that moral agents have an obligation to help others. Egoism and altruism both contrast with ethical utilitarianism, which holds that a moral agent should treat one's self (also known as the subject)
with no higher regard than one has for others (as egoism does, by
elevating self-interests and "the self" to a status not granted to
others). But it also holds that one is not obligated to sacrifice one's
own interests (as altruism does) to help others' interests, so long as
one's own interests (i.e. one's own desires or well-being)
are substantially equivalent to the others' interests and well-being,
but he has the choice to do so. Egoism, utilitarianism, and altruism are
all forms of consequentialism, but egoism and altruism contrast with utilitarianism, in that egoism and altruism are both agent-focused forms of consequentialism (i.e. subject-focused or subjective). However, utilitarianism is held to be agent-neutral (i.e. objective and impartial):
it does not treat the subject's (i.e. the self's, i.e. the moral
"agent's") own interests as being more or less important than the
interests, desires, or well-being of others.
Ethical egoism does not, however, require moral agents to harm
the interests and well-being of others when making moral deliberation;
e.g. what is in an agent's self-interest may be incidentally
detrimental, beneficial, or neutral in its effect on others. Individualism
allows for others' interest and well-being to be disregarded or not, as
long as what is chosen is efficacious in satisfying the self-interest
of the agent. Nor does ethical egoism necessarily entail that, in
pursuing self-interest, one ought always to do what one wants to do;
e.g. in the long term, the fulfillment of short-term desires may prove
detrimental to the self. Fleeting pleasure, then, takes a back seat to protracted eudaimonia. In the words of James Rachels, "Ethical egoism ... endorses selfishness, but it doesn't endorse foolishness."
Ethical egoism is often used as the philosophical basis for support of right-libertarianism and individualist anarchism.
These are political positions based partly on a belief that individuals
should not coercively prevent others from exercising freedom of action.
Forms
Ethical egoism can be broadly divided into three categories: individual, personal, and universal. An individual ethical egoist would hold that all people should do whatever benefits "my" (the individual's)self-interest; a personal ethical egoist would hold that they should act in their self-interest, but would make no claims about what anyone else ought to do; a universal ethical egoist would argue that everyone should act in ways that are in their self-interest.
History
Ethical egoism was introduced by the philosopher Henry Sidgwick in his book The Methods of Ethics, written in 1874. Sidgwick compared egoism to the philosophy of utilitarianism,
writing that whereas utilitarianism sought to maximize overall
pleasure, egoism focused only on maximizing individual pleasure.
Philosophers before Sidgwick have also retroactively been
identified as ethical egoists. One ancient example is the philosophy of Yang Zhu (4th century BC), Yangism, who views wei wo, or "everything for myself", as the only virtue necessary for self-cultivation. Ancient Greek philosophers like Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics were exponents of virtue ethics,
and "did not accept the formal principle that whatever the good is, we
should seek only our own good, or prefer it to the good of others." However, the beliefs of the Cyrenaics have been referred to as a "form of egoistic hedonism", and while some refer to Epicurus' hedonism as a form of virtue ethics, others argue his ethics are more properly described as ethical egoism.
Justifications
Philosopher James Rachels, in an essay that takes as its title the theory's name, outlines the three arguments most commonly touted in its favor:
"The first argument," writes Rachels, "has several variations, each suggesting the same general point:
"Each of us is intimately familiar with our own individual wants
and needs. Moreover, each of us is uniquely placed to pursue those
wants and needs effectively. At the same time, we know the desires and
needs of others only imperfectly, and we are not well situated to pursue
them. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that if we set out to be
'our brother's keeper,' we would often bungle the job and end up doing
more mischief than good."
To give charity to someone is to degrade him, implying as it does
that he is reliant on such munificence and quite unable to look out for
himself. "That," reckons Rachels, "is why the recipients of 'charity'
are so often resentful rather than appreciative."
Altruism, ultimately, denies an individual's value and is therefore
destructive both to society and its individual components, viewing life
merely as a thing to be sacrificed. Philosopher Ayn Rand
is quoted as writing that, "[i]f a man accepts the ethics of altruism,
his first concern is not how to live his life but how to sacrifice it."
Moreover, "[t]he basic principle of altruism is that man has no right
to exist for his own sake, that service to others is the only
justification for his existence, and that self-sacrifice is his highest
moral duty, virtue or value." Rather, she writes, "[t]he purpose of
morality is to teach you, not to suffer and die, but to enjoy yourself
and live."
All of our commonly accepted moral duties, from doing no harm unto
others to speaking always the truth to keeping promises, are rooted in
the one fundamental principle of self-interest.
It has been observed, however, that the very act of eating
(especially, when there are others starving in the world) is such an act
of self-interested discrimination. Ethical egoists such as Rand who
readily acknowledge the (conditional) value of others to an individual,
and who readily endorse empathy for others, have argued the exact
reverse from Rachels, that it is altruism which discriminates: "If the
sensation of eating a cake is a value, then why is it an immoral
indulgence in your stomach, but a moral goal for you to achieve in the
stomach of others?" It is therefore altruism which is an arbitrary position, according to Rand.
Criticism
It
has been argued that extreme ethical egoism is self-defeating. Faced
with a situation of limited resources, egoists would consume as much of
the resource as they could, making the overall situation worse for
everybody. Egoists may respond that if the situation becomes worse for
everybody, that would include the egoist, so it is not, in fact, in
their rational self-interest to take things to such extremes. However, the (unregulated) tragedy of the commons and the (one off) prisoner's dilemma are cases in which, on the one hand, it is rational for an individual to seek to take as much as possible even though
that makes things worse for everybody, and on the other hand, those
cases are not self-refuting since that behaviour remains rational even though
it is ultimately self-defeating, i.e. self-defeating does not imply
self-refuting. Egoists might respond that a tragedy of the commons,
however, assumes some degree of public land. That is, a commons
forbidding homesteading requires regulation. Thus, an argument against
the tragedy of the commons, in this belief system, is fundamentally an
argument for private property rights and the system that recognizes both
property rights and rational self-interest—capitalism.
More generally, egoists might say that an increasing respect for
individual rights uniquely allows for increasing wealth creation and
increasing usable resources despite a fixed amount of raw materials
(e.g. the West pre-1776 versus post-1776, East versus West Germany, Hong
Kong versus mainland China, North versus South Korea, etc.).
It is not clear how to apply a private ownership model to many
examples of "Commons", however. Examples include large fisheries, the
atmosphere and the ocean.
Some perhaps decisive problems with ethical egoism have been pointed out.
One is that an ethical egoist would not want ethical egoism to be
universalized: as it would be in the egoist's best self-interest if
others acted altruistically towards him, he wouldn't want them to act
egoistically; however, that is what he considers to be morally binding.
His moral principles would demand of others not to follow them, which
can be considered self-defeating and leads to the question: "How can
ethical egoism be considered morally binding if its advocates do not
want it to be universally applied?"
Another objection (e.g. by James Rachels) states that the
distinction ethical egoism makes between "yourself" and "the rest" –
demanding to view the interests of "yourself" as more important – is
arbitrary, as no justification for it can be offered; considering that
the merits and desires of "the rest" are comparable to those of
"yourself" while lacking a justifiable distinction, Rachels concludes
that "the rest" should be given the same moral consideration as
"yourself".
Notable proponents
The term ethical egoism has been applied retroactively to philosophers such as Bernard de Mandeville and to many other materialists
of his generation, although none of them declared themselves to be
egoists. Note that materialism does not necessarily imply egoism, as
indicated by Karl Marx, and the many other materialists who espoused forms of collectivism. It has been argued that ethical egoism can lend itself to individualist anarchism such as that of Benjamin Tucker, or the combined anarcho-communism and egoism of Emma Goldman, both of whom were proponents of many egoist ideas put forward by Max Stirner.
In this context, egoism is another way of describing the sense that the
common good should be enjoyed by all. However, most notable anarchists
in history have been less radical, retaining altruism and a sense of the
importance of the individual that is appreciable but does not go as far
as egoism. Recent trends to greater appreciation of egoism within anarchism tend to come from less classical directions such as post-left anarchy or Situationism (e.g. Raoul Vaneigem). Egoism has also been referenced by anarcho-capitalists, such as Murray Rothbard.
Philosopher Max Stirner, in his book The Ego and Its Own,
was the first philosopher to call himself an egoist, though his writing
makes clear that he desired not a new idea of morality (ethical
egoism), but rather a rejection of morality (amoralism), as a nonexistent and limiting "spook"; for this, Stirner has been described as the first individualist anarchist. Other philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes and David Gauthier,
have argued that the conflicts which arise when people each pursue
their own ends can be resolved for the best of each individual only if
they all voluntarily forgo some of their aims—that is, one's
self-interest is often best pursued by allowing others to pursue their
self-interest as well so that liberty is equal among individuals.
Sacrificing one's short-term self-interest to maximize one's long-term
self-interest is one form of "rational self-interest"
which is the idea behind most philosophers' advocacy of ethical egoism.
Egoists have also argued that one's actual interests are not
immediately obvious, and that the pursuit of self-interest involves more
than merely the acquisition of some good, but the maximizing of one's chances of survival and/or happiness.
Philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche suggested that egoistic or "life-affirming" behavior stimulates jealousy or "ressentiment" in others, and that this is the psychological motive for the altruism in Christianity. Sociologist Helmut Schoeck similarly considered envy
the motive of collective efforts by society to reduce the
disproportionate gains of successful individuals through moral or legal
constraints, with altruism being primary among these. In addition, Nietzsche (in Beyond Good and Evil) and Alasdair MacIntyre (in After Virtue) have pointed out that the ancient Greeks did not associate morality with altruism in the way that post-Christian Western civilization has done.
Aristotle's view is that we have duties to ourselves as well as to other people (e.g. friends) and to the polis as a whole. The same is true for Thomas Aquinas, Christian Wolff and Immanuel Kant,
who claim that there are duties to ourselves as Aristotle did, although
it has been argued that, for Aristotle, the duty to one's self is
primary.
Ayn Rand
argued that there is a positive harmony of interests among free,
rational humans, such that no moral agent can rationally coerce another
person consistently with his own long-term self-interest. Rand argued
that other people are an enormous value to an individual's well-being
(through education, trade and affection), but also that this value could
be fully realized only under conditions of political and economic
freedom. According to Rand, voluntary trade alone can assure that human
interaction is mutually beneficial. Rand's student, Leonard Peikoff
has argued that the identification of one's interests itself is
impossible absent the use of principles, and that self-interest cannot
be consistently pursued absent a consistent adherence to certain ethical
principles. Recently, Rand's position has also been defended by such writers as Tara Smith, Tibor Machan, Allan Gotthelf, David Kelley, Douglas Rasmussen, Nathaniel Branden, Harry Binswanger, Andrew Bernstein, and Craig Biddle.
Philosopher David L. Norton
identified himself an "ethical individualist", and, like Rand, saw a
harmony between an individual's fidelity to his own self-actualization,
or "personal destiny", and the achievement of society's well-being.
Walden (/ˈwɔːldən/; first published in 1854 as Walden; or, Life in the Woods) is a book by American transcendentalist writer Henry David Thoreau. The text is a reflection upon simple living in natural surroundings. The work is part personal declaration of independence, social experiment, voyage of spiritual discovery, satire, and—to some degree—a manual for self-reliance.
Walden details Thoreau's experiences over the course of two years, two months, and two days in a cabin he built near Walden Pond amidst woodland owned by his friend and mentor Ralph Waldo Emerson, near Concord, Massachusetts.
Thoreau makes precise scientific observations of nature as well
as metaphorical and poetic uses of natural phenomena. He identifies many
plants and animals by both their popular and scientific names, records
in detail the color and clarity of different bodies of water, precisely
dates and describes the freezing and thawing of the pond, and recounts
his experiments to measure the depth and shape of the bottom of the
supposedly "bottomless" Walden Pond.
Background information
There
has been much guessing as to why Thoreau went to the pond. E. B. White
stated on this note, "Henry went forth to battle when he took to the
woods, and Walden is the report of a man torn by two powerful and
opposing drives—the desire to enjoy the world and the urge to set the
world straight", while Leo Marx noted that Thoreau's stay at Walden Pond was an experiment based on his teacher Emerson's "method and of nature" and that it was a "report of an experiment in transcendental pastoralism".
Likewise others have assumed Thoreau's intentions during his time at Walden Pond
was "to conduct an experiment: Could he survive, possibly even thrive,
by stripping away all superfluous luxuries, living a plain, simple life
in radically reduced conditions?" He thought of it as an experiment in "home economics".
Although Thoreau went to Walden to escape what he considered
"over-civilization", and in search of the "raw" and "savage delight" of
the wilderness, he also spent considerable amounts of his time reading
and writing.
Thoreau used his time at Walden Pond (July 4, 1845 – September 6, 1847) to write his first book, A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers (1849). The experience later inspired Walden,
in which Thoreau compresses the time into a single calendar year and
uses passages of four seasons to symbolize human development.
By immersing himself in nature, Thoreau hoped to gain a more objective understanding of society through personal introspection. Simple living and self-sufficiency were Thoreau's other goals, and the whole project was inspired by transcendentalist philosophy, a central theme of the American Romantic Period.
Plot
I
went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately, to front only
the essential facts of life, and see if I could not learn what it had to
teach, and not, when I came to die, discover that I had not lived. I
did not wish to live what was not life, living is so dear; nor did I
wish to practice resignation, unless it was quite necessary. I wanted to
live deep and suck out all the marrow of life, to live so sturdily and
Spartan-like as to put to rout all that was not life, to cut a broad
swath and shave close, to drive life into a corner, and reduce it to its
lowest terms, and, if it proved to be mean, why then to get the whole
and genuine meanness of it, and publish its meanness to the world; or if
it were sublime, to know it by experience, and be able to give a true
account of it in my next excursion.
Part memoir and part spiritual quest, Walden opens with the
announcement that Thoreau spent two years at Walden Pond living a simple
life without support of any kind. Readers are reminded that at the time
of publication, Thoreau is back to living among the civilized again.
The book is separated into specific chapters, each of which focuses on
specific themes:
Economy: In this first and longest chapter, Thoreau
outlines his project: a two-year, two-month, and two-day stay at a
cozy, "tightly shingled and plastered", English-style 10' × 15' cottage
in the woods near Walden Pond.
He does this, he says, to illustrate the spiritual benefits of a
simplified lifestyle. He easily supplies the four necessities of life
(food, shelter, clothing, and fuel) with the help of family and friends,
particularly his mother, his best friend, and Mr. and Mrs. Ralph Waldo
Emerson. The latter provided Thoreau with a work exchange: he could
build a small house and plant a garden if he cleared some land on the
woodlot and did other chores while there.
Thoreau meticulously records his expenditures and earnings,
demonstrating his understanding of "economy", as he builds his house and
buys and grows food.
Henry David Thoreau
Where I Lived, and What I Lived For: Thoreau recollects thoughts of places he stayed at before selecting Walden Pond, and quotes Roman Philosopher Cato's advice "consider buying a farm very carefully before signing the papers".
His possibilities included a nearby Hollowell farm (where the "wife"
unexpectedly decided she wanted to keep the farm). Thoreau takes to the
woods dreaming of an existence free of obligations and full of leisure.
He announces that he resides far from social relationships that mail
represents (post office) and the majority of the chapter focuses on his
thoughts while constructing and living in his new home at Walden.
Reading: Thoreau discusses the benefits of classical literature, preferably in the original Greek or Latin,
and bemoans the lack of sophistication in Concord evident in the
popularity of unsophisticated literature. He also loved to read books by
world travelers. He yearns for a time when each New England village supports "wise men" to educate and thereby ennoble the population.
Sounds: Thoreau encourages the reader to be "forever on the alert" and "looking always at what is to be seen".
Although truth can be found in literature, it can equally be found in
nature. In addition to self-development, developing one's
perceptiveness can alleviate boredom. Rather than "look abroad for
amusement, to society and the theatre", Thoreau's own life, including
supposedly dull pastimes like housework, becomes a source of amusement
that "never ceases to be novel".
Likewise, he obtains pleasure in the sounds that ring around his
cabin: church bells ringing, carriages rattling and rumbling, cows
lowing, whip-poor-wills singing, owls hooting, frogs croaking, and cockerels crowing. "All sound heard at the greatest possible distance," he contends "produces one and the same effect".
Solitude: Thoreau reflects on the feeling of
solitude. He explains how loneliness can occur even amid companions if
one's heart is not open to them. Thoreau meditates on the pleasures of
escaping society and the petty things that society entails (gossip,
fights, etc.). He also reflects on his new companion, an old settler who
arrives nearby and an old woman with great memory ("memory runs back
farther than mythology").
Thoreau repeatedly reflects on the benefits of nature and of his deep
communion with it and states that the only "medicine he needs is a
draught of morning air".
Visitors: Thoreau talks about how he enjoys
companionship (despite his love for solitude) and always leaves three
chairs ready for visitors. The entire chapter focuses on the coming and
going of visitors, and how he has more comers in Walden than he did in
the city. He receives visits from those living or working nearby and
gives special attention to a French Canadian born woodsman named Alec
Thérien. Unlike Thoreau, Thérien cannot read or write and is described
as leading an "animal life".
He compares Thérien to Walden Pond itself. Thoreau then reflects on the
women and children who seem to enjoy the pond more than men, and how
men are limited because their lives are taken up.
The Bean-Field: Reflection on Thoreau's planting
and his enjoyment of this new job/hobby. He touches upon the joys of his
environment, the sights and sounds of nature, but also on the military
sounds nearby. The rest of the chapter focuses on his earnings and his
cultivation of crops (including how he spends just under fifteen dollars
on this).
The Village: The chapter focuses on Thoreau's
reflections on the journeys he takes several times a week to Concord,
where he gathers the latest gossip and meets with townsmen. On one of
his journeys into Concord, Thoreau is detained and jailed for his
refusal to pay a poll tax to the "state that buys and sells men, women, and children, like cattle at the door of its senate-house".
Walden Pond, discussed extensively in chapter The Ponds
The Ponds: In autumn, Thoreau discusses the countryside
and writes down his observations about the geography of Walden Pond and
its neighbors: Flint's Pond (or Sandy Pond), White Pond, and Goose
Pond. Although Flint's is the largest, Thoreau's favorites are Walden
and White ponds, which he describes as lovelier than diamonds.
Baker Farm: While on an afternoon ramble in the
woods, Thoreau gets caught in a rainstorm and takes shelter in the
dirty, dismal hut of John Field, a penniless but hard-working Irish
farmhand, and his wife and children. Thoreau urges Field to live a
simple but independent and fulfilling life in the woods, thereby freeing
himself of employers and creditors. But the Irishman won't give up his
aspirations of luxury and the quest for the American dream.
Higher Laws: Thoreau discusses whether hunting wild
animals and eating meat is necessary. He concludes that the primitive,
carnal sensuality of humans drives them to kill and eat animals, and
that a person who transcends this propensity is superior to those who
cannot. (Thoreau eats fish and occasionally salt pork and woodchuck.) In addition to vegetarianism, he lauds chastity, work, and teetotalism.
He also recognizes that Native Americans need to hunt and kill moose
for survival in "The Maine Woods", and eats moose on a trip to Maine
while he was living at Walden. Here is a list of the laws that he mentions:
One must love that of the wild just as much as one loves that of the good.
What men already know instinctively is true humanity.
The hunter is the greatest friend of the animal which is hunted.
No human older than an adolescent would wantonly murder any creature which reveres its own life as much as the killer.
If the day and the night make one joyful, one is successful.
The highest form of self-restraint is when one can subsist not on
other animals, but of plants and crops cultivated from the earth.
Brute Neighbors: This chapter is a simplified version of one of Thoreau's conversations with William Ellery Channing,
who sometimes accompanied Thoreau on fishing trips when Channing had
come up from Concord. The conversation is about a hermit (himself) and a
poet (Channing) and how the poet is absorbed in the clouds while the
hermit is occupied with the more practical task of getting fish for
dinner and how in the end, the poet regrets his failure to catch fish.
The chapter also mentions Thoreau's interaction with a mouse that he
lives with, the scene in which an ant battles a smaller ant, and his
frequent encounters with cats.
House-Warming: After picking November berries in
the woods, Thoreau adds a chimney, and finally plasters the walls of his
sturdy house to stave off the cold of the oncoming winter. He also lays
in a good supply of firewood, and expresses affection for wood and
fire.
Former Inhabitants; and Winter Visitors: Thoreau
tells the stories of people who formerly lived in the vicinity of Walden
Pond. Then, he talks about a few of the visitors he receives during the
winter: a farmer, a woodchopper, and his best friend, the poet Ellery Channing.
Winter Animals: Thoreau amuses himself by watching wildlife during the winter. He relates his observations of owls, hares, red squirrels, mice, and various birds as they hunt, sing, and eat the scraps and corn he put out for them. He also describes a fox hunt that passes by.
The Pond in Winter: Thoreau describes Walden Pond
as it appears during the winter. He says he has sounded its depths and
located an underground outlet. Then, he recounts how 100 laborers came
to cut great blocks of ice from the pond to be shipped to the Carolinas.
Spring: As spring arrives, Walden and the other
ponds melt with powerful thundering and rumbling. Thoreau enjoys
watching the thaw, and grows ecstatic as he witnesses the green rebirth
of nature. He watches the geese winging their way north, and a hawk
playing by itself in the sky. As nature is reborn, the narrator implies,
so is he.
Conclusion: In the final chapter, Thoreau
criticizes conformity: "If a man does not keep pace with his companions,
perhaps it is because he hears a different drummer. Let him step to the
music which he hears, however measured or far away", By doing so, men may find happiness and self-fulfillment.
I do not say that John or Jonathan
will realize all this; but such is the character of that morrow which
mere lapse of time can never make to dawn. The light which puts out our
eyes is darkness to us. Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There
is more day to dawn. The sun is but a morning star.
Themes
Memorial with a replica of Thoreau's cabin near Walden
The site of Thoreau's cabin marked by a cairn in 1908
Walden is a difficult book
to read for three reasons: First, it was written in an older prose,
which uses surgically precise language, extended, allegorical metaphors,
long and complex paragraphs and sentences, and vivid, detailed, and
insightful descriptions. Thoreau does not hesitate to use metaphors,
allusions, understatement, hyperbole, personification, irony, satire,
metonymy, synecdoche, and oxymorons, and he can shift from a scientific
to a transcendental point of view in mid-sentence. Second, its logic is
based on a different understanding of life, quite contrary to what most
people would call common sense. Ironically, this logic is based on what
most people say they believe. Thoreau, recognizing this, fills Walden
with sarcasm, paradoxes, and double entendres. He likes to tease,
challenge, and even fool his readers. And third, quite often any words
would be inadequate at expressing many of Thoreau's non-verbal insights
into truth. Thoreau must use non-literal language to express these
notions, and the reader must reach out to understand.
Walden emphasizes the importance of solitude, contemplation,
and closeness to nature in transcending the "desperate" existence that,
he argues, is the lot of most people. The book is not a traditional
autobiography, but combines autobiography with a social critique of
contemporary Western culture's consumerist and materialist attitudes and
its distance from and destruction of nature.
Thoreau's proximity to Concord society and his admiration for classical
literature suggest that the book is not simply a criticism of society,
but also an attempt to engage creatively with the better aspects of
contemporary culture. There are signs of ambiguity, or an attempt to see
an alternative side of something common. Some of the major themes that
are present within the text are:
Self-reliance: Thoreau constantly refuses to be in "need"
of the companionship of others. Though he realizes its significance and
importance, he thinks it unnecessary to always be in search for it.
Self-reliance, to him, is economic and social and is a principle that in
terms of financial and interpersonal relations is more valuable than
anything. To Thoreau, self-reliance can be both spiritual as well as
economic. Self-reliance was a key tenet of Transcendentalism, famously
expressed in Emerson's essay "Self-Reliance".
Simplicity: Simplicity seems to be Thoreau's model for life.
Throughout the book, Thoreau constantly seeks to simplify his lifestyle:
he patches his clothes rather than buy new ones, he minimizes his
consumer activity, and relies on leisure time and on himself for
everything.
Progress: In a world where everyone and everything is eager
to advance in terms of progress, Thoreau finds it stubborn and skeptical
to think that any outward improvement of life can bring inner peace and
contentment.
The need for spiritual awakening: Spiritual awakening is the
way to find and realize the truths of life which are often buried under
the mounds of daily affairs. Thoreau holds the spiritual awakening to be
a quintessential component of life. It is the source from which all of
the other themes flow.
Man as part of nature
Nature and its reflection of human emotions
The state as unjust and corrupt
Meditation: Thoreau was an avid meditator and often spoke about the benefits of meditating.
Patience: Thoreau realizes that the methods he tries to employ at Walden Pond will not be instituted in the near future. He does not like compromise, so he must wait for change to occur. He does not go into isolation in the woods of Massachusetts for over 2 years for his own benefit. Thoreau wants to transform the world around him, but understands that it will take time.
Style and analysis
Walden
has been the subject of many scholarly articles. Book reviewers,
critics, scholars, and many more have published literature on Thoreau's Walden.
Thoreau carefully recounts his time in the woods through his writing in Walden.
Critics have thoroughly analyzed the different writing styles that
Thoreau uses. Critic Nicholas Bagnall writes that Thoreau's observations
of nature are “lyrical” and “exact". Another critic, Henry Golemba, asserts that the writing style of Walden is very natural. Thoreau employs many styles of writing where his words are both intricate and simple at the same time. His word choice conveys a certain mood. For instance, when Thoreau describes the silence of nature, the reader may feel that serene moment as well. Thoreau continues to connect back to nature throughout the book because he wants to depict what he experienced and what he saw.
Many scholars have compared Thoreau to fellow transcendentalist writer Ralph Waldo Emerson. Although Thoreau was 14 years younger than Emerson, lots of his writing was influenced by him.
Critic John Brooks Moore examined the relationship between Thoreau and
Emerson and the effects it had on their respective works. Moore claims that Thoreau did not simply mimic Emerson's work, but he was actually the more dominant one in the relationship.
Of course, Thoreau has learned from Emerson and some "Emersonism” can
be found in his works, but Thoreau definitely put his own stamp on his
work.
Scholars have recognized Walden’s use of Biblical allusions. Such allusions are useful tools to convince readers because the Bible is seen as a principal book of truth.
According to scholar Judith Saunders, the signature Biblical allusion
identified in the book is, “Walden was dead and is alive again.” This is almost verbatim from Luke 15.11-32. Thoreau is personifying Walden Pond to further the story relevant to the Bible. He compares the process of death and rebirth of the pond to self-transformation in humans.
Walden enjoyed some success upon its release, but still took five years to sell 2,000 copies, and then went out of print until Thoreau's death in 1862.
Despite its slow beginnings, later critics have praised it as an
American classic that explores natural simplicity, harmony, and beauty.
The American poet Robert Frost wrote of Thoreau, "In one book ... he surpasses everything we have had in America".
It is often assumed that critics initially ignored Walden,
and that those who reviewed the book were evenly split or slightly more
negative than positive in their assessment of it. But, researchers have
shown that Walden actually was "more favorably and widely received by Thoreau's contemporaries than hitherto suspected". Of the 66 initial reviews that have been found so far, 46 "were strongly favorable".
Some reviews were rather superficial, merely recommending the book or
predicting its success with the public; others were more lengthy,
detailed, and nuanced with both positive and negative comments. Positive
comments included praise for Thoreau's independence, practicality,
wisdom, "manly simplicity",
and fearlessness. Less than three weeks after the book's publication,
Thoreau's mentor Ralph Waldo Emerson proclaimed, "All American kind are
delighted with Walden as far as they have dared to say."
On the other hand, the terms "quaint" or "eccentric" appeared in over half of the book's initial reviews. Other terms critical of Thoreau included selfish, strange, impractical, privileged (or "manor born"), and misanthropic. One review compared and contrasted Thoreau's form of living to communism, probably not in the sense of Marxism, but instead of communal living or religious communism.
While valuing freedom from possessions, Thoreau was not communal in the
sense of practicing sharing or of embracing community. So, communism
"is better than our hermit's method of getting rid of encumbrance".
In contrast to Thoreau's "manly simplicity", nearly twenty years after Thoreau's death Scottish author Robert Louis Stevenson
judged Thoreau's endorsement of living alone in natural simplicity,
apart from modern society, to be a mark of effeminacy, calling it
"womanish solicitude; for there is something unmanly, something almost
dastardly" about the lifestyle. Poet John Greenleaf Whittier criticized what he perceived as the message in Walden that man should lower himself to the level of a woodchuck and walk on four legs. He said: "Thoreau's Walden is a capital reading, but very wicked and heathenish ... After all, for me, I prefer walking on two legs". Author Edward Abbey criticized Thoreau's ideas and experiences at Walden in detail throughout his response to Walden called "Down the River with Thoreau", written in 1980.
Today, despite these criticisms, Walden stands as one of America's most celebrated works of literature. John Updike wrote of Walden, "A century and a half after its publication, Walden
has become such a totem of the back-to-nature, preservationist,
anti-business, civil-disobedience mindset, and Thoreau so vivid a
protester, so perfect a crank and hermit saint, that the book risks
being as revered and unread as the Bible." The American psychologist B. F. Skinner wrote that he carried a copy of Walden with him in his youth, and eventually wrote Walden Two in 1945, a fictional utopia about 1,000 members who live together in a Thoreau-inspired community.
Kathryn Schulz has accused Thoreau of hypocrisy, misanthropy and being sanctimonious based on his writings in Walden, although this criticism has been perceived as highly selective.